Article

Street Vendors, their Contested Environment and Urbanization Asia

4(1) 173–190
Spaces, and the Policy Environment: © 2013 National Institute
of Urban Affairs (NIUA)
A View from Caloócan, Metro Manila SAGE Publications
Los Angeles, London,
New Delhi, Singapore,
Washington DC
DOI: 10.1177/0975425313477760
http://eua.sagepub.com
Redento B. Recio and José Edgardo A. Gomez, Jr

Abstract
In developing states of Southeast Asia, street vendors play a significant but frequently unappreciated
role in both the vibrancy of public spaces as well as the informal economy. Yet, they are subject to
indiscriminate purges from sidewalks and other contested territories, which they occupy for lack of
provision of spaces in which they could otherwise do business. But such occurrences, and the conflicts
that may follow, can be addressed by revisiting policies, which seem anti-vendor or which fail to com-
prehend their presence and needs. This research studied street vendors of one of the active commuter
interchanges of Metro Manila, the Monumento Station area in Caloócan City, framing their needs,
issues and aspirations against existing laws. Simultaneously examined were typical uses of shifting, often
contested stretches of roads, corners, and easements where hawkers, among other users, daily negoti-
ate a claim to the city’s space.

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梃䤓⦿㈈㧒ᇭ

Keywords
Street vendors, policy, planning, informal economy, contested spaces

Introduction, Scope and Methodology

The public spaces of many of Southeast Asia’s cities thrive with the colour and vibrancy of the informal
economy, in which street vendors play a significant role. Often unappreciated, and worse, subject to indis-
criminate purges from sidewalks and other fluid spaces, the street vendors find themselves constantly
searching for strategic locations where they can sell foodstuff and other items that will ensure their survival,

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174 Redento B. Recio and José Edgardo A. Gomez, Jr

if only for the day. Planners and policy-makers however have begun to glance the other way in recent years,
questioning the basis for wiping the cityscape clean of such itinerant or temporarily stationary peddlers, as
the gainful labour supported by the informal sector is gradually being appreciated.
This paper contributes to the critical review of the informal economy in general, and examines the
street vendors of a major transportation hub of the National Capital Region of the Philippines in particu-
lar, vis-à-vis the prevailing laws and policies of that country. From June 2009 through September 2011,
the research studied street vendors of one of the active commuter interchanges of Metro Manila, the
Bonifacio Monumento Station area in Caloócan, framing their needs, issues and aspirations against
existing laws. Simultaneously examined were typical uses of shifting, often contested stretches of roads,
corners and easements where hawkers, among other users, daily negotiate for a claim to the city’s space.
On-site detached observations, transect walks and key informant interviews were the primary means of
gathering data, which was then compared and integrated to form a rich description and compelling argu-
ment for further research into the dynamics of informality in the urban public space of Philippine cities,
which could later be contrasted against similar socioeconomic activity in neighbouring Southeast Asian
metropolises.

Review of Related Literature

The Informal Economy and Street Vending

Informal economic activities have been around since the dawn of civilization, antedating nations’ formal
commerce and trading protocols by centuries. Scholarly investigation of the nature and activities of the
informal economy however, is historically attributed in the literature to Keith Hart’s initial labelling of
the phenomenon pursuant to his studies in Ghana in 1973, regarding the size, determinants and charac-
teristics of the informal sector (Alderslade et al., 2006; Dierwechter, 2002). Since then, facets of infor-
mal market activity have been described, ranging from gender and class-based hierarchies in Africa,
where vendors take advantage of the ‘commerce of circumstance’ (Bass, 2000) to cities in Latin America
where itinerant children roam the streets to vend at high risk (Bromley and Mackie, 2008), while older
sellers are organised by leaders who distribute space and mediate conflict (Peña, 2000).
One particular concept that emerged soon after World War II and developed nearly simultaneously
with the recognition of the informal economy is the idea of urban dualism that prevails in cities, which
highlights differences between formal economic activities and informal ones (Ranis, 2003), or the spe-
cialized modern sector versus the more rudimentary traditional one (Myint, 1992). The idea of dualism
is actually pervasive across disciplines, and lends itself to dualistic conceptualization in sociology and
technology, for instance, so that characterization of urban informality can be easily matched with rural
(or at least non-urban) patterns of behaviour and attitudes, as well as accompanying simple technologies.
Correspondingly, the assumed spatial pattern that emerges is one where clear distinctions can be made
between spaces used for both formal and informal economic activity. In the urban spaces of developing
cities in Asia however, there is—and has always been to some extent—a great degree of overlap, with
entrepreneurs moving fluidly in and out of each sector as their fortunes and opportunities change. These
considerations lead to the rejection of dualistic labour market theories and suggest that the urban econo-
mies of Third World nations are very heterogeneous and adaptive (Kasarda and Crenshaw, 1991).
Provisionally speaking, the dualistic formulation is nevertheless useful conceptually in capturing key

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Street Vendors, their Contested Spaces, and the Policy Environment 175

characteristics for analytical or policy discourse (Basu et al., 2011). By extension, this would include the
discussion of the use of urban spaces, as regulators often base their actions on implicit acceptance of the
existence of duality, or even multi-faceted social spheres.
Street vending in particular has become an object of scholarly attention, as it interfaces informal eco-
nomic behaviour with the uses of public urban space, in which there is a variety of interests, including
government’s interest in order and norms. As an ancient and important occupation, street vending can be
found in virtually every country and major city around the world. It may be defined simply as the retail
or wholesale trading of goods and services in streets and other related public axes such as alleyways,
avenues and boulevards. Street vendors add vitality to the streetscape and contribute economic activity
and service provision (Bromley, 2000). But why do people vend in the first place? First, people vend to
make money and increase their autonomy. Second, they vend to learn and practice skills. Third, people
vend to set up new businesses or have a consistent source of income. Fourth, people vend to socialize
children and as a social event (Morales, 2000).
Vending, of street food for instance, may be stationary, residential or ambulatory, and combines char-
acteristics of planned, opportunistic and reactive behaviour (Hiemstra et al., 2006). This is consistent
with the schema of Bromley (2000) who elaborates that street vending may be practiced full time, part-
time, seasonally or occasionally. It may be fixed, occasionally mobile or almost continuously mobile,
and it can go on at any or all times of the day or night. The firms involved can range from one-person
micro-enterprises through numerous forms of partnership and family businesses, up to franchises, piece-
workers and wageworkers of larger off-street businesses. Street vendors tend to cluster in those spaces
with a high level of business opportunity. Agglomeration in a few locations increases turnover because:
(a) concentrations of vendors become known and attract more customers; (b) more on-street business
may forestall and block easy entry to nearby off-street businesses; and (c) more street vendors increase
pedestrian and vehicular congestion, slowing everything down and enabling them to spend more time
looking at merchandise and receiving sales pitches. This typical bazaar economy trading is focused on
intense day-to-day interaction of vendor and buyer where each tries to get the best deal. This is in con-
trast to the ‘firm-centred’ economy, while in between lie varying degrees of informality, depending on
how far the seller has entered the legal permit and taxing system (Cross, 2000).
All this is often contrasted against the structured macroeconomic milieu that is ridden by that equally
amorphous but more visibly palpable phenomenon called globalization, one of whose aspects is that
chain of economic relationships that binds developing economies in subservience to the developed
world. Globalization and social exclusion is apparent in cities, with the latter being the inevitable side-
effect of global realignment (Beall, 2002), that in turn benefits some and harms others who often find
themselves turning to informal trade to survive. Related to this, spatial change associated with globaliza-
tion has resulted in skyrocketing property values in central cities and changing patterns of employment
that have translated into increases in the cost of (legal) housing, increased distances between places of
employment and residence, and a deterioration of the urban environment (Shatkin, 2004), which are
somehow contributory to survival-oriented informal activities.

Informality in the Asian Context

Leading to the next aspect of this review, one result of the emerging global factory is that it makes
labour a common substance not only for industrial workers in factories (as factory labour), but also

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176 Redento B. Recio and José Edgardo A. Gomez, Jr

increasingly for all human lives in Asia (as socialized labour), whose nation–states over the last decade
have had to lift at least 1 billion people out of poverty, of which about 240 million are living in cities
(ADB, 2002). Labour becomes common substance and ubiquitous, it becomes informal or formless.
Hence, few social protections have developed in Asia, because of the increasing anonymity combined
with ready availability, while simultaneously there is a persistent stereotype that industrial factory
workers are the ‘normal’ form of labour. When capital moves, it involves changes in social relations
as well as labour captured in the social relations (Chang, 2009). This inevitably leaves the uncompeti-
tive behind to be absorbed by the informal sector. For instance, Brata (2008) mentions that informal
sector absorbs 77.9 per cent of agricultural employment in Indonesia, and some 66.9 per cent in the
Philippines.
Aspects of vulnerability of this informal category include insufficient institutional support, need to
care for dependents, long hours of work, and coping with the debilitating consequences of material pov-
erty. From a structuralist perspective, workers in this informal sector have no proper status, being neither
capitalist nor urbanized working class. They may be categorized according to whether they have a per-
manent or temporary pitch or whether they are itinerant. Other categories include the nature of goods or
services provided, means of sourcing products, and whether franchising or branding takes place (Walsh,
2010). Because of the lack of status, livelihood activities such as vending become subjected to all man-
ner of uncertainty, especially when they take place in public, contested spaces. The street vendors, and
presumably their households of origin, organise themselves in response to this incertitude. There are two
sources of uncertainty: interactions and information from household members or employees, and inter-
actions and information from outsiders. Responses include routinized habits for streetside interactions
that they can control (Morales, 1997).

Public Spaces and Streetscape Usage in Asia

In writing about street life, Malone (2002) reminds us that all boundaries are socially-constructed.
Because they help construct identity, they matter—especially because some urban boundaries are strong-
ly-classified, while others are uncertain and fluid. This is quite apparent in the street scenes of Asia,
particularly in developing countries, where people use the streets for purposes that simply do not occur
in the West. In Vietnam for instance, families and individuals make use of public space for private activi-
ties such as cooking and eating (Drummond, 2000). Aside from vendors, a more recent study by Babiano
and Hitoshi (2007) explains further that pedestrians use streets for different purposes: to undergo utilitar-
ian trips making movement a derived demand; or to conduct optional trips such as to exercise or breathe
in fresh air, to socialize and interact. In the latter examples, the sidewalk becomes a destination in itself.
The common assumption is that pedestrians are moving entities; therefore sidewalks only serve as space
for distribution. However, sidewalks are not mere conduits but also serve as a space for communication.
Keen and constant observers of the Asian streetscape however, may note that it is not just a platform for
activity, but may be worthy of its own peculiar geographic categorization. Hence the admonition of
Dierwechter (2002) who says that there is a tendency to spatialize a given theory, rather than theorize
space—in this case the space of informality, with all its shades and colours. This is a space which various
transient players claim, but which at the same time nominally falls under the jurisdiction of the state,
which will be discussed next.

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Street Vendors, their Contested Spaces, and the Policy Environment 177

Government Spatial Policies and Street Vending

A seminal study by Mcgee and Yeung (1977) identified that developing Asian countries tended to espouse
policies unfavourably disposed towards the informal sector, which happened to be uncritical continua-
tions of colonial policies. More precisely, there prevails an often implicit belief of decision-makers that
‘the streets need to be cleaned up’, hence various reasons for castigating the informal economy (Alderslade
et al., 2006), while at the same time relying on the historical assumption that the provision of services
(and goods otherwise provided by informal vendors) is the responsibility of the state, yet governments
have been unable to provide, operate, and maintain public services in line with rapid urbanization and
population growth (Cavill and Sohail, 2004). This is of course, also tied in with the demands of more
monopolistic formal players in a globalizing economy. This is consistent with the observation that the
real incentive structure of an economy is defined by both formal rules and informal constraints. This
explains why governance is always about imposing constraints that enable greater politico-economic
freedoms, and consequently about the state trying to define and clamp down on informality, in so far as
it is perceived as a source of unfair competition or tax leakage, for instance (Avellaneda, 2009).
The perception has been changing however, and some officials have tried to approach informality not
as a problem for eradication, but as a phenomenon to be managed. The integration of key urban dimen-
sions, such as informality, in plans is an improvement over prior planning that took no part in managerial
functions (Chakrabarty, 2001). For instance, Malaysia early on adapted a more measured, non-antago-
nistic policy (Mcgee and Yeung, 1977). The Philippines has given some political recognition to street
vendors, although local administrators do not provide for operational needs, hence the vendors are
blamed for health risks, traffic problems and illegal sidewalk occupation (Bhowmik, 2005). Human
development paradigms nowadays place particular emphasis on urban upgrading strategies where the
poor help themselves. The so-called human-centred development (HRCD)1 is among the emerging
development frameworks that puts premium on the rights of poor people to development.
Engagement with informality is in many ways quite difficult for planners. Informal spaces seem to be
the exception to planning, lying outside its realm of control. But informality, and the state of exception
that it embodies is produced by the state, hence the need for the state’s officials to review and revise their
own approaches, in order to turn informality into a blessing rather than a curse (Roy, 2005). It should be
remembered however, that the interaction of regulators and informal vendors is not the same everywhere
in urban space, as urban public management is weak in peri-urban areas due to fragmentation and the
absence of state institutions anchored in this transition zone (Kritsanaphan and Sajor, 2011). In a similar
manner, the potential for radical improvement can only take place in critical areas where state, market,
and societal interests can come together in constructive dialogues over spaces that ultimately must be
shared.

Profile of the Research Site

A Brief Profile of the City

Caloocan is one of the component cities of the Metropolitan Manila, the country’s National Capital
Region. Divided into Southern and Northern Districts, the city has 188 barangays. Its total land area is

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178 Redento B. Recio and José Edgardo A. Gomez, Jr

53.33 square kilometres. The southern portion (13.625 sq. km.) of the City lies directly north of the City
of Manila and is bounded by Malabon City and Valenzuela City to the north, Navotas to the west and
Quezon City to the east. The Northern part (39.709 sq. km.) lies to the east of Valenzuela City, north of
Quezon City, and south of San Jose del Monte City in the province of Bulacan. As of year 2000, Caloocan
City has around 1,177,604 residents. The City’s annual population growth rate is 3.06 per cent.

Transportation Demand and Traffic Condition in Caloocan City

The Metro Manila Urban and Transportation Integrated Study (MMUTIS) reports that Caloocan City
registered a total of 2.89 million person–trips a day in 1997. This is 9.5 per cent of the total person–trips
in Metro Manila, which was 30.3 million a day in the same period. Of the 2.89 million trips in Caloocan,
81.4 per cent are via public transportation and 61.2 per cent of the journeys come from South Caloocan.
In terms of daily trips per person, the City registered an average of 2.7 trips per person. For South
Caloocan alone, where the study area is situated, the average was 3.1 trips per person.
With regard to daily traffic conditions, the Bonifacio Monumento–Rizal Avenue intersection and the
Bonifacio Monumento–EDSA registered the highest morning and afternoon peak hours traffic volume
every day. During the peak hours, the Bonifacio Monument–Rizal Avenue has 6679 vehicles while the
Bonifacio Monument–EDSA has 4664 vehicles. The total daily volume for the two intersections was
pegged at 59,886. The MMUTIS also noted a high concentration of jeepneys, a public utility vehicle,
daily in the intersections of Rizal Avenue–Bonifacio Monumento and Rizal Avenue–10th Avenue; the
daily volumes were 22,842 and 19,805, respectively. Moreover, the City Medium-Term Development
Plan 2000–2005 has identified the Rizal Avenue as one of the areas where people experience traffic
congestion. Among the cited causes of congestion are as follows: narrow streets, narrow sidewalks, load-
ing and unloading practice, bus/jeepney terminal near the area, street vendors, market shoppers, poor
pavements and inadequate traffic management systems. While the street vendors were identified as one
of the causes of traffic congestion, they were never mentioned in the section of the plan where proposed
solutions to traffic problems were identified.
When it comes to the volume of pedestrians, the 2010 ridership data of Light Railway Transit (LRT)
1 records that daily average of 139,342 passengers use the LRT Monumento station. Of this, more than
half (73,991 passengers) troop to the station during AM (6–9am) and PM (4–9pm) peak hours. These
figures do not yet include the pedestrians who frequent the area to go to shopping malls and other trans-
portation terminals such as jeepney and bus stations (Recio, 2010).

The Locational Importance of the Study Area to the City and to the Metropolitan Manila
The study area is a major commercial area, which is surrounded by institutional and residential areas. It
is also located in one of the four major urban growth nodes in the southern part of the city. In terms of
functional capability, the Monumento–Rizal Avenue area is part of the region that is fit for, and is cur-
rently experiencing, high density urban development. In fact, it is considered as the Central Business
District of the Caloocan and a central growth node of the CAMANAVA2 area (Recio, 2010).
Further, the study area is currently serving different, and possibly conflicting, road functions. First, it
is considered as a major arterial road serving as a gateway of, and link between, the Northern part of

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Street Vendors, their Contested Spaces, and the Policy Environment 179

Metro Manila and the Central and Northern Luzon. Second, the presence of several jeepney terminals
(and some bus stops) near the area and the fact that jeepneys pass through the Rizal Avenue extension
indicate that it is de facto treated and used as a minor arterial road of traffic between South Caloocan (and
other parts of Northern Metro Manila) and the rest of Metro Manila. Third, there are tricycles stationed
near the study area that ferry passengers to and from Rizal Avenue. Some of these small public vehicles
traverse the Rizal Avenue itself. Based on classification of roads, this suggests that the area may also be
functioning as either collector or local streets (Recio, 2010). The figure below (Figure 1) shows the study
area as part of an integrated urban core.
This strategic location of the Monumento–Rizal Avenue partly explains the traffic conditions—volume
of vehicles and the daily trip per person—in the area. As Recio (2010) observes, it provides a locational
advantage that draws in a lot of street vendors. For one, the area is located right in the middle of a major
urban growth node and a commercial area where people regularly visit to consume or sell goods and

Figure 1. The Study Area as Part of an Inner and Integrated Urban Core
Source: Caloocan City Development Plan, Caloocan City Development Planning Department.

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180 Redento B. Recio and José Edgardo A. Gomez, Jr

services. Its proximity to residential and institutional regions of the city’s southern portion also enhances
its ‘locational utility’3 for a lot of urban dwellers and workers.

Street Vendors in South Caloocan vis-à-vis those in the Study Area

Based on the records of the Caloocan City Planning and Development Office and the Market Division
Office, there are 1091 street vendors in South Caloocan as of June 2009. Of this, 310 or about 28 per cent
are located in the Monumento–Rizal Avenue area. Figure 2 shows detailed information on the number of
street hawkers in 2002 and 2009. There are no available data from 2003 to 2008.
Aside from the increasing number of street vendors in 2002 and 2009, there is a notable rise in the
percentage share of hawkers in the Monumento–Rizal Avenue area vis-à-vis the total number of vendors
in South Caloocan. It has almost doubled from 15.55 per cent in 2002 to 28.41 per cent in 2009. In seven
years only a few vendors were added to the total number of street vendors in the entire South Caloocan.
In contrast, those located in the study area almost doubled. This may mean that vendors transfer from
other parts of the city to the Monumento–Rizal Ave Area (Recio, 2010).

Street Vendors in Caloocan City

1200
1091
1042
1000
Number of Vendors

800

600

310
400

200 162

0
2002 2009
Year

South of Caloocan City

Monumento-Rizal Avenue Area (Study Area)

Figure 2. Street Vendors in Caloocan City in 2002 and 2009

Source: Caloocan City Planning and Development Office and the Market Division Office.

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Street Vendors, their Contested Spaces, and the Policy Environment 181

Meanwhile, based on the organizational records of the street vendors themselves, Fremista4 (2009)
claimed that there are 27 vendors’ organizations in Caloocan City. In the chosen study area alone, from
11th Avenue to EDSA Monumento Circle, including those along nearby streets, the AMCI5 estimates that
there are around 300 vendors belonging to about 10–14 vendors’ organizations. Fremista (2009) also
noted that there are about 100 unorganized vendors in the area.

Different Types of Vendors in the Area

1. Ambulant/Mobile Vendors—The figures from the government (310 vendors) and from the
vendors’ organizations (about 300 vendors) are still low compared to the actual number of
hawkers occupying the Monumento–Rizal Avenue area during the peak hours. Based on an
actual observation, during peak hours, there are 494 street vendors in the area. These can be
considered as ambulant/mobile vendors. They use carts, clothes, improvised steel panels and
tables.
2. Semi-fixed, Semi-static Vendors—There are around 33 vendors who display and sell their wares
using uniform and regulated stalls. Without fear of being demolished, these hawkers have a verbal
agreement with the private owner of the lot they occupy, in front of a shopping mall, the Victory
Central Mall. They can be considered as semi-fixed, semi-static vendors. The actual location is
1.5 meters off the Rizal Avenue.
3. Salaried Street Vendors—Aside from the regular and organized vendors, unorganized street
hawkers and those who have relatively secure space, another emerging phenomenon is the
existence of salaried vendors. Mangulabnan6 (2009) and Fremista (2009) shared that some of
these hawkers are paid on a daily basis with different time arrangements: 8:00 o’clock in the
evening until 5:00 to 7:00 o’clock in the morning or 7:00 o’clock in the morning until 7:00
o’clock in the evening. Others engage in street vending on a consignment basis (Recio, 2010).
This means that they do not own the capital used to finance the goods and the necessary equip-
ment. As of the moment, however, there is no available figure on the number of this type of
street vendors.

Average Income of Street Vendors

According to Banigoos7 (2009), the average income varies based on the products being sold. If there is
no clearing operation, he estimates that the average daily incomes of street vendors (per stall/cart) in the
study area are as follows:

1. Fruit vendors—US$11.00
2. Accessories—US$7.00
3. Candies and newspapers—US$7.00
4. Clothes—US$7.00
5. School supplies—US$7.00 to US$11.00
6. DVDs—US$11.00 to US$22.00
7. Street Foods—US$5.00 to US$7.00

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182 Redento B. Recio and José Edgardo A. Gomez, Jr

Aside from the products they sell, the time spent on street vending also affects the incomes of the
street hawkers. Vendors selling candies and newspapers are on the street from early in the morning until
evening while those selling accessories, clothes and school supplies begin occupying their vending space
from 4:30 in the afternoon until around 8:00 o’clock to 9:00 o’clock in the evening. For the salaried street
vendors, Mangulabnan (2009) and Fremista (2009) explained that the wage varies depending on the
arrangement. It ranges between US$2.5 and US$4.00 plus free meals (Recio, 2010).

Vendors’ Willingness to Pay

Fremista (2009) claimed that regular street vendors would be willing to pay P 20–P50 (US$ 0.46 to US$
1.63) every day for a secure space. For cigarette vendors, he noted that it should be P5–P10 (US$ 0.12
to US$ 0.23) daily. These figures, Fremista recalled, are based on the association’s agreement in one of
their general assemblies. Except for cigarette vendors who are willing to pay P5–P10 (US$ 0.12 to US$
0.23) daily, all figures are higher than the proposed daily collection by the Caloocan City Market Division.
Based on a 2009 document from Caloocan City Government, the office plans to collect P 10.00 (US$
0.23) from every vendor each day.

Issues Concerning the Informal Vendors and the Use of Streets and
Sidewalks
Based on interviews and group discussions with vendors and select government officials, the issues and
problems related to street vending can be summarized into three categories: (a) physical/spatial con-
cerns; (b) governance and legal concerns; and (c) socio-economic concerns.
Two major spatial issues have surfaced. First is the effect of the presence of street vendors on the
vehicular traffic and pedestrian movement. Both vendors and government officials admitted that some
unorganized hawkers who occupy the streets slow down, if not totally obstruct, the vehicular and pedes-
trian flow. Some of these unorganized vendors do not mind blocking the traffic since they are either
connected to some people in authority such as local policemen or they give bribes to these personnel in
exchange for tolerance (Nicolas, 2009, cited in Recio, 2010). The other problem has to do with sanita-
tion. Some hawking areas are not cleaned up after the vending period (Recio, 2010).
There are several issues that have to do with governance and legal concerns. First, vendors complain
that the government refuses to legally recognize their existence and contributions. This is manifested in
absence of permit for street hawkers. There is no office to accommodate vendors’ concerns.
Another main issue is on laws that affect street vendors. At best, these policies are ambivalent toward
the recognition of vending as legitimate work. At worst, the laws are inconsistent, which keeps the legal
status of the hawkers in a precarious condition. The lack of awareness of vendors about the policies
affecting them is also a major concern. For instance, the specific rules on prohibiting street vending on
sidewalks and easement spaces are not clear to the vendors. They are not even aware of the specific laws
or local ordinances that declare street vending as illegal. Lastly, vendors argue that there are no holistic
and sustainable government programs for them. Fremista (2009) claimed that some government officials
and politicians approach the street vendors during the electoral season to ask for support. After the

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Street Vendors, their Contested Spaces, and the Policy Environment 183

electoral contests, however, the elected officials do not deliver on their promises of coming up with
vendor-friendly programs and policies (Recio, 2010).
Finally, with respect to socio-economic concerns, the most pressing problem is the lack of capital.
Vendors usually resort to getting loans from either cooperatives or loan sharks to address their financial
needs. For those who occupy and rent a private space owned by a shopping mall, the fee is prohibitive.
There is no official document that contains the terms and conditions between the renting vendors and the
shopping mall. Everything is negotiated through verbal agreement (Mangulabnan, 2009).

The Policy Environment

The national and local policies affecting the street vendors and the use of streets and sidewalks cover three
major areas. These are (a) policies that provide principles and frameworks that recognize street vendors’
use of streets and sidewalks; (b) policies that provide national and local structures for vendors’ involve-
ment and those that have structures affecting street vendors; (c) policies with specific provisions on the use
and regulation of spatial resources (for example, streets). For each of the policy areas, the policy review
reveals that the laws are either supportive or highly critical of street vendors and the vending practice.
At the national level, the Philippine Constitution implicitly provides principles that support micro
entrepreneurial initiatives such as vending. This is also explicitly mentioned in other enabling national
laws such as the Local Government Code of 1991 and the Executive Order 452, which specifically pro-
vides guidelines to ensure security of vendors in their working areas. There are even laws specifying
rules on how street vendors and their representatives can be part of government structures. These include
the Republic Act 8425 or the Social Reform and Poverty Alleviation Act (1997), the Republic Act 7941
or the Party List System Act, among others. There are also local ordinances in three cities that have simi-
lar legal provisions.
However, there are policies that do not support street vending as a lawful economic activity. At least
two Supreme Court decisions and a national legislation have declared street hawking as illegal. At the
local level, the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and the Caloocan City govern-
ment have legal documents prohibiting street and sidewalk vending in Metro Manila and Caloocan City,
respectively.
In sum, as can be seen in the Figure 3, the policies affecting the street vendors are at odds with each
other. This is true for national policies and local regulations in some cities. Figure 3 presents the laws that
have been reviewed based on their effects on the street vendors. These policies have also been examined
vis-à-vis the three policy areas already mentioned.

Interventions and Strategies Employed by the Vendors

Given the varying, and to a certain extent conflicting, policies that affect street hawking, vendors, through
their associations and federations, have employed various strategies and tactics to survive and push for
their agenda. These range from formal dialogues and extra-legal actions like rallies against the notorious
bribery (lagay/kotong) and backdoor negotiations. Figure 4 illustrates the wide continuum of vendors’
interventions and mechanisms to have an access and temporarily exercise control over an urban space.

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184 Redento B. Recio and José Edgardo A. Gomez, Jr

Policies with Principles Policies with Provisions

Policies with Provisions on
and Framework on the Use and
Structures Involving and
Recognizing Street Regulation of Spatial
Affecting Street Vendors
Vendors Resources (e.g. streets)

1987 Philippine Constitution

Local Government Code of 1991

N Supreme Court Decisions,

A G.R. Nos. 93654 & 97764
T
I
O Republic 7924 (MMDA Charter of 1995)
N
A Republic Act 8425 (1997) & Republic Act 7941 (Party List System Act)
L
Executive Order 452 (1997) (Guidelines that Ensures the Security of Registered
Vendors in the Workplace)

NEDA – Social Development Committee Resolution No. 2 (2003)

Caloocan City Government Ordinance No. 0391 (2005)

L Paraňaque, Ordinance 826, 2003 MMDA Resolutions O2-28

O & 02-40
C
A Mandaluyong City, Executive
L Order No. 002, S 2002

Naga City Ordinance 92-026

Symbols:

Laws and policies that suppport street Laws and policies that prohibit street
vendors’ use of streets for vending vendors’ use of streets for vending
Figure 3. Spectrum of Existing Policies Affecting Street Vending & the Use of Streets9
Source: Recio, 2010.

1. Series of formal dialogues with local government officials—Fremista (2009) claimed that the first
dialogue was conducted with the former Mayor of the City years ago. The vendors initiated series of
talks with Attorney Enrico Echiverri, the present Mayor of Caloocan. Some leaders have also par-
ticipated in consultations facilitated by the Department of Labour and Employment Bureau of Rural
Workers, the national agency tasked to look after the welfare of workers in the informal economy.

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Street Vendors, their Contested Spaces, and the Policy Environment 185

‘Backdoor’ or Informal
Engagement Formal Engagement

Lagay/Bribery ‘Backdoor’ Establishing good Public rallies Series of dialogues

negotiations relation with Barangay Letter to government
or Village Officials officials
Formation of Quick
Response Team or QRT

Figure 4. Spectrum of Vendors’ Strategies and Tactics in Dealing with Authorities (Recio, 2010)
Source: Recio, 2010.

2. Letter to people in authority—The vendors’ organizations have sent official position letters to
their Mayor and the Congressional Representative stating their recommendations regarding the
vendors’ issues. Some of the stated demands are the following: (a) Observe a ‘One-Line Policy’
in regulating vendors. The One-Line Policy is an agreement where government authorities draw
a demarcation line. Beyond this line, vendors are not allowed to sell or display their goods; (b)
Allow vendors to sell their goods/products from Monday–Friday starting from 5 pm until 10 pm;
(c) Allow vendors to sell at an earlier schedule during Saturdays and Sundays.
3. Public Rallies—Vendors also employ public rally as a strategy to push for their agenda. Fremista
(2009) recalled that they were able to organize around 3000 individuals to participate in a mobi-
lization in front of the Caloocan City Hall. This resulted in a short moratorium on clearing
operations.
4. Quick Response Team—Some vendors’ organizations form an ad hoc group called a quick
response team (QRT). This team documents cases of harassment that they experience during evic-
tion and clearing operations. As a form of warning mechanism, the QRT sends SMS messages to
other vendors once some of them have been informed that the MMDA would conduct a clearing
operation.
5. Backdoor Negotiation—Vendors tap people who are close to people in authority like the police,
administrators and other government officials to allow them to occupy the street. Some of them
even go to mistresses of some policemen to discuss their agenda (Nicolas, 2009).
6. Lagay/Kotong or Bribery—Some vendors also give in to extortion to avoid being harassed or
evicted from their ‘pwesto’ or stall. In an interview with Mr Armand Perez (2009), an official of
the MMDA Clearing Operation Division, admitted that some MMDA agents do practice extor-
tion. He also said that MMDA has already dismissed some of them. Others are still subjected to
investigation.

Analysis and Discussion

From the preceding findings, it may be gathered that there are several forces at work that affect the
dynamics of informality in the study site, most predominant of which appears to be the powerful magne-
tism of location and urban infrastructures (for example, the light rail line and bus stations) that attract all

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186 Redento B. Recio and José Edgardo A. Gomez, Jr

types of economic activity. The primacy of location for entrepreneurial activities revolves not only
around the fact that the Monumento area is an old transport nexus, but also has much to do with the
24-hour quality of incessant pedestrian and vehicular activity that add to the per-square-meter vibrancy
of place. To put it more crudely, there is always someone passing by to sell to, to service, or to rob—this
latter referring of course to the more unscrupulous denizens of the streets. It is important to note that such
intense activity dwindles relatively quickly within a kilometre of the site, as retail commercial and ser-
vices give way to more prosaic land uses, and even semi-industrial buildings, so that one can actually
plan for very localized interventions and traffic and pedestrian management, rather than sweeping and
costly controls of a wider area.
On the subject of controls, the researchers noted the simultaneous run of other tendencies, such as the
regulatory activities of the MMDA and agents of the local government, who often carry a mental picture
of inflexible duality in their minds. Clearly, periodic purges and ‘clean-ups’ are premised on a notion,
often uncritically examined, that the informal is possibly (a) inferior or unnecessary in contrast to the
formal businesses in the neighbourhoods; (b) harmful or inefficient in some way; or (c) disorderly or out
of its ‘proper’ place. While it must be admitted that sidewalks need to be cleared of the more recalcitrant
hucksters so that pedestrians may enjoy free passage, other assumptions fail to see how the informal
activity can be viewed as a healthy transition to the formal, rather than a hindrance. Also, it has been
shown by the findings that such economic activity is sustained by the myriad passersby who do not
always have the time, money, or other inclination to enter the more formal establishments, and would
rather deal with an informal vendor or two, as the food and non-food items sold are generally safe and
sound. There is in fact a visible hazy order, if at all, to the informal activity, as vendors organize them-
selves in groups, and expand and contract with the coming and going of rush hours. It is this dynamic
that must be noticed and respected by the law enforcers.
An analysis of the site and the interview results shows that one is dealing not just with economic
space, but a multi-layered, rich political space that is negotiated by its various stakeholders. The fact that
groups of sidewalk users—mostly vendors, have organized themselves and acted according to planned
agendas shows that they have become quite adept at wielding political power, no matter how small or
transient. Political actions arguably run the whole spectrum from a negotiated bribe with the local patrol
to formal letters directed to city hall. This is no disorderly mob that intrudes haphazardly into street
space, but rather a collection of deliberate, networked groups that voice legitimate needs and grievances,
and advocate for their wants. If government persists in ignoring such capacities, then it will fail not only
to tame the keen peddlers, but also to gain from the substantial economic benefits that could be harnessed
by engaging such players.
Moreover, the wide spectrum of vendors’ interventions aimed at having an access to and control over
contested physical space somehow reflects the way the government relates to hawkers. It demonstrates
the inadequacy of government mechanisms and opportunities by which street vendors could effectively
engage the state. These formal avenues should have been the government’s way of resolving spatial
issues related to informal vending and responding to the needs of the vendors.
The informal strategies also form part of what Claudia Rosett calls ‘underground legal code’. These
underground legal codes ignore, and to a certain extent replace, insensitive and inefficient laws, which
contribute to the culture of informality and drive people into their precarious situation. The backdoor
interventions such as bribery also indicate that even the government officials engage in transactions that
strengthen the culture of informality. These normalized practices constitute what Brachet-Marquez calls

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Street Vendors, their Contested Spaces, and the Policy Environment 187

‘clientelist strategy’8. The ‘clientelistic’ relationship between some authorities and urban informal ven-
dors creates certain behaviour and arrangements that influence how limited urban physical resources are
distributed and occupied by multiple users.
Indeed, the numerous informal strategies and backdoor channels somehow relate to the contention on
informality, and its elements, as a reflection of dysfunctional relationship of individuals with the state—
from a vertical and state-centred vantage point, and with each other—from a horizontal point of view.
Vendors resort to multiple, and sometimes contradicting long-term strategies and daily tactics, because
there is no existing institutional relationship with the state or the supposed institutional link between
them and the government simply does not work.
The preceding discussion leads the researchers then to the realization that the situation in the
Caloocan–Monumento station, as it reflects so many other similar sites in Metro Manila, is one that lies
ripe for comprehensive planning intervention. It also opens itself to stakeholder participation with a suf-
ficiently high-level of engagement, as the vendors and other regular street users themselves are usually
quite aware of their rights and responsibilities, and can therefore contribute to a well-rounded discussion
on how their working neighbourhood is to be used for the majority welfare. If the bureaucrats and users
can engage constructively in planning and implementing both civic and economic activities, these will
almost surely open the door towards integration that is consistent with the Asian context of merging
formal and informal cityscapes.

Conclusion
The foregoing discussion has provided the researchers a more serious, in-depth understanding of the
dynamics of informality in a typical high-density transport interchange in Metropolitan Manila. It has
also led them to tentatively conclude that in order for negative or inefficient dynamics to be avoided or
removed, the first step may have to be a serious reconsideration of the mental paradigms that players
bring into the picture. That is, a duality exists and is constructed, it appears, out of the differing percep-
tions of hawkers (which by themselves are divided among the organized and the unorganized), the regu-
lators (the street level bureaucrat to the high-level metro-wide enforcer), commercial locators, and even
habitual transients who may both fret at the obstacle maze created by vendors while at the same time
patronize the vendors’ products—such as popular bootleg DVD movies, for instance.
While a sweeping conclusion for other similar sites in Metro Manila cannot be made, this study pro-
vides a good comparative case and framework for analysing informal dynamics in those areas. Such a
direction of investigation would eventually lead to a greater understanding of the unappreciated role of
the informal economy in this particular developing context in Southeast Asia.
Finally, the paper offers critical reflection points to which urban planners may refer in revisiting plan-
ning frameworks and in coming up with concrete steps on how to address informality as an urban spatial
concern. By specifically identifying spatial issues that come with street vending and presenting the legal,
political and economic concerns of the street vendors, the paper provides an intimate link between con-
ceptually-laden governance issues and the everyday socio-spatial imperatives of informal hawking in a
metropolitan setting. Planners are thus offered with another lens for looking into a particular urban plan-
ning issue and an alternative approach for tackling the phenomenon of street vending.

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188 Redento B. Recio and José Edgardo A. Gomez, Jr

Notes
1. Diokno describes human rights centred development (HRCD) as ‘an integrated, multi-disciplinary and tri-
faceted framework for the formulation, articulation, and implementation of development policy, planning and
programming’ (Diokno, 2004: 3). As a framework, Diokno believes that HRCD should always start with the
principle that ‘the human person is the central subject, active participant, owner, director, and beneficiary of
development’ (Diokno, 2004: 3).
2. CAMANAVA stands for Caloocan, Malabon, Navotas and Valenzuela, a cluster of adjoining cities in Metropolitan
Manila.
3. Locational utility is a measure of the utility of specific places or areas, which is determined by the aggregate time
expenditure (cost or effort) in transport required for that place or area to satisfy its operational needs (Jannelle,
1969: 349). Jannelle (1969) describes ‘operational needs’ as those natural and human resource requirements
which permit an area to fulfil its functional roles in the larger spatial system of places and areas.
4. Mr Rene Fremista is the President of the Asosasyon ng Magtitinda sa Caloocan Inc. (AMCI), a coalition of
organizations of street vendors in Caloocan.
5. The AMCI is a coalition of 27 vendors’ organizations in Caloocan City, which was established in 2007.
6. Ms Carmelita Mangulabnan is a street vendor who sells newspapers and candies in the study area.
7. Mr Roger Banigoos is the leader of another vendors’ organization that is a member of AMCI.
8. Brachet-Marquez (1992: 98 cited in Cross 1998: 45) defines ‘clientelism’ as the structuring of political power
through networks of informal dyadic relations that link individuals of unequal power in relationships of exchange.
In clientelistic structures of authority, power is vested upon the top individual (the boss, sovereign or head of
clan), who personally decides how to distribute resources according to personal preferences.
9. This is largely based on Recio’s (2010) diagram; however, the authors added the Supreme Court decisions
affecting the street hawkers.

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Redento B. Recio, Senior Research Associate, DLSU Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance, and
Assistant Professorial Lecturer, College of Liberal Arts, De La Salle University, 2401 Taft Avenue
Manila, Mobile (063)908-9105476. Email: redenbrecio@gmail.com

José Edgardo A. Gomez, Jr, Assistant Professor, School of Urban & Regional Planning, University of
the Philippines, E. Jacinto Street, Diliman Campus, Mobile (063)9156912283. E-mail: jedgomez101@
yahoo.com

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