INDO CHINA RELATIONS

“In International Relations there are no Permanent Friends only Permanent Interests”

The ongoing standoff between India and China in the Eastern Ladakh Region of India is perhaps one
of the key parameters to critically gauge the sensitivity of the relations between these two sub-continent
giants; whose cumulative population makes up for one third of the people on this planet. Any drastic
outcome of this stand-off will impact not only the sub-continent but the entire world given the economic
impact they together have on the global arena. Against the backdrop of this impasse and the global
pandemic and its accompanying international crisis; an attempt is made to trace the contours of the
relations of these two neighbours to gain a deeper insight into a possible prognosis to the current crisis.

Structure

The essential structure, governance model, philosophy and ethos should be put in perspective in a
comparative format as under

INDIA CHINA
PHILOSOPH Democratic and Secular Republic Communist ideology with Party reigning
Y Largest Democracy with Federal supreme
structure Totalitarian state with full control by Party and
no voice for dissent
Economy Free market economy Controlled Market economy
Aspirations Peaceful co-existence in harmony and Alternate power to the US in the present
individual sovereignty and independence unipolar world.
Overseas expansionism.
OBOR, BRI to reduce dependence on sea-faring
trade and increase own outreach.

Trade Poor exports. Major manufacturing hub with a huge export

Large Trade deficits with major content of both raw materials and finished
economic powers. products.
Territorial Along the LAC on the western side that is Island and maritime disputes with Taiwan,
Dispute East of Ladakh Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philipines and
Vietnam.
With Bhutan on the Doklam issue

It can be well appreciated that with a neighbor having such diametrically opposing ideologies and thought
process; there is bound to result in friction which needs to be managed within the present Geopolitical
compulsions. Moreover India shares a very long border of 3488 kms with China, divided into the three main
parts the Eastern parts which borders Arunachal and is around 1700 kms long, then comes the Middle
which is around 625 kms bordering Himachal and Uttara Khand and the Western part which is around 2000
kms long along the Ladakh region.

Land Disputes.

1962 Indo-China War In the post-Independence era Indo-China relations had reached an all-time low in
1962 when Chinese unilaterally attacked an unprepared and relatively trusting and complacent India with
the Aksai Chin area remaining the bone of contention. There had been a series of violent border skirmishes
between the two countries after the 1959 Tibetan uprising, when India granted asylum to the Dalai Lama.
Chinese military action grew increasingly aggressive and on 20 Oct 1962, Chinese troops advanced
over Indian forces in both theatres, reaching Rezang La in the Western theatre, as well as Tawang in the
Eastern theatre. The war ended when China declared a ceasefire on 20 November 1962, and simultaneously
announced its withdrawal to its claimed "Line of Actual Control".
Subsequently Chinese attempts at intrusions like the Nathu la and Cho la in 1987 have only served
to excarebate the relations. The more recent Galwan Stand-off was due to China’s interest in the Aksai chin
area for two main reasons:

(a) The CPEC passing North of Karakoram which is observed and dominated by India. The
annexation of Aksai-chin serves to consolidate his road communication from any possible
envisaged Indian misadventure.

(b) The construction of the road from Ladakh to DBO and to the Karakoram Pass by India has made
the Chinese nervous and are apprehensive of Indian intent.
Claim Lines. The claim lines by India and china are also an eternal friction point with China claiming
Arunachal Pradesh and Tibet as its integral area and India claiming Aksai Chin as its integral territory
contiguous to Ladakh. The two countries failed to resolve their border dispute. Both countries have steadily
established military infrastructure along border areas
THE DOKLAM STAND OFF

On 16 June 2017 Chinese troops with construction vehicles and road-building equipment began extending
an existing road southward in Doklam, located at the tri junction of India, Bhutan and China, but claimed by
both China and Bhutan. On 18 June 2017, around 270 Indian troops, with weapons and two bulldozers,
entered Doklam to stop the Chinese troops from constructing the road. India accused China of changing the
status quo in violation of a 2012 understanding between the two governments regarding the tri-junction
boundary points and causing "security concerns", with the strategic Siliguri Corridor. India unequivocally
stated said that if China unilaterally changed the status-quo of the tri-junction point between China-India
and Bhutan then it posed a challenge to the security of India.
On 28 August 2017, China and India reached a consensus to put an end to the border stand-off. Both of
them agreed to disengage from the standoff in Doklam.
Water Dispute
 The water dispute between India and China stems from the Brahmaputra River which originates in
China. Brahmaputra is the backbone for agriculture in both India and Bangladesh. Since China has a
predominant de-facto control on the YARLUNG ZANGBO (what Brahmaputra is called in China), it can
prevent water from flowing into India by constructing infrastructure projects.
A major trust deficiency exists between the two nations as China is reluctant to disclose details of its Hydro
-electricity projects. Several MOUs have been signed to obviate any misadventure by China but the issue
continues to simmer as a probable impediment to peace and tranquility in the region moreso with China’s
plans for four more dams on the same river in Tibet.
Trade dispute

Since the late 1980s, both countries have successfully rebuilt diplomatic and economic ties. In 2008, China
became India's largest trading partner and the two countries have also extended their strategic and military
relations. Despite economic and strategic ties, there was a lot of hurdles for India and China to overcome.
India faces trade imbalance heavily in favour of China. China is India's largest trading partner. Chinese
imports from India amounted to $16.4 billion or 0.8% of its overall imports, and 4.2% of India's overall
exports in 2014. Chinese exports to India amounted to $58.4 billion or 2.3% of its overall exports, and 12.6%
of India's overall imports in 2014. Bilateral trade between China and India touched US$89.6 billion in
2017–18, with the trade deficit widening to US$62.9 billion in China's favour. In 2017, the volume of bilateral
trade between India & China stands at US$84.5 billion. This figure excludes bilateral trade between India &
Hong Kong which stands at another US$34 billion.

Other Areas Impacting Indo-China Relations

CHINA-PAK COLLUSION With escalating border tensions leading to the 1962 Sino-Indian war,
China and Pakistan aligned with each other in a joint effort to counter India and the Soviet Union as both
have border disputes with India. Since then, an informal alliance has grown into a lasting relationship that
has benefited both nations on the diplomatic, economic and military frontiers. China’s cordial relations with
Pakistan and the fall out of the assistance to Pakistan has always adversely impacted Indo-china Relations.
Some of these issues are:-
(a) Pakistan ceded the Trans-Karakoram Tract to China to end border disputes and improve
diplomatic relations. In so doing Pakistan has not only illegally ceded disputed territory but has
strategic implications for India.
(b) CPEC. CPEC plays a key role in China’s foreign policy, linking infrastructure measures
aimed at establishing a “New Silk Road” (one road) running through Central and South Asia with
efforts to create a “Maritime Silk Road” (one belt) in the Indian Ocean. The two routes are to meet in
the Pakistani port city of Gwadar in the Balochistan Province, the development of which China has
been promoting for many years. Upon completion, CPEC will form a network of roads, railways and
gas pipelines encompassing approximately 3,000 kilometers in length. CPEC has far reaching
implications for India’s security. Besides China is trying to build in redundancy into its sea lines of
communication, further diluting India’s leveraging ability of the Strait of Malacca.
 (c) HAFEEZ SAYEED. China kept blocking the UN move to declare Hafeez Sayeed as a
GLOBAL TERRORIST and had to finally yield only when severe global diplomatic pressure was
exerted.
(c) MILITARY ASSISTANCE. China has been surreptiously rendering military assistance to
Pakistan in terms of hardware and technology and is perhaps the only major partner in military
endeavours after the USA decided to stop all military aids and assistance.

Despite the attempts by Both the Heads of State to normalize relations, improve trade ties and
restore normalcy at the LAC through informal summits at WUHAN and MAHABALIPURAM, the recent
Pandemic and increasing marginalization of China globally and Premier Li XiPing’s diminishing popularity
within the CCP; precipitated the GALWAN stand-Off. China was taken by surprise at India’s violent retaliation
at Galwan, besides trade sanctions. There was a slight softening of stand by China with promises of a
verifiable pull back in the Eastern Ladakh regions of Aksai Chin which has been set in motion and is
progressing.

Whatever the status of Indo-China Relations; India will never allow a repeat of 1962 and is strongly
poised militarily, diplomatically and economically to stymie any nefarious misadventures planned by its
neighbours individually or in collusion..

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Diplomacy needed: The situation along the LAC amplifies that the disengagement process has broken down.

Maj-Gen Ashok K Mehta (retd)

Coinciding with 70 years of India-China diplomatic ties and on the 74th Independence Day, soon after Prime
Minister Narendra Modi had spoken from the Red Fort, lambasting China without naming it for aggression
and expansionism — diplomatic invectives usually reserved for Pakistan — Beijing rebuffed New Delhi’s call
for full restoration of peace and tranquillity on the border, despite a positive readout on disengagement
after the latest diplomatic parleys.

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and Northern Army Commander, Lt Gen YK Joshi’s doubts about the
realisation of the restoration of status quo ante on April 19 were confirmed. Indian Ambassador in Beijing
Vikram Misri has been pleading with Chinese officials in the Central Military Commission and the
Communist Party for return of peace and stability along the LAC even as Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi
and Ambassador in India Sun Weidong blamed New Delhi for the Galwan clash, calling for disciplining Indian
soldiers who crossed on to China’s side of the LAC. To recap, the situation along the LAC amplifies that the
disengagement process has broken down as the PLA has withdrawn only about one km from the Hot
Springs-Kungrang River-Goghra junction points. Only in Galwan, the disengagement is four km, of which
three kilometres is on the Indian side of the LAC.

Through a wily template of a separation of forces, the PLA has imposed a four kilometre buffer zone
quarantining Indian troops, depriving them of their patrolling rights to patrolling points along India’s
perception of the LAC. China has pushed its LAC to conform to the 1959 claim line, annexing several
hundred square kilometres of the Indian territory. The Indian non-response to the renewed Chinese
assertion of what India calls its ‘unilateral aggression’ is to emphasise that the Indian troops will remain
deployed opposite multiple intrusion points as long as the PLA does not disengage completely.

This is India in despair, unable to make China vacate the intrusions and now doing a kind of military
satyagraha. But Modi has insisted ‘what India can do, the world has seen in Ladakh.’ Given that border
protocols bar the use of military force, though unarmed combat is permitted as Galwan demonstrated, India
should have intruded across the Chinese LAC at suitable places, besides blocking PLA intrusions. As the
military option was realistically unavailable, an alternative to impose costs on China is paramount.
The Modi government has perfected a two-strand border policy against China. Internally, it is telling the aam
aadmi that all is well along the LAC. The focus has been shifted from multiple intrusions ceding territory to
Galwan, where the PLA was given a befitting reply.

On August 14-15, the salvo of ‘befitting replies’ was delivered sequentially by the Defence Minister,
President and Prime Minister ‘if India is attacked’, while hailing the valour of the brave and launching proxy
attacks on China. The government has stuck to the denial of China’s land-grab by taking down from the
MoD website the specifications of the intrusions. But India’s sovereignty has been attacked.

The second strand of the LAC policy which contradicts the first, addresses the intrusions diplomatically, but
essentially bilaterally, without naming China as the aggressor. The Chinese are extremely sensitive to being
named, blamed and shamed. In 1998, after India’s nuclear tests, a letter written by the Government of India
was leaked in the US which named China as the rationale for the nuclear tests, which incensed Beijing.
It required Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh having to retract the accusation in Beijing and in full glare of the
media by saying that ‘China is not a threat to India.’ The famous Chinese aphorism ‘those who tie the knot
must untie it first’ derives from such situations. Still, it will not be easy for India to maintain its charade on
the LAC — portraying defeat as victory.
India’s friends, the US, the UK and others, may have sympathised with New Delhi, but except for Washington
which has called out China’s aggression, no country has specifically targeted Beijing for its territorial
assertion.
This is especially true in India’s immediate and extended neighbourhood where even Bhutan is silent. In
many ways, India’s plight is similar to that of the Philippines where President Duterte has said that though
he has a favourable verdict from the UNCLOS in 2016, on his country’s territorial claim, he cannot challenge
China militarily.
India has been signalling for some time now that it is considering de-coupling the border and overall
relations and imposing economic costs. It has said that peace and tranquillity on the border are essential
and necessary preconditions for normal bilateral relations.
So far, New Delhi has not crossed the red line as it hopes that Beijing will see sense in restoring normalcy
across the LAC. But it is China that is capitalising from the advantages of an undefined LAC even as India
faces its periodic perils.
The next level of dialogue is between the two special representatives — NSA AK Doval and Foreign Minister
Wang Yi, who has been quite vituperative on the border clash and pinned the blame on India. He has been
visiting military facilities in Tibet where the PLA recently carried out extensive battle drills, which China’s
foreign ministry spokesperson described as not directed at any country.

Apparently, the two summits between Modi and President Xi Jinping at Wuhan and Mahabalipuram, the
Chennai connect, have imploded, though the Chinese are still recalling their virtues. Through all the tea-
drinking ceremonies, India failed to read the tea leaves. The strategic guidance given by the two leaders to
their militaries, especially Xi’s Training Mobilisation Order in January that launched the intrusions, was a
second stab in Modi’s back after Chumar in 2014. Still, as diplomacy is the only way forward to untie the
knot, a serious political engagement is vital. President Putin, who enjoys the best of relations with Modi
(Sochi and Vladivostok summits) and Xi (who said in June 2019 that Putin is his best friend and colleague),
can help break the stalemate.