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Cognitive
Psychology
2ND EMEA EDITION
E. BRUCE GOLDSTEIN AND JOHANNA C. VAN HOOFF
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About the authors
E. BRUCE GOLDSTEIN is Associate Professor Emeritus of
Psychology at the University of Pittsburgh and Adjunct Professor
of Psychology at the University of Arizona. He has received the
Chancellor’s Distinguished Teaching Award from the University of
Pittsburgh for his classroom teaching and textbook writing. He
received his Bachelor’s degree in Chemical Engineering from Tufts
University and his PhD in Experimental Psychology from Brown
University. He was a postdoctoral fellow in the Biology Department
at Harvard University before joining the faculty at the University of
Pittsburgh. Bruce published papers on a wide variety of topics,
including retinal and cortical physiology, visual attention and the
perception of pictures before focusing exclusively on teaching (Sensation & Perception, Cognitive
Psychology, Psychology of Art, Introductory Psychology) and writing textbooks. He is the author
of Sensation and Perception, 10th edition (Cengage, 2017) and edited the Blackwell Handbook
of Perception (Blackwell, 2001) and the two-volume Sage Encyclopedia of Perception (Sage,
2010). In 2016, he won “The Flame Challenge” competition, sponsored by the Alan Alda Center
for Communicating Science, for his essay, written for 11-year-olds, on What Is Sound?
JOHANNA (HANNIE) C. VAN HOOFF is Lecturer at the

Faculty of Science, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. She
received her Master’s degree (Cum Laude) and PhD in Physiological
Psychology at Tilburg University. She then moved to the United
Kingdom where she taught various cognitive and biological
psychology courses at three different universities (Solent University,
Portsmouth University and University of Kent at Canterbury) while
continuing her research into attention and memory processes.
Johanna has published many research papers in internationally
renowned journals and she is an expert in the recording and
analysis of event-related brain potentials (ERPs). She has been a
long-standing member of the Psychophysiology Society and has organized conferences and
workshops in that field. In 2009 she moved back to her home country, the Netherlands, where
the focus of her work shifted to the development and teaching of courses integrating cognitive
and biological sciences.
Brief contents
CHAPTER 1 CHAPTER 8
Introduction to Cognitive Everyday Memory and Memory
Psychology 1 Errors 224
CHAPTER 9
CHAPTER 2
Knowledge 261
Cognitive Neuroscience 23
CHAPTER 10
CHAPTER 3 Visual Imagery 298
Perception 50
CHAPTER 11
CHAPTER 4 Language 327
Attention 86
CHAPTER 12
CHAPTER 5 Problem Solving 367
Short-Term and Working
Memory 124 CHAPTER 13
Judgment, Reasoning and Decisions 407
CHAPTER 6
Long-Term Memory: Structure 163 Glossary 448
References 465
Photo Credits 496
CHAPTER 7
Long-Term Memory: Encoding, Name Index 497
Retrieval and Consolidation 191 Subject Index 502
iv
Contents
CHAPTER 1 TEST YOURSELF 2.1 36
Organization: Neuropsychology
Introduction to Cognitive Localization demonstrated by
36
Psychology 1 neuropsychology 36
Method: Demonstrating a double
Cognitive psychology: Studying the mind 3
dissociation 38
What is the mind? 3
Studying the mind: Early work in cognitive Organization: Brain imaging 39
psychology 4 Brain imaging evidence for localization of
function 39
Abandoning the study of the mind 8
1913: Watson founds behaviourism 9 Method: Functional magnetic resonance
1938: Skinner’s operant conditioning 9 imaging 39
Setting the stage for the re-emergence of the Distributed representation across the brain 43
mind in psychology 10 All together now: Neural networks 45
The rebirth of the study of the mind 12 Method: Electroencephalography 46
Introduction of the digital computer 12
Something to consider 46
Artificial intelligence and information theory 13 From correlation to causation 46
The cognitive “revolution” took a while 13
TEST YOURSELF 2.2 48
Looking ahead 14
Chapter summary 48
Modern research in cognitive psychology 14
Think about it 49
The role of models in cognitive psychology 14
Key terms 49
Benefits for science, society and you! 17
CogLab experiment 49
Applying Donders’ subtraction method 20
CHAPTER 3
Chapter summary 21
Think about it 22 Perception 50
Key terms 22 The nature of perception 52

CogLab experiment 22 Some basic characteristics of perception 52
Going beyond light-dark patterns 53
Why is it so difficult to design a perceiving
CHAPTER 2 machine? 55
The stimulus on the receptors is ambiguous 55
Cognitive Neuroscience 23
Objects can be hidden or blurred 56
Why study cognitive neuroscience? 24 Objects look different from different
Neurons: Communication and representation 26 viewpoints 57
The microstructure of the brain: Neurons 26 Information for human perception 57
The signals that travel in neurons 28 Perceiving objects and people 58
Method: Recording from a neuron 29 Hearing words in a sentence 60
The principle of neural representation 31 Experiencing pain 61
Representation by neurons 32 TEST YOURSELF 3.1 62
Sensory coding 34 Conceptions of object perception 62
vi CONTENTS
Helmholtz’s theory of unconscious inference 62 Method: Posner spatial cueing task 106
The Gestalt principles of organization 63 Divided attention: Can we attend to more than
Taking regularities of the environment into one thing at a time? 107
account 65 Divided attention can be achieved with practise:
Bayesian inference 68 Automatic processing 107
Comparing the four approaches 69 Divided attention becomes more difficult when
Research box 3.1: The role of motivation 71 tasks are harder 108
Distractions while driving 109
Neurons and knowledge about the TEST YOURSELF 4.2 110
environment 73 What happens when we don’t attend? 111
Neurons that respond to horizontals and Inattentional blindness 111
verticals 73 Research box 4.1: Inattentional blindness in
Experience-dependent plasticity 73 expert observers 112
The interaction between perceiving and taking Change detection 113
action 75 Attention and experiencing a coherent
Movement facilitates perception 75 world 115
The interaction of perception and action 76 Why is binding necessary? 115
The physiology of perception and action 76 Feature integration theory 115
Method: Brain lesioning 77 Something to consider 118
Picking up a coffee cup and other How emotion drives attention 118
behaviours 80 TEST YOURSELF 4.3 121
Something to consider 81 Chapter summary 121
The role of culture in perception 81 Think about it 122
TEST YOURSELF 3.3 83 Key terms 123
Chapter summary 83 CogLab experiments 123
Think about it 84
Key terms 84
CogLab experiments 85
CHAPTER 5
Short-Term and Working
CHAPTER 4
Memory 124
Attention 86
The modal model of memory 127
Pioneering studies: Attention as selection 89 Sensory memory 129
Broadbent’s filter model of attention 89 The sparkler’s trail and the projector’s
Modifying Broadbent’s model: The attenuation shutter 129
model 91 Sperling’s experiment: Measuring the capacity
A late selection model 93 and duration of the sensory memory store 130
Method: Flanker and load tasks 94 Short-term memory 132
What is the duration of short-term
Modern studies: Processing capacity
memory? 132
and perceptual load 95
How many items can be held in short-term
Distraction and cognitive control 98
memory? 134
Method: Change detection 136
Spatial attention: Overt and covert attention 100
How much information can be held in short-term
Overt attention: Scanning a scene with eye
memory? 137
movements 100
Covert attention: Directing attention without eye TEST YOURSELF 5.1 138
movements 105 Working memory 139
CONTENTS vii
The phonological loop 141 TEST YOURSELF 6.2 183

The visuospatial sketch pad 144 Procedural memory, priming and
The central executive 147 conditioning 183
Method: Event-related potentials 148 Procedural memory 183
Priming 185
Research box 5.1: Individual differences in
controlling access to working memory 150 Method: Avoiding explicit remembering in a
The episodic buffer 151
priming experiment 186
Other models of working memory 152 Classical conditioning 187
Working memory and the brain 153 Something to consider 187

The effect of damage to the prefrontal Imagining the future 187
cortex 153 TEST YOURSELF 6.3 188
Prefrontal neurons that fire when holding Chapter summary 189
information 154 Think about it 190
fMRI research: Executive attention and object
Key terms 190
representations 154
Method: fMRI decoding procedure 156
Stress and working memory 157
CHAPTER 7
Chapter summary 160 Long-Term Memory: Encoding,
Think about it 161 Retrieval and Consolidation 191
Key terms 162
Encoding: Getting information into long-term
CogLab experiments 162 memory 193
Levels of processing theory 193
Forming visual images 194
CHAPTER 6 Linking words to yourself 194
Long-Term Memory: Generating information 196
Organizing information 196
Structure 163 Retrieval practice 197
Comparing short-term and long-term Research box 7.1: Drawing as an effective
memory processes 165 encoding technique 198
Method: Measuring a serial position curve 166 TEST YOURSELF 7.1 199
Serial position curve 167 Retrieval: Getting information out of memory 200
Coding in short-term and long-term Retrieval cues 200
memory 167 Method: Cued recall 200
Locating memory in the brain 170
Matching conditions of encoding and
TEST YOURSELF 6.1 173 retrieval 202
Episodic and semantic memory 174 TEST YOURSELF 7.2 206
Distinctions between episodic and semantic Consolidation: The life history of memories 206
memory 174
Synaptic consolidation: Experience causes
Interactions between episodic and semantic changes at the synapse 207
memory 177
Systems consolidation: The hippocampus and
What happens to episodic and semantic the cortex 208
memories as time passes? 179
Consolidation and sleep: Enhancing
Method: Remember/know procedure 179 memory 212
Research box 6.1: Does the internet weaken our Research box 7.2: Sleep selectively supports
memory? 181 memories that are relevant for future use 213
viii CONTENTS
Updating memories: Retrieval and Errors due to suggestion 253

reconsolidation 215 What is being done? 255
Something to consider 219 Something to consider 256
TEST YOURSELF 7.3 221 Why do we have such a flawed memory
Chapter summary 221 system? 256
Think about it 222 TEST YOURSELF 8.3 258
Key terms 223 Chapter summary 258
CogLab experiments 223 Think about it 259
Key terms 260
CHAPTER 8
Everyday Memory and Memory CHAPTER 9
Errors 224 Knowledge 261
Autobiographical memory: What has happened in How are objects placed into categories? 264
my life 226 Why definitions don’t work for categories 264
The multidimensional nature of autobiographical The prototype approach: Finding the average
memory 226 case 265
Memory over the life span 227
Method: Sentence verification technique 268
Memory for “exceptional” events 230 The exemplar approach: Thinking about
Memory and emotion 230 examples 270
Flashbulb memories 232 Which approach works better: Prototypes or
Method: Repeated recall 234 exemplars? 271
TEST YOURSELF 8.1 238 An alternative view on typicality based on ideals 271
The constructive nature of memory 238 Is there a psychologically “privileged” level of

Bartlett’s “War of the Ghosts” categories? 273
experiment 238 What’s special about basic level
Source monitoring and source monitoring categories? 273
errors 239 How knowledge can affect categorization 275
Research box 8.1: Who said what, and can I Research box 9.1: We are all face recognition
trust it? 242 experts! 276
How real-world knowledge affects TEST YOURSELF 9.1 277
memory 243 Representing relationships between categories:
TEST YOURSELF 8.2 246 Semantic networks 278
Memory can be modified or created by Introduction to semantic networks: Collins and
suggestion 246 Quillian’s hierarchical model 278
The misinformation effect 246 Method: Lexical decision task 281
Method: Presenting misleading post-event Criticism of the Collins and Quillian model 281
information 247 Representing concepts in networks:
Creating false memories for early events in The connectionist approach 282
people’s lives 249 What is a connectionist model? 283
Why do people make errors in eyewitness How are concepts represented in a connectionist
testimony? 250 network? 284
Errors of eyewitness identification 251 The representation of concepts in the brain 287
Errors associated with perception and The sensory-functional hypothesis 287
attention 251 The semantic category approach 289
Misidentifications due to familiarity 252 The multiple-factor approach 289
CONTENTS ix
The embodied approach 291 CHAPTER 11

Sorting out the approaches 293
Language 327
The hub and spoke model 293 What is language? 328
TEST YOURSELF 9.2 295 The creativity of human language 329
Chapter summary 295 The universal need to communicate with
language 329
Think about it 296
Studying language 330
Key terms 297
Perceiving phonemes, words
and letters 331
Components of words 331
How perceiving sounds and letters is affected
CHAPTER 10 by meaning 332
Visual Imagery 298 Method: Demonstrating the word superiority
Imagery in the history of psychology 301 effect 334
Early ideas about imagery 301 Understanding words 335
Imagery and the cognitive revolution 301 The word frequency effect 335
Imagery and perception: Do they share Method: Eye movements in reading 336
the same mechanisms? 302 Lexical ambiguity 337
Kosslyn’s early mental scanning
experiments 302 TEST YOURSELF 11.1 339
Method/Demonstration: Mental scanning 303 Understanding sentences 340
Semantics and syntax 340
The imagery debate: Is imagery spatial or
propositional? 303 Method: Event-related potentials and
Behavioural experiments: Comparing imagery language 341
and perception 306 Understanding sentences: Parsing 342
How can the imagery debate be resolved? 308 The syntax-first approach to parsing 343
TEST YOURSELF 10.1 309 The interactionist approach to parsing 344
Imagery and the brain 309
Imagery neurons in the brain 310
Understanding text and stories 350
fMRI research 311
Making inferences 351
Transcranial magnetic stimulation 313
Situation models 352
Neuropsychological case studies 314
Conclusions from the imagery debate 318 Research box 11.1: Discourse context and
world knowledge interact in online sentence
The role of gaze in mental imagery 319
comprehension 354
Method: Eye tracking 319
Producing language: Conversations 356
Eye movements during recollection 320
Taking the other person into account 356
Research box 10.1: The functional role of eye Syntactic coordination 359
movements in memory retrieval 320
Method: Syntactic priming 359
Eye movement hotspots 322
Something to consider 323 Something to consider 361
Visual imagery and emotion 323 Culture, language and cognition 361
TEST YOURSELF 10.2 325 TEST YOURSELF 11.3 364

Chapter summary 325 Chapter summary 365
Think about it 326 Think about it 365
Key terms 326 Key terms 366
CogLab experiments 326 CogLab experiments 366
x CONTENTS
CHAPTER 12 The availability heuristic 410

The representativeness heuristic 412
Problem Solving 367
Preconceptions, attitudes and judgment 415
What is a problem? 369 TEST YOURSELF 13.1 417
The Gestalt approach: Problem solving Deductive reasoning: Syllogisms and
as representation and restructuring 369 logic 417
Representing a problem in the mind 369 Validity and truth in syllogisms 418
Restructuring and insight 370 Mental models of deductive reasoning 420
Research box 12.1: “Aha,” so this is how Conditional syllogisms 422
it works! 373 Conditional reasoning: The Wason four-card
Obstacles to problem solving 374 problem 423
The information-processing approach: What real-world versions of the Wason task
Problem solving as a search process 378 tell us 425
Newell and Simon’s approach 378 An evolutionary approach to the four-card
problem 427
The importance of how a problem is stated 383
What has the Wason four-card problem
Method: Think-aloud protocol 384 taught us? 428
TEST YOURSELF 12.1 385 TEST YOURSELF 13.2 428
Using analogies to solve problems 385 Decision making: Choosing among
Analogical transfer 386 alternatives 429
Analogical problem solving and the Duncker The utility approach to decisions 429
radiation problem 386 How emotions affect decisions 432
Analogical encoding 390
Research box 13.1: The financial costs of
Analogy in the real world 392
sadness 436
Method: In vivo problem-solving research 392 Decisions can depend on the context within
How experts solve problems 393 which they are made 437
Differences between how experts and novices Decisions can depend on how choices are
solve problems 393 presented 438
Expertise is only an advantage in the expert’s Neuroeconomics: The neural basis of decision
speciality 395 making 440
Creative problem solving 395 Something to consider 441
What is creativity? 396 The dual systems approach to thinking 441
Practical creativity 396 Postscript: Donders returns 444
Generating ideas 398 TEST YOURSELF 13.3 444
Effects of mood and physical exercise 400 Chapter summary 445
Something to consider 402 Think about it 446
Creativity, mental illness and the open mind 402
Key terms 446
TEST YOURSELF 12.2 404 CogLab experiments 447
Chapter summary 404
Think about it 405
Glossary 448
Key terms 405
References 465
Photo Credits 496
CHAPTER 13 Name Index 497
Judgment, Reasoning and Subject Index 502
Decisions 407
Making judgments 408
The nature of inductive reasoning 408
CogLab experiments
Numbers in parentheses refer to the experiment numbers in CogLab 5.0. The first experiments
in each chapter are “primary experiments.” These experiments are directly or closely related to
discussion in the text. Asterisks (*) indicate “related experiments.” These experiments are relevant
to the topic of the chapter but are not directly related to the discussion in the text.
CHAPTER 1
Simple Detection (2) A simple reaction time task that measures how fast you react to the
appearance of a dot.
CHAPTER 2
Brain Asymmetry (15)* How speed of processing for shapes and words may be different in the
left and right hemispheres.
CHAPTER 3
Apparent Motion (3) Determining how fast two dots have to be flashed, one after the other, to
achieve an illusion of movement.
Statistical Learning (49) How learning can occur in response to exposure to sequences of
forms.
Signal Detection (1)* Collecting data that demonstrate the principle behind the theory of signal
detection, which explains the processes behind detecting hard-to-detect stimuli.
Garner Interference: Integral Dimensions (4)* Making light/dark judgments for a square. A
one-dimensional task.
Garner Interference: Separable Dimensions (5)* Making light/dark judgments for squares of
different sizes. A second dimension is added.
Müller-Lyer Illusion (6)* Measuring the size of a visual illusion.
Blind Spot (14)* Mapping the blind spot in your visual field that is caused by the fact that there
are no receptors where the optic nerve leaves the eye.
Metacontrast Masking (16)* How presentation of a masking stimulus can impair perception of
another stimulus.
Categorical Perception: Discrimination (39)* Demonstration of categorical perception based
on the ability to discriminate between sounds.
Categorical Perception: Identification (40)* Demonstration of categorical perception based
on the identification of different sound categories.
xi
xii COGLAB EXPERIMENTS
CHAPTER 4
Visual Search (7) Feature search experiment. Searching for a green circle among blue lines, with
different numbers of blue lines.
Change Detection (9) A task involving detecting changes in alternating scenes.
Inhibition of Return (10) How presentation of a target away from fixation can cause a slowing
of responding.
Spatial Cueing (12) How cueing attention affects reaction time to the cued area. Evidence for
the spotlight model of attention.
Stroop Effect (13) How reaction time to naming font colours is affected by the presence of con-
flicting information from words.
Attentional Blink (8)* Testing your ability to detect stimuli that are presented in rapid succession.
Simon Effect (11)* How speed and accuracy of responding is affected by the location of the
response to a stimulus.
Von Restorff Effect (32)* How the distinctiveness of a stimulus can influence memory.
CHAPTER 5
Partial Report (18) The partial report condition of Sperling’s iconic memory experiment.
Brown-Peterson Task (20) How memory for trigrams fades.
Irrelevant Speech Effect (23) How recall for items on a list is affected by the presence of irrel-
evant speech.
Memory Span (24) Measuring memory span for numbers, letters and words.
Operation Span (25) Measuring the operation-word span, a measure of working memory.
Phonological Similarity Effect (26) How recall for items on a list is affected by how similar the
items sound.
Word Length Effect (27) Measurement of the word length effect.
Modality Effect (17)* How memory for the last one or two items in a list depends on whether
the list is heard or read.
Position Error (21)* Memory errors when trying to remember the order of a series of letters.
Sternberg Search (22)* A method to determine how information is retrieved from short-term
memory.
Neighbourhood Size Effect (43)* How recall in a short-term memory task is affected by the size
of a word’s “neighbourhood” (how many words can be created by changing a letter or phoneme).
CHAPTER 6
Serial Position (31) How memory for a list depends on an item’s position on the list.
Remember-Know (36) Distinguishing between remembered items in which there is memory for
learning the item and items that just seem familiar.
Implicit Learning (47) How we can learn something without being aware of the learning.
Suffix Effect (19)* How adding an irrelevant item to the end of a list affects recall for the final
items on a list in a serial position experiment.
COGLAB EXPERIMENTS xiii
CHAPTER 7
Encoding Specificity (28) How memory is affected by conditions at both encoding and retrieval,
and the relation between them
Levels of Processing (29) How memory is influenced by depth of processing.
Production Effect (30)* How memory depends on whether words are read out loud or silently.
CHAPTER 8
False Memory (33) How memory for words on a list sometimes occurs for words that were not
presented.
Forgot It All Along (34) How it is possible to remember something and also have the experience
of having previously forgotten it.
Memory Judgment (35) A test of how accurate people are at predicting their memory
performance.
CHAPTER 9
Lexical Decision (42) Demonstration of the lexical decision task, which has been used to pro-
vide evidence for the concept of spreading activation.
Prototypes (48) A method for studying the effect of concepts on responding.
Absolute Identification (45)* Remembering levels that have been associated with a stimulus.
Concept Formation (46)* Investigate the properties of concepts that are learned by feedback.
CHAPTER 10
Link Word (37) A demonstration of how imagery can be used to help learn foreign vocabulary.
Mental Rotation (38) How a stimulus can be rotated in the mind to determine whether its shape
matches another stimulus.
CHAPTER 11
Lexical Decision (42) Demonstration of the lexical decision task.
Word Superiority (44) Comparing speed of identifying a letter when the letter is isolated or in
a word.
Categorical Perception: Discrimination (39)* Demonstration of categorical perception based
on the ability to discriminate between sounds.
Categorical Perception: Identification (40)* Demonstration of categorical perception based
on the identification of different sound categories.
Age of Acquisition (41)* Comparing response times of lexical decisions on a set of stimuli.
Neighbourhood Size Effect (43)* How recall in a short-term memory task is affected by the size
of a word’s “neighbourhood” (how many words can be created by changing a letter or phoneme).
xiv COGLAB EXPERIMENTS
CHAPTER 13
Decision Making (50) How decisions can be affected by the context within which the decision
is made.
Risky Decisions (52) How decision making is influenced by framing effects.
Typical Reasoning (53) How the representativeness heuristic can lead to errors of judgment.
Wason Selection (54) Two versions of the Wason four-card problem.
Monty Hall (51)* A simulation of the Monty Hall three-door problem, which involves an under-
standing of probability.
Demonstrations
CHAPTER 3 CHAPTER 7
Judging the length of two lines 59 Reading a list 196
Visualizing scenes and objects 67
CHAPTER 8
CHAPTER 4 Reminiscence bump for football
Focusing on one message 89 players 229
The Stroop effect 96 Reading sentences 243
Find the hidden animal 101 Reading sentences (continued) 244
Looking off to the side 101 Memory for a list 245
Change detection 114

Searching for conjunctions 118 CHAPTER 9
Family resemblance 267
CHAPTER 5 Listing common features 273
Remembering three letters 132 Naming things 274
Digit span 134

Word length effect 142 CHAPTER 10
Articulatory suppression 143 Experiencing imagery 299
Comparing visual objects 144

Recalling visual patterns 146 CHAPTER 11
Holding a spatial stimulus in the The lexical decision task 336

mind 146 Garden path sentences 343
CHAPTER 6 CHAPTER 12
Reading a passage 169 Two insight problems 371
Mirror drawing 184 The candle problem 374
xv
xvi DEMONSTRATIONS
Tower of Hanoi problem 379 CHAPTER 13

The mutilated checkerboard Judging occupations 412
problem 383 Description of a person 413
Duncker’s radiation problem 386 Male and female births 414
Creating an object 400 Wason four-card problem 424
Guilford’s alternate uses test What would you do? 439
(GAU) 401
Methods
CHAPTER 2 CHAPTER 8
Recording from a neuron 29 Repeated recall 234
Demonstrating a double Presenting misleading post-event
dissociation 38 information 247
Functional magnetic resonance
imaging 39 CHAPTER 9
Electroencephalography 46 Sentence verification technique 268
Lexical decision task 281
CHAPTER 3
Brain lesioning 77 CHAPTER 10
Mental scanning 303
CHAPTER 4 Eye tracking 319
Flanker and load tasks 94
Posner spatial cueing task 106 CHAPTER 11
Demonstrating the word superiority
CHAPTER 5 effect 334
Change detection 136 Eye movements in reading 336
Event-related potentials 148 Event-related potentials and
fMRI decoding procedure 156 language 341
Syntactic priming 359
CHAPTER 6
Measuring a serial position curve 166 CHAPTER 12
Remember/know procedure 179 Think-aloud protocol 384
Avoiding explicit remembering in a In vivo problem-solving research 392

priming experiment 186
CHAPTER 7
Cued recall 200
xvii
Preface for instructors
This second EMEA edition of Bruce Goldstein’s bestselling textbook, Cognitive Psychology has
been updated by Dr Johanna C. van Hooff of the University of Amsterdam who also adapted and
contextualized the original content for the first edition to localize it for the European, Middle East
and South African markets. Real-life examples are given from countries in these parts of the world
and cross cultural differences are featured prominently. This more culturally diverse approach is
supported by pictures, illustrations and photographs from across the world. All chapters have
been revised and updated with the latest research, whilst also reflecting on how cognitive psy-
chology ideas and theories have evolved over time.
The highly accessible writing style has been retained from the original edition, along with the
approach and structure. Updated and new content in pedagogical features has been introduced
whilst also retaining some of the strong features of the original, including:
●● Research boxes highlight recent individual studies mainly from Europe and elsewhere inter-
nationally. These studies provide helpful levels of detail to increase and enhance students’
understanding of experimental design and the interpretation of results.
●● Demonstrations, easy-to-do mini-experiments provide students with firsthand experience
with the phenomena of cognitive psychology.
●● Test Yourself sections help students to review the material and aid self-study.
●● Think About It questions ask students to critically consider questions that go beyond the
presented material.
●● Methods sections highlight the ingenious methods cognitive psychologists have devised to
study the mind. They describe methods such as brain imaging, the lexical decision task and
think-aloud protocols. This not only highlights the importance of the method, but makes it eas-
ier to return to its description when it is referred to later in the text.
●● The end-of-chapter Something to Consider sections describe cutting-edge research,
important issues, or applied research.
●● Additionally, adopters of CogLab will have access to more than 50 online experiments that
students can run themselves and then compare their data to the class average and to the
results of the original experiments from the literature.
We want to note that at the time of this second EMEA edition going to press, the global
COVID-19 pandemic is still at large worldwide. For the past few months governments across
the world have introduced a range of social distancing, isolation and quarantine methods to help
control the pandemic and it is too early to tell what the effects of this pandemic will be on topics
related to cognitive psychology.
Cengage’s peer reviewed content for higher education courses is accompanied by a range of
tailored digital teaching and learning support resources.
To discover the dedicated companion website resources accompanying this textbook
including:
●● Instructor’s Manual
●● PowerPoint slides
●● Testbank
Please register here for access: cengage.com/dashboard/#login
xviii
Preface for students
In this book you will learn what we actually do and do not know about the mind, as determined
from the results of controlled scientific research. You will learn that there is much more going on
in your mind than you are conscious of. You are aware of experiences such as seeing something,
remembering a past event, or thinking about how to solve a problem—but behind each of these
experiences are a myriad of complex and largely invisible processes. Reading this book will help
you appreciate some of the “behind the scenes” activity in your mind that is responsible for every-
day experiences such as perceiving, remembering and thinking.
Another thing you will become aware of as you read this book is that there are many practical
connections between the results of cognitive psychology research and everyday life. One espe-
cially important connection is how research in cognitive psychology can help you to improve the
way you study. The following two principles are designed to help you get more out of this book.
Principle 1: It is important to know

what you know
Have you ever experienced an exam that you thought went well, but when your results came
back found that you hadn’t done as well as you expected? If so, the problem may be that you
didn’t have a good awareness of what you knew about the material and what you didn’t know.
If you think you know the material but actually don’t, you might stop studying or might continue
studying in an ineffective way, with the result being a poor understanding of the material and an
inability to remember it accurately for exams. You can help to ensure a good understanding of the
material by testing yourself on it using the Test Yourself questions in each chapter.
Principle 2: Don’t mistake ease

and familiarity for knowing
One of the main reasons that you may think you know the material, even when you don’t, is that
you can mistake familiarity for understanding. You read the chapter once when you first study a
topic, and when you come back to read it again for revision the material is familiar because you
remember it from the first time. This might lead you to think that you know the material and can
move on to the next section. However, this feeling of familiarity is not necessarily equivalent to
knowing the material and may not help you to answer questions on it in an exam. In fact, it may
even lead you to choose a wrong answer to a multiple choice question just because it is familiar,
rather than the best answer.
This brings us back again to the idea of testing yourself. One finding of cognitive psychology
research is that the very act of trying to answer a question increases the chances that you will be
able to answer it when you try again later. Another related finding is that testing yourself is a more
effective way of learning than simply re-reading, because generating material is a more effective
way of getting information into memory than simply reviewing it. Bear these two principles in mind
as you read through the book and remember to keep testing yourself on what you have read.
xix
Acknowledgments
The authors and publisher would like to thank the following people for their valuable input in the
development of this book:
Donna Rose Addes Christine Feeley
University of Auckland, New Zealand Adelphi University
Jessica Alderman Alex Fine
Tim Andrews University of Illinois
University of York Stephani Foraker
Anna Babarczy Buffalo State College, SUNY
McDaniel College Budapest Jack Gallant
Karl G. D. Bailey University of California, Berkeley
Andrews University Giorgio Ganis
Jeff Bane University of Plymouth
Miriam Bassok Martha Ghent
University of Washington Daniel Goldreich
Linda Becker McMaster University
University of Erlangen-Nuremberg Robert Goldstone
Sian Beilock University of Indiana
University of Chicago Christopher Gore
Deon Benton Newham College
Carnegie-Mellon University Ralf Greenwald
Dharanivel Bhasker Central Washington University
Jeanine Blumenau Paul G. Helton
University of Witwatersrand Freed-Hardeman University
Laura Boubert Pernille Hemmer
University of Westminster Rutgers University
Sarah Brown-Schmidt Elizabeth A. Hennon
University of Illinois University of Evansville
Ruth Byrne Robert J. Hines
University of Dublin University of Arkansas, Little Rock
Roberto Cabeza Keith Holyoak
Duke University University of California, Los Angeles
Fernando Calamante Almut Hupbach
Florey Institute, Heidelberg, Australia Lehigh University
Francesca Carota Alexender Huth
University of Cambridge University of California, Berkeley
Charlene Carpentier Jeffrey Karpicke
Jason C. K. Chan Purdue University
Iowa State University Charles Kemp
Christie Chung Carnegie-Mellon University
Mills College Daniel Kersten
Marlene Cohen University of Minnesota
University of Pittsburgh Daniël Knobel
Anne Draus University of Mpumalanga, South Africa
Kenneth Drinkwater Joann Kozyrev
Manchester Metropolitan University, UK Shannon Lemay-Finn
Stephen Emrich Steve Lindsay
Brock University University of Victoria
xx
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xxi
Sander Los Shayna Rosenbaum

Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam York University
Brad Mahon Jennifer K. Roth
University of Rochester Concordia College–New York
Ken Manktelow Ursula Schade
University of Wolverhampton University of Erlangen-Nuremberg
Eirini Mavritsaki Christopher Schunn
Birmingham City University University of Pittsburgh
James Minkin Enid Schutte
Karen Mitchell University of the Witwatersrand
Yale University Stacie Shaw
Vanessa M. McKinney Presentation College
SUNY Fredonia Carine Signoret
Katherine Moore Linköping University
Elmhurst College John R. Silvestro
Trevor Morris Elms College
Utah Valley University Madhu Singh
Gregory Murphy Tougaloo College
New York University Scott Sinnett
Andriy Myachykov University of Hawaii at Manoa
Northumbria University, UK Erin I. Smith
Veerabhagu Nagarajan California Baptist University
Lynn Nadel Diana De Sousa
University of Arizona The South African College of Applied
Thomas Naselaris Psychology
University of California, Berkeley SR Research Ltd.
Robert Nash Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
University of Surrey Catherine Thompson
Ellen Hamilton Newman University of Salford
IE University Lisa Torri
Mary Noel Margaret Tropp
Tim Nokes Richard Tunney
University of Pittsburgh University of Nottingham
Yemisi Oduntan Argiro Vatakis
Independent Institute of Education, Panteion University, Greece
South Africa Kimberly Wade
Robyn Oliver University of Warwick
Roosevelt University Jennifer Wahi
Mary Peterson Tessa Warren
University of Arizona University of Pittsburgh
Marie Poirier Geoffrey Woodman
City, University of London Vanderbilt University
Friedemann Pulvermüller Contributors to MindTap 2e
University of Berlin Anna Babarczy
Evan Raiewski McDaniel College Budapest
University of California, San Diego Linda Becker
Keith Rayner Friedrich-Alexander-Universität
University of California, San Diego Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany
Thomas S. Redick Yemisi Oduntan
Indiana University–Purdue University Independent Institute of Education,
Columbus South Africa
Timothy Rogers Catherine Thompson
University of Wisconsin University of Salford, UK
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A hiker looks down over a fjord and anticipates her journey through an amazing and varied landscape. Now you, the reader of
this book, are about to embark on an intellectual journey that will take you through the remarkable inner workings of the mind.
This chapter sets the stage for this journey, by tracing the history of the scientific study of the mind from its beginnings in a few
laboratories in Europe in the late 19th century, to today’s widespread scientific study of what the mind is and what it does.
Contents
Cognitive psychology: studying the mind
What is the mind?
Studying the mind: Early work in cognitive psychology
CHAPTER 1
Abandoning the study of the mind
Introduction
1913: Watson founds behaviourism
1938: Skinner’s operant conditioning
Setting the stage for the re-emergence of the mind
in psychology
The rebirth of the study of the mind
to Cognitive
Introduction of the digital computer
Flow diagrams for computers
Flow diagrams for the mind: Information processing
stages
Psychology
Artificial intelligence and information theory
The cognitive “revolution” took a while
Looking ahead
Modern research in cognitive psychology
The role of models in cognitive psychology
Benefits for science, society, and you!
Cognitive strategies in enhancing learning
Something to consider
Applying Donders’ subtraction method
Test yourself 1.1
Chapter summary
Think about it
Key terms
CogLab experiment
2 Chapter 1 Introduction to Cognitive Psychology
Some questions we will consider

●● How is cognitive psychology relevant to everyday experience?
●● How is it possible to study the inner workings of the mind when we can’t really see
the mind directly?
●● How are models used in cognitive psychology?
●● What are the practical applications of cognitive psychology?
A
s Ruben is walking across campus, talking to Susan on his mobile phone about meeting
at the student union later this afternoon, he remembers that he left the book she had lent
him at home (Figure 1.1). “I can’t believe it,” he thinks, “I can see it sitting there on my
desk, where I left it. I should have put it in my backpack last night when I was thinking about it.”
As he finishes his call with Susan, and after making a mental note to be on time for their
appointment, his thoughts shift to how he is going to deal with the fact that his bicycle still has
a flat tyre. Renting a bicycle from the campus shop offers the most mobility, but is expensive.
Borrowing one from his friend wouldn’t cost anything, but is more difficult to coordinate. “Maybe I’ll
try to catch the bus from the student union,” he thinks, as he puts his mobile phone in his pocket.
Entering his psychology class, he remembers that an exam is coming up soon. Unfortunately,
he still has a lot of reading to do, so he decides that he won’t be able to go to the movies
with Susan tonight as they had planned. As the lecture begins, Ruben is anticipating, with some
anxiety, his meeting with Susan.
Visualizes
Understands book on
conversation Thinks “Be
desk
on time for
appointment.”
Remembers
Susan’s
book
Thinks
FIGURE 1.1 Perceives about bicycle
What’s happening in Ruben’s mind as he walks campus problem
across campus? Each of the thought bubbles scenes
corresponds to something in the story in the text.
This brief slice of Ruben’s life is noteworthy because it is ordinary, while at the same time so
much is happening. Within a short span of time, Ruben does the following things that are related
to material covered in chapters in this book:
●● Perceives his environment—seeing people on campus and hearing Susan talking on the
phone (Chapter 3: Perception)
●● Pays attention to one thing after another—the people on his right, what Susan is saying, how
much time he has to get to his class (Chapter 4: Attention)
●● Remembers something from the past—that he had told Susan he was going to return her
book today (Chapters 5–8: Memory)
●● Distinguishes items in a category, when he thinks about different possible forms of

transportation—rental bicycle, friend’s bicycle, bus (Chapter 9: Knowledge)
●● Visualizes the book on his desk the night before (Chapter 10: Visual Imagery)
●● Understands and produces language as he talks to Susan (Chapter 11: Language)
●● Works to solve a problem, as he thinks about how to get places while his bicycle has a flat tyre
(Chapter 12: Problem Solving)
●● Makes a decision, when he decides to postpone going to the movies with Susan so he can
study (Chapter 13: Judgment, Reasoning and Decisions)
The things Ruben is doing have something very important in common: They all involve the
mind. Cognitive psychology is the branch of psychology concerned with the scientific study of
the mind. In this book, you will learn what the mind is, how it has been examined, and what study
results tell us about how the mind works. In this chapter we will first describe the mind in more
detail, then consider some of the history behind the field of cognitive psychology, and finally begin
considering how modern cognitive psychologists have gone about studying the mind.
Cognitive psychology: Studying the mind

You may have noticed that we have been using the term mind without precisely defining it. Mind,
like many other concepts in psychology, such as intelligence or emotion, can be thought of in a
number of different ways.
What is the mind?

One way to approach the question “What is the mind?” is to consider how the word “mind” is
used in everyday conversation. Here are a few examples:
1. “He was able to call to mind what he was doing on the day of the accident.” (The mind as
involved in memory.)
2. “If you put your mind to it, I’m sure you can solve that maths problem.” (The mind as
problem-solver.)
3. “I haven’t made up my mind yet” or “I’m in two minds about this.” (The mind as used to make
decisions or consider possibilities.)
4. “He is of sound mind and body,” or “When he talks about his encounter with aliens, it sounds
like he is out of his mind.” (A healthy mind being associated with normal functioning, a
non-functioning mind with abnormal functioning.)
5. “A mind is a terrible thing to waste.” (The mind as valuable, something that should be used.)
6. “He has a brilliant mind.” (Used to describe people who are particularly intelligent or creative.)
These statements tell us some important things about what the mind is. Statements 1, 2
and 3, which highlight the mind’s role in memory, problem solving and making decisions, are
related to the following definition of the mind: The mind creates and controls mental functions
such as perception, attention, memory, emotions, language, deciding, thinking and reasoning.
This definition reflects the mind’s central role in determining our various mental abilities, which are
reflected in the titles of the chapters in this book. It is important to realize that cognition does not
only reflect our higher “thinking” functions and that many of the processes involved (the basic as
well as the more complex ones) operate outside conscious control.
Another definition, which focuses on how the mind operates, is: The mind is a system that
creates representations of the world so that we can act within it to achieve our goals. This definition
reflects the mind’s importance for functioning and survival, and also provides the beginnings
of a description of how the mind achieves these ends. The idea of creating representations is
something we will return to throughout this book.
These two definitions of the mind are not incompatible. The first one indicates different types
of cognition—the mental processes, such as perception, attention and memory, that are what
the mind does. The second definition indicates something about how the mind operates (it c reates
representations) and its function (it enables us to act and to achieve goals). It is no c oincidence
that all of the cognitions in the first definition play important roles in acting to achieve goals.
Statements 4, 5 and 6 emphasize the mind’s importance for normal functioning, and the
amazing abilities of the mind. The mind is incredible in all its facets and forms, and not just in
whiz kids and masterminds. Even the most “routine” things—like recognizing a person or having
a conversation, involve many sophisticated qualities and complex operations of the mind. What
exactly are the properties of the mind? What are its characteristics? How does it operate and
how is it related to brain processes? Stating that the mind creates cognition and is important
for functioning and survival tells us what the mind does, but not how it achieves what it does.
The question of how the mind achieves what it does is what cognitive psychology is about. Our
goals in the rest of this chapter are to describe how the field of cognitive psychology evolved from
its early beginnings to where it is today, and to begin describing how cognitive psychologists
approach the scientific study of the mind.
Studying the mind: Early work in cognitive psychology

In the 1800s, ideas about the mind were dominated by the belief that it is not possible to study
the mind. One reason given was that it is not possible for the mind to study itself, but there
were other reasons as well, including the idea that the properties of the mind simply cannot be
measured. Nonetheless, some researchers defied the common wisdom and decided to study
the mind anyway. One of these people was the Dutch physiologist, F ranciscus Donders, who
in 1868, 11 years before the founding of the first laboratory of scientific psychology, did one
of the first experiments that today would be called a cognitive psychology experiment. (It is
important to note that the term “cognitive psychology” was not coined until 1967, but the
early experiments we are going to describe next, would today qualify as cognitive psychology
experiments.)
1868: Donders’ pioneering experiment: How long does it take to make a decision?
Donders was interested in determining how long it takes for a person to make a decision. He
determined this by measuring reaction time—how long it takes to respond to the presentation of
a stimulus (a stimulus is a sound, a light, a touch, a smell, etc). He used two measures of reaction
time. First, he measured simple reaction time by asking his participants to push a button as
rapidly as possible when they saw a light go on (Figure 1.2a). In addition, he measured choice
reaction time by using two lights and asking his participants to push the left button when they
saw the left light go on, and the right button when they saw the right light go on (Figure 1.2b).
The steps that occur in the simple reaction time task are shown in Figure 1.3a. P resenting the
stimulus (the light) causes a mental response (perceiving the light), which leads to a behavioural
response (pushing the button). The reaction time (dashed line) is the time between the presentation
of the stimulus and the behavioural response. The steps that occur in the choice reaction time
task are indicated in Figure 1.3b. In this task, an extra step (or mental response) is required,
asking participants to determine whether the left or right light was illuminated and then to decide
which button to push. As expected, reaction times in this choice task were longer than those
in the simple task. Donders reasoned that the difference in reaction time between these tasks
would indicate how long it took participants to make the decision that led to pushing the correct
button. Because in this example the choice reaction time took around 100 m illiseconds (ms)
longer than the simple reaction time, it could therefore be concluded that the decision-making
process took around 100 ms.
(a) Press
(a) Press J when
J when lightlight
goesgoes
on.on. (b) Press
(b) Press J forJ left
for left light,
light, K forright.
K for right.
FIGURE 1.2
A contemporary version of Donders’ (1868) reaction time experiment: (a) the simple reaction time task and (b) the choice
reaction time task. In the simple reaction time task, the participant pushes the J key when the light goes on. In the choice
reaction time task, the participant pushes the J key if the left light goes on and the K key if the right light goes on. The
purpose of Donders’ experiment was to determine how much time it took to decide which key to press in the choice reaction
time task.
Donders’ experiment is important, both because it was one of the first cognitive psychology
experiments and because it illustrates something extremely significant about studying the mind:
Mental responses (perceiving the light and deciding which button to push, in this example) c annot
be measured directly, but must be inferred from behaviour. We can appreciate this by recognizing
that the dashed lines in Figure 1.3 indicate that the measured reaction times represent the
relationship between the presentation of the stimulus (the light flashes) and the participant’s
response (button presses). He did not measure mental responses directly, but inferred how long
they took from the reaction times. The fact that mental responses cannot be measured directly,
but must be inferred from observing behaviour, is a principle that holds not only for Donders’
experiment but for all research in cognitive psychology.
Light flashes Left light flashes Stimulus
Reaction “Perceive left light” and Mental

“Perceive the light”
time response
“Decide which button to push”
Behavioural
Press button Press left button
response
(a) (b)
FIGURE 1.3
Sequence of events between presentation of the stimulus and the behavioural response in Donders’ experiments: (a) simple
reaction time task and (b) choice reaction time task. The dashed line indicates that Donders measured reaction time—the
time between presentation of the light and the participant’s response.
1879: Wundt’s psychology laboratory: Structuralism and analytic introspection

Eleven years after Donders’ reaction time experiment, Wilhelm Wundt founded the first laboratory
of scientific psychology at the University of Leipzig in Germany. Wundt’s approach, which
dominated psychology in the late 1800s and early 1900s, was called structuralism. According to
structuralism, our overall experience is determined by combining basic elements of experience which
were called sensations. Thus, just as chemistry developed a periodic table of the elements, which
combine to form molecules, Wundt wanted to create a “periodic table of the mind,” which would
include all of the basic sensations involved in creating complex experiences.
Wundt thought he could achieve this scientific description of the components of experience
by using analytic introspection, a technique in which trained participants described their
sensations, feelings and thought processes in response to stimuli. Analytic introspection (intro =
inside, spectare = to look) required extensive training because it is difficult to describe an experience
in terms of basic, fundamental elements, such as the sensations of “redness,” “sweetness” and
“crispiness” when viewing an apple. In one experiment, Wundt asked p articipants to describe
their experience of hearing a five-note chord played on the piano. One of the questions he then
hoped to answer was whether his participants were able to hear each of the individual notes that
made up the chord. As we will see when we consider perception in Chapter 3, structuralism was
not a fruitful approach and was therefore abandoned in the early 1900s. Nonetheless, Wundt
made a substantial contribution to psychology by his commitment to studying behaviour and the
mind under controlled conditions. Indeed, Wundt is seen by many as leading the shift in the study
of the mind from the rationalist approach to the empiricist approach, emphasizing the pivotal
role of experiments in gaining knowledge about the human mind. In addition, he trained many
doctoral students who later established psychology departments at other universities in Europe
and the United States. To see for yourself how experiments were carried out in Wundt’s time, you
can still visit his laboratory in Leipzig (see Figure 1.4).
FIGURE 1.4
Wundt’s laboratory.
1885: Ebbinghaus’ memory experiment: What is the time course of forgetting?

Meanwhile, 120 miles from Leipzig, at the University of Berlin, German psychologist Hermann
Ebbinghaus (1885/1913) was using another approach to measuring the properties of the mind.
Ebbinghaus was interested in determining the nature of memory and forgetting—specifically, how
rapidly information that is learned is lost over time. Rather than using Wundt’s method of analytic
introspection, Ebbinghaus used a quantitative method for measuring memory. Using himself as
the participant, he repeated lists of 13 nonsense syllables such as DAX, QEH, LUH and ZIF to
himself one at a time at a constant rate. He used nonsense syllables so that his memory would
not be influenced by the meaning of a particular word.
Ebbinghaus determined how long it took him to learn a list for the first time (i.e., recall
orrectly). He then waited for a specific amount of time (the delay) and then determined how long
c
it took him to re-learn the list for the second time. Because forgetting had occurred during the
delay, Ebbinghaus did not perform perfectly in his first attempt after the delay, but he was able to
achieve correct recall quicker and with fewer attempts than before. In other words, he re-learned
the list more rapidly than when he had learned it for the first time. Thus, something from the
original learning period must have been saved in memory to achieve this quicker learning.
To determine how much information was retained after a particular delay, Ebbinghaus
proposed a measure called savings, calculated as follows: Savings = (Original time to learn the
list) − (Time to re-learn the list after the delay). Thus, if it took 1,000 seconds to learn the list the
first time and 400 seconds to re-learn the list after the delay, the savings would be 1,000 − 400 =
600 seconds. Figure 1.5, which represents original learning and re-learning after three different
delays, shows that longer delays result in smaller savings.
Savings = 600 Savings = 350 Savings = 270

1,000
Time (sec)
730
650
400
0 19 0 1 0 6
minutes day days
FIGURE 1.5
Calculating the savings score in Ebbinghaus’ experiment. In this example, it took 1,000 seconds to learn the list of nonsense
syllables for the first time. This is indicated by the lines at 0. The time needed to re-learn the list at delays of (a) 19 minutes,
(b) one day, and (c) six days are indicated by the line to the right of the 0 line. The red line indicates the savings score for
each delay. Notice that savings decrease for longer delays. This decrease in savings provides a measure of forgetting.
According to Ebbinghaus, this reduction in savings provided a measure of forgetting,

with smaller savings meaning more forgetting. Thus, the plot of per cent savings versus time in
Figure 1.6, called a savings curve, shows that memory drops rapidly for the first two days after the
initial learning and then levels off. This curve was important because it demonstrated that memory
could be quantified and that functions like the savings curve could be used to describe a property
of the mind—in this case, the ability to retain information. Interestingly, this 130-year-old experiment
was recently replicated and an almost exactly similar forgetting curve was found (Murre & Dros,
2015). Notice that although Ebbinghaus’ savings method was very different from Donders’ reaction
time method, both measured behaviour to determine a property of the mind.
60 19 minutes
50
1 hour
40
Per cent savings
FIGURE 1.6 8.75 hours

Ebbinghaus’ savings curve. Ebbinghaus considered 1 day
the per cent savings to be a measure of the amount 30 2 days
remembered, so he plotted this versus the time between 31 days
initial learning and testing. The decrease in savings 6 days
20
(remembering) with increasing delays indicates that
forgetting occurs rapidly over the first two days and then
occurs more slowly after that. 10
Based on: Ebbinghaus, H. (1885/1913). Memory: A contribution
to experimental psychology, H. A. Ruger & C. E. Bussenius, 0
Trans., New York: Teachers College, Columbia University. 0 Time
1890: William James’ Principles of Psychology

William James, one of the early American psychologists, described significant observations about
the mind in his famous textbook, Principles of Psychology (1890). James’ observations were
based not on the results of experiments but on observations about the operation of his own
mind. One of the best known of James’ observations is the following, on the nature of attention:
Millions of items . . . are present to my senses which never properly enter my

experience. Why? Because they have no interest for me. My experience is what I agree
to attend to. . . . Everyone knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the
mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible
objects or trains of thought. . . . It implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal
effectively with others.
The observation that paying attention to one thing involves withdrawing from other things still
rings true today and has been the topic of many modern studies of attention. As impressive as the
accuracy of James’ observations, so too was the range of cognitive topics he considered, which
included thinking, consciousness, attention, memory, perception, imagination and reasoning.
The founding of the first laboratory of psychology by Wundt, the quantitative experiments
of Donders and Ebbinghaus, and the perceptive observations of James provided what seemed
to be a promising start to the study of the mind (Table 1.1). However, research on the mind was
soon to be curtailed, largely because of events early in the 20th century that shifted the focus of
psychology away from the study of the mind and mental processes. One of the major forces that
caused psychology to reject the study of (invisible) mental processes was a negative reaction to
the analytic introspection technique.
TABLE 1.1 Early pioneers in cognitive psychology
Person Procedure Results and Conclusions Contribution

Donders (1868) Simple reaction time vs choice Choice reaction time takes 100 First cognitive psychology
reaction time milliseconds longer; therefore, it experiment
takes 100 milliseconds to make
a decision
Wundt (1879) Analytic introspection No reliable results Established the first laboratory of
scientific psychology
Ebbinghaus (1885) Savings method to measure Forgetting occurs rapidly in the Quantitative measurement of
forgetting first one to two days after original mental processes
learning
James (1890) No experiments; reported Descriptions of a wide range of First psychology textbook; some
observations of his own experience experiences of his observations are still valid
today
Abandoning the study of the mind

Many early departments of psychology conducted research in the tradition of Wundt’s laboratory,
using analytic introspection to analyze mental processes. This emphasis on studying the
mind was to change, however, being largely replaced by a focus on “pure” observable behaviour.
This approach became known as behaviourism, devoting its efforts to the strict study of stimulus–
response or input–output relationships.
1913: Watson founds behaviourism

The account of how John Watson founded behaviourism is probably known to most introductory
psychology students. We will briefly review it here because of its importance to the history of
cognitive psychology. Around 1913, Watson became dissatisfied with the method of analytic
introspection because (1) it produced extremely variable results from person to person, and
(2) these results were difficult to verify. In response to what he perceived to be deficiencies in
analytic introspection, Watson proposed a new approach called behaviourism. The goals of this
approach are expressed clearly in this famous quote:
Psychology as the behaviourist sees it is a purely objective, experimental branch

of natural science. Its theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behaviour.
Introspection forms no essential part of its methods, nor is the scientific value of its
data dependent upon the readiness with which they lend themselves to interpretation in
terms of consciousness. . . . What we need to do is start work upon psychology making
behaviour, not consciousness, the objective point of our attack. (Watson, 1913, pp. 158,
176; emphasis added)
This passage makes two key points: (1) Watson rejects introspection as a method, and
(2) observable behaviour, not consciousness (which would involve unobservable processes such
as thinking, emotions and reasoning), is the main topic of study. In other words, Watson wanted
to restrict psychology to observable behavioural data and rejected the idea of going beyond
those data to draw conclusions about unobservable mental events. As a consequence of these
ideas, psychologists’ attention shifted from asking “What does behaviour tell us about the mind?”
to “What is the relation between stimuli in the environment and behaviour?”
Watson’s ideas are closely associated with classical conditioning as originally studied
by Ivan Pavlov from around 1890. Pavlov (1927) demonstrated that dogs could be made to
salivate to the sound of a bell, when this (neutral) sound was previously paired to the arrival of
food. Watson showed that the same principles applied to human behaviour and he used the
idea of classical conditioning to argue that behaviour can be analyzed without any reference
to the mind. For Watson, what is going on inside our head (or inside the head of Pavlov’s dog),
either physiologically or mentally, is irrelevant. The only thing he cared about was how pairing one
stimulus with another stimulus affected behaviour.
1938: Skinner’s operant conditioning

Twenty-five years later, B. F. Skinner provided another tool for studying the relationship between
stimulus and response, which ensured that this approach would dominate psychology for
decades to come. Skinner introduced operant conditioning, which focused on how behaviour
is strengthened by the presentation of positive reinforcers, such as food or social approval (or
withdrawal of negative reinforcers, such as a shock or social rejection). For example, Skinner
showed that reinforcing a rat with food for pressing a bar maintained or increased the rat’s rate
of bar pressing. Like Watson, Skinner was not interested in what was happening in the mind, but
focused solely on determining how behaviour was controlled by stimuli (Skinner, 1938).
The idea that behaviour can be understood by studying stimulus–response relationships
influenced an entire generation of psychologists from the 1940s through to the 1960s.
Psychologists applied the techniques of classical and operant conditioning to classroom teaching,
treating psychological disorders and testing the effects of drugs on animals. Figure 1.7 is a time
line showing the initial studies of the mind and the rise of behaviourism. But even as behaviourism
was dominating psychology, events were occurring that eventually led to the rebirth of the study
of the mind.
1868 1879 1885 1890 1913 1938
Donders: Wundt: Ebbinghaus: James: Watson: Skinner:

Reaction time Scientific Forgetting Principles of Behaviourism Operant
psychology curve Psychology conditioning
laboratory
FIGURE 1.7
Time line showing early experiments studying the mind in the 1800s and the rise of behaviourism in the 1900s.
One general critique was that a simple stimulus–response theory cannot explain that people
often respond to different aspects of the same stimulus event, and which aspect that is, is not
known until the response is made. For example, consider a group of people in a museum viewing
a painting of a Parisian street market, like the one presented in Figure 1.8. One person may
comment to his friend on how the specific painting technique has captured the moment so nicely.
At the same time, another may suggest to his friend that they could try the new brasserie tonight.
For the first person, the stimulus aspect he reacts to is the artist’s technique in the painting,
whereas for the second person, it is the specified content represented in the painting. In both of
these instances, the controlling stimulus aspect is defined after the fact, in terms of the meaning it
has to the individual, not in terms of its external, objective qualities as would be suggested by the
stimulus–response theory.
FIGURE 1.8
Painting of a street market in Paris.
Setting the stage for the re-emergence of the mind in psychology

Although behaviourism dominated Psychology, and particularly American Psychology, for
many decades, some researchers were not toeing the strict behaviourist line. One of these
researchers was Edward Tolman and the other, ten years later, was Noam Chomsky.
1948: Tolman’s cognitive map

In one of his experiments, Tolman (1938) placed a rat in a maze like the one in Figure 1.9. Initially,
the rat explored the maze, running up and down each of the alleys (Figure 1.9a). After this initial
period of exploration, the rat was placed at A and food was placed at B, and the rat quickly
learned to turn right at the intersection to obtain the food. This is exactly what the behaviourists
would predict, because turning right was rewarded with food (Figure 1.9b). However, when
Tolman (after taking precautions to be sure the rat couldn’t determine the location of the food
based on smell) placed the rat at C, something interesting happened. While behaviourists would
predict the rat to go right (because this behaviour was rewarded in the past), the rat turned
left at the intersection to reach the food at B (Figure 1.9c). Tolman’s explanation of this result
was that when the rat initially experienced the maze it was developing a cognitive map—a
conception within the rat’s mind of the maze’s layout (Tolman, 1948). Thus, even though the
rat had previously been rewarded for turning right, its mental map indicated that it should turn
left to reach the food. The use of the word cognitive, and the idea that something other than
stimulus–response connections might be occurring in the rat’s mind, placed Tolman outside of
mainstream behaviourism.
C C C
D B D B D B
Food Food
A A A
(a) Explore maze (b) Turn right for food (c) Turn left for food
FIGURE 1.9
Maze used by Tolman (1948). (a) The rat initially explores the maze. (b) The rat learns to turn right to obtain food at B when it starts at A.
(c) When placed at C, the rat turns left to reach the food at B. In this experiment, precautions are taken to prevent the rat from knowing where
the food is based on cues such as smell.
Other researchers were aware of Tolman’s work, but for many psychologists in the 1940s,
the use of the term cognitive was difficult to accept because it violated the behaviourists’ idea
that internal processes, such as thinking or maps in the head, were not acceptable topics to
study. It wasn’t until about a decade after Tolman introduced the idea of cognitive maps that
developments occurred that led to a resurgence of the mind in psychology. Ironically, one of
these developments was the publication, in 1957, of Skinner’s book Verbal Behaviour.
1959: Chomsky’s critical review of Skinner’s language development theory

In his book, Skinner argued that children learn language through operant conditioning. According
to this idea, children imitate speech that they hear, and repeat correct speech because it
is rewarded. In 1959, Noam Chomsky, however, published a scathing review of this book, in
which he pointed out that children say many sentences that have never been rewarded by parents
(“I hate you, Mummy,” for example), and that during the normal course of language development,
they go through a stage in which they use incorrect grammar, such as “The boy hitted the ball,”
even though this incorrect grammar may never have been reinforced.
Chomsky saw language development as being determined not by imitation or reinforcement,
but by an inborn biological programme that holds across cultures. Chomsky’s idea that
language is a product of the way the mind is constructed, rather than a result of reinforcement,
led psychologists to reconsider the idea that language and other complex behaviours, such as
problem solving and reasoning, can be explained by operant conditioning. Instead, they began
to realize that to understand complex cognitive behaviours, it is necessary not only to measure
observable behaviour but also to consider what this behaviour tells us about how the mind works.
The rebirth of the study of the mind

The decade of the 1950s is generally recognized as the beginning of the cognitive revolution—a
shift in psychology from the behaviourist’s stimulus–response relationships to an approach whose
main thrust was to understand the operation of the mind. Even before Chomsky’s critique of
Skinner’s book, other events were happening that signalled a shift away from behaviourism.
In order to look beyond observable behaviour, psychologists needed to develop new ways of
conceptualizing the mind. Luckily, just as psychologists were questioning behaviourism, a new
technology was emerging that suggested a new way of describing the operation of the mind.
That new technology was the digital computer.
Introduction of the digital computer

The first digital computers, developed in the late 1940s, were huge machines that took up entire
buildings, but in 1954 IBM introduced a computer that was available to the general public. These
computers were still extremely large compared to the laptops and tablets of today, but they found
their way into university research laboratories, where they were used both to analyze data and,
most important for our purposes, to suggest a new way of thinking about the mind.
Flow diagrams for computers

One of the characteristics of computers that captured the attention of psychologists in the 1950s
was that they processed information in stages, as illustrated in Figure 1.10a. In this diagram,
information is first received by an “input processor.” It is then stored in a “memory unit” before
it is processed by an “arithmetic unit,” which then creates the computer’s output. Using this
stage approach as their inspiration, some psychologists proposed the information-processing
approach to studying the mind—an approach that traces sequences of mental operations
involved in cognition. According to the information-processing approach, the operation of the
mind can be described as occurring in a number of stages. Applying this stage approach to the
mind led psychologists to ask new questions and to frame their answers to these questions in
new ways. One of the first experiments influenced by this new way of thinking about the mind
involved studying how well people are able to focus their attention on some information when
other information is being presented at the same time.
Input Input Memory Arithmetic

processor unit unit Output
FIGURE 1.10 (a)

(a) Flow diagram for an early computer; (b) flow
diagram for Broadbent’s filter model of attention.
This diagram shows many messages entering a
“filter,” which selects the message to which the Input Filter Detector To memory
person is attending for further processing by a
detector and then storage in memory. We will
describe this diagram more fully in Chapter 4. (b)
Flow diagrams for the mind: Information processing stages

Beginning in the 1950s, a number of researchers became interested in describing how well the
mind can deal with incoming information. One question they were interested in followed from
James’ idea that when we decide to attend to one thing, we must withdraw attention from other
things. Taking this idea as a starting point, Cherry (1953) presented participants with two auditory
messages, one to the left ear and one to the right ear, and told them to focus their attention on one
of the messages (the attended message) and to ignore the other one (the unattended message).
The rebirth of the study of the mind 13
For example, a participant might be told to attend to the left-ear message that began “As Susan
drove down the road in her new car . . .” while simultaneously receiving, but not attending to, the
right-ear message “Cognitive psychology, which is the study of mental processes. . . .”
The result of this experiment, which we will describe in detail in Chapter 4, was that when
people focused on the attended message, they could hear the sounds of the unattended
message but were unaware of the contents of that message. This result led Donald Broadbent
(1958), to propose the first flow diagram of the mind (Figure 1.10b). This diagram represents what
supposedly happens in a person’s mind when selectively directing attention to one stimulus in the
environment. Applied to Cherry’s dichotic listening experiment, “input” would be the sounds
of both the attended and unattended messages; the “filter” lets through the attended message
(in this case that what was presented to the left ear) and filters out the unattended message
(that which was presented to the right ear); and the “detector” records the information that gets
through the filter.
Broadbent’s flow diagram provided a way to visualize and analyze the operation of the mind
in terms of a sequence of processing stages, and proposed a model that could be tested by
further experiments. You will see many more flow diagrams like this throughout this book because
they have become one of the standard ways of depicting the operation of the mind, implying that
information is processed through a series of stages.
Artificial intelligence and information theory

The development of the digital computer not only introduced the idea of serial processing
stages to the study of the mind, it also inspired other researchers to try and see how computers
could be programmed to carry out intelligent behaviour. John McCarthy, a young professor of
mathematics, was one of the first to coin the term artificial intelligence, which he defined as
“making a machine behave in ways that would be called intelligent if a human were so behaving”
(McCarthy, Minsky, & Shannon, 1955). With this aim in mind, Newell and Simon claimed to
have succeeded in creating such a programme at the first conference dedicated to this topic at
Dartmouth in 1956. They called this programme the logic theorist as it was able to create proofs
of mathematical theorems that involved principles of logic. This programme, although primitive
compared to modern artificial intelligence programmes, was considered a real “thinking machine”
because it did more than simply process numbers—it used humanlike reasoning processes to
solve problems.
Around the same time, an important paper appeared by George Miller (1956) disclosing
stringent limitations to the processing capacity of the human mind. More specifically, the
experiments in his paper showed that people can hold only about seven items simultaneously in
their mind or “immediate memory”; a finding we still like to quote today (7 ± 2, see also Chapter 5).
In his research, Miller focused on basic perceptual skills and, inspired by computational science,
he started using the term “bits.” Moreover, because perceptual judgements can represent just
a few “bits,” Miller (1956) reasoned that, to enable further processing, memory processes must
actively recode the information that is carried in complex stimuli into smaller units. In other words,
memory is not just a passive store of sensory information. Further details of this idea will be
explained later in Chapter 5, but the important point for now is that Miller’s approach represented
a new way of thinking, leading to the fact that “the mind as a computer metaphor” became very
popular in psychology. Furthermore, the notion that many of our cognitive functions have a limited
capacity became, and still is, a central theme in modern cognitive psychology.
The cognitive “revolution” took a while

The events we have described so far—Chomsky’s observation of language development, Cherry’s
dichotic listening experiment, Broadbent’s flow-chart filter model, the rise of artificial intelligence
and information theory—represented the beginning of a shift in psychology from behaviourism
(the study of stimulus–response relations) to cognitive psychology (the study of mental processes
we cannot observe directly). Although we have called this shift the cognitive revolution, it is
worth noting that the shift from Skinner’s behaviourism to the cognitive approach, which was
indeed revolutionary, occurred over a period of time. In fact, even years after these discoveries,
methods and new theories, a textbook on the history of psychology made no mention of the
cognitive approach (Misiak & Sexton, 1966), and it wasn’t until 1967 that Ulrich Neisser published
a textbook with the title Cognitive Psychology (Neisser, 1967). Figure 1.11 shows a time line of
some of the events that led to the establishment of the field of cognitive psychology.
Skinner: Chomsky:
Verbal “A Review of B. F.
Behaviour Skinner’s Verbal
Behaviour”
1948 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1967
Tolman: Cherry: First Artificial Broadbent: Neisser:

Cognitive Attention commercially Intelligence Flow First cognitive
map experiment available approach diagram psychology
digital book
computer
FIGURE 1.11
Time line showing events associated with the decline of the influence of behaviourism (above the line) and events that led to the development
of the information-processing approach to cognitive psychology (below the line).
Looking ahead
Neisser’s Cognitive Psychology textbook emphasized the information-processing approach to
studying the mind, and is, in a sense, the grandfather of the book you are now reading. Since
the 1967 textbook, many experiments have been carried out, new theories proposed, and new
techniques developed. This new approach turned out to be very successful in explaining many
aspects of human behaviour and as a result, cognitive psychology became one of the dominant
approaches in Psychology. In contrast to behaviourism, Cognitive Psychology thus accepts the
existence of unobserved (cognitive) processes that can be scientifically studied via the creation
and evaluation of mental models.
Modern research in cognitive psychology

How do contemporary cognitive psychologists think about the complexity of the mind? How
does this influence the questions they ask and the experiments they carry out? What are the
theoretical and practical implications of their results? The answers to these questions may be
different for different researchers and different types of problems. Next, we will consider two
aspects of research that apply to cognitive psychology in general: (1) the role of models in
cognitive psychology; and (2) benefits for science and society.
The role of models in cognitive psychology

Models are representations of structures or processes that help us visualize or explain the
structure or process. We will consider two kinds of models: structural models, which represent
structures in the brain that are involved in specific functions; and process models, which illustrate
how a process operates.
Structural models
Structural models are representations of a physical structure. A model can mimic the
appearance of an object, as a model car or airplane represents the appearance of a real car or
airplane. Similarly, 3D models such as the one in Figure 1.12 have been used to illustrate the
locations of different structures of the brain. Structures can also be represented by diagrams that
don’t resemble the structure itself but that instead indicate how different areas of the brain are
connected.
FIGURE 1.12
A 3D model of the brain can be used to illustrate the
locations of different brain structures. The different colours
refer to different parts of the cerebral cortex, the wrinkled
outer layer of the brain (see Chapter 2).
One purpose of models is to simplify. We can appreciate this purpose by considering how
we might build a model of the brain. The 3D model in Figure 1.12 can be taken apart to reveal
different structures. Of course, this model isn’t anything like a real brain because it doesn’t show
what is happening inside each structure and how the structures are connected to each other.
We would have to increase the amount of detail in our model to represent this. In fact, if we
really wanted our model to be exactly like the brain, we would have to represent the individual
cells, called neurons, that make up the brain (this will be described in Chapter 2) and how they
are connected. Besides that this would be an impossible task, it would also go against the main
purpose of models, namely to simplify.
Thus, structural models are designed to represent the structures involved in specific
functions. Such models however, do not tell you how these structures are involved in the specific
functions that cognitive psychologists are interested in, no matter how detailed they are. Indeed,
to really understand how cognitive functions operate we do need models that go beyond just
considering (brain) structure.
Process models
Process models represent the processes that are involved in cognitive mechanisms, with boxes
usually representing specific processes and arrows indicating connections between processes.
Broadbent’s filter model of attention (see Figure 1.10b) is an example of a process model. In
this model, the box representing the “filter” represents the process that separates the attended
message from other messages. Please take note: This process is not necessarily located in one
particular place in the brain, so the boxes do not represent specific brain structures! Indeed,
these boxes symbolize a process that could be carried out by any number of different structures
working together.
Another example of a process model is given in Figure 1.13, representing the operation
of memory. This model of memory, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5, was
proposed in the 1960s and guided memory research for many years. Sensory memory holds
incoming information for a fraction of a second and then passes a selection of this information
Rehearsal: A control process

FIGURE 1.13
An early model of memory. Short- Long-
Sensory
Based on: Atkinson, R. C. and Shiffrin, R. M. (1968). Human Input term term
memory
memory memory
memory: A proposed system and its control processes,
in K. W. Spence & J. T. Spence, Eds., The psychology of
learning and motivation, Vol. 2, pp. 89–195, New York:
Academic Press. Output
to short-term memory, which has a limited capacity and holds information only for seconds (like
an address you are trying to remember until you can write it down). Subsequently, some of the
information in short-term memory can be transferred to long-term memory, a high-capacity
system that can hold much more information and for longer periods of time (like your memory of
what you did last weekend, or the names of important cognitive psychologists). Finally, the green
arrow indicates that some of the information in long-term memory can be returned to short-term
memory. According to this model, this is what happens when we are recalling something that was
stored in long-term memory. Process models like this one make complicated processes easier to
understand and also provide a good starting point for research.
Resource models
Resource models are closely related to the process models mentioned above, but focus on
the mental “effort” or the “resources” that these processes require. When a process uses a lot of
effort or can only obtain this effort from a limited resource, a capacity problem can arise leading
to ineffective functioning of the process. The clearest example of a limited capacity process is
short-term memory, which, as claimed by Miller (1956), can only hold five to nine items for a
limited period of time (some other views are described in Chapter 5). The consequence of this
limitation is that many things in our environment go unnoticed (i.e., they never reach the stage of
short-term memory) and that complex control mechanisms have evolved to ensure that access
is granted predominantly to those items or events that are in some way relevant for our current or
long-term goals (this is explained further in Chapter 4).
Another idea that plays a role in these models is that processes often share resources
and therefore have to compete for them. You probably have experienced such competition
for resources yourself at task level, for example, when you are trying to concentrate on your
homework while you start thinking about your shopping list for the weekend or checking incoming
messages on your mobile phone. Only rarely, will you succeed in doing all these things at the
same time because you are unable to divide the available resources (attention in this case) to all
these competing demands. Cognitive psychologists in the 1970s discovered however, that some
tasks can be done simultaneously while others suffer when done at the same time. This led to
the idea of a multiple resource model that was particularly useful for predicting performance
differences in multi-task settings (Wickens, 1976; 2002; 2008).
This model consists of three dimensions and can therefore be expressed as a cube (Figure 1.14).
The first dimension is the stages of processing dimension, distinguishing between perception and
cognition processes (e.g., working memory) on the one hand and responding on the other. This
suggests that we use a different set of resources for the intake and handling of information than
for responding to that information. The second dimension has to do with codes of processing,
indicating that spatial activities require different resources than verbal/linguistic activities. As you
will see in Chapter 5, this suggested dichotomy is clearly present in Baddeley and Hitch’s working
memory model (1974). Finally, the third dimension refers to modalities, indicating that auditory
perception uses different resources than visual perception (this dimension obviously does not apply
to the response stage). Thus, according to this model, “the extent that two tasks use different levels
along each of the three dimensions, timesharing will be better” (Wickens, 2008, p. 450).
Stages of processing
Visual
processing Perception cognition Responding
Ambient
Spatial Manual-spatial
Focal Responses
Verbal Vocal-verbal
Visual
Modalities
FIGURE 1.14 Auditory
The three dimensional representation
of the structure of multiple resources.
Source: Wickens (2008). Multiple Resources
and Mental Workload, The Journal of the
Human Factors and Ergonomics Society,
50(3):449–455, July. Spatial
DOI: 10.1518/001872008X288394 Codes of
Reproduced by permission of Taylor processing
Verbal
& Francis.
Benefits for science, society and you!

So far, we have considered several approaches and methods that have helped us to conceptualize
some aspects of the human mind. With carefully designed experiments and with help from new
technology we have made enormous progress in understanding the functioning of our mind.
It is clear however, that there is still a lot to discover and that by no means have we already
figured out exactly how our minds work. New theories are constantly being developed and old
ones are upgraded or rejected. But apart from this quest to raise our understanding of the mind,
cognitive psychologists are also called upon to start thinking about how some of this knowledge
can actually be used to solve problems in society, to improve road safety or healthcare settings,
to create better work circumstances, or to design more effective routines.
For example, the notion that a selective attention filter mechanism (as Broadbent suggested)
prevents a lot of information from reaching our awareness has a serious impact on how we should
build control panels in cars and airplanes and/or how we could best design safe traffic situations
(e.g., Theeuwes & Van der Horst, 2017). Similarly, understanding which factors influence our
decision-making process informs businesses and government organizations about persuasive
communication strategies, health-promoting campaigns and innovative commercial techniques,
like neuromarketing (Breiter et al., 2014). Also, knowing about the complexity of face recognition
and realizing the many ways in which our memory can fool us has given a great impulse for
the conception of strict guidelines and recommended protocols regarding eye witness testimony
(Loftus, 2013; see further Chapter 8). Furthermore, the suggested links between working
memory, executive functioning and intelligence has led to an increased interest in developing and
testing brain training programmes, for example, to slow down cognitive decline at older age, or
to reduce impulsivity in children with ADHD (Karbach & Verhaeghen, 2014). Finally, understanding
how learning and memory work can provide us with important information about how to improve
education (Schacter & Szpunar, 2015; Goldwater & Schalk, 2016) and how to study better. In
Chapter 7 we will explain in more detail what memory research has taught us about effective
studying, but because you should be able to profit from this information at the beginning of your
course, a few of these tips will be stated next.
Cognitive strategies in enhancing learning

Spacing and interleaving: As already demonstrated by Ebbinghaus (1885/1913), repeated
presentation and reviewing of information facilitates learning and improves memory. When
distributed over time (this is called spacing), repetition of information may initially lead to slower
learning but will ensure more durable retention. But if information is spaced out over time,
what should we do in between? Can we start revising another topic or would this interfere and
deteriorate our performance? To answer this latter question, research suggests that intermixing
different topics within a particular domain (this is called interleaving) will not deteriorate but
actually improve performance! (Roediger & Pyc, 2012; Rohrer, 2012). This increased performance
has usually been attributed to the fact that interleaving requires students to practice discrimination
between topics, problems, concepts or principles. In mathematics for example, it is important
that students learn not only how to multiply fractions ( 12 × 13 = 16 ) but also that the principle of
multiplying “tops” and “bottoms” does not transfer to additions ( 12 + 13 ≠ 25 ). In other words, apart
from knowing how, one also needs to learn when to apply certain (mathematical) principles.
Without going into too much detail here, the main conclusion from these types of studies
is that it is best to use spaced and interleaved practice when lasting learning is desirable. Such
routines can be accomplished in general by mixing up several topics during study and by repeatedly
returning to the same topics in different contexts. In this textbook, this will naturally happen because
you will find that many themes and issues are not restricted to just one chapter. Going back and
forth between different chapters and checking up on how “new” topics and theories relate to ones
that had been introduced earlier would therefore be a recommendable learning strategy.
Retrieval-based learning: From laboratory studies, it has been known for a long time that
the act of retrieving information from memory might be beneficial for learning. Within a classroom
setting, this has been demonstrated in a classic study by Roediger and Karpicke (2006), in which
three groups of students were asked to read texts that were tested for recall a week later. In
the first group, students were asked to read the text four times in the week before the final test
(denoted as SSSS). The second group was asked to read the text three times and then do a
practice recall test (denoted SSST). The final group read the text only once and was then tested
for recall three times (STTT) during the practice week. Then, all students received a surprise
free recall test after five minutes and an expected recall test after one week. Results from these
tests are indicated in Figure 1.15. As can be seen in this Figure, simply rereading the text (SSSS)
produced superior recall performance in the immediate test after five minutes, but this performance
Rereading
Testing
0.8
Proportion of idea units recalled
0.7
0.6
FIGURE 1.15
Results of the Roediger and Karpicke (2006) experiment. Note 0.5
that at longer time intervals after learning, the performance
of the testing group is better than the performance of the
re-reading group. 0.4
Republished with permission of SAGE Publications, from Roediger,
H. L. and Karpicke, J. D., Test-enhanced learning: Taking memory
tests improves long-term retention, Psychological Science, 0
5 minutes 2 days 1 week
(2006), 17, 249–255; permission conveyed through Copyright
Clearance Center, Inc. Delay
dropped dramatically to about 40 per cent recall after one week. In contrast, repeated testing during
practice (STTT) produced initially the lowest recall rate (around 70 per cent) but the performance
of this group hardly dropped in a week’s time (to around 60 per cent). These results show that fast
learning results in fast forgetting and that retrieval practice is very beneficial in the long run.
Thus, what has been demonstrated in this and other studies is that retrieving information from
memory increases the chance that the same information will be retrieved again in the near future. In
other words, retrieving makes the remembered information more retrievable. This is a fundamental
characteristic of our memory, which has been supported also at brain level by a recent brain imaging
study (Keresztes, Kaiser, Kovács, & Racsmány, 2014). Furthermore, it needs to be appreciated that
this increased retrievability comes on top of other potential benefits of continuous assessment.
For example, repeated assessment also informs teachers and students which materials
need further explanation or study. Furthermore, it ensures that students become more used to
test-taking, which will likely reduce their test anxiety. Indeed, Khanna (2015) showed that test-
enhanced learning may occur only or primarily when participants are not anxious about the
practice tests themselves. Moreover, she showed that students who engaged in ungraded pop
quizzes during their introductory Psychology course outperformed not only those not engaged
in such quizzes but also those engaged in graded pop quizzes. She attributed these differences
to the fact that compared to students taking the graded pop quizzes, those taking the ungraded
ones felt less anxious and more positive towards the quizzes. With this in mind, please note that
this textbook comes with many online support materials, including quizzes, and that at the end of
each chapter test-yourself questions are included.
Note taking and elaboration: It is increasingly common that students take their laptops into the
classroom, which often distracts attention from the contents of the lecture and the actual learning
process (for example, when students use their laptops to answer their emails or to engage in online
shopping). However, even when the laptops are used for their intended function of efficient note
taking, a recent laboratory study revealed that taking notes by hand led to s uperior performance in
tests of both factual and particularly conceptual understanding (Mueller & Oppenheimer, 2014). This
superior performance was found despite the fact that the laptop note takers produced more notes
than the longhand note takers; and more notes means more information to review. However, when
comparing the contents of notes of the two groups, several qualitative differences were observed
that may account for these results. The most important one was that the laptop notes showed
greater verbatim overlap with the lecture than the longhand notes, suggesting that students who
used their laptop for note taking were just simply transcribing content without thinking about it.
Furthermore, this verbatim note taking appeared remarkably robust, as it remained present when
laptop users were instructed not to take such notes.
The results from this note taking study parallel those from studies into explanatory questioning
(e.g., Smith et al., 2010) emphasizing that elaboration and active involvement with the materials is
necessary for efficient learning. Thus, whether it is note taking or reading this textbook, we would
like to encourage you to repeatedly ask yourself “Why?” At the end of each chapter you will find
self-test questions, and we recommend you to try and answer these as well.
We have emphasized behaviour in this chapter, because behaviour is what cognitive psychologists
are trying to explain. But in addition to measuring behaviour, cognitive psychologists also measure
physiological processes that underlie that behaviour. For example, in addition to considering
how memory operates behaviourally, cognitive psychologists are also interested in how memory
operates in the brain. In fact, for every behavioural question, there is a physiological question,
because the brain is the “machinery” responsible for creating the behaviour. Evidently, mind and
brain are intimately linked and this will be discussed further in Chapter 2. As a preview to this
chapter and to give you some idea of how initial thinking about the mind (i.e., in terms of separate
mental operations) has influenced experimental design of contemporary (brain) research,
consider the following brain imaging study. This study made use of an experimental method that
we discussed earlier and which was invented to calculate decision time more than a century ago!
Something to consider
Applying Donders’ subtraction method
The question of how certain cognitive operations are implemented and organized in our brain is
central to cognitive neuroscience, a psychology sub-discipline that developed out of a “marriage”
of cognitive psychology and neuroscience. In a typical cognitive neuroscience experiment brain
activations are measured while people perform certain cognitive tasks. Let’s take a closer look at
one such experiment to find out how this can be done.
This particular study (Petersen, Fox, Posner, Mintun, & Raichle, 1988) used Positron Emission
Tomography (PET) to examine which brain areas become active while participants are involved in
a semantic (meaning) association task. In this task, participants were asked to name a verb that is
meaningfully related to a particular object word that is presented on a computer screen or through
headphones. For example, they could say “eat” when they were presented with the word “cake,”
or “hit” when presented with the word “hammer.” This seemingly easy task actually involves
many cognitive operations, like perceiving and understanding the word presented, making
a semantic association, selecting an appropriate response and producing a motoric o utput.
Consequently, many different processes will be initiated and many brain areas will be activated at
approximately the same time while carrying out this task. A special “trick” is therefore needed to
isolate the different elementary operations, like perception of the object word, coming up with an
association, and preparing a motoric output, so that they subsequently can be linked to specific
brain areas. As explained next, the strategy that was used in this study to achieve this shows
strong resemblance to the subtraction method originally developed by Donders 120 years earlier
(recall that in his case he wanted to “isolate” the time for making a decision from the time needed
to perceive light flashes and to make a motoric response, see 1868: Donders’ pioneering
experiment: How long does it take to make a decision?).
A set of four task conditions was developed according to a hierarchical design consisting
of four levels (see Figure 1.16). During each task condition or level, the brain activity of
the participants was recorded by means of a PET scan. The first task condition (1) was the
simplest one, asking participants to just watch a fixation point on a computer screen. In the
+ PET scan showing:
Activity related to sitting upright

Task 1 + “Look at fixation cross”
and staring to a computer screen
hammer
Activity related to sitting upright,

Task 2a hammer “Silently read word” staring to a computer screen,
and reading a word
hammer
hammer
Activity related to sitting upright,
Task 3 hammer “Read word aloud” staring to a computer screen,
reading a word, and speaking
hammer this word aloud
hit ? Activity related to sitting upright,

staring to a computer screen,
Task 4 hammer “Say related verb” reading a word, searching and
selecting an associated verb,
and speaking this word aloud
FIGURE 1.16
Schematic representation of how the subtraction technique was applied in the PET study of Petersen et al., 1988. The hierarchical design
lies in the fact that a particular experimental state generated by a certain task functions as the control state of the next, higher-level task.
CHAPTER SUMMARY 21
second task condition, participants were passively viewing (2) words. In the third task condition
(3), participants were asked to repeat the word they had seen. In the fourth and most complex
condition (4), participants were asked to generate an appropriate verb in response to the noun
presented. In this hierarchical design, each subsequent task condition supposedly adds one
or two extra cognitive operations. Consequently, the brain areas involved with these added
operations can be made visible by means of subtraction.
For example, as schematically indicated in Figure 1.16, subtracting the PET scan obtained
for task condition (1) from the one obtained for task condition (2) would show the brain areas that
are involved with passive visual word processing and word-level coding.
Similarly, subtracting the PET scans from task condition (2) from those from task condition 3
would show the brain areas associated with vocal repetition of the presented words. And finally,
subtracting PET scans from task condition (3) from PET scans from task condition 4 would
show the brain areas involved with making semantic associations and with selecting appropriate
actions. As it turned out, this latter subtraction revealed two active brain areas. One of these
brain areas was located at the left frontal side and was presumably associated with semantic
association processing. The other brain area that became visible was localized more centrally and
more towards the back of the head. This particular brain area was believed to be part of a system
engaged in the selection of action (Petersen et al., 1988).
Regardless of the specific brain areas mentioned (these will be explained in more detail in
Chapter 11), the important point to take home from this study is how the subtraction method can be
used to isolate specific cognitive processes. It illustrates how cognitive psychology (and also cognitive
neuroscience) tries to understand the operation of the mind by identifying and analyzing different
processes or stages of information processing and by finding out how they relate to each other.
Test yourself 1.1

1. How would you define the mind?
2. Why could we say that Donders and Ebbinghaus were cognitive psychologists, even though in the 19th
century there was no field called cognitive psychology?
3. Describe the rise of behaviourism and how this has affected research on the mind?
4. What is meant by “the information-processing approach” and how is this relevant for cognitive psychology?
5. Why are models important in cognitive psychology? What are structural, process and resource models and
how do they relate to each other?
6. Describe four different everyday situations for which it is important to understand how we process
information and come to certain decisions.
Chapter summary
1. Cognitive psychology is the branch of psychology measure, such as behaviour or physiological responding.
concerned with the scientific study of the mind. This is one of the basic principles of cognitive psychology.
2. The mind creates and controls mental capacities such 5. The first laboratory of scientific psychology, founded by
as perception, attention and memory, and creates Wundt in 1879, was concerned largely with studying the
representations of the world that enable us to function. mind. Structuralism was the dominant theoretical approach
3. The work of Donders (simple vs choice reaction time) and of this laboratory, and analytic introspection was one of the
Ebbinghaus (the forgetting curve for nonsense syllables) are major methods used to collect data.
examples of early experimental research on the mind. 6. William James, in the United States, used observations of
4. Because the operation of the mind cannot be observed his own mind as the basis of his textbook, Principles of
directly, its operation must be inferred from what we can Psychology.
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line the paragaster as fast as its original covering of choanocytes
retreats into the newly formed chambers.
Fig. 81.—S. setosum. Young Sponge, with one whorl of radial tubes. o, Osculum;
p, pore; sp1, monaxon; sp4, quadriradiate spicule. (After Maas.)
With a canal system precisely similar to that of Sycon, Ute (Fig. 83)
shows an advance in structure in the thickening of the dermal layers
over the distal ends of the chambers. The dermal thickenings above
neighbouring chambers extend laterally and meet; and there results
a sheet of dermal tissue perforated by dermal ostia, which open into
the inhalant canals, and strengthened by stout spicules running
longitudinally. This layer is termed a cortex; it covers the whole
sponge, compacting the radial tubes so that they form, together with
the cortex, a secondary wall to the sponge, which is once more a
simple sac, but with a complex wall. The cortex may be enormously
developed, so as to form more than half the thickness of the wall
(Fig. 84). The chambers taken together are spoken of as the
chamber layer.
Fig. 82.—Sycon raphanus. A, Longitudinal section of young decalcified Sponge
at a stage somewhat later than that shown in Fig. 81. B, Transverse section
of the same through a whorl of tubes. d, Dermal membrane; g, gastral
membrane; H, paragaster; sp4, tetraradiate spicule; T, radial tube. (After
Maas.)
Fig. 83.—Transverse section of the body-wall of Ute, passing longitudinally
through two chambers. a.p, Apopyle; d.o, dermal ostium; fl.ch, flagellated
chamber or radial tube; i.c, inhalant canal; p, prosopyle. (After Dendy.)
We have already alluded to the resemblance between a young

Ascon person and a radial tube of Sycon—a comparison which calls
to mind the somewhat strange view of certain earlier authors, that
the flagellated chambers are really the sponge individuals. If now we
suppose each Ascon-like radial tube of Sycon to undergo that same
process of growth by which the Sycon itself was derived from the
Ascon, we shall then have a sponge with a canal system of the type
seen in Leucandra among British forms, but more diagrammatically
shown in the foreign genus Leucilla (Fig. 85). The foregoing remarks
do not pretend to give an account of the transition from Sycon to
Leucilla as it occurred in phylogeny. For some indication of this we
must await embryological research.
In Leucandra the fundamental structure is obscured by the

irregularity of its canal system. It shows a further and most important
difference from Leucilla in the smaller size and rounded form of its
chambers. This change of form marks an advance in efficiency; for
now the flagella converge to a centre, so that they all act on the
same drop of water, while in the tubular chamber their action is more
widely distributed and proportionately less intense (see p. 236).
Fig. 84.—Transverse section through the body-wall of Grantiopsis. d.o, Dermal
ostium; fl.ch, flagellated chamber; i.c, long incurrent canal traversing the
thick cortex to reach the chamber layer; p, apopyle. (After Dendy.)
Fig. 85.—Transverse section through the body-wall of Leucilla. d.o, Dermal

ostium; ex.c, exhalant canal; fl.ch, chamber; i.c, inhalant canal. (After
Dendy.)
Above are described three main types of canal system—that of

Homocoela, of Sycon, and of Leucandra and Leucilla. These are
conveniently termed the first, second, and third types respectively,
and may be briefly described as related to one another somewhat in
the same way as a scape, umbel, and compound umbel among
inflorescences. These types formed the basis of Haeckel's famous
classification.[221] It has, however, been concluded[222] that the
skeleton is a safer guide in taxonomy, at any rate for the smaller
subdivisions; and in modern classifications genera with canal
systems of the third type will be found distributed among various
families; while in the Grantiidae, Ute and Leucandra stand side by
side. This treatment implies a belief that the third type of canal
system has been independently and repeatedly evolved within the
Calcarea—an example of a phenomenon, homoplasy, strikingly
displayed throughout the group. It is, remarkably enough, the case
that all the canal systems found in the remainder of the Porifera are
more or less modified forms of one or other of the second two types
of canal system above described.
The families Grantiidae, Heteropidae, and Amphoriscidae, all

possessing a dermal cortex, are distinguished as follows:—The
Grantiidae by the absence of subdermal sagittal triradiate spicules
and of conspicuous subgastral quadriradiates; the Heteropidae by
the presence of sagittal triradiates; the Amphoriscidae by the
presence of conspicuous subgastral quadriradiates.
Two families of Calcarea, possibly allied, remain for special mention

—the Pharetronidae, a family rich in genera, and containing almost
all the fossil forms of the group, and the Astroscleridae.
The Pharetronidae are with one, or perhaps two exceptions, fossil

forms, having in common the arrangement of the spicules of their
main skeletal framework in fibres. The family is divided into two sub-
families:—
I. Dialytinae.—The spicules are not fused to one another; the exact

mode of their union into fibres is unknown, but an organic cement
may be present.
Lelapia australis, a recent species, should probably be placed here

as the sole living representative. Dendy has shown[223] that this
remarkable species has a skeleton of the same fibrous character as
is found in typical Dialytinae, and that the triradiate spicules in the
fibres undergo a modification into the "tuning-fork" type (Fig. 86, C),
to enable them to be compacted into smooth fibres. "Tuning-forks,"
though not exclusively confined to Pharetronids, are yet very
characteristic of them.
Fig. 86.—Portions of the skeleton of Petrostroma schulzei. A, Framework with
ensheathing pellicle; B, quadriradiate spicules with laterally fused rays; C, a
"tuning-fork." (After Doederlein.)
II. Lithoninae.—The main skeletal framework is formed of spicules

fused together, and is covered by a cortex containing free spicules.
Fig. 87.—A spicule from the skeleton framework of Plectroninia, showing the
terminally expanded rays. (After Hinde.)
The sub-family contains only one living genus and a few recently
described fossil forms. Petrostroma schulzei[224] lives in shallow
water near Japan; Plectroninia halli[225] and Bactronella were found
in Eocene beds of Victoria; Porosphaera[226] long known from the
Chalk of England and of the Continent, has recently been shown by
Hinde[226] to be nearly allied to Plectroninia; finally, Plectinia[227] is a
genus erected by Počta for a sponge from Cenomanian beds of
Bohemia. Doederlein, in 1896, expressed his opinion that fossil
representatives of Lithoninae would most surely be discovered. The
fused spicules are equiangular quadriradiates; they are united in
Petrostroma by lateral fusion of the rays, in Plectroninia (Fig. 87) and
Porosphaera by fusion of apposed terminal flat expansions of the
rays, and in some, possibly all, genera a continuous deposit of
calcium carbonate ensheaths the spicular reticulum. Thus they recall
the formation of the skeleton on the one hand of the Lithistida and on
the other of the Dictyonine Hexactinellida (see pp. 202, 211).
"Tuning-forks" may occur in the dermal membrane.
Fig. 88.—Astrosclera willeyana, Lister. A, the Sponge, × about 3. p, The ostia on

its distal surface. B, a portion of the skeleton showing four polyhedra with
radiating crystalline fibres. C, an ostium; the surrounding tissue contains
young stages of polyhedra. (After Lister.)
The Astroscleridae, as known at present, contain a single genus

and species, apparently the most isolated in the phylum. Astrosclera
willeyana[228] was brought back from the Loyalty Islands, and from
Funafuti of the Ellice group. Its skeleton is both chemically and
structurally aberrant. In other Calcarea the calcium carbonate of the
skeleton is present as calcite, in Astrosclera as aragonite, and the
elements are solid polyhedra, united by their surfaces to the total
exclusion of soft parts (Fig. 88). Each element consists of crystalline
fibres radially disposed around a few central granules, and
terminating peripherally in contact with the fibres of adjacent
elements. Young polyhedra are to be found free in the soft parts at
the surface. The chambers are exceptionally minute, especially for a
calcareous sponge, comparing with those of other sponges as
follows:—
Astrosclera chambers, 10µ × 8µ to 18µ × 11µ.

Smallest chambers in Silicea, 15µ × 18µ to 24µ × 31µ.
Smallest chambers in Calcarea, 60µ × 40µ.
In its outward form Astrosclera resembles certain Pharetronids. The
minute dimensions of the ciliated chambers relegate Astrosclera to
the Micromastictora, and the fortunate fact that the calcium
carbonate of its skeleton possesses the mineral characters not of
calcite, but of aragonite, renders it less difficult to conceive that its
relations may be rather with the non-calcareous than the calcareous
sponges.
BRANCH II. MICROMASTICTORA

All sponges which do not possess calcareous skeletons are
characterised by choanocytes, which, when compared with those of
Calcarea, are conspicuous for their smaller size. The great majority
(Silicispongiae) of the non-calcareous sponges either secrete
siliceous skeletons or are connected with siliceous sponges by a
nicely graded series of forms. The small remainder are entirely
askeletal. All these non-calcareous sponges are included, under the
title Micromastictora, in a natural group, opposed to the
Megamastictora as of equal value.
The subdivision of the Micromastictora is a matter of some difficulty.

The Hexactinellida alone are a well circumscribed group. After their
separation there remains, besides the askeletal genera, an
assemblage of forms, the Demospongiae, which fall into two main
tribes. These betray their relationship by series of intermediate
types, but a clue is wanting which shall determine decisively the
direction in which the series are to be read. The askeletal genera are
the crux of the systematist. It is perhaps safest, while recognising
that many of them bear a likeness of one kind or another to various
Micromastictora, to retain them together in a temporary class, the
Myxospongiae.
CLASS I. MYXOSPONGIAE
The class Myxospongiae is a purely artificial one, containing widely
divergent forms, which possess a common negative character,
namely, the absence of a skeleton. As a result of this absence they
are all encrusting in habit.
One genus, Hexadella, has been regarded by its discoverer

Topsent[229] as an Hexactinellid. The same authority places
Oscarella with the Tetractinellida; it is more difficult to suggest the
direction in which we are to seek the relations of the remaining type,
Halisarca.
Hexadella, from the coast of France, is a remarkable little rose-

coloured or bright yellow sponge, with large sac-like flagellated
chambers and a very lacunar ectosome.
Oscarella is a brightly coloured sponge, with a characteristic velvety

surface; it is a British genus, but by no means confined to our
shores. Its canal system has been described by some authors as
diplodal, by others as eurypylous. Topsent[230] has shown, and we
can confirm his statement, that though the chambers have usually
the narrow afferent and efferent ductules of a diplodal system, yet
since each one may communicate with two or three canals, the canal
system cannot be described as diplodal. The hypophare attains a
great development, and in it the generative products mature. The
pinacocytes, like those of Plakinidae, and perhaps of Aplysilla, are
flagellated.
Halisarca, also British, is easily distinguished from Oscarella by the

presence of a mucus-like secretion which oozes from it, and by the
absence of the bright coloration characteristic of Oscarella. It
naturally suggests itself that the coloration in the one case and the
secretion in the other are protective, and in this respect perform one
of the functions of the skeleton of other sponges. The chambers are
long, tubular, and branched. There is no hypophare.
CLASS II. HEXACTINELLIDA[231]
Silicispongiae, defined by their spicules, of which the rays lie along
three rectangular axes. The canal system is simple, with thimble-
shaped chambers. The body-wall is divided into endosome,
ectosome, and choanosome.
Some authors would elevate the Hexactinellida to the position of a

third main sub-group of Porifera, thus separating them from other
siliceous sponges. In considering this view it is important to realise at
the outset that they are deep-water forms. They bear evident traces
of the influence of their habitat, and like others of the colonists of the
deep sea, are impressed with marked archaic features. Yet they are
still bound to other Micromastictora, first by the small size of their
choanocytes, and secondly by the presence of siliceous spicules.
This second character is really a double link, for it involves not
merely the presence of silica in the skeleton, but also the presence
in each spicule of a well-marked axial filament. Now this axial
filament is a structure which is gaining in importance, for purposes of
classification, in proportion as its absence in Calcarea is becoming
more probable. The Hexactinellida are the only sponges, other than
the bath sponge, which are at all generally known. They have won
recognition by their beauty, as the bath sponge by its utility, and, like
it, one of their number—the Venus's Flower-Basket—forms an
important article of commerce, the chief fishery being in the
Philippine Islands. This wonderful beauty belongs to the skeleton,
and is greatly concealed when the soft parts are present.
We have said that the Hexactinellids are deep-sea forms; they are
either directly fixed to the bottom or more often moored in the ooze
by long tufts of rooting spicules. In the "glass-rope sponge," the
rooting tuft of long spicules, looking like a bundle of spun glass, is
valued by the Japanese, who export it to us. In Monorhaphis the
rooting tuft is replaced by a single giant spicule,[232] three metres in
length, and described as "of the thickness of a little finger"! Probably
it is as a result of their fixed life in the calm waters of the deep
sea[233] that Hexactinellids contrast with most other sponges by their
symmetry. It should not, however, be forgotten that many of the
Calcarea which inhabit shallow water exhibit almost as perfect a
symmetry.
Fig. 89.—Longitudinal section of a young specimen of Lanuginella pupa O.S.,

with commencing formation of the oscular area. × 35. d.m, Dermal
membrane; g.m, gastral membrane; pg, paragaster; sd.tr, subdermal
trabeculae; Sg.tr, subgastral trabeculae. (After F. E. Schulze.)
The structure of the body-wall in Hexactinellida is so constant as to

make it possible to give a general description applicable to all
members of the group. It is of considerable thickness, but a large
part is occupied by empty spaces, for the actual tissue is present in
minimum quantity. In the wall the chamber-layer is suspended by
trabeculae of soft tissue, between a dermal membrane on the
outside and a similar gastral membrane on the inner side (Fig. 89).
Thus the water entering the chambers through their numerous pores
has first passed through the ostia in the dermal membrane and
traversed the subdermal trabecular space; on leaving the chambers
it flows through the subgastral trabecular space and the ostia in the
gastral membrane, to enter the paragaster and leave the body at the
osculum. The trabeculae and the dermal and gastral membranes
together constitute the dermal layer. This conclusion is based on
comparison with adults of the other groups, for in the absence of
embryological knowledge no direct evidence is available. According
to the Japanese investigator, Isao Ijima,[234] the dermal and gastral
membranes are but expansions of the trabeculae, and the
trabeculae themselves are entirely cellular, containing none of the
gelatinous basis met with in the dermal layer of all other sponges.
There is no surface layer of pinacocytes, the cells forming the
trabeculae being all of one type, namely, irregularly branching cells,
connected with one another by their branches to form a syncytium.
In the trabeculae are found scleroblasts and archaeocytes.
The chambers have a characteristic shape: they are variously

described as "thimble-shaped," "tubular," or "Syconate," and they
open by wide mouths into the subgastral trabecular space. Their
walls have been named the membrana reticularis from the fact that,
when preserved with only ordinary precautions, they are seen as a
regular network of protoplasmic strands, with square meshes and
nuclei at the nodes. This appearance recently found an explanation
when Schulze, for the first time, succeeded in preserving the collared
cells of Hexactinellids.[235] Schulze was then able to show that the
choanocytes are not in contact with one another at their bases,
where the nuclei are situated, but communicate with one another by
stout protoplasmic strands. The form of the choanocyte can be seen
in Fig. 91.
Fig. 90.—Portion of the body-wall of Walteria sp., showing the thimble-shaped

flagellated chambers, above which is seen the dermal membrane. (After F.
E. Schulze.)
To Schulze's description of the chamber, Ijima has added the
important contributions that every mesh in the reticulum functions as
a chamber pore or prosopyle; and that porocytes, such as are found
in Calcarea, are wanting. This structure of the chamber-walls, the
absence of gelatinous basis in the dermal layer, and the slight
degree of histological differentiation in the same layer, added to the
more obvious character of thimble-shaped chambers, are the chief
archaic features of Hexactinellid morphology.
Fig. 91.—Portion of a section of the membrana reticularis or chamber-wall of

Schaudinnia arctica, × 1500. (After F. E. Schulze.)
The skeleton which supports the soft parts is, like them, simple and
constant in its main features. It is secreted by scleroblasts, which lie
in the trabeculae, and is made up of only one kind of spicule and its
modifications. This is the hexactine, a spicule which possesses six
rays disposed along three rectangular axes. Each ray contains an
axial thread, which meets its fellow at the centre of the spicule,
where they together form the axial cross. Modifications of the
hexactine arise either by reduction or branching, by spinulation or
expansion of one or more of the rays. The forms of spicule arising by
reduction are termed pentactines, tetractines, and so on, according
to the number of the remaining rays. Those rays which are
suppressed leave the proximal portion of their axial thread as a
remnant marking their former position (Fig. 94). Octactine spicules
seem to form an exception to the above statements, but Schulze has
shown that they too are but modifications of the hexactine arising by
(1) branching of the rays of a hexactine, followed by (2)
recombination of the secondary rays (Fig. 92).
Fig. 92.—A, discohexaster, in which the four cladi a, a', b, b', c of each ray start
directly from a central nodule. B, disco-octaster, resulting from the
redistribution of the twenty-four cladi of A into eight groups of three. (After
Schulze, from Delage.)
The various spicules are named, irrespective of their form, according

to their position and corresponding function. The arrangement of the
spicules is best realised by means of a diagram (Fig. 93).
Fig. 93.—Scheme to show the arrangement of spicules in the Hexactinellid

skeleton. Canalaria, microscleres in the walls of the excurrent canals;
Dermalia Autoderm[alia], microscleres in the dermal membrane; D.
Hypoderm[alia], more deeply situated dermalia; Dictyonalia, parenchymalia
which become fused to form the skeletal framework of Dictyonina; Gastralia
Autogastr[alia], microscleres in the gastral membrane; Gastralia
Hypogastr[alia], more deeply situated gastralia; Parenchymalia Principalia,
main supporting spicules between the chambers; P. Comitalia, slender
diactine or triactine spicules accompanying the last; P. Intermedia,
microscleres between the P. principalia; Prostalia, projecting spicules; P.
basalia, rooting spicules, from the base; P. marginalia, defensive spicules,
round the oscular rim; P. pleuralia, defensive spicules, from the sides. (From
Delage and Hérouard, after F. E. Schulze.)
The deviations from this ground-plan of Hexactinellid structure are
few and simple. They are due to folding of the chamber-layer, or to
variations in the shape of the chambers, and to increasing fusion of
the spicules to form rigid skeletons. A simple condition of the
chamber-layer, like that of the young sponge of Fig. 89, occurs also
in some adult Hexactinellids, e.g. in Walteria of the Pacific Ocean
(Fig. 90). Thus is represented in this order the second type of canal
system described among Calcarea. More frequently, however,
instead of forming a smooth sheet, the chamber-layer grows out into
a number of tubular diverticula, the cavities of which are excurrent
canals; these determine a corresponding number of incurrent canals
which lie between them. In this way there arises a canal system
resembling the third type of Calcarea. By still further pouching so as
to give secondary diverticula, opening into the first, a complicated
canal system is formed, as, for example, in Euplectella suberea.
To return to the skeleton, the most complete fusion is attained by the

deposit of a continuous sheath of silica round the apposed parallel
rays of neighbouring spicules. This may be termed the dictyonine
type of union, for it occurs in all those forms originally included under
the term Dictyonina, in which the cement is deposited pari passu
with the formation of the spicules. In other cases connecting bridges
of silica unite the spicules, or there may be a connecting reticulum of
siliceous threads, or, again, rays crossing obliquely may be soldered
together at the point of contact. These more irregular methods occur
in species where the spicules are free at their first formation.
Spicules originally free may later be united in a true Dictyonine
fashion. The terms Lyssacina and Dictyonina are useful to denote
respectively: the former all those Hexactinellida in which the spicules
are free at their first formation, and the latter those in which the
deposit of the cementing layer goes hand in hand with the formation
of the spicules. But the terms do not indicate separateness of origin
of the groups denoted by them, for there is evidence that Dictyonine
types have been derived repeatedly from Lyssacine types, and that
in fact every Dictyonine was once a Lyssacine.
Fig. 94.—Amphidisc, at a are traces of the four missing rays.
The real or natural cleft in the class lies between those genera
possessing amphidiscs (Figs. 94, 97) among their microscleres, and
all the remainder of the Hexactinellida which bear hexasters (Fig.
96). The former set of genera constitute the sub-class
Amphidiscophora, the latter the Hexasterophora.
Fig. 95.—Portion of body-wall of Hyalonema, in section, showing the irregular

chambers.
Sub-Class 1. Amphidiscophora.—Amphidiscs are present,

hexasters absent. A tuft of rooting spicules or basalia is always
present. The ciliated chambers deviate more or less from the typical
thimble shape, and the membrana reticularis is continuous from
chamber to chamber (Figs. 94, 95, 97).
Fig. 96.—Hexasters. A, Graphiohexaster; B, floricome; C, onychaster.
Sub-Class 2. Hexasterophora.—Hexasters are present,

amphidiscs absent. The chambers have the typical regular form, and
are sharply marked off from one another (Figs. 90, 96).
All the Amphidiscophora have Lyssacine skeletons; in the

Hexasterophora both types of skeleton occur. The subdivision of the
Hexasterophora is determined by the presence or absence of
uncinate spicules. An "uncinatum" is a diactine spicule, pointed at
both ends and bearing barbs all directed towards one end. This
method of classification gives us a wholly Dictyonine order,
Uncinataria, and an order consisting partly of Dictyonine, partly of
Lyssacine genera, which may be distinguished as the
Anuncinataria. Ova have rarely been found, and sexually produced
larvae never; but Ijima has found archaeocyte clusters in abundance,
and his evidence is in favour of the view that they give rise asexually
to larvae, described by him in this class for the first time (see p. 231).
Both sub-classes are represented in British waters: the

Amphidiscophora by Hyalonema thomsoni and Pheronema
carpenteri; the Hexasterophora by Euplectella suberea and
Asconema setubalense, and of course possibly by others.
Hyalonema thomsoni, one of the glass-rope sponges, was dredged

by the Porcupine off the Shetland Islands in water of about 550
fathoms. The spindle-shaped body of the sponge is shown in Fig. 97.
Its long rooting tuft is continued right up its axis, to end in a conical
projection, which is surrounded by four apertures leading into
corresponding compartments of the paragaster.
Fig. 97.—Hyalonema thomsoni. A, Whole specimen with rooting tuft and

Epizoanthus crust; B, pinulus, a spicule characteristic of but not peculiar to
the Amphidiscophora, occurring in the dermal and gastral membranes; C,
amphidisc with axial cross; D, distal end of rooting spicule with grapnel.
(After F. E. Schulze.)
The crust of Anthozoa of the genus Epizoanthus (p. 406) on the

rooting tuft is a constant feature in this as in other species of
Hyalonema. It contributed to make the sponge a puzzle, which long
defied interpretation. The earliest diagnosis the genus received was
the "Glass Plant." Then the root tuft was thought to be part of the
Epizoanthus, which was termed a "most aberrant Alcyonarian with its
base inserted in a sponge"; next we hear of the sponge as parasitic
on the Sea Anemone. Finally, the root tuft was shown to be proper to
the sponge, which was, however, figured upside down, till some
Japanese collectors described the natural position, or that in which
they were accustomed to find it.
Pheronema carpenteri was found by the Lightning off the north of

Scotland in 530 fathoms. The goblet shaped, thick walled body and
broad, ill-defined root tuft are shown in Fig. 98, but no figure can do
justice to the lustre of its luxuriant prostalia and delicate dermal
network with stellate knots at regular intervals. The basalia are two-
pronged and anchor-like.
Fig. 98.—Pheronema carpenteri. × ½. (From Wyville Thomson.)
Both the Hexasterophoran genera were dredged off the north of

Scotland, and both conform to the Lyssacine type without uncinates.
Euplectella suberea is a straight, erect tube, anchored by a tuft of
basalia. The upper end of the tube is closed by a sieve plate, the
perforations in which are oscula, while the beams contain flagellated
chambers, so that the sieve is simply a modified portion of the wall. It
is a peculiarity of this as of one or two other allied genera that the
lateral walls are perforated by oscula. They are termed parietal gaps,
and are regularly arranged along spiral lines encircling the body.
Fig. 99.—Sieve plate of Euplectella imperialis. (After Ijima.)
Ijima, who has dredged Euplectellids from the waters near Tokyo,
finds that in young specimens oscula are confined to the sieve plate;
parietal gaps are secondary formations. The groundwork of the
skeleton is a lattice similar to that shown in Fig. 100. The chamber-
layer is much folded. Various foreign species of Euplectella afford
interesting examples of association with a Decapod Crustacean,
Spongicola venusta, of which a pair lives in the paragaster of each
specimen. The Crustacean is light pink, the female distinguished by
a green ovary, which can be seen through the transparent tissues. It
is not altogether clear what the prisoner gains, nor what fee, if any,
the host exacts.
Ijima relates that the skeleton of Euplectella is in great demand in

Japan for marriage ceremonies. He also informs us that the
Japanese name means "Together unto old age and unto the same
grave," while by a slight alteration it becomes "Lobsters in the same
cell," and remarks that the Japanese find this an amusing pun.
Fig. 100.—Skeletal lattice of Euplectella imperialis. (After Ijima.)

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COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 2E - eBook

E. BRUCE GOLDSTEIN AND JOHANNA C. VAN HOOFF

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Key terms 22 The nature of perception 52

The phonological loop 141 TEST YOURSELF 6.2 183

Working memory and the brain 153 Something to consider 187

Updating memories: Retrieval and Errors due to suggestion 253

The constructive nature of memory 238 Is there a psychologically “privileged” level of

The embodied approach 291 CHAPTER 11

TEST YOURSELF 10.2 325 TEST YOURSELF 11.3 364

CHAPTER 12 The availability heuristic 410

Find the hidden animal 101 Reading sentences (continued) 244

Looking off to the side 101 Memory for a list 245

Change detection 114

CHAPTER 5 Listing common features 273

Remembering three letters 132 Naming things 274

Digit span 134

Articulatory suppression 143 Experiencing imagery 299

Comparing visual objects 144

Holding a spatial stimulus in the The lexical decision task 336

Tower of Hanoi problem 379 CHAPTER 13

Remember/know procedure 179 Think-aloud protocol 384

Avoiding explicit ­remembering in a In vivo problem-solving research 392

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Some questions we will consider

●● Distinguishes items in a category, when he thinks about different possible forms of

Cognitive psychology: Studying the mind

What is the mind?

Studying the mind: Early work in cognitive psychology

Light flashes Left light flashes Stimulus

Reaction “Perceive left light” and Mental

1879: Wundt’s psychology laboratory: Structuralism and analytic introspection

1885: Ebbinghaus’ memory experiment: What is the time course of forgetting?

Savings = 600 Savings = 350 Savings = 270

According to Ebbinghaus, this reduction in savings provided a measure of forgetting,

FIGURE 1.6 8.75 hours

1890: William James’ Principles of Psychology

Millions of items . . . are present to my senses which never properly enter my

TABLE 1.1 Early pioneers in cognitive psychology

Person Procedure Results and Conclusions Contribution

Abandoning the study of the mind

1913: Watson founds behaviourism

Psychology as the behaviourist sees it is a purely objective, experimental branch

1938: Skinner’s operant conditioning

Avoiding explicit remembering in a In vivo problem-solving research 392