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A review of uncertainty
visualization errors: Working
memory as an explanatory theory
Lace Padillaa,∗, Spencer C. Castrob, and Helia Hosseinpoura
a
Cognitive and Information Sciences Department, University of California Merced, Merced, CA, United States
b
Management of Complex Systems Department, University of California Merced, Merced, CA, United States
∗
Corresponding author: e-mail address: lace.padilla@ucmerced.edu
Contents
1. Introduction 2
2. Visualization decision-making framework 7
2.1 Visual array and attention 7
2.2 Working memory 8
2.3 Visual description 10
2.4 Graph schemas 11
2.5 Matching process 11
2.6 Instantiated graph schema 12
2.7 Message assembly 12
2.8 Conceptual question 12
2.9 Decision-making 13
2.10 Behavior 14
3. Uncertainty visualization errors 14
3.1 Early-stage processing errors 14
3.2 Middle-stage processing errors 22
3.3 Late-stage errors 31
4. Conclusions 34
References 36
Abstract
Uncertainty communicators often use visualizations to express the unknowns in data,
statistical analyses, and forecasts. Well-designed visualizations can clearly and effectively
convey uncertainty, which is vital for ensuring transparency, accuracy, and scientific
credibility. However, poorly designed uncertainty visualizations can lead to misunder-
standings of the underlying data and result in poor decision-making. In this chapter,
we present a discussion of errors in uncertainty visualization research and current
approaches to evaluation. Researchers consistently find that uncertainty visualizations
requiring mental operations, rather than judgments guided by the visual system, lead
to more errors. To summarize this work, we propose that increased working memory
Psychology of Learning and Motivation Copyright # 2021 Elsevier Inc. 1

ISSN 0079-7421 All rights reserved.
https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.plm.2021.03.001
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2 Lace Padilla et al.
demand may account for many observed uncertainty visualization errors. In particular,
the most common uncertainty visualization in scientific communication (e.g., variants of
confidence intervals) produces systematic errors that may be attributable to the appli-
cation of working memory or lack thereof. To create a more effective uncertainty
visualization, we recommend that data communicators seek a sweet spot in the work-
ing memory required by various tasks and visualization users. Further, we also recom-
mend that more work be done to evaluate the working memory demand of uncertainty
visualizations and visualizations more broadly.
1. Introduction
From simple analyses, such as those used in introductory statistics text-
books, to the complex forecasts of pandemic projection models, uncertainty
presents a difficult challenge for those seeking to represent and interpret it.
Uncertainties that can arise throughout a modeling and analysis pipeline
(Pang, Wittenbrink, & Lodha, 1997) are of interest to many fields. To con-
strain the complex category of uncertainty to its component parts, scholars
commonly distinguish between several types of uncertainty: ontological
(uncertainty created by the accuracy of the subjectively described reality
depicted in the model), epistemic (limited knowledge producing uncertainty),
and aleatoric (inherent irreducible randomness of a process; Spiegelhalter,
2017). Additionally, quantified forms of aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty
are referred to as risk in decision-making domains (Knight, 2012). In this chap-
ter, we define uncertainty to encompass quantifiable and visualizable uncer-
tainty, such as a probability distribution.
Many people have difficulty reasoning with even simple forms of uncer-
tainty (Gal, 2002). One study found that 16–20% of 463 college-educated
participants could not correctly answer the question, “Which represents the
larger risk: 1%, 5%, or 10%?” (Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001). Other work
finds that even experts with training in statistics commonly misunderstand
how to interpret statistical significance from frequentist 95% confidence inter-
vals (Belia, Fidler, Williams, & Cumming, 2005). These findings—that even
simple forms of uncertainty are challenging for college graduates and statisti-
cians to understand—should concern both the scientific community and soci-
ety. We should be concerned because we all make both small- and large-scale
decisions with uncertainty throughout our lives, such as picking stocks to
invest in or evaluating our pandemic risk.
In the context of textual expressions of uncertainty, researchers propose
that people have difficulty understanding probabilities when expressed as a
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Uncertainty visualization errors 3
percent (e.g., 10% chance of rain), because this framing is not how we expe-
rience probabilities in our daily lives (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). A sub-
stantial body of research demonstrates that if we express uncertainty in
the form of frequency (e.g., it will rain 1 of 10 times), the representation
becomes more intuitive (e.g., Gigerenzer, 1996, 2008; Gigerenzer &
Gaissmaier, 2011; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Gigerenzer, Todd, &
ABC Research Group, 2000; Hoffrage & Gigerenzer, 1998). This line of
inquiry takes the perspective that humans can effectively reason with uncer-
tainty if, and only if, the information is presented in an intuitive way.
In addition to research on textural expressions of uncertainty, a large body of
evidence demonstrates that communicating uncertainty visually can help peo-
ple make more effective judgments about risk (for reviews see, Kinkeldey,
MacEachren, Riveiro, & Schiewe, 2017; Kinkeldey, MacEachren, &
Schiewe, 2014; Maceachren et al., 2005; Padilla, Kay, & Hullman, 2021).
Researchers propose that visualizations leverage the substantial processing
power of the visual system (Zacks & Franconeri, 2020), recruiting roughly half
of the brain (Van Essen, Anderson, & Felleman, 1992). Visualizations allow a
viewer’s visual system to complete some complex processing efficiently, such as
pattern recognition and data comparisons (Szafir, Haroz, Gleicher, &
Franconeri, 2016), which would be more challenging to do mathematically.
The power and efficiency of the visual system creates an advantage for visual-
izations over textual expressions of uncertainty. For example, consider how
long it takes to read about the following two treatments and how challenging
it is to decide which is riskier.
Treatment A: 3 of 10 patients have side effects.
Treatment B: 6 of 45 patients have side effects.
Now consider the same comparison of treatments but visualized using
the icon array in Fig. 1.
Treatment A Treatment B
Fig. 1 Icon arrays showing the proportion of patients with side effects in red after
receiving hypothetical treatments A or B.
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The red icons in Treatment A represent a larger portion of side effects

than the red icons in Treatment B. Icon arrays afford visual comparisons
that are relatively quick and easy for the visual system to compute, using
Gestalt grouping principles, which we will discuss in the Early-Stage
Processing Errors section. The visual comparison process above does not nec-
essarily require any mathematical calculation. A viewer can arrive at the correct
answer, that treatment A is riskier than B, by visually comparing the propor-
tion of side effects for each treatment and determining that A is larger. The
viewer does not need to calculate the exact proportions to accomplish this
task. Researchers have extensively studied icon arrays in the context of health
care communication; they find that icon arrays consistently help people
understand probabilities of risk and can be easier to understand than textual
representations of probabilities (for reviews, see Fagerlin, Zikmund-Fisher,
& Ubel, 2011; Garcia-Retamero & Cokely, 2017; Waters, Fagerlin, &
Zikmund-Fisher, 2016).
Many researchers have demonstrated that visualizations of uncertainty can
lead to better judgments than textual descriptions of the same information
(Fagerlin, Wang, & Ubel, 2005; Feldman-Stewart, Brundage, & Zotov,
2007; Fernandes, Walls, Munson, Hullman, & Kay, 2018; Garcia-Retamero
& Galesic, 2009a, 2009b; Garcia-Retamero, Galesic, & Gigerenzer, 2010;
Garcia-Retamero, Okan, & Cokely, 2012; Hawley et al., 2008; Tait,
Voepel-Lewis, Zikmund-Fisher, & Fagerlin, 2010; Waters et al., 2016;
Waters, Weinstein, Colditz, & Emmons, 2006). For example, one study
presented a mixed group of older adults and students with probabilities
via text (e.g., “aspirin can reduce the risk of having a stroke or heart attack
by 13%”). A second group was shown textual and icon arrays of this infor-
mation (Galesic, Garcia-Retamero, & Gigerenzer, 2009). Participants were
asked to estimate the number of people out of 1000 who had a stroke if
they did and did not take aspirin. Participants who were provided with
the icon arrays in addition to the textual information made significantly
more accurate judgments. Researchers have also documented improve-
ments compared to text for more complex visualizations (e.g., Fernandes
et al., 2018) (for a review of effective uncertainty visualization technique,
see Padilla et al., 2021).
In addition to mounting evidence illustrating the utility of uncertainty
visualizations, a number of studies have also documented reasoning errors
(e.g., Belia et al., 2005; Correll & Gleicher, 2014; Joslyn & LeClerc,
2013; Padilla, Creem-Regehr, & Thompson, 2020; Padilla, Ruginski, &
Creem-Regehr, 2017; Ruginski et al., 2016). Errors due to interpreting
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uncertainty visualizations can exacerbate the difficulty people have in rea-

soning with uncertainty.
An uncertainty visualization can unintentionally mislead its viewers,
which results in poorer decision-making (e.g., Broad, Leiserowitz,
Weinkle, & Steketee, 2007). For example, the Cone of Uncertainty—
produced by the National Hurricane Center—has become one of the most
notorious uncertainty visualizations (see, Fig. 2). The Cone of Uncertainty is
intended to show the forecasted path of a storm with the centerline rep-
resenting the mean prediction and the edge of the cone denoting a 66.6%
confidence interval around the mean. When people are not provided with
additional information about what the cone is intended to represent, they
believe that the cone shows the size of the hurricane growing over time
(Padilla et al., 2017). Instead, the cone is intended to show that the uncer-
tainty in the storm’s path increases with time from the initial forecast. The
concept of uncertainty increasing over time can be intuitive. For example,
Fig. 2 Example hurricane track forecast cone produced by National Hurricane Center
(https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutcone.shtml).
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it is easier to predict the temperature for tomorrow than the temperature for
2 weeks from now. However, when uncertainty in the storm’s path is rep-
resented visually with a cone-like visualization, it requires effort to under-
stand it as anything other than the size of the storm.
Within traditional uncertainty visualization research, practitioners
commonly recommend a set of best practices or general principles without
positing cognitive theories as to why a visualization might produce errors.
However, uncertainty visualization researchers are increasingly interested
in cognitive perspectives (Fernandes et al., 2018; Hullman, Kay, Kim, &
Shrestha, 2017; Kale, Kay, & Hullman, 2020; Kale, Nguyen, Kay, &
Hullman, 2018; Kim, Walls, Krafft, & Hullman, 2019). Notably, Kim
et al. (2019) propose a Bayesian cognitive modeling approach to incorporate
prior beliefs and update evaluations of uncertainty visualizations. Also, Joslyn
and Savelli (2020) detail the cognitive mechanisms associated with a specific
type of reasoning error in uncertainty visualization. Although prior approaches
have detailed the cognitive aspects of reasoning with uncertainty visualizations,
they do not offer a unified theory that describes the sources of errors across
visualization types. As a result, accurately predicting when a new type of
uncertainty visualization will fall into the category of helpful or harmful is
difficult.
The current chapter seeks to bridge this gap in knowledge by providing
a unifying theory for why errors occur when making decisions with uncer-
tainty visualizations. We begin this work by describing a cognitive framework
for how decisions are made with visualizations (Padilla, Creem-Regehr,
Hegarty, & Stefanucci, 2018), which we subsequently use as a tool to ground
empirical work on errors in uncertainty visualization. Then, we review
behavioral evidence of using uncertainty visualizations with a focus on when
errors or misunderstandings occur, in order to find commonalities among
these errors.
As a preview, researchers consistently observe errors when a visualization
or task requires a viewer to perform a complex mental computation to accu-
rately interpret the visual information. We propose that a unifying cognitive
process that predicts these errors is increased working memory or cognitive
effort. This chapter reviews research on working memory demand in the
context of visualizations and how working memory as a mental process
can potentially explain many of the errors observed in uncertainty-
visualization use.
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2. Visualization decision-making framework

Reasoning errors with uncertainty visualizations have the potential to
arise at various stages in the decision-making process. If we have a clear
understanding of where an error occurs in this process, we can more clearly
develop interventions to help make more effective decisions with uncer-
tainty visualizations.
For this chapter, we will utilize a cognitive model that describes decision-
making with visualizations proposed by Padilla et al. (2018) (see Fig. 3). The
Padilla et al. (2018) model integrates a dual-process theory of decision-making
and a modern understanding of visualization comprehension and learning.
2.1 Visual array and attention

The Padilla et al. (2018) model begins with a visual array, which is the
unprocessed neuronal firing in response to a stimulus. Bottom-up and
top-down attention guide a viewer’s gaze around the image. Bottom-up atten-
tion refers to how the visual system is guided to elements in the visualization
based on visual salience. Errors that occur from bottom-up attention result
from the visualization directing a viewer’s attention to task-irrelevant infor-
mation. Top-down attention is how the viewer controls his or her gaze
around a visualization. Top-down attention is based on the viewer’s goals,
experiences, and other individual differences. For example, Kim et al. (2019)
capture the influence of top-down attention on decision-making with
Working
Memory
Conceptual
Question
inference
top-down
attention Visual Instantiated
Visual Array Description Graph Schema
Conceptual
bottom-up Message decision Behavior
attention MATCH message
assembly making
processes
influences
Fig. 3 Visualization decision-making model proposed by Padilla et al. (2018).

Reproduced per CC-BY license from Padilla, L., Creem-Regehr, S., Hegarty, M., &
Stefanucci, J. (2018). Decision making with visualizations: A cognitive framework across dis-
ciplines. Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications, 3, 29.
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Bayesian priors representing previous beliefs and experiences. Errors that

arise due to top-down attention may come from users having an incomplete
understanding of how to achieve their goals, having experiences that tell
them to search through an image ineffectively, or other potential biases
based on long-term knowledge.
2.2 Working memory

Working memory (located in the circle at the top of Fig. 3) is a cognitive pro-
cess that can influence most visualization decision-making processes (Padilla
et al., 2018). The debate about how to define the term working memory is
ongoing, as it has differing characteristics in various fields (Cowan, 2017).
For this review, we will use the definition of working memory defined
by Cowan (2017), where working memory is a multi-component system.
Working memory maintains a finite amount of information for a short time
before that information is potentially stored in long-term memory. In the
context of uncertainty visualization, the term maintain means that when
viewers see a visualization, they store a mental representation of it in their
mind to update or manipulate later. For example, viewers might see a scatter
plot and want to find the data’s central tendency. In their mind, they would
mentally overlay a trend line onto their temporarily stored mental represen-
tation of the visualization. Within the traditional model of working mem-
ory, the visual-spatial sketch pad represents the mechanism that maintains
information from a visualization; a separate mechanism maintains phonolog-
ical information (Baddeley, 1992).
Working memory has a central executive that controls its multicomponent
functions, and it works to control attention while suppressing automatic
processes (Logie & Marchetti, 1991). For example, the process of explicitly
directing top-down attention requires working memory (Shipstead,
Harrison, & Engle, 2015), as in directing one’s attention away from salient
information in a visualization. An error occurs when bottom-up attention
guides the visual system to visually salient but task-irrelevant elements in
the visualization. The central executive exerts its control over the finite
amount of working memory available to simultaneously suppress
bottom-up attention shifting to task-irrelevant information and guide atten-
tion toward task-relevant stimuli.
Three types of errors may occur due to working memory relevant to
uncertainty visualizations: capacity limitation errors, failure to utilize work-
ing memory, and temporal decay errors. Researchers have traditionally
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studied capacity limitation errors in the context of how many digits or items in
sequence participants can remember (Miller, 1956). More recent work sug-
gests that we tend to group information (e.g., chunk) rather than maintain the
information separately and that we can remember between three to five
chunks of information (Doumont, 2002). Errors may occur when viewing
uncertainty visualizations if a visualization requires the viewer to maintain
too much information in working memory, essentially surpassing the limited
working memory capacity. As a simple example, imagine a visualization that
maps elements of the data to color, opacity, texture, size, shape, and position.
To interpret the visualization correctly, one must maintain in working mem-
ory how each variable relates to the data. Working memory capacity may be
overloaded if people are asked to do a complex data analysis with such a
working-memory demanding visualization. Capacity limitation errors include
failing to integrate all of the relevant information in a visualization; not being
able to perform a mental computation on a visualization; or failing to main-
tain, switch, or update task goals.
The second category of errors related to working memory encompasses
viewers failing to use working memory when they should. By default, we
tend to make fast and automated decisions that use as little working memory
as possible (Type 1 processing) (Kahneman, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman,
1974). Type 1 processing is an adaptive strategy that we have developed
to minimize effort because effort is metabolically costly. Researchers esti-
mate that our brains account for 20–25% of our resting metabolism
(Leonard & Robertson, 1994). Voluntary effort may not exclusively account
for the mind’s propensity toward Type 1 processing, but a combination of
energy conservation and reserving limited capacity working memory vali-
dates the preference for fast and automated decisions (Kool & Botvinick,
2014). However, some visualizations require the use of working memory
to be understood correctly (Type 2 processing). For example, when viewing
the line chart in Fig. 4 that illustrates the impact of the Stand Your Ground
law on gun deaths in Florida, a viewer might not notice that the Y-axis is
inverted. Without using working memory, the viewer would assume that
the Stand Your Ground law correlated with a drop in gun deaths in
Florida. To interpret this visualization correctly, a viewer needs to activate
working memory to recognize that the Y-axis is inverted and reimagine the
data’s appropriate relationships.
The third type of error related to working memory results from forgetting
relevant information because working memory decays over time. For exam-
ple, if asked to memorize the sequence 9,875,341,890, recalling the numbers
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Fig. 4 Deceptive visualization showing the impact of the 2005 Stand Your Ground law
in Florida and the number of murders from firearms with the Y-axis reversed. This exam-
ple is based on a data visualization that was released to the public by Christine Chan at
Reuters (Pandey, Rall, Satterthwaite, Nov, & Bertini, 2015). Redrawn per CC-BY license from
Padilla, L., Creem-Regehr, S., Hegarty, M., & Stefanucci, J. (2018). Decision making with
visualizations: A cognitive framework across disciplines. Cognitive Research: Principles
and Implications, 3, 29.
after holding them in working memory for 5 s is easier than after 5 min. To
memorize such information and hold it in working memory for prolonged
periods, people generally chunk information, such as (987) 534–1890, and
then mentally rehearse the information. Without rehearsal, our ability to store
information begins to decay after approximately 5–10 s (Cowan, 2017). The
nature of the decay can vary due to the task, type of information, and indi-
vidual capacities (Cowan, Saults, & Nugent, 1997). Longer sequential visual-
ization tasks that require completion of longer-term goals may be error-prone
due to the degradation of working memory over time.
2.3 Visual description

The visual description (second box in Fig. 3) is the resultant mental conception of
the visualization’s information after top-down and bottom-up processing have
guided the extraction of information. Note that the visual description is not
identical to the visualization; its generation is dependent on what the viewer
focuses on and can be incomplete, biased, or skewed in its representation.
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A visual description allows for enough understanding to mentally transform,

interpret, and make decisions with the representation. These processes require
the cognitive ability termed mental imagery, and again depend on working
memory (for a review, see Kosslyn, 1995).
2.4 Graph schemas

Graph schemas (third box in Fig. 3) are templates, rules, graphic conventions,
or strategies that people use to interpret a visualization. People might
develop graph schemas during formal education if they were taught how
to read different visualizations. For example, teachers commonly instruct
students on how to read maps by explaining the purpose and use of a legend,
scale, and compass rose. As another example, most educational institutions
introduce the number line to students at a young age, cementing a more is to the
right mapping (Winter & Matlock, 2013). These formal educational experi-
ences likely establish many graph schemas. People may also develop a graph
schema implicitly through practice viewing visualizations that utilize the same
conventions. Errors may occur with graph schemas if a viewer has not devel-
oped the necessary schema to interpret a visualization. A viewer may lack
graphic education or familiarity with a visualization, resulting in individual
differences in graph literacy (Okan, Garcia-Retamero, Galesic, & Cokely,
2012). Alternatively, the visualization might be wholly novel and require
the development of a new schema.
2.5 Matching process

The matching process between the visual description and the graph schema
occurs when a viewer selects a graph schema to expedite the process of inter-
preting a visualization. The mechanism of how viewers select a particular
schema remains unclear. Viewers may select a schema from the same broad
category as a visualization. For example, a viewer may select a schema for a
Cartesian coordinate plane when viewing a line graph. Viewers may also
select schemas based on matching salient features of the visualization and
the schema. When viewers see a bar chart, they may select a schema with
similar rectangular objects. Viewers may select the schema that is easiest
to recall, more recently stored, or one that has been primed. Errors may
occur when viewers select the wrong schema for a visualization. For exam-
ple, recent work shows that researchers could prime the type of schema par-
ticipants used by telling them an interesting story about the data (Xiong, Van
Weelden, & Franconeri, 2019). Different groups of people received
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different stories, and each story pointed out different features within the
same visualization. When asked what other people might see as essential
features in the data, participants were more likely to report that other people
would see the information they were primed to think of as relevant (Xiong
et al., 2019).
2.6 Instantiated graph schema

Instantiating the graph schema occurs when viewers update their mental rep-
resentation of the visualization to include information from the graph
schema. Errors can occur in this process if viewers select the wrong schema;
they can also occur if the viewers have to perform a complex mental transfor-
mation to update their mental representation with the information from the
schema. With a large mismatch between the schema and the viewer’s mental
representation of the visualization, a mental transformation may be required to
combine the two (Vessey, 1991). For example, if the Y-axis is inversely
ordered (low numbers at the top), the viewer may need to mentally transform
the visualization to correctly order the Y-axis (according to their schema)
before incorporating the visual description and schema. Increased errors
and time to instantiate the graph schema will occur in cases in which a large
mismatch and exorbitant mental transformations are required. Theses out-
comes result from overloading the limited resources of working memory
available as time decays the information and exceeds the capacity to hold
chunks of information in memory (Doumont, 2002).
2.7 Message assembly

The message assembly process describes how viewers interpret their mental rep-
resentation of the visualization after it has been updated by the graph schema.
The resultant conceptualization of the meaning of the graphic is the concep-
tual message (fourth box in Fig. 3). Errors that may occur at this stage of the
process result from taking the wrong meaning from the visualization’s men-
tal representation.
2.8 Conceptual question

The conceptual question (box below working memory in Fig. 3) refers to the
question that the viewer asks of the visualization. A viewer may have specific
goals, such as attempting a data analytics task, which could produce various
direct conceptual questions, as in “Where are the outliers?” or “Which vari-
ables have meaningful relationships?.” Conceptual questions can also be
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more general (e.g., What can this visualization tell me about my health?)
or ill-defined (e.g., What am I looking at?). Many times, viewers may have
a sequence of conceptual questions about the visualization, which may
evolve.
In the Padilla, Creem-Regehr, Hegarty, & Stefanucci, 2018 framework,
conceptual questions play a key role as they channel working memory. This
framework suggests that the central executive (i.e., the resource allocation
mechanism in working memory) applies working memory to answer the
conceptual question during visualization reasoning. As a result, the concep-
tual question can:
1. Drive a viewer’s top-down attention to relevant information
2. Guide which graph schemas are selected
3. Frame the conceptual message
4. Influence decisions
The viewer’s specific question can influence all of the processes in this model
except bottom-up attention. These processes can also form feedback loops
or prime a specific graph schema (e.g., Xiong et al., 2019). Based on the con-
ceptual message, a viewer may decide to update the question or goal and
repeat some of the processes. Errors can occur as a result of the conceptual
question if it is unclear to the viewer how to achieve his or her particular
goals. The viewer might ask the wrong question to achieve their goals or
use incorrect steps. Viewers might also have too many goals, which can
be challenging to keep track of and require a significant amount of working
memory to manage.
2.9 Decision-making
Once all the relevant conceptual questions have been answered for the viewer
to feel comfortable making a decision, he or she completes the decision step.
The majority of the widely documented decision-making biases and heuristics
occurs in the decision-making step. This process involves taking the visual
information stored in the mind and using Type 1 or Type 2 processing to reach
a conclusion, usually in order to perform an action (Kahneman, 2011). Type 1
processing is relatively fast, unconscious, and intuitive. Type 2 processing
involves working memory and is slower, more metabolically intensive, and
more contemplative than Type 1 processing (Evans & Stanovich, 2013).
Other models of decision-making characterize these processes differently.
Here we note two processes in line with Evans and Stanovich (2013), one that
requires the activation of working memory to make a decision and another
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process that does not require significant working memory. There exists a mas-
sive body of literature detailing numerous possible decision-making biases that
can occur at this stage. Not all decision-making biases have been generalized
to the context of decisions with visualizations, but many of these biases may
influence reasoning with visualizations. However, more work is needed to
examine if all previously documented decision-making biases generalize to
the context of decision-making with visualizations.
2.10 Behavior
The final stage of the Padilla et al. (2018) model results in action or behavior.
Errors, although not decision-making errors, might occur in this model’s
final stage when people cannot take the action that they have selected.
For example, in hurricane forecasting, people might see a hurricane visual-
ization, decide to evacuate, and then lack the necessary resources to evacuate
or not know the appropriate evacuation route. These phenomena require
exploration in the more applied social sciences and are beyond the scope
of this chapter. However, failures to suppress heavily automated behaviors
(e.g., in the case of addictions) due to reduced cognitive resources or poor
executive control can also be observed during this stage.
3. Uncertainty visualization errors

Errors in understanding uncertainty visualizations can occur through-
out the decision-making process. Here we will use the Padilla et al. (2018)
cognitive model to organize and describe the widely documented errors as
early-, middle-, and late-stage visualization processing errors (as seen in
Fig. 5).
3.1 Early-stage processing errors

Early-stage visual processing errors are driven by the visual system and atten-
tional processes. Occurring early in the decision-making process, these types
of errors can be particularly hard to overcome as they influence all of the
downstream processes. Researchers refer to early-stage errors driven by ele-
ments in the visualization as visual-spatial biases (Padilla et al., 2018).
Researchers also speculate that visual-spatial biases are particularly hard to
overcome because they may be due to bottom-up attention and Gestalt
principles, both of which are difficult to cognitively control.
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Fig. 5 Early-, middle-, and late-stage uncertainty visualization errors that are organized using the Padilla et al. (2018) visualization
decision-making model.
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3.1.1 Boundaries 5 conceptual categories

One visual-spatial bias that occurs often in uncertainty visualization arises when
visualization creators delineate continuous data with isocontours, boundaries,
intervals, bins, or other types of segmenting marks. Throughout our daily lives,
we have learned to interpret the delineations in the world, such as fences, road
lanes, and crosswalks, as indications of important information. Tversky (2011)
writes, “Framing a picture is a way of saying what is inside the picture has a
different status than outside of the picture” (p. 522). In our continuous world,
physical delineations separate and categorize meaningful differences and space
(Tversky, 2001). Delineations can also be metaphorical. We draw a proverbial
line in the sand to indicate a boundary that should not be crossed (Lakoff &
Johnson, 1980). As humans, we are adept at categorizing complex information,
and we commonly do this by physically or mentally constructing boundaries.
The problem for uncertainty visualization emerges when the designer
creates boundaries in probabilistic data, and the boundaries do not indicate
categorically different information (Padilla et al., 2015, 2017). For example,
95% confidence intervals delineate probabilistic information to indicate that
the true mean has a 95% chance of falling within the specified range.
However, there is no categorical difference between the data inside and out-
side of the confidence interval. Said another way, 95% confidence is not
unique, and scientists could have also chosen intervals at 96%, 94%, or
99%. Ninety-five percent confidence exists as a convention concerning
the probability of error scientists consider acceptable to make certain infer-
ences. Some fields have different conventions. The National Hurricane
Center uses a 66.66% confidence interval to communicate the uncertainty
in a hurricane forecast path.
When most viewers see an interval, they utilize the strategies they have
developed throughout their lives and interpret it as a meaningful boundary
that notes categorically different information (Tversky, Corter, Yu,
Mason, & Nickerson, 2012; Zacks & Tversky, 2013). This error could also
be considered a mismatch of the visual description and the instantiated graph
schema. In a geospatial context, researchers have called this a containment
strategy (McKenzie, Hegarty, Barrett, & Goodchild, 2016), where areas
within a boundary are imbued with semantic homogeneity (Fabrikant &
Skupin, 2005). For example, navigation applications show a user’s location,
but sometimes the location can have uncertainty (i.e., if the GPS signal is
interrupted). One study examined different visualizations for representing
the uncertainty in the viewer’s location by comparing a gradient map to a
95% CI (see Fig. 6). When viewing the 95% confidence interval that looked
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Fig. 6 Visualizations that show the uncertainty in two locations, using a gradient or a
bounded circle right, used in McKenzie et al. (2016). Reproduced per CC-BY license, from
visualizations: A cognitive framework across disciplines. Cognitive Research: Principles
and Implications, 3, 29.
like a bounded circle, participants were more likely to take a containment

strategy than when viewing the same positional uncertainty represented
in a gradient (McKenzie et al., 2016).
Work examining hurricane forecasts also finds that people use a contain-
ment strategy. In one study, researchers showed participants five visualiza-
tions of a hurricane’s forecasted path (Fig. 7). The path visualizations were
intended to show the forecasted direction of the storm and the uncertainty in
the forecasted route. As the time increases from the initial forecast, it becomes
increasingly more difficult to accurately predict the path of the storm, which is
shown in the visualizations’ spread increasing for B–E in Fig. 7. Researchers
compared a version of the cone of uncertainty, which shows the main forecast
path of the storm, along with a 66.6% confidence interval (C in Fig. 7), to a
version with just the center line (A), a cone with no center line (B), a gradient
mapping of the confidence interval (D), and a new visualization technique
entitled an ensemble visualization (E). The ensemble visualization shows a subset
of paths sampled from the hurricane’s probabilistic forecast (Liu et al., 2016;
Liu, Padilla, Creem-Regehr, & House, 2019). This research demonstrated
that the visualizations that were cone-like (B–D in Fig. 7) elicited a contain-
ment strategy where participants rated areas inside of the cones to have more
damage than areas outside of the cones. With the ensemble visualization, par-
ticipants reported that areas near the center of the distribution would receive
more damage and damage ratings decreased along with the distance to the
center of the distribution (Ruginski et al., 2016). The response patterns
observed for ensemble visualizations indicate that participants understand
the distribution of uncertainty that the ensembles represent. In the context
of hurricane forecasting, this experiment was the first to find an alternative
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Fig. 7 Redrawn versions of hurricane forecast path of visualizations based on Ruginski et al. (2016).
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to the cone of uncertainty that did not elicit the containment strategy.
Researchers determined that the edge of the hard boundary elicits the highest
visual salience and likely drives the containment strategy (Padilla et al., 2017).
The misunderstandings associated with delineations occur in one-
dimensional data as well. Delineation errors can be understood as boundaries
creating conceptual categories (Padilla et al., 2021). The boundaries creating con-
ceptual categories error likely contributes to the numerous studies finding that
people misunderstand how to interpret error bars and confidence intervals.
Both well-trained experts in statistics and novices commonly misunderstand
how to interpret statistical significance from frequentist 95% confidence
intervals (e.g., Belia et al., 2005; Hofman, Goldstein, & Hullman, 2020).
Researchers find that even trained experts incorrectly assume that no signif-
icant difference exists between two groups with overlapping intervals (Belia
et al., 2005). When comparing two health treatments with visualized means
and frequentist 95% confidence intervals, participants were more willing to
overpay for treatment and to overestimate the effect size compared to when
the same data were shown with predictive intervals (Hofman et al., 2020).
People tend to believe that error bars contain the distribution of values,
resulting in the mismatch between the visual description and instantiated
graph schema. If the two bars are far apart, the boundaries lead people to
believe that these boundaries contain all the relevant values and therefore
they incorrectly assume a statistically significant difference. A similar effect
has also been found with bar charts. Researchers have demonstrated a
“within the bar bias,” where people believe that data points that fall within
a bar are more likely to be part of a distribution than data points equal dis-
tance from the mean but outside of the bar (Newman & Scholl, 2012).
This boundaries- create-conceptual-categories error likely occurs early in the
decision-making process. As demonstrated in Padilla et al. (2017), bound-
aries make up some of the most salient features in a visualization and can
attract our bottom-up attention. As a result, we might spend more time
looking at the boundaries in a visualization, which can produce an over-
weighting of the boundaries in our conceptualization of the data.
One of the reasons boundaries create conceptual categories is that they
may reinforce Gestalt grouping principles, which are the visual system’s pro-
pensity to group and categorize visual information based on similarities in
properties such as shape, color, physical proximity, and other contextual
information (Wertheimer, 1938). As an illustration, try to determine if pat-
terns are depicted in Fig. 8. All the figure items may seem to be a part of one
global grouping because they are all circular and loosely arranged in a circle.
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Fig. 8 Ambiguous Gestalt grouping example.
Fig. 9 Ambiguous Gestalt grouping example with boarder around the ovular items.
With effort, most viewers notice that some objects are larger or smaller and
others circular or ovular. Identifying patterns becomes easier when bound-
aries are added, as in Fig. 9, which bounds the ovular items with a line.
When the boundaries are included, visually grouping the ovular objects
and noticing they have an upward trend is much easier. The boundary works
to precategorize some of the information for the visual system. Said another
way, the boundaries offload cognition on the visualization by categorizing
the objects before the visual system does. The categorization created by the
boundaries occurs early in the decision-making process and reduces a visual
system processing step. However, a problem arises when a viewer needs to
group different information than what the boundary contains. When viewing
Fig. 9, try to mentally group the smaller objects. Most people can successfully
group the smaller objects and see their trend, but this process requires
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significant effort. Mentally grouping the small objects requires suppressing or

ignoring the grouping formed by the boundary, requiring additional working
memory.
The prominence of the boundaries on the patterns we can see in the data
illustrates a visual-spatial bias, where the boundary can lead viewers to see
different patterns within the same visualization or data. When visualization
designers use boundaries, they define the types of patterns that viewers can
see in their data. Their viewers will have difficulty seeing any other patterns
within the data. The immutable effect of the boundary can be problematic
when the boundaries are arbitrary (i.e., 95% CIs or 66% CIs in the Cone of
Uncertainty), making viewers believe that categorical differences exist in
the data when there are none, which hinders viewers from finding other
important patterns.
Although the point at which the boundary enters the decision-making
process occurs very early (e.g., the visual array), the impact of boundaries
might be observed at multiple points throughout the decision-making pro-
cess. Boundaries may be highly salient and direct viewers’ bottom-up atten-
tion to information inside the boundaries. Viewers might form a strategy to
assume that visualization designers are trying to communicate something
meaningful with the boundaries and direct their top-down attention to the
boundaries’ information. Boundaries may evoke incorrect schemas and lead
to misunderstandings about what the data represent. Boundaries could even
evoke some traditional decision-making biases such as anchoring, where peo-
ple are biased to make judgments in relationship to the boundaries.
Such early-stage processing errors are some of the most consistent and
widely documented, but little is known about why these errors occur.
One theory that we propose here is that working memory is a crucial con-
tributor to early-stage processing errors in uncertainty visualization.
Early-stage processing errors represent a unique category because working
memory cannot easily influence all these processes. In particular, bottom-up
attention is difficult to control with effort. As noted throughout this section,
many of the errors we reviewed might be fully explained by bottom-up
attentional processes. For example, some work finds that boundaries in hur-
ricane forecasts are highly salient and draw the viewers’ attention (Padilla
et al., 2017). All types of boundaries may draw viewers’ attention, and there-
fore, they have an overstated impact on viewers’ decision-making process
compared to more task-relevant information in the visualization. Further,
even when viewers consciously know not to focus on information, as with
the Cone of Uncertainty boundary, they likely have difficulty suppressing
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saccadic movements toward such salient information. Thus, the boundary

may increase the working memory required due to active inhibition.
The most notable characteristic of early-stage processing errors is that
they are challenging to overcome. For example, in one study, participants
were provided with extensive instructions on interpreting the Cone of
Uncertainty (Boone, Gunalp, & Hegarty, 2018). Researchers instructed
participants that the cone does not show the storm’s size growing over time,
but participants still made decisions as if the storm’s size was increasing.
Notably, at the end of the experiment, participants could accurately answer
questions about interpreting the cone correctly (Boone et al., 2018). This
work provides some evidence that even when viewers are aware that they
should cognitively override the visual array’s impacts, they find it challeng-
ing to do so.
Participants’ inability to utilize working memory to make more effective
decisions in the previous examples may be because working memory has
difficulty impacting early processing errors. Working memory’s problem
in affecting early processing errors could be due to earlier errors biasing
all the downstream processes. It could also be the case that early processing
errors are primarily due to bottom-up attention and working memory may
have little ability to impact bottom-up attention. However, no work has
examined the exact nature of early-stage processing errors in visualization
reasoning. More work is needed to understand the cause, prevalence, and
unwavering nature of such errors.
3.2 Middle-stage processing errors

In the Padilla et al. (2018) framework, middle-stage processing errors occur
after the visual system has created a mental representation of the visualization.
At this stage, viewers apply a schema that they have stored in long-term mem-
ory to their mental representation of the visualization. For example, when
viewing Fig. 10 (left), most people would categorize the picture as a map.
Consciously or unconsciously, they would retrieve the schema for maps
and make assumptions about the information, including that North is at
the top and that a consistent relationship likely exists between the physical size
of the areas shown. They would have made assumptions based on map
schemas even though we excluded the map’s compass rose and legend. As
in this example, many of the assumptions we make about visualizations based
on schemas create an advantage over their absence. Schemas help us interpret
information correctly, efficiently, and quickly when a visualization adheres to
known graphic conventions.
King’s Cross King’s Cross
St Pancras St Pancras
Edgware Euston
Paddington Road Baker St.
Euston
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Baker St. Old Street
Warren
Warren Marylebone St. Farringdon
Moorgate
St. Liverpool
Street
Liverpool St.
Edgware Tottenham Holborn
Road Oxford Court Road
Circus Moorgate
Bank Notting Bond Oxford
Aldgate
Paddington Hill Gate Street Circus Holborn
Leicester
Bond St. Square Tower Hill
Notting Bank
Hill Gate Embankment London
Piccadilly Bridge Aldgate
Green Park Circus Charing Green Park Cannon
Waterloo
Cross Leicester Street
Square
Piccadilly
Circus Monument Tower Hill
High St. Charing
Kensington Cross
Westminster
Gloucester Elephant
Gloucester Blackfriars
Road & Castle
Road
Earl’s
Court
South Victoria Westminster Embankment London Bridge
Kensington Earl’s South Victoria
Court Kensington
Waterloo
Geographically Accurate London Tube Map Diagrammatic London Tube Map

Fig. 10 Left geographically accurate transit map and right diagrammatic map of the London Tube. Redrawn from Guo, Z. (2011). Mind the map!
The impact of transit maps on path choice in public transit. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 45(7), 625–639.
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The Padilla et al. (2018) schema instantiation process has three steps, as
illustrated in Fig. 11. A viewer must first correctly classify the visualization
type. With standard visualizations (e.g., line or bar charts), accurate classifi-
cation occurs relatively easily. However, errors can arise when ambiguity
exists in classifying the category or type for a visualization.
A famous example of classification involves the London Underground map
by Harry Beck (see an example based on Beck’s innovation in Fig. 10, right).
Beck helped define a new cartographic convention that departed from the his-
torical approach of superimposing subway lines on a geographically accurate
map (Guo, 2011). In Beck’s redesign, he opted to arrange the layout in a dia-
grammatic fashion that focused on improving the legibility of routes, transfers,
and stops, inspired by electrical circuits. Initially, transit officials scoffed at the
design, but it was ultimately adopted in 1933. Some of the apprehension about
Beck’s map began because officials thought that riders might see it as a standard
map, fail to realize that the distances between stops were not based on physical
distance, become confused, and miss their stops. Researchers continue to
discuss whether Beck’s design should be classified as a map or as a diagram
(Cartwright, 2012).
When new innovations change visualization design, viewers might
become confused about how to classify a new type of visualization, which
can affect how they determine and implement an appropriate schema.
Today, Beck’s approach has been utilized worldwide for close to a century,
and most transit riders have developed a specific schema for diagrammatic
subway maps. Beck’s success is likely due in part to the design being different
enough from standard approaches that the design prompted riders to recog-
nize that a standard map-based schema would not work. Additionally, the
design reduced directional information to three axes, reducing the memory
required to match viewers’ destination goals with their visual description.
In the next step of the graph instantiation process, viewers retrieve the
relevant schema based on how they classified the visualization. Errors can
occur in this process when viewers have not learned an appropriate schema.
When no schema is available for a graph type, the viewers might utilize a
schema from a different visualization type or context. For example, see
the new coordinate system in Fig. 12 and try to determine the values for B.
Visual description Schema retrieval

(from long-term Schema application
classification
knowledge)
Fig. 11 Three-step schema instantiation process.

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A
(2,3)
B
(?,?)
Fig. 12 Hypothetical new coordinate plane.
Fig. 13 Example of a mental rotation needed to apply at the schema for Cartesian coor-
dinate plane to a hypothetical new coordinate plain and derived B.
One strategy is to notice that A and B both have two values and a coor-
dinate plane. Dot plots use similar Cartesian coordinate planes but have dif-
ferent axes than in the example. One could apply the Cartesian coordinate
schema to interpret the new hypothetical coordinate plane and then derive
B’s values, as illustrated in Fig. 13.
The problem with applying the schema for a Cartesian coordinate plane to
the new coordinate plane is that the planes do not adhere to the same graphic
conventions. The angles of the axes in Fig. 14 are not 90°. Applying a schema
for a Cartesian coordinate to the new coordinate plane incorrectly is easy,
as they share similar properties. When the appropriate schema is unknown,
viewers commonly retrieve a different visualization schema to interpret the
new information, which can work out well in some cases or can lead them
to systematic misinterpretations. Graph schemas that viewers can easily
remember and those frequently used are more likely to be applied to an
ambiguous visualization type.
In the final stage of the schema instantiation process, viewers must apply
the schema that they have retrieved to the visualization in order to answer
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A
(2,3)
B
(-2,3)
Fig. 14 Illustration of how the axes for the new coordinate plane are not 90° angles.
the conceptual question. When a mismatch between the schema and the
visualization occurs, as illustrated in the prior example, a transformation is
required to make the two align. Cognitive Fit Theory describes how errors
occur when a mismatch between the schema and the visualization requires
exorbitant mental computations (Vessey, 1991). A large mismatch between
the schema and visualization requires significant working memory to make
the two align, which results in increased errors and time to complete the task
(Padilla et al., 2018). Note that the Padilla et al. (2018) model suggests that
the schema matching process and all other processes (other than bottom-up
attention) are in service of the conceptual question. Even if viewers do not
think they are trying to answer a specific question, they always have a goal,
which could be as simple as understanding what they see.
3.2.1 Schema errors in hurricane visualizations

Uncertainty visualizations of hurricane forecasts represent one of the most
highly studied types of schema errors (Padilla et al., 2017; Padilla, Creem-
Regehr, et al., 2020; Ruginski et al., 2016). As previously discussed, viewers
assume that the National Hurricane Center’s Cone of Uncertainty represents
the storm’s size growing over time, even though it does not communicate
storm size information (Padilla et al., 2017). Researchers have also observed
the misunderstanding that the cone’s area represents the size of the storm
when blurry or fuzzy boundaries border the cone.
One key source of these errors involves the schema that people utilize
when seeing hurricane forecast maps. Viewers looking at a hurricane forecast
map reasonably use the schema that they have learned for maps, which dic-
tates that physical distance on a map should correspond to physical distance
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in the world. However, cone-like hurricane forecasts violate cartographic

expectations by using physical distance to represent uncertainty in the
storm’s path. To interpret the forecast correctly, viewers must maintain
the base-map schema but then suppress the map schema when looking at
the cone. Viewers must keep schemas for both maps and uncertainty in
working memory and apply each where appropriate in the visualization.
Flexibly switching between schemas is highly demanding on working mem-
ory. Such a high working memory demand required by cone-like hurricane
forecasts may overtax viewers’ limited working memory capacity.
When the working memory demand of a visualization exceeds a viewer’s
working memory capacity, the viewer may drop one schema (e.g., use only
the map schema). Viewers who utilize only a map schema commonly report
that the cone-like visualizations represent a danger zone, where areas inside
the cone are at risk and areas outside the cone are relatively safe (Ruginski
et al., 2016). When forced to drop a schema, we argue that people will likely
maintain the schema with which they have the strongest associations. As
most people have seen and used maps for large portions of their lives, the
map schema will take prominence over the uncertainty schema, which they
may have less training or experience using.
We were initially surprised to find that viewers of a blurry cone also see a
similar danger zone, as researchers have suggested that blur/fuzziness/trans-
parency may be a more intuitive way to communicate uncertainty
(MacEachren et al., 2012). Researchers continue to test blurry cones as an
alternative approach to the Cone of Uncertainty and see no benefits of blur
(Millet et al., 2020). The interest in testing alternative metaphorical expres-
sions of uncertainty (e.g., blur, fuzziness, transparency, fogginess, and sketch-
iness), including our own, occurred mainly due to a misattribution of why
the Cone of Uncertainty leads to misunderstandings. We argue that the prin-
cipal error inherent in cone-like visualizations is that they force viewers to
hold multiple schemas in working memory, which is the case for cones with
both rigid and blurry boundaries. Blur, fuzziness, transparency, fogginess, and
sketchiness express uncertainty explicitly as an additional attribute of the visu-
alization that requires a second schema. More modern uncertainty visualiza-
tion techniques implicitly communicate the uncertainty in animations
(Hullman, Resnick, & Adar, 2015) or color (Correll, Moritz, & Heer,
2018) and may prove to be more effective because they do not require the
viewer to hold multiple schemas in their mind.
Blur or distributional visualizations can be highly successful if a second
schema is not required to understand the visualization. For example,
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researchers have found that gradient plots of 1D data can outperform interval
plots of the same information (Correll & Gleicher, 2014). Gradient plots of
1D data require only a single schema for mapping opacity to probability.
Researchers have also documented how ensemble visualizations, which
are the most effective hurricane forecast visualization technique (Ruginski
et al., 2016), can also suffer from schema errors (Padilla et al., 2017;
Padilla, Creem-Regehr, et al., 2020). The approach of this work was to
identify the schema participants use when viewing ensemble visualizations.
Ensemble visualizations have been developed as a technique relatively
recently (Liu et al., 2016), and we can reasonably assume that people have
not developed a specific schema for ensembles.
After reviewing all commonly available visualization techniques,
researchers noted that the ensemble visualization shared many similar prop-
erties to map-based navigation applications (Padilla et al., 2017). Both
map-based travel applications and ensemble hurricane forecasts have a base
map that adheres to standard cartographic principles and overlays of lines.
Researchers speculated that when viewing an ensemble visualization, people
utilize the schema that they have developed for understanding travel appli-
cations (Padilla et al., 2017). An essential benefit to using a travel application
schema is that participants would not have to hold multiple schemas in their
minds (e.g., one for maps and one for uncertainty). The use of a single
schema could be one reason why ensemble visualizations outperform
cone-like hurricane forecasts (Padilla et al., 2017; Ruginski et al., 2016).
However, the problem with using a travel application schema for hur-
ricane ensembles is that the schema could lead to errors in specific cases.
Researchers tested an additional hypothesis that people see each line of
the hurricane forecast ensemble as a specific path the hurricane could take
(Padilla et al., 2017). The schema for geospatial travel visualizations dictates
that the application shows a finite list of possible discrete routes and not a
distribution of routes. Whereas for the ensemble visualization, each line
depicts a subset of a distribution. In other words, the ensemble lines show
the spread of uncertainty in the path of the storm. They do not show an
exhaustive list of every possible path the storm could take. If people use a
schema for geospatial travel applications and one of the ensemble members
intersects a location of interest, they may incorrectly think the likelihood is
higher that the storm will hit that location (Padilla et al., 2017).a
a
Note that researchers provided participants little information about how to interpret the ensembles,
which simulates the conditions in which they would see hurricane forecast in the news (i.e., on average,
hurricane forecasts are shown on TV for 1.52 min; Padilla, Creem-Regehr, et al., 2020; Padilla,
Powell, Kay, & Hullman, 2020).
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Researchers tested the hypothesis that viewers use a geospatial travel

application schema to interpret ensemble displays by showing participants
ensemble hurricane forecasts with two indicated locations (See Fig. 15)
(Padilla et al., 2017). On each trial, an ensemble member intersected one
of the locations. Researchers found that when the ensemble member inter-
sected a location, the participants believed that the location would receive
more damage than the location that was not intersected by an ensemble
member. This overreaction due to the colocation with the ensemble mem-
ber persisted regardless of the damage probability (Padilla et al., 2017).
Follow-up research provided converging evidence that ensemble visu-
alizations evoke a geospatial travel application schema by replicating the
overreaction when an ensemble member intersects a point of interest and
demonstrating that the number of lines shown moderates this effect
(Padilla, Creem-Regehr, et al., 2020). Researchers reduced the overreaction
bias by increasing the number of lines shown. As an illustration, when shown
an ensemble visualization with 5 or 10 paths and one path intersects a loca-
tion, people commonly report a 20% chance the storm will hit the location
with 5 paths and 10% with 10 paths. Researchers found that increasing the
lines from 9 to 14 to 33 meaningfully reduced the overreaction bias (Padilla,
Creem-Regehr, et al., 2020).
However, researchers were never able to entirely eliminate the
overreaction by changing the number of lines (Padilla, Creem-Regehr,
et al., 2020). In a final attempt to reduce the overreaction bias, researchers
Fig. 15 Example ensemble hurricane forecast visualizations with two locations from
Padilla et al. (2017). In each visualization, one location is intercepted by an
ensemble member. Reproduced per CC-BY license, from Padilla, L., Creem-Regehr, S.,
Hegarty, M., & Stefanucci, J. (2018). Decision making with visualizations: A cognitive frame-
work across disciplines. Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications, 3, 29.
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tested if participants could override the graph schema using working mem-
ory to control their overreaction cognitively. Researchers provided partic-
ipants with extensive instructions on interpreting an ensemble visualization
and how to perform the task correctly. Participants with extensive instruc-
tions were able to reduce their bias but not entirely remove it. At the end of
the study, participants who received extensive instructions could report the
correct strategy, but these participants still overreacted in their behavioral
judgments, albeit to a lesser degree (Padilla, Creem-Regehr, et al., 2020).
In summary, ongoing research on hurricane forecast visualizations dem-
onstrates multiple schema-related errors. Errors are highly likely when
working memory demand from a visualization is increased, by maintaining
two schemas or attempting to cognitively override one schema. The major-
ity of geospatial uncertainty visualizations will likely encounter similar errors
because superimposing the uncertainty visualization on the base map will
likely evoke the viewer’s map schema.
Future visualization designers interested in communicating geospatial
uncertainty that does not evoke a traditional cartographic schema could uti-
lize the approach pioneered by Harry Beck in the London Underground
map. One possible reason that the London Underground map does not pro-
duce large schema-based errors is that its differences sufficiently separate the
visualization from a traditional map, which makes people aware that a con-
ventional map schema is not appropriate. If the visualization alerts the viewer
to its novelty, it could trigger the viewer to develop a new schema.
3.2.2 Deterministic construal errors

Many schema-based errors may also be explained by viewers ignoring the
uncertainty and instead interpreting uncertainty visualizations as communicat-
ing deterministic data, called deterministic construal errors ( Joslyn & Savelli,
2020). Researchers first identified deterministic construal errors in 1D tem-
perature forecasts, when they presented participants with uncertainty in mean
temperature forecasts with confidence intervals visualized as bars (Savelli &
Joslyn, 2013). The researchers found that 36% of participants believed that
the confidence intervals represented high- and low-temperature forecasts
rather than uncertainty around the mean (Savelli & Joslyn, 2013). Savelli
and Joslyn then tested alternative visualization techniques, including dotted
lines and blurry boundaries, and found that the participants still assumed that
the intervals around the means were high- and low-temperature forecasts.
The researchers went further by creating an obvious key that instructed
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viewers on how to interpret the confidence intervals accurately, which did not
reduce the deterministic construal error (Savelli & Joslyn, 2013). Other
researchers have demonstrated similar effects with color encoding, where
viewers interpret the probability of rain fall as cumulative rainfall (Wilson,
Heinselman, Skinner, Choate, & Klockow-McClain, 2019).
In a recent review of deterministic construal errors, Joslyn and Savelli
(2020) propose that the psychological cause closely relates to attribute sub-
stitution. Attribute substitution is where people opt to use an easy and often
incorrect mental process rather than doing a challenging mental computa-
tion (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). Indeed, the schema associated with
most uncertainty visualizations places high demand on working memory,
and viewers may opt for a more easily interpreted schema, essentially reduc-
ing their working memory demand. In the context of textual information,
scholars in a wide range of fields have documented an aversion to working
memory demand associated with uncertainty, termed ambiguity aversion
(e.g., Bach, Hulme, Penny, & Dolan, 2011; Curley, Yates, & Abrams,
1986; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1985; Ellsberg, 1961; Highhouse, 1994;
Huettel, Stowe, Gordon, Warner, & Platt, 2006).
We propose that a schema hierarchy may be an additional contributor to
deterministic construal errors, presenting a unique challenge to uncertainty
visualizations where viewers unconsciously use only the dominant schema.
The effectiveness of emerging visualization techniques supports this assertion,
such as hypothetical outcome plots (Hullman et al., 2015) that force users to
utilize a schema that includes uncertainty. Hypothetical outcome plots consist
of animated visualizations that sample from a distribution. Each frame of the
animation shows one sample from a probabilistic distribution. Hypothetical
outcome plots force viewers to utilize a schema that incorporates uncertainty
and have been found to outperform other modern visualization techniques
(Hullman et al., 2015; Kale et al., 2018).
3.3 Late-stage errors

After viewers have gathered relevant information from a visualization, used
graph schemas to interpret the visualization, and attempted to answer their
conceptual question, the final stage of the process consists of making a deci-
sion with all of that information and acting. Late-stage processing errors in
visualization decision making can occur when viewers apply universal
decision-making heuristics. Universal decision-making heuristics are not
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specific to reasoning with visual information and are studied significantly

by researchers in psychology and economics (e.g., Gigerenzer, 2008;
Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Montibeller & Von Winterfeldt, 2015). In this
section we will review studies that have generalized decision-making biases
to reasoning with uncertainty visualizations.
3.3.1 Framing errors: Probabilistic vs frequency

In the context of uncertainty communication, researchers find that textual
information that uses a frequency framing (1 out of 10) is more intuitive than
probabilistic framing (10%) (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995) and requires
less working memory (Yin et al., 2020). The general theory suggests that
people have difficulty reasoning with probabilities because they rarely expe-
rience risk in the form of probabilistic expressions (Gigerenzer, 1996, 2008;
Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Gigerenzer et al., 2000). Emerging work in
uncertainty visualization demonstrates that visualization techniques that uti-
lize frequency framing can be highly successful, including icon arrays
(Galesic et al., 2009), quantile dot plots (Fernandes et al., 2018), hypothetical
outcome plots (Hullman et al., 2015), and ensemble plots (Liu et al.,
2016, 2019).
Visualizations that utilize frequency framing allow the viewers’ visual sys-
tem to interpret probabilities rather than requiring them to consider numeric
expressions. When communicated in text, researchers found that individuals
with low working memory capacity can more easily interpret statements
expressed as frequencies rather than probabilities (Yin et al., 2020). It is pos-
sible that visualizations that display frequency information rather than prob-
ability information will also require less working memory.
For example, the bottom of Fig. 16 shows a quantile dot plot of night-
time low temperatures, and the top shows the cumulative distribution func-
tion used to generate the dot plot. In this example, each dot represents a 5%
probability. If the researcher asks a viewer to determine the probability that
the nighttime temperature will be 32° or below using Fig. 16, the viewer
could simply count the number of dots. In this example, each dot represents
a 5% probability. If the same information is visualized with a density plot
(e.g., a bell curve), the viewer would have to mentally compute the integral
under the curve, which is a highly challenging judgment, resulting in
viewers likely substituting this process for an easier one. Scholars suggest that
frequency-framing uncertainty visualizations afford a simple and effective
heuristic that requires minimal working memory compared to probabilistic
techniques (Padilla et al., 2021). However, no work as directly tested the
working memory demand of uncertainty visualizations.
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Fig. 16 The bottom illustrates a quantile dot plot that shows a forecasted nighttime
low temperature, and the top shows the cumulative distribution function that was used
to create the quantile dot plot. Redrawn from, Padilla, L. M., Powell, M., Kay, M., &
Hullman, J. (2020). Uncertain about uncertainty: How qualitative expressions of forecaster
confidence impact decision-making with uncertainty visualizations. Frontiers in
Psychology, 11, 3747.
A slight conflict in the field of uncertainty visualization exists between

visualizations that provide more expressive information about the distribution
of data (e.g., distributional visualizations) and visualizations that are more sim-
ple (e.g., visualizations that show summary statistics). Distributional visualiza-
tions can represent essential features about the distribution, including the
shape, skewing, or outliers (Padilla et al., 2021). A rule of thumb in visuali-
zation design is that more expressive visualizations are preferred because they
give a more fine-grained and thorough representation of the data (Mackinlay,
1986; Munzner, 2014). However, more expressive visualizations depict more
information, which might have the unintended consequence of increasing
working memory demand. For example, distributional visualizations such
as quantile dot plots convey more attributes of the data than simpler visuali-
zations such as error bars or means. Interestingly, frequency framing distribu-
tional visualizations seem to hit the sweet spot by conveying the distributional
data simplistically. Mounting evidence suggests that quantile dot plots
improve accuracy and memory compared to density plots (Hullman et al.,
2017; Kay, Kola, Hullman, & Munson, 2016) and outperform summary plots,
density plots, and text descriptions of uncertainty for decisions with risk
(Fernandes et al., 2018).
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Icon arrays, which are nondistributional frequency-framing visualiza-

tions, have also consistently shown decision-making advantages over text
communications of health risk (for review, see Fagerlin et al., 2011;
Waters et al., 2016). Icon arrays can also reduce common decision-making
biases, such as individuals focusing on the numerator and neglecting the
denominator (for a review, see Garcia-Retamero et al., 2012), anecdote bias
(e.g., prioritizing anecdote information over data; for a review, see Fagerlin
et al., 2005) and side effect aversion (Waters, Weinstein, Colditz, & Emmons,
2007). Side effect aversion is a common bias where patients over-weight
negative effects of treatment when making health decisions (Waters et al.,
2007). Using a large sample (n ¼ 4248), researchers found that including icon
arrays describing the likelihood of developing cancer with and without a
hypothetical preventative drug decreased side effect aversion (Waters
et al., 2007). Scholars propose that side effect aversion is closely related to
risk aversion (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990) and may have similar
cognitive mechanisms (Waters et al., 2007). Icon arrays’ use of frequency
framing also helps people with low numeracy to interpret probabilities cor-
rectly (e.g., Galesic et al., 2009; Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2009a, 2009b;
Hawley et al., 2008). While not directly tested, icon arrays may guide the
viewer’s attention to task-relevant information, which may naturally coun-
teract the classical decision-making biases that tend to occur later in the
decision process.
In summary, the majority of work in uncertainty visualization that
examines universal decision-making biases finds that frequency-framing
visualizations consistently outperform probabilistic depictions of the same
data. Some studies also find that frequency-framing visualizations can reduce
common decision-making biases. One explanation for the superiority of
frequency-framing visualizations is that they evoke an effective heuristic for
interpreting uncertainty, using less working memory (Kahneman &
Frederick, 2002). However, more work is needed to directly test working
memory in the context of decision-making biases with uncertainty
visualizations.
4. Conclusions
In this chapter, we reviewed research on biases in uncertainty visual-
ization. Using the Padilla et al. (2018) framework, we discussed biases at
early-, middle-, and late-stage decision-making processes. We proposed a
unifying theory that increased working memory demand or lack thereof
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contributes to many of the biases reviewed in this paper. If visualization

designers can understand the source of the biases, they may be less likely
to repeat visualization mistakes. Further, visualization designers will find
novel visualization solutions more quickly by focusing on the problem’s
source (optimizing working memory demand) rather than on the symptoms
of the problem. The problem’s source can occur in:
• The Early stage: Due to bottom-up attention and Gestalt principles,
visual-spatial biases may result in a poorly perceived and poorly under-
stood visualization. These biases include boundaries of continuous data.
Boundaries may cause conceptual categories that do not exist, and distort
categories that do exist. Some boundaries invoke a containment heuristic,
resulting in viewers reducing continuous data to a binary understanding,
as in the Cone of Uncertainty (Boone et al., 2018; Padilla et al., 2017).
• The Middle stage: Schema errors occur when the visual description
does not match the instantiated schema (e.g., judging walking distance
and direction from the diagrammatic London Tube map, Fig. 10).
Other errors may occur at this stage due to the viewer’s unfamiliarity
with uncertainty, resulting in a deterministic interpretation (Savelli &
Joslyn, 2013).
• The Late stage: When people make decisions and perform actions, fram-
ing the data in complex or unfamiliar domains (i.e., probability) leads to
poor decision-making. However, this outcome can be circumvented by
reframing the data in a more intuitive (i.e., frequency) framing, allowing
early and middle stage processes to lead to fully informed decision-
making.
A key takeaway from this work is that a sweet spot exists in working memory
demand. If uncertainty visualizations require too much working mem-
ory demand, as in those that require multiple schemas, viewers will become
overloaded and not be able to complete a task accurately. However, in
some cases, if a viewer fails to use working memory, they may rely on an inef-
fective or misleading heuristic. More work is needed to identify this sweet
spot in the working memory demand of uncertainty visualizations. A path
forward would be to measure working memory more directly in visualiza-
tion experiments. Methods such as pupillometry, EEG, and fNIRS can
provide relatively accurate working memory demand proxies but are rarely
used in visualization research (for exceptions see, Padilla, Castro, Quinan,
Ruginski, & Creem-Regehr, 2019; Peck, Yuksel, Ottley, Jacob, & Chang,
2013). More work is needed to determine which visualization techniques
and tasks are working-memory demanding to predict when errors will occur
more accurately.
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We argue that visualizations that utilize frequency framing are more

likely to find the sweet spot in working memory demand, including icon
arrays (Zikmund-Fisher et al., 2014), quantile dot plots (Fernandes et al.,
2018), hypothetical outcome plots (Hullman et al., 2015), and some ensem-
ble plots (Liu et al., 2019). Frequency-framing visualizations convey prob-
abilistic data in a way that is more intuitive to understand, requiring less
working memory then other techniques. Further, frequency-framing visu-
alizations capitalizes on the visual system’s substantial processing power to
interpret the probabilistic data. However, such visualizations are not entirely
free of errors. For example, ensemble hurricane visualizations can lead
viewers to think that all the forecasted hurricane paths are shown, which
is a misunderstanding of the probabilistic data (Padilla, Creem-Regehr,
et al., 2020).
Of the visualization research reviewed in this chapter, visualizations that
summarize probabilistic data using ranges, boundaries, or intervals produce
systematic and consistent reasoning errors. Part of the reason that summary
uncertainty visualizations consistently lead to poor performance is that they
can produce errors at every stage of the decision-making process. Of note are
the errors produced by bottom-up attention, which are challenging for
working memory to overcome. Concerningly, summary uncertainty visu-
alizations are the most common visualization type used in scientific journals
(e.g., confidence intervals and means). Researchers interested in effectively
communicating the uncertainty in their science should opt for distributional
visualization techniques, particularly those that use frequency framing. For
an in-depth review of effective uncertainty visualization techniques, see
Padilla et al. (2021).
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were killed and wounded, and their captain taken prisoner.
25. 160 of Gen. Fremont’s Body-guard, under command of Major
Zagonyi, charged 2,000 rebels, drawn up to receive them, near
Springfield, Mo., routed them, and occupied the town. Rebel loss,
106 killed, many wounded, and 27 prisoners. Zagonyi’s loss, 15
killed, 27 wounded, 10 missing. The Missouri “Prairie Scouts,” under
Maj. F. J. White, attacked the rear of the rebel force, at the same
time, making three successful charges, and inflicting severe loss on
the enemy. The loss of the “Scouts” was 33 in killed, wounded and
missing.
26. An artillery fight across the Potomac, at Edward’s Ferry, for
several hours. Two killed in Gen. Banks’ encampment, and 3
wounded. Both parties were compelled to move back their
encampments.
26. Gen. B. F. Kelly, with 2,500 Virginia and Ohio Volunteers,
from New Creek, Va., attacked an inferior rebel force near Romney,
who were routed and pursued through that town with severe loss.
Col. Thos. Johns, of 2d regiment, Potomac Home Brigade, made a
diversion of the enemy’s force, by marching to the rear of Romney,
by way of Frankfort, and engaged and held in check a regiment of the
rebels. The expedition was successful in capturing a large supply of
military stores and provisions. Federal loss, 2 killed, 14 wounded.
Rebel loss, 10 killed, 15 wounded, and a number of prisoners,
including Col. Angus McDonald, their commander: their artillery
wagons, camps, etc., were captured.
26. Parson Brownlow was forced to suspend the publication of the
Knoxville (Tenn.) Whig.
26. A wagon train was established between Baltimore and
Washington, for want of sufficient railway facilities, consequent on
the danger from rebel batteries in navigating the Potomac.
26. Major Phillips, with 300 of the 9th Illinois, from Paducah,
sailed on the steamer Conestoga to West Eddyville, Ky., on the
Cumberland river, where they landed and marched 6 miles to
Saratoga, and surprised a detachment of rebel cavalry, under Capt.
Wilcox. After a brief resistance the enemy fled, losing 13 killed, many
wounded, 24 prisoners, and 52 horses. Four of the Illinois men were
wounded.
26. Surprise of a rebel encampment at Plattsburg, Clinton co., Mo.,
by a superior force of Federals. Rebel loss, 8 killed, 12 prisoners, one
cannon, and a quantity of small arms.
28. Three rebel vessels were surprised and burnt at Chincoteague
Inlet, Va., by a portion of the crew of U. S. gunboat Louisiana, under
Lieut. A. Hopkins.
28. D. Davis, of Ill., J. Holt, of Ky., and H. Campbell, of Mo., were
appointed Commissioners by Pres. Lincoln to audit all unsettled
military claims in Missouri.
29. 250 U.S. Kentucky volunteers, under Col. Burbridge, marched
from Owensboro’ to Morgantown, Ky., crossed the river at that point,
defeated a superior rebel force and destroyed their camp. Federal
loss, 2 wounded.
28. Gen. J. B. Henderson, with a superior force, surrounded and
captured 400 rebels at Dyer’s Mills, near Concord, Mo. They were
allowed to lay down their arms and return home.
29. Nearly 100 “contrabands” arrived at Fortress Monroe in two
days.
29. Rebel State “Conference” at Russellville, Ky.
29. The great naval expedition sailed from Fortress Monroe, under
the command of Flag-officer Com. Samuel F. Dupont, comprising 77
vessels of all classes. The land forces, numbering 20,000 men, were
commanded by Brig.-Gen. Thos. W. Sherman.
31. Skirmish at Morgantown, Green River, Ky. Col. McHenry’s
command drove a party of rebels attached to Buckner’s camp across
the river, with loss.
31. At N. York, the jury empaneled for the trial of the sailors
captured on the privateer Savannah, the first rebel armed vessel that
was commissioned, failed to agree.
Nov. 1. Lieut.-Gen. Winfield Scott, at his own request, was retired
from active service, and Maj.-Gen. George B. McClellan was
appointed to succeed him as Commander-in-chief of the U. S. army.
1. Lieut.-Col. Morse, with 450 cavalry and infantry, surprised and
routed a rebel force 800 strong, under Col. Sweeny, in camp near
Renick, Randolph co., Mo.
1. Rebels from Gen. Floyd’s command attacked a Federal camp at
Gauley Bridge, Va., by cannonading from the opposite shore. They
were driven into the hills by 3 companies from Gen. Benham’s camp,
at Hawk’s Nest.
1. A violent storm overtook the naval expedition off the N. C. coast.
3 vessels were disabled and returned, 2 were driven ashore, and 2
foundered. Seven lives lost.
2. Gen. Fremont, at Springfield, received an order from
Washington, relieving him from command of the Department of
Missouri. Gen. Hunter was appointed temporarily to the command.
2. An address was issued by Gov. Harris, of Tenn., calling upon the
people to furnish every shot-gun and rifle to defend the soil.
2. Major Joseph’s Missouri militia, numbering 129, were attacked
at Platte City, Mo., by Silas Gordon with 300 rebels, who were
repulsed with a loss of 13 killed and wounded, 30 prisoners, many
guns, and all their equipments.
2. The English steamer Bermuda ran the blockade at Charleston, S.
C., with 2,000 bales of cotton.
2. Prestonburg, Ky., was occupied by Union troops under Gen.
Nelson, without opposition.
3. et seq. Rising of Union men in E. Tenn., who burned or broke
down several important railroad bridges.
3. Five rebel boats made an attack on Fort Hatteras, N. C., but
were repulsed by the U. S. gunboat National, and the Fort.
3. Col. Greensle drove rebel troops from Houston, Mo., and
returned to Rolla with several prisoners and a large amount of
property.
4. Enthusiastic Union meeting in Baltimore Co., Md., addressed by
Reverdy Johnson.
4. Barboursville, Ky., was occupied by 1,500 Federals without
opposition.
6. Extra session of South Carolina Legislature adjourned, after
choosing Presidential electors and ordering the banks to loan the
State $300,000.
5. Colonel Corcoran and 15 other national officers who were
prisoners, were selected by lot by the rebels, as hostages, to be hung
in the event of that punishment being awarded to the privateers held
by the national government.
6. Two parties of rebel troops met above Newport News, Va., and
by mistake fired on each other, killing and wounding a number.
Among the killed was Major Bailey, of Mobile.
6. The grand jury at Frankfort, Ky., found indictments for treason
against 32 prominent citizens, among whom were R. J. Breckinridge,
Jr., J. C. Breckinridge, Humphrey Marshall, and Benj. Desha.
6. Electors for President and V. President were chosen throughout
the revolted States, and also members of Congress.
6. 120 Federals, under Capt. Shields, were captured by 500 rebels
near Little Santa Fé, Mo. They were on their way to join Gen.
Fremont’s column.
6. The 13th Indiana regiment, Col. J. J. Sullivan, and Capt.
Robinson’s Ohio cavalry, returned to Huttonsville, Va., from an
extensive march through Webster Co. Several rebels were killed and
wounded in scouting, and 13 prisoners taken.
7. Battle of Belmont, Mo., Gens. Grant and McClernand with 2,850
men, landed at Belmont at 8 A. M., drove in the rebel pickets and
captured their camp, which was burnt. A battery of 12 guns was
taken, and about 200 prisoners. Meantime, a large reinforcement of
rebels was landed from Columbus, on the opposite side of the river,
which intercepted Gen. Grant’s army in their return to their boats.
The Federals cut their way through a much superior force of the
enemy, losing 150 of their number prisoners, together with their
killed and wounded, who fell into the hands of the rebels. Federal
loss, 89 killed, 150 wounded, 150 missing. The rebel loss was greater,
155 were taken prisoners.
7. Gen. Hunter, Fremont’s successor in Missouri, repudiated the
agreement just, made between Gens. Fremont and Price, the rebel
commander, concerning the privileges of unarmed citizens, and the
disarming of unrecognized bodies of men.
7. Skirmishing on New river, near Gauley Bridge, Va. Federal
forces under Gen. Rosecrans, drove off a body of rebels who had
besieged his camp for several days. Several rebels and one private of
13th Ohio killed.
7. The Federal fleet under Com. Dupont captured Forts Warren
and Beauregard at Port Royal entrance, and took the town of
Beaufort, S. C., with a loss of 8 killed, 6 badly wounded, and 17
slightly. None of the national vessels seriously damaged. Rebel loss
unknown, but not large.
7. Two launches and 40 men, commanded by Lieut. Jas. E. Jouett,
from the U.S. frigate Santee, off Galveston, Texas, surprised and
burnt the rebel privateer Royal Yacht, by night, after a sharp conflict,
killing several of the rebels, and capturing 13. Federal loss 2 killed
and 7 wounded.
8. U. S. gunboat Rescue shelled out a rebel battery at Urbana
Creek, on the Rappahannock, Va., and captured a large schooner
with stores.
8. Five railway bridges were burned in E. Tennessee by Unionists.
8. Capt. Wilkes, with the U. S. steam sloop-of-war San Jacinto,
overhauled the English mail-steamer Trent in the Bahama channel,
and took from her the rebel emissaries Mason and Slidell, with their
secretaries, who had taken passage for England.
8. Col. Grensle returned with his command to Rolla, Mo., from an
expedition against the rebels in Texas co., bringing 9 prisoners, 500
head of cattle and 40 horses and mules.
8. A portion of Gen. Nelson’s Ky. brigade were ambuscaded while
on their way to Piketon, Ky., by 200 rebels in a strong position. The
rebels were dispersed with the loss of 10 killed, 15 wounded. Gen.
Nelson had 6 killed and 24 wounded. Another portion of Gen.
Nelson’s brigade under command of Col. Sill, reached Piketon by a
circuitous route, and attacked a body of rebels, defeating them with a
small loss, and having one Federal soldier killed.
8. A bridge on the E. Tenn. railway, 200 feet span, was destroyed
by Unionists. Also 4 on the line N. of Knoxville, and a heavy wooden
bridge at Charleston, Bradley co., Tenn.
9. Maj.-Gen. Henry W. Halleck, of Cal., was ordered to take
command of the Department of Missouri, in place of Gen. Fremont:
Brig.-Gen. Don Carlos Buell, of Ind., was appointed to command the
Department of Kentucky: Maj.-Gen. Hunter to command the
Department of Kansas: Col. E. R. S. Canley, the Department of N.
Mexico.
10. A band of rebel marauders was captured by Lieut. Shriver, with
a squad of 1st Iowa cavalry, near Clark’s Station, Mo.
10. A portion of Gen. Cox’s brigade crossed the New river near
Gauley, Va., and attacked Floyd’s forces posted there, who retreated
after a severe skirmish, in which the 11th Ohio regiment lost 8 killed
and 10 wounded.
10. 150 of the 9th Virginia regiment, Col. K. V. Whaley, were
surprised at Guyandotte, Va., on the Ohio river, by a superior force of
rebels, and after a sharp skirmish, in which 8 of the Federals were
killed and 12 wounded, and nearly the same loss sustained by the
rebels, Col. Whaley and 45 of his men were captured, and the rest
escaped. About two-thirds of the town was burned next day by the
Union Virginia and Ohio troops who arrived there, in retaliation for
the treachery and cruelty of the rebel inhabitants evinced in the
scenes of the engagement.
11. At Columbus, Ky., two rebel lieutenants and six privates were
killed by the explosion of a Dahlgren gun. Rev. Maj.-Gen. Polk
narrowly escaped.
11. 110 of Col. Anthony’s regiment attacked a rebel camp on the
Little Blue river, near Kansas City, Mo., which proved too strong for
them, and after severe fight, Col. Anthony’s men were drawn off in
good order, losing 8 killed and 8 wounded.
12. Reconnoissance in force by Gen. Heintzelman, with 6,000
men, to Occoquan Creek, Va., 18 miles from Alexandria. Capt. Todd’s
company of Lincoln cavalry were surprised by a superior force of
rebels, 3 killed, 1 wounded and 3 taken prisoners, including the
captain.
12. Attack on the U.S. fleet at the Passes of the Mississippi, by the
Manassas Ram, 5 gunboats and several fire ships, under command of
Capt. Hollins. U. S. ship Vincennes grounded, and the Richmond was
damaged by the ram and also grounded: but the enemy were driven
off without obtaining any advantage.
12. The privateer Beauregard, of Charleston, S. C., with 27 men,
was captured 100 miles E. N. E. of Abaco, by the U. S. sloop-of-war
W. G. Anderson, Lieut. W. C. Rogers, commanding.
12. Skirmish on Laurel Creek by portions of Gen. Benham’s with
Gen. Floyd’s forces, in which the rebels retreated after small loss.
12. Skirmish of Gen. Kelly’s pickets near Romney, Va., losing 2
killed and several wounded. 12 rebels taken prisoners.
13. Rebel Gen. Zollicoffer retreated from Cumberland Ford to
Cumberland Gap, Tenn.
14. The privateer schooner Neva, from China, was seized at San
Francisco, Cal., by Capt. Pease, of U. S. cutter Mary.
14. Lieut. J. H. Rigby, with 20 men of the Gist Artillery, on an
expedition from Salisbury, Md., to Wilmington and Newcastle, Md.,
seized 3 brass 6-pounders and 100 muskets, in possession of
secessionists in those places.
14. The Gov. of Florida, by proclamation, forbade the enlistment of
citizens of that State to serve in any other portion of the Confederacy.
14. $30,000 had been raised by Southern people for the widow of
“the martyr Jackson,” who killed Col. Ellsworth, at Alexandria, Va.
14. Gen. Benham, in pursuit of the army of Gen. Floyd, in W. Va.,
overtook the rear guard near McCoy’s Mills, and defeated it, killing
15 rebels, among them Col. Croghan. Floyd, in his retreat, destroyed
200 of his tents, and lost 10 wagon loads of ammunition and arms.
14. Fast day was observed in the rebel States.
14. Steamship Champion arrived at New York from Aspinwall,
bringing Gen. Sumner and several companies of regular soldiers
from San Francisco, having under arrest ex-Senators Gwin and
Brent, and C. Benham, late Attorney General of California, charged
with complicity with the rebels.
16. A party of 57 of the N. Y. 30th, attached to Gen. Keyes’ brigade
on the Potomac, while out foraging west of Upton’s Hill, Va., were
betrayed and surrounded by 200 rebel cavalry, and one-half their
number, with the teams and wagons, captured.
16. 50 wagons and 500 oxen, with the teamsters and stores, were
captured near Pleasant Hill, Cass co., Mo., by the rebels.
16. 68 Federal prisoners, the crews of fishing smacks captured off
the Florida coast, were taken to Tallahassee, Fla.
17. Union troops under Col. Alcorn, defeated Hawkins’ regiment at
Cypress Bridge, McClean co., Ky., routing them with severe loss, and
taking 25 prisoners, 300 horses, etc. Federal loss, 10 killed, 15
wounded.
17. A party of Union troops recaptured nearly all the wagons and
cattle seized the day before near Pleasant Hill, Mo.
17. U. S. gunboat Connecticut captured British schooner Adelaide,
with military stores and supplies for rebels, near Cape Canaveral,
and took her into Key West.
17. Lieut. G. W. Snyder, U. S. A., a valuable engineer officer, died at
Washington, of typhoid fever.
17. The 3d Missouri cavalry routed a large number of rebels near
Palmyra, Mo., while on their way to join Price’s army, killing 3,
wounding 5, taking 16 prisoners.
18. The rebel Congress met at Richmond, Va., Howell Cobb, of Ga.,
in the chair.
18. Capt. A. H. Foote was appointed Flag-officer of the fleet of the
Western Military Department.
18. Gen. Halleck assumed charge of the Missouri Department, vice
Gen. Hunter.
18. Information was received at Washington of the imposition
practised upon the Indians west of Arkansas, by Albert Pike, rebel
Commissioner.
18. Rebel troops in Accomac and Northampton cos., Va.,
disbanded, and Union troops, under Gen. Lockwood, seized their
arms and took possession of the peninsula.
18. 150 rebels were taken prisoners by Federal cavalry, near
Warrensburg, Mo.
19. Missouri rebel legislature, at Neosha, Newton co., passed an
ordinance of secession.
19. N. Y. ship Harvey Birch was captured and burnt in the British
channel by the rebel steamer Nashville.
19. The principal part of Warsaw, capital of Benton co., Mo., was
burnt by rebels.
19. Lieut. Worden, U.S.N., held prisoner by the rebels, was
exchanged for Lieut. Short, of the Confederate army.
19. U. S. gunboat Conestoga engaged rebel batteries on the
Tennessee river, and silenced them, receiving but slight damage
herself.
19. First flotilla of the “Stone Fleet” sailed for the South, from
Conn. and Mass.
20. Col. Burchard, with Lieut. Gregg and 24 men, attacked a large
company of rebels under Capts. Hays and Gregg, near Kansas City,
Mo., and defeated them, killing 5 and wounding 8. The Col. and
Lieut. were slightly wounded.
20. A special Committee from the Virginia State Convention to
consider proposed amendments to the State Constitution, reported
in opposition to free schools and free suffrage for poor whites.
20. Secession State Convention at Russelville, Ky., adopted an
ordinance of secession, and appointed Commissions to the rebel
government.
22. Two U. S. gunboats, Cambridge and Hertzel, from Fortress
Monroe, shelled out the camps of the 2d Louisiana and 10th Georgia
regiments, at the junction of James and Warwick rivers.
22. Fort Pickens opened fire on the rebel encampments and forts,
near Pensacola, Fla., which was replied to by them, and a severe
cannonade ensued for two days. Much damage was experienced by
Fort McRae, the Navy Yard, and town of Warrington—loss of life
slight on either side. The U. S. fleet in the harbor took part. The
Richmond was badly damaged by a shot. 1 killed, 6 wounded at Fort
Pickens: 1 killed, 7 wounded on the Richmond.
23. The Confederate gunboat Tuscorora accidentally took fire and
was destroyed on the Mississippi, near Helena, Ark.
24. An explosion took place at Fort Pickens, Fla., by the careless
handling of a shell, by which 5 men were killed, and 7 wounded.
24. A skirmish in Lancaster, Mo., between 450 Federals under Col.
Moore, and 420 rebels commanded by Lieut.-Col. Blanton. The
rebels were routed with the loss of 13 killed, and many wounded and
prisoners. Union loss, 1 killed and 2 wounded.
24. Tybee Island, in Savannah harbor, was occupied by U. S. forces
under Flag-officer Dupont.
24. Rebel Commissioners Mason and Slidell were imprisoned in
Fort Warren, Mass.
25. Col. Bayard with the 1st Pa. Cavalry made a reconnoissance
from Langley to Dranesville, Va., and in a skirmish killed 2 and
captured 4 rebels. 3 or 4 were wounded. 6 secessionists were also
arrested. 2 of the Cavalry were wounded.
25. Com. Tatnall, with 3 steamers and a gunboat, attacked the
Federal fleet in Cockspur Roads, Ga., but withdrew without injury,
after 40 or 50 shots were exchanged.
25. The State of Missouri, as represented by the late Governor
Jackson and the Commissioners from the rebel members of the
Legislature, was unanimously received by the Richmond Congress as
a member of the Confederacy.
26. The house of Mr. Bell, near Franklin, Tenn., was attacked by an
armed party of rebels, the building fired, and the inmates, some 10 or
12, all killed or burned but two, who escaped.
26. Skirmish at Black Oak Point, Hickory co., Mo. Capt. Cosgrove
and Lieut. Bobbitt, with 25 men, surprised a rebel camp, killed 5,
captured 8, and took 75 tents, 6 wagons, 10 horses, 35 guns, and
other property, and released 6 loyal prisoners.
26. A squadron of the 3d Pa. Cavalry, near Vienna, Va., were
attacked on three sides by a superior force of cavalry and infantry,
and retreated after a short engagement. 29 of their men were
missing.
26. The Convention to form a new State in W. Va., met at
Wheeling.
27. Federal troops, from Gen. Sherman’s command, visited Bear
Island and Edisto Island, near the mouth of the Ashepoo river, S. C.
27. Henry R. Jackson was appointed a Maj.-Gen. in the Georgia
army.
27. Gen. McClellan appointed the hour of 11 each Sabbath for
religious worship throughout the U. S. army, and directed that all
officers and men off duty should have opportunity to attend.
27. Transport Constitution sailed from Fortress Monroe to Ship
Island, Mississippi Sound, with a portion of Gen. Butler’s expedition,
under Brig.-Gen. Phelps.
28. Capts. Robb and White, and Lieut. Moonlight, three U. S.
officers, were captured from the railway train at Weston, Mo., by Sy.
Gordon.
28. S. C. planters on the seaboard burnt their cotton, to prevent its
capture by the Federal forces or the coast.
29. The English Government forbade temporarily the exportation
of cotton.
29. Major Hough, with 4 companies of Missouri cavalry, in defence
of the Sedalia railway train, had an engagement at Black Walnut
Creek, Mo., in which 17 rebels were killed and wounded, and 5 taken
prisoners. 5 of the cavalry, including the Major, were wounded.
29. Col. De Kay, Maj. Sharpf and other Federal officers, and 40
men, had a skirmish about a mile beyond New Market, Va., in which
the rebels were routed, leaving 2 dead, and carrying off their
wounded.
Dec. 1. The U. S. steamer Penguin arrived at Brooklyn with the
prize “Albion,” captured while attempting to run the blockade at
Charleston, S. C., with arms, ammunition, provisions, &c., worth
$100,000.
1. A party of Federals attacked the rebel pickets at Morristown, E.
Tenn., killing a large number and putting the rest to flight.
1. Skirmish near Hunter’s Chapel, Va., between a squadron of Gen.
Blenker’s horsemen and a squadron of rebel cavalry, who were
defeated, losing 3 or 4 killed and wounded, and 2 prisoners. 1
Federal killed.
2. The first regular session of the 37th Congress commenced at
Washington.
2. A party of citizens in Mo., near Dunksburg, 20 miles west of
Sedalia, attacked a body of rebels under Capts. Young and Wheatley,
killing 7 and wounding 10 of them. Several citizens slightly wounded.
3. Skirmish at Salem, Dent co., Mo. A party of Federal soldiers,
commanded by Maj. Bowen, were surprised and fired on, while
sleeping in a house near headquarters, by 300 rebels under Cols.
Freeman and Turner, and 15 killed and wounded. The main body of
the Federals were drawn out by Maj. Bowen, who attacked the rebels
in turn and drove them from the town. 1 Federal killed and 4
wounded. Rebel loss unknown.
3. H. C. Burnett of Ky. and J. W. Reed of Mo. were expelled from
U. S. House of Representatives as traitors.
4. Col. Taylor with 30 men of the 3d New Jersey had a skirmish
with a number of rebel cavalry near Annandale, Va., three or four of
whom were captured, and several killed and wounded without
Federal loss.
4. Gen. Phelps, with 2,000 men, attached to Gen. Butler’s
expedition, occupied Ship Island, Mississippi Sound.
4. A detachment of Federal cavalry surprised the rebel guard at
Whip-poor-will Bridge, on the Memphis Branch railway, Ky., taking
11 prisoners. 5 or 6 Confederates were killed or wounded. 4 Federals
were wounded.
4. J. C. Breckinridge was expelled from the U. S. Senate.
5. Reports of the Secs. of War and Navy show the Government had
in service for the war 682,971 men.
5. Skirmish at Brownsville, Ky. 100 Home Guards defeated a
superior rebel force under Gen. T. C. Hindman, of Ark. Rebel loss, 3
killed, 5 wounded; the Guards sustaining no loss.
5. Successful foray of the 13th Mass., Col. Leonard, from the
Potomac to Berkley Springs, Va., capturing a large quantity of
provisions.
5. Riot at Nashville, Tenn., occasioned by the attempt of the rebel
authorities to enforce the endraftment of the militia. Two persons
were killed and several wounded.
7. At Sedalia, Mo., 106 mule teams and the teamsters were seized
by rebels.
7. Capt. Sweeney, with 35 rebel guerrillas, were captured near
Glasgow, Mo., by Capt. Merrill’s cavalry.
7. Skirmish near Dam No. 5 on the Potomac. Rebels driven off,
losing 12 men.
7. Skirmish near Olathe, Mo. 2 Federals killed. 3 rebels killed and 5
wounded.
8. Capt. McGuire’s company of 27th Mo., captured 14 rebels at
Sedalia, Mo.
8. U. S. steamer Augusta captured schr. E. Waterman, loaded with
provisions, coal and war munitions, off Savannah, Ga.
9. Gen. Halleck required all municipal officers at St. Louis, Mo., as
well as State officials, to subscribe to the oath of allegiance
prescribed by the State Convention in October previous.
9. The U. S. steamer Harriet Lane, and 6 steamers attached to the
upper Potomac flotilla, shelled the woods at Budd’s Ferry, and
exchanged shots with the rebel batteries opposite, at Shipping Point.
Some large buildings, containing rebel stores, were burnt, by
boatmen from the Jacob Bell and Anacosta.
9. Gov. Pickens of S. C. proclaimed the State invaded, by land and
sea, and called for 12,000 twelve-month volunteers.
9. A detachment of the “Stone Fleet” left New Bedford, Mass., for a
southern port.
9. Garret Davis was elected a senator from Ky., in place of J. C.
Breckinridge.
9. The rebel Congress “admitted” Kentucky to the Confederacy.
11. Federal troops, under Lieut.-Col. Rhodes, had a skirmish near
Bertrand, Mo., losing 1 man. They took 16 prisoners and a number of
horses and fire-arms.
11. Five vessels of the Stone Fleet, and the ships George Green and
Bullion, of Gen. Butler’s expedition, sailed from Boston, Mass.
11. Skirmish at Dam No. 4, on the Potomac, near Sharpsburg, Md.
Seven rebels on the Virginia shore were killed, and many wounded.
Capt. Williams and 6 men having crossed the river were captured by
the rebels.
11. Great fire at Charleston, S. C. 600 houses destroyed.
12. A squad of men from Col. Whitaker’s regiment were defeated in
an attempt to arrest secessionists near Bagdad, Shelby co., Ky., and
retreated with one wounded.
12. Col. Merrill’s cavalry regiment returned to Sedalia, Mo., from
Waverley, bringing as prisoners 4 rebel capts., 2 lieuts. and 40 men,
a mortar, and many horses.
12. Co. I, of 15th Ohio, were attacked on the banks of the Green
river, Ky., by a superior force of rebel cavalry, whom they repulsed,
wounding several of the cavalry, without loss themselves.
13. Villages of Papinsville and Butler, Bates co., Mo., rebel
rendezvous, were burned by Maj. Williams of the 3d Kansas.
13. Wm. H. Johnson, of the Lincoln Cavalry, a deserter, who was
captured, under military order was shot.
13. The British ship Admiral was captured off Savannah, Ga., while
attempting to run in, by the Augusta.
13. Rebel Gov. Jackson, of Mo., issued a proclamation, from New
Madrid, praising the valor, fortitude and success of the rebel army,
and calling for more volunteers.
13. Battle of Camp Alleghany, Va. 2,000 Federal troops, under
Brig.-Gen. R. H. Milroy, marched from Cheat Mountain Summit to
attack a rebel camp on Alleghany Summit, of 2,000 troops, under
Col. E. Johnson. The Federals approached in 2 divisions, of 750 each,
from different directions, but did not arrive simultaneously, and
alternately attacked the whole rebel force. They retired after a well
contested fight of 8 hours, losing 20 killed, 107 wounded, and 10
missing. The rebels reported about the same loss.
14. Ex-minister Faulkner was released on parole, to be exchanged
for Congressman Ely.
14. Reconnoissance by Federal troops, within 28 miles of
Charleston, S. C. The rebels, as they retreated, burnt their cotton.
15. Skirmish on the Virginia shore, opposite Berlin, Md. A
detachment from the 28th Penn. were attacked by 120 rebels in
ambush, but cut their way through to their boat, and escaped, having
1 wounded, and 2 taken prisoners. 2 of the enemy were killed and 5
wounded.
15. Many Union refugees escaped from Arkansas. Capt. Ware, late
of the Ark. Legislature, organized a military company of Ark. Union
men at Rolla, Mo.
16. Platte City, Mo., was fired by rebels, and the principal public
buildings destroyed.
16. The Europa arrived from England, with news of the excitement
among the British people occasioned by the arrest of Messrs. Mason
and Slidell, and also the ultimatum of the British Government,
demanding a surrender of the rebel commissioners, and an apology
for their seizure. Mr. Seward’s dispatch to Mr. Adams, dated Nov. 30,
having settled the matter in anticipation, there was but little
excitement in the public mind.
16. Gen. Zollicoffer established a camp on the banks of the
Cumberland river, six miles from Somerset, Ky.
16. A party of 8 men from the 2d and 4th N. J. advanced to
Annandale, on the south bank of the Potomac. They were surprised
by the enemy and 3 of them captured.
17. Battle at Munfordsville, Green river, Ky. The rebels defeated;
33 killed and 60 wounded. Federal loss, 10 killed and 17 wounded.
17. Gen. Pope captured 300 rebels near Osceola, Mo.
17. Entrance to the harbor at Savannah, Ga., blockaded by sinking
7 vessels laden with stone.
18. A part of Gen. Pope’s forces under Col. J. C. Davis and Col. F.
Steele, surprised a rebel camp near Milford, north of Warrensburg,
Mo., and captured nearly 1300 men, 70 wagons loaded with stores,
and all their camp equipage and arms. Federal loss, 2 killed, 17
wounded.
18. Gen. Barnard, Chief-engineer of the U. S. army, reported to
Congress that the defences around Washington consisted of 48
works, the perimeter of which was 48 miles, mounting above 300
guns.
18. The Island City sailed from Boston for Fortress Monroe with
240 rebel prisoners, to be exchanged.
18. Rebel Gen. Jackson attempted a movement against
Williamsport, Md., but Gen. Williams being on the alert, the rebel
force retired.
18. News from Ky., that Gen. McCook, was at Munfordsville, Gen.
Mitchell at Bacon Creek, and Gen. Zollicoffer, (rebel) at Cumberland
river, near Mill Springs.
19. Skirmishing at Point of Rocks, Md. Rebels from Va. shore
commenced shelling the encampment of Col. Geary’s Pennsylvania
regiment, but were repulsed after half an hour’s fight, without loss on
the Federal side.
19. A band of 25 rebels visited the town of Ripley, Jackson Co., Va.,
and seized all the arms in the place, some ammunition and clothing.
They also robbed the post-office and the principal store in the place.
20. George W. Jones, late U. S. Minister to Bogota, was arrested in
New York on a charge of treason.
20. Battle of Dranesville, Va. Federal forces, under Gen. E. O. C.
Ord, defeated about 2,800 Confederates from South Carolina,
Alabama, and Virginia. Federal force about 4,000 men, of whom 7
were killed and 61 wounded. Rebel loss, 75 killed 150 wounded and
30 prisoners, together with a large supply of forage.
20. A scouting party under Capt. Wood, captured 100 rebels near
Springfield, Mo., who were released upon taking the oath of
allegiance.
20. A party of rebels from Gen. Price’s army committed extensive
ravages on the N. Missouri railway, between Hudson and Warrenton.
The bridges, wood-piles, water tanks, ties and rails were destroyed
along the route for 80 miles.
20. 103 Federal soldiers, under Major McKee, repulsed a superior
force of rebels four miles S. of Hudson, Mo., killing 10 and capturing
17 prisoners and 30 horses, at the same time rescuing a stock train
which had just been seized by the rebels.
20. The main ship channel at Charleston harbor, was obstructed
by sinking 16 vessels of the “stone fleet.”
22. Reconnoissance in the vicinity of Tybee Island and Broad river,
Ga., from Gen. Sherman’s command.
22. Skirmish near New Market bridge, Newport News, Va. Two
companies of 20th N. Y. regiment, under Major Schoepf, were
attacked by 700 rebel cavalry and infantry, and escaped with loss of 6
wounded. Ten of the enemy were killed and a number wounded,
when they retreated.
23. Gen. Pope sent an expedition to Lexington, Mo. Two boats of
the rebels were captured and burnt.
26. A skirmish took place at Camp Boyle, Columbia, Ky. A body of
rebels were attacked by a detachment of Col. Hazzard’s regiment,
under Major Ousley, who dispersed them, killing 5 and wounding
others, without loss themselves.
26. Gen. McCall sent a reconnoitering party towards Dranesville,
Va., which was driven back by the rebels, who had a force of 10,000
men there.
26. A Cabinet Council at Washington, decided to give up Mason
and Slidell, on the ground that they could not be held consistently
with the doctrine of neutral rights always maintained by the U. S.
Government.
26. Gen. Scott arrived at New York, in the Arago, from France.
26. Bluffton, S. C., was occupied by Federal troops under Gen.
Stevens.
26. The Lighthouse on Morris Island, Charleston, S. C. harbor, was
blown up by order of rebel authorities.
26. Major Gower, with a squadron of 1st Iowa cavalry, arrived at
Jefferson City, Mo., bringing as prisoners, 1 capt., 13 men, and 10
wagon loads of stores.
26. Philip St. George Cook, a Brig.-Gen. in the rebel army, shot
himself, at his residence in Powhatan Co., Va.
26. A fire occurred in the government stables at Washington, D. C.,
in which nearly 200 horses were burned.
27. Lord Lyons, the British minister at Washington, was notified
that Mason and Slidell awaited his disposal.
27. Alfred Ely, U. S. representative from Rochester, N. Y., taken
prisoner at Manassas Plains, was released in exchange for C. J.
Faulkner.
27. The rebel privateer Isabel, ran the blockade off Charleston, S.
C.
27. The bridges over Fabias river on the Palmyra railway, Mo.,
destroyed by rebels.
28. Gen. Buell’s army in Ky., was reported by the War Department
to number 60,000 men.
28. The rebels at Bowling Green, Ky., were reported to number
30,000, under Gens. A. S. Johnston, Buckner, and Hindman.
28. Gen. Prentiss, with 5 companies 3rd Missouri cavalry, under
Col. John Glover, and 5 companies of Col. Birge’s sharpshooters, 470
in all, attacked a rebel camp at Mount Zion, in Boone Co., Mo.,
numbering nearly 900 men. The rebels were routed, losing 25 killed,
150 wounded, and 40 prisoners. 90 of their horses and 105 stand of
arms were captured. The Federal loss was 3 killed and 46 wounded.
28. A squadron of Federal cavalry, from Col. Jackson’s regiment,
commanded by Major Murray, left their camp near Calhoun, Ky., on
a scouting expedition across Green river. They were attacked near
Sacramento, by a large force of rebels under Col. De Forrest, and
after a short engagement compelled to retire. Capt. A. G. Bacon was
killed, and Lieut. R. H. King, of Frankfort, and 8 privates wounded.
Capt. Merriweather and two privates of the rebels were killed, and a
number wounded.
30. The rebel Gen. H. H. Sibley having entered New Mexico with a
military force without opposition, took possession of it, and annexed
it to the Southern Confederacy by proclamation.
30. Messrs. Thomas and Burnett, of Ky., were “qualified” and took
their seats in the rebel Congress at Richmond, Va.
31. Two boats under Acting Masters A. Allen, and H. L. Sturges,
from the U. S. steamer, Mount Vernon, destroyed a light ship off
Wilmington, N.C., which the rebels had fitted up for a gunboat. The
expedition was at night, and the boats were under fire from Fort
Caswell, but escaped injury.
31. Capt. Shillinglaw and Mason, N. Y. 79th, and Lieutenants
Dickinson, 3rd U. S. infantry, J. W. Hart, 20th Indiana, and other
officers and men were released by the rebels from Richmond, Va.
31. Capture of the town of Biloxi, Miss, by U. S. gunboats Lewis,
Water Witch, and New London, with national forces from Ship
Island. The town and fort surrendered without a fight. The guns were
removed by Commander Smith, and the Federals retired.
1862.
Jan. 1. The rebel Commissioners Mason and Slidell, with their

Secretaries, left Boston for England, via Provincetown, Mass., where
the British war steamer Rinaldo received them.
1. Col. H. Brown opened fire from Fort Pickens on the rebel vessels
and fortifications within range of his guns, which was returned by
the enemy.
1. The British bark Empress arrived at New York as a prize, with
6,500 bags of coffee, captured by the U. S. sloop-of-war Vincennes,
off New Orleans bar.
1. Part of the Louisville and Nashville railway was destroyed by
order of the rebel Gen. Buckner.
1. Skirmish at Port Royal Ferry, S. C. Federal troops under Gen.
Stevens, with the assistance of five gunboats, crossed from Beaufort
to the mainland and attacked batteries erected by the rebels, who
retreated towards Grahamville. Federal loss, 3 killed, 11 wounded.
Rebels, 6 killed, 12 wounded.
1. Jeff. Owens, Col. Jones, and 50 rebel bridge-burners were
captured near Martinsburg, Adrian Co., Mo., by State militia under
General Schofield.
1. Four Federal soldiers were captured, 1 killed, and 10 guns taken
by a party of rebels on Green river, Ky., near Morgantown.
2. The U. S. gunboats Yankee and Anacosta, exchanged shots with
the rebel batteries at Cockpit Point, on the Potomac.
2. Daniel P. White of Ky., qualified and took his seat in the
Confederate Congress.
3. Col. Glover, with 300 Federal troops, attacked a rebel camp 9
miles N. of Hunnewell, Mo., taking 8 prisoners, putting the rest to
flight, and capturing a quantity of arms, &c.
3. 240 released Federal prisoners arrived at Fortress Monroe from
Richmond.
4. The 84th Pa., 39th Ill., 500 cavalry and other troops were driven
from Bath, Va., by a superior rebel force under Gen. Jackson, who
took 30 Federals prisoners. The Federals retreated to Hancock, Md.
7 rebels were killed and a number wounded. 3 of the Federals were
killed, several wounded.
4. Skirmish at Huntersville, W. Va. A portion of the 25th Ohio, 2d
Va., and Bracken’s Ind. cavalry, all under Major Webster, attacked a
rebel force of 400 cavalry and 350 infantry who were guarding the
rebel supplies at that depot. They were routed with a loss of 2 killed
and 7 wounded, leaving $50,000 worth of army stores which were
destroyed by Unionists.
5. Skirmish on the mainland near Port Royal, S. C. 7 rebels were
captured.
5. Rebel army under Gen. Jackson bombarded Hancock, Md. from
the opposite Va. shore, but were driven away by artillery forces under
Gen. Lander without a close engagement.
5. Five Federal soldiers were killed by rebels in ambush in Johnson
Co., Kansas.
6. 4,000 Cherokee Indians were driven from their homes by Texas
rebels.
7. Destruction of bridges and culverts on the Balt. and Ohio
railway, near the Cacapon river, by rebel Gen. Jackson.
7. Engagement at Blue’s Gap, near Romney, W. Va. Federal troops
under Col. Dunning, of the 5th Ohio, attacked 2,000 of the enemy,
routing them with the loss of 15 killed, 20 prisoners, 2 pieces of
cannon, their wagons, &c. No Federal loss.
7. 300 of the 32d Ohio, under Capt. Lacey, were sent by Gen.
Milroy into Tucker Co., Va., where they dispersed 400 rebels,
capturing 2 officers and a private, and a large quantity of stores. 4
rebels were found dead and many were wounded.
7. Three brigades of Gen. Smith’s division, S. side of the Potomac,
proceeded toward Peacock Hill, Lewinsville, Fairfax Court House
and Vienna, and captured an immense quantity of hay, oats, corn,
&c.
7. A band of rebels having seized a quantity of army stores from
the depot at Sutton, Braxton Co., W. Va., information was sent to
Col. H. Anisansel, commanding 1st Virginia Cavalry, at Clarksburg.
The Col. overtook the rebels 30 miles E. of Sutton, and, attacking
them, killed or wounded 22, took 15 horses and 56 head of cattle, and
recaptured the greater part of the stores.
7. Skirmish at Paintsville, near Prestonburg, Ky. Col. Garfield
dispersed 2,500 rebels under Humphrey Marshall, killing 3,
wounding a large number, and capturing 15. Federal loss 2 killed and
1 wounded.
8. The newspapers of Missouri were put under military censorship,
and their editors ordered to send two copies of each issue to the
Provost-Marshal.
8. Riot at Warsaw, Mo. Two secessionists were shot.
8. Reconnoissance of gunboats towards Savannah, Ga., under
command of Capt. Davis.
8. Capt. Latham and 17 men of 2d Virginia regiment, encountered
about 30 rebel guerrillas on the Dry Fork of Cheat river, W. Va., and
after a severe fight of an hour’s duration, the rebels were driven from
the field with the loss of 6 killed and several wounded. Federal loss 6
wounded. Capt. Latham destroyed the rebel tents and provisions.

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A review of uncertainty visualization

errors: Working memory as an

Psychology of Learning and Motivation Copyright # 2021 Elsevier Inc. 1

2 Lace Padilla et al.

Uncertainty visualization errors 3

4 Lace Padilla et al.

The red icons in Treatment A represent a larger portion of side effects

Uncertainty visualization errors 5

uncertainty visualizations can exacerbate the difficulty people have in rea-

6 Lace Padilla et al.

Uncertainty visualization errors 7

2. Visualization decision-making framework

2.1 Visual array and attention

Fig. 3 Visualization decision-making model proposed by Padilla et al. (2018).

8 Lace Padilla et al.

Bayesian priors representing previous beliefs and experiences. Errors that

2.2 Working memory

Uncertainty visualization errors 9

10 Lace Padilla et al.

2.3 Visual description

Uncertainty visualization errors 11

A visual description allows for enough understanding to mentally transform,

2.4 Graph schemas

2.5 Matching process

12 Lace Padilla et al.

2.6 Instantiated graph schema

2.7 Message assembly

2.8 Conceptual question

Uncertainty visualization errors 13

14 Lace Padilla et al.

3. Uncertainty visualization errors

3.1 Early-stage processing errors

16 Lace Padilla et al.

3.1.1 Boundaries 5 conceptual categories

Uncertainty visualization errors 17

like a bounded circle, participants were more likely to take a containment

Uncertainty visualization errors 19

20 Lace Padilla et al.

Fig. 8 Ambiguous Gestalt grouping example.

Uncertainty visualization errors 21

significant effort. Mentally grouping the small objects requires suppressing or

22 Lace Padilla et al.

saccadic movements toward such salient information. Thus, the boundary

3.2 Middle-stage processing errors

Geographically Accurate London Tube Map Diagrammatic London Tube Map

24 Lace Padilla et al.

Visual description Schema retrieval

Fig. 11 Three-step schema instantiation process.

Uncertainty visualization errors 25

Fig. 12 Hypothetical new coordinate plane.

26 Lace Padilla et al.

3.2.1 Schema errors in hurricane visualizations

Uncertainty visualization errors 27

in the world. However, cone-like hurricane forecasts violate cartographic

28 Lace Padilla et al.

Uncertainty visualization errors 29

Researchers tested the hypothesis that viewers use a geospatial travel

30 Lace Padilla et al.

3.2.2 Deterministic construal errors

Uncertainty visualization errors 31

3.3 Late-stage errors

32 Lace Padilla et al.

specific to reasoning with visual information and are studied significantly