Donald Trump as Löwenthal’s American Agitator:

Conspiracy, Wealth and the ‘Charade of Doom’

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in Politics

Student Number: 170318796

Supervised by Dr Ben Coulson

POL3048 Project in Politics: Semester 2

School of Geography, Politics and Sociology

August 2020
Abstract

Drawing upon the scholarly research of Leo Löwenthal and Norbert Guterman, this study
examines the extent to which [President] Donald Trump is representative of the ‘American
agitator’. It isolates several agitational techniques described in their 1949 book, Prophets of
Deceit, and analyses them against Trump’s rhetorical style. It questions the extent to which
Trump’s widespread support and momentum are less a reflection of America’s inherent
prejudices, but rather a ‘product of calculated techniques of [political]
communication’ (Prophets of Deceit: xii). Through a thematic analysis of Trump’s ‘Tweets’
and speeches, we find that Löwenthal’s theoretical framework can shed light on the recent
successes of Donald Trump and the strength of his support. It concludes that Trump’s
popular appeal and unconventional [digital] rhetoric is best understood through a
Löwenthalian reading of agitation. Although Löwenthal directed his critique towards older
mediums of political communication, such as newspaper print, radio and film, it remains
highly applicable to the digital sphere. This project focuses on three core themes: the
agitator’s frequent use of conspiracy; his appeals to the ‘possibility of total
disaster’ (‘Charade of Doom’); and the role of personal wealth in populist mobilisations. As an
example of conspiracy, we investigate Trump’s fake news discourse, its demonisation of
critical [media] opponents, as well as its effectiveness amongst the American public.
Additionally, we consider Adorno's concept of ‘negative integration’ and argue that it can
usefully supplement the theoretical deficiencies of Löwenthal’s analysis.

Table of Contents

1 Introduction 2

1.1 Prophets of Deceit: Historical Background 2

2 Theme 1: Conspiracy 3

2.1 Trump’s Fake News Discourse 4

2.2 Limitations of Löwenthal’s Analysis of Agitational Conspiracy 8

3 Theme 2: Wealth as Vice 9

3.1 Adorno’s Negative Integration 9

4 Theme 3: ‘The Charade of Doom’ 11

4.1 Make America Great Again 13

4.2 A Note on Historical Relativism 15

4.3 An Emancipatory Project: The Practical Relevance of Löwenthal’s Theory 16

5 Conclusion 17

Bibliography 18

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 1 Introduction

Scholars have long recognised the Frankfurt School’s ability to ‘[provide] unique and powerful
perspectives to conceptualise, explain and critique recent socio-political developments’ (Kellner,
1989:182). Although writing in 1989, Kellner’s sentiment captures the ‘extraordinary insight’ and
continuing relevance of their work on American politics, society and culture. Rather than falling into
neglect, the Frankfurt School’s rich body of writing has enjoyed a [popular and scholarly] revival in
recent years, especially those concerning populist authoritarianism (Abromeit, 2017; Rensmann,
2017; Jeffries, 2017). The rise of a former reality TV star to the world’s highest political office —
and his use of unconventional and incendiary rhetoric — was undoubtedly fundamental to this
trend (ibid.). Critical Theorists have investigated the proliferation of populist and authoritarian
forces in Europe (Gandesha, 2017; Rensmann, 2018; Fuchs, 2018), the U.K (Morelock, 2018) and
the United States (Abromeit, 2017). Since this research relied primarily on Theodor Adorno,
Herbert Marcuse, Max Horkheimer and Erich Fromm, the writings of Leo Löwenthal and Norbert
Guterman have been relatively under-researched and under-applied, despite their relevance to
America’s current political environment. Accordingly, this project examines the extent to which
Donald Trump reflects the characteristics of the ‘American agitator’, as exposed by Löwenthal and
Guterman in Prophets of Deceit: The Techniques of the American Agitator. Although Löwenthal
directed his critique towards older mediums of political communication, such as newspaper print,
radio and film, it remains highly applicable to the digital sphere. After providing historical
background, this project focuses on three agitational themes: the agitator’s frequent use of
conspiracy; his appeals to the ‘possibility of total disaster’ (‘Charade of Doom’); and the role of
personal wealth in populist mobilisations.

1.1 Prophets of Deceit: Historical Background

After their exile from Germany to the United States in 1935 following Hitler’s rise to power, the
Institute for Social Research (Institut für Sozialforschung) — spearheaded by its new director, Max
Horkheimer — directed itself towards a critique of American society. Their status as refugees in
America ‘imbued their work with a tremendous vitality and a sense of relevance’, with Frankfurt
School scholars publishing in the fields of psychoanalysis, political science, economics, sociology
and philosophy, among others (Wrong, 1950:279). The development of European fascism [and the
failure of socialist revolution] in Germany prompted members of the ‘Horkheimer Circle’ to focus
their attention on [populist] authoritarianism or, in Löwenthalian terms, ‘agitation’. Fearing that
American society was also ‘susceptible to … the psychological manipulation and mass anti-
semitism’ of ideologues like Hitler, Leo Löwenthal, a German sociologist, and Norbert Guterman, a
Polish scholar and translator, co-authored Prophets of Deceit. Published in 1949, this book sought
to investigate America’s pro-fascist sentiment by analysing the speeches, literature and radio

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broadcasts of mid-twentieth century demagogues; namely, Charles Coughlin, Carl H. Mote and
William Dudley Pelley. Löwenthal (1949) details the prototypical agitator and his relationship to
American audiences, as well as contextual factors ‘which combine to offer a fertile field for …
demagogical appeal’ (Friedman, 1950:199). He theorised that agitation was ‘not merely a
pathology of German culture or German backwardness … but was instead a potential threat in all
societies’ (Abromeit, 2018:8). While the subjects of Löwenthal’s analysis gained only marginal
political influence, their techniques remain both effective and widely used (ibid.). The following
sections describe three agitational themes/techniques advanced by Löwenthal and investigates
whether they actualise in the [digital] rhetoric and behaviour of President Donald Trump.

2 Theme 1: Conspiracy

For Löwenthal, the agitator’s use of ‘conspiratorial rhetoric’ was fundamental to his method. The
agitator characterises his audience 'not merely as cheated but as cheated systematically,
consistently, and perpetually… for [they] are the victims of a comprehensive and carefully planned
political conspiracy’ (Löwenthal, 1949:23).1 His followers, influenced by their leader’s rhetoric,
consider themselves ‘eternal dupes’ and ascribe their sufferings to the ‘secret enemy machinations’
of elites (ibid., 24). Investigating the use of conspiracy by post-war political figures, Kevin Gotham
(1992:65) found that J. Edgar Hoover’s ‘symbolic construction of the Communist Menace’ in his
1958 handbook book, Masters of Deceit, closely resembled this motif described by Löwenthal.
Gotham argues that Hoover consciously ‘exaggerated the perils of Communist subversion, deceit
and hysteria,’ while simultaneously demonstrating the ability of America and the FBI to ‘tackle [any]
communist threat’ (ibid.:57). Although not an agitator per se, by propagating this narrative of a
grand conspiracy, Hoover ‘acted as both evil seer and good shepherd — playing on vague fears,
discontents, and insecurities of foreign subversion’ (ibid.). In other words, the prototypical agitator
encourages his audiences to (i) conceptualise a ‘carefully planned’ conspiracy (foreign or
domestic) (ii) perceive it as threatening to their [American] values and ‘way of life’, and then (iii)
mobilise around his movement in order to contain the threat (Löwenthal, 1949:4). Löwenthal’s
agitator does this, not by ‘moulding his audience’s beliefs into a specific and predetermined cast,’
but by exploiting their underlying attitudes towards America’s political system — such as general
suspicion of government, powerful elites and the media (ibid:5). As Löwenthal (1949:5) writes: ‘He
does not confront his audience from the outside; he seems rather like someone arising from its
midst to express its innermost thoughts. He works from inside the audience, stirring up what lies
dormant there’. Through allegations of conspiracy, the agitator thereby ‘functions to ignite these
dispositions into a proverbial inferno’ of mass paranoia, suspicion and political mobilisation
(Gothan, 1992:58).

1This essay uses ‘he/his’ pronouns to describe agitators to follow the style and descriptions in
Löwenthal and Guterman’s writings.
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Trump has a long tradition of accusing influential political actors, as well as more vulnerable
individuals ([irregular] migrants and minorities) of engaging in conspiracies (Uscinski, 2016).
Appearing on Good Morning America in 2011, for example, he openly supported the ‘birther
conspiracy theory’ which held that President Obama was not a natural-born citizen, and therefore
ineligible to serve as president (ibid.). Pressure from Trump’s Republican audience would later
force the White House to release President Obama’s official birth certificate, thus negating the
conspiracy, but demonstrating its faculty for coercing political action/mobilisation (BBC News,
2011). More recently in 2018, in the wake of Puerto Rico’s Hurricane Maria, Trump accused
Democrats of exaggerating the official death toll: ‘3000 people did not die in the two hurricanes …
[Puerto Rico] had anywhere from 6 to 18 deaths’ (Trump, 2018a). Despite government reports
stating a figure of 2,975 people killed (MIPH, 2018), Trump suggested that statistical meddling ‘…
was done by the Democrats … to make me look as bad as possible when I was successfully
raising Billions of Dollars to help [the country]’ (Trump, 2018b, emphasis added). In another recent
allegation, Trump claimed that a 75-year old protester, who was assaulted by police during a Black
Lives Matter rally in Buffalo, was a ‘provocateur’ and part of a ‘set up’ by the [so-called] Radical left.
Trump tweeted: ‘[He] could be an ANTIFA provocateur. [He] was pushed away after appearing to
scan police communications in order to blackout the equipment. I watched, he fell harder than was
pushed. Was aiming scanner. Could be a setup?’ (Trump, 2020a). All of these conspiracies reflect
Trump’s consistent suspicion of ideological opponents and his willingness to peddle alternative
narratives (Uscinski, 2016). Perhaps most reflective of Trump’s conspiratorial methods, however, is
his [infamous] creation of a ‘fake news’ discourse.

2.2 Trump’s Fake News Discourse

Defined here as ‘news that is either wholly false or containing deliberately misleading elements
incorporated within its content or context,’ fake news — and Trump’s consistent allegations of its
use by political and media adversaries — proved central to his election victory (Bakir and McStay,
2017; Ross and Rivers, 2018:2). The entry of anti-media concepts (‘fake news’, ‘the mainstream
media’, ‘LameStream media’, ‘Fake Suppression Polls’) to the lexicon of American political
discourse indicates the extent to which conspiracy is fundamental to Trump’s agitation (ibid.). Alcott
and Gentzkow (2017:217) identify two central motivations behind the production and circulation of
fake news stories; pecuniary and ideological. Individuals and organisations motivated by the former
attempt to draw profits from ‘click-though’ site advertisements, without regard for ideology: Those
motivated by the latter seek to promote candidates they favour and oppose their respective rivals
(ibid.:218). Political actors who directly accuse their rivals of propagating and endorsing fake news,
whether campaign opponents, reporters or news institutions, share similar incentives, but are also
motivated by the creation of collective identity. In this vein, Polletta and Callahan (2017) echoing

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Löwenthal (1949), locate the [agitational] strength of conspiracy narratives in their ability to create
a powerful sense of in-group identity among the speaker and his audience.

Trump appears to utilise this particular strength of conspiracy narratives. On Twitter and in
campaign speeches, he uses derogatory labels against media organisations — such as ‘Fake
News LameStream [sic] Media’ or the ‘failing New York Times’ — and depicts them as ‘the true
ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE’; part of a grand conspiracy against Trump and his supporters (See
Table 1). Example five of Table 1 closely resembles Löwenthal’s conceptualisation of grand
conspiracy, which the agitator ‘extends indefinitely’: Here, Trump talks of a ‘GIANT AND ILLEGAL
HOAX’ created by his political and ideological opponents, most notably, Hillary Clinton and the
‘liberal elite’. Through his accusations, Trump thus constructs an in-group, consisting of those who
realise and appreciate the threat of the 'fake news media', and a sinister out-group, who are
complicit in the plot against the American ‘way of life' (Löwenthal & Guterman, 17; Polletta &
Callahan, 2017). Constant repetition of these group constructions, on Twitter and in his electoral
and presidential speeches, functions to reinforce in-group identity: He reminds his audience that
they, the ‘eternal dupes’, are ‘wise to [the media’s] game of dishonesty and deception’, and
promises to oppose the [perceived] threat of fake news in all its forms (Trump, 2019c; Löwenthal &
Guterman, 17).

Trump also reflects Löwenthal's conspiratorial techniques in his exploitation of the audience's
dispositions; namely, the public’s diminishing trust of institutionalised media. From 2000, citizen
‘trust and confidence’ in America’s mass media ‘when it comes to reporting [the] news fully,
accurately and fairly’ has been characterised by a persistent decline (Alcott & Gentzkow,
2017:215). During and following the 2016 presidential election, however, there was a sharp
decrease among Republican voters; due, at least in part, to Trump’s fake news conspiracy (ibid.).
Just as the prototypical agitator ‘appears to arise from [the audience’s] midst’ by expressing his
followers’ latent fears, Trump articulates his audiences’ anti-media frustrations, thus making his
rhetoric appear natural, organic and expressive of their ‘innermost thoughts’ (Löwenthal &
Guterman, 1949). Trump’s narrative merely affirms the preexisting suspicions of his audience: ‘The
degree to which [his] narrative [can] align with an individual’s perception of the world, irrespective
of factual accuracy, truthfulness, and objective reality, is what matters most in affirming
beliefs’ (Ross and Rivers, 2018:3). As Löwenthal (1949:25) puts it, the agitator ‘enhances his
listeners’ sense of distrust by reminding them that they are ruled by remote control, … exposed to
constant sinister manipulations, and cheated all along the line through the press’. In this regard, by
exploiting the dispositions of his audience, Trump’s rhetoric sharply reflects the conspiratorial
motifs detailed by Löwenthal.

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Trump's persistent attacks on any media organisations critical of his policies [or personal character]
are also typical of Löwenthal’s agitator. ‘Any organisation the agitator conceives as hostile to his
aims,’ Löwenthal (1949) writes, ‘he includes in the conspiracy. He speaks of [them] as seeking ‘to
destroy … the American way of life.’ Trump includes most traditional news firms in the pejorative
category of the ‘Main Stream Media’ (MSM), whether centre-left and centre-right, such as CNN and
The Wall Street Journal, respectively (ibid.). Trump’s accusations are not merely part of his
rhetorical conspiracy but are followed by tangible action against the media. In 2018, for example,
Trump opposed his alleged conspirators by revoking the White House press pass of a CNN
reporter, Jim Acosta, whom he accused of disseminating fake news (The Guardian, 2018).

It is unsurprising that Trump’s accusations of fake news do not apply to pro-Trump media
organisations, such as Fox News, Breitbart and Infowars. Trump frequently retweets these outlets
and praises them for exposing the ‘secret machinations’ of [anti-Trump] fake news organisations
(ibid.). Rather than providing verifiable facts and informing citizens with clarity, these pro-Trump
organisations function as ‘echo chambers’ by endorsing and disseminating fake news narratives
(Polletta & Callahan, 2017; Ross & Rivers, 2018). Contrary to journalistic orthodoxy, ‘they
[deliberately] assume a pedagogical role by instructing their audiences how to interpret mainstream
news’ (Polletta & Callahan, 2017). Pro-Trump media organisations thus facilitate and extend the

Table 1. Selection of Trump’s recent accusations of fake news on Twitter.

Example Date of Tweet Tweet (@realDonaldTrump)

i. 21 August 2019 The Fake News LameStream Media is doing everything possible [to] “create” a U.S. recession
even though the numbers and facts are working totally in the opposite direction.

ii. 15 August 2019 The Fake News Media is doing everything they can to crash the economy because they think that
will be bad for me and my re-election

iii. 19 May 2019 Watched some of the Fake News Political Shows this morning … every question is asked in the
most negative way. …The USA is wise to your game of dishonesty and deception!

iv. 8 February 2019 ...It is all a GIANT AND ILLEGAL HOAX, developed long before the election itself, but used as
an excuse by the Democrats as to why Crooked Hillary Clinton lost the Election! Someday the
Fake News Media will turn honest!

v. 25 June 2020 The Fake News and phony Fake Suppression Polls have never been worse. The Lamestream
Media has gone CRAZY!

vi. 20 May 2019 The Mainstream Media has never been as corrupt and deranged as it is today. FAKE NEWS is
actually the biggest story of all and is the true ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE! That’s why they refuse
to cover the REAL Russia Hoax. But the American people are wise to what is going on.....

Table 2. Selection of Trump’s populist (‘establishment’) campaign rhetoric on Twitter.

Example Date of Tweet Tweet (@realDonaldTrump)

i. 18 March 2016 With millions of dollars of negative and phony ads against me by the establishment, my numbers
continue to go up. Can anyone explain this?

ii. Tweeted 7 times from The Establishment and special interests are absolutely killing our country. We must put
5-12 August 2016 #AmericaFirst

iii. 16 March 2016 In the last 2 weeks, I had $35M of negative ads against me in Florida & I won in a massive
landslide.The establishment should save their $$!

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use of Trump’s fake news narrative — from the individual Twitter feeds of his supporters to the
institutionalised press — and further reinforce ‘in-group’ identity (ibid.). Much to the dismay of
Löwenthal and the Frankfurt School, one can speculate, these hallmarks of contemporary reporting
‘have diminished the critical power of other news sources’ and weakened the civic role of
journalism (Polletta & Callahan, 2017). Trump and pro-Trump media encourage supporters to view
any negative press as false, unreliable and fashioned with intent to subvert. Trump thereby
encourages individuals to view his Twitter feed and ideological allies as the sole sources of valid
and truthful information, free from suppression of the media (Ross & Rivers, 2018:1).

Trump not only alleges fake news against political opponents but creates a distinct set of concepts
in order to (i) support his conspiracy and (ii) deflect any criticism from enemy press outlets. Similar
to Hoover’s construction of the ‘Communist Menace’, Trump thus devises an ontological framework
through which he — and, more importantly, his audience — can view the social world around them
with constant suspicion. This ‘post-truth’ worldview is one in which ‘the factual [validity] of media
claims is increasingly irrelevant’ (Ross & Rivers, 2018:2). Previously unknown concepts, such as
‘alternative facts’, infamously employed by the U.S Counsellor to the President, Kellyanne Conway,
epitomise Trump’s ‘post-factual’ political rhetoric (Ross & Rivers, 2018; Blake, 2017). Trump utilises
this ‘fake news’ ontology, typically via Twitter, as ‘an instrument of strategy to disseminate his own
[ideological] discourse’, while simultaneously invalidating almost all criticism from the ‘Main Stream
Media’ (Kreis, 2017:609). Löwenthal (1949:18) alludes to a similar phenomenon in Prophets,
stating that the agitator’s conspiracies ‘distorts [the audience’s] sense of objectivity’. Accordingly,
while paranoid conspiracy is not new to American political discourse (Hofstadter, 1964), through his
fake news ontology, Trump has successfully extended its use (and misuse) to all features of the
socio-political environment.

For Löwenthal (1949:26), the effectiveness of any conspiratorial rhetoric lies in its ability to ‘satisfy
the audience’s craving for an explanation of its sufferings’ and the pervasive environment of social
malaise. Such satisfaction is illusionary and counter-productive because the agitator ‘always
suggests that what is necessary is the elimination of people, rather than a change in the political
structure’ (Löwenthal, 1948:16). For the agitator/Trump, therefore, ‘every social phenomenon is
reified, and every anonymous, complex social process or structure is personalised and
simplified’ (Rensmann, 2018:36). By directing his followers to critique allegedly subversive
organisations or political actors rather than macro [social, economic and political] forces, the
agitator ‘cheats his audience of its curiosity’ (Löwenthal, 1949:17). Agitation thus forestalls what the
Frankfurt School believed was most vital for substantive social and political change; a critical
analysis of the totality (Horkheimer, 2001). Löwenthal considered this ability of agitational rhetoric
to preclude social change, through ‘grand conspiracy’ or otherwise, as a fundamental danger to
American society.
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2.3 Limitations of Löwenthal’s Analysis of Conspiracy

While he rightly deems conspiracy as vital to the agitational method and the prevention of critical
analysis, Löwenthal’s analysis cannot sufficiently recognise its ever-expanding role in America’s
contemporary political discourse. Löwenthal and his Frankfurt School colleagues believed that
objective social circumstances are ‘primarily responsible for the persistent undercurrents of
resentments [and fears] that enable the rise of [mass agitation]’ (Rensmann, 2017:42). They
conceded, however, that certain socio-political conditions may provide greater opportunities for
agitational mass manipulation than others, thus allowing it to ‘transform into a politically relevant
destructive force’ (ibid.). One such condition is the extent to which mass communication enables
what Rensmann (2017:43) calls ‘semi-public, quotidian and public [political] discourses’. In this
vein, Twitter and other digital platforms, such as Facebook, Reddit and Instagram, are increasingly
used as a way of disseminating political information, disinformation and viewpoints (Ross & Rivers,
2018:1; Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). In contrast to the institutionalised mediums of radio, print and
cinema that Löwenthal analysed, user-based platforms allow the public to disseminate and relay
the agitator’s conspiracies with relative ease. Users engage in ‘quotidian’ discourses ‘[without]
significant third party filtering, fact-checking, or editorial judgement,’ thus providing the agitator and
his audience greater opportunity to influence the socio-political status-quo (Allcott & Gentzkow,
2017:211). This phenomenon persists despite the introduction of fake news to the contemporary
digital lexicon and greater public awareness of mass disinformation (ibid.). Accordingly, the advent
of mass social media has prompted a normative shift of power; from the media magnates and
news corporations of Löwenthal’s era to individual users and online political communities within the
digital ecosystem. The trend of increasing digital communication thus continues to augment the
power of the agitator and his conspiratorial techniques in ways that Löwenthal could not have
foreseen.

Table 3. Selection of Trump’s campaign Tweets regarding wealth.

Example Date of Tweet Tweet (@realDonaldTrump)

i. 1 August 2016 Hillary Clinton raked in money from regimes that horribly oppress women and gays & refuses to
speak out against Radical Islam.

ii. 21 June 2016 Hillary took money and did favors for regimes that enslave women and murder gays.

iii. 16 July 2016 Very sad that a person who has made so many mistakes, Crooked Hillary Clinton, can put out
such false and vicious ads with her phony money!

iv. 16 July 2016 Crooked Hillary is spending big Wall Street money on ads saying I don't have foreign policy
experience, yet look what her policies have done!

v. 17 January 2016 I am self-funding my campaign - putting up my own money, not controlled. Cruz is spending
$millions on ads paid for by his N.Y. bosses.

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 3 Theme 2: Wealth as Vice
One aspect in which Trump differs considerably from Löwenthal and Guterman’s ‘American
agitator’ is the latter’s consistent denouncement of wealth and materialism. Löwenthal’s agitator
describes and condemns the [alleged] material excesses of his political enemies, branding their
lifestyles as ‘un-American, characteristic of foreigners and refugees who squander fortunes when
they are not busy stealing jobs from Americans’ (Löwenthal and Guterman, 1949: 27). He mistrusts
the ‘very presence of material comfort’ and actively encourages resentment against it by stirring up
the audience’s ‘moral disgust of [real or imagined] corrupt practices’ (ibid.). Thus, for the agitator
and his audience, Löwenthal argues, wealth is the ‘forbidden fruit’ since it signifies the ‘debauch
and vice’ of America’s political elites (ibid., 28).

Concerning wealth, however, Trump represents the antithesis of Löwenthal and Guterman’s
characterisation of the proto-fascist agitator. Rather than encouraging resentment of material
excesses and showing open hostility to corporate power, Trump encourages his audiences —
consciously and consistently — to view his wealth as a ‘vital credential’ for his presidential bid
(Abromeit, 2018; Winberg, 2017). As Abromeit (2018:16) notes, ‘he insists that his achievements
as a wealthy businessman, successful real estate developer and tough negotiator are the ideal
qualifications to ‘make America great again.’’ In Trump’s words, he discusses his $9bn net-worth
not ‘to brag… [but to] show that it is the kind of thinking our country needs’ (The Guardian, 2015).
Trump’s materialist rhetoric also manifests in his choice of cabinet upon election; which is, ‘without
doubt, the wealthiest in American history’ (Siniver and Featherstone, 2020). A study by Kopf (2016)
found that Trump's ‘initial seventeen cabinet choices held a combined wealth greater than that of a
third of all American households’. Scholars of American populism thus theorised that the
unparalleled level of wealth within the current federal administration heralds the rise of ‘populist
plutocracy’ (Linker, 2016; Pierson, 2017). For our purposes, however, and contrary to Löwenthal
and Guterman’s characterisation, the higher the agitator’s [alleged] wealth and that of his ‘gilded
cabinet’, the more he can employ and exploit his public image as America’s ‘dealmaker-in-
chief’ (Kar, 2017; Gearan & Lynch, 2019; Siniver & Featherstone, 2020).

3.1 Adorno’s Negative Integration

While Löwenthal and Guterman’s analysis fails to address or navigate this particular rhetorical and
ideological shift, other writers of the Frankfurt School can shed light on the role of wealth in populist
agitation. Most notable of these is Theodor Adorno in his discussion of ‘negative integration’.
Negative integration is the most fundamental thesis of Adorno's 1950 book, The Authoritarian
Personality, which analysed the psychosocial mechanics of authoritarianism in the United States
(Bertstein, 2017; Adorno et al., 1950). Negative integration refers to the authoritarian subject’s
tendency to ‘define themselves negatively through a negative relation to various [religious, political,
9
ethnic, or national] out-groups’ (ibid.). As Adorno et al. write, ‘[they] fall negatively in love with the
out-group enemies they construct’. Negative integration thus produces a constructed ‘in-group’ that
lacks, what Adorno et al. (1950:41) call, an ‘affirmative, necessary or positive content’. In the
context of authoritarianism or agitation, Adorno et al. consider this process as a central component
of identity formation. Bernstein (2017) extends this view, implying that negatively derived identities
are more flexible and durable than those originating from positive norms and ideals. He suggests
that ‘Even when affirmative identities fail, a practical analogue of the social space of worth can be
accomplished through social hatred: the worthless and dangerous out-group becomes the negative
source fuelling self-affirmation’ (Bernstein, 2017). In other words, because such groups base their
identity entirely ‘on what they are not, on whatever differences support their claimed [distinctness]
from the out-group,’ intra-group differences thus function to reinforce collective identity, not to
divide it (ibid.). By nature of Adorno’s direct experiences of pre-war Germany, his scholarly focus
lay more firmly on the immediate victims of Nazi authoritarianism; namely, Jews, communists and
dissenting intellectuals. One can usefully apply the concept of negative integration to Trump’s
frequent political targets — Muslims, Mexicans, and the ‘Radical Left’ — which are not dissimilar to
those studied by Adorno et al. (1950). Negative integration also holds theoretical utility vis-a-vis the
category of wealth.

Since Trump supporters, as shown, are not intrinsically resentful of wealth and success (Siniver
and Featherstone, 2020; Abromeit, 2017), a qualifier is necessary to apply Adorno’s concept to this
category. Trump’s stylistic armoury is loaded with populist phrases, many of which reflect the sharp
dichotomy between establishment wealth and that of the working man (See Table 2) (ibid.). Trump
(2017, Inaugural Address) stresses that Wall Street financiers, liberal elites and business lobbyists
have ‘robbed’ the latter and ‘reaped the rewards of government while the people have borne the
cost’. He frequently reminds his audience that ‘I am self-funding my campaign … putting up my
own money, not controlled’ (Trump, 2016e). Here, Trump negatively constructs an image of the
people’s wealth as hard-earned, righteous and authentic, while presenting wealth derived from the
‘establishment’, special interests or ‘[liberal] elite’ as crooked, undeserved and morally dubious
(see Table 3). There is a clear distinction between the [negative] ‘in-group’ and their enemies,
which Trump depicts as opposed in both morals and wealth. Trump consistently advances this
emotionally charged image, leaving little room for political nuance or subtlety (Homolar & Scholz,
2019). In doing so, as Löwenthal and Guterman (1949:26, 36) suggest, the agitator effectively
‘cheats his audience of its curiosity’ and ‘[encourages them] to follow the path of least intellectual
resistance’. Trump’s agitation — and, by extension, its use of ‘materialist rhetoric’ — is ‘decidedly
populist in orientation’ (Homolar and Scholz, 2019: 355; Abromeit, 2018). Accordingly, while
Löwenthal gives sufficient theoretical attention to different forms of ‘othering’, his concept of wealth
as the ‘forbidden [materialist] fruit’ cannot apply to Trump (Löwenthal & Guterman, 1949). Adorno’s

10
notion of negative integration, when combined with Löwenthal’s thematic analysis of the agitator,
thus provides a degree of conceptual flexibility that accounts for the populist elements of Trump’s
agitational method.

4 Theme 3: The ‘Charade of Doom’

In the chapter entitled ‘The Charade of Doom’, Löwenthal and Guterman (1949:33) identify that
almost all advocates of social, economic or political change ‘invoke the possibility of total disaster
… as a contrast to their solutions’. Reformers, revolutionaries and agitators, the three primary
‘categories’ advanced in Prophets of Deceit, employ this rhetoric of potential national disintegration
in different ways and for different purposes. The former two encourage their audience(s) to
conceptualise the prospect of ‘catastrophe’ as ‘a definite obstacle to be removed’; be it the
capitalist system, environmentally damaging policies, anti-minority laws or nationalism, for example
(ibid.:34). While these two figures abuse their audiences’ latent fears and apprehensions, the
reformer and revolutionary ‘summon [them] to work towards an achievable utopia rather than to
flee from imminent danger’ (ibid., 33). In other words, the social solutions advanced by reformers
and revolutionaries tend to be positive, objective and pragmatic [in the Horkheimian sense],
despite their emotional appeals to the ‘possibility of disaster’ (Horkheimer, 2001; Löwenthal &
Guterman, 1949: 33). Similar to the reformer or revolutionary, the agitator’s objective is to promote
within his audience a ‘pervasive sense of fear and insecurity’ by elaborating on specific problems
of the social reality (Löwenthal & Guterman, 1949:14; Gotham, 1992). Agitation hinges on the
ability of the agitator to successfully exaggerate and manipulate of what Löwenthal (1949:15) calls
social malaise; ‘the modern individual's sense of isolation, his so-called spiritual homelessness, his
bewilderment in the face of the seemingly impersonal forces of which he feels himself a helpless
victim’. This social malaise is ‘both the origin of agitation and the field in which agitation
flourishes’ (ibid., 138).

Trump’s rhetoric patently reflects the ‘Charade of Doom’ motif. At pre-election rallies, for example,
he articulated his supporters’ concern at America’s diminishing national power, economic strength
and international reputation: America is in a ‘state in crisis’, a ‘dumping ground for everyone else’s
problems’ and a ‘third-world country’ (Homolar & Scholz, 2019:356). The ‘Charade of Doom’
invoked by Trump encompasses all aspects of American society: ‘The attacks on our police, and
the terrorism in our cities, threaten our very way of life’ (Peters & Woolley, 2016). Here, Trump
establishes himself as a member and ally of the ‘forgotten people’ in this ‘Crisis America’ by
identifying his supporters’ inherent anxieties and fears (ibid.). He frequently explains that ‘we live in
fear in our churches and our synagogues; we live in fear that we’re going to lose our tax-exempt
status if we say anything that’s even slightly political’ (ibid., 357, emphasis added). Additionally, he
promotes audiences to view particular groups (Mexicans, migrants, Arabs, Muslims and
Democrats) as ‘objects of derisions’ and direct threats to traditional American values (Gounari,
11
2019): ‘If elected POTUS - I will stop RADICAL ISLAMIC TERRORISM in this country! … We need
to #DrainTheSwamp!’ (Trump, 2016d).

Through his frequent use of this collective terminology — or ‘we-ness’, as Homolar and Scholz
(2019:356-357) describe it — Trump establishes an ‘urgency for [radical] change’ while discursively
locating himself as the ‘primus inter pares’ (first among equals) in enacting such change
(Löwenthal, 1949:34; Homolar & Scholz, 2019). He warns his followers that ‘we need somebody
fast’ and that ‘[he] alone can fix this problem’ (Applebaum, 2016; Abromeit, 2018:19). Only by
electing Trump can ‘the people’ succeed in avoiding the ‘total disaster’ depicted by their leader and
thereby actualise his vision of ‘one glorious [national] destiny’ (Trump, 2017, Inaugural Address).
Through this reading, Trump’s success is merely a synthesis of the angst held working Americans
against his constructed ‘Crisis America’.

Yet, rather than working towards an ‘achievable utopia’, like Löwenthal’s reformer or revolutionary,
the agitator seeks a renewal of an imagined past and articulates little in terms of concrete policy
(Löwenthal & Guterman, 1949:34). As Löwenthal (1949:34) writes:

[For the American agitator], the possible alternative to the threat of disaster is either totally
lacking or suggested only in the vaguest form as a return to ‘the good old days’… [He is] full
of reactionary cliches about the 'simple American Way which our ancestors loved’… All [the
agitator] can offer is a rededication to the established…ideological framework of the
American republic as it has persisted since the founding fathers … If anything has gone
wrong, it can be only because we Americans … have strayed from American ways’

Trump’s advisers acknowledge that ‘debates and campaigns are not won or lost on policy minutiae
… [but by] staying focused on big-picture themes’ (Healy et al., 2016). It is unjustifiable to argue,
as some political commentators have, that ‘Trump has no [concrete] policies’ (Washington Post,
2017). In the sphere of foreign policy, Trump invariably declared his opposition to multilateral
orthodoxy, for example; promising to ‘renegotiate or break’ from several international agreements,
such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the 2015 Paris accords
(Druckman, 2019). Throughout his 2016 election campaign and subsequent presidency, however,
Trump’s rhetorical style — digital or otherwise — hinged on several quixotic and imprecise slogans:
namely, ‘Lock Her Up’; ‘Build the Wall’; ‘Drain the Swamp’; ‘Make America Great Again’ (MAGA)
(Holland & Fermor, 2017). Some theorists suggest that Trump’s infamous and unprecedented use
of ‘Twitter diplomacy’ is fundamental to this rhetorical trend: As Nelson (2016:45) notes, ‘Policy
details do not fit into 140-character limits’. While such arguments appreciate the inherent limits of
Twitter as an ‘outlet for public [and personal] frustrations’, they underestimate the effectiveness of
Trump’s vague language and its role in political agitation (Holland & Fermor, 2017:184). Both
Löwenthal and more contemporary critical theorists (Healy et al., 2016; Holland & Fermor, 2017),
however, recognise the power of simplistic rhetoric: ‘Despite [Trump’s] self-interruptions, angry

12
tangents and repetition of the same limited vocabulary of adjectives, [his method] is
effective’ (Holland & Fermor, 2017:185).

4.1 Make America Great Again

Make America Great Again, which Trump trademarked as his official 2016 campaign slogan,
sharply reflects the agitator’s ‘imagined past’. Capturing America’s foundational myths, MAGA
recalls the audience’s ‘romanticised nostalgia for the recent past and [promises] to deliver a
glorious patriotic future, befitting a [once] great nation’ (Holland & Fermor, 2017:184). This
recurrent conception of ‘the good old days’ is not limited to Trump’s official campaign slogans but
continues to ‘serve as the bedrock foundation [of his presidency]’ and narrational method (ibid.).
Trump modifies and elaborates upon this emotionally charged, alarmist vision throughout both his
electoral and presidential speeches. In his inaugural address, for instance, an occasion that
historically sets the tone of office (Campbell & Jamieson, 1985), he consistently refers to all
aspects of America’s imagined national past and its potentiality for renewal:

January 20th 2017, will be remembered as the day the people became the rulers of this
nation again. … We will bring back our jobs. We will bring back our borders. We will bring
back our wealth. And we will bring back our dreams. … America will start winning again …
Our country will thrive and prosper again … Together, we will make America strong again.
We will make America wealthy again. We will make America proud again. We will make
America safe again. And, yes, together, we will Make America Great Again. (Inaugural
Address, January 2017, emphasis added.)

The ambiguity of this phraseology, as described in Prophets, affords both strength and weakness
to the speaker (Löwenthal, 1949). On the one hand, the agitator’s narrational strength derives from
the subjectivity of his message. As Löwenthal (1949:17) writes, ‘while most other political [actors]
promise a cure for a specific, and therefore limited, social ailment, the agitator, because he voices
[America’s generalised discontent], gives the impression that he aims to cure some chronic,
ultimate condition.’ His political opponents ‘fumble with symptoms’, but he directs his critique
towards the ‘roots of disease’ by voicing generalised anxieties and desires about the ‘totality of
modern feeling’ (ibid.). In the same way, Trump’s oft-repeated concepts of American ‘prosperity’,
‘wealth’, ‘strength’, ‘safety’ and ‘greatness’ all lack fixed meanings, but succeed in mobilising
audiences against a ‘chronic [national] condition’ (ibid.). In the words of Löwenthal (1949:49),
Trump’s idiosyncratic ambiguity ‘divests [itself] of any ideological significance and extends its
meaning to the point where it is completely vague’. Frequent use of this technique thus enables
him to ‘elicit identification from across the political spectrum as audiences ‘fill in’ its ambiguity with
their own [subjective experiences]’ (Soloman, 2016:16). Mandelbaum (2020:460) crystallises this,
stating that ‘subjectivity is what renders the national-populism edifice so appealing … [It] offers a
chain of signification without ever really arresting the flow of articulations’. In other words, since
policy specifics can often alienate voters and their respective identities (Healy et al., 2016), the
13
strength of agitational discourse rests on its ability to be openly interpreted by the audience.
Accordingly, the use of rhetorical subjectivity helps to explain much of Trump's agitational
successes.

On the other hand, it is precisely because of this subjectivity and vagueness that agitation fails to
promote meaningful social change (Holland & Fermor, 2017; Löwenthal & Guterman, 1949).
Löwenthal (1949:34) considers loose references to ‘the good old days’ as a powerful tool in the
agitator’s armoury. He warns, however, that, while agitators may ‘appear as radicals who will have
no truck with mere fragmentary reforms’, their alternatives to the ‘Charade of Doom’ are devoid of
achievable goals. By stirring up subjective images of an unattainable ‘Golden Age’ or ‘greatness’ of
American history, the agitator thus ‘steers his adherents wide of any basic social
reorganisation’ (Löwenthal & Guterman, 1949:34). For this reason, Löwenthal argued that the
‘Charade of Doom’, far from a mere rhetorical technique, was a direct threat to the Frankfurt
School’s emancipatory project, as well as to the progression of liberal democracy itself.

4.1 A Note on Historical Relativism

In keeping with the critical tradition, one must note that Löwenthal and Guterman could not have
predicted the recent social and economic transformations of the last half-century; transformations
which have undoubtedly played a role in Trump’s ascendency and the appeal of his agitation
(Rensmann, 2017). Löwenthal and Guterman, like Horkheimer, Adorno and all other members of
the early Frankfurt School, acknowledge the importance of historical context in their analyses of
social phenomena. They stress that the political appeal of agitational and authoritarian techniques
lies within the structural bases of society writ large (Horkheimer, 2001; Adorno et al., 1950). As
Löwenthal (1949: xii) writes in his introduction to Prophets of Deceit, ‘None of the specific
techniques of agitation can be judged outside their political and social contexts. Their specific
significance as a means of anti-democratic mass manipulation lies solely within the structural unit’.
In this vein, Abromeit (2018:9) argues the West’s transition ‘from a Fordist-Keynsian model of
capitalism [of the 1950s] to a post-Fordist, neoliberal phase’ generated social conditions conducive
to agitation and authoritarianism. He crystallises this position: ‘[It] created a climate which more
closely resembles the 1920s and 1930s and [facilitated the emergence of] right-wing populist
movements’. These social transforms, as Lamont et al. (2017:153-156) note, include the [recent]
concentration of global wealth and monopolisation; increased class segregation; the persistence of
structural racism; and globalisation. Just as the economic, social and geopolitical context of the
Cold War provided fertile ground for Hoover to engage in manipulatory tactics, structural trends
have enabled Trump to succeed in his form of mass agitation (ibid.). Thus — insofar as the authors
could not foresee such structural transformations — an acknowledgement of historical relativism
helps to account for the limitations of Löwenthal’s analysis (Rensmann, 2017).

14
4.2 An Emancipatory Project: The Practical Relevance of Löwenthal’s American
Agitator

The application of Löwenthal’s agitational framework to Donald Trump raises several vital
questions: Does Löwenthal’s theory of the ‘American agitator’ hold practical significance in the
[contemporary] social world? What are its implications? Why are they important? To answer these
questions, an understanding of the Frankfurt School’s ‘emancipatory project’ is necessary.
Following the Marxian tradition, the IfS believed theorists should not only rationalise and inquire
into the social world but should also function to emancipate humanity from all forms of domination
and exploitation (Fuchs, 2017:159; Horkheimer, 2001; Morelock, 2018). As Horkheimer (1973: 246)
notes, a theory is ‘critical’ only insofar as it seeks human ‘emancipation from slavery’ and strives ‘to
create a world which satisfies the needs and powers [of human beings]’. For the first generation of
Frankfurt School thinkers, therefore, theory (social enquiry) and praxis (social change) were
intimately related. Löwenthal alludes to the Frankfurt School’s emancipatory project in his final
chapter:
If we strip the agitator's message of its mystical grandiloquence and rhetoric, and present it
in a rationally formulated version, we [can] understand … the basis of appeal of agitation.
Such a translation lays bare [its] objective social consequences … [but] does not destroy
the appeal of agitation … or give a blueprint for opposing the agitator politically. But it does
at the very least expose the true social and psychological content of agitation — the
essential prerequisite for its prophylaxis. (Löwenthal & Guterman, 1949:141)

For Löwenthal, social discontent or ‘social malaise’ is not merely a construct of the agitator, but a
real and genuine social phenomenon. It ‘reflects the stresses [of] transformations taking place in
our economic and social structure, [such as] the breakdown of primary ties between individuals in
an increasingly mechanised world’ (Löwenthal & Guterman, 1949: 17). Social malaise is not a
threat to human emancipation per se, but its misdirection, distortion and manipulation by political
agitators are. By ‘exposing the true content [and social consequences] of agitation’, Löwenthal
(1949:141) sought to inoculate Americans against the demagogic rhetoric seen in his native
Germany. Only then could he, thus, emancipate them from its illusions, irrationality and false
promises (Rensmann, 2017). While his Löwenthal’s theory of agitation cannot be ‘practised’, it
demonstrates a commitment to the Frankfurt School’s emancipatory vision. In this vein, through a
Löwenthalian analysis, modern Americans can better understand Trump’s incendiary political
tactics and temper their exploitation.

5. Conclusion

Through his empirical analysis of the agitator's tropes and techniques, Löwenthal, as well as
Adorno and Horkheimer, gave insight into their potential effectiveness in the United States. These
theorists, as Rensmann (2017:44) notes, ‘[provide increasingly] important hypotheses about the
sources of the demagogues’ appeal [and] the origins of authoritarian mobilisations in modern
15
democracies’. While ‘American hate-mongers [were] at a low point in influence and prestige’ during
Löwenthal's time, present social conditions have empowered agitators like Donald Trump to gain
both (Horkheimer, 2001, xii; Abromeit, 2017). His agitational behaviour and rhetoric have
destabilised American democracy over the last four years (Siniver & Featherstone, 2020). By
identifying trends within the agitator’s discourse — just as Löwenthal did following the rise of
authoritarianism in his native country — researchers can better understand the agitational
mechanisms and popular appeal of his techniques. Since Löwenthal’s analysis ‘exposes the true
social and psychological content of agitation,’ it also provides a starting point for activists,
journalists and politicians to combat the ‘rise of illiberal democracy’ (Löwenthal, 1949:141;
Rensmann, 2017).

While specific concepts of Löwenthal’s analysis seem almost universal — social malaise, the
emphasis on conspiracy, and the strength of ambiguous and ill-defined political rhetoric — Trump
demonstrates the flexibility of agitational techniques. Contrary to Löwenthal’s prototypical agitator,
for example, Trump views wealth not as vice, but as a politically relevant and useful virtue (Lamont,
2017). One can argue, therefore, that Trump represents an evolution of Löwenthal’s agitator since
he employs [and omits] individual techniques to match his political environment. Nevertheless, the
preceding analysis highlights the theoretical potential of Prophets of Deceit to provide insight into
America’s 'politics of resentment’ (Rensmann, 2017:45). It reveals that [Trump’s] agitational
techniques — widely employed, but often unnoticed — can profoundly influence the parameters of
American political discourse. Whether agitation persists beyond Trump’s presidential term, only
time will tell.

Word Count: 6580

16
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Trump, D. [@realDonaldTrump]. (2016d). “If elected POTUS - I will stop RADICAL ISLAMIC TERRORISM in this
country! In order to do this, we need to #DrainTheSwamp!” Twitter, 16 October, 4:32 p.m. https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/789132223479947264
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possible when I was successfully raising Billions of Dollars to help rebuild Puerto Rico. If a person died for any
reason, like old age, just add them onto the list. Bad politics. I love Puerto Rico!” Twitter, 13 September, 1:49 p.m.
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1040220855400386560?lang=en
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would be willing to hurt many people, but that doesn’t matter to them. Our Economy is sooo strong, sorry!” Twitter,
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economy because they think that will be bad for me and my re-election. The problem they have is that the
economy is way too strong and we will soon be winning big on Trade, and everyone knows that, including China!”
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continue to be amazed at how every question is asked in the most negative way. The Mainstream Media should be
ashamed of itself - But the good news is that the USA is wise to your game of dishonesty and deception!” Twitter,
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Trump, D. [@realDonaldTrump]. (2019d). “…It is all a GIANT AND ILLEGAL HOAX, developed long before the
election itself, but used as an excuse by the Democrats as to why Crooked Hillary Clinton lost the Election!
Someday the Fake News Media will turn honest & report that Donald J. Trump was actually a GREAT Candidate!”
Twitter, 8 February, 1:59 p.m. https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1093871865246961666
Trump, D. [@realDonalTrump]. (2019e). “The Mainstream Media has never been as corrupt and deranged as it is
today. FAKE NEWS is actually the biggest story of all and is the true ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE! That’s why they
refuse to cover the REAL Russia Hoax. But the American people are wise to what is going on…..” Twitter, 20 May,
12:20 p.m. https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1130433207487336450
Trump, D. [@realDonaldTrump]. (2020a). “Buffalo protester shoved by Police could be an ANTIFA provocateur. 75
year old Martin Gugino was pushed away after appearing to scan police communications in order to black out the
equipment. @OANN I watched, he fell harder than was pushed. Was aiming scanner. Could be a set up?” Twitter,
9 June, 1:34 p.m. https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1270333484528214018
Trump, D. [@realDonalTrump]. (2020b). “The Fake News and phony Fake Suppression Polls have never been
worse. The Lamestream Media has gone CRAZY!” Twitter, 25 June, 4:20 p.m. https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1276173394053156865
Trump, D. [@realDonal Trump]. (2016e) “I am self-funding my campaign - putting up my own money, not
controlled. Cruz is spending $millions on ads paid for by his N.Y. bosses.” Twitter, 17 January, 9:05 p.m. https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/688829594472939520
Trump D. [@realDonaldTrump]. (2016f) “Crooked Hillary is spending big Wall Street money on ads saying I don't
have foreign policy experience, yet look what her policies have done” Twitter, 16 July, 2:08 p.m. https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/754301737431928832
Trump, D. [@realDonaldTrump]. (2016g) “Very sad that a person who has made so many mistakes, Crooked
Hillary Clinton, can put out such false and vicious ads with her phony money!” Twitter, 16 July, 12:19 p.m. https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/754304371186405376
Trump, D. [@realDonaldTrump]. (2016h). “Hillary took money and did favors for regimes that enslave women and
murder gays.” Twitter, 21 June, 12:19 p.m. https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/745304333483393024
Trump, D. [@realDonaldTrump]. (2016i). “Hillary Clinton raked in money from regimes that horribly oppress
women and gays & refuses to speak out against Radical Islam.” Twitter, 1 August, 11:52 p.m. https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/760246732152311808

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