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V.

STATE PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, Article II

A. Preamble (comes from the word preambulare, to walk before)


1. Nature, purpose and aims

The preamble cannot be regarded as a source of any substantive power. The true office of
the preamble is to expound the nature, extent and application of the powers actually conferred
by the constitution.

Purpose: It indicates the source of authority adopting the constitution. It also sets forth the
basic aims and ends sought to be achieved with the adoption of the fundamental law and it is
referred to in ascertaining the meaning and correct interpretation of the provisions of the
constitution.

Is it part of the Constitution? Yes. But it is not an essential part of the Constitution. It serves
as an introduction.
It states the origin and purpose of the Constitution. It talks of who the authors are and for
whom is the Constitution promulgated. It states the general purpose which are intended to be
achieved by the Constitution; the government it seeks to establish; it contains the basic
principles underlying the Constitution and all these can serve as an aid or guide in legislation and
interpretation. It serves as a guide to the different departments.

B. Principles

Statement of the ideological principles that underlie the Constitution.


Purpose: It sheds light to the other provisions of the Constitution; it serves as a guide to all
departments of the government and they aid as to the meaning of the different provisions of
the Constitution.

What is the difference between state principles and state policies?


Principles – comprehensive and fundamental doctrines in the Constitution accepted as norms
in the creation, establishment and operation of the government.
State Policies – definite methods and courses of actions to guide and determine present and
future decisions.

1. Democratic and Republican State, Article II, Section 1


The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.

The people are the possessors of sovereign power and the source of all government authority.
This does not connote, however, that the new constitution allows direct or pure democracy
where the people directly manage their affairs. The essence of our system is republican or
representative meaning that the people should not exercise the powers of government directly.
They can do it only through the medium of the duly elected and appointed public officials.

a. Manifestations of Democracy and Republicanism


- Rule of the majority
- Rule of law
- Elections through popular will
- Existence of bill of rights

Other: no irrepealable laws; separation of powers; separation of church and state; checks and
balances.

2. Adoption of International Law, Article II, Section 2

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy
of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.

a. Renunciation of war

This is based on the Kellogg-Brian Pact of 1928 which is a solemn undertaking of 61 nations
renouncing war as an instrument of national policy and agreeing to settle their disputes by
pacific means.

Who can declare war in the Philippines? No one; because we renounce war as an instrument
of national policy.
Who can declare the existence of a state of war? Congress by a vote of 2/3 of both Houses
in joint session assembled, voting separately. (Art. VI, Sec. 23)

b. Incorporation Clause

International Law, two kinds:


1. International Customary Law (binding on all states)
Elements:
a. Objective element – acts amounting to settled practice of States (practices
which are widespread, established and consistent)
b. Subjective element – opinio juris sive necessitates: the belief that this practice
is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.

These are generally accepted principles of international law which we adopt under Art. II,
Sec. 2 (incorporation doctrine).

2. International Agreement (applicable only to signatories)


The signatory may enact a law to implement or embody the international agreement
(transformation doctrine)

Jus cogens – unique class of customary laws that occupy the highest echelon in Human Rights
Law hierarchy; peremptory norms which are non-derogable and imprescriptible.
Elements:
1. It is a peremptory norm of general international law;
2. It is accepted and recognized by the international community;
3. There can be no derogation therefrom;
4. It can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character.

Obligatio erga omnes – obligations that are owed by States to all, regardless of the presence
or absence of their assent to be bound thereby.

Actio popularis – rule of procedure in bringing a suit on another’s behalf. NGOs of good standing
in the international community may be allowed to sue for and on behalf of victims who do not
have the means to do so.

Universal jurisdiction
The principles of jus cogens and obligation erga omnes transcend boundaries.
Under this principle, a State may prosecute a crime committed elsewhere if such crime is a
jus cogens crime.

Jus dispositivum – lower class of norms, lower than jus cogens. They can be set aside or
modified by the agreement of the states.
Pacta sunt servanda – agreement must be kept; every treaty in force is binding upon the
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith. (Art. 26, Vienna Convention on the
Law on Treaties)
XPN: rebus sic stantibus - a fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with
regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen
by the parties. (Art. 62, Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties)

In the Philippines, we follow the doctrine of incorporation whereby the generally accepted
principles of international law become part of the law of the land without need of a law to be
passed by Congress. This is to be distinguished from states that follow the doctrine of
transformation where their legislative body may have to pass a statute adopting, for example,
a treaty before it becomes part of their body of laws.

Case: Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch v CIR, 704 SCRA 216 (2013)
Facts:

Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch remitted to CIR the amount of PHP 67,688,553.51, which
represented the fifteen percent (15%) branch profit remittance tax (BPRT) on its regular
banking unit (RBU) net income remitted to Deutsche Bank Germany (DB Germany) for 2002
and prior taxable years. Believing that it made an overpayment of the BPRT, petitioner filed
with the BIR. an administrative claim for refund or issuance of its tax credit certificate in the
total amount of PHP 22,562,851.17. On the same date, petitioner requested from the
International Tax Affairs Division (ITAD) a confirmation of its entitlement to the preferential tax
rate of 10% under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty. Alleging the inaction of the BIR on its
administrative claim, petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CTA.

The CTA Second Division denied petitioner’s claim for refund because the application for a tax
treaty relief was not filed with ITAD prior to the payment by the former of its BPRT and actual
remittance of its branch profits to DB Germany, or prior to its availment of the preferential
rate of ten percent (10%) under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty provision. It held that petitioner
violated the fifteen (15) day period mandated under Section III paragraph (2) of Revenue
Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 1-2000. The CTA En Banc affirmed the ruling of the CTA
Second Division.

Issue:

Whether the failure to strictly comply with RMO No. 1-2000 will deprive persons or corporations
of the benefit of a tax treaty?
Held:

No.

By virtue of the RP-Germany Tax Treaty, we are bound to extend to a branch in the Philippines,
remitting to its head office in Germany, the benefit of a preferential rate equivalent to 10%
BPRT. On the other hand, the BIR issued RMO No. 1-2000, which requires that any availment
of the tax treaty relief must be preceded by an application with ITAD at least 15 days before
the transaction. The Order was issued to streamline the processing of the application of tax
treaty relief in order to improve efficiency and service to the taxpayers. Further, it also aims
to prevent the consequences of an erroneous interpretation and/or application of the treaty
provisions (i.e., filing a claim for a tax refund/credit for the overpayment of taxes or for
deficiency tax liabilities for underpayment).

The Constitution provides for adherence to the general principles of international law as part
of the law of the land. The time-honored international principle of pacta sunt servanda demands
the performance in good faith of treaty obligations on the part of the states that enter into the
agreement. Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties, and obligations under the treaty
must be performed by them in good faith. More importantly, treaties have the force and effect
of law in this jurisdiction.

Tax treaties are entered into "to reconcile the national fiscal legislations of the contracting
parties and, in turn, help the taxpayer avoid simultaneous taxations in two different jurisdictions."
Simply put, tax treaties are entered into to minimize, if not eliminate the harshness of
international juridical double taxation, which is why they are also known as double tax treaty or
double tax agreements.

"A state that has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations
those modifications that may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations
undertaken." Thus, laws and issuances must ensure that the reliefs granted under tax treaties
are accorded to the parties entitled thereto. The BIR must not impose additional requirements
that would negate the availment of the reliefs provided for under international agreements.
More so, when the RP-Germany Tax Treaty does not provide for any pre-requisite for the
availment of the benefits under said agreement.
Likewise, it must be stressed that there is nothing in RMO No. 1-2000 which would indicate a
deprivation of entitlement to a tax treaty relief for failure to comply with the 15-day period. We
recognize the clear intention of the BIR in implementing RMO No. 1-2000, but the CTA’s outright
denial of a tax treaty relief for failure to strictly comply with the prescribed period is not in
harmony with the objectives of the contracting state to ensure that the benefits granted under
tax treaties are enjoyed by duly entitled persons or corporations.

The obligation to comply with a tax treaty must take precedence over the objective of RMO
No. 1-2000. Logically, noncompliance with tax treaties has negative implications on international
relations, and unduly discourages foreign investors. While the consequences sought to be
prevented by RMO No. 1-2000 involve an administrative procedure, these may be remedied
through other system management processes, e.g., the imposition of a fine or penalty. But we
cannot totally deprive those who are entitled to the benefit of a treaty for failure to strictly
comply with an administrative issuance requiring prior application for tax treaty relief.

c. Adherence to peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, amity with


nations

3. Civilian supremacy; Role of the military, Article II, Section 3

Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines
is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State
and the integrity of the national territory.

c. Commander-in-chief clause, Article VII, Section 18

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

b. AFP in active service, Article XVI, Section 5 (4)

No member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed or
designated in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government including government-owned
or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries.

c. Respect for people’s rights Article XVI, Section 5 (2)

The State shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of the military, and
respect for people’s rights in the performance of their duty.
4. Duty and Role of Government, Article II, Sections 4 and 5

The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may
call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be
required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal military or civil service.

The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the
promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the
blessings of democracy.

5. Separation of Church and State, Article II, Section 6

The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

a. Freedom of Religion, Article III, Section 5

No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for
the exercise of civil or political rights.

Lemon Test: The Supreme Court, citing Lemon vs. Kurtzman (403 U.S. 602 [1971]), said that a
regulation is constitutional when (a) it has a secular legislative purpose; (b) it neither advances
nor inhibits religion; and (c) it does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.

Case: Republic v Manalo, GR 221029, Apr 4, 2018

Facts:

Marelyn Tanedo Manalo filed a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry
of San Juan City by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese Court. The RTC
denied the petition. It opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law
"does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the country or living
abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in
the Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of
another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights
and duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into
contracts and civil relations, including marriages.

On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC’s. It held that Article 26 of the Family is applicable even
if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree they
obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry.

The Supreme Court discussed that the Constitution does not prohibit divorce. And through the
years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the Philippine society to re-
institute absolute divorce. However, a good number of the Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic
Church react adversely to any attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as
contrary to our customs, morals, and traditions that has looked upon marriage and family as an
institution and their nature of permanence, inviolability, and solidarity.

Issue:

Whether or not our policy on marriage (specifically divorce) should depend on the views of a
religious sect?

Held:

No. None of our laws should be based on any religious law, doctrine, or teaching; otherwise, the
separation of Church and State will be violated.

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with
religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the
government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the
government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to
adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establish a state religion.

The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and
the rest of the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely
believes that they are good for the country. While marriage is considered a sacrament, it has
civil and legal consequences which are governed by the Family Code. It is in this aspect, bereft
of any ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.

b. Political party ban on sects, Article IX-C, 2 (5)


The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in
addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and
accredit citizens’ arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall
not be registered.

c. No sectoral representative from religious sector, Article VI, Section 5 (2)

The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one- half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives
shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector.

d. Tax exemption of churches, Article VI, Section 28 (3)

Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques,


non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and
exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.

e. No appropriations for sects; exemptions, Article VI, Section 29 (2)

No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or


indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher,
or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to
the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.

f. Optional religious instruction, Article XIV, Section 3 (3)

At the option expressed in writing by the parents or guardians, religion shall be allowed to be
taught to their children or wards in public elementary and high schools within the regular class
hours by instructors designated or approved by the religious authorities of the religion to which
the children or wards belong, without additional cost to the Government.

g. Filipino ownership for schools; exceptions, Article XIV, Section 4 (2)


Educational institutions, other than those established by religious groups and mission boards,
shall be owned solely by citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations at least sixty
per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens. The Congress may, however,
require increased Filipino equity participation in all educational institutions.
C. Policies

1. Independent foreign policy and nuclear free Philippines, Article II, Sections 7-8

The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states the
paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and
the right to self-determination.

The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom
from nuclear weapons in its territory.

Foreign policy – conduct of the government in dealing with other countries.


The power to formulate foreign policy belongs to Congress and the President.
The conduct of relations with foreign states is vested in the President (diplomatic power).

a. Foreign military bases, Article XVIII, Sections 4 and 25

All existing treaties or international agreements which have not been ratified shall not be
renewed or extended without the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the Members of
the Senate. [Sec. 4]

After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the
United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate
and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a
national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
State. [Sec. 25]

1. Just and dynamic social order

The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and
independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide
adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved
quality of life for all [Sec. 9].

a. Social justice, Article II, Section 10, Article XII, Sections 1 (2)

The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development. [Sec 10]
Social justice is neither communism or despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of the social and economic forces by the State so
that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.

The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income,
and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation
for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of
life for all, especially the underprivileged.

The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural
development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human
and natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets.
However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and
trade practices.

In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be
given optimum opportunity to develop. Private enterprises, including corporations, cooperatives,
and similar collective organizations, shall be encouraged to broaden the base of their ownership.
[Sec. 1]

b. Respect for human dignity and human rights, Article XIII, Sections 1, 17-19

The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for
the common good.

Sec. 17-19: Commission on Human Rights

c. Role of women; Fundamental equality of women and men, Article II, Section
14; Article XIII, Section 14

The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men. [Sec. 14]

The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful working conditions,
taking into account their maternal functions, and such facilities and opportunities that will
enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the nation.
[Sec. 14]

- RA 9262 – Anti Violence Against Women and their Children (2004)


Case: Garcia v Drilon, 699 SCRA 352 (2013)

Facts:

Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children, a petition before the
RTC of Bacolod for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband,
Jesus Garcia pursuant to RA 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional,
psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner,
with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support. The RTC issued
a TPO. A second TPO was issued and this was continuously extended and renewed for thirty
(30) days, after each expiration, until further orders. Jesus Garcia then filed before the Court
of Appeals a petition for prohibition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9262 for being violative
of the due process and the equal protection clauses. The CA dismissed his petition.

Issue:

Whether or not RA 9262 violates the equal protection clause by favoring women over men as
victims of violence and abuse?

Held:

No. The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. All that is
required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
that it must apply equally to each member of the class.

(1) R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.


The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more
likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice
against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law.

The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue, passed its
Resolution 48/104 on the Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on December
20, 1993 stating that "violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power
relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination
against women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement of women, and that
violence against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced
into subordinate positions, compared with men."

Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy – the institutional
rule of men. Women were seen in virtually all societies to be naturally inferior both physically
and intellectually. In ancient Western societies, women whether slave, concubine or wife,
were under the authority of men. In law, they were treated as property.

The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and
prejudices against women. Addressing or correcting discrimination through specific
measures focused on women does not discriminate against men.

(2) The classification is germane to the purpose of the law. The distinction between men and
women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed
against women and children.
In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines ratified on
August 5, 1981. Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also ratified by the
Philippines on October 6, 2003. This Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to
women equality with men before the law and shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations on the
basis of equality of men and women. The Philippines likewise ratified the Convention on the
Rights of the Child and its two protocols. It is, thus, bound by said Conventions and their
respective protocols.

d. Independent people’s organization, Article II, Section 23; Article XIII, Sections
15-16

The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral organizations that


promote the welfare of the nation. [Sec. 23]

The State shall respect the role of independent people’s organizations to enable the people to
pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests
and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means.
People’s organizations are bona fide associations of citizens with demonstrated capacity to
promote the public interest and with identifiable leadership, membership, and structure. [Sec.
15]

The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all
levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall, by
law, facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms. [Sec. 16]

e. Priority of education, science, technology, arts, culture and sports, Article II,
Section 23; Article XIII, Sections 15-16; Article XIV, Sections 1-19

f. Urban land reform and housing, Article XIII, Sections 9-10


- RA 7279 – Urban Development and Housing Act

The State shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with the public
sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make available at
affordable cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in
urban centers and resettlements areas. It shall also promote adequate employment
opportunities to such citizens. In the implementation of such program the State shall respect
the rights of small property owners. [Sec. 9]

Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished, except in
accordance with law and in a just and humane manner.

No resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall be undertaken without adequate consultation


with them and the communities where they are to be relocated. [Sec. 10]

g. Reform in agriculture and other natural resources, Article II, Section 21,
Article XIII, Sections 4-8
- PD 27 – Land Reform Act
- RA 6657 -Comprehensive and Agrarian Reform Law (1998)

The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform. [Sec. 21]

Sec. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of
farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands
they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To
this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands,
subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking
into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of
just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small
landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

Sec. 5. The State shall recognize the right of farmers, farmworkers, and landowners, as well
as cooperatives, and other independent farmers’ organizations to participate in the planning,
organization, and management of the program, and shall provide support to agriculture through
appropriate technology and research, and adequate financial, production, marketing, and other
support services.
Sec. 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever
applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources,
including lands of the public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject
to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to
their ancestral lands.

The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its own agricultural estates which
shall be distributed to them in the manner provided by law.

Sec. 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local
communities, to the preferential use of local marine and fishing resources, both inland and
offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and
research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The
State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to
offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall
receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.

Sec. 8. The State shall provide incentives to landowners to invest the proceeds of the agrarian
reform program to promote industrialization, employment creation, and privatization of public
sector enterprises. Financial instruments used as payment for their lands shall be honored as
equity in enterprises of their choice.

h. Protection to labor, Article II, Section 18; Article XIII, Section 3


- PD 442 – Labor Code of the Philippines

The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of
workers and promote their welfare. [Sec. 18]
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.

It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with
law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage.
They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and
benefits as may be provided by law.

The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers
and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall
enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.

The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right
of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable
returns on investments, and to expansion and growth.

i. Promotion of health and ecology, Article II, Sections 15 and 16; Article XIII,
Section 11

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which
shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the
people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged sick,
elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care
to paupers. [Sec. 11]

Case: Oposa v Factoran, GR 101083 (1993)

Facts:
The petitioners, all minors and duly represented and joined by their respective parents, filed a
complaint before the RTC of Makati against Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The complaint is a class suit and
alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and
entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the
country's virgin tropical forests." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. They prayed that the defendant and/or his
representatives be ordered to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country
and cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreements. They averred that the Philippines is endowed with rich, lush and verdant
rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found, among
others, and that deforestation in the country resulted in a host of environmental tragedies,
such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as
the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a
result of the intrusion therein of salt water, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of
soil fertility and agricultural productivity, etc.

Factoran filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action
against him and (2) the issue raised is a political question. The RTC granted the MTD. Hence,
this petition. The petitioners contend that they have a cause of action concerning their right to
a sound environment based on Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi?


(2) Whether or not the petitioners alleged violation of their right to a balanced and healthful
ecology constitutes a cause of action?

Held:

(1) Yes. Petitioners minors can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the
succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,
considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.
Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations.

(2) Yes. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to
be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights,
it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in
the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns
nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the
petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now
explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its
framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated
as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and
imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present
generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but
parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

- RA 7277 – Magna Carta for Disabled Persons


j. Self-reliant and independent economic order, Article II, Sections 19-20

The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled
by Filipinos. [Sec. 19]

k. Role of the private sector, Article II, Section 20

The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private
enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments. [Sec. 20]

l. Role of People’s Organizations, Article II, Section 23; Article XIII, Sections 15-
16
The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral organizations that
promote the welfare of the nation. [Sec. 23]
The State shall respect the role of independent people’s organizations to enable the people to
pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests
and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means.

People’s organizations are bona de associations of citizens with demonstrated capacity to


promote the public interest and with identifiable leadership, membership, and structure. [Sec.
15]

The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all
levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall, by
law, facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms. [Sec. 16]

3. The family and role of the youth, Article II, Sections 12 and 13, Article XV, Sections 1-
4

The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as
a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life
of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing
of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government. [Sec. 12]

The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect
their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth
patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs. [Sec. 13]

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.

Sec. 3. The State shall defend:


(1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the
demands of responsible parenthood;
(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection
from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development;
(3) The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
(4) The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation
of policies and programs that affect them.

Sec. 4. The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but the State may also do so
through just programs of social security.

a. Family as a basic autonomous social institution


- EO 209 – Family Code of the Philippines
- Republic v Albios, 707 SCRA 584 (2013)
Facts:

Daniel Lee Fringer, an American citizen, and Liberty Albios contracted a marriage.
Consequently, Albios filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage alleging that they never
really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential
marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and
void ab initio. The RTC granted the petition. The OSG filed an appeal. The CA affirmed the
RTC’s decision which found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated
that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married and
that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. Hence, this petition. The OSG argues that
albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for Fringer to be paid
$2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly
entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of being bound by it.

Issue:

Whether or not the marriage is valid despite the real motive of parties not to be bound by it
but only for Albios to acquire American citizenship?

Held:

Yes. The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to
establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no
real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely
entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature,
consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A
marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There
is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the
Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long
as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or
voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.

Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot
dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle
would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions.
The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any
way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one
another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or
otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they
comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a
marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded
by law, may validly support a marriage.

Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage
with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court
cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration
benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These
unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent
schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience;
she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.

- PD 603 – Child and Youth Welfare Code


- RA 7610 - Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation
and Discrimination Act
- RA 9262 – Anti Violence Against Women and their Children (2004)
b. Protection of the mother and the unborn
- RA 10354 – Reproductive Health and Responsible Parenthood Act
(2012)
Case: Imbong v Ochoa, 721 SCRA 146 (2014)

Issue: Whether or not RA 10354 (Reproductive Health and Responsible Parenthood Act of
2012) is unconstitutional?

Contentions:

(1) The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. The implementation of the RH Law would
authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which
are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees
protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.

Held: No. The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting
the life of the unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure
legalizing abortion. A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and
actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any determination, at this
stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be
afforded from the moment of fertilization. The RH Law is replete with provisions that embody
the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel
to the uterus for implantation.

The RH Law, consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has
life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because
the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion. The Court finds that
inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not sanction abortion.

Note: A provision in the RH-IRR which defines abortifacient as any drug or device that
“primarily” induces abortion was declared unconstitutional. There is danger that the insertion of
the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or
destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12
of the Constitution. With such qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a
contraceptive will only be considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion
or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum.

(2) The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous
products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives
which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and other health problems

Held: No. The RH Law did not repeal the provisions of RA 4729 [allows contraceptive drugs and
devices but they could not be sold, dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and
distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription
of a qualified medical practitioner]. It is still a good law and its requirements are still need to be
complied with. The effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of
contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices
will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists
adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made
available to the public.
(3) The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.

(a) The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee respecting
religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For
the petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their
beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom.

Held: No. In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can
do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They
can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone,
nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms,
would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.

Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance
its population control program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of
contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to
pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any one
religion.

(b) Duty to Refer: while the RH Law attempts to address religious sentiments by making
provisions for a conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated
because the law also imposes upon the conscientious objector the duty to refer the patient
seeking reproductive health services to another medical practitioner who would be able to
provide for the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring the conscientious
objector to cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do without violating his/her religious
beliefs.

Held: Unconstitutional. The obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious
belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will,
refers a patient seeking information on modem reproductive health products, services,
procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled
to perform an act against his beliefs. Though it has been said that the act of referral is an
opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it makes pro-life health providers
complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They
cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal,
but he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free
speech, it being an externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the
right to be silent. With the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection
that should be afforded to individuals in communicating their beliefs to others as well as the
protection for simply being silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to
utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. While the RH Law
seeks to provide freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees
the liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden,
whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion.

In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one
hand, and the interest of the State, on the other, to provide access and information on
reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods to enable the people to
determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the
strong view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be
accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance
with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious
belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the
constitutional right to free exercise of religion.

The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group and health care service providers. Considering that Section 24
of the RH Law penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to
refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for
being violative of the freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in
relation to Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of information regarding programs
and services and in the performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom
of health care service providers should be respected.

Violation of equal protection clause:

The RH-IRR provides that “skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health
officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of
their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act
and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.”

This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection
clause should be equally protective of the religious belief of public health officers. There is no
perceptible distinction why they should not be considered exempt from the mandates of the
law. The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical
practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all,
the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees
its free exercise is not taken off even if one acquires employment in the government.

EXCEPTION:

While generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health
care procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made
in life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In these
situations, the right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral
by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing
the life of a mother in grave danger.

(c) On Mandatory Family Planning Seminars:

Held: No. It is a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A cursory reading of
the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of the petitioners is not at all violated.
All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning
breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of family planning methods
to be included in the seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the
OSG, those who receive any information during their attendance in the required seminars are
not compelled to accept the information given to them, are completely free to reject the
information they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life
without the intervention of the State.

(4) The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the
petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be
accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours
of pro bona services for indigent women, under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment
and other forms of punishment.

Held: No. The practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a
power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the
public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged
burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people.
Also, other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to
do otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also
enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and
how to provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat
is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such
service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider
the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by
Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.

Note: Conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs
and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.

(5) The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law
discriminates against the poor as it makes them the primary target of the government program
that promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting
reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that would
effectively reduce the number of the poor.

Held: No. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive
health care program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to
Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address
the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health
development of the people. Thus:

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health
development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services
available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide
free medical care to paupers.

It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who
are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to
the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While
the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction
abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth
rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive health."
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does
not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise
that the assailed law seeks to charge couples with the duty to have children only if they would
raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into its provisions shows that what the law
seeks to do is to simply provide priority to the poor in the implementation of government
programs to promote basic reproductive health care.

(6) The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution.
It is contended that the RH Law providing for mandatory reproductive health education
intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their children in accordance with their beliefs.
It is claimed that, (a) by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive
health procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes
the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-being of their
family. (b) In the same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a
miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to determine whether their child should use
contraceptives.

Held: (a) Unconstitutional. Reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy
which, by their very nature, should require mutual consent and decision between the husband
and the wife as they affect issues intimately related to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art.
XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the "right of the spouses to found
a family." One person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In
the same Section 3, their right "to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and
programs that affect them " is equally recognized.

The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute
authority to the spouse who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from
participating in the decision would drive a wedge between the husband and wife, possibly result
in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the
population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage
as an inviolable social institution.

Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to


the couple, not just one of them. Any decision they would reach would affect their future as a
family because the size of the family or the number of their children significantly matters. The
decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both
spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed
private right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the
State should see to it that they chart their destiny together as one family.

The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy
and such state intervention would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by
the Constitution.

(b) Unconstitutional. When a minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents
are excluded from the decision making process of the minor with regard to family planning.
Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off just because there
is a need to tame population growth.

It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and
guidance of her own parents. The State cannot replace her natural mother and father when
it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no longer relevant is
clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional
mandate to protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.

More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.”

EXCEPTIONS:
(1) Access to Information:
There must be a differentiation between access to information about family planning services,
on one hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and modern family planning
methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is concerned, the Court
finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the minor referred to under
the exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care
of her own body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution
mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother as that of the unborn child.
Considering that information to enable a person to make informed decisions is essential in the
protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to such information with respect to
reproductive health must be allowed. In this situation, the fear that parents might be deprived
of their parental control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise parental
guidance and control over their minor child and assist her in deciding whether to accept or
reject the information received.
(2) Life Threatening Cases:
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening
cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the
minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be put at
grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized that no person should be denied
the appropriate medical care urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right
to life.

In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii) should be struck down. By
effectively limiting the requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures,"
it denies the parents their right of parental authority in cases where what is involved are
"non-surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an
abused child as provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be
deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of this right would be
an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family.

(7) The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority.
The petitioners question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine
whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL).

Held: No. The FDA does not only have the power but also the competency to evaluate, register
and cover health services and methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render
such services and highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that health services and
methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily understood
as "health products."

(8) The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing
for reproductive health measures at the local government level and the ARMM, infringes upon
the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government Code and R.A. No.
9054.

Held: No. The essence of the express reservation of power by the national government is that,
unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a
program for which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual
general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within
the jurisdiction of the LGU. A complete relinquishment of central government powers on the
matter of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government
Code itself weighs against it.

In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment
of health care facilities, the hiring of skilled health professionals, or the training of barangay
health workers, it will be the national government that will provide for the funding of its
implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national government still has the say when
it comes to national priority programs which the local government is called upon to implement
like the RH Law. Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LGUs are merely
encouraged to provide these services. There is nothing in the wording of the law which can be
construed as making the availability of these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason,
it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national
government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.

(9) The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the
due process clause of the Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private
health service provider" among those who may be held punishable but does not define who is
a "private health care service provider." They argue that confusion further results since
Section 7 only makes reference to a "private health care institution."

Held: No. In determining the definition of "private health care service provider," reference must
be made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health service provider.”
Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of
"private health care service provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious
reason that they are used synonymously.

(10) RH Law violates natural law.

Held: No. The Court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law.
Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated from what
is perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or
ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate
body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by
theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are interested in
the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or present. Unless, a natural
right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law.
(11) RH Law violates academic freedom. It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation
to Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching of Age-and-Development-Appropriate
Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the principle
of academic freedom. According to the petitioners, these provisions effectively force
educational institutions to teach reproductive health education even if they believe that the
same is not suitable to be taught to their students.

Held: Any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on
age-appropriate reproductive health education. One can only speculate on the content, manner
and medium of instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents and whether they will
contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus,
considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its
constitutionality or validity. At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides
that the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State
recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to become productive
members of society. Notably, it places more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children by recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is, that the
right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State.

c. Natural and primary right and duty of parents

2. Communication and information in nation building, Section 24; Article XVI, Sections
1—11; Article XVIII, Section 23; EO 02 (2016)
The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation-building. [Sec.
24]

Article XVI, Sec. 11.


(1) The ownership and management of mass media shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations, cooperatives or associations, wholly-owned and managed by
such citizens.

The Congress shall regulate or prohibit monopolies in commercial mass media when the public
interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition therein shall
be allowed.
(2) The advertising industry is impressed with public interest, and shall be regulated by law for
the protection of consumers and the promotion of the general welfare.

Only Filipino citizens or corporations or associations at least seventy per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens shall be allowed to engage in the advertising
industry.

The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of entities in such industry shall be
limited to their proportionate share in the capital thereof, and all the executive and managing
officers of such entities must be citizens of the Philippines.
Article XVIII, Section 23: Advertising entities affected by paragraph (2), Section 11 of Article
XVI of this Constitution shall have five years from its ratification to comply on a graduated and
proportionate basis with the minimum Filipino ownership requirement therein.

5. Rights of indigenous cultural communities, Article II, Section 22; Article VI, Section 5
(2); Article XII, Section 5; Article XIII, Section 6; Article XIV, Section 17; Article XVI, Sec 12;
- RA 8371 - Indigenous People’s Rights Act (1997)

The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the
framework of national unity and development. [Sec. 22]

The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one- half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives
shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector. [Art. VI, 5(2)]

The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and
programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to
ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being.

The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or
relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain. [Article XII, Sec. 5]

The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in
accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands
of the public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights,
homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral
lands. [Article XIII, Sec. 6]

The State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities
to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions. It shall consider these rights
in the formulation of national plans and policies. [Article XIV, Sec. 17]

The Congress may create a consultative body to advise the President on policies affecting
indigenous cultural communities, the majority of the members of which shall come from such
communities. [Article XVI, Sec. 12]

6. Honest public service, Article II, Sections 27-28

The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and
effective measures against graft and corruption.

a. Ombudsman, Article XI, Sections 4-6


Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and
exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

Sec. 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the
Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for
Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise
be appointed.

Sec. 6. The officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, other than the Deputies,
shall be appointed by the Ombudsman according to the Civil Service Law.

d. Full public disclosure, Article II, Section 28

Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy
of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

c. SALN, Article XI, Sections 17


A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may
be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In
the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the
Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers
of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public
in the manner provided by law.

- RA 3019 – Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act


d. President’s health, Article VII, Section 12

In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be informed of the state of his health.
The Members of the Cabinet in charge of national security and foreign relations and the Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, shall not be denied access to the President
during such illness.

e. Publication of loan applications, Article VII, Section 20

The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every
quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its decisions on
applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the Government or government-
owned and controlled corporations which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt,
and containing other matters as may be provided by law.

f. Public foreign loans, Article XII, Section 21

Foreign loans may only be incurred in accordance with law and the regulation of the monetary
authority. Information on foreign loans obtained or guaranteed by the Government shall be
made available to the public.

g. Contracts with foreign groups, Article XII, Section 2 (5)

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this
provision, within thirty days from its execution.

h. Conflict of Interest, books of account, Article VII, Sections 12 and 20


i. COA annual report, Article IX-D, Section 4

The Commission shall submit to the President and the Congress, within the time fixed by law,
an annual report covering the financial condition and operation of the Government, its
subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and non-governmental entities subject to its audit, and recommend measures
necessary to improve their effectiveness and efficiency. It shall submit such other reports as
may be required by law.

j. Right to information, Article III, Section 7

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

k. Equality of opportunity; political dynasty, Article II, Section 26

The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law.
Case: Ang Ladlad v Comelec, 618 SCRA 32 (2010)

Facts:

Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians,
gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first
applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied
on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. In 2009, Ang Ladlad
again filed a petition for registration with the COMELEC. The COMELEC Second Division denied
the petition on moral grounds (1) the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner
tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs; in contrary to the bible and the Koran; (2)
Ang Ladlad advocates immoral doctrines. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the decision of the
COMELEC Second Division. Hence, this petition. Ang Ladlad contends that the denial of its
accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the
constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. It also claims that the Assailed
Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly,
and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines international
obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

Issue:

Whether or not the denial of Ang Ladlad’s petition for accreditation violated the equal
protection clause?
Held:

Yes. The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual
conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the
petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine electorate has expressed no such
belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about
homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were to assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC
describes it, the asserted state interest here that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority
is not a legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the
equal protection clause. The COMELEC’s differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang
Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation that would benefit the nation, furthers
no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored group.

From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have
the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political
parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of
general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in
the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under- represented sectors.

On violation of the non-establishment clause:

Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of


neutrality. It was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize
the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Rather than relying on religious
belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the
COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to
religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways
that have primarily secular effects.

On violation of other fundamental rights (free speech and association):

Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to
persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means.

Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society,


and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that
offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this
Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not
free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or
discouraging a disfavored one.

With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in Europe,
with its vibrant human rights tradition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has
repeatedly stated that a political party may campaign for a change in the law or the
constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal and democratic means and the changes it
proposes are consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR has emphasized that political
ideas that challenge the existing order and whose realization is advocated by peaceful means
must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression through the exercise of the right of
association, even if such ideas may seem shocking or unacceptable to the authorities or the
majority of the population. A political group should not be hindered solely because it seeks to
publicly debate controversial political issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying
everyone concerned.

Therefore, to the extent that Ang Ladlad has been precluded, because of COMELECs action,
from publicly expressing its views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the
political process with other equally-qualified party-list candidates, indeed, there has been a
transgression of petitioner’s fundamental rights.

- RA 6713 – Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials


and Employees (1989)

7. Autonomy of local governments, Article II, Section 25; Article X; RA 7160 (LGC)

The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments. [Sec. 25]

a. Kinds of Autonomy: Administrative Autonomy v Political Autonomy


Case: Limbona v Conte Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786
Facts:

Sultan Limbona was the then Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang
Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). Limbona sent out a telegram to all Assemblyman that
there would be no session in November because their presence is required in the house
committee hearing in Congress. However, the Assembly held session on November 2, 1987 in
defiance of Limbona’s instruction. In that session, the seat of the Speaker was declared vacant.
Now, Limoba seeks to declare the proceedings on November 2, 1987 as null and void.

Issue:

Whether or not the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao are subject to the
jurisdiction of the national courts?

Held:

Yes.

Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is


decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative
powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the
process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," "and ensure their
fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the
pursuit of national development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national
concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that
local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense
that he can substitute their judgments with his own.

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in favor
of local government units declare to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government
is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central
authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to
"self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to
the central authorities but to its constituency.

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category is subject alone to the
decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of
"autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is under the
supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the Department of
Local Government).

An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of


Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense,
that is, in which the central government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree
No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general
supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." In the second place, the Sangguniang
Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative services. Thus,
national courts can assume jurisdiction.

Control vs. Supervision


Control – the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former
for that of the latter.
Supervision – means overseeing, or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties, and if the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, then the former
may take such action or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform these duties.

e. Devolution, Section 17, RA 7160, Local Government Code of 1991

Devolution refers to the act by which the National Government confers power and authority
upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities.

f. Deconcentration of powers, Section 528, RA 7160

The National Government shall, six (6) months after the effectivity of this Code, effect the
deconcentration of requisite authority and power to the appropriate regional offices or field
offices of national agencies or offices whose major functions are not devolved to local
government units.

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