Equal protection of the Laws

1. People vs. Vera (Sec.11; probation officers)

In case of the People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng the information was filed with the Court of First Instance of
Manila, petitioner herein Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation intervening in the case as private prosecutor.

The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng. Mariano Cu
Unjieng filed a motion for reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which were denied. The defendant thereupon
sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States but the latter denied the petition. The SC
also denied the petition subsequently filed by the defendant.

Now, the instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed by the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng
before the trial court, under the provisions of Act No. 4221.

Respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng states in his petition that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no
criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the future. The Court of First Instance of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason
presiding, referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same.

Thereafter, the Court of First Instance of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing. The
Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng. The
private prosecution also filed an opposition, alleging that Act No. 4221 violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the
Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands.

Respondent Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution, concludes that the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng "es inocente
por duda racional" of the crime of which he stands convicted but denying the Cu Unjieng’s petition for probation. Counsel for the
herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng filed an exception to the resolution denying probation and a notice of intention to file a
motion for reconsideration.

The Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion with the trial court for the issuance of an order of execution of the judgment of this
court in said case and forthwith to commit the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng to jail in obedience to said judgment. The
private prosecution filed its opposition to the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae asking that a date be set for a hearing of
the same and that, at all events, said motion should be denied with respect to certain attorneys signing the same who were
members of the legal staff of the several counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng.

Respondent Judge Jose O. Vera issued an order requiring all parties including the movants for intervention as amici curiae to
appear before the court. Evidence as to the circumstances under which motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was signed
and submitted to court.

Petitioners came on extraordinary legal process, they alleged that the Court of First Instance of Manila fostered "the campaign of
the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the execution of the sentence imposed by the Honorable Court, exposing the courts
to criticism and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment of this court
imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng. Herein petitioners allege that the respondent judge has acted without jurisdiction or
in excess of his jurisdiction.

In a supplementary petition, the petitioner Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation further contends that Act No. 4221 of the
Philippine Legislature providing for a system of probation for persons eighteen years of age or over who are convicted of crime, is
unconstitutional because it is violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III, of the Constitution of the Philippines guaranteeing
equal protection of the laws because it confers upon the provincial board of its province the absolute discretion to make said law
operative or otherwise in their respective provinces because it constitutes an unlawful and improper delegation to the provincial
boards of the several provinces of the legislative power lodged by the Jones Law (section 8) in the Philippine Legislature and by
the Constitution (section 1, Art. VI) in the National Assembly.

The respondents maintain that Act No. 4221 is constitutional because, contrary to the allegations of the petitioners, it does not
constitute an undue delegation of legislative power, does not infringe the equal protection clause of the Constitution, and does not
encroach upon the pardoning power of the Executive.

WON Act No.4221 is violative of equal protection clause

Courts of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings derived their jurisdiction solely from Act No. 4221 which prescribes in
detailed manner the procedure for granting probation to accused persons after their conviction has become final and before they
have served their sentence.

The jurisdiction to suspend the execution of sentences pronounced in criminal cases is not inherent in the judicial function but it is
conferred exclusively by Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature.

The court a quo admits that the constitutional question was raised before it, it refused to consider the question solely because it
was not raised by a proper party, however, the state can challenge the validity of its own laws.

On the case at bar, the Probation Act has been repeatedly relied upon the past and all that time has not been attacked as
unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila but, on the contrary, has been impliedly regarded by him as constitutional, is no reason for
considering the People of the Philippines estopped from nor assailing its validity.

Act No. 4221, otherwise known as the Probation Act, vests in the President of the Philippines. Probation was always a part of the
judicial power; the Pardon was always a part of the executive power.

The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their
provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial
boards.
Section 11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal protection of the law. Under section 11 of the Probation Act, not only
may said Act be in force in one or several provinces and not be in force in other provinces, but one province may appropriate for
the salary of the probation officer of a given year — and have probation during that year — and thereafter decline to make further
appropriation, and have no probation is subsequent years. It indicates to show that the Probation Act sanctions a situation which is
intolerable in a government of laws. Hence, it is repugnant to equal-protection clause of our Constitution.

2. Ichong vs. Hernandez (Alien and citizen distinction)

The main provisions of the Act are:

(1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the
capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade;
(2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are
allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or
voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term
in case of juridical persons;
(3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States;
(4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws on nationalization, control
weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry;
(5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or
branches of retail business,
(6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the proper authorities a
verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and
liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and
(7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business for a period
of six months for purposes of liquidation

Petitioner claims that in the exercise of police power is attended by a violation of the constitutional requirements of due process
and equal protection of the laws

WON petitioners have been denied of equal protection of the law

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or
the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall
be treated alike.

The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within
such class and those who do not.

The power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal
protection of the laws clause. The legislative power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the
constitutional limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis.

The alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a genuine contribution to national income and wealth. He
undoubtedly contributes to general distribution, but the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that would help the
country's economy and increase national wealth. The alien's interest in this country being merely transient and temporary. Hence,
the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between
alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated

3. Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho (Alien’s Mayor’s Permit)

Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila signed by the herein petitioner Mayor Antonio J. Villegas which
requires alien to secure mayor’s permit before employment in Manila.

Private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Manila,
praying for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of Ordinance No. 6537 as
well as for a judgment declaring said Ordinance No. 6537 null and void. The respondent contends that it is arbitrary, oppressive,
and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore,
violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.

Respondent Judge rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 null and void and making permanent the writ of preliminary
injunction. Mayor Antonio J. Villegas filed the present petition alleging that respondent judge committed an error of law in ruling that
said Ordinance violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

WON Ordinance 6537 violates the equal protection clause with respect to alien’s employment in Manila

The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.

Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is
tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. Thus, the ordinance
in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.
 4. Dumlao vs. COMELEC (Purpose of Law)
Petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of
Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a member of the Bar Petitioner, Alfredo
Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, resident of San Miguel, Iloilo.

Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the
equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. It states that any retired elective provincial city or municipal
official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 65
years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same
elective local office from which he has retired

WON Section 4 of BP 52 violative of equal protection clause

Persons similarly situated are similarly treated. The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local
governments.

The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. For purposes of public service,
employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are
subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.

What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a
reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law

In the case of a 65-year-old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to
disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.

5. Philippine Association of Service Exporters vs. Drilon (Temporary Suspension of Deployment)

Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. PASEI, for short challenges the constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1,
Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY
SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS

Petitioner PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-
making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.

The Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine State

WON D.O. No.1 is violative of equal protection clause

The Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of such
a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group of persons.

There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect
Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that:

(1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions;

(2) they are germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and
(4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.

The impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic overseas workers, that it does not apply to "all Filipina workers".
The assailed Order clearly accords protection to certain women workers, and not the contrary.

6. Himagan vs. People (Police suspension)

Petitioner Himagan a policeman assigned with the medical company of the Philippine National Police Regional Headquarters at
Camp Catitigan, Davao City, was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar.

The informations for murder and attempted murder were filed with the Regional Trial Court, the trial court issued an Order
suspending petitioner until the termination of the case on the basis of Section 47, R.A. 6975, otherwise known as Department of
Interior and Local Government Act of 1990 which provides:

Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. — Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and
substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or
more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to
continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused

Petitioner posits that as a member of the Philippine National Police, under Sec. 91 of RA 6975 which reads:

Sec. 91. The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the Department.

Petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for his suspension, relying on Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his
suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days
Sec. 42. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. — When the administrative case against the officer
or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days
after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated
in the service; Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the
respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.

Petitioner claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a
violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws.

Respondent judge denied the motion pointing out that under Section 47 of R.A. 6975, the accused shall be suspended from office
until his case is terminated. The motion for reconsideration of the order of denial was, likewise, denied. Hence, the petition
for certiorari and mandamus to set aside the orders of respondent Judge and to command him to lift petitioner's preventive
suspension.

WON the petitioner had been denied of his equal protection of law

The case of petitioner falls under the Revised Penal Code falls squarely under Sec. 47 of RA 6975 which specifically applies to
members of the PNP. In dispute however, is whether the provision limits the period of suspension to 90 days, considering that
while the first sentence of Sec. 47 provides that the accused who is charged with grave felonies where the penalty imposed is six
(6) years and one (1) day shall be suspended from office "until the case is terminated", the second sentence of the same section
mandates that the case, which shall be subject to continuous trial, shall be terminated within 90 days from the arraignment of the
accused.

The language of the first sentence of Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than
that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day
or more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second
sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify
or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second
deals with the time frame within which the trial should be finished.

Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous reading of the section clearly shows that it refers to the lifting of preventive
suspension in pending administrative investigation, not in criminal cases

The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 of R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended
policeman's constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. When a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious
offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to
constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed.

The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression
based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand
absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications, such as the
one which exists in the instant case. If the classification is based on real and substantial differences; is germane to the purpose of
the law; applies to all members of the same class.

7. Quinto vs. COMELEC (Deemed resigned by filing COC)

A number of high-ranking Cabinet members had already filed their Certificates of Candidacy without relinquishing their posts.

Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition and seeks to declare as
unconstitutional the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, mainly on the ground that they violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. The Court ruled in their favor, that the assailed provision violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because of the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices and those holding elective positions.

COMELEC filed motion for reconsideration, and the movants-intervenors’ motions for reconsideration-in-intervention. In support of
their respective motions for reconsideration, respondent COMELEC and movants-intervenors submit that the assailed provisions
do not violate the equal protection clause when they accord differential treatment to elective and appointive officials, because such
differential treatment rests on material and substantial distinctions and is germane to the purposes of the law.

WON the assailed provisions are violative of equal protection clause

In Fariñas, the constitutionality of Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to Sections 66 and 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code, was assailed on the ground, among others, that it unduly discriminates against appointive officials. As Section 14 repealed
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, elected officials are no longer considered ipso facto resigned from their respective
offices upon their filing of certificates of candidacy. In contrast, since Section 66 was not repealed, the limitation on appointive
officials continues to be operative – they are deemed resigned when they file their certificates of candidacy.

The classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-à-vis appointive officials, is anchored upon
material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal
protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
 8. Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission (Previous Administration only)
A month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the
PTC from performing its functions.

The first case is a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and
taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 and the second case is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by
petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as
incumbent members of the House of Representatives.

Petitioners contend E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials
and personnel of the previous administration. Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the commission must also cover reports
of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of former President Arroyo.

The respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General argued that The Truth Commission does not violate the equal
protection clause because it was validly created for laudable purposes and the search for truth behind the reported cases of graft
and corruption must encompass acts committed not only during the administration of former President Arroyo but also during prior
administrations where the "same magnitude of controversies and anomalies.

WON E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for
a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be
challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or
prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.

The equal protection clause permits classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites:

(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

(2) It is germane to the purpose of the law;

(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice
because they agree with one another in certain particulars.

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state.
It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are
different. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. Executive Order No. 1 suffers from
arbitrary classification. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration" only. The intent to single out the previous administration
is plain, patent, and manifest.

9. Almonte vs. Vazquez (Investigation without Complaint)

The Ombudsman issued subpoena duces tecum in connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds
representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed against petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly
Commissioner of the EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez is Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division.

Petitioner Almonte denied in his comment. He averred that the only funds released to his agency by the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) were those corresponding to 947 plantilla positions which were filled. Similarly, petitioner Perez, budget chief
of the EIIB, denied in his comment that savings had been realized from the implementation of E.O. No. 127, since the DBM
provided allocations for only the remaining 947 personnel.

The Graft Investigation Officer of the Ombudsman's office, Jose F. Saño asked for authority to conduct a preliminary investigation.
Anticipating the grant of his request, he issued a subpoena to petitioners Almonte and Perez, requiring them to submit their
counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses, as well as a subpoena duces tecum to the Chief of the EIIB's Accounting
Division ordering him to bring "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and all evidence, such as
vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988.

Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved to quash the subpoena and the subpoena duces tecum raising that all documents relating to
personal services of funds for the year 1988 and all evidence such as vouchers for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988 are classified
therefore beyond the reach of respondent’s subpoena duces tecum. Respondent Ombudsman granted the motion to quash the
subpoena since there were no affidavits filed against petitioners but denied their motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum
Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved for a reconsideration, arguing that the Ombudsman was compelling them to produce
evidence against themselves. Petitioners' motion was denied by respondent Ombudsman. Petitioners question the Order.
Petitioners complain that "in all forum and tribunals ... the aggrieved parties ... can only hale respondents via their verified
complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed," while in proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman
anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation.

WON petitioners’ equal protection of the law were violated when the Ombudsman start an investigation without verified complaints
or sworn statements

In the first place, there can be no objection to this procedure because it is provided in the Constitution itself. In the second place, it
is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints "in any form and in a manner," the framers of the Constitution considered the
well-known reticence of the people which keep them from complaining against official wrongdoings. As this Court had occasion to
point out, the Office of the Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government
because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash, delay, or
dismiss investigations held against them. Therefore, there is no violation of petitioner's right to the equal protection of the laws.

10. Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc. vs. Treasurer of Ormoc City (Exclusive Taxation)
The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal
sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale
to the United States of America and other foreign countries.

Payments for said tax a total of P12,087.50 were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Ormoc Sugar Company,
Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, with service of a copy upon the Solicitor General, a complaint against the City
of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that Ordinance No. 4 is unconstitutional for being violative
of the equal protection clause.

Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant city's power to enact under the Local Autonomy
Act and that the same did not violate the equal protection clause.

The Court of First Instance rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance. plaintiff Ormoc Sugar Company,
Inc. Appellant alleges the same on its appeal in the ordinance.

WON the equal protection clause were infringed in the imposition of tax of Ordinance 4

The equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the
subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where

(1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;

(2) these are germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to
those of the present;
(4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.

The ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.
and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., was the only sugar central in the city
of Ormoc.

Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not
be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage
of the tax. However, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly
points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.