Senator Juan Ponce Enrile successfully argues that he cannot be separately charged for violation of Presidential Decree No.

1829, as the charge is absorbed by the charge of rebellion.

Facts: Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with rebellion complexed with murder with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City and with violating Presidential Decree No. 1829 for allegedly harboring Ex-Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan in his house ,
thus obstructing justice.

Enrile filed an Omnibus Motion to hold the issuance of an arrest warrant and to dismiss the case.

The motion was denied by respondent RTC Judge Ignacio Capulong, who found probable cause for the charge under PD No.
1829.

Enrile's Motion for Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss the Information was also denied, leading to his arraignment being
set. Enrile then filed a petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court,

Arguing that the facts charged do not constitute an offense under PD 1829 and that the act of harboring or concealing was
absorbed in the crime of rebellion.

Issue: Whether or not Senator Juan Ponce Enrile could be separately charged for violation of PD No. 1829.

Supreme Court Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Enrile, stating that the charge of violation of PD No. 1829 is absorbed by the charge
of rebellion.

The Supreme Court relied on the doctrine established in People v. Hernandez, which prohibits the complexing of rebellion
with any other offense committed.

The court held that if a person cannot be charged with the complete crime of rebellion, neither can he be charged separately
for offenses that are constitutive or component elements of rebellion.

In this case, the Supreme Court explained that Enrile's alleged act of harboring or concealing Honasan was committed in
furtherance of the crime of rebellion and therefore cannot be the basis of a separate charge.

The court emphasized that the prosecution must make up its mind whether to charge Enrile with rebellion alone or to drop
the rebellion case and charge him with other offenses. The court also noted that the charge of violation of PD No. 1829 is
absorbed by the charge of rebellion, and thus, Enrile cannot be separately charged for this offense. With this ruling, the court
quashed the information in the case and made the writ of preliminary injunction permanent, enjoining the respondent judges
from further proceedings in the case.

***********

This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not be charged with the complete crime of rebellion for the
greater penalty to be applied, neither can he be charged separately for two (2) different offenses where one is a constitutive
or component element or committed in furtherance of rebellion

**********
The Supreme Court applied the doctrine established in People vs. Hernandez, which holds that common crimes committed in
furtherance of rebellion are absorbed by the crime of rebellion and cannot be punished separately or complexed with
rebellion to form a complex crime.

This ruling was reiterated in the case involving Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, where the Court determined that the act of
harboring or concealing, alleged to violate Presidential Decree No. 1829, was a component or an act done in furtherance of
rebellion. Accordingly, it could not form the basis of a separate charge outside of rebellion.

The decisive factor in determining whether other offenses are absorbed by rebellion is the motive or intent behind them. If
the acts are committed with the intent to further political objectives or in connection with a rebellion, they are considered
part of the rebellion itself.

Applying these principles, the Supreme Court granted Enrile's petition, resulting in the quashing of the separate charge for
violating Presidential Decree No. 1829, which involved harboring or concealing a fugitive.

NOTES:

RECAP:

Senator Juan Ponce Enrile successfully argues that he cannot be separately charged for violation of Presidential Decree No.
1829, as the charge is absorbed by the charge of rebellion.

In this case, the legal dispute revolves around whether Senator Juan Ponce Enrile can be separately charged under
Presidential Decree No. 1829 for allegedly harboring Ex-Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan, given that he was
already facing charges for rebellion complexed with murder, with the two incidents being linked to the same
event on December 1, 1989. The central legal question pertains to the applicability of the doctrine established in
People v. Hernandez, which prohibits the charging of multiple offenses that are inherently linked to the act of
rebellion as separate crimes.
The petitioner, Senator Enrile, challenges the decision of the respondent court to proceed with charges under PD
No. 1829, arguing that such charges are essentially absorbed by the primary charge of rebellion. This argument is
anchored in the principle that acts committed in furtherance of rebellion should not be prosecuted separately but
should be considered as part and parcel of the rebellion charge. This stance is bolstered by the assertion that the
alleged harboring or concealing of Honasan by Enrile is directly related to the overarching political motive, which
is the essence of the rebellion charge.

The respondent court, however, differentiated the charges based on the distinct legal foundations of PD No. 1829,
a special law, versus the rebellion charge under the Revised Penal Code, a general law. Despite this differentiation,
the principle articulated in the Hernandez case, as reiterated in subsequent rulings, suggests a prohibition against
the fragmentation of offenses associated with rebellion, arguing against the separate prosecution for acts that are
components of or committed in the pursuit of rebellion.

In summary, the contention hinges on whether the act of harboring or concealing Honasan, allegedly committed
by Enrile, should be treated as a separate offense under PD No. 1829 or be considered an integral part of the
rebellion charge. This debate reflects broader questions about legal interpretations related to the prosecution of
political crimes and the boundaries between specific and general laws in the context of acts committed in the
course of political upheavals.

RULING:

In this case, the core legal issue revolves around whether Senator Juan Ponce Enrile can be tried separately for violating
Presidential Decree No. 1829, which involves harboring or concealing Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan, in light of existing
rebellion charges against him. This scenario taps into established jurisprudence, particularly People v. Hernandez and related
cases, which underscore that actions taken in support of rebellion, although criminal under different statutes, are subsumed
under the broader crime of rebellion.

Senator Enrile's defense posits that his alleged actions, specifically harboring or concealing Honasan, are integral to and in
advancement of the rebellion, rendering them inseparable from the primary charge of rebellion. This perspective is anchored
in legal precedents that prevent the fragmentation of the rebellion charge by treating its components as distinct offenses.

The argument against separate charges is further reinforced by the example of People v. Prieto, which analogizes that actions
constituting aid and comfort to a rebellion cannot be independently penalized if they are intrinsic to the treason (or rebellion)
itself. This principle is applied to Senator Enrile's case, arguing that the essence of his actions — conspiring with and aiding
Honasan — cannot form the basis for separate charges under PD No. 1829 and the rebellion charge because they are
committed with a unified political intent.

Prosecutors have attempted to distinguish the cases based on the different legal bases of the charges (special law versus the
Revised Penal Code). However, this distinction is challenged by the assertion that the doctrine of absorption applies
universally, encompassing both common crimes and offenses under special laws, as long as they are committed in
furtherance of a political goal like rebellion.

The discussion culminates in the assertion that Enrile's actions, being inextricably linked to the political objective of rebellion,
cannot be dissected into separate charges. This is aligned with the rationale that political crimes, and actions taken towards
their commission, assume a political character that supersedes their classification under separate legal provisions.
Hence, the conclusion is drawn that prosecuting Senator Enrile separately under PD No. 1829, alongside the rebellion
charges, is untenable. This decision emphasizes the overriding principle that acts committed in the pursuit of a political
objective like rebellion should be treated as components of that singular crime, not as separate offenses.

Therefore, the petition to quash the separate charge under PD No. 1829 against Senator Enrile is granted, reinforcing the
principle that actions integral to the commission of rebellion cannot form the basis for independent prosecution. This ruling
underscores the precedence of political motive in determining the legal treatment of actions associated with rebellion,
effectively consolidating the charges into a single case of rebellion.

SEPARATE OPINION: