End Sem Ios

MODULE 2 BASIC PRINCIPLES &
GUIDING RULES
Tags
There are 4 basic types of interpretation:
1. There are several types of interpretation: beneficial, contextual, equitable,

grammatical, historical, by legal organs, jurisprudential, liberal, logical,
purposive , restrictive, sociological, strict.
2. The 4 basic types/rules of interpretation are as follows:
- Aka Textual interpretation and entails reading of the text of the statute as
it is and interpreting it in accordance with its literal meaning—LANGUAGE
Literal Rule of OF THE STATUTE SHOULD BE READ AS IT IS. - The courts first have
interpretation to go by textual interpretation, however, it may not always be sufficient -
1950-1960 was the period of simple textual interpretation of statutes by
the Indian judiciary
- It entails looking beyond the black letters of the law— going beyond the
literal interpretation. - Common in Judicial Interpretation - This rule is a
modification of the literal rule. - It states that if the literal rule produces an
absurdity, then the court should look for another meaning of the words to
avoid that absurd result. - Landmark Case: The rule was defined by Lord
Wensleydale in Grey v Pearson (1857) HL Cas 61 : “The grammatical and
ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to (begin with the literal rule)
unless that literal interpretation would lead to some absurdity or some
repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the
Golden Rule
instrument/interpretation doesn’t confirm to purpose/doesn’t suffice—- in
which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be
modified so as to avoid the absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther
(within these defined limits only)” - thus literal rule can be deviated from
only in certain specific cases - the judge cannot create
absurdity/repugnance/inconsistency on their own to cross the threshold of
literal rule—- for ex— in certain cases inconsistency is alleged— here we
have to first check the similarity/difference in the fields that are occupied
by the two contradictory provisions in the statutes.
MODULE 2 BASIC PRINCIPLES & GUIDING RULES 1

Mischief - It entails looking at the mischief that the legislature is intending to
Rule/Hayden’s correct. - It entails determining if the interpretation of the provision in the
Rule particular case sufficiently remedies the mischief that the legislature is
seeking to remedy through the enactment of that law/provision. -
Common in Judicial Interpretation - Landmark Case: Heydon's Case (1584)
76 ER 637 [R v. Heydon] -—[Headnote: interpretation that achieves object
of the act should be chosen— interpretation made must suppress the

mischief, advance remedy, suppress subtle inventions/evasions
responsible for continuance of mischief, add force and life to the remedy
according to the true intent of the makers, in the interest of the public] [
As per the case the rule envisages (1) looking at the common law before
the making of the Act ; (2) ascertaining the mischief and defect for which
the common law did not provide; (3) determine the remedy that the
parliament had resolved and appointed to cure the disease; (4) ascertain
true reason of the remedy.] [Side Note: See Pro-private commodo and
pro-bono publica]
Purposive Rule - Aharon Barak (Judge, legal Theorist)—- Proposed rule of purposive
interpretation: * In his book he argues that an alternative approach —
purposive interpretation — allows jurists and scholars to approach all legal
texts in a similar manner while remaining sensitive to the important
differences—— * He explains purposive interpretation as follows: All
legal interpretation must start by establishing a range of semantic
meanings for a given text, from which the legal meaning is then drawn. In
purposive interpretation, the text’s “purpose” is the criterion for
establishing which of the semantic meanings yields the legal meaning.
Establishing the ultimate purpose — and thus the legal meaning —
depends on the relationship between the subjective and objective
purposes; that is, between the original intent of the text’s author and the
intent of a reasonable author and of the legal system at the time of
interpretation. This is easy to establish when the subjective and objective
purposes coincide. But when they don’t, the relative weight given to each
purpose depends on the nature of the text. For example, subjective
purpose is given substantial weight in interpreting a will; objective
purpose, in interpreting a constitution. - looks at the larger purpose of law
and accordingly fills in the gaps + gives certain leeway to the litigants -
emerges from boiling down of the mischief rule - Common in Judicial
Interpretation— most growing mode of interpretation— wide
interpretations by the court— most widely used today - This is also a
controversial mode as it raises the debate of “whether judges can
legislate” - Important Indian cases where the purposive interpretation

was applied include: - Vishakha Judgment (Sexual Harassment guidelines )—-
Courts gave minimum threshold guidelines till legislature could enact a
law. - Arnesh Kumar judgment - Aadhar Judgment — DY Chandrachud heavily
relied on purposive rule.
I. INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE
1. There are two schools of thought—- one school believes that the intent of
legislature is crucial to look at, while other school considers that the intent of the
legislature is not easy to determine.
2. Statute is an edict of the legislature——- conventional way of interpreting or

construing a statute is to seek the “intention” of its maker.
3. interpreted in the context of the intent of those who make it.
4. The principle envisages that the organ interpreting the statute must seek the
intention of the maker.
5. It is the duty of the judicature to act upon the true intention of the legislature
(mens or sententia legis)
6. if there are two interpretations possible, then one which furthers the true
intention of the legislature has to be chosen.
7. If, for instance, two interpretations are correct and further the true intentions,
then use external aids for interpretation, to determine the one which fits bets.
8. Looking at the intention only is not sufficient, also imp to look at the socio-
economic changes.
9. The black letter of the law cannot be completely set aside while ascertaining the
intention of the legislature.
10. Both internal and external aids must be used to ascertain the intent of the
legislature. The External aids include: mischief against which statute is directed;
surrounding circumstances; statutes in pari materia; state of the law at present;
past circumstances/statutes; historical perspective of the law.
11. [Side note: See the Case where the definition of “domestic” was expanded to
extend the application of Domestic Violence Act to Live-in relationships]

📢 Central India spinning & weaving manufacturing Corporation v. Municipal
Committee, 1958
[Headnote: General words and phrases, howsoever wide and

comprehensive they may be in their literal sense, they must usually be
construed in light of the object of the enactment. The
construction/interpretation of the words have to be limited to the actual
object of the enactment even though they might be capable of wide and
comprehensive interpretation—- For example terms such as “child”,
“forest”.—- Thus, words/phrases might be capable of wide interpretation
in literal sense, however, they must be construed in accordance with the
object of the act]
II. STATUTE MUST BE READ AS A WHOLE IN ITS CONTEXT
1. When the question arises as to the meaning of a certain provision in a statute, it

is not only legitimate but proper to read that provision in its context.
2. Law should not be read in void, socio-political conditions must be considered
3. The context here means: the statute as a whole, the previous state of the law,
other statutes in pari materia, the general scope of the statute and the mischief
that it was intended to remedy.
4. Statute has to be construed within the four corners of the statute itself (ex
visceribus actus)
5. Lord Coke: "It is the most natural and genuine exposition of a statute to
construe one part of a statute by another part of the same statute, for that best
expresseth the meaning of the makers".—- Whenever you are interpreting one
part of the law, simultaneously the other part of the statute also has to be read
—- unless statute is read as a whole it would be difficult to ascertain if there is
any ambiguity.
6. The conclusion that the language used by the Legislature is plain or ambiguous
can only be truly arrived at by studying the statute as a whole
7. [side note: in case of conflict between the provision and preamble the provision
will always prevail—this is a basic rule of statutory interpretation—- However, in

case of Constitution, the conflict between preamble and Article does not exist—
generally supplements]
📢 RBI v. Pearless General Finance and investment Company, 1987
[Headnote: Interpretation must depend upon text + context—-best

interpretation is when textual and contextual interpretation
match/compliment each other—- balance text and the context—- if law is
archaic then this balance is difficult to achieve as the context of the law
when it was made would not cater to present circumstances due to the
socio-economic changes]

📢 IMP UOI v Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Co Ltd, 2001 (1) JT SC 536, p 563
[Headnote: For contextual interpretation, textual interpretation (original

intent) is equally important —- when the court tries to interpret the statute
in its context, reading the original intent from the text of the statute is
equally important—the contextualist interpreters also refer to original
intent—- correlated]
[Held: reference to "mismanagement" in the Preamble of the Textile

Undertakings (Taking over of Management) Act, 1983 could not restrict
the operation of the Act to only those mills of the companies mentioned in
the Schedule whose financial condition was deplorable only on account of
mismanagement but not otherwise]
[HELD: When question arises as to the meaning of a certain provision in

a statute, it is not only legitimate but proper to read that provision in its
context. Context here
means:
• the statute as a whole,
• the previous state of the law,
• other statutes in pari materia,
• the general scope of the statute and
• the mischief which it intends to remedy.

📢 National Insurance Co Ltd v Anjana Shyam, (2007)
[Headnote: To ascertain the meaning of a word in a statute the court

must look at the whole statute- preceding section, succeeding sections—-
as they may be interrelated—
Lord Watson: “it is conceivable that the Legislature whilst enacting one
clause in plain terms, might introduce into the same statute other
enactments which to some extent qualify or neutralise its effect"
The same word may mean one thing in one context and another in a
different context. [ex “child”]—- depending on context they may have
restricted or wider connotation.
📢 AG v HRH Prince Ernest Augustus, (1957) 1 All ER 49
[Headnote: "The key to the opening of every law is the reason and the
spirit of the law—it is the animus imponentis, the intention of the law-
maker, expressed in the law itself, taken as a whole. Hence to arrive at
the true meaning of any particular phrase in a statute, that particular
phrase is not to be viewed detached from the context—meaning by this
as well the title and the preamble as the purview or enacting part of the
statute."]

📢 CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384, p 408
(Aust)
[Headnote: High Court of Australia: "the modern approach to statutory

interpretation (a) insists that the context be considered in the first
instance, not merely at some later stage when ambiguity might be
thought to arise [Start with contextual interpretation at the very beginning
and not merely when ambiguity arises] and (b) uses context in its widest
sense to include such things as the existing state of the law and the
mischief which, by legitimate means—one may discern the statute was
intended to remedy."]
📢 IMP Aswini Kumar Ghose v Arabinda Bose, AIR 1952
[Headnote: Conflict b/w Advocates Act and the rules followed by Calcutta
HC in original side—- advocate not allowed to practice in original side of
HC—- Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in High Courts) Act, 1951
provides that such Advocates are “entitled as of right to practice” in any
High Court in India—- contended that “right to practice” has to be
interpreted widely to include pleading and appearing —- held that term
“practice” has to be interpreted widely to including pleading and acting—
court read statute as a whole and considered purpose of enactment—
right to practice would be meaningless in the context of the act if practice
would not include pleading and acting]

📢 IMP Newspapers Ltd. v. State Industrial Tribunal, 1957
[Headnote: A person employed as a lino typist by the appellant company

was
dismissed——-co-workers and other workmen did not espouse his cause
—- case of
respondent was not taken up by any union of workers in similar or allied
trades—— but the U.P. Working Journalists Union, with which respondent
had no
connection whatsoever, took the matter——— case involved the
Interpretation of the term “industrial dispute”—- issue was whether
dispute between employer and single employee would fall within the
definition of Industrial Dispute—— Court interpreted literally and held that
it would not be an industrial dispute—- in the given context plural does
not include singular—- however there is a change in jurisprudence—-
now dispute between single workman whose cause is espoused by other
workmen and the employer qualify as industrial dispute]

📢 IMP Gurmej Singh v. S Pratap Singh, 1966
[Headnote: The appellant and respondent were the contesting

candidates in the general election from the X constituency——
respondent secured the highest number of votes , declared elected to the
Punjab Legislative Assembly—— appellant filed an election petition for
the declaration that the election of the respondent was void—-alleged by
him that the respondent and his election agent had appointed a number
of persons as the respondent's counting and polling agents —-said
persons were, at the material time, working as lambardars——corrupt
practice within the meaning of s. 123 of RPA (DEALS WITH CORRUPT
PRACTICES)—- S. 123(7) “revenue officers including village
accountants, such as, patwaris, lekhpals, talatis, karnams and the like but
excluding other village officers”—- issue was how to interpret the
excluding parts—- held that: elementary rule of construction that the
construction of section has to be made considering all the parts together
and not one part only by itself——meaning of the clause is fairly clear—-
genus is the "revenue officer," and the "including" and "excluding" clauses
connected by the conjunction "but" show that the village accountants are
included in the group of revenue officers, but the other village officers are
excluded therefrom,—- held that when parliament, with the knowledge
and clear distinction have expressly excluded, the courts cannot read it in
impliedly——unreasonable to construe the clause in such a way as to
include the lambardars in the category of village accountants.]

📢 IMP Regional Provident Fund Commissioner v. Shri Krishna Metal Mfg., 1962
[Headnote: the issue was Whether the given company fell within the
definition of factory—-The Co. protested and urged that it was not a
factory under s. 1(3)(a) of the Act and so, it could not be called upon to
comply with its provisions——— Held that ordinary rule of grammar
cannot be treated as an invariable rule which must
always and in ever ease be accepted without regard to the context. If the
context
definitely suggests that the relevant rule of grammar is inapplicable, then
the.
requirement of the context must prevail over the rule of grammar——-the
grammatical rule must not be overemphasized/unduly relied upon]

📢 IMP State of Rajasthan v. Leela Jain, 1965
[Headnote: respondent made certain unauthorized construction——

municipal authority ordered the matter to be compounded by the payment
of a fine—— aggrieved person moved the State Government under
Rajasthan City Municipal Appeals (Regulation) Act, 1950, and State
Government set aside the order of the Municipal authority—-HC held that
State Government has no jurisdiction to interfere——SC set aside HC
order —-Held that——- we do not consider it possible to reject words
used in an enactment merely for the reason that they do not accord with
the context in which they occur or with the purpose of the legislation as
gathered from the preamble or long title——Underlying purpose of
enactment can be understood by studying the object and reasons,
preamble, long title—- they however cant be used to eliminate as
redundant, the operative part of the statute—not be proper, when the
words of the statute are clear, to take the preamble and the long title into
consideration and come to the conclusion that it could not have been
intended to permit the Government to interfere in municipal affairs,
especially when such an interpretation has the effect of omitting or
deleting the words]
III. STATUTE TO BE CONSTRUED TO MAKE IT EFFECTIVE AND WORKABLE
1. Interpretation that reduces a provision to futility should be avoided.
2. A provision that is prima facie constitutional should not be construed otherwise

merely because there is certain vagueness. It must be entirely unworkable for
the court to declare it as void.
3. The maxim “ut res magis valeat quam pereat” is applicable which means that: It
is better for thing to have effect than be made void.
4. If there are two possible interpretations, wherein the narrow interpretation would
fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislature, then such interpretation
should be avoided that would lead the legislation to futility, instead the court
must accept a more broader construction based on presumption that the
parliament would legislate with the object of bringing effective legislation.

5. when two interpretations are possible— reasonable to be adopted.
📢 Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co Ltd v State of Assam, AIR 1990 SC 123
[Headnote: Challenging the Const. validity of nationalization- court

applied the principle of “ut res magis valeat quam pereat”----- one of the
contentions was that the statute failed to provide provision for the
creditors- Held that it is to be impliedly read that the government would
formulate policy wrt the creditors- provision of statute must be construed
to make it effective and operational- nothing short of impossibility should
allow a court to declare a statute as unworkable/void.]
[ Side-note: In cases of Nationalization the concept of eminent domain,

Article 31A (Acquisition of property)]]

📢 Udayan Chinubhai v RC Bali, AIR 1977 SC 2319
[Headnote: s. 12 of limitation Act (exclusion of time in legal proceedings)-

“In computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an application for
leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a judgment, the day on
which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite
for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or
sought to be revised or reviewed shall be excluded”——the issue was
whether the time between the date of the judgment and the date of
preparation of decree is to be excluded from the limitation period if the
application for certified copy is made after the decree was prepared——-
In this case the court also relied on external aid of interpretation (law
commission report)- court read that statute in a manner to make it
workable by making the provision under s. 12(2) clear- held that the
limitation exclusion would not apply in the given case as the decree had
already been prepared and the application was made after the
preparation of the decree- s. 12 would apply in the instance that the party
had approached court between the judgment and before the preparation
of decree- Thus, in reference to the object of the section +
recommendations made by the law commission it was held that in
computing the time requisite for obtaining the copy of decree, the time
that has elapsed between the pronouncement of the judgment and the
signing of the decree is not to be excluded if the application for obtaining
certified copy is made after preparation of the decree]
[Side-note: The difference between judgment and decree- the judgment

is pronounced/given/delivered in the court. Thereafter decree is prepared
that will be used for execution]

📢 KB NAGPUR MD AYURVED v. UOI, 2012[SEE PARA 8]
[ Headnote: Relates to election for Ayush board—- vacancy has not been
filled by the central government— s. 7 provides that “or until his
successor shall have been duly elected/nominated whichever is longer”—
The court studied the intention of legislature + the maxim “ut res magis
valeat quam pereat” and worked on presumption that legislature doesn’t
make a statute that is unconstitutional or the legislature has not
transgressed jurisdiction— burden of proof is on the challenger—- held
that s. 7 is for extraordinary situations/exceptional situations— the
concept of “reasonable time” comes into play to ensure that the statute
remains workable even though the provision expressly doesn’t provide for
a time period— the court has supplied lacuna to make the provision
workable within the object of the legislature]
📢 UOI v Ranbaxy, 2008
[Headnote: While construing exemption notification—- principle of

purposive construction applied to give full effect to the exemption
notification——The exemption notification must be construed to be a
workable one—- held that “Applying the principle of doctrine of purposive
construction, we are of the opinion that meaningful purpose could be
achieved only if the construction of the notification as indicated before is
adopted and no other—— while construing an exemption notification not
only pragmatic view us required but also practical aspects must be
considered.]
📢 R&B Falcon v. CIT, 2008
[Headnote: well settled principle of law that the court shall avoid such
constructions which would render a part of the statutory provision otiose
or meaningless— each word of statute has some meaning]

IV. IF MEANING IS PLAIN, EFFECT MUST BE GIVEN TO IT IRRESPECTIVE OF
CONSEQUENCES
1. When the words of a statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, i.e., they are
reasonably
susceptible to only one meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that
meaning
irrespective of consequences.
2. even though the provision may be strange or surprising, unreasonable or unjust

or oppressive or creating hardship or stringent, the courts cannot delve into
construction when the language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only
one meaning.
3. if the words of a statute on a proper construction can be read only in a particular

way, then it cannot be read in another way by a court anxious to avoid
unconstitutionality. Similarly, if a statute is apparently unconstitutional, judges
cannot use any tool of interpretation to avoid unconstitutionality.
4. However, if inconvenience is pleaded, the court should not lightly dismiss it

aside w/o considering the circumstances, especially in those statutes which are
not stringent.

📢 CIT, Agri v Keshab ChandraMandal, AIR 1950 SC 265
[Headnote: According to the prescribed rules the Income tax returns

have to be signed by the person filing——-in given case illiterate person
gave thumb print while son signed on his behalf——-the issue was
whether such declaration would be considered as valid- HC considered it
valid- However matter went to SC— SC delved into the maxim “qui tacit
alium, tacit per se” which means he who does something through
another does so himself— SC held that as per the evidence adduced,
there was noting conclusive on record to establish “ample contact”/
authorization when the son signed on behalf of the asesse— difficult to
ascertain consent— Thus court gave effect to the provision despite the
consequences to give effect to the plain meaning within the intention of
the legislature- Justice mahajan dissented.]
[Side note: for interpretation of contract act see cases: Chaturbhuj case,
BK Mondal Case]

📢 MV Joshi v MU Shimpi, AIR 1961 SC 1494
[Headnote: Relates to food adulteration— Rule 11, Appendix B

Prevention of food adulteration Rules—- “Butter prepared by milk/cream
by whatever process”—- “by whatever process” signifies intent of
legislature to give wider connotation— interpreting restrictively will defeat
the purpose of legislation— the penal provision related to food
adulteration has to be interpreted strictly, but in cases of determining food
adulteration the wider interpretation in public interest is essential— Court
held that there was adulteration— process was not essential but the
quality was the determining factor— “by fiction treated to be adulterated”]
[When it is said that all penal statutes are to be construed strictly it only
means that the court must see that the thing charged is an offence within
the plain meaning of the words used and must not strain the words. It
has also been held that in construing a penal statute it is a cardinal
principle that in case of doubt, 'the construction favorable to the subject
should be preferred. But these rules do not in any way affect the
fundamental principles of interpretation, namely that the primary test is
the language employed in the Act and when the words are clear and plain
the court is bound to accept the expressed, intention of the Legislature.]
📢 Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd vs Maddula Ratnavalli & Ors, 2007
[Headnote: Merely because statute causes hardship does not make it

ultra vires—- statute has to be construed justly (lex injuste non est lex)
—- however, the concept of just will not be the only guiding factor as in
certain cases stringency is necessary and the law is made accordingly—-
the parliament is presumed to have enacted a reasonable/rational law—-
thus the extent to which justice and equity can steep in is limited ,
especially when such interpretation would defeat the object of the act]

HOWEVER, Construction to avoid absurdity is permissible
📢 SR BATRA V. TARUNA BATRA, 2007
permissible]
[ Construction to avoid absurdity is
[Headnote: If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous it

must be interpreted in its ordinary sense even though it might lead to
manifest absurdity, repugnance, mischief, or injustice—- not all laws aim
for justice, certain stringent statutes seek to penalize—- even if the
statute/provision in a stringent law is unclear/ambiguous, still strict
interpretation is necessary—however tools of interpretation to resolve the
ambiguity/conflict can be used.]
V. PLAIN MEANING RULE
1. Plain meaning rule is not plain
2. The rule is that plain words require no construction—- however this rule itself
starts with the premise that the words are plain and this conclusion that the
words are plain is itself a conclusion reached after construing the words. It is
not possible to decide whether certain words are plain or ambiguous unless
they are studied in their context and construed.
3. Thus plain meaning rule envisages that the literal meaning can be applied only
after the context of the statute us construed— otherwise it would not be
possible to determine if colloquial meaning has to be attributed to the word or
any other meaning within the context of the statute.
4. Once the court construes the words in the true context of the legislation and
comes to the conclusion that there can only be one meaning attributed, then the
duty of the court is to give effect to that meaning.
5. Even while applying literal rule, external aids of construction can be used to
determine the context in which the word has been used to determine if there are
more than one meanings that can be attributed.
6. Plain meaning rule should be applied unless it leads to prima facie

unconstitutionality, anomalies, injustices, absurdities.

HOW TO DETERMINE AMBIGUITY
ambiguity can be attributed when the provision is open to diverse meanings
contextual ambiguity— the ambiguity can be attributed only after construing the
word in the context of the legislation
context means balancing with the preamble, existing state of law, other statutes
in pari materia, mischief sought to be remedied.
ambiguity should not be attributed where there is none
📢 Mazdoor Sangh v. Usha Breco Ltd.
[Headnote: Court held that just because it is beneficial legislation, wider

interpretation should be justified in terms of the entire statute—- even in
beneficial legislation the first rule remains literal interpretation. Wider
interpretation should not be the first step merely because it is a beneficial
legislation] [The Court must construe the statutory provision with a view
to uphold the object and the purpose of the Parliament. It is only
in a case where there exists a grey area and the court feels a difficulty in
interpreting or in construing and applying the statute, the doctrine of
beneficent construction can be taken recourse to. Even where such a
case is resorted to, the same would not mean that the statute should be
interpreted in a manner which would take it beyond the object and
purpose thereof]
VI. HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION (Conflict between provisions)
1. If two sections are repugnant/contradictory/in conflict, then Later added part will
prevail over earlier part as it will better reflect intent of legislature, but only when
they are irreconcilable and harmonious construction is not possible.
2. If two sections are repugnant, the known rule is that last must prevail
3. Proviso Clauses ( “provided that”, “subject to”)—- when the proviso clause is not
in tune with the main part of the section then the court often tries to harmonize

them, however, if harmonious construction is not possible then the proviso/later
part will prevail.
4. When there is conflict between two provisions that are not in pari materia (ex IT
act and Companies Act—- the court will first try to determine if there exists an
actual inconsistency/conflict [two provisions that occupy two different fields
entirely cannot be said to be in conflict]— if conflict is determined, If possible
the courts will try to harmonize the provisions—- if not then the courts would
determine in the given context of the case that which of the statute is the
general law and which is specific— this means the court will look into the nature
of the legislation and determine if it is general or specific based on factors such
as: nature of enactment, who has enacted, which lays down the general
principles, nature of operation. In matters of sexual assault against minors the
special law POCSO will prevail over IPC.
[Side note: The maxim generalia specialibus non derogant means that, for
the purposes of interpretation of two statutes in apparent conflict, the provisions
of a general statute must yield to those of a special one. On the other hand,
Generalibus specialia derogant means that where a special provision is made
in a special statute, that special provision excludes the operation of a general
provision in the general law.]
CASE LAWS
📢 Hamdard Dawakhana v. State of Bihar
[Headnote: Essential Commodities Act— if it is possible for two

conflicting provisions to coexist then harmonious construction should be
done— however, if it would lead to apparent unconstitutionality, then the
same should be avoided]
📢 Novartis v. UOI
GUIDING RULES

I. LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE SHOULD BE READ AS IT IS
1. Facet of literal rule
2. A construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or

which results in rejection of the words as meaningless has to be avoided
3. Main ingredients:
a) avoiding addition/substitution of words
Construction which requires addition/substitution/rejection/deletion of words

as meaningless should be avoided
Lacuna, if any, cannot be supplied by the courts
it is not for the court to remedy defect in the statute
court cannot reframe the legislation because it has no power to legislate
📢 UOI v. VRN Nair, 2020
in the statute]
[It is not for the court to remedy defect
[Headnote: Interpretation of regulation related to armed forces—

Navy Pension Regulation, 1964— reference made to landmark
case of N Bysack v. Shyam Sunder wherein the court held that by
judicial interpretation words cant be added to the statutes/rules,
courts cannot supply to lacuna based on the presumed meaning
of legislature, further where the court feels that words have been
accidentally omitted or that not adopting a construction would
deprive certain existing words of all its meaning, then it is
permissible to supply additional words. But the courts should not
easily read in words which have not been expressly enacted]

📢 Commercial Tax Officer Bharatpur v. Bhagat Singh, 2020
any, cannot be supplied the courts] [statute should be

[Lacuna, if
interpreted in just , reasonable , sensible manner]

[Headnote: Interpretation of term “casual traders” in Rajasthan
Tax on entry of MV into local Areas Act, 1988—- it was
contended by the CTO that the assesse was not “casual trader”
as there was only single transaction——SC held that legislature
could not have intended that person making 2/3 transactions is
treated as casual trader but person making single transaction is
treated at par with “regular trader”- Held that single transaction
cannot qualify as “casual traders”—— SC referred case Tirath
Singh v. Bachittar Singh, 1955 wherein its was observed that
words in singular include plural, unless repugnant to the intent of

legislature——modifying structure of words in their interpretation
in cases where their grammatical meaning creates absurdity,
ambiguity, etc. is not intended by the legislature]

📢 Insaf v. UOI, 2020
[Headnote: Foreign contribution regulation act—-Rule 3 (v) deals

with organizations of farmers, workers, students etc. which are
not directly aligned to any political party but objectives of which
include steps towards advancement of ‘political interests’ of such
groups—— contended by appellant that such organizations
agitating for their legitimate claims cannot be prevented access to
foreign funds by resorting to the vague term ‘political interests’.
——-held that words ‘political interests’ are vague and are
susceptible to misuse. However, possible abuse of power is not a
ground to declare a provision unconstitutional. Where the
provisions of a statute are vague and ambiguous and it is
possible to gather the intention of the legislature from the object
of the statute, the context in which the provisions occur and
purpose for which it is made, the doctrine of “reading down” can
be applied. To save Rule 3(v) from being declared as
unconstitutional, the Court can apply the doctrine of “reading
down”]
📢 [Avoiding Addition/substitution of words]

Sakshi v. UOI, 2004
[Headnote: Plea to enhance the scope and ambit of rape

(”sexual intercourse”)- See para 19— Penal provisions are to be
strictly interpreted— SC gave guidelines regarding the trial in
case of Rape and sexual assault cases, however, court did not
interfere with the text of the statute as that was in the domain of
legislature- judiciary cannot change the text of the statute, it can
merely interpret and give guidelines— court cannot reframe the
legislation because it has no power to legislate- court can give
interpretation and then it is up to the legislature to bring
amendment [tussle between legislature and judiciary]

📢 IMP British
1959
India General Insurance Co Ltd v Captain Itbar Singh, AIR
[Headnote: MV Act, 1992, s. 96(2)—- insurer liability exemptions

pleaded by Insurance company on grounds that were not
expressly listed under s. 96—- the issue was whether the courts
can add an exception where legislature has not provided any—-
court rejected the contention and held that addition cannot be
made by the court as that is the domain of legislature—- in the
given statute legislature did not intend to create the exception
and the court cannot read the same as that would defeat the
purpose.] [HELD that the rules of interpretation, do not permit us
to do unless the section as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful
meaning]

📢 VLS Finance Ltd v UOI, (2013) 6 SCC 278
[Headnote: s. 621A & 211 of companies Act 1956 —

companies liability—whether the company law board has power
to compound offences —whether permission has to be taken to
compound the offences—- check the intent of the provision + the
impact—- cardinal rule that the words/phrases/sentences are to
be given their natural meaning/ interpreted in their ordinary sense
—no addition/substitution of words—-Reading statute as a whole
(621A r/w 211)—- held that when the offence is only punishable
with fine then permission not required]
[Held: Section 621-A provides for compounding, by the Company
Law Board, of any offence punishable under the Act, not being an
offence punishable with imprisonment only, or with imprisonment
and also with fine, either before or after the institution of any
prosecution. It was held that the Company Law Board has the
power to compound such offences without the permission of the
court. Since the Legislature, in its wisdom, has not put the
rider of prior permission in the section, addition of the words
"with the prior permission of the court" to the provision is
not permissible]

📢 IMP Bharat Aluminium Co v Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc,
(2012) [BALCO JUDGMENT]
[Headnote: Landmark judgment in arbitration law—- Domestic

Arbitration vis-a-vis International Arbitration—- s. 2 and 20 of
A&C Act—- S. 2 deals with the Applicability of the Act (Part I of
Act to apply to domestic arbitrations, and Part II to apply to
foreign arbitration), and s. 20 deals with seat, place, venue—- the
seat of the arbitration will be the place of the conduct of the
arbitration and the governing law will be the law of that place——
seat to be decided by the parties—-the choice of the country as
to the seat of arbitration implies that the parties are automatically
choosing the governing law of that country ——- in the given
case, the seat of the arbitration was choses by the parties as
London, however, they chose the governing law to be the Indian
law—- the constitutional validity of s. 20 of A&C act was
challenged
The Court in the BALCO judgment considered the

observations made in Bhatia International v Bulk Trading SA,
(2002): The SC here held while interpreting s. 2 of the Act that

Part I of the Act applies to awards passed in International
arbitration proceedings held outside India—- Court observed that
s.2 has not expressly excluded the application of Part I to
International Arbitration—- the court reasoned that exclusion
cannot be created where none exists—- further that balancing the
applicability and scope with the intent of legislature is required
when the provision neither expressly included/excludes—- if
excluding the application would create a vaccum then such
exclusion has to be avoided.
However, the Court in the BALCO judgment set aside and

overruled the BHATIA INT. Judgment and held as follows: Part I
and Part II of the Act are distinct—- Part I includes arbitration with
no foreign parties or foreign party with seat/place in India,
whereas Part II only applies to enforcement of foreign awards in

India—- Court held that by interpretation, the Application of Part I
and the provisions therein cannot be extended to International
arbitrations—- in such a case certain words would have to be
added to section 2(2), which would then have to provide that "this
part shall apply where the place of arbitration is in India and to
arbitrations having its place out of India". This would amount to a
drastic and unwarranted rewriting or alteration of
the language of section 2(2), and it is not permissible for the court
to reconstruct a statutory provision——the court also held that
there is no difference in seat and place—- the judgment is heavily
criticized.]
[Side note: See Hardy Explorations Case 2018 (J Dipak Mishra)

where segregation between seat and place has been once again
made and reiterated that seat decides the governing law]

📢 UOI v. Namit Sharma, 2013
[Headnote: Interpretation of s. 12(5) and 15(5) of RTI Act, 2005

—- the act has provision for appointment of information
commissioner—it was contended that the criteria for appointment
of information commissioner was vague—- court held that the
function performed by the information comm. was administrative
function and he had duty to act justly and fairly—- the court had
to consider whether there was error apparent on the face of the
record (patent illegality)—- held that changes in the criteria of
qualification can only be done by the legislature.—-court cannot
read into the provisions of sections 12(5) and 15(5) of the Act the
words that such persons must have a basic degree in their
respective fields]
Review petition has been filed against this judgment.
[side note: Administrative function v. Judicial function— lis and

quasi-lis; earlier the test of “trappings of court” was used to
determine if a forum was a tribunal; In PUCL v. UOI (phone
tapping case) it was held that RTI is an ingrained aspect of
freedom of speech and expression (Art. 19(1)(a))
b) casus omissus
gap left in legislative enactment
Casus omissus is the application of the principle which says that the matter
which should have been, but has not been provided for in a statute cannot
be supplied by the court as this would amount to legislation and not
construction
Casus omissus means judicial interpretation suppling terms that have been
deliberately omitted by the legislature— this is seen equivalent to judicial
law-making
Omission of words cannot be supplied by the courts, however, in certain

circumstances courts can supply words which have been accidentally

omitted.
Court should not so interpret a statute as to create a casus omissus when

there is really none

📢 VVIMP: State of Jharkhand v. Govind Sigh, 2005
[Headnote: Indian Forest Act, 1927 - Sections 52 (3) and 68 ———

Confiscation of vehicle seized for involvement in forest offence——-
Whether single Judge of High Court justified in holding that even
though there was no specific provision in Section 52 (3), vehicle so
seized can be released on payment of fine in lieu of confiscation?-
Held, "no"-Language of Section 52 (3) is clear and unambiguous-No
case of casus omissus-High Court not justified in reading in Section
52 (3) power to direct release by imposing fine in lieu of confiscation-
On combined reading of Sections 52 and 68, vehicle liable for
confiscation may be released on payment of value of vehicle and not
otherwise-Judgment of High Court clearly indefensible and set aside.]
Important observations in the Case: [several rules of interpretation were

used in this case]
1. When the words of a Statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, i.e.,

they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the Courts
are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of
consequences.
2. The intention of the Legislature is primarily to be gathered from

the language used, which means that attention should be paid to
what has been said as also to what has not been said.
3. A construction which requires for its support addition or

substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as
meaningless has to be avoided.
4. Court cannot aid Legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, it

cannot add or mend and, by construction make up deficiencies
which are left there—- Court cannot reframe the legislation as it
has no power to legislate.
5. the Legislature cannot be approached as the Legislature, after

enacting a law or Act, becomes functus officio so far as that
particular Act is concerned and it cannot itself interpret it. No

doubt, the Legislature retains the power to amend or repeal the
law so made and can also declare its meaning, but that can be
done only by making another law or statute after undertaking the
whole process of law-making.
6. Statute being an edict of the Legislature, it is necessary that it is

expressed in clear and unambiguous language.
7. Where the words are clear, there is no obscurity, there is no

ambiguity and the intention of the Legislature is clearly conveyed,
there is no scope for the Court to innovate or take upon itself the
task of amending or altering the statutory provisions.
8. Court in interpreting the Constitution enjoys a freedom which is

not available in interpreting a statute
9. Lord Diplock in Duport Steels Ltd. v. Sirs, 1980 (1) All ER 529 : “It
endangers continued public confidence in the political impartiality
of the judiciary, which is essential to the continuance of the rule of
law, if Judges, under the guise of interpretation, provide their own
preferred amendments to statutes which experience of their
operation has shown to have had consequences that members of
the Court before whom the matter comes consider to be injurious
to public interest.”
10. The question is not what may be supposed and has been
intended but what has been said. "
11. In Dr. R. Venkatchalam and others, etc. v. Dy. Transport Commissioner
and others, etc.AIR 1977 SC 842 it was observed that Courts must
avoid the danger of a priori determination of the meaning of a
provision based on their own pre-conceived notions of ideological
structure or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is
somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function
under the disguise of interpretation.
12. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of

process of law, it is for the Legislature to amend, modify or repeal
it, if deemed necessary—- The legislative casus omissus
cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process.

13. Two principles of construction-one relating to casus omissus
and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole-appear
to be well-settled. Under the first principle, a casus omissus
cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear
necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners
of the statute itself but at the same time, as casus omissus
should not be readily inferred and for that purpose, all the
parts of a statute or section must be construed together and
every clause of a section should be construed with reference
to the context and other clauses thereof so that the
construction to be put on a particular provision makes a
consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be
more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to
manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have
been intended by the Legislature.
14. A casus omissus ought not to be created by interpretation unless

there is a case of strong necessity.
15. Where, however, a casus omissus does really occur, either

through the inadvertence of the Legislature, or on the principle
quod semel aut bis existit proetereunt legislators, the rule is that
the particular case, thus left unprovided for, must be disposed of
according to the law as it existed before such statute-casus
omissus et oblivioni datus dispositioni communis juris relinquitur
[A case omitted and given to oblivion (forgotten) is left to the
disposal of the common law]

📢 Karnataka State Financial Corporation v. Narasimahaiah
[Headnote: For the interpretation of statute in a reasonable manner,

court must place itself in the place of a reasonable legislature and
check why one provision is amended and not other and also why one
term is used in a particular provision and different clause in another
—- statute must be interpreted having regard to the constitutional
provisions and human rights—— Supplying casus omissus is
generally not permissible]

👉 IMP Shri Balaji Nagar Residential Association v. State of TN, 2015
[Headnote: See also Indore Dev Auth v. Manohar lal, 2020 and Pune
(overruled in Indore Dev

Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand, 2014
Case)—-these cases deal with s. 24 of Right to Fair Compensation

and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013—-s. 24 provides for retrospective effect of
the 2013 Act—- if a dispute under the previous 1894 Act has not
been compensated for , then the aggrieved would be entitled to the
compensation under 2013 Act as per s. 24(1)——however in case if
the compensation award is made under 1894 act , the claim would be
considered lapsed as per s. 24(2)—- in the Shri Balaji Case, Tamil
Nadu govt acquisition of land—land proceedings initiated in
2/02/2005—-award made in 2006——approached HC —-claimants
claimed that the case should be according to 2013 Act—-if award is
made but the money is not deposited then issue arises vis-a-vis
applicability of the act—-in such case the parties would be entitled to
compensation under 2013 Act—— Intention of s. 24 to be determined
from the words of the statutes and case laws—-it was considered that
in calculating the period of lapse if factors such as pending litigation
have to be considered—-this is the casus omissus——SC held that
s.24 of the Act does not exclude expressly the period of litigation in
calculating the period of lapse (5years)—if legislature wanted to
exclude it would have expressly provided—-thus the legislature has
made the period of 5 years as absolute under s. 24(2), and this is
unaffected by any delay in the proceedings on account of any order
of stay by the court—-court did not deviate from the literal rule]
[Held: Legislature has consciously omitted to extend the period of five

years indicated in section 24(2) of the Act, even if the acquisition
proceedings were delayed on account
of an order of stay or injunction granted by a court of law or for any
other reason, and
this omission cannot be supplied by a court of law.]

👉 IMP Durgesh Sharma v. Jayshree,2008 [Illustration of the difficulty
faced in construction when a related provision is not amended ]
[Headnote: Divorce sought on the grounds of desertion—-s. 13 HMA,

s. 23 and 25 of CPC —-matter dealt with Jurisdictional Issue —
transfer of case—-Fact was that the HC transferred the case from
court subordinate to it in ujjain to a court subordinate to it in malegao-
this was the issue—SC relied on several aids of interpretation
(objects and reasons)—held that the HC jurisdiction is confined to
respective state—cannot be extended to another state as it can only
be done by SC by virtue of s. 25 ——s. 23 is merely enabling—order
of transfer cannot be made by HC in this case—-Held that there is No
Casus omisus—intent of legislature is clear—-MP HC cannot read
into the provision something not intended by the legislature—-
wholistic reading.]
IMP: Section 25 confers power on the Supreme Court to transfer any

suit appeal or other proceeding from a High Court or civil court in one
state to a High Court or civil court in another state. The amending Act
did not delete or omit section 23(3) of the Code which provides that
where several Courts having jurisdiction are subordinate to different
High Courts, the application for transfer shall be made to the High
Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the High Court in
which the suit is brought is situate. Because of continuance of section
23, it was held by several HC that it was still open for a party to apply
to the High Court for transfer ——-This view was overruled by the
Supreme Court in Durgesh Sharma v Jayshree------ section 23 must be
read subject to section 25
c) avoiding the rejection of words
effort to give meaning to each and every word used by the legislature
it is to be presumed that every part has been included by the legislature

with some purpose

court cannot simply reject the use of words used by the legislature in a
particular provision
👉 Hill v. William (1949)
[Headnote: Meaning should be given to every word in the statute, if

possible——words add something which would not be there if the
words were left out]

👉 Chloro Controls v. Severn Trent Water
[ Headnote: Whether a non-signatory party can be bound by an

arbitration agreement—-every word used in the provision should be
given its due meaning—- in earlier case of Sukanya Holdings the SC
had held that arbitration agreement will only bind the parties that have
entered into the agreement——- party autonomy——Group of
Companies doctrine——in Chloro Controls case the decision of
Sukanya Holdings was overturned, concept of party autonomy diluted
——group of companied doctrine would apply—- also bind non-
signatories—-court interpreted s. 8 vis-a-vis s.45 of A&C Act and
widened the approach——s. 45: “persons claiming
through/under” —-here it includes the non-signatories who are
claiming under the primary agreement——held that in case of s.45
each word has to be given due meaning—interpret in context, give
wider meaning]
HELD: Applying the rule of interpretation that every word used by the
Legislature in a statutory provision should be given its due meaning,
the Supreme Court held that the expression "one of the parties or any
person claiming through or under him" in section 45, is wider than the
word "party" in section 8 of the Act, and therefore not only a party to
the arbitration agreement, but also any person
claiming through or under a party to the arbitration agreement, can
move the court under section 45 to refer the disputes raised before it
to arbitration
[Side note: Group of companies doctrine has developed in

International Context, whereby an arbitration agreement entered into
by a company being one within the group of companies can bind its
non-signatory affiliates or sister/parent concerns if circumstances
demonstrate that the mutual intention of all parties was to bind both
signatories and non signatories]

👉 D Velluswamy v. Patchiamal,2010
[Headnote: 125 CrPC, DMV, live-in relation—-claim of maintenance

for live in partners—-s. 2 (f) of DMV: “domestic relationship” - “in the
nature of marriage”- “shared household”—- Court held that domestic
relation does not only include marriage , but also “in the nature of
marriage”—- S Khushboo v. Kanniamal : held that under DVA live-in
relationship can be covered but not all—- In Velluswamy Case held
that it is not for the courts to legislate /amend the law—thus “live in”
cannot be read into the DVA by the court—only through legislative
process—-remanded to the lower court to determine the nature of
relationship]
[Side note: Palimony (concept evolved in USA)- If man and women

live together for substantial period of time then by fiction it would be
presumed that there exists a contract b/w them which would obligate
the husband to pay palimony if he deserts the wife]
👉 Balwant Kaur v. Charan Singh, 2000
[Headnote: ——widowed daughter—-interpretation of s.14 of Hindu

Adoption and maintenance Act,1956—- s. 14(1): limited estate can
be converted to full ownership but s. 14(2): limited estate cannot be
converted to full estate in case of gifts, acquired property through will
——HC held that this case would fall under s. 14(2)—-SC held that
even before the will the female has right as the widowed daughter—-
pre-existing right in the property during lifetime of father— held that s.
14(1) would be applicable——held that don’t reject the existence of
s.14(1) which is the primary substantive clause]
4. Exceptions/Departure from the Rule:
The Court can correct drafting errors but not redraft the legislation—-object,
purpose should be upheld.

Addition of words when permissible:
when accidentally omitted—where the court feels that words have been
accidentally omitted or that not adopting a construction would deprive
certain existing words of all its meaning, then it is permissible to supply
additional words.
to give effect to intention
mischief rule
purposive construction
necessity
📢 S.S. Kalra v. UOI
[Headnote: Omission of words cannot be supplied by the courts,

however, in certain circumstances courts can supply words which
have been accidentally omitted—- when words are inherently present
in the statement, but not expressly mentioned, then in such cases
they have to be read—- Court held that this would not amount to
legislation/law-making and it simply means that the court attempts to
give a wholistic meaning— however deliberate omissions made by
the legislature cannot be read into the provision by the courts]

👉 Siraj - ul - Haq v. Sunni Central Board, 1959
[Headnote: First applicable rule should be literal construction——

only in case of necessity adopt liberal construction to give full
meaning——- construing section 5(2) of the UP Muslims Waqfs Act,
1936, which provides, "Mutwalli of a waqf or any person interested in
a Waqf"——-Supreme Court interpreted the words "any person
interested in a Waqf" as meaning "any person interested in what is
held to be a waqf"———-where literal meaning of the words used in
a statutory provision would manifestly defeat its object by making a
part of it meaningless and ineffective, it is legitimate and even
necessary to adopt the rule of liberal construction so as to give
meaning to all parts of the provision and to make the whole of it
effective and operative.]
👉 State Bank of Travancore v. Mohammad, 1981
[Headnote: Kerala Agriculture Debt Relief Act———words "any debt

due before the commencement of this Act to any banking company"
as occurring in section 4(1) of the Act were construed by the
Supreme Court to mean "any debt due at and before the
commencement of this Act"— Held that “we see no escape from that
course since that is the only rational manner by which we can give
meaning and content to it, so as to further the object of the Act]
👉 Gujrat Composite Limited v. Ranip Nagarpalika, 2000
[Headnote: Gujrat Gram and Nagar Panchayats Taxes and Rules,

1964——-
entry 70 Schedule I——-one of the items mentioned is "Grog
Minerals". As there is no such mineral as Grog Mineral whereas Grog
and Minerals are known to the technical world the expression "Grog
Minerals" was read to mean "Grog and Minerals" instead of rejecting
it as meaningless.]

👉 Union Bank of India v. Seppo Rally, 1999
[Headnote: Consumer Protection Act 1986——Section 17

constitutes a State Commission for each State but there is no
provision in the Act limiting their territorial jurisdiction——-the
intention of Parliament could not have been that dispute arising in
one State could be taken cognizance of by the State Commission of
another State——applying a purposive construction, limitations of
territorial jurisdiction on the lines provided in section 11 with reference
to District Forums with suitable modifications were read into section
17]
👉 Ramaswamy Nadar v. State of Madras, 1958
[HEADNOTE: When a choice has to be made out of two

constructions, both of which require reading of some additional
words, the court will naturally prefer that which is more in consonance
with reason or justice———construing section 423(i)(a) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1898, which reads: "In an appeal from an
order of acquittal, reverse such order and find him guilty and pass
sentence on him according to law"———question was "find the
accused person guilty of what?——Two constructions were
suggested, one that the sub-section authorizes to find the accused
person guilty "of such offence as has been charged and of which he
has been acquitted" and the other that the sub-section authorizes to
find him guilty "of the offence disclosed". The Supreme Court adopted
the latter construction which was more in consonance with reason or
justice]
Rejection of Words when permissible:

👉 Labour Contact Co-op Society Palikur v Director & Mines of Geology
Hyderabad,
1993
[Headnote: word "within" in rule 12(4) AP Minor Mineral Concession

Rules, 1966 ignored on the ground that it was inappropriate and was
used incautiously by the draftsman]
Treating words/provisions as superfluous
It is only when other provisions of an Act give out that a provision in the Act
owes its origin to a confusion of ideas or to a misunderstanding of the law
or to abundant caution, the court reaches the conclusion that that provision
is superfluous.

MODULE 3 AND MODULE 4
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL AIDS
TO INTERPRETATION
Tags
👉 Judicial Processes and methodological approaches are used by the Judiciary

—-internal and external aids. Undue reliance on external and internal aids is
also not justified
Internal Aids to Interpretation
Long title/Short Title of the Act
1. EXAMPLE: “An act to………”
2. Each and every part of the statute has meaning
3. The long title precedes the preamble. It guide to understand objective,

scope, purpose of the enactment
4. Long title is not an enacting provision —-it is a debated point whether the
long title is part of the enactment —-it is agreed that it is not an
enacting/enabling part and does not create any rights/obligations
5. Long title can be used only in cases of ambiguity to decipher clear meaning.
6. In case of conflict between long title and provision, the provision

(substantive part) will prevail—— long title must not be given undue
importance
7. The Short title simply states the name of the enactment—-long title has
more weightage compared to short title—-short title should not be
unnecessarily relied upon.
MODULE 3 AND MODULE 4 INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL AIDS TO INTERPRETATION 1

[Headnote: Conflict b/w Advocates Act and the rules followed by

Calcutta HC in original side—- advocate not allowed to practice in
original side of HC—- Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in High
Courts) Act, 1951 provides that such Advocates are “entitled as of
right to practice” in any High Court in India—- contended that “right to
practice” has to be interpreted widely to include pleading and
appearing —- held that term “practice” has to be interpreted widely to
including pleading and acting— court read statute as a whole and
considered purpose of enactment— right to practice would be
meaningless in the context of the act if practice would not include
pleading and acting]
[REFERENCE MADE TO LONG TITLE:
”it is now settled law that the title of a statute is an important part of
the Act and may be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining its
general scope and of throwing light its construction, although it
cannot override the clear meaning of the enactment. In the present
case the full title 'of the Act now under consideration runs thus: "An
Act to authorise Advocates of the Supreme Court to practise as
of right in any High Court."——-The language in which- the title of
the Act has been expressed is a good and cogent means of finding
out the true meaning and import of the Act, and, as it were, a key to
the understanding of it—- however matter cannot rest on the title of
the Act alone.”
[REFERENCE MADE TO PUNCTUATION:
”Punctuation is after all a minor element in the construction of a

statute, and very little attention is paid to it by English Courts…. It
seems, however, that in the vellum copies printed since 1850, there
are some cases of punctuation, and when they occur they can be

looked upon as a sort of contemporanea expositio…. When a statute
is carefully punctuated and there is doubt about its meaning, a weight
should undoubtedly be given to punctuation
—. I need not deny that punctuation may have its uses in some
cases, but it cannot certainly be regarded as a controlling element
and cannot be allowed to control the plain meaning of a text.]
Preamble
A. PREAMBLE AS AN AID TO INTERPRET THE CONSTITUTION
1. Preamble is part of the Constitution [Earlier there was a conflict wherein

the SC in the case In re Berubari Case held that Preamble not part of
the Constitution. However Keshavananda Bharti Case it was held that
preamble is a (part of the constitution) ]
2. The Preamble of the Constitution like the Preamble of any statute

furnishes the key to open the mind of the makers of the Constitution
more so because the Constituent Assembly took great pains in
formulating it so that it may reflect the essential features and basic
objectives of the Constitution.
3. The Constitution, including the Preamble, must be read as a whole and

in case of doubt interpreted consistent with its basic structure to
promote the great objectives stated in the Preamble.
4. But the Preamble can neither be regarded as the source of any

substantive power nor as a source of any prohibition or limitation.
5. The Preamble of a Constitution Amendment Act can be used to

understand the object of the amendment.
6. In plethora of cases—-preamble is used as an aid to constitutional

interpretation (socio-economic justice) (part III and IV read with
preamble) [ Minerva Mills Case , Keshvananda Bharti Case ] The majority
judgments in Keshavananda and Minerva Mills strongly relied upon the
Preamble in reaching the conclusion that the power of amendment
conferred by Article 368 was limited and did not enable Parliament to
alter the basic structure or framework of the Constitution.

B. PREAMBLE AS AN AID TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
1. The Preamble of the Act gives information regarding the purpose of the
legislation——-The true nature and character of Act is reflected in the
preamble of the Act.
2. But, unlike the constitution, in case of statutory enactments, preamble is

not present in all enactments—-it is considered part of the statute
——”admissible aid to construction”
3. Preamble is not enabling/enacting part—-it has no substantive value
4. Preamble explains the objective, purpose—- background of the statute

and remedies——more detailed than the long title
5. Preamble is used to decide the intent of the legislation—key to open the

mind of the framers
6. The preamble cannot be used in those cases where the enactment

talks about qualifications/exceptions from the general purpose of the act
—-in exception clauses the preamble cannot be referred to ascertain
the intent—-cannot guide in such cases as the preamble is “generally
worded”
7. Only in those cases when it conveys a clear and definitive meaning in

comparison to the indefinite words of the provision, the preamble may
be resorted to. The act should be read as a whole to decide whether
part of the statute is clear/ambiguous and when preamble aids
regarding the clarity only then it can be resorted to—only when
preamble substantiates the understanding

👉 M/s Burrakur Coal Co. Ltd. v. UOI
[HEADNOTE:
The Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act,

1957—-preamble indicated that the act was for the acquisition by
the State of unworked land containing or likely to contain coal
deposits——Central Government published a notification
in respect of an area in which the petitioners had acquired mining
rights—- the petitioners challenged the validity of the notification
on the ground that the preamble of the Act and argued that the
Act was applicable only to unworked mines which must mean
virgin lands,, and not to those which were being worked at the
time of notification or which were worked in the past. ——HELD
that the expression "unworked land" occurring in the preamble
of the Act includes dormant mines—-the preamble of this Act
need not be resolved to for construing its provisions and in
particular for understanding the meaning of the word "land" used
in the Act; that even if the preamble is taken into consideration
the expression "unworked land" occurring in the preamble should
be given its ordinary meaning, that is to say, land which was not
being worked at the time of the notification issued under the Act,
which would include dormant mines]
Where the object or meaning of a enactment is not clear, the

preamble may be resorted to to explain it. However, Where the
language of the act is clear the preamble may be disregarded—-
where very general language is used, but it is clear that the act is
intended to have a limited application, the preamble may be used
to indicate what particular instances the enactment intends to
apply to——not start with the preamble, first read enabling
provision to determine the intended application (broad/narrow)
——Act to be read as a whole—-the words of the section must be
the first guided and only after ascertaining this the preamble
should be resorted to—-there can be additional rules/notifications

etc., thus the long title and preamble may not cover all aspects as
they are generally worded]
👉 Sardar Inder Singh v. State of Rajasthan
[HEADNOTE: Ordinances—-whether the proclamation of

extension of law is a delegated or conditional legislation—-
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court examined the provision
contained in Section 3(1) of the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants)
Ordinance, 1949, which, inter alia, provided that it shall come into
force at once, and shall remain in force for a period of two years
unless this period is further extended by the Rajpramukh by
notification—-relied on Preamble for interpretation]
Heading/Title of the Provision
1. Heading can be used as an internal aid to construction —-debated to what

extent
2. The key is to try and decipher what kind of intention has to be undertaken
and the heading must only be relied on when there is
inconsistency/absurdity/ambiguity
3. Heading and marginal note may be relied to clear the doubt/ambiguity —-

discern the legislative intent—when the section is clear and unambiguous
the heading will not play a crucial role—-undue reliance on headings not to
be given
4. the title of the chapter cannot be legitimately used to restrict the plain terms
of an enactment.
5. if the import of section is broad/narrow, the heading cannot be relied on to

make the section otherwise
6. Headings which are prefixed to sections cannot control the plain words—
they cannot be referred when the words used are clear and unambiguous

—they can only be used in case of ambiguity and that too it cannot be used
for cutting down the wide application of clear words in the provision
7. It is permissible to assign limited role to the heading/titles—they can be

seen as a broad indicator of the subject matter
8. In case of a conflict between the plain meaning and the heading, the plain
meaning which is easily discernable from the provisions would prevail

👉 Frick India Ltd. v. UOI, 1990
[HEADNOTE:
Appellant-company was engaged in the manufacturing of air
conditioning and refrigeration equipment, The issue was whether the
fact that manufacturer supplies the refrigerating or air-conditioning
appliances as a complete unit or not is relevant for the levy of duty on
the parts specified in sub-item (3) of Item 29-A." It was argued that
though sub-item (3) may appear to cover all and
every part of refrigerating and air-conditioning appliances
and machinery of all sorts, the words "and parts thereof" in
the heading controlled the meaning and restrict it in the context
only to parts of a completed unit which would have come under sub-
items (1) and (2) of item 29-A.
HELD THAT "It is well settled that the headings prefixed to sections
or entries cannot control the plain words of the provision; they cannot
also be referred to for the purpose of construing the provision when
the words used in the provision are clear and unambiguous; nor can
they be used for cutting down in the plain meaning of the words in the
provisions. Only, in the case of ambiguity or doubt the heading or
sub-heading may be referred to as an aid in construing the provision
but even in such a case it could not be used for cutting down the wide
application of the clear words used in the provision. Sub-item (3) so
construed is wide in its application and all parts of refrigerating and
air-conditioning appliances and machines whether they are covered
or not covered under sub-items (1) and (2) would be clearly covered
under that sub-item. Therefore, whether the manufacturer supplies
the refrigerating or air-conditioning appliances as a complete unit or
not is not relevant for the levy of duty on the parts specified in sub-
item (3) of Item 29-A."

👉 UOI v. National Federation of Blind, 2013
[HEADNOTE: s. 33 of Person with Disabilities Act, 1995

—-”Reservation of Posts” (Heading)—-the issue was whether
reservations should apply to posts or vacancies only——held that the
intention of legislature would not be with respect to posts despite the
heading—-court treated as vacancies—-court set aside reliance on
heading—-the section is of broad import and the heading cannot be
used to narrow the import of the section—-”The heading of a Section
or marginal note may be relied upon to clear any doubt or ambiguity
in the interpretation of the provision and to discern the legislative
intent. However, when the Section is clear and unambiguous, there is
no need to traverse beyond those words, hence, the headings or
marginal notes cannot control the meaning of the body of the section.
Therefore, the contention of Respondent No. 1 herein that the
heading of Section 33 of the Act is “Reservation of posts” will not play
a crucial role, when the Section is clear and unambiguous.”
Marginal notes
1. The law is not settled on whether marginal notes can be an aid of

interpretation—-debatable if they can be authoritatively relied on for the
purpose of interpretation —there are conflicting decisions
2. marginal notes to give basic idea regarding the section
3. marginal notes solely cannot be relied on and it must be used with other
aids

👉 Deewan Singh v. Rajindra AR Devi , 2007
[HEADNOTE: Although there is no ambiguity, even if there be any,

the marginal note may be taken into consideration for the purpose of
proper construction of the provision.]
Punctuations & Brackets
1. Earlier the statutes did not have punctuations—modern statutes are

punctuated and these punctuations are relied upon for interpretation.
2. if a statute is revised and re-enacted but the section under construction in

the revised statute is brought in identical terms as in the old statute except
as to variation of some punctuation, that in itself will not be indicative of any
intention on the part of the Legislature to change the law as understood
under the old section
👉 Mohammad Shabir v. State of Maharashtra, 1979
[HEADNOTE: s. 27 of Drugs and Cosmetics Act—court relied on

intention and punctuation— By this section whoever "manufactures
for sale, sells, stocks or exhibits or sale or distributes" a drug without
a licence, is liable for punishment. In holding that mere stocking is not
an offence within the section, the Supreme Court pointed out the
presence of comma after "manufactures for sale" and "sells" and
absence of any comma after "stocks". It was, therefore, held that only
stocking for sale could amount to offence and not mere stocking.]

[Headnote: Conflict b/w Advocates Act and the rules followed by

Calcutta HC in original side—- advocate not allowed to practice in
original side of HC—- Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in High
Courts) Act, 1951 provides that such Advocates are “entitled as of
right to practice” in any High Court in India—- contended that “right to
practice” has to be interpreted widely to include pleading and
appearing —- held that term “practice” has to be interpreted widely to
including pleading and acting— court read statute as a whole and
considered purpose of enactment— right to practice would be
meaningless in the context of the act if practice would not include
pleading and acting]
[REFERENCE MADE TO PUNCTUATION:
”Punctuation is after all a minor element in the construction of a

statute, and very little attention is paid to it by English Courts…. It
seems, however, that in the vellum copies printed since 1850, there
are some cases of punctuation, and when they occur they can be
looked upon as a sort of contemporanea expositio…. When a statute
is carefully punctuated and there is doubt about its meaning, a weight
should undoubtedly be given to punctuation
—. I need not deny that punctuation may have its uses in some
cases, but it cannot certainly be regarded as a controlling element
and cannot be allowed to control the plain meaning of a text.]

👉 Gujrat Composite Limited v. Ranip Nagarpalika, 2000
Headnote: Gujrat Gram and Nagar Panchayats Taxes and Rules,

1964——- entry 70 Schedule I——-one of the items mentioned is
"Grog Minerals". As there is no such mineral as Grog Mineral
whereas Grog and Minerals are known to the technical world the
expression "Grog Minerals" was read to mean "Grog and Minerals"
instead of rejecting it as meaningless.]
Illustrations
1. Illustrations which are appended to a section form part of the statute and
although forming no part of the section, they are yet of relevance and value
and shouldn’t be rejected as repugnant to the section
2. Illustrations cannot be used to curtail the meaning/scope or modify the

application of the section—it cannot add/omit
3. Illustration cannot have an effect to control the real content of the section
and must give way in case of repugnance with the text of the section
4. Illustrations are not generally used in modern statutes
5. if illustration is in conflict with section whose words are unambiguous and

clear —then the illustration has to be set aside —it cannot be used to
modify the meaning of the section as intended by the legislature —main
section would prevail

👉 Shambhu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer, 1956
[HEADNOTE: Illustration does not exhaust the full content of the

section which it illustrates—-It can neither curtail nor expand the
ambit and scope of the provision]
The appellant was put up for trial under s. 420 IPC and s. 5(2) of
the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1947—- prosecution relied on
Illustration (b) to s. 106 of the Evidence Act and contended that it
was for the appellant to prove that he had actually paid the
second class fares—-HELD that Illustration (b) to s. 106 of the
Evidence Act had no application, the evidence adduced by the
prosecution did not warrant a conviction and the accused should,
having regard to the long lapse of time, be acquitted. That
illustrations to a section do not exhaust its full content even as they
cannot curtail or expand its ambit. ]
Definitions
1. Same term can be defined differently in different acts—example:

“information” under RTI and IT Act
2. The specific definition will guide regarding the context of the act—
interpretation may be broad /narrow—the context of use of the definition
varies, and the term might have different meaning depending upon the
context.
3. The definition has to be read in the context—should not be interpreted in a

way that it conflicts—instead it must supplant to the other provisions
4. In the case of the definition sections, the role of the court is to determine its
usage
5. definitions could have either extensive (broad) or restrictive/exhaustive

(narrow) import—-this will guide the interpretation
(beneficial/liberal/literal/strict).

6. if extensive definition is used as in case of Labor legislation then intention
would be liberal/beneficial
“means” / “means and includes”
The definition is exhaustive/restrictive if the word “means” is used in the

definition. For example , s. 2(f) of DV Act.
If the definition uses “means and includes” then it would be a

restrictive/exhaustive definition

👉 Mahalakshmi Oil Mills v. State of AP, 1989
[HEADNOTE:
The appellant-assessee claimed that tobacco seed oil and
tobacco seed cake, being forms of tobacco, were entitled to
exemption under section 8, read with entry 7 of the Fourth
Schedule, of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957,
which confers exemption from sales tax in respect of certain
goods including `tobacco'------ as per the definition of Tobacco
under the Act (”tobacco means…….. and includes…..”)---issue is
whether tobacco seeds are included in the definition--held that
tobacco seeds are not covered---The definition consists of two
separate parts which specify what the expression means and
also what it includes. The joint use of the words "mean and
include" makes the definition exhaustive---strict interpretation—-
taxing statute—if it has to be included then it is in the domain of
legislature]
" ISSUE was whether the words tobacco' and any form of
tobacco' in the first part of the definition be given a wider meaning
and read as including the seeds also, particularly as it talks of
tobacco in any form, cured or uncured, manufactured or
unmanufactured? Court held that The expression used in the
first part of the definition, though very wide, is, therefore,
singularly inappropriate to take within its purview tobacco seeds
as well. Secondly, the definition occurs in a statute levying excise
duty which is concerned not with the parts of a plant grown on the
field but with the use to which those parts are put or can be put
after severance-----we agree with the High Court that tobacco
seed once it is separated from the plant, is an item entirely
different from tobacco and does not fall within the expression
`tobacco or any form of tobacco'."

👉 Thalappalam Service Cooperative Bank v. State of Kerala
[HEADNOTE: s. 2(h) RTI—-most contentious section—-”public

authority means…..”—issue was will Thalappalam bank fall under
public authority—-court held that it does not fall under the Act
—-”means” is used—-restrictive meaning—-RTI Act will not apply
to Thalappalam Bank]
👉 State of West Bengal v. Associated contractors, 2015
[HEADNOTE: S. 2(1)(e) A&C Act—-definition of

“COURT”—”mean…….includes…”—-issue was whether court
includes SC—held that not included—”means and includes” have
restrictive import]
“includes”/ “to apply and to include”
If the definition uses “includes” then it is an extensive definition—-

inclusive definition —-not confined to only specific.
If the definition uses “to apply and to include” then it is an extensive

definition-broader connotation
The words “includes” in interpretation clauses enlarges the meaning of

words /phrases used and when it is so used the words/phrases must be
construed as comprehending not only such things as they signify in
their natural import but also those things which the interpretation clause
declares that they shall include—-not confined to those words/phrases
expressly used
When the term is defined in a restrictive way and the intention to restrict
the meaning is clear—-”includes” cannot be used to broaden the
meaning as the same is not intended by the legislature
“includes” cannot be used to stretch the meaning to include

circumstances not covered if the meaning is restricted even if the word
“includes” is used.

The definition section may also include “deemed to include” or
“deemed” in inclusive and extensive definitions—-used to create legal
fiction to bring within the word something which according to the
ordinary meaning is not included within it.
👉 Carter v. Brad Beer, 1975
[HEADNOTE: s. 20 of Licensing Act—- term “BAR” defined as

“includes a place…..”——the issue was whether the counters
used for serving liquor could be categorized as a bar—-held that
“includes” is used which has broader import—-thus bar also
includes counter where liquor is served]

👉 State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha
[HEADNOTE:
This case involved payment of retrenchment compensation to
workmen in JJ Hospitals, Mumbai. The Management pleaded
that the Hospital was not involved in any trade or business and
hence they are not industry. High Court of Bombay held that the
administration of a hospital didn’t fall under the meaning of
‘Industry’ as provided under the Act.——Section 2(j) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 defines ‘industry’ as any
business, trade, undertaking, manufacture, or calling of
employers and includes any calling, service, employment,
handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen”—
issue before the Supreme Court—-Whether Hospitals come
within the ambit of definition of an ‘Industry’ and thus the
provisions of the Act would Apply——
HELD THAT:
The services in the hospital were held to be material service and

hence Hospitals are industry under the Industrial Disputes Act.
1. The words used in the definition of the term are very wide in
their import. The Court opined that if there is such deliberate
usage of words of such wide import, then prima facie, it is
necessary to abide by interpretation of such wide connotation
—--inclusive definition—-extensive/broader interpretation is
to be given.
2. In the present appeal, the Court relied upon an inclusive

interpretation of Section 2(j) to mean that the words are used
in an inclusive definitive way denoting an extension; therefore
the meaning of the words cannot be restricted in any sense.
The Court further used the principle of ‘noscitur a sociis’ to

determine whether Hospitals would form part of Industry or not.

1. The Court referred to Maxwell’s definition of the principle,
which states that the meaning of an unclear or ambiguous
word in a statute should be determined by considering the
words with which it is associated in the context. This principle
aims to define the more general words of a statute within the
ambit of the meanings of more narrow and specific words.
2. The Court was of the opinion that noscitur a sociis is merely a

rule of construction which can be applied where the meaning
of words of wider import has to be ascertained or the
intention of the Legislature is doubtful.
3. meanings of such words wide in their import, shouldn’t be

qualified or cut down by their being associated with other
words.
4. philosophy behind the principle of noscitur a sociis is that the

meaning of doubtful words may be ascertained by reference
to the meaning of words it associates itself with.
👉 Delhi Judicial Services v. State of Gujrat, 1991
[HEADNOTE: Article 129—-”including the power to punish for

contempt of itself”—-can this be extended to punishing of
subordinate courts—-held not to limit the inherent power of the
SC to punish for contempt of itself and also of subordinate courts
—-supervision/power of judicial superintendence of subordinate
courts——extraordinary circumstances SC can punish for
contempt of itself and also the subordinate courts—-held instant
case is of exceptional circumstance]
“means but not limited to” versus “means and limited to”
“means but not limited to” has a extensive/wide import
“means and limited to” has a restrictive import

“unless the context otherwise requires”
when the word defined is subject to the context, then the context makes
the definition—-where the context makes the definition given in the
interpretation clause inapplicable, then the defined word used in the
body of the statute may be given a meaning different from the one used
in the interpretation clause
All definitions are subject to certain qualifications—-no definition is

uniformly applied—-in different contexts words can have different
meaning—this inherent qualification will always exist.
👉 National Insurance Co. ltd. v. Kirpal Singh, 2014
[HEADNOTE: Pension scheme 1995—para 2—”in this scheme

unless the context otherwise requires”—-held that the scheme is
a beneficial legislation—thus considering the context wider
interpretation has to be given—the words “unless context
otherwise requires” will not restrict a beneficial legislation as the
intent of the legislature could not have been to have a narrow or
restrictive interpretation——when the legislature intends to give
broad meaning the phrase “unless the context otherwise
requires” cannot be used to restrict the import which ideally the
legislature does not intend to restrict.
In case of Ambiguous Definition
if the definition is ambiguous / there is lack of clarity regarding the

interpretation/scope/object/ambit then the court must see the language
employed in the enactment, nature of the statute—read the statute as a
whole in its context
In case of absurdity arising out of literal meaning used in the

enactment, it has to be interpreted using other provisions of the Act,
ordinary connotation (dictionary meaning)

📢 IMP Bangalore
548
Water Supply and Sewerage Board v A Rajappa, AIR 1978 SC
[HEADNOTE: The case dealt with the interpretation of the definition

of “industry” under Industrial Disputes Act, 1947—-3 tests to
determine if it is an industry: (1) systemic industry (2) organization by
cooperation b/w employer and employee (3) for production and
distribution of goods and services to satisfy human wants and desires
(not inclusive of religious or spiritual goods)—— SC refused to accept
the narrow meaning of definition of Industry &
has recognized the wider definition of Industry—-wide words may be
given a limited meaning having regard to the context as a whole—-
however it will not be correct to say that a wide word in an inclusive
definition should be given limited scope by reference merely to the
ordinary meaning of the word defined—-variety of definitions can be
associated with a word—-to ascertain exact usage of the term—rely
on the context, scheme, language, and object—these four
cumulatively guide regarding the meaning that would be appropriate
out of the variety of definitions.

👉 Hariprashad Shivshankar v. AD Divikar, 1957
[HEADNOTE: The issue before the court was whether the definition
of retrenchment in section 2(00) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
goes beyond the ordinary notion of retrenchment to include the
termination of service of all workmen in an industry when the industry
itself ceases to exist on a bona fide closure or discontinuance of
business by the employer. The Apex Could answered the question in
the negative on the authority—— that the words "for any reason
whatsoever" used in the definition would not include a bona fide
closure of the whole business because "it would be against the entire
scheme of the Act to give the definition clause relating to
retrenchment such a meaning as would include within the definition
termination of service of all workmen by the employer when the
business itself ceases to exist".
👉 Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. v. Registrar of Restrictive Trade

agreements, 1977
”The definition of restrictive trade practice is an exhaustive and not

an inclusive one. The decision whether a trade practice is restrictive
or not has to be arrived at by applying the rule of reason and not on
doctrine that any restriction as to area or price will per se be a
restrictive trade practice. The question in each case is whether
the restraint is such as regulates and thereby promotes competition
or whether it is such may suppress or even destroy competition.
To determine this question three matters are to be considered,
namely, (1) what facts are peculiar to the business to which the
restraint is applied, (2) what was the condition before and after the
restraint was imposed, and (3) what was the nature of the restraint
and what was its actual and probable effect.”

Proviso clauses
1. “provided that”
2. When one finds a proviso to a section the natural presumption is that, but
for the proviso, the enacting part of the section would have included the
subject-matter of the proviso.
3. The proper function of a proviso is to except and to deal with a case which
would otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment,
and its effect is confined to that case.
4. The proviso may be "a qualification of the preceding enactment which is

expressed in terms too general to be quite accurate".
5. As a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify or create an

exception to what is in the enactment, and ordinarily, a proviso is not
interpreted as stating a general rule.
6. The proviso clauses create certain exception to the main general rule
7. proviso clauses can never be interpreted to extend the scope of the main
section. It also cannot be used to tone down the scope/limit the scope
unnecessarily. The court must give effect to the intention—if the intent is to
give wide interpretation, judges cannot use proviso to limit.
8. proviso can also be qualifying in nature
9. proviso may also give clarity regarding the situations in which the main
enacting section will be operative
10. proviso is a part of the section—-however the proviso is not the enacting
part—in case of conflict between the proviso and enacting part—
Harmonious construction to identify the exemptions—proviso has to be
balanced with the enacting part
11. when there is conflict between two proviso , then the later proviso would
prevail as it better reflects the intent of legislature
12. As a matter of general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment to

qualify/create an exception to what is in the enactment—-ordinarily the
proviso is not interpreted as laying down a general rule

Proviso Not to be construed as excluding or adding something by
implication—when the language of the main enactment is clear and
unambiguous, a proviso can have no repercussion on the interpretation of the
main enactment so as to exclude from it by implication what clearly falls within
its express terms——-
in such cases where the proviso is given in a section and it expressly

provides for something, then exceptions cannot be read in by
necessary implication-cannot broaden the scope of the proviso—the
proviso has to be read as it is.
👉 TN Kanniyan v. ITO Pondicherry, 1968
[Headnote: By Article 240(1) of the Constitution, power is

conferred on the President "to make Regulations for the peace,
progress and good Government" of the Union territories. There is
a proviso appended to Article 240(1) which directs that the
President shall not
make any regulation after the Constitution of a Legislature of a
Union territory for that Union territory. It was contended on the
basis of the proviso that the power of the President is co-
extensive with the power of the Legislature which may be
constituted for a Union territory and hence the President's power
to make regulations is limited to subjects falling within the
Concurrent and State List. This argument was negated on the
reasoning that the enacting part of Article 240(1) in plain terms
confers plenary powers of making regulations which are not
curtailed by the proviso——held that the proviso cannot be
interpreted broadly to create a fetter—proviso will not act as a
fetter on the power of the president—proviso cannot read in
impliedly an exception which the proviso expressly doesn’t
provide for.
Proviso must be Construed in relation to the section or sections to which it

is appended

It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that a proviso to a particular
provision of a statute only embraces the field which is covered by the
main provision. It carves out an exception to the main provision to
which it has been enacted as a proviso and to no other
It is a fundamental rule of construction that proviso must be considered

in relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso

👉 IMP: Delhi Metro Rail Corporation v. Tarun Pal Singh, (2018)
“As per section 24 of LARR, In case of land acquisition

proceedings, initiated under the 1894 Act, wherein an award has
been made within 5 years or more prior to the commencement of
the 2013 Act, if physical possession has not been taken or
compensation has not been paid, then the said proceedings shall
be deemed to have lapsed. The proviso to sub-section (2) makes
it clear that when the award has been made and, compensation
in respect of majority of holdings has not been deposited in the
account of beneficiaries the
acquisition would not lapse. However, all the beneficiaries shall
be entitled to enhanced compensation under the 2013 Act—-held
that This proviso is to be necessarily part of sub-section (2) of
Section 24
only. The legislative intention is clear that it is enacted as proviso
to Section 24(2), and otherwise also if read as if it were a proviso
to Section 24(1) (b), it would create repugnancy with the said
provision and the provisions of Section 24(1)(b)—- The proviso
appended to Section 24(2) indicates that it carves out an
exception for a situation where the land acquisition proceedings
shall not be
deemed to lapse. Thus, for the applicability of the proviso, a case
has to be covered by Section 24(2) i.e. award has been made
five years or more prior to the enforcement of the 2013 Act——
proviso appended to a provision has to be specifically interpreted
in the
manner so as to enable the field which is covered by the main
provision. The proviso is only an exception to the main provision
to which it has been enacted and no other. The proviso deals with
a situation which takes something out of the main enactment to
provide a particular course of action, which course of action could
not have been adopted in the absence of the proviso—-
contended that the amount has not been deposited with respect
to majority of holding in the account of the beneficiaries, the

acquisition stands
lapsed—-held that proviso to Section 24(2) is not applicable in
the instant case, same is applicable where the award had been
passed 5
years before. In a case where award has been passed within 5
years, the said proviso of Section 24(2) cannot be said to be
applicable. The submission made on the basis of the proviso
cannot be said to be sustainable.]
👉 Shrimati Vijaya Lakshmamma v. BT Shankar, 2001
[HEADNOTE: The proviso and the Explanation appended to

section 7 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 were
not permitted to be read in section 8 of the Act in support of the
argument that when there are two widows, adoption by one
widow can be made only with the consent of her co-widow—-
Court reasoned that Proviso must be Construed in relation to the
section or sections to which it is appended]

👉 State of Punjab v Kailash Nath, 1989
[HEADNOTE: Rule 2.2 of the Punjab Civil Service Rules which

reserves to the Government the right to withhold or withdraw a
pension or part of it or to order recovery from it if the pensioner is
subsequently found guilty of grave misconduct or negligence
during the period of his service in a departmental or judicial
proceeding—-proviso reads—”No such judicial proceeding if not
instituted while the officer was in service—shall be
instituted in respect of a cause of action which arose or an event
which took place more than four years before such institution.”—-
HELD that the proviso had to be read as an exception to the main
provision meaning that if the judicial proceeding is not instituted
within the period mentioned in the proviso, the Government will
not have the right to withhold or
withdraw the pension and that the proviso does not provide a
general embargo on the prosecution of the officer after the expiry
of that period]
Proviso must be used as guide to construction of enactment—-If the

enacting portion of a section is not clear, a proviso appended to it may give an
indication as to its true meaning
There is no doubt that where the main provision is clear, its effect
cannot be cut down by the proviso. But where it is not clear, the proviso,
which cannot be presumed to be a surplusage, can properly be looked
into to ascertain the meaning and scope of the main
provision
Proviso at times may be added to allay fears
The general rule in construing an enactment containing a proviso is to

construe them together without making either of them redundant or
otiose.
Even if the enacting part is clear effort is to be made to give some

meaning to the proviso and to justify its necessity.

But a clause or a section worded as a proviso, may not be a true
proviso and may have been placed by way of abundant caution. In such
cases the proviso has no effect whatsoever on the enactment and
"cannot be relied on as controlling the operative words." But such a
construction if appears, will be reached only when the operative words
of the enactment are abundantly clear.
There have been exceptional circumstances where proviso have created a

fresh enacting part
👉 State of Orissa v Debaki Debi, 1964
[HEADNOTE: held by the Supreme Court that the period of

limitation contained in the proviso in sub-section (6) of section 12
of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, was an independent legislative
provision and applied both to original assessments as well as to
assessments made in appeal or revision]
Distinction between proviso, exception and saving clause
PROVISO EXCEPTION SAVING CLAUSE
"Proviso", is
used to remove
"Saving Clause" is used to
special cases "Exception" is intended to
preserve from destruction of
from the general restrain the enacting clause to
certain rights, remedies or
enactment and particular cases
privileges already existing
provide for them
specially
expressio unius expressio unius est exclusio

est exclusio alterius whatever not included ,
alterius deemed to be excluded An
whatever not exception affirms that the
included , things not exempted are
deemed to be covered under the main
excluded provision. In case the case of a
repugnancy between an

operating part and an
exception, the operative part
must be relied upon, however
some judgements have
dwelled upon the Principle that
the exception being the later
will of the legislature must
prevail over the substantive
portion the enactment.
Exceptions have to be strictly
interpreted—cannot
narrow/broaden the scope. In
case of conflict between
exception and main provision—
balancing/ harmonizing In
Director of Secondary Education
v. Pushpendara Kumar, 1998[

general provisions providing for
appointment on the post by
following a particular procedure
—-exception provision enables
appointment being made
without following the said
procedure—- it is in the nature
of an exception to the general
provisions. An exception
cannot subsume the main
provision to which it is an
exception and thereby nullify
the main provision by taking
away completely the right
conferred by the main
provision. Care has, therefore,
to be taken that a provision for
grant of compassionate
employment, which is in the
nature of an exception to the
general provisions, does not
unduly interfere with the right of
other persons who are eligible
for appointment of seek

employment against the post
which would have been
available to them, but for the
provision enabling appointment
being made on compassionate
grounds of the dependent of a
deceased employee.] Collector
of Customs v. M/s Modi Rubber,
1999 [ Customs Tariff Act—-

Exemption Notification—-
principal clause of this
notification 'exempts raw
rubber, natural or synthetic
rubber, latex, natural or
synthetic "—— makes a
distinction between rubber,
natural or synthetic, and latex,
natural or synthetic——-clause
1A of notification says that the
said notification shall not apply
to "styrene butadiene rubber
and oil extended styrene
butadiene rubber" that means
clause1A it covers the rubber
but not the latex—-contended
that styrene butadiene rubber
referred to in clause 1A of the
said notification should also be
read as covering latex—-held
that it would not be read as
including latex— Clause 1A of
the said notification is in the
nature of an exception to the
principal clause thereof and
must be construed with regard
to that principal clause.
Explanation

An explanation is appended to a section to explain the meaning
of words contained in the section—it is a part of the enactment
in case of conflict b/w Explanation and main enacting part, then enacting
part would prevail
Explanation gives clarification
The object of explanation is to understand the act in the light of explanation

provided therein.
Explanation doesn’t enlarge the scope of original Section which it explains

but only
makes the meaning clear
explanation is not a substantive part—doesn’t exist independently.

👉 PURPOSE OF EXPLANATION [ Sundaram
(1985) ]
Pillai v. Patta Biraman
(a) to explain the meaning and intendment of the Act itself,
(b) where there is any obscurity or vagueness in the main enactment,

to clarify the same so as to make it consistent with the dominant
object which it seems to subserve.
(c) to provide an additional support to the dominant object of the Act

in order to make it meaningful and purposeful,
(d) an Explanation cannot in any way interfere with or change the

enactment or any part thereof but where some gap is left which is
relevant for the purpose of the Explanation, in order to suppress the
mischief and advance the object of the Act it can help or assist the
court in interpreting the true purport and intendment of
the enactment, and
(e) it cannot, however, take away a statutory right with which any
person under a statute has been clothed or set at naught the working
of an Act by becoming an hindrance in the interpretation of the same.
👉 Sulochana Amma v Narayanan Nair, 1994
[Explanation VIII to section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, has

been construed to promote the object for which it was inserted viz.,
that an issue once decided by a competent court should not be
litigated over again even though the court deciding it was a court of
"limited jurisdiction" not competent to decide the subsequent suit.
Consistent with this object the words "a court of limited jurisdiction"
were construed as wide enough to include a court whose jurisdiction
is subject to pecuniary limitation.]

Schedules/ Order/Rules/Forms
1. part of the statute
2. are added to avoid excessive detail in the section
3. schedules detail out the procedure
4. can be transitory .- Ex: 9th Schedule Constitution, Govt of India Act, 1935.
5. Schedule could contain detailing-forms, transitory provisions, rules , detail

out the requirements according to local needs.
6. Schedule may contain Substantive parts - schedule may go beyond the

section as it may have connection with other sections as well
7. in case of conflict the section (main body of enactment would Prevail over
the
Schedule.
Statement of object and reasons
a. Subject matter and object
1. The words of a statute, when there is a doubt to their meaning, are to

be understood in the sense in which they best harmonize with the
subject of the enactment and the object which the Legislature has in
view—-effectuates the object of the Legislature.—-when there is
conflict, balance with the subject matter/object of the act
2. subject matter is to be ascertained from the terms of the enactment
3. This object oriented approach however, cannot be carried to the extent

of doing violence to the plain language used by rewriting a section or
substituting words in place of actual words used by the legislature.

👉 U.P Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v. Brij Kishore, 1988 [Headnote: Court
was concerned with the interpretation of the term “landless
person”— purpose of the act was to distribute to landless
peasants —- applying “Linga Principle” court interpreted “landless
person” to refer to landless peasants only and not to landless
businessmen—- when narrow v. wide interpretation is possible,
court must go with the interpretation that is in consonance with
the purpose of the legislation— fundamental principle that
statute has to be read as a whole to determine the context behind
the usage of a particular word.
👉 Workmen of Dimakuchi v. Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, 1958
[Section 2(k) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, interpretation of the

term “any person” used in the definition of the term “industrial
dispute”—-expression “any person” can’t mean anybody in this
whole wide world because the subject matter of dispute must
relate to employment or non-employment or terms of employment
or conditions of labor of any person and these necessarily import
a limitation on the term “any person”. Also the definition clause
must be read in the context of the subject matter and scheme of
the Act, and consistently with the objects and other provisions of
the Act. If the term “any person” is given its ordinary meaning,
then the definition clause will be so wide as to become
inconsistent not merely with the objects and other provisions of
the Act, but also with the other parts of that very clause——held
that the words “any person” cannot have its widest amplitude, as
that would create incongruity and repugnancy in the provisions of
the Act.]

👉 Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386
[HEADNOTE: interpretation of Section 235(2) of Criminal

Procedure Code, 1973—-whether mandatory or directory—- SC
held that section was mandatory and that it was not only confined
to oral hearing, but was also intended to give an opportunity to
the prosecution and the accused to place before the court facts
and material related to various factors bearing on the question of
sentence, and if they are contested by either side, then to
produce evidence for the same.
👉 Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 3 SCC 92
[HEADNOTE: Section 319 of Cr.PC., the Court can exercise its

power to summon a person other than the accused under this
provision. The Court further held that even though a person may
not be named in the FIR or in the charge-sheet, or though
named in the FIR, has not named in the main part of the charge-
sheet, can also be summoned under Section 319 of Cr.PC.
However, a person discharged cannot be summoned directly
under this provision—-court referred to the subject matter and
object of the provision]

👉 K Prabhakaran v. P Jayarajan, (2005) 1 SCC 754
[HEADNOTE: Section 8, Representation of Peoples Act, 1951

——In Section 8(3) of the RPA, the word 'any' has been used as
an adjective qualifying the word 'offence' to suggest not the
number of offence but the nature of the offence—-' The use of
adjective 'any' qualifying the noun 'offence' cannot be pressed in
service to countenance the submission that the sentence of
imprisonment for not less than two years must be in respect of a
single offence——It is also well-settled that such interpretation
has to be avoided as would result in creating confusion, anomaly,
uncertainty and practical difficulties in the working of any system.
When a word is not defined in the Act itself, it is permissible to
refer to dictionaries to find out the general sense in which that
word is understood in common parlance. However, in selecting
one out of the various meanings of a word, regard must always
be had to the context as it is a fundamental rule that "the
meanings of words and expressions used in an Act must take
their colour from the context in which they appear". Therefore,
"when the context makes the meaning of a word quite clear, it
becomes unnecessary to search for and select a particular
meaning out of the diverse meanings.
4. Mischief rule and Purposive rule also envisage that the interpretation
must be in due regard to the subject matter/objective of the act
When the material words are capable of bearing two or more

constructions the most established rule for construction of such
words can be referred from Heydon’s Case.
The mischief rule enables consideration of four matters in

construing an Act : a) What was the law before making of the act;
b) What was the mischief or defect for which the law did not
provide; c) What is the remedy that the Act has provided d) What is
the reason behind that remedy. The rule then directs that the courts
must adopt the construction which “shall suppress the mischief and
advance the remedy.

👉 imp**** RMDC v. Union of India, AIR 1957
[HEADNOTE: contention of the petitioners was that the term

‘prize competition’ as defined under Sec 2(d) of Prize
Competitions Act, 1955 included competitions not merely of
gambling nature but also those whose success depends on
substantial degree of skill— hence, violative of their
Fundamental Right—- Held - On a proper construction there
could be no doubt that the Act, in defining the word 'prize
competition' as it did in S. 2(d), had in view only such
competitions as were of a gambling nature and no others. In
interpreting an enactment the Court should ascertain the
intention of the legislature not merely from a literal meaning
of the words used but also from such matters as the history
of the legislation, its purpose and the mischief it seeks to
suppress.
👉 Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661
[Judges are supposed to construe statutes by seeking the

true intent of the makers of the Act, which is presumed to
be pro bono publico, or intent for the public good as opposed
to for private interest—-The office of all the judges is always
to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief,
and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions
and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato
commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy,
according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono
publico.]

👉 Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank, AIR 2000 SC 1535 ,
[ HEADNOTE : when two competing acts construed to further

the purposes behind them produce a conflict, the Court may
resolve the conflict by taking into consideration as to which
Act represents “the superior purpose” in addition to other
relevant factors—-example SARFESI AND IBC]
👉 New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Nusli Neville Wadia, AIR 2008 SC
876
[HEADNOTE: So as to enable a superior court to interpret a

statute in a reasonable manner, the court must place itself in
the chair of a reasonable legislator/ author. So done, the
rules of purposive construction have to be resorted to which
would require the construction of the Act in such a manner so
as to see that the object of the Act fulfilled; which in turn
would lead the beneficiary under the statutory scheme to
fulfill its constitutional
obligations.]

👉 CIT v. Sodra Devi, AIR 1957 SC 832
Rule]
[Application of Mischief
[HEADNOTE: The common question of law for determination

was whether the word 'individual ' in s. 16(3) of the 'Indian
Income-tax Act, 1922, as amended by Act IV of 1937,
includes a female and whether the income of minor sons
from a partnership, to the benefits of which they were
admitted, was liable to be included in computing the total
income of the
mother who was a member of the partnership.
Section 16(3) of the Act provides :

“In computing the total income of any individual for the
purpose of assessment, there shall be included – (a) so
much of the income of a wife or minor child of such individual
as arises directly or indirectly :
(ii) from the admission of the minor to the benefits of the
partnership in a firm of which such individual is a partner”
Held as per majority: The word 'individual' occurring in s.

16(3) of the Indian Income-tax Act, as amended by Act IV Of
1937, means only a male and does not include a female.
The evil which was sought to be remedied by Act IV of 1937
was the one resulting from the widespread practice of
husbands entering into nominal partnerships with their wives
and fathers admitting their minor children to the benefits of
the partnerships of which they were members. This evil was
sought to be remedied by the enactment of section 16(3) of
1922 Act. If this background of the enactment of section
16(3) of 1922 Act is borne in mind, there is no room for any
doubt that howsoever that mischief was sought to be
remedied by the amending Act, the only intention of the
Legislature in doing so was to include the income derived by

the wife or a minor child, in the computation of the total
income of the male assessee for the purpose of assessment.
If that was the position, howsoever wide the words ‘any
individual’ or ‘such individual’ may appear, however these
words in the context could only have been meant as
restricted to the male and not including the female of the
species.
Where the Legislature uses ambiguous language in

enacting a statute, as it has undoubtedly done in the
instant case, recourse must necessarily be had, for a
clarification of such ambiguity, to the pre-existing state of
the law in order to see what defect or mischief therein
was being sought to be remedied, the remedy that was
prescribed by the statute and the reason for it.
This rule cannot be used to the length of applying

unnatural meaning to familiar words or of so stretching
the language that its former shape is transformed into
something which is not only significant but has a name of
its own, especially when “the language has no evident
ambiguity or uncertainty about it.” If the statutory
language in its primary or ordinary meaning in the
context has a wider effect, it cannot be artificially
confined to remedy the single identified mischief which is
conceived.
If there is some ambiguity in the terms of a provision,

recourse can and must be made to surrounding
circumstances and constitutional principles and practice.
b. Regard to consequences
1. If the language used is capable of bearing more than one construction

in
selecting the true meaning, regard must be had to the consequences

resulting
from adopting the alternative constructions.
2. A construction that results in hardship, serious inconvenience, injustice,

absurdity or anomaly or which leads to inconsistency or uncertainty and
friction in the system which the statute purports to regulate has to be
rejected and preference should be given to that construction which
avoids such results. This rule has no application when the words are
susceptible to only one meaning and no alternative construction is
reasonably open.
* Hardship, inconvenience, injustice, absurdity and anomaly to be

avoided
The individual cases of hardship or injustice have no bearing for

rejecting the natural construction, and it is only when the natural
construction leads to some general hardship or injustice and some
other construction is reasonably open that the natural construction
can be departed from.
No doubt in cases of ambiguity that construction which better

serves the ends of justice and fairness will be accepted, but
otherwise it is for the Legislature in forming its policy to consider
these elements.
if no alternative construction if open, the court cannot ignore a

statutory provision “to relieve what it considers a distress resulting
from its operation; a statute has to be given effect to whether the
court likes it or not.”
It is no doubt true that of on its true construction, a statute leads to

anomalous results, the Courts have no option but to give effect to it
and leave it to the Legislature to amend and alter the law. But when
on a construction of a statute, two views are possible, one which
results in anomaly and other not, it is our duty to adopt the latter
and not the former, seeking consolation in the thought that law
bristles with anomalies.
When words are clear, obviously, they must be given effect to,
however, in cases where alternative meanings are possible, one

which is more consistent with the smooth working of the system
which statute purports to regulate, and that alternative is to be
rejected, which will introduce uncertainty, friction or confusion into
the working of the system.
👉 Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh; AIR 1955 SC 830
[HEADNOTE: question of interpretation of Section 99 of RPA

—-SC declined to follow the rule of literal construction of the
Statute on the ground that it would lead to absurdity,
presumably, not intended by the Statute having regard to the
scheme and the purpose of the Act—- where the language of
a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical
construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the
apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some
inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably
not intended, a construction may be put upon it which
modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of
the sentence——-In the absence of some other indication
that harsh or ridiculous effect was actually intended by the
Legislature, it cannot be readily accepted that it represents
the legislative intent.]

👉 Central India Spinning, Weaving and Manufacturing Co. v.
Municipal Committee, Wardha, AIR 1958 SC 341
[HEADNOTE: Section 66 of Central Provinces and Berar

Municipalities Act, 1922 “terminal tax on goods or animals
imported or exported from limits of municipality”. Will it cover
power to levy tax on goods in transit?— Considerations of
hardship, injustice or anomalies do not play any useful role in
construing taxing statutes unless there be some real
ambiguity—— taxing statutes must be strictly construed and
any doubt must be construed against the taxing authorities
and in favour of the taxpayer—-“Statutes levying taxes or
duties upon citizens will not be extended by implication
beyond the clear import of the language used, nor will their
operation be enlarged so as to embrace matters not
specifically pointed out, although standing upon a close
analogy, and all questions of doubt will be resolved against
the Government and in favour of the citizen, and because
burdens are not to be imposed beyond what the statute
expressly imparts.”]
Inconsistency and Repugnancy to be avoided (harmonious

construction)
Statute has to read as a whole and one provision of the Act should
be construed with reference to other provisions in the same Act so
as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute.
Such a construction has the merit of avoiding any inconsistency or

repugnancy either within a section or between a section and other
parts of the statute.
If two sections of an Act cannot be reconciled, as there may be

absolute contradictions, it is often said that the last must prevail.

But this is to acceptable only in the last resort.The first thing to be
done by the court, is to give effect to the whole expression of the
parliamentary intention.
To reconcile is the primary objective. If no way out, then determine

which is the leading provision and which is the subordinate
provision, one must give way to other.
👉 Raj Krushna v. Binod; AIR 1954 SC 202
[HEADNOTE: section 33(2) and section 123(8) of the ROPA

(The Representation of People Act), 1951 were in conflict.
The section 33(2) talks about the power of a government
servant to nominate in an election, the other section 123(8)
specifies that a government servant cannot assist any
candidate in the election except by casting his vote. The
court followed the rule and interpreted both the sections
Harmoniously. It was held that a government servant has
both the right to nominate a candidate but is forbidden to
assist in any other manner and he also has a right to vote.
——-It is usual, when one section of an Act takes away what
another confers, to use a non obstante clause and say that
"notwithstanding anything contained in section so and so, this
or that will happen", otherwise, if both sections are clear,
there is a head-on clash. It is the duty of courts
to avoid that and, whenever it is possible to do so, to
construe provisions which appear to conflict so that they
harmonize— It should not be lightly assumed that
“Parliament had given with one hand what it took away with
the other.”——provisions of one section of the statute cannot
be used to defeat those of another “unless it is impossible to
effect reconciliation between them.”

👉 Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255
[HEADNOTE: …..there are two provisions of equal authority,

neither of them being subject to the other. The question is
how the apparent conflict between them is to be resolved.
The rule of construction is well settled that when there are in
an enactment two provisions which cannot be reconciled with
each other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible,
effect could be given to both. This is what is known as the
rule of harmonious construction. A construction that reduces
one of the provisions to a “useless number” or “dead letter” is
not harmonious construction.
conflict between a general and a special provision
When there is a conflict between a general and a special provision

——-find out which of the two apparently conflicting provisions is
more general and which is more specific—- has to be determined
with reference to the area and extent of their application either
generally or specially in particular situations.
The principle is expressed in the maxim generalia specialibus

non derogant (General things do not derogate from special things)
and generalibus specialia derogant (Special things derogate from
general things).
Generalia specialibus non derogant
This expression was explained to mean that when there is

conflict between a general and special provision, the latter
(special provision) shall prevail. But this rule of construction is
not of universal application. It is subject to the condition that
there is nothing in the general provision, expressed or implied,
indicating an intention to the contrary.

In case of conflict between the two statutes, a prior special
law would yield to a later general law, if either of the two
following conditions is satisfied: (i) The two are inconsistent
with each other; (ii) There is some express reference in the
later to the earlier enactment” ( Ajoy Kumar Banerjee v. Union of
)——A special law may be altered, abrogated or

India Case
repealed by a later general law by an express provision, A later

general law will override a prior special law if the two are so
repugnant to each other that they cannot co-exist. It is only in
the absence of a provision to the contrary and of a clear
inconsistency that a special law will remain wholly
unaffected by a later general law.
👉 Paradip Port Trust v. Their Workmen (AIR 1977 SC 36.)
[Whether representation by a
legal practitioner was permissible in an industrial dispute
before
adjudicatory authorities contemplated by the Industrial
Disputes Act.
By applying this maxim, the Supreme Court held that the
special
provision in the Industrial Disputes Act would prevail in
that regard
over the Advocates Act which was held to be a general
piece of
legislation relating to subject-matter of appearance of
lawyers before
all courts, tribunals and other authorities, whereas
Industrial Disputes
Act was concerned with the representation by legal
practitioners.
Generalibus Specialia Derogant

Special things derogate from general things.
If a special provision is made on a certain matter, the matter is

excluded from the general provisions.
👉 South India Corpn. (P.) Ltd. v. Secretary, Board of

Revenue AIR 1964 SC 207
[HEADNOTE: general provision under Article 372 of the

Constitution regarding continuance of existing laws is
subject to article 277 of the Constitution which is a
special provision relating to taxes, duties, cesses, or fees
lawfully levied at the commencement of the Constitution.
——If a special provision is made on a certain matter, the
matter is excluded from the general provisions.]
👉 Vinay Kumar Singh v. Bihar State Electricity Board [2003]

8 ILD 318
[HEADNOTE: Patna High Court——article 351 of the

Constitution of India is a general provision regarding
development of Hindi all over India, whereas article 348
is a specific provision with regard to the language to be
used in the Supreme Court and the High Courts and that,
therefore, the applicability of article 351 of the
Constitution is entirely obviated—-If a special provision is
made on a certain matter, that matter is excluded from
the general provision.]

👉 J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills v. State of U.P.,
AIR 1961
This principle can also be used in construction of

statutory rules and orders:
[U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947——Order making

dletailed provisions for the settlement of Industrial
Disputes. Clause 5(a) of the Government Order
empowered a recognised association of employers to
refer
an industrial dispute for adjudication to the Conciliation
Board. Clause 23 provided that no employer shall
discharge
or dismiss any workman during the pendency of an
inquiry except with the written permission of the
Regional Conciliation Officer—-HELD s Cl. 23 was a
special
provision which prevailed over the general provisions in
cl.
5(a).——there will be complete harmony if cl. 5(a) will
apply in all other cases of proposed dismissal or
discharge except where an inquiry is pending within the
meaning of cl. 23—— well known rule of construction that
general provisions yield to special provisions. The
rule that general provisions should yield to specific
provisions is not an arbitrary principle made by lawyers
and judges but springs from the common understanding
of men and women that when the same person gives two
directions one covering a large number of matters in
general and another to only some of them his intention is
that these latter directions should prevail as regards
these while as regards all the rest the earlier direction
should have effect——"The rule is, that whenever there
is a particular enactment and a general enactment in the

same statute and the latter, taken in its most
comprehensive sense, would overrule the former, the
particular enactment must be operative, and the general
enactment must be taken to affect only the other parts of
the statute to which it may properly apply". —- Applying
this rule of construction that in cases of conflict
between a specific provision and a general provision
the specific provision prevails over the general
provision and the general provision applies only to
such cases which are not covered by the special
provision, we must hold that cl. 5(a) has no application
in a case where the special provisions of cl. 23 are
applicable]
Index, scheme and arrangement
External Aids to Interpretation
Travaux preparatories [ They are the official record of a negotiation] [

Parliamentary debates + Parliamentary History]
1. English Practice— parliamentary history was not considered imp — as it

was presumed that that would not lead to understanding the actual intent,
circumstances, as they were scattered—-this view was criticized—-
distinguish between admitting these reports and referring to reports to
understand —-therefore in late 1950s the practice to avoid relying
parliamentary history has been done away with.
2. USA—-parliamentary history has relevance
3. India—-parliamentary history relied on, but judges skeptical (common law

influence)—-it is debatable regarding the extent to which the parliamentary
debates are used—-CAD is relied on frequently—undue reliance not to be
given—-they may or may not have a persuasive value—
4. Parliamentary debates are a part of Parliamentary history

[Ex: Novartis v. UOI the SC relied on the Parliamentary Debate]
[ State of MP v. Dada Bhoy, 1972 --MMDR Bill—-speech of the minister
introducing the Bill in Parliament referred to]
5. With regards to the amendments proposed during the passing of Bill, undue
reliance cannot be placed on them if they are rejected—-acceptance or
rejection of amendment to a bill in course of parliamentary proceedings
forms part of pre enactment history and might throw light on intention of
legislature when the language used in the statute is capable of more than
one construction. However, this statement should be cautiously taken
because why a particular amendment is accepted or rejected is a matter of
controversy.
👉 Pepper v. Hart
[Referring to parliamentary material should be permitted as an

aid to construction only in cases of ambiguity or when the legal
meaning lead to absurdity]
👉 State of Travancore v. Bombay Co. Ltd., 1952
[Justice Patanjali Shastri—how to use Parliamentary history as

external aid—-a speech made in course of debate can indicate
the opinion of the person—-but underlying circumstances and
overall opinion cannot be ascertained as all minds might not be in
consonance—-individual speeches cannot be relied on]

👉 Chiranjeetlal Chaudhary v. UOI
[legislative history cannot be relied on solely—but it is imp

to understand the circumstances and reasons behind
enactment of law]—-Post this case the Indian SC started
relying on the Parliamentary history to the extent of
understanding reasons and circumstances and in case of
absurdity]
Statement of Objects and Reasons
1. Part of Parliamentary history
2. ascertain the mischief for which the law was made—-reasons that made the
mover of the Bill to introduce.
3. statement of objects and reasons appended to bill cannot be relied on —-

however it is permissible to understand the background, antecedent state of
affairs, evil which statute seeks to remedy, surrounding circumstances
4. statement of objects cannot curtail— main provisions will prevail as they are
enabling part]
5. State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal [Art. 19(1)(g)]
6. Express Newspapers Case**
7. Aswini Kumar v. Arabinda Bose AIR 1952 SC 369
8. [Art 164— reference to

Harsharan Verma v. Tribhuvan Narayan Singh, 1971
rejections as an aid to interpretation—to understand what the legislature did

not intend to do]
9. Bhaiji v. SDO Thandala , 2003 [Ashwini Kumar accepted in this judgements]
10. Ajoy Kumar Banerjee v. UOI, 1984 [s. 16 General Insurance Business
Nationalization Ac—-Memorandum supplied during Bill to understand the
intent of s. 16—-the court relied on the Memorandum]
11. Hyderabad Industries Ltd. v. UOI, 1995 [Finance Bill 2002—-court relied on
notes on clauses to hold that the particular clause will apply prospectively]

Commission , Committee reports
1. Part of parliamentary history
2. commission reports, inquiry committee reports established before the bill

has been introduced can also be referred to —- CIT v. Sodhra Devi , Express
News Papers Case
3. CIT v. Jayalaxmi Rice and Oil Mills, 1971 [Reference to special committee
report]
4. CIT v. Vadilal Lallubhai [reference to select committee report]
5. AR Antulay v. RS Nayak (imp) (for the purpose of administrative function

court can be considered as state under Art 12, but not for judicial function
—-also court said that reports of committee are limited —-cannot be unduly
relied on—this has been followed.
6. Mithilesh Kumar v. Prem Bihari [Reference to law commission report]
7. Mohammad Haneef Quereshi v. State of Bihar [Nutritionist Report, Committee

Report]
Dictionaries
1. particular term may have two meanings— common parlance, technical

meaning
2. Grog Mineral Case
3. The general rule is that it is permissible to look into dict. to look into the
literal meaning
4. The dict. meaning of a particular word cannot be used the words have been
statutorily defined. It is only in those case where the def section doesn’t
provide for a particular definition reference to dict is permissible. However,
while interpreting those words , reference to context should be made.
5. The general rule w.r.t use of dict as aid of construction—-first look at the
definition section and then first look at ordinary sense of the word and

reconcile them depending on the context—-the statutory definition and
judicial interpretation should assume primary significance
6. India is a dualist country not monolist
7. meanings of particular words deliberated on and their meaning has evolved

accordingly—-ex terrorism definition—here reliance of dict. would not be
sufficient —-look at other authoritative texts
8. In certain cases a particular word might have distinctive meanings

depending on context —- ex “information” under IT Act and RTI —-
depending on context
9. if in special law the def not provided , but in general law it is provided—-
then the general law def can be referred it should be used only in according
to the context—-similarly also in the case of statutes in pari materia——
however, if the general law meaning is narrow, it cannot be taken to curtail
special law—-in general law the definitions are merely illustrative in nature
—they are the interpretation clauses.
👉 S. 31 of Copyright —-
Entertainment Network v. Super Cassettes, 2008 [
international law can be referred when there is no conflict with

existing domestic law Act. International covenants and conventions
can also be utilized by the court if a country is signatory to
international conventions]
Foreign decisions
1. Use of foreign decisions —-rule of construction —-they should be referred

only when same system of law or similar practices, common state of affairs,
whether the legal system is at par (parity of legal systems)
2. The assistance of foreign decisions is subject to the qualification that prime

importance has to be given to the lang. of the relevant Indian statutes, the
circumstances, and the settings in which it is enacted and the Indian
conditions where it is to be applied
3. NALSA judgement.

4. In certain cases, foreign judgements are also referred to deviate from it i the
context of the Indian legal framework
Social political and economic dev. and scientific inventions
1. The underlying principle —— Royal College of Nursing of UK v. Dept. of Health

and Social security [Lord Wilberforce’s opinion] —-law is a speaking variety
—-meant to endure for ages—-interpretation must be in light of socio

political economic and cultural dev. —contemporary developments
2. Ex Triple Talaq Case, Adultery Case, Navtej Sign Johar
References to other Statutes as an external aid
a. Reference to statutes in pari materi :
Where statutes are in pari materia (those statutes relating o same subject
mater)—-reading statutes as a whole is the base for the rule of reading
statutes in pari materia—— particular statutes cannot be used to interpret
the same words when the statutes are not in pari materia—same words will
not have same meaning—-look at the context—in statute in pari materia all
subject matters may not be similar, particular provisions may be in pari
materia (Common Cause v. UOI —Income Tax Act and Companies Act and
RPA —-particular sections where in pari materi , not whole ACT)
The rule of harmonious construction is a part of applying statutes in pari

materi
This rule allows earlier statute to throw light on the meaning of a phrase
used in later statute in the same context—permits raising of a presumption
that in the absence of any context indicating contrary intention, the same
meaning attaches to the same words in a later statute as the one in earlier
statute—-if ambiguity then later will prevail
👉 State of Madras v. V Iyer, 1958
[ s. 4 Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947——”shall presume” held to

be in Pari Materia with the section under Indian Evidence Act s. 4]

👉 Common Cause v. UOI
[ Income Tax Act, 293A Companies Act, RPA section 77 explanation

——-held that s. 293A and IT provisions —-bring transparency—-if
political party deliberately violates —-such party cannot be allowed to
claim such money under the election expenditures—-this expenses
incurred in elections cannot be funded through black money——”any
money recieved” means from legal source—-read the three statutes
in pari materia —-avoiding contradiction—harmoniously construe ]
b. reference to other statutes
when statutes are not in pari materi—-then reliance of other statute for
meaning cannot be made—-meaning will not be similar
Assistance taken of earlier statutes—-
-if same words and expressions are retained the court will presume that the
parliament has retained their exposition of law .
-if there is no ambiguity—no need for reliance on statutes in pari materia or the
question of which meaning will prevail
-Can change in language of the statute indicate a change in the interpretation
due to change in meaning—-does not necessarily indicate that there has been
a change in meaning
-Addition/omission of words always doesn’t warrant a change in the meaning or
interpretation—— mischief rule —reason behind the change and if it makes a
difference to the import of the provision
Assistance of later statute— if ambiguity then later will prevail—-if the

parliament has completely deviated from earlier statute and explicitly
cleared that the earlier statute offends certain principles etc. ( ANAND BROTHERS
v. UOI, 2014 9 SCC 212. )
In certain cases the parliament enacts a change in the law to counter the
decision of the court—-even if the parliament has changed that does not

suo moto indicate that the decision was wrong——ex Tribunalization]
Incorporation of earlier acts into later/reference of earlier acts into later——

Ex Ar Act references to EPA have been made—-to avoid repetition
—-”unless the context otherwise requires”—- incorporation or reference is a
legislative devise—-presumed that the provision of the other act has
become a part —-bodily transposed—- Bharat Cooperative Bank v. Cooperative
Bank Employees Union, 2007 ] [ Headnote: In case of legislation by
Incorporation as the incorporated provision becomes part and parcel of a
fresh statute the const. validity of such statute, including the provisions so
incorporated is judged with reference to the powers of legislature enacting
the fresh statute and not with reference to the powers of the legislature
enacting the original legislation—the two statutes remain distinct and they
have their own independent source of validity—- just because earlier was
const. valid does not mean that the other will be valid—-there is a difference
between mere reference (ex: notwithstanding anything contained in s 5 of
xyz law”) and incorporation —- mere reference is only for a specific
purpose, but suppose if a new act is created and includes provision that
explicitly stipulates that the particular part of earlier act will be applied. ]
State law declared void—-and central government passes the law—-

competence—-[ VAIJ NATH v. GUR AMMA, 1999 ] [Incorporation by central act
——parliament incorporates the provisions of a void state law—a state law
which is void for the want of competence of the state legislature can be
incorporated in the later central act if parliament has the legislative
competence over the subject matter—-valid]
If Act is meant to have limited application—cannot incorporate to widen the

import.
Bajya v. Gopika Bai , 1978 [Reference is made to a particular provision

of other statute—-and the other statute is amended—-then the
reference has to be made by considering the amended position ——
inclusive of subsequent amendments. ]
Juristic opinion

Precedents are not aids of interpretation/ aids of construction , but they are
a part of judicial process
Notifications by Ministries , Law Commission Reports
Clean Ganga Case
White Paper/Working Paper
they have persuasive value—-Aayodhya judgement
Expert opinion
Case Law— Cow Slaughter Case— Hanif Quereshi v. State -- opinion of

nutritionist
International Instruments
Laksmikant v. UOI
Vishakha v. State of Rajasthan
Sunil Batra Case
Indian Council for Enviro legal Action case
MC Mehta v. Kamal Nath
[Patent and Right to health]
rapporteur reports
Conferences
Taskind Conference

MODULE 5 SUBSIDIARY RULES
Tags
Subsidiary rules of interpretation work in

tandem with the basic and guiding rules of
interpretation
I. Same word to have same meaning
1. RULE: When a word or phrase appears more than once in a statute, it is

generally construed the same way each time it appears, unless there is a
reason to belief that the legislature intended it in a different way.
2. When the Legislature uses same word in different parts of the same section or
statute,
there is a presumption that the word is used in the same sense throughout——-
words appearing multiple times in the statute should generally have same
meaning.
3. The above presumption is, however, a weak one and is readily displaced by the
context—-meaning might differ depending upon the context, subject.
4. It has been said that the more correct statement of the rule is that "where the
draftsman uses the same word or phrase in similar contexts, he must be
presumed to intend it in each
place to bear the same meaning."
5. When a provision is re-enacted using same word as in the old provision, it is

presumed that it has the same meaning, especially if the word has been
judicially construed to have certain meaning and the legislature has adopted
this meaning——Where meaning has been judicially ascertained and the
legislature uses the same word for re-enactment, it must be taken to be aware
of meaning so judicially ascertained.
MODULE 5 SUBSIDIARY RULES 1

6. [Side note: s. 2 of ICA, 1872: following words and expressions are used in the
following sense, “unless a contrary intention appears from the context.”]

👉 Arvind Mohan Sinha v. Amulya Kumar Biswas, 1974 [Whether the same terms
appearing in different enactments should have same meaning?]
[Headnote: Court was hearing two clubbed appeals—-Appeal 1—

Issue before the court is whether the Probation of Offenders Act can
apply to offences under the Customs Act and Defense of India Rules——
Held: unable to accept that the probation of Offenders Act can have no
application to offences consisting of the contravention of the Customs
Act or the "Gold Control" Rules of the Defense of India Rules]
[Appeal 2: ——-bars of foreign gold were found on respondent——-

convicted —-Customs Act & the Defense of India Rules—— HC set aside
the conviction and sentence imposed on the respondent for contravention
of the "Gold Control" Rules—-regarding the contravention of the two
Rules it held that no declaration need have been made by the
respondent to the Administrator, as the gold of which the respondent was
in possession was smuggled gold and not "legal" gold—-held that "the
legislature never expected that smuggled gold would be
declared"————SC held that definition of "gold" under Rules is in wide
terms—-not any distinction between smuggled gold and gold lawfully
possessed———First, intention of the legislature must be gathered
primarily and principally from the words used by it and the definition
of "gold" carves out no exception in favor of smuggled gold———
Under the definition contained in Rule 126A (d), "gold means gold" and
no rule of statutory construction can permit the definition to be altered
materially so as to read: "Gold means gold but shall not include smuggled
gold"————word "gold" is used at several places in the Rules and it is a
well-recognized rule of construction that the same word should
receive the same meaning in a collocation—-thus: It is manifest from
the language, intendment and the scheme of these Rules that the
word "gold" covers not only gold which is lawfully possessed but
gold in any form or shape and whether possessed lawfully of
otherwise.—--impossible to hold that the legislature wanted to regulate
the possession and control of gold lawfully possessed as distinguished
from smuggled gold——-therefore SC held that HC had erred and that

respondent is liable and that the "gold" includes smuggled gold——-
order convicting and sentencing the respondent under Customs Act and
Defense of India Rules restored.]
👉 IMP Githa Hariharan v. RBI
[HEADNOTE: Issue was whether mother can be considered “natural

guardian”——Definition of “natural guardian” under Hindu Maintenance
and Guardianship Act, 1956—-Interpretation of “after” —-held that
mother’s name is also sufficient for opening bank account—-read s. 6
with s. 4(c)—held that same meaning ought to be attributed to same word
used and defined—- same word used in different places should have
same meaning, unless context requires otherwise—contextual reading]
👉 Keshavji Ravji Co. v, CIT, 1991
[HEADNOTE: If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous

and if two interpretations are not reasonably possible, the plain meaning
of the words should not be discarded—-words acquire particular meaning
because of authoritative construction and they are presumed to have
same meaning in subsequent legislation—- sometimes interpretation
attributed may not apply and here the court has to determine in light of all
relevant circumstances (context)—-when statute expressly/by necessary
implication departs from general law (human rights, equity) then the
general law cannot be involved to displace the effect of the statute——if
no statutory departure then the general principle would determine nature
—— it is said that equity and taxation are often strangers but modern
approach is to balance—-but aim to give effect to objective/intent of
legislature.]
Exceptions to the rule of same word same meaning

It is essential to interpret and ascertain object of the section—-depending
on object of section and colloquial meaning attributed , there may be need
to give different meaning to the same words appearing in same statute.
👉 IMP Indian Handicrafts Emporium v. UOI, 2003
[HEADNOTE: Wildlife Protection Act, 1972—-appellant engaged in

manufacture and sale of articles relating to ivory——issue was the
constitutional validity of Amendment Act 1991—-court heavily used
purposive construction—-provision should be construed according to
the “intent” of legislature—gathered from language of the provision—
if meaning is plain then give effect regardless of consequences —-
otherwise go beyond literal confines and rely on other rules of
construction—- Thus, court in the Indian Handicrafts Case relied on
several cases dealing with purposive interpretation and held that the
present case required purposive construction—-contention was
raised by appellant on the basis of ART. 19 (1)(G)—-this was
countered with the “reasonable restrictions”—however appellant
argued that present case involved outright prohibition and not mere
restriction—-Court relied on Narendra Kumar v. UOI wherein it was held
that restrictions and prohibitions can mean the same in certain cases
——thereafter on the contention of right to compensation for property
it is held that legislature can make laws to restrict such rights—-not
fundamental right ——thereafter court considered the intent of
legislature and held that the strict interpretation would not be in tune
with the intent—-”ivory” could have different meanings— required
balance with objective and context. ]

👉 Balram Kumawat v. UOI
[ Supreme Court gave wide meaning to the word "ivory" in section

49C(7) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 and held that the said
word should be construed to include "mammoth ivory" having regard
to the object and purpose of the Act. The court also observed that
"the rule of strict construction of a regulatory penal statute may not be
adhered to, if thereby the plain intention of Parliament to combat
crimes of special nature would be defeated".]
👉 CIT Saheli Leasing & Industries, 2010
[HEADNOTE: Held that one word occurring in different sections of

the act can have different meaning if the object of the two sections
are different and when both operate in different fields]
II. Contemporanea expositio est Optima et fortissima in lege.
1. Means that “contemporaneous exposition is the best and strongest law”
2. It states that the words of statutes should be construed in a true sense as in the
manner intended by the person who created such a statute—-envisages the
reference to historical materials to ascertain the intent and is majorly used in
interpretation of old laws
WHY THE MAXIM CANNOT APPLY IN MODERN

INTERPRETATIONS?
There is debate regarding the practicality in application of this maxim. For

instance this maxim would not apply in the Adultery judgment.
The maxim can have application in beneficial statutes but not in penal/taxation
statutes

In modern progressive society it would be unreasonable to confine intent of
legislature based merely on historical materials.
👉 JK Cotton Spinning & Weaving v. UOI, 1988
[HEADNOTE: The appellants were operating composite mills where they

manufacture different kinds of fabrics at the immediate stage and for the
same, they have to pay excise duty which was removed from the factory.
The Collector Central Excise issued a notice under rule 9(1) of the central
rules demanding the payment of central excise. The appellants
contended that they are liable to pay the excise only when the yarn is
removed from the factory and pleaded 'Contemporanea Expositio Est
Optima Et Fortissmo in lege', however, the apex court rejected the appeal
—- if in any case there is ambiguity and a word is capable of two
constructions then the principle can be applied but in the instant case the
maxim of Contemporanea Expositio Est Optima Et Fortissmo in lege
cannot be applied as there is no ambiguity.]
👉 Mubarik Ali Ahmed v. State of Bombay, 1957
[Headnote: s. 420 IPC—-S. 2 Extraterritorial Jurisdiction——not

permissible to construe the provisions of IPC at present in accordance
with the notions of criminal jurisdiction prevailing at the time when the
code was enacted —thus even though the accused was never
corporeally present in India, however, C.O.A is in India and thus section 2
pertaining to extraterritorial jurisdiction would be applicable—-held that
the maxim Contemporanea expositio would have no application in the
present case—-construe with reference to modern needs unless any
particular section indicates to the contrary]

👉 State of Maharashtra v. Praful B Desai
[Headnote: This case dealt with Medical negligence—- CrPC and

Evidence Act—-Video Conferencing—- Court rejected the application of
the maxim Contemporanea expositio——- s. 273 CrPC interpretation—
contended that s. 273 must be given meaning in accordance with the
maxim —-held that this maxim would not apply when interpreting
provision of on-going statute/Act—-s. 273 widely interpreted—-
evidences can be both oral and documentary—-electronic records can be
produced as evidence —-which means that evidence even in criminal
matters can be by way of electronic records (video conferencing)]
On-going statute/Act
[Bennion on Statutory Interpretation]
* On-going statute means statute in practice—- application on day to day
basis/affairs—-organic laws—current laws.
* On going statutes have to be interpreted in a manner that the statute
remains workable
* It is presumed that the parliament intended to give effect to the original
intention —-balance with the social and technological change and the
resultant change in the meaning of words
* presumed that the parliament would not make a law so rigid that it
cannot be construed to balance with the social and technological change
and the resultant change in the meaning of words

👉 State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh, 1961
[Headnote: Section 123. Evidence as to affairs of State. “No one shall be

permitted to give any evidence derived from unpublished official records
relating to any affairs of State, except with the permission of the
officer…”—- phrase "affairs of the State"—held that when the Act was
passed, the concept of Governmental functions and their extent was
limited; and so was the concept of the words 'affairs of the State'
correspondingly limited; but as is often said, words are not static vehicles
of ideas or concepts. As the content of the ideas or concepts conveyed
by respective words expand, so does the content of the words keep pace
with the said expanding content of the ideas or concepts and naturally
tend to widen the field of public interest which the section wants to
protect.]
👉 Oswal Agro Mills Ltd. v. CCE , 1993
[Headnote: If the words are plain and clear then use only textual /literal—
in cases of ambiguity/inconsistency— look at statement of object ,
legislative history to ascertain the intention—however Contemporanea
expositio cannot be said to have universal application —each case must
be considered on its own facts]
III. Noscitur A Sociis

👉 The principle of Noscitur A Sociis envisages that the meaning of unclear/
ambiguous words must be determined by considering the words with
which it is associated in the context.
1. Noscitur means to know and Sociis means association — “to know

from the association”
2. Maxwell: 2 or more words that are susceptible to analogous

meaning are coupled together then they are to be understood
and used in their cognate sense, they take their color from each
other—the more general word would be restricted to a sense
analogous to the less general word
3. Noscitur A Sociis is applied when:
(a) meaning of word/phrase is doubtful or where a particular

expression when taken singly is inoperative
section 2(47) IT Act— transfer" in relation to a capital asset, includes

the sale, exchange or relinquishment of the asset or the
extinguishment of any rights therein or the compulsory acquisition
thereof under any law;”
Here the meaning of “extinguishment of any right therein” is doubtful
(b) when the associated words have similar meaning/ belong to the
same family
EXAMPLE- Labrador Retriever, German Shepherd, Golden

Retriever , and other animals —-same family (dogs) then it is
noscitur.
EXAMPLE- if the rules of a particular establishment prohibit the visitor

from entering the premises with any “purse, shoulder bag, hand bag,
duffel bag, fanny bag..” and the visitor has brought a clutch bag—the
issue is whether the clutch would fall within the meaning of purse—

there is ambiguity pertaining to the ambit of purse—-here the rule of
noscitur can be applied as the list includes words belonging to same
family (bags).
EAXAMPLE: If a particular act envisages that “foodstuffs including

edible oil seeds and oils” are essential commodities. The State
government passes an order preventing the sale of “Raw cashew nut”
—- the issue is whether raw cashew nut can be read under
“foodstuff”—-here applying the principle of noscitur a sociis the raw
cashew nuts can be included under foodstuffs as they are also edible
oil seeds.
(c) when the intention of the legislature is not clear
(d) word or phrase capable of bearing more than one meaning
3. Exceptions—-Noscitur a sociis is merely a rule of construction and it

cannot prevail in cases where:
(a) when the arrangement of words has a clear meaning—-it is clear

that the wider words have been deliberately used in order to make
the scope of the defined word correspondingly broader. Only when
there is lack of clarity that whether the interpretation should be
broader or narrower then this maxim would be applied and not
otherwise.
(b) where the intention of the legislature is clear
(c) where the word is defined in the statute
(d) using this rule, what is expressly excluded cannot be included.

👉 Pradeep Agarbatti v. State of Punjab
[Headnote: Entry 16 of Schedule A to the Punjab General Sales Tax Act,

1948 which reads "cosmetics, perfumery and toilet goods, excluding tooth
paste, tooth powder, kumkum and soap”—-The issue was whether
Agarbatti falls under the category of perfumes—- held that the word
“perfumery” in Entry 16 should draw color from words “cosmetics” and
“toilet goods” therein—thus perfumery can only refer to such articles of
perfumery as used in cosmetics and toilet goods—- agarbatti not included
in perfumery—-later 16A was included which said that perfumery includes
dhoop and agarbatti—-the principle of Noscitur a sociis was applied in
this case—- thus agarbatti cannot be included in entry 16 but can be
included in 16A.]
[When some articles are grouped together in an entry in the schedules of

Sales Tax and Excise statutes, each word in the entry draws colour from
the other words therein on the principle of noscitur a sociis.]
Ejusdem Generis [”of the same kind”]

👉 When Does Ejusdem generis apply —- This doctrine applies when
(i) the statute contains an enumeration of specific words;
(ii) the subjects of the enumeration constitute a class or

category;
(iii) that class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration;
(iv) the general term follows the enumeration; and
(v) there is no indication of a different legislative intent.
For example, if a law refers to automobiles, trucks, tractors,

motorcycles, and other motor-powered vehicles, a court might use
ejusdem generis to hold that such vehicles would not include
airplanes, because the list included only land-based transportation.
If the series of words not in the same family follow a general word
then it ejusdem generis [Example Dogs, Cats, Rats, and other
animals]

👉 VVIMP APPLICATION OF EJUSDEM GENERIS TO ARTICLE 12
OF CONSTITUTION
[ EJUSDEM GENERIS NO LONGER APPLICABLE TO ARTICLE

12]
Ujjam Bai v. State of UP
[Art. 12 winds up the list of authorities falling within the definition by

referring to "other authorities" within the territory of India which
cannot, obviously be read as ejusdem generis with either the
Government and the Legislatures or local authorities.]
Noscitur A Sociis v. Ejusdem Generis
Noscitur A Sociis is in the same family as Ejusdem Generis (series of

words)—-noscitur is broader and ejusdem falls under it—- Ejusdem generis
is only an illustration/specific application of the broader maxim Noscitur a
sociis.
When specific terms are followed by a general term then the application
these maxims would restrict the scope of the general term in the context of
specific terms only without considering the object of the enactment—-these
maxims would only apply when contrary intention does not appear either
expressly or through necessary implication—— First check ambiguity and
only then deviate from the literal rule.
Noscitur A Sociis Ejusdem Generis
“to know from its association” “of the same kind” words belonging to
words having similar meaning same class/category are followed by a
(same family) written together have general word such as “or any other”—-
to be understood in the similar here the meaning of “or any other” is
sense—-here there is no mention ascertained in reference to the specific
of “or any other” words—by determining if the specific
words are creating a genus having a
common feature —-this common

feature will be attributed to the general
word by adopting the doctrine.
It is a wider principle doesn’t

require that a general word has to It is a narrower principle
be following specific words
to interpret questionable words in to interpret loosely written statutes “or

statutes other wise” “or any other”
👉 [Which Maxim is broader Noscitur A sociis or Ejusdem

Generis?] [Exception to Noscitur A Sociis]
VVIMP: State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, 1960
[Headnote: Industrial disputes act 1947—- the issue was

whether the group of hospitals constitute an industry under s. 2(j)
——industry "means any business, trade, undertaking,
manufacture of calling of employers and includes any calling,
service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or
avocation of workmen”——-held that prima facie the definition
has deliberately used broad words (words of wide import)
—-”including” has been used which gives a wide import—-
Hospitals cannot be excluded—- the counsel contended that the
maxim Noscitur should apply—-this maxim is broader than
ejusdem —-held that it is essential to see intention of act and fair
line has to be drawn——-definition of industry to be construed in
light of the context of the enactment—- the maxim noscitur helps
restrict the meaning—- but the object of the statute is not to
restrict but to broaden——the court held that the maxim would
not apply where the legislature has intended wide
interpretation]

👉 Maharashtra University Of Health v. Satchikista Prasarak Mandal &
Ors, 2010
[HEADNOTE: main question on which the matter was argued by

the appellants was that the High Court was in error in deciding
that the Grievance Committee constituted under Section 53 of the
Maharashtra University of Health Sciences Act, 1998, has no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of any complaint filed by the 5th
and 6th respondent, as they are not approved teachers of the
respondent college——issue was whether the respondents
qualify as “teachers” under s. 2(35) of Act— "2(35) "teachers"
means full time approved Demonstrators, Tutors, Assistant
Lecturers, Lecturers, Readers, Associate Professors, Professors
and other persons teaching or giving instructions on full time
basis in affiliated colleges or approved institutions in the
university;”—— “and” is disjunctive (creates a different class
altogether) whereas “or” signifies alternative——- High Court
following the principle of "ejusdem generis" had held that 5th and
6th respondent, being unapproved teachers, do not come within
the definition of `teachers.'---- "ejusdem generis" means "of the
same kind or nature" is a principle of construction, meaning
thereby when general words in a statutory text are flanked by
restricted words, the meaning of the general words are taken to
be restricted by implication with the meaning of restricted words
—- this principle is presumed to apply unless there is some
contrary indication—-
Supreme court held that the HC had erred--- The definition of

teachers under Section 2(35) is wide enough to include even
unapproved teacher. In fact the said definition has two parts, the
first part deals with full time approved Demonstrators, Tutors,
Assistant Lecturers, Lecturers etc. and the second part deals with
other persons teaching or giving instructions on full time basis in
affiliated colleges or approved institutions in the University-----
"and" is disjunctive and "or' creates an alternative.

This ejusdem generis principle is a facet of the principle of
Noscitur a sociis. The Latin maxim Noscitur a sociis contemplates
that a statutory term is recognised by its associated words. The
Latin word sociis' means society'. Therefore, when general words
are juxtaposed with specific words, general words cannot be read
in isolation. Their colour and their contents are to be derived from
their context.
But like all other linguistic canons of construction, the ejusdem

generis principle applies only when a contrary intention does not
appear. In instant case, a contrary intention is clearly indicated
inasmuch as the definition of `teachers' under Section 2(35) of
the said Act, as pointed out above, is in two parts. The first part
deals with enumerated categories but the second part which
begins by the expression "and other" envisages a different
category of persons. Here `and' is disjunctive. So, while
construing such a definition the principle of ejusdem generis
cannot be applied. The purpose of this doctrine is to reconcile
any incompatibility between specific and general words so that all
words in a Statute can be given effect and no word becomes
superfluous
It is, therefore, clear where there is a different legislative intent,

as in this case, the principle of ejusdem generis cannot be
applied to make a part of the definition completely redundant.
IV. Ut res magis quam paream valet
1. “it may rather be operative than null”’
2. Statute should be made workable irrespective of consequences
3. Side Note: Equitable based interpretation—trying to incorporate the concept

of equity , justice, and good conscience.

📢 Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co Ltd v State of Assam, AIR 1990 SC 123
[Headnote: Challenging the Const. validity of nationalization- court

applied the principle of “ut res magis valeat quam pereat”----- one of the
contentions was that the statute failed to provide provision for the
creditors- Held that it is to be impliedly read that the government would
formulate policy wrt the creditors- provision of statute must be construed
to make it effective and operational- nothing short of impossibility should
allow a court to declare a statute as unworkable/void.]
[ Side-note: In cases of Nationalization the concept of eminent domain,

Article 31A (Acquisition of property)]]
👉 HS Vankani v. State of Gujrat, 2010
[HEADNOTE: It is well settled principle of interpretation that the

construction should not be put on a statutory provision which would lead
to manifest absurdity, futility, palpable injustice and absurd inconvenience
or anomaly]
👉 Indian Handicrafts Emporium v. UOI, 2003
👉 AZB Grindlays Bank v. Director of Enforcement, 2005
👉 Corporation of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema, 1965
[HEADNOTE: Tax v. Fee—-make statute workable]
👉 Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1965

[HEADNOTE: s. 39 IPC]

👉 Curtis v. Stovin
👉 WHAT ARE THE APPROACHES AND METHODOLOGIES TO MAKE

THE STATUTE EFFECTIVE AND WORKABLE
A. Give effect to the intention of the legislature

B. Harmonious Construction
C. In case of necessity casus omissus can be supplied
D. Read the statute as a whole in its context
E. Give effect to the provisions of statute irrespective of consequences
F. presumption of constitutionality—presumption that the legislature would
intend to make a statute that is workable
G. If meaning is plain then literal meaning should be given effect to—-
text + context
H. Avoid construction that would devoid the words/phrases in the statute
of any meaning—every word in the statute has to be given meaning
I. In case of ambiguity recourse should be taken to external and internal
aids of interpretation
J. Statute should be read as a whole to ascertain if there is an actual
ambiguity
K. The courts strongly lean against any construction which reduce the
statute to futility. The provisions of the statute should be interpreted to
make it effective and workable. In case the words used in the statute are
absolutely vague and the language is intractable and absolutely
meaningless only then the statute can be declared as vague/void,
L. On the face of it if the statute is vague/void then the court cannot
strictly adhere to the threshold of Art. 14.
V. Reddendo Singula Singulis
1. referring to each other
2. mode of interpreting doc whereby each phrase is referred to its appropriate

objects

3. EXAMPLE: (a) A devise and bequeth all my real and personal property to B.
Here you can devise your real property and bequeth personal property
4. EXAMPLE: (b) If any one shall draw or load any sword or gun
Here you can draw a sword and load a gun
👉 Kotteshwar Vittal Kamath v. K Rangappa Baliga, 1969
[Headnote: Court applied the maxim Reddendo Singula Singulis to

Article 304 of Constitution—-”no Bill or amendment……. introduced or
moved”—- held that the word introduced should be read as confined to
Bill —-application of maxim]
VI. Non obstante clause
1. In case of non obstante clause the section sometimes begins with the phrase
“notwithstanding anything contained” (”in spite of “)—-this is a non obstante
clause —-the general purpose of such clauses is to give the provision contained
in the non-obstante clause an overriding effect in case of a conflict between the
non obstante clause and the rest of the part/section
2. a non-obstante clause is affixed to a section with an outlook to furnish the

enacting part of that particular provision, in case a conflict arises, an overruling
effect over that particular provision either in that same act only, or any other act,
as mentioned in that non-obstante clause.
3. In case of conflict the non obstante clause will determine the scope and object
of the section—-however, if the enabling part is clear and unambiguous then the
scope cannot be whittled down by the use of non obstante clause—-if the
enabling/primary section broadens the scope then the non obstante clause
cannot be used to curtail the scope
4. It is equivalent to saying that in spite of the provision or Act mentioned in the

non obstante clause, the enactment following it will have its full operation or that
the provisions embraced in the non obstante clause will not be an impediment
for the operation of the enactment.
5. Subject to (subjection clause) is different from non obstante clause

6. Side note: See case —- can Article 12 explanation be applied to other parts of
the constitution or restrict to part III only.
👉 VLS Finance Ltd v UOI, (2013)
[HEADNOTE: section 621-A(1) of the Companies Act, 1956, provides

that “notwithstanding anything contained in the CrPC” any offence
punishable under the companies Act, not being an offence punishable
with imprisonment only, or with imprisonment and also with fine, may,
either before or after the institution of any prosecution, be compounded
by the Company Law Board. HELD —-that a non obstante clause is used
as a legislative device to give the enacting part of the section, in case of
conflict, an overriding effect over the provisions of the statute mentioned
in the non obstante clause. Though ordinarily the offence is compounded
under the provisions of the CrPC and the power to accord permission is
conferred on the court (excepting those offences for which permission is
not required), however, in view of the non obstante clause, the power of
composition can be exercised by the court or the Company Law Board.]

👉 Sarwan Singh v. Kasturi Lal, 1977
[Headnote: two or more enactments operating in the same field and

each containing a non obstante clause stating that its provisions will have
effect—- conflict in such cases is resolved on consideration of purpose
and policy underlying the enactments and the language used in them——
the matter has to be decided in accordance with the object and purpose
of the laws under consideration]
[Section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956
provides that proceedings for eviction of tenants cannot be taken
without permission of the competent Authority notwithstanding anything
contained in any other law for the time being in force. Section 39 of the
Act further provides that the provisions of the Act shall take effect
notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other
law. The Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 was amended and Section 14A
confers a right on a landlord to recover immediately possession of any
premises let out by him in case he is required to vacate any residential
premises allotted to him by the Central Government or any local
Authority. The conferral of the right is "notwithstanding
anything contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law for the time
being in force or in any contract (whether express or implied), custom or
usage to the contrary"———the court considered the object and policy of
the relevant provisions. The court also took into account the fact that
sections 14A, 25A, 25B and 25C were introduced in the Delhi Rent Act by
an Amending Act which was later in time to the Slum Clearance Act. As
regards section 54 of the Delhi Rent Act, the court held that it was
overridden by the notwithstanding clauses in sections 14A and 25A.
Applying the same principles it was held that the provisions of the Public
Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, were a special
and later law as against the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, and so the
Premises Act prevailed in case of a conflict over the Rent Control Act
although both the Acts contained non obstante clauses.]

👉 UOI v. GM Kokil , 1984
[HEADNOTE: It was held that non obstante clause is a legislative device

which is usually employed to give overriding effect to certain provisions
over other contrary provisions that may be found either in the same
enactment or some other enactment to avoid the operation and effect of
all contrary provisions]
👉 Ram Narain v. Shimla Industrial Banking Company, 1956
[Headnote: It is desirable to determine the overriding effect of one or the

other of the relevant provisions in these two acts then in such cases on
broader consideration of purpose and the policy underlying the two acts
and the clear intention conveyed by the language of the provision]
VII. Rule of last antecedent
Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or

phrases to which they are immediately associated. They do not qualify words or
phrases which are distantly or remotely located.
In other words, in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, preferential

and qualifying words and phrases must be applied only to their immediate or
last antecedent, and not to the other remote or preceding words or association
of words.

👉 Mahadeolal Kanodia vs The Administrator-General of West Bengal, 1960
[HEADNOTE: In a case relating to the interpretation of the proviso to

section 1, sub-section (2) of the Calcutta Thika (Amendment) Act, 1953,
which reads, "provided that the provisions of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy
Act, 1949, as amended by this Act, shall subject to the provisions of
section 9, also apply and be deemed to have been always applied to all
suits, appeals and proceedings pending", the argument was that the
words "as amended by this Act" qualify the word "provisions"—-held that
“We are unable to see how it is possible, unless rules of grammar are
totally disregarded to read the words 'as amended by this Act' to qualify
the word 'provisions'. If ordinary grammatical rules are applied, there is no
escape from the conclusion that the adjectival phrase 'as amended by
this Act' qualifies the proximate substantive, viz., the Calcutta Thika
Tenancy Act, 1949.]
👉 Mongibai Hariram v. State of Maharashtra,1965
[while construing the definition of "premises" in the Bombay Land

Requisition Act, 1948, which reads "any building or part of a building let or
intended to be let separately", it was held that the words "let or intended
to be let separately" did not qualify the word "building" but only the words
"part of a building".]
VIII. Legal Fiction/Deeming Clause
1. Use of clauses such as “deemed to be” “as if”
2. Example: attributing legal personality to company
3. converting non-existent to existent
4. In interpreting a provision creating legal fiction the court has to : (a) ascertain for
what purpose the fiction is created; (b) after ascertaining this the court is to

assume all those facts and consequences which are incidental/inevitable
corollaries to giving effect to the fiction; (c) But, in construing this fiction, it is not
to be extended beyond the purpose for which the fiction has been created or
beyond the language of the section by which it was created; (d) After
ascertaining purpose — full effect must be given to the legal fiction and it should
be carried on to its logical conclusion and to that end it would be proper and
necessary to assume all those facts on which alone the fiction can operate
5. Deeming clauses have to be interpreted cautiously—look at the consequences

—- scope and purpose of the operation of deeming provision must be
considered cautiously.
👉 V Chinnaiah v. State of AP, 2005
[HEADNOTE: Article 341 of Constitution—-”scheduled caste”—- “for the

purposes of this constitution be deemed to be SC”——held that Art. 341
creates legal fiction —-form part of same class—- subdivisions/hierarchy
not allowed through presidential order—-legal fiction resulting from
deeming provision—-no authority to sub-divide further]
[Article 341(1) of the Constitution empowers the President to specify with

respect to any State by notification "the castes, races or tribes or parts of
or groups within castes, races or tribes which shall for the purposes of
this Constitution be deemed to be Scheduled Castes in relation to that
State". Article 341(2) provides that the notification
so issued shall not be varied except by Parliament. In interpreting this
provision, it has been held that because of the legal fiction resulting from
the deeming provision, the conglomeration of castes in the Presidential
Order shall be considered as representing a class as a whole and the
state concerned has no authority by legislation or otherwise
to further subdivide the castes in the notification so as to give more
preference in the matter of reservation to a minuscule proportion thereof
in preference to other members of the same class]
IX. Disjunctive and Conjunctive

1. grammatical meaning rule
2. The word "or" is normally disjunctive and "and" is normally conjunctive, but at
times they are read as vice versa to give effect to the manifest intention of the
Legislature as disclosed from the context
3. Depending upon the purpose and the intention of the legislature “or” may be
interpreted /read (not substituted) as “and” and vice versa.
4. Where provision is clear and unambiguous the word "or" cannot be read as
"and" by applying the principle of reading down
5. unskillfulness' of the draftsmen may render the provision technically incorrect

—-court cannot automatically consider it as an unconstitutional provision—thus
there may be exceptional circumstances where “and” may be read as “or” and
vice versa depending upon the objective—-EXAMPLE—-there may be cases
where due to the unskillfulness' of draftsmen “may” has been used for a
mandatory provision.

👉 UOI v. Rabinder Singh, 2012
[HEADNOTE: section 52(f) of the Army Act, 1950, provides that any
person subject to the Act, who "does any other thing with intent to
defraud, or to cause wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to
another person", commits an offence in respect of property. The Supreme
Court held that the two parts of section 52(f) are disjunctive, which can be
seen from the use of a comma and the word "or" between the two parts of
the clause, and that if the Legislature had intended both the parts to be
read together, it would have used the word "and". Hence, it was held that
it is possible to[ charge someone under section 52(f) only for acting with
"intent to defraud", and it is not necessary to refer to the second part of
the clause viz. causing wrongful gain or wrongful loss, in the charge]
[However, If the literal reading of the words produces unintelligible

/absurd results “and” may be read for “or” and vice versa. Even though
the result of so modifying the word is less favourable to the subject
provided that the intention of the legislature is otherwise clear. If it
produces grammatical distortion then also reading “and” as “or” and vice
versa is permissible]****

👉 Maharishi mahesh yogi vedic vishwavidyalaya v. State of MP, 2013
[HEADNOTE: The case dealt with the interpretation of the Maharishi

Mahesh Yogi Vedic Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1955. The Preamble to
the Act states that it is to provide for education "and" prosecution of
research in Vedic learnings and practices and to provide for matters
connected therewith or incidental thereto. Section 4(i) of the Act provides
that the object of the Adhiniyam is to provide for instruction in all
branches of Vedic learning and practices "and" the promotion and
development of the study of Sanskrit "and" to make provision for research
and for the advancement and dissemination of knowledge. The Supreme
Court held that, considering the context in which the expression "and" has
been used in the Preamble and section 4(i), it has to be read
disjunctively, as giving a restrictive or narrow interpretation to the
provision would go against the basic tenets of education and create a
serious restraint on the University in imparting education. Therefore,
merely because a specific reference has been made to prosecution of
research in Vedic learnings, the imparting of education in the University
cannot be restricted to that subject alone.
👉 Ishwar Signh Bindra v. State of UP
[HEADNOTE: s. 3(b) (i) Drugs and Cosmetics Act—-definition of drugs—

"All medicines for internal or external use of human beings or animals and
all substances intended to be used for or in the diagnosis, treatment,
mitigation or prevention of disease in human beings or animals other than
medicines and substances exclusively used or prepared for use in
accordance with the Ayurvedic or Unani systems of medicine". The
italised, word "and" in this definition was read disjunctively as the context
showed that it was the clear intention of the Legislature.
The word "or" is normally disjunctive and "and" is normally conjunctive
but at times they are read as vice versa to give effect to the manifest
intention of the Legislature as disclosed from the context]

X. Directory and Mandatory
1. If there is absence of any provision for contingency on the non-compliance of

any particular rule, i.e. if there are no consequences provided then the provision
is generally directory in nature. Conversely, if serious general inconvenience
and prejudice to general public would result due to non-compliance, and
accordingly consequences are stipulated, it is generally a mandatory provision.
2. However, There is no universal rule as to when may a statutory provision can

be regarded as merely directory and when mandatory. The question as to
whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends upon the intent of the
Legislature—- meaning and intention of the Legislature must govern, and these
are to be ascertained not only from the phraseology of the provision, but also by
considering its nature, its design, and the consequences which would follow
from construing it the one way or the other.
3. If object of the enactment will be defeated by holding the same directory, it will
be construed as mandatory, whereas if by holding it mandatory serious general
inconvenience will be created to innocent persons without very much
furthering the object of enactment, the same will be construed as directory. But
all this does not mean that the language used is to be ignored.
4. In the case of statutes that are said to be mandatory, the court have held that if
it is not done, the proceedings that follow upon it are all void. On the other
hand, when the courts hold the provisions to be directory, they say that although
such provisions may not have been complied with, the subsequent proceedings
do not fail.
5. Factors to be considered include:
Intention of the legislature (context):
Regard must be had to the context, subject matter and object of the
statutory provision in question in determining whether the same is
mandatory or directory.
It is well settled that the use of word ‘may’ in a statutory provision would not
by itself show that the provision is directory in nature. In some cases the
legislature may use the word ‘may’ as a matter of pure conventional
courtesy and yet intent a mandatory force. In order, therefore, to interpret

the legal import of the word ‘may’. The court has to consider various factors,
namely the object and the scheme of the Act, the context and the
background against which the words have been used, the purpose and the
advantages sought to be achieved by the use of this word, and the like.
👉 Keshav Chandra Joshi v Union of India AIR 1991 SC 284
[The Supreme Court observed that under Rule 27 of the Uttar

Pradesh Forest Service Rules 1952, if the Governor is satisfied that
the operation of any rule regarding conditions of service of the
members caused undue hardship in a particular case, he ‘may’
consult the Public Service Commission notwithstanding anything
contained in the rules and dispense with or relax the requirement of
the conditions of service and extend the necessary benefit as is
expedient so as to relieve hardship and to cause just and equitable
results. The word ‘may’ has been used in the context of discharge of
statutory duty. The Governor is obligated to consult the Public Service
Commission. Therefore, the word ‘may’ must be construed as to
mean ‘shall’ and it is mandatory on the part of the Governor to consult
the Commission before exempting or relaxing the operation of the
rule The word ‘shall’ is not always decisive.]
👉 Hari Vishnu Kamath v Ahmad Ishaque, 1955
An enactment, mandatory in form, might in substance be directory.

The use of word ‘shall’ does not conclude the matter. look at the
context.
Purpose behind the statute and the effect of the provision
The principle as regards the nature of the statute must be determined

having regard to the purpose and object the statute seeks to achieve. If an
object of the enactment is defeated by holding the same directory, it should
be construed as mandatory; whereas if by holding it mandatory serious
general inconvenience will be created for innocent persons of the general

public without furthering the object of enactment, the same should be
construed as directory.
👉 DA Koregaonkar v State of Bombay, 1958
[it was held that, one of the important tests that must always be
employed in order to determine whether a provision is mandatory or
directory in character is to consider whether the non-compliance of a
particular provision causes inconvenience or injustice and, if it does,
then the court would say that, the provision must be complied with
and that it is obligatory in its character.]

👉 Aeron Steel Rolling Mills v State of Punjab AIR 1960
[HEADNOTE: question before the court was whether section 33B of

the Industrial Disputes Act 1947——-“The appropriate Government
may, by order in writing and for reasons to be stated therein withdraw
any proceeding under this Act pending before a Labour Court,
Tribunal, or National Tribunal and transfer the same to another
Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, for
the disposal of the proceeding”. The Court observed that the
provision empowered the Government to transfer cases from one
tribunal to another and specified the manner in which the power shall
be exercised———- held— “A failure to comply with this provision is
not likely to result in any injury or prejudice to the substantial rights of
interested person, or in the loss of any advantage, the destruction of
any right or the sacrifice of any benefit. On the other hand, insistence
on a strict compliance with it is likely to result in serious general
inconvenience of injustice to hundreds of innocent person who have
no control over Government without promoting the real aim and
object of the legislature. The power to transfer is not so limited by the
direction to give reasons that it cannot be exercised without following
the directions given. No penalty has been provided for failure to
comply with the terms of provision and the enactment is silent in
regard to the consequences of non – compliance. No substantial
rights depend on a strict observance of this provision; no injury can
result from ignoring it; and no Court can declare that the principal
object of the legislature that case should be capable of being
transferred has not been achieved. Considerations of convenience
and justice plainly require that this provision should be held to be
directory and not mandatory]
Use of prohibitory words

👉 State of Himachal Pradesh v MP Gupta (2004) 2 SCC 349
[Court was interpreting section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

1973, which provided ‘that no court shall take cognizance of any
offence alleged to have been committed by a public servant, judge,
magistrate, or member of the armed forces’. It was held that the use
of the words ‘no’ and ‘shall’ make it abundantly clear that the bar on
the exercise of power of the court to take cognizance of any offence
is absolute and complete.]

MODULE 6 FINALITY
CLAUSES/EXCLUSION OF
JURISDICTION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
Tags
General Principles, The extent of exclusion, Exclusion of Jurisdiction of

superior Courts
The exclusion clauses/ finality clause that seek to oust the jurisdiction of
particular court to hear the suit or the appeal are present in certain statutes. For
example section 9 of the CPC
The exclusion clauses have to be strictly interpreted in the case of lower courts.
However, the exclusion clauses cannot be construed to preclude the

Constitutional courts (superior courts) from hearing the matter under Article 32
or Article 226 of the Constitution as their jurisdiction cannot be ousted by a
statutory provision.
General rules of interpretation of the Constitution
1. The constitution must be read as a whole to avoid conflict. Harmonious reading

(not construction) must be applied. For example the golden triangle of 14, 19,
21
2. The Constitution contains major policy guidelines, therefore, the surrounding

circumstances, history , etc. has to be considered—-Internal and External aids
may be used while interpreting—preamble as an aid to construction.
3. The Constitution must be interpreted in a broad and literal sense.
4. The court has to infer the spirit of the Constitution from the language.
MODULE 6 FINALITY CLAUSES/EXCLUSION OF JURISDICTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 1

5. The Constitution prevails over other statutes
6. The Constitution is meant to endure for ages—-therefore the contemporary

interpretation of the Articles are essential, otherwise it would become
redundant.
7. Powers given in Constitution are generally strictly construed
8. Fundamental rights have to be read in light of the DPSP
9. presumption of constitutionality, check statutes against part III
10. Trade and Commerce [ ARTICLE 304] [ARTICLE 301]
11. Emergency Provisions [ARTICLE 352] [ARTICLE 356]
12. Article 72 of the Constitution gives the president the right to grant pardons,
remit, or commute the sentences of anyone convicted of any crime
The following principles have frequently been discussed by the courts while
interpreting the Constitution:
Doctrine of Pith and Substance
1. In India legislative powers of Parliament and State Legislatures are

conferred by Article 246 and distributed by Lists I, II and III in the seventh
schedule of the Constitution.
2. Article 246 : Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to
any of the matters in List I and State Legislatures have exclusive power to
make laws with respect to matters in List II. Parliament and State
Legislatures have both power to make laws with respect to matters in List III
which is called the Concurrent List.
3. There can be circumstances in which subject matter of list 1 clashes with

the subject matter of list 2. Hence, this doctrine is applied in this kind of
situation. The main reason behind the adoption of this doctrine of pith and
substance is that the powers of the legislature would be severely limited if
every law were to be declared invalid on the ground that it infringes power.
4. In every case where the legislative competence of a Legislature in regard to

a particular enactment is challenged with reference to the entries in the

various Lists, it is necessary to examine the pith and substance of the Act
and to find out if the matter comes substantially within an item in the List.
5. DOCTRINE OF PITH AND SUBSTANCE—-
In case of matters in List 1 and List II——-The question whether the

Legislature has kept itself within the jurisdiction assigned to it or has
encroached upon a forbidden field is determined by finding out the true
nature and character or pith and substance of the legislation. The doctrine
envisages that if the pith and substance of the legislation is covered by an
entry within the permitted jurisdiction of the Legislature any incidental
encroachment in the rival field is to be disregarded.
Because of the doctrine of pith and substance which permits incidental

encroachment in the rival field, it is possible that a law made by a State
Legislature, which in pith and substance is a law in respect of a matter in
List II, has made incidental encroachment on some matter in List I. Such an
incidental encroachment will be valid if the field of encroachment is not
covered but it will be void, to the extent of repugnancy, if the field be already
covered or it will become void if the field be later covered by a law made by
Parliament.
👉 State of Bombay and another v. F.N Balsara-
[This case acquires quite a lot of importance as it was the first case
which upheld the doctrine of Pith and Substance in India.]

👉 Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee v. Bank of Khulna
[In this case, the validity of the Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946
came to be questioned. The main argument here was that promissory
notes formed a part of the central subject and not state subject. But
on the contrary, the Privy Council held that interpreting the doctrine of
Pith and Substance, the act is actually a law with respect to ‘money
lending and money lenders’ and this was clearly a state subject,
further the court went ahead and stated an important point that this
act was valid even if it entrenched upon the subject of ‘Promissory
note’ which is a central subject, thus upholding the principle of the
doctrine of Pith and Substance.]
👉 In cases where conflict arises between a Central Act and a State Act
because of incidental encroachment on a subject in the rival
exclusive list, it is the Central Act which will always prevail.
But in ITC Ltd v Agricultural Produce Market Committee, 2002 held that in
a case where the conflict is between a State Act and a Central Act,
because of incidental encroachment of the Central Act on a subject in
the State List, the State legislation being within the exclusive power of
the State Legislature will be the dominant legislation and shall prevail
over the Central Act in the field of encroachment. It has been held in
some cases that the doctrine of covered field or occupied field can be
applied only to matters in List III.

👉 In Central Bank of India v State of Kerala, 2009 ——question related to
conflict between State Sales Tax Acts on the one hand and Central
Acts on the other. The State Acts were enacted under Entry 54 List II
and the Central Acts under Entry 45 in List I—-court found no
overlapping or conflict between the two sets of legislations.
Therefore, the question of repugnancy did not factually arise. It
cannot, however, be said that repugnancy cannot arise outside the
concurrent list or outside Article 254. The doctrine of pith and
substance which permits incidental encroachment may result in
repugnancy outside the concurrent list and in that event the central
law shall prevail.
👉 Security Association of India v UOI, (2014)
[Doctrine of Pith and Substance applied to decide whether the

Central Act was in conflict with the State Act—- held that the subject
matters of the two Acts are substantially different as the State Act
was a labour legislation, which seeks to regulate the employment of
private security guards employed in factories and establishments in
Maharashtra, and is hence relatable to List III, whereas the Central
Act only regulates the business of private security agencies, which is
relatable to the residuary Entry 97 in List I. Hence, both Acts were
found to be valid as they occupied different fields, and the
conflict in the operation of the two Acts was merely incidental.]

👉 State of Rajasthan v. G Chawla-
Significance of the doctrine in the judgment– The primary question

involved here was the power to legislate on matters of Public health.
The state government argued that entry 6 of the list II gives power to
the state government to regulate the use of amplifier as it produces
loud noise. On the other hand, the opposition put forth the point that
entry 31 of list I, which speaks about various means of
communication like that of telegraphs, telephones, wireless
broadcasting, etc., gives the union government the right to make laws
regarding the use of the amplifiers—— court held that amplifiers do
not come under entry 31 of list I. The court justified its point by
stating- ‘though amplifier is an apparatus of broadcasting and
communication, the legislation in its pith and substance would lie with
the state government and not the central government’.
In case of legislation on matters in List III (concurrent list)—-There is a

presumption of constitutionality of statutes and hence, prior to determining
whether there is any repugnancy between a Central Act and a State Act, it
has to determined whether both Acts relate to the same entry in List III, and
whether there is a "direct" and "irreconcilable" conflict between the two,
applying the doctrine of "pith and substance".
A law made by a State Legislature with respect to a matter in the concurrent

list if repugnant to a law made by Parliament will be void to the extent of the
repugnancy unless the state law has received the assent of the President in
which case it will prevail in that state. [article 254]. The assent of the
President to the State law does not prevent Parliament from, enacting later
any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding, amending
or repealing the State law.
The doctrine of pith and substance is sometimes invoked to find out the
nature and content of the legislation. However, when there is irreconcilable

conflict between the two legislations the Central Legislation shall prevail.
However, every attempt would be made to reconcile the conflict.
Doctrine of incidental and ancillary powers
The doctrine of Ancillary and Incidental encroachment is actually an

addition to the doctrine of Pith and Substance.
The prime ideology existing behind this doctrine is that the power to
legislate on a subject will automatically include the power to legislate even
on the subordinate (ancillary) matters which happen to be reasonably
connected to the subject of the matter.
A matter mentioned in an entry is construed to cover all ancillary or

subsidiary matters which can be reasonably be said to be comprehended in
it. Further, power to enact a law on a particular topic includes the power to
make provision in the law enacted to prevent its evasion.
It also includes rights to legislate on ancillary matters with the right to

legislate on a subject.
The express words employed in an entry would necessarily include

incidental and ancillary matters so as to make the legislation effective.
👉 This doctrine doesn’t imply that the extent of the power can be
stretched out to an unreasonable extent.
R M D Charbaugwala vs State of Mysore

[Supreme Court held that wagering and betting is a state subject as
referenced in the State list however it excludes capacity to impose
taxes on wagering and betting because it exists as a separate item in
the same list.]

👉 United Provinces v Atiqa Begum & Others , AIR 1941
[ The main issue was whether the regularization of the Remission

Act, 1938, an Act of the Uttar Pradesh legislature was valid.—— “The
subjects dealt with in the three legislative lists are not always set out
with a scientific definition. It would be practically impossible for
example to define each item in the Provincial List in such a way as to
make it exclusive of every other item in that list[…] In the case of
some of these categories […] the general word is amplified and
explained… while the inclusion of others might not be so obvious. […]
I think however that none of the items in the Lists is to be read in a
narrow or restricted sense, and that each general word should be
held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly
and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it.”]
[This case laid down the way for the doctrine of ancillary or incidental
powers in the Indian legal system. It clarifies that a legislature has the
power to make law on matters which are ancillary or incidental to the
main matters of legislation and thus, are essential to fulfil the object of
the law.]
Test of Repugnancy /Doctrine of Occupied Field
1. Difference between pith and substance and repugnancy— doctrine of

pith and substance deals with conflicts between state and Centre when they
formulate legislation that is not a part of their list. However, the doctrine of
repugnancy deals with the conflict that arises due to the legislation
formulated on the concurrent list. If the Union formulates a law that is part of
the state list and vice versa and then the inconsistency arises between
state and Center then that has to be dealt with under the doctrine of pith
and substance and not under the doctrine of repugnancy. [ Hoechst Pharma
Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1983) .]
2. India has sui generis model of federalism— State of WB v. UOI
3. Legislative division of power under the constitution—- Central , State and

concurrent lists— Schedule 7 list I, II, III (legislative competency) —- Article

245, Article 246]
4. According to Article 246 of the Constitution, there are three lists on which
the State and the Centre can make laws. These are mentioned below: List
– I (Union list) includes subject matter on which the Parliament can make
laws; List – II (State list) includes subject matter on which the state
legislatures can make laws; List – III (Concurrent list) includes on which
both the state legislatures and the Parliament can make laws.
5. The concept of repugnancy has been developed under Article 254 of the
Indian Constitution to deal with the conflict between the Centre and states
regarding the legislation on the same subject matter in the Concurrent List.
6. Article 254(1) clearly states that if any legislation enacted by the state
legislature is repugnant to the legislation enacted by the Parliament which
Parliament is competent to enact, or if the state legislation is repugnant to
an existing central law on matter enumerated in the Concurrent List, then
the central law, whether passed before or after the state law, shall prevail
and the State law to the extent of the repugnancy, be void.
7. State legislations on the matters under the concurrent list must be in

consonance with the central legislations occupying the same field— if the
state legislation in this case is contrary , then state legislation will be set
aside when balance can’t be draw—incidental/non-intentional intrusion by
the state into the legislative field of center, this issue will not be taken
seriously/gravely—-State rules also have to be in consonance with the
central rules/notifications occupying the same field
8. Article 254(2) clearly states that in case of a repugnant legislation passed

by the state against the Parliament, the state can enforce the legislation if
they receive assent from the President. This would not prevent the
Parliament from enacting any law with respect to the same matter including
a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the state law.

👉 In the case M Karunanidhi v. Union of India (1979) , it was held by
the Supreme Court that three conditions must be satisfied to
conclude that repugnance exists. These are:
(A) That there is a clear and direct inconsistency between

the Central Act and the State Act.
(B) That such an inconsistency is absolutely irreconcilable.
(C)That the inconsistency between the provisions of the two Acts
is of such a nature as to bring the two Acts into direct collision
with each other and a situation is reached where it is impossible
to obey one without disobeying the other.
This landmark judgment laid down that for the legislations to be

repugnant to each other, it should not only be inconsistent but
also be irreconcilable, meaning that the similar legislation passed
are not repugnant unless and until they encroach on each other.

👉 Deep Chand v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (1959)
[ Uttar Pradesh Transport Service (Development) Act, 1955 was

found repugnant to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 by the
Parliament, when the State Government of Uttar Pradesh issued
a notification under Section 3 of the impugned Act, directing that
the said routes along with others should be exclusively served by
the State buses, and followed up that notification by others under
Sections 4 and 8 of the Act. Therefore, the Supreme Court, in this
case, held that the U.P. Transport Service Act is void to the extent
of repugnancy.]
[The Supreme Court laid down the three tests to identify

whether the two legislations are repugnant or not:
1. Whether there is a direct conflict between the two conflicting

provisions,
2. Whether the Parliament intended to lay down an exhaustive

enactment on the subject matter and to replace the law made by
the State legislature, and
3. Whether the law made by the Parliament and that made by the
State legislature occupies the same field.
Principle of Harmonious Construction
1. The rule of harmonious construction can be termed as purposive approach.

It envisages that the “Constitutional provisions should not be construed in
isolation from all other parts of the Constitution, but should be construed as
to harmonize with those other parts.”
2. Supreme Court of India has made an attempt to interpret certain provisions

of the Constitutions as well as the Entries provided under the schedule VII
of the Constitution of India with the help of applying the rule of harmonious
construction. The main objective of the court in applying such interpretation

is to bring consistency among different provisions which are in conflict with
each other so that none of them get effected as all the provisions have
been made to meet the necessities that might have arose in the past or in
future.
3. There can be a clash between the powers of the State and that of the
Union. There are certain subjects in three lists which may overlap with each
other under the Constitution. Since, these Entries are in conflict with each
other, they need to be harmonized by the court in order to avoid any conflict
among them and all these Entries are to be given effect.
4. When wide construction of an entry leads to a conflict or overlapping with

another entry in the same or different list, the rule of harmonious
construction is applied so as to reconcile the conflict and to give effect to all
of them. Repugnancy arises when the conflict between competing
legislations cannot be reconciled and it is not possible to give effect to both.
But before reaching the conclusion that there is repugnancy arising from
conflict, effort should be made to remove the conflict by harmonious
construction. [ Doctrine of Harmonious Construction ]

👉 In the case of In Re C.P. Berar Sales of Motor Spirits and Lubricants
Taxation Act, 1939 the rule of reconciliation was propounded.
[Under this rule, courts have read the Entries of two list together
so as to avoid any inconsistency by determining the extent of the
subjects. By applying this rule, court interpreted the Entry 24 and
25 of State list and observed that the court has the duty to
reconcile and bring consistency between the Entries which are in
direct conflict and may overlap with each other. Therefore,
Supreme Court held that ‘gas and gas works’ of Entry 25 are
different from ‘Industry’ under Entry 24. Thus, under this case, it
was also observed that emphasize should be made on the
language of the Entries and where there is direct conflict of
Entries or where these Entries overlap with each other, the courts
have the duty bring consistency between those Entries and
reconcile them.]
Doctrine of Colorable legislation
1. The doctrine of colourable legislation is based on the maxim that “what

cannot be done directly cannot also be done indirectly”. The doctrine
becomes applicable when a legislature seeks to do something in an indirect
manner when it cannot do it directly. Thus, it refers to the competency of the
legislature to enact a particular law. If the impugned legislation falls within
the competence of the legislature, the question of doing something
indirectly which cannot be done directly does not arise.
2. Legislative competency is an issue that relates to how legislative power

must be shared between the centre and states. The main point is that the
legislature having restrictive power can not step over the field of
competency. It is termed as the “fraud on the constitution”
3. Powers of Union/ Central Government and State Government are

bifurcated vide Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India to make Laws
related to Taxation

4. The doctrine of colourable legislation has nothing to do with the motive of
the legislation, it is in the essence a question of vires or power of the
legislature to enact the law in question. It was observed by the Apex court
that “the motive of the legislature in passing a statute is beyond the scrutiny
of the courts” so the court has no power to scrutinize the policy which led to
an enactment of a law falling within the ambit of the legislature concerned.
5. There is always a presumption that the legislature that the legislature does
not exceed its jurisdiction (ut res magis, valet quam parret) and the burden
of establishing that an act is not within the competence of the legislature or
that it has transgressed other constitutional mandates as is always on the
person who challenges its constitutionality.
👉 K.C gajapti vs state of Orissa
[ SC retained the validity of the Orissa Agricultural Income Tax

Amendment Act, 1950. State can levy tax on Agriculture as per the
State list. The court held that the Act was not colourable legislation
as it falls within the legislative capacity of the State Legislature.]

👉 State of M.P. V. Mahalaxmi Fabric Mills Ltd.
[ The issue was the increasing of the royalty rates from 400 per cent
to 2000 per cent by the Parliament in the cess and other taxes on
minerals validating Ordinance, 1992 —-the contention was that this
was a colourable device, issued not for the development of minerals
but for compensating the State government. The Supreme Court
upheld the validity of the notification and held that it could not be said
to be a convenience device. Minerals belonged to the state and the
losses suffered by them should be repaid.]
[Following factors have to be established to ascertain that it is a

colourable legislation and hence void—-
That it was not within the competence of legislature to enact the

impugned act.
That the act was a fraud on the constitution and that certain parts
of the act were unenforceable on account of vagueness and
indefiniteness]
Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain ]

MODULE 7 INTERPRETATION OF
SPECIFIC STATUTES
Tags
👉 MANNER OF INTERPRETATION VARIES:
TAXATION —STRICTLY
PENAL—STRICTLY
REMEDIAL/BENEFICIAL - LIBERALLY
REMEDIAL
1. Remedial statutes are distinguished from penal statutes —-remedial statutes

are declaratory in nature while penal are prohibitory in general ( in certain cases
the penal statutes can be declaratory + prohibitory)
2. The remedial statutes are generally liberally construed —the contemporary

approach is towards purposive interpretation
3. If multiple interpretation are possible then the court will adopt an interpretation
that would be beneficial for whose benefit the law has been enacted
4. A remedial statute can have penal provisions —ex. Employees Provident Fund
Act.
5. General Principles for construing the Remedial statutes:
The courts have to give the widest possible operation while construing the
language of the remedial statute, however, it should be within the confines of
the enactment.
UOI v. Prabhakaran Vijay Kumar, 2008 [Liberal construction was adopted in

interpreting section 123(c) of the Railways Act, 1989 which defines "untoward
MODULE 7 INTERPRETATION OF SPECIFIC STATUTES 1

accident" to include "accidental falling of a passenger from a train carrying
passengers". The question in the case was whether the expression "untoward
accident" so defined will also cover the case of a passenger who fell down and
died while trying to board the train and his dependants will be entitled to
compensation under section 124A of the Act. In answering this question in the
affirmative—-held that since the provision for compensation in the Railways Act
is a beneficial piece of legislation should receive a liberal and wider
interpretation and not a narrow and technical one. Hence interpretations which
advances the object of the statue and serves its
purpose should be preferred.]
The words have to be construed to give complete remedy which the

phraseology permits. [relief intended should not be denied]
In case of labour and welfare legislations the court should interpret statutes in
the light of DPSP and other International conventions—-this is teleological
approach (Ex Juvenile Justice Act)
Whenever a provision imposes a penalty for workmen will be considered a

penal enactment subject to the rule of strict construction in their favour. Strict
construction in favor of workmen due to disparity in the negotiating/bargaining
power of the employer and the workmen.
[ Glaxo Laboratories v. Presiding Officer Labour Court, 1984 -—what could be

classified as misconduct was strictly interpreted by the Court.——a standing
order defining misconduct, proof of which could enable the employer to impose
penalties on the employee was held to be a penal enactment for purposes of
construction]
Sant Ram v. Rajendra Lal, 1978 [extrinsic aid—social welfare ideologies are also
extrinsic aids]
Rules while testing the constitutional validity of remedial statute—-

presumption of constitutionality—if blatantly violating then principles of
interpretation cannot be applied to keep the provision—-reasonable and just
——FR, DPSP, PREAMBLE—-in case of conflict constitution will prevail.

Western India Plywood Ltd. v. P Ashokan , 1997 [if the language of the statute is
clear then regardless of it being a beneficial legislation, it has to be interpreted
as it is—-employment injury—-workmen compensation act—-can it be sought
under torts if the legislation is preventing—-court held that the remedy could not
be claimed under tort as the statute has barred—-cannot go beyond the
express words of the statute]
Exception clauses under the remedial statutes/beneficial legislations—— have

to be interpreted narrowly.
Legislature cannot take away the rights given under remedial statute by
enacting a conflicting statute simultaneously taking away the right
👉 Bhagirath Kanoria v. State of MP, 1984
[Held that non-payment of employer's contribution within fifteen days

under the Employers' Provident Funds Scheme, 1952 which was
punishable under section 14(2-A) of the Employees' Provident Funds and
Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 was a continuing offence—
Considering the object and purpose of this provision, which is to ensure
the welfare of workers, we find it impossible to hold that the offence is not
of a continuing nature]
👉 State of Karnataka v. Appa Balu Ingale , 1993 [protection of civil rights act,
1955— landmark case under Article 17—- the statute is a remedial
statute] [protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 enacted for punishing the
enforcement of any disability arising out of untouchability abolished by
Article 17 of the Constitution and to implement its mandate will be
construed in the light of the constitutional goal to
annihilate untouchability and the disabilities arising out of it]

PENAL
1. Penal statutes have to be strictly construed—-as they are policy decisions —-

legislative domain—-the court intervention has to be seldom
👉 State of Punjab v. Gurmeet Singh , 2014
[The presumption related to dowry death in section 304-B of the IPC,

which covers not only the husband of the deceased woman but also "any
relative of her husband", was construed strictly to hold that the brother
of the aunt of the husband cannot be prosecuted thereunder. Since the
term "relative" is not defined in the IPC, the same has to be understood in
its natural, ordinary or popular sense, and would therefore mean only a
person related to the husband by blood, marriage or adoption.]
2. If the penal statute provides for a duty but no mode of enforcing it, the
traditional presumption used to be that the person in breach of the duty could
be made liable for the offence of contempt of the statute—- in the modern
legislations such presumption does not exist—-the statute has to provide
explicitly provide for the duty and mechanism for punishment on the breach of
the duty—-clear defined words have to be used to create an offence
3. If there is ambiguity in the intention of legislature, then the interpretation

adopted would be in favor of the ACCUSED —[ State of Kerala v. Raneef [UAPA] -
—Mere passive membership of an alleged illegal organization may not amount
to an offence under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967]
4. The casus omissus cannot be supplied in the penal statutes——strict rule
5. Penal statutes may have a color of beneficial legislation—— Surendar Singh v.
State of Haryana , 2014 [s. 103 B of Evidence Act, 304B of IPC—- “Dowry
death”—— “soon before her death”—- beneficial import despite in penal

statutes—-the term “soon before” ha to be interpreted in a beneficial manner—
cannot be a strict interpretation]

6. Reema Agrawal v. Anupam , 2004 [In sections 304B and 498A of the Penal Code,
having regard to the object of preventing cruelty to women, the expression
"husband" has been construed to cover a person who enters into marital
relationship with the woman concerned whatever may be the legitimacy of the
marriage]
7. If the statute requires the accused to disprove by preponderance of probabilities

, a presumed fact which is an essential element of offence , the statute may be
read to offend a due process a clause and against fair trial. The provision may
be read down and construed to only provide for evidential burden on the
accused and the prosecution has to show beyond reasonable doubt that the
defence is not made out by the evidence—presumption of innocence is a
human right [ s. 35 NDPS]
8. deeming provisions in cases of penal statutes—- read it in the context—— “in

the nature of”—they have to be strictly interpreted—reversal of elements of
crime cannot be done through the deeming provisions
9. Heydons Rule (mischief Rule) is prominently applied in Penal Statutes—-clearly

expressed intention has to be seen during interpretation
10. , 2002 [s. 15 TADA, 1987—- confession

State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Chagan Lal
made before the police is admissible as per section (contrary to the CrPC)—-as
per section the confession sent to judicial magistrate does not require inquiry as
to confirming if the confession was voluntary—he has to forward it——held that
the confession under s. 15 is a substantive piece of evidence and can be used
against the accused and also the co-accused.] important departure from the ordinary law---
receive that interpretation which would achieve
object of that provision and not frustrate..
TAXING
CONSTITUTION vis-a-vis TAXING STATUTES
1. Article 265 for checking constitutionality of taxing statutes
2. Article 265 of the Constitution of India provides that “no tax shall be levied
or collected except by the authority of law”. Therefore, no direct taxes can
be levied or collected in India, unless it is explicitly and clearly authorized by
way of legislation.
3. The Income-tax Act, 1961 (ITA) was enacted to provide for levy and
collection of tax on income earned by a person.

4. Moreover, the Constitution of India provides for certain limitations on the
powers of the parliament to enact legislations in relation to direct taxes.
First, the parliament should have legislative competence to enact the law to
impose tax. Only those taxes, specifically mentioned in List I of Schedule 7
can be imposed by the union government. Any tax not specifically
mentioned in List II and List III of the Schedule 7, is also taxable by the
parliament under Article 248 of the Constitution read with Entry 97 of Union
List ( residuary provisions)
Second, the taxing statutes should not be in contravention of the

fundamental rights enumerated in Part III of the constitution—-taxing
statutes should not be arbitrary, discriminatory or in violation of Articles 21,
14 and 19(1) (g) of the Constitution of India.

👉 Vodafone case——SC held that Article 265 of the Constitution of
India states that no tax shall be levied except by authority of law.
Consequently, no tax can be levied without clear words incorporated
in the legislation and no equitable construction of the words is
permissible.
The Vodafone case was largely decided against the revenue because
tax statutes are strictly interpreted and there was a lacuna in the law
itself which did not explicitly cover such transactions. Taxation statute
being a fiscal statute imposes pecuniary burden on the taxpayer, and
so such statutes are construed strictly. Unless the black letter of the
law permits, no tax can be levied merely by doing purposive
interpretation. This is in accordance to Article 265 of the constitution,
which only allows tax to be imposed by ‘authority of law’.
Separately, another law of interpretation applicable to tax statutes are

that wherever there are two possible outcomes, then that
interpretation is given which is in favour of assessee. This was
another reason for the revenue losing its case in Supreme Court.
In Vodafone case, retrospective application of tax statutes was

considered to be against fair and equitable treatment (FET)
Interpretation of taxing statutes
1. Taxation is a policy matter, within the domain of the administrative and

legislative authorities—-Generally strict interpretation by the court—-Start
with literal rule—in case of absurdity, purposive can be adopted in certain
cases—modern approach.
2. Charging and computation provisions in the Taxation statute are together

treated as an integral code. Charging section fix the tax rates (substantive
part). Computation provisions stipulate what should be excluded
(exemptions) or included while computation of the Income tax.

3. There are three stages in the imposition of a tax, viz. (1) declaration of
liability in respect of persons or property; (2) assessment of tax that
quantifies the sum which the person liable has to pay; and (3) methods of
recovery if the person taxed does not voluntarily pay.
4. The elements of TAXING STATUTE—- a)subject of tax, b) person liable to

pay the tax, c) rate of tax——if there is defect in these three elements it can
only be cured by the parliament.
3. The penal provision in taxing statutes do not attract the rule of presumption
of mens rea—not an essential component under taxing statute and in
economic offences
4. The words “shall presume” used in taxing statutes are there to show
infringement of some provision which subjects the assesee to a penalty are
construed as a rebuttable presumption—generally “shall presume”
connotes mandatory presumption, but in taxing statute it is rebuttable
5. Penalty cannot be inferred under taxing statutes—it has to be explicitly

provided for—-legislative gap—cannot be provided for by the court
6. retrospectivity cannot be implied or inferred in case of a taxing statute
7. Penalty can be imposed on non-payment of tax, but, Tax cannot be

imposed by way of penalty— [ Hardeo Motor Transport v. State of MP, 2006 ]
8. The exemption provisions have to be interpreted in the ordinary sense—

there are two distinct schools of thought—-First school believes that the
exemption provision must be liberally construed in favor of the assessee
(tax payer) —this is the American view that in case of taxing statute—
matter always to be resolved in favor of tax payer—ultimate object of
taxation is public welfare—the US courts believe that the taxing statures
are interpreted towards/in favor of the tax payer—-this is different from the
Indian scenario. The Second school believes that since exemption from
taxation would increase the burden on the other members of the society it
should be strictly construed against the tax payer in the case of doubt (in
favor of govt)
9. State of Gujrat v. Esser Oil Ltd., 2012 [ In case of ambiguity in taxing

statute the benefit to be given to asessee—- however, this does not apply to

construction of an exception or an exempting provision as they have to
be strictly construed—-a person invoking the exception clause to relieve
him from tax liability must clearly establish that he is covered by the
provision and that in case of doubt the benefit must go to the state]
10. Considerations of hardships, anomalies , injustice cannot be claimed and

doesn’t factor in the interpretation of taxing statutes—-However, in the case
of mass hardship such as covid there can be certain relaxation —but in
individual cases the taxing statute will be strictly interpreted.
11. Double Taxation—- Ideally double taxation must be avoided—--But if the

legislature has explicitly provided for double taxation then the courts cannot
interpret it otherwise—they have to be strictly construed as it is—-the
aggrieved can challenge such law.

👉 National Mineral Development Corporation v. State of MP, 2004
[Several charging sections do not have a computation provision

appended—-Charging section and the computation provisions
together constitute an integrated code and, therefore, when there is a
case to which the computation provisions cannot apply at all, it can
be concluded that such a case was not intended to be brought within
the charging section.
This principle was applied for construing and applying section 9 of the
Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 which is
the charging section for levy of royalty "in respect of any mineral
removed or consumed" at the rates fixed in Schedule II of the Act. In
case of iron ore the schedule prescribes rates of royalty for (i) lumps
(ii) fines and (iii) concentrates but not for "slimes"—- held that no
royalty could be recovered on "slimes" which have no commercial
value .—-For the purpose of levying any charge, not only has the
charge to be authorised by law, it has also to be computed—-the law
should expressly provide for charging and computation provision—-if
a particular component is not provided in the computation section
then the tax cannot be charged on that
The charging provision and the computation provision may be found

at one place or at two different places—In the latter case, the
charging provision and the computation provision, though placed in
two parts of the enactment, shall have to be read together as
constituting one integrated provision.
In case of conflict, the computation provision shall give way to the

charging provision.
In case of doubt or ambiguity the computing provision shall be so

interpreted as to act in aid of charging provision. If the two can be
read together homogeneously then both shall be given effect to. The

computing provision cannot be treated as mere surplusage or of no
significance.
👉 Fiscal legislation imposing liability is generally governed by the

normal presumption that it is not retrospective and it is a cardinal
principle of the tax law that the law to be applied is that in force in the
assessment year unless otherwise provided expressly or by
necessary implication.
State of Kerala v Alex George, (2005)
[HEADNOTE: held that revision of Schedule to the Kerala Plantation

Tax Act, 1960 by the Kerala Finance Act, 1987 with effect from 1 July
1987 which revised the tariff categories as well as the tariff structure
was held to be applicable only in the next financial year, viz. 1988-89
and not in the financial year 1987-88.—-A taxable event is that which
on its occurrence creates the liability to tax, which liability does not
exist at later point of time. Even though the taxable event of a tax
happens to be at a particular point of time, the levy and collection of
such tax may be postponed, for administrative convenience, to a later
date. As a corollary, the charging section cannot be limited or
circumscribed by the machinery provisions of the Act. The machinery
provisions cannot be interpreted so as to restrict the scope of the
charging section. Liability to tax is distinct from quantification by
assessment.]
There are three components of a taxing statute, viz., subject of the
tax, person liable to pay the tax and the rate at which the tax is levied.

👉 Mathuram Agarwal v State of MP, AIR 2000
[HEADNOTE: In fiscal legislation a transaction cannot be taxed on

any doctrine of "the substance of the matter" as distinguished from its
legal signification, for a subject is not liable to tax on supposed "spirit
of the law" or "by inference or by analogy"—- "the subject is not to be
taxed unless the words of the taxing statute unambiguously impose
the tax on him." The proper course in construing revenue Acts is to
give a fair and reasonable construction to their language without
leaning to one side or the other but keeping in mind that no tax can
be imposed without words clearly showing an intention to lay the
burden and that equitable construction of the words is not
permissible. Considerations of hardship, injustice or anomalies do not
play any useful role in construing taxing statutes unless there be
some real ambiguity.]
👉 CCE v National Tobacco Co of India Ltd, (1972)
[In Article 265 and also in taxing statutes the words "levy" and
"collect" are not used as synonymous terms. Though the term "levy"
may include "imposition" and "assessment", it does not include
"collection".
"Exemption" from tax comes later to levy for "exemption" can only
operate when there is a valid levy; if there was no levy at all, there
would be nothing to exempt.]

👉 Rajasthan Rajya Sahakari Spinning & Ginning Mills Federation Ltd v Deputy
CIT, Jaipur, (2014)
[ In all tax matters one has to interpret the taxation statute strictly—-
no tax can be levied unless there is a clear provision levying tax—
Simply because one class of legal entities is given a benefit which is
specifically stated in the Act, does not mean that the benefit can be
extended to legal entities not referred to in the Act as there is no
equity in matters of taxation. Accordingly, the benefit available to
companies under section 72-A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, of having
the losses of an amalgamating company carried forward and set off
against the profits of the amalgamated company, was held to be
inapplicable to cooperative societies in the absence of a specific
provision to that effect.]
👉 AV Fernandez v State of Kerala, AIR 1957
[ The enacting part of the statute must, where it is clear, be taken to

control the non obstante clause where both cannot be read
harmoniously]
[In construing fiscal statutes and in determining the liability of a

subject to tax one must have regard to the strict letter of the law. If the
revenue satisfies the court that the case falls strictly within the
provisions of the law, the subject can be taxed. If, on the other hand,
the case is not covered within the four corners of the provisions of the
taxing statute, no tax can be imposed by inference or by analogy or
by trying to probe into the intentions of the Legislature and by
considering what was the substance of the matter. But where such
literal interpretations lead to absurd result cassus omissus could be
inferred]

👉 Sales Tax Commissioner v Modi Sugar Mills, AIR 1961
[ In interpreting a taxing statute, equitable considerations are entirely

out of place. taxing statutes cannot be interpreted on any
presumptions or assumptions. Equitable considerations, logic, or
reasons cannot guide while interpreting taxing statutes—The court
must look squarely at the words of the statute and interpret them. It
must interpret a taxing statute in the light of what is clearly expressed;
it cannot imply anything which is not expressed; it cannot import
provisions in the statute so as to supply any assumed deficiency—-if
the words are capable of two interpretations, the benefit of the
interpretation is to be given to the tax payer as the mistake is on the
legislature, it has to make the legislation clear]
👉 Lakshmi Ammal v KM Madhav Krishnan, AIR 1978
Court fees act—equal access to court—liberally interpreted—if

economic statutes have fiscal requirement—court can interpret in
light of the purpose
[ In construing the Court-fees Act, there is yet another ground for
construing it strictly. The Act may, if the fee is heavy, seriously restrict
the rights of a person to seek his remedies in a court of justice and as
access to justice is the basis of the legal system, in a case where
there is reasonable doubt, the benefit of construction must go to him
who says that the lesser court-fee alone be paid—-if there is a
possibility to interpret this act in two ways, it should lean in favor of
the one who is facing hardship—-this is an exception to the general
rule which says that hardship should not factor in while interpreting
the taxing statute]

MODULE 8 & 9
Tags
RETROSPECTIVE OPERATION
All laws must have a prospective operation. However, when there has to be a
transition from a repealed law to a new law, retrospective operation van be seen
When intent of legislature is to apply retrospectively, then the judges have to

apply retrospectively, but if there is an option prospective application must be
interpreted.
transitional provisions—-help in transition towards a new policy /

Act—-only expected to be temporary till vacuum is filled—- in certain cases the
period of transition is mentioned.
EXPIRY AND REPEAL
If old law is repealed but the case is instituted under it, then the case would be
continued under old law itself—-saving clauses
GENERAL CLAUSES ACT, 1897
common approach as to how to read a statute—definition clause
MODULE 8 & 9 1
👉 Where this Act, or any [Central Act] or
section 6: Effect of repeal.—
Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any

enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a
different intention appears, the repeal shall not--
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal
takes effect; or
(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or

anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or

incurred under any enactment so repealed; or
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any

offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any

such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment
as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may
be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or
punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not
been passed.
MODULE 8 & 9 2

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MODULE 2 BASIC PRINCIPLES &

There are 4 basic types of interpretation:

1. There are several types of interpretation: beneficial, contextual, equitable,

2. The 4 basic types/rules of interpretation are as follows:

MODULE 2 BASIC PRINCIPLES & GUIDING RULES 1

of the act should be chosen— interpretation made must suppress the

MODULE 2 BASIC PRINCIPLES & GUIDING RULES 2

I. INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE

2. Statute is an edict of the legislature——- conventional way of interpreting or

3. interpreted in the context of the intent of those who make it.

MODULE 2 BASIC PRINCIPLES & GUIDING RULES 3

[Headnote: General words and phrases, howsoever wide and

II. STATUTE MUST BE READ AS A WHOLE IN ITS CONTEXT

1. When the question arises as to the meaning of a certain provision in a statute, it

2. Law should not be read in void, socio-political conditions must be considered

MODULE 2 BASIC PRINCIPLES & GUIDING RULES 4

📢 RBI v. Pearless General Finance and investment Company, 1987

[Headnote: Interpretation must depend upon text + context—-best

MODULE 2 BASIC PRINCIPLES & GUIDING RULES 5

[Headnote: For contextual interpretation, textual interpretation (original

[Held: reference to "mismanagement" in the Preamble of the Textile

[HELD: When question arises as to the meaning of a certain provision in

MODULE 2 BASIC PRINCIPLES & GUIDING RULES 6

[Headnote: To ascertain the meaning of a word in a statute the court

📢 AG v HRH Prince Ernest Augustus, (1957) 1 All ER 49

MODULE 2 BASIC PRINCIPLES & GUIDING RULES 7

[Headnote: High Court of Australia: "the modern approach to statutory

📢 IMP Aswini Kumar Ghose v Arabinda Bose, AIR 1952

MODULE 2 BASIC PRINCIPLES & GUIDING RULES 8

[Headnote: A person employed as a lino typist by the appellant company

MODULE 2 BASIC PRINCIPLES & GUIDING RULES 9

[Headnote: The appellant and respondent were the contesting

MODULE 2 BASIC PRINCIPLES & GUIDING RULES 10

MODULE 2 BASIC PRINCIPLES & GUIDING RULES 11

[Headnote: respondent made certain unauthorized construction——

III. STATUTE TO BE CONSTRUED TO MAKE IT EFFECTIVE AND WORKABLE

1. Interpretation that reduces a provision to futility should be avoided.

2. A provision that is prima facie constitutional should not be construed otherwise

MODULE 2 BASIC PRINCIPLES & GUIDING RULES 12

📢 Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co Ltd v State of Assam, AIR 1990 SC 123

[Headnote: Challenging the Const. validity of nationalization- court

[ Side-note: In cases of Nationalization the concept of eminent domain,

MODULE 2 BASIC PRINCIPLES & GUIDING RULES 13

[Headnote: s. 12 of limitation Act (exclusion of time in legal proceedings)-

[Side-note: The difference between judgment and decree- the judgment

MODULE 2 BASIC PRINCIPLES & GUIDING RULES 14

📢 UOI v Ranbaxy, 2008

[Headnote: While construing exemption notification—- principle of

📢 R&B Falcon v. CIT, 2008

MODULE 2 BASIC PRINCIPLES & GUIDING RULES 15

2. even though the provision may be strange or surprising, unreasonable or unjust

3. if the words of a statute on a proper construction can be read only in a particular

4. However, if inconvenience is pleaded, the court should not lightly dismiss it

MODULE 2 BASIC PRINCIPLES & GUIDING RULES 16

[Headnote: According to the prescribed rules the Income tax returns

MODULE 2 BASIC PRINCIPLES & GUIDING RULES 17

[Headnote: Relates to food adulteration— Rule 11, Appendix B

📢 Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd vs Maddula Ratnavalli & Ors, 2007

[Headnote: Merely because statute causes hardship does not make it

MODULE 2 BASIC PRINCIPLES & GUIDING RULES 18

📢 SR BATRA V. TARUNA BATRA, 2007

[Headnote: If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous it

V. PLAIN MEANING RULE