determinants formulated by former Supreme Court

14. Francisco, Jr vs House of Representatives, G.R. No. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive:
160261, [November 10, 2003) 1. the character of the funds or other assets
involved in the case;
2. the presence of a clear case of disregard of a
Facts: On June 2, 2003, an impeachment complaint
constitutional or statutory prohibition by the
(1st impeachment complaint) was filed by former
public respondent agency or instrumentality of
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario Davide,
the government; and
Jr. and 7 Associate Justices for “culpable violation of the
3. the lack of any other party with a more direct
Constitution, betrayal of public trust and other high
and specific interest in raising the questions
crimes”.
being raised. Applying these determinants, this
Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein
On October 22, 2003, the House Committee on Justice
are indeed of transcendental importance.
voted to dismiss the complaint for being insufficient in
substance, although it was sufficient in form.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a
liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner
On October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee
where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of
on Justice voted to dismiss the complaint or 4 months
transcendental significance to the people, as when the
and 3 weeks since the filing thereof, a 2nd
issues raised are of paramount importance to the
impeachment complaint was filed with the House’s
public. Such liberality does not, however, mean that the
Secretary General by Representatives Teodoro, Jr. and
requirement that a party should have an interest in the
Funtabella against Chief Justice Hilario Davide, founded
matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at the very
on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry "to
least, still plead the existence of such interest, it not
conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the
being one of which courts can take judicial notice.
manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
De14velopment Fund (JDF).”

The 2nd impeachment complaint was accompanied by

a “Resolution of Endorsement/ Impeachment” signed
by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.

Due to the events that took place, several instant

petitions were filed against the House of
Representatives, mostly contending that the filing of the
2nd impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it
violates Article XI Section 5 of the Constitution that “no
impeachment proceedings shall be INITIATED against
the same official more than once within a period of
one year”; and that sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the
12th Congress are unconstitutional as well.

ISSUE: WON the The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R.

No. 160403, has legal standing invoking the sole
ground of transcendental importance.

HELD: Yes.There being no doctrinal definition of

transcendental importance, the following instructive
 15. FALCIS V. CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL
FACTS: Jesus Falcis III filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65, seeking to have Articles 1
and 2 of the Family Code declared as unconstitutional,
and as a consequence having Articles 46(4) and 55(6)
of the same Code be nullified as well.
(Art. 1 - definition of marriage as a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman; Art. 2 -
essential requisites of marriage, where the consenting
parties must be a man and a woman; Art. 46(4) -
concealment of homosexuality as a ground for
annulment; Art. 55(6) - homosexuality/lesbianism as a
ground for legal separation)
Falcis claims his petition has the elements of judicial
review (actual case/controversy, standing, raised at the
earliest opportunity, lis mota). As to standing, he claims
that it consists of:
1. His personal stake in the outcome of the case,
being an open and self-identified homosexual;
2. The “normative impact” of the Family Code on
same-sex relationships in the Philippines; and
3. His alleged injury, caused by the prohibition
against the right to marry the same sex.
2. For taxpayers, they must show "sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of
money raised by taxation.
3. Legislators, meanwhile, must show that some
government act infringes on the prerogatives of
their office.
4. Third-party suits must likewise be brought by
litigants who have "sufficiently concrete
interest" in the outcome of the dispute.
Falcis’ “personal stake in the outcome of this case” is
not the direct injury contemplated by jurisprudence
which would endow him with standing. His desire to find
a partner to settle down with in the Philippines does not
constitute legally demandable rights that require judicial
enforcement.
Anticipation of harm is not equivalent to direct injury.
Falcis failed to present any proof of the danger the
Family Code poses on him. If the mere passage of a law
does not create an actual case or controversy, neither
can it be a source of direct injury to establish legal
standing. Falcis has neither suffered any direct personal
injury nor shown that he is in danger of suffering any
injury from the present implementation of the Family
Code. He has neither an actual case nor legal standing.

ISSUE: WON Falcis, as a member of the LGBTQIA+ The petition was dismissed.
community, has the standing to challenge the Family
Code.

RULING: No. Legal standing is a party's "personal and

substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. It ensures that a party is seeking a
concrete outcome or relief that may be granted by
courts.

Even for exceptional suits filed by taxpayers, legislators,

or concerned citizens, this Court has noted that the
party must claim some kind of injury-in-fact:
1. For concerned citizens, it is an allegation that
the continuing enforcement of a law or any
government act has denied the party some right
or privilege to which they are entitled, or that
the party will be subjected to some burden or
penalty because of the law or act being
complained of.
 .17. RIOFERIO versus CA, G.R. No. 129008,
January 13, 2004
FACTS: Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will. He
left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada with
whom he had seven children who are the herein
respondents. Also, the decedent left a paramour,
Teodora Riofero (petitioner).
Respondents Orfinada discovered that petitioner
Rioferio (paramour) and her children executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased
Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the
estate of the decedent. Respondents also found out that
petitioners were able to obtain a loan of P700,000.00
from the Rural Bank of Mangaldan Inc. by executing a
Real Estate Mortgage over the properties subject of the
extra-judicial settlement.
On December 1, 1995, respondent Alfonso "Clyde" P.
Orfinada III filed a Petition for Letters of Administration,
praying that letters of administration encompassing the
estate of Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. be issued to him. On
December 4, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for
the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement
of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim, Real
Estate Mortgage and Cancellation of Transfer
Certificate of Titles and Other Related Documents with
Damages against petitioners.
Rioferio filed an Answer to the complaint and also raised
the affirmative defense that respondents are not the
real parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso
O. Orfinada, Jr. in view of the pendency of the
administration proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether the heirs have legal standing to
prosecute the rights belonging to the deceased
subsequent to the commencement of the
administration proceedings. - YES
(Whether the heirs may bring suit to recover property of
the estate pending the appointment of an administrator
- YES)
RULING: YES. The heirs without doubt have legal
personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the
decedent in accordance with the provision of Article
777 of the New Civil Code "that the rights to succession
are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent." The provision in turn is the foundation of the
principle that the property, rights and obligations to the
extent and value of the inheritance of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or others by his
will or by operation of law.
Even if administration proceedings have already been
commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if an
administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the
proper modality despite the total lack of advertence to
the heirs in the rules on party representation, namely
Section 3, Rule 3 and Section 2, Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court.
In fact, in the case of Gochan v. Young, this Court
recognized the legal standing of the heirs to represent
the rights and properties of the decedent under
administration pending the appointment of an
administrator. Thus:
The above-quoted rules, while permitting an executor or
administrator to represent or to bring suits on behalf of
the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from
representing the deceased. These rules are easily
applicable to cases in which an administrator has
already been appointed. But no rule categorically
addresses the situation in which special proceedings
for the settlement of an estate have already been
instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed.
In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to wait
for the appointment of an administrator; then wait
further to see if the administrator appointed would care
enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the
interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do
nothing while the rights and the properties of the
decedent are violated or dissipated.
Even if there is an appointed administrator,
jurisprudence recognizes two exceptions:
(1) if the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses
to bring suit; and
(2) when the administrator is alleged to have
participated in the act complained of and he is made a
party defendant.
Evidently, the necessity for the heirs to seek judicial
relief to recover property of the estate is as compelling
when there is no appointed administrator, if not more,
as where there is an appointed administrator but he is
either disinclined to bring suit or is one of the guilty
parties himself.
Therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal standing
to sue for the recovery of property of the estate during
the pendency of administration proceedings has three
exceptions, the third being when there is no appointed
administrator such as in this case.
 20. CUYUGAN versus JOSE P. DIZON, 79 SCRA 80 adverse to hers, or that the defendant, by any
possibility, has any evidence to present with reference
to the husband.
Facts: The plaintiff leased to the defendant several
registered parcels of land which have a combined area
of over 33 hectares, situated in the municipality of
Mabalacat, Province of Pampanga,

Upon the execution of this contract, initially defendant

paid the rentals from 1941-1943. However, no other
rental was ever paid after February, 1943. This led the
plaintiff to file a suit to rescind the lease and to recover
the total yearly rental for 1943 and 1942. Here, there
was an attack regarding the validity of the judgment on
the ground that the plaintiff's husband was not joined as
plaintiff. It is contended, with support of law and
authorities, that even though the subject matter of the
contract is a separate property of the wife, yet the suit
seeks to recover rents which under article 1401 of the
Civil Code belong to the conjugal partnership.

Issue: Whether/not the case should be dismissed for

the failure to implead the husband as plaintiff.

Ruling: No. The case should not be dismissed for the

failure to implead the husband as plaintiff.

We, however, do not believe that the case should be

dismissed for plaintiff's failure to join her husband. (Sec.
11, Rule 2, Rules of Court.) Nor should the case be
remanded to the court below and a new trial ordered on
this account. The complaint may and should be
amended here, to cure the defect of party plaintiffs, after
final decision is rendered. Section 11, Rule 2, and
section 2, Rule 17, explicitly authorize such procedure.
As this Court had occasion to say in Quison vs. Salud (12
Phil., 109, 1169), "a second action would be but a
repetition of the first and would involved both parties,
plaintiffs and defendant, in much additional expense
and would cause much delay, in that way defeating the
purpose of the section, which is expressly stated to be
'that the actual merits of the controversy may speedily
be determined without regard to technicalities and in
the most expenditious and inexpensive manner.'" (See
also Diaz vs. De la Rama, 73 Phil., 104.)

This procedure is all the more reasonable in the

present case because it does not appear nor is there
the slightest hint that the plaintiff's husband is hostile
to his wife's demand or claims any interest in the suit
 21. Pantranco North Express Inc. and Alex Buncan
vs. Standard Insurance Company Inc. and Martina
Gicale | G.R No. 140746, March 16, 2005.
Facts:
On October 28, 1984, Crispin GIcale was driving the
passenger jeepney owned by his mother Martina Gicale.
While driving north bound the national highway in Nueva
Ecija, a passenger bus owned by Pantranco driven by
Alexander Buncan overtook the jeepney, in doing so, hit
the left rear side of the jeepney and sped away.
Crispin reported the incident to the Talavera Police
Station and Standard Insurance, the insurer of the
jeepney. The total cost of the repair was Php 21,415,
but Standard insurance paid only Php 8,000, while the
remaining Php 13,415 was shouldered by Martina
Gicale.
Thereafter, Standard and Martina both respondent on
the case, demanded reimbursement from Pantranco
and its driver Alexander Buncan to which they refused,
prompting the respondents to file with the RTC Branch
94 Manila, a complaint for sum of money.
In their answer, Pantranco and Alex specifically denied
the allegations in the complaint and averred that it is the
Metropolitan Trial Court and not the RTC which was
jurisdiction over the case due to the amount claimed,
and that RTC has no jurisdiction since the cause of
action of each respondent did not arise from the same
transaction and that there are no common question of
law and fact common to both parties
Issue: Whether Martina Gicale and Standard Insurance
may join as plaintiffs in one complaint?
Held: Yes.
Rule 3, Section 6 provides that there may be permissive
joinder when:
A.) The right to relief arises out of the same transaction
or series of transaction;
B.) There is question of fact or law common to all
plaintiffs or defendants;
C.) Such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the
provisions of the rules on Jurisdiction and venue.
In this case, there is a single transaction common to all,
that is Pantranco’s bus hitting the left rear side of the
jeepney.
There is also a common question of fact which is
whether Pantranctio and Alex Buncan are negligent.
There being a single transaction common to both
Standard and Martina, consequently, they have the
same cause of action against Pantranco and Alex.
(In question of jurisdiction)
There being a proper joinder of parties and joinder of
cause of actions Totality Rule shall apply as provided in
Section 5(d) of Rule 2, where it provides that where the
claims in all the causes of action are principally for
recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall
be the test of jurisdiction.
The RTC has jurisdiction, as the total claim is Php
21,415 which is within the Php 20,000 threshold of
Section 19 of BP 129 before the effectivity of RA 7691
expanding the jurisdiction of the MTCs.
22. CSC vs. PACOL RASUMAN (G.R. No. 239011 |
June 17, 2019)
FACTS
Pacol Rasuman, a Senior Executive Assistant in the
Bureau of Customs (BOC), filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) a verified petition for correction of his date
of birth from February 12, 1952 to February 12, 1956,
impleading as respondent the Local Civil Registrar of
Marantao, Lanao del Sur.
The RTC issued an Order setting the case for hearing
and directing the publication of the Order in a
newspaper of general circulation in Marawi City and
Iligan City for three consecutive weeks at his expense.
Rasuman later filed an Amended Petition to implead the
BOC.
The RTC granted the petition for correction and directed
the Local Civil Registrar of Marantao and the BOC to
effect the correction of Rasuman’s date of birth in their
respective official records.
Thereafter, Rasuman filed with the Civil Service
Commission-National Capital Region (CSC-NCR) a
request for correction of his date of birth in his service
records. The CSC-NCR issued a Resolution denying
Rasuman's request for correction.
It held that while respondent's Certificate of Live Birth
(belatedly registered) supported his claim that his date
of birth was February 12, 1956, however, his
employment and school records showed otherwise; that
his personal data sheet on file with the CSC Field Office
showed that he attended elementary school from 1957
to 1962; thus, if his birthday was February 12, 1956, he
was only one year old at the time he first attended
elementary school.
Rasuman filed a petition for review with the CSC Proper,
which dismissed the petition. It held that it is not bound
by the RTC decision in the correction of respondent's
birthdate because it was not impleaded therein,
although it was an indispensable party; that the RTC
decision would have no effect insofar as the CSC is
concerned.
Rasuman filed a petition for review with the CA, which
reversed the CSC Decision. CSC filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the CA also denied. Hence, the
instant petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N the CSC is an indispensable party to the
petition for correction of birthdate in the RTC.
RULING: YES. Petition for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry is governed by Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court which provides, among others:
SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register is
sought, the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. - Upon the filing
of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix
the time and place for the hearing of the same,
and cause reasonable notice thereof to be
given to the persons named in the petition. The
court shall also cause the order to be published
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in
a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. - The civil registrar and any
person having or claiming any interest under
the entry whose cancellation or correction is
sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice
of the petition, or from the last date of
publication of such notice, file his opposition
thereto.
In this case, respondent sought from the RTC the
correction of his birthdate from February 12, 1952 to
February 12, 1956. He impleaded in his petition for
correction the BOC, the agency where he was working at
so as to update his service records, but did not implead
the CSC. It bears stressing that one of the CSC's
mandated functions under Executive Order No. 292 is to
keep and maintain personnel records of all officials and
employees in the civil service. Therefore, the CSC has
an interest in the petition for correction of
respondent's birth certificate since the correction
entails a substantial change in its public record, i.e.,
he would have an additional four years before
reaching his compulsory retirement age. To reiterate,
Section 3 of Rule 108 mandatorily requires that the civil
registrar and the interested parties who would be
affected by the grant of a petition for correction should
be made parties. Considering that the CSC is an
indispensable party, it should have been impleaded in
respondent's petition, and sent a personal notice to
comply with the requirements of fair play and due
process, before it could be affected by the decision
granting the correction of his date of birth. The CSC
should have been afforded due process before its
interest be affected, no matter how the proceeding was
classified. Thus, the CSC correctly denied respondent's
request for correction of his date of birth on the basis of
the RTC decision granting the correction.
 23. Imson v. CA [ GR No. 106436, Dec 08, 1994 ]
Facts:
The case arose from a vehicular collision involving
petitioner's Toyota Corolla and a Hino diesel truck
registered under the names of private respondents
FNCB Finance Corporation and Holiday Hills Stock and
Breeding Farm Corporation. The collision seriously
injured petitioner and totally wrecked his car. Petitioner
filed with the RTC a Complaint for Damages against
private respondents as registered owners of the truck;
truck driver; the beneficial owners and the truck insurer,
Western Guaranty Corporation. Defendants driver and
beneficial owners failed to answer and were declared in
default. however, petitioner and defendant insurer,
entered into a compromise agreement
In consequence of the compromise agreement, the trial
court dismissed the Complaint for Damages against
Western Guaranty Corporation. A copy of the Order of
dismissal was received by private respondent Holiday
Hills Stock and Breeding Farm Corporation. Nearly (18)
months later, said private respondent moved to dismiss
the case against all the other defendants. It argued that
since they are all indispensable parties under a common
cause of action, the dismissal of the case against the
defendant insurer must result in the dismissal of the suit
against all of them. The trial court denied the motion.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, as it ruled:
that in a common cause of action where all the
defendants are indispensable parties, the court's power
to act is integral and cannot be split, such that it cannot
relieve any of them and at the same time render
judgment against the rest.
Issue: Whether /N the insurer is an INDISPENSABLE
party?
to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his
absence there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of
the parties before the court which is effective, complete,
or equitable.
Conversely, a party is not indispensable to the suit if his
interest in the controversy or subject matter is distinct
and divisible from the interest of the other parties and
will not necessarily be prejudiced by a judgment which
does complete justice to the parties in court. He is not
indispensable if his presence would merely permit
complete relief between him and those already parties
to the action, or will simply avoid multiple litigation.
It is true that all of petitioner's claims in Civil Case No.
248-R is premised on the wrong committed by
defendant truck driver. Concededly, the truck driver is
an indispensable party to the suit. The other defendants,
however, cannot be categorized as indispensable
parties. They are merely proper parties to the case.
Proper parties have been described as parties whose
presence is necessary in order to adjudicate the whole
controversy, but whose interests are so far separable
that a final decree can be made in their absence without
affecting them. It is easy to see that if any of them had
not been impleaded as defendant, the case would still
proceed without prejudicing the party not impleaded.
Thus, if petitioner did not sue Western Guaranty
Corporation, the omission would not cause the dismissal
of the suit against the other defendants. Even without
the insurer, the trial court would not lose its competency
to act completely and validly on the damage suit. The
insurer, clearly, is not an indispensable party in Civil
Case No. 248-R
REMANDED to the trial court.

Ruling: NO.

Defendants in Civil Case No. 248-R are not all

indispensable parties.

An indispensable party is one whose interest will be

affected by the court's action in the litigation, and
without whom no final determination of the case can be
had. The party's interest in the subject matter of the suit
and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined
with the other parties' that his legal presence as a party
 24. Relucio v. Lopez
FACTS:
On September 15, 1993, herein private respondent
Angelina Mejia Lopez (plaintiff below) filed a petition for
"APPOINTMENT AS SOLE ADMINISTRATIX OF CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES, FORFEITURE, ETC.,"
against defendant Alberto Lopez and petition Imelda
Relucio.
In the petition, private-respondent alleged that
sometime in 1968, defendant Lopez, who is legally
Angeline
married to the private respondent, abandoned the
latter and their four legitimate children; that he
arrogated unto himself full and exclusive control and
administration of the conjugal properties, spending and
using the same for his sole gain and benefit to the total
exclusion of the private respondent and their four
children; that defendant Lopez, after abandoning his
family, maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited
Imelda Relucid
with herein petitioner since 1976.
with respondent, and give support to respondent and
their children, and dissolve Alberto J. Lopez' conjugal
partnership with respondent, and forfeit Alberto J. Lopez'
share in property co-owned by him and petitioner. Such
judgment would be perfectly valid and enforceable
against Alberto J. Lopez.
Nor can petitioner be a necessary party in Special
Proceedings M-3630. A necessary party as one who is
not indispensable but who ought to be joined as party if
complete relief is to be accorded those already parties,
or for a complete determination or settlement of the
claim subject of the action.20 In the context of her
petition in the lower court, respondent would be
accorded complete relief if Alberto J. Lopez were
ordered to account for his alleged conjugal partnership
property with respondent, give support to respondent
and her children, turn over his share in the co-ownership
with petitioner and dissolve his conjugal partnership or
absolute community property with respondent.

On December 8, 1993, a Motion to Dismiss the Petition

was filed by herein petitioner on the ground that private
respondent has no cause of action against her.

"An Order dated February 10, 1994 was issued by herein

respondent Judge denying petitioner Relucio's Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that she is impleaded as a
necessary or indispensable party because some of the
subject properties are registered in her name and
defendant Lopez, or solely in her name.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Relucio’s inclusion as party defendant
is essential in the proceedings for a complete
adjudication of the controversy. NO

RULING:
A real party in interest is one who stands "to be
benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit."18 In
this case, petitioner would not be affected by any
judgment in Special Proceedings M-3630.

If the petitioner is not a real party in interest, she cannot

be an indispensable party. An indispensable party is one
without whom there can be no final determination of an
action.19 Petitioner's participation in Special
Proceedings M-36-30 is not indispensable. Certainly,
the trial court can issue a judgment ordering Alberto J.
Lopez to make an accounting of his conjugal partnership
 25. BORLASA versus POLISTICO, 47 Phil. 345, 34
FACTS:
An association called Turnuhan Polistico & Co was
formed where Vicente Polistico was elected president
and treasurer. Through their by-laws, the members
obligated themselves to pay 50 centavos every sunday.
Borlasa and the other members of the association filed
an action against Polistico and the other members of the
board of directors of the association, for the dissolution
of the association, and to compel them to account for
and surrender the money and property of the
association in order that its affairs may be liquidated
and its assets applied according to law.
Polistico et. al. raised the question of lack of parties and
set out a list of some hundreds of persons whom they
alleged should be brought in as parties defendant on the
ground, among others, that they were in default in the
payment of their dues to the association.
The court made an order requiring Borlasa et.al. to
amend their complaint so as to include all of the
members of the Turnuhan Polistico & Co. either as
plaintiffs or defendants.
Borlasa amended the complaint and included hundreds
of people. Polistico et. al demurred to the amended
complaint on the ground that it showed on its face a lack
of necessary parties and this demurrer was sustained,
with the ultimate result of the dismissal of the action.
of the rule as to indispensable parties would require that
each and every individual in the class should be present.
But at this point the practice is so far relaxed as to
permit the suit to proceed, when the class is sufficiently
represented to enable the court to deal properly and
justly with that interest and with all other interest
involved in the suit. In the class suit, then,
representation of a class interest which will be
affected by the judgment is indispensable; but it is not
indispensable to make each member of the class an
actual party.
AS TO THIS CASE
The addition of some hundreds of persons to the
number of the plaintiffs, made in the amendment to the
complaint was unnecessary, and the presence of so
many parties is bound to prove embarrassing to the
litigation from death or removal.
Thus, the case was remanded and it was ordered that:
- The plaintiff shall amend their complaint by
dismissing as to unnecessary parties plaintiffs,
retaining a sufficient number of responsible
persons to secure liability for costs and fairly to
present all the members of the association.
- The complaint should be made to show on its
face that the action is intended to be litigated
as a class suit.
- Plaintiffs should further amend by adding after
the names of the parties plaintiffs the words, "in
their own behalf and in behalf of other
members of Turuhan Polistico & Co."

ISSUE: Whether all the members of the Turnuhan

Polistico & Co. should be brought in either plaintiffs or
defendants. (NO)

RULING:
It would be impossible to make all of the persons in
interest parties to the cases and to require all of the
members of the association to be joined as parties
would be tantamount to a denial of justice.

The general rule with reference to the making of

parties in a civil action requires the joinder of all
necessary parties wherever possible, and the joinder
of all indispensable parties under any and all
conditions, the presence of those latter being a sine
qua non of the exercise of judicial power.

CLASS SUIT
The class suit contemplates an exceptional situation
where there are numerous persons all in the same plight
and all together constituting a constituency whose
presence in the litigation is absolutely indispensable to
the administration of justice. Here the strict application
26. PLASABAS versus COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No.
166519, March 31, 2009
FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of
title to a parcel of coconut land with damages before
the Court of First Instance of Maasin, Southern Leyte
against the respondents. The petitioners prayed that the
judgement be rendered confirming their rights and legal
title to the subject property and ordering the defendants
to vacate the occupied portion and to pay damages.
Respondents denied the allegations of the petitioner
and interposed that the subject land was inherited from
their ancestor.
During the course of the trial, the testimonies of the
petitioners’ witnesses revealed that Nieves was not
the sole and absolute owner of the land. It was passed
to her and her 3 other siblings.
Respondents raised in their memorandum the
argument that the case should have been terminated
at inception for the petitioners’ failure to implead
indispensable parties—the other 3 siblings as co-
owners.
RTC: DISMISSED the case without prejudice. The trial
court stated that the case lacks cause of action
because the spouses Plasabas and Malazarte have no
complete legal personality to sue by themselves alone
without joining the siblings of Nieves who are also
indispensable in the final determination of the case.
They are indispensable as a final decree would
necessarily affect their rights, the court cannot proceed
without their presence. When an indispensable party is
not before the court, the action should be dismissed.
CA: AFFIRMED the ruling of the trial court. It further
declared that the non-joinder of the indispensable
parties would violate the principle of due process. It also
declared that Article 487 of the Civil Code could not be
applied considering that the complaint was not for
ejectment, but for recovery of title or a reivindicatory
action.
ISSUE: W/N THE PETITIONERS NEED TO IMPLEAD THEIR
CO-OWNERS AS PARTIES HELD: NO.
HELD: NO. The case falls in the exception where the co-
owners in an action for recovery of possession needs no
longer need to be impleaded.
Article 487 of the Civil Code, which provides that any
one of the co-owners may bring an action for
ejectment, covers all kinds of actions for the recovery
of possession, including an accion publiciana and
accion reivindicatoria. Thus, a co-owner may file a suit
without necessarily joining the other co-owners as co-
plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted
for the benefit of all. However, if the judgment be
adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the
unimpleaded co-owners.
The only exception to this rule is when the action is for
the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the
sole owner and is, thus, entitled to the possession
thereof. In such a case, the action will not prosper
unless the plaintiff impleads the other co-owners who
are indispensable parties.
In this case, the petitioners acknowledged that the
property is co-owned by Nieves and her siblings and
they have been authorized by the latter to pursue the
case on their behalf. Impleading other co-owners in
this case is not mandatory because the suit is deemed
to be instituted for the benefit of all.
The trial and appellate courts committed an error when
they summarily dismissed the case after both parties
had rested their cases on the sole ground of failure to
implead indispensable parties. The rule is settled that
the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a
ground for the dismissal of an action. The proper
remedy is to implead the party claimed to be
indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the
court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at
any stage of the action.
When the petitioner refuses to implead an
indispensable party despite the order of the court. It
will then be a ground for dismissal.
27. CSC versus RASUMAN, G.R. No. 239011, June 17,
2019

Facts:
(see #22)

Issue: WON failure to implead the CSC was fatal to

Rasuman’s petition.

Ruling: YES.

Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, "parties

in interest without whom no final determination can be
had of an action shall be joined as plaintiffs or
defendants." If there is a failure to implead an
indispensable party, any judgment rendered would have
no effectiveness. It is "precisely 'when an indispensable
party is not before the court (that) an action should be
dismissed.' The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void
for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even to those present." The purpose of the
rules on joinder of indispensable parties is a complete
determination of all issues not only between the parties
themselves, but also as regards other persons who may
be affected by the judgment. A decision valid on its face
cannot attain real finality where there is want of
indispensable parties.
 28. SPS. GARCIA versus GARCIA
G.R. No. 169157, November 14, 2011
Facts: Emilio Garcia and Eleuteria Pineda Garcia had 9
children, all surnamed Garcia. Emilio, thereafter,
married Monica Cruz, with whom he had eight (8)
children.
On October 26, 1962, Emilio died intestate, survived by
his wife Monica Cruz and his children of the first and
second marriage. He left, among others, a 1,564-
square-meter (sq m) lot (hereafter referred to as
"subject property") located in San Francisco Del Monte,
Quezon City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 18550 registered in the name of Emilio
married to Eleuteria.
On June 28, 1965, Emilio’s children of the first
marriage executed a General Power of Attorney (GPA)
in favor of Rita. On July 29, 1971, Benjamin and Rita
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate,
declaring themselves as the sole and only heirs of Emilio
and Eleuteria, and adjudicating unto themselves the
subject property, 1,000 sq m of which to Rita and the
remaining 564 sq m to Benjamin. Pursuant to said
Deed, TCT No. 18550 was cancelled and TCT No.
170385 was issued in the name of Rita and Benjamin.
The latter title was further cancelled and two (2) new
TCTs were issued, namely, TCT No. 171639 in the name
of Benjamin corresponding to his share of the subject
property and TCT No. 171640 in the name of Rita for her
share.
On July 25, 1973, Emilio’s daughters (Irma and Imelda)
of his second marriage filed a complaint against Rita
and Benjamin for the annulment of title, docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-17933. In addition to the annulment
and cancellation of the TCT, Irma and Imelda prayed that
the property covered thereby be partitioned in
accordance with the law on intestate succession.14 The
parties, thereafter, entered into a Compromise
Agreement15 which was approved by the court on
August 29, 1974.16 The subject property was supposed
to be partitioned among the siblings of the first and
second marriage. Pursuant to the said agreement as
approved by the court, the children of the first
marriage were supposed to receive a total area of
1,091.90 sq m, while the children of the second
marriage, including the surviving spouse Monica,
were supposed to receive a total area of 472.10 sq m.
It was further agreed upon by the parties that the shares
of Monica and her children were to be taken from Rita’s
1,000-sq-m portion of the subject property.
On August 22, 1979, Rita sold her property covered by
TCT No. 207210 to petitioner Norma Dimalanta Garcia
(Norma) resulting in the registration and issuance of TCT
No. 278765 in the name of Norma married to Benjamin.
Respondents Ester, Adela, Amado, Rosa and David
filed a complaint for reconveyance, which was later
amended on October 26, 1982, of the parcel of land
originally covered by TCT No. 18550, against Rita,
Benjamin, and Monica and her children.
RTC: On March 15, 1989, the RTC rendered a Decision
in favor of respondents.
CA: On appeal, except for the deletion of the award of
attorney’s fees, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Meanwhile on August 30, 1993, Norma filed a Petition
for Quieting of Title against Amado with the RTC. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-93-17396.
Norma alleged that she is the owner of a portion of the
property being claimed by Amado and his siblings in a
reconveyance case in which she was not made a party.
She added that she bought the property from Rita.
Issue: WON Norma is estopped from invoking the rule
on indispensable party. YES
Ruling: Respondents instituted the action for
reconveyance involving the subject property originally
covered by TCT No. 18550. At that time, Norma had
been the registered owner of a portion of the subject
property. As such, she was an indispensable party as her
title to the property was affected. The Court had
thoroughly discussed in a number of cases the nature
and definition of an indispensable party, to wit:
x x x [I]ndispensable parties [are] parties-in-
interests without whom there can be no final
determination of an action. As such, they must
be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants.
The general rule with reference to the making
of parties in a civil action requires, of course,
the joinder of all necessary parties where
 possible, and the joinder of all indispensable
parties under any and all conditions, their
presence being a sine qua non for the exercise
of judicial power. x x x
An indispensable party is a party who has such an
interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final
adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without
injuring or affecting that interest, a party who has not
only an interest in the subject matter of the controversy,
but also has an interest of such nature that a final
decree cannot be made without affecting his interest or
leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final
determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity
and good conscience. It has also been considered that
an indispensable party is a person in whose absence
there cannot be a determination between the parties
already before the court which is effective, complete, or
equitable. Further, an indispensable party is one who
must be included in an action before it may properly go
forward.
Thus, a person who was not impleaded in the complaint
cannot be bound by the decision rendered therein, for
no man shall be affected by a proceeding in which he is
a stranger. Otherwise stated, things done between
strangers ought not to injure those who are not parties
to them.
In this case, however, as aptly held by the RTC and CA,
Norma is estopped from invoking the rule on
indispensable party. Estoppel by laches or "stale
demands" ordains that the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which by exercising due diligence could or should have
been done earlier, or the negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. There is no
absolute rule as to what constitutes laches; it is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Being an
equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by
equitable considerations.
The CA has thoroughly explained the circumstances
showing Norma’s knowledge of the existence of the
pending litigation involving the subject property which
includes the portion registered in her name.
Further, the private respondents alleged in their
Comment dated 10 January 1997, that petitioner
Norma D. Garcia was very much aware of the
existence of Civil Case No. Q-36147 as the same
involves the estate of her deceased parent-in-law
Emilio Garcia from which her property covered by TCT
No. 66234 came from; that she knew very well that her
property is involved in the litigation yet she did not take
steps to have the same excluded therefrom, and that
she even participated actively during the trial of the case
and testified to support the theory put up by the
defendants. Petitioner Norma Garcia’s filing of the
Petition for Quieting of Title with [the] RTC of Quezon City
docketed as Q-93-17396 raffled to Branch 103 (Judge
Jaime N. Salazar, Jr.) supports private respondents’
assertion of petitioner Norma Garcia’s knowledge of the
existence and subject matter of the reconveyance case
(Civil Case No. Q-36147) as she categorically stated in
paragraph 6 of said Petition that said case for
reconveyance of property apparently includes the
property registered in her name. x x x
We, therefore, find that petitioner Norma Garcia is
estopped by laches from invoking the rule on
indispensable parties. Taking into consideration the
established circumstances surrounding the transfer in
her name of the parcel of land covered by TCT No.
66234 (278765), her non-joinder as an indispensable
party is a mere technicality that cannot prevail over
considerations of substantial justice. x x x
Indeed, evidence clearly shows that Norma had
knowledge of the existence and the pendency of the
reconveyance case filed by respondents against her
husband Benjamin, Rita, and Monica and her children.
She is now estopped from claiming that the RTC had not
acquired jurisdiction over her and thus not bound by the
decision sought to be executed.54 The RTC, therefore,
did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’
urgent motion to quash the writ of execution.
FLORETE vs FLORETE
Topic: Derivative Suit
Doctrine: A stockholder may suffer from a wrong done
to or involving a corporation, but this does not vest in
the aggrieved stockholder a sweeping license to sue in
his or her own capacity. The determination of the
stockholder's appropriate remedy—whether it is an
individual suit, a class suit, or a derivative suit—hinges on
the object of the wrong done. When the object of the
wrong done is the corporation itself or "the whole body
of its stock and property without any severance or
distribution among individual holders," it is a derivative
suit, not an individual suit or class/representative suit,
that a stockholder must resort to.
FACTS:
This resolves consolidated cases involving a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Issuances,
Transfers and Sale of Shares in People's
Broadcasting Service, Inc. and All Posterior
Subscriptions and Increases thereto with Damages.
The Complaint did not implead as parties the
concerned corporation, some of the transferees,
transferors and other parties involved in the assailed
transactions. People's Broadcasting Service, Inc.
(People's Broadcasting) is a private corporation
authorized to operate, own, maintain, install, and
construct radio and television stations in the
Philippines. In October 1993, People's Broadcasting
sought the services of the accounting and auditing
firm Sycip Gorres Velayo and Co. in order to determine
the ownership of equity in the corporation. Sycip
Gorres Velayo and Co. submitted a report detailing the
movements of the corporation's shares from
November 23, 1967 to December 8, 1989. Even as it
tracked the movements of shares, Sycip Gorres
Velayo and Co. declined to give a categorical
statement on equity ownership as People's
Broadcasting's corporate records were incomplete.
On June 23, 2003, Marcelino, Jr., Ma. Elena, and Raul
Muyco (Marcelino, Jr. Group) filed before the Regional
Trial Court a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Issuances, Transfers and Sale of Shares in People's
Broadcasting Service, Inc. and All Posterior
Subscriptions and Increases thereto with Damages
against Diamel Corporation, Rogelio, Sr., Imelda
Florete, Margaret Florete, and Rogelio Florete, Jr.
(Rogelio, Sr. Group).
The Marcelino, Jr. Group seeks to nullify the following
transactions on the shares of stock of People's
Broadcasting, as noted in the report of Sycip Gorres
Velayo and Co.The Rogelio, Sr. Group filed their
Answer with compulsory counterclaim.
The Regional Trial Court issued a Decision (which it
called a "Placitum") dismissing the Marcelino, Jr.
Group's Complaint. It ruled that the Marcelino, Jr.
Group did not have a cause of action against the
Rogelio, Sr. Group. It also ruled that indispensible
parties were not joined in their Complaint. The
Regional Trial Court granted Rogelio, Sr.'s compulsory
counterclaim for moral and exemplary damages
amounting to P25,000,000.00 and P5,000,000.00,
respectively, reasoning that Rogelio, Sr. suffered from
the besmirching of his personal and commercial
reputation.
The Court of Appeals denied the Marcelino, Jr. Group's
Petition and affirmed the trial court Decision.
ISSUES:
1. Whether it was proper for the Regional Trial Court to
dismiss the Complaint filed by the Marcelino, Jr. Group
on the ground that indispensable parties were not
joined in the Complaint.
2. Whether the Regional Trial Court's award of moral and
exemplary damages in favor of Rogelio, Sr. may be
executed.
RULING:
1. Yes, the dismissal is proper.
In this case, the Marcelino, Jr. Group anchored their
Complaint on violations of and liabilities arising from
the Corporation Code, specifically: Section 23 (on
corporate decision-making being vested in the board
of directors), Section 25 (quorum requirement for the
transaction of corporate business), Sections 39 and
102 (both on stockholders' preemptive rights),
Section 62 (stipulating the consideration for which
stocks must be issued), Section 63 (stipulating that
no transfer of shares "shall be valid, except as
between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in
the books of the corporation"), and Section 65 (on
liabilities of directors and officers "to the corporation
and its creditors" for the issuance of watered stocks)
in relation to provisions in People's Broadcasting's
Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws as regards
conditions for issuances of and subscription to
shares. The Marcelino, Jr. Group ultimately prays that
People's Broadcasting's entire capital structure be
reconfigured to reflect a status quo ante. The action
should be a proper derivative suit even if the assailed
acts do not pertain to a corporation's transactions
with third persons. The pivotal consideration is
whether the wrong done as well as the cause of action
arising from it accrues to the corporation itself or to
the whole body of its stockholders. An action "seeking
to nullify and invalidate the duly constituted acts [of a
corporation]" entails a cause of action that "rightfully
pertains to [the corporation itself and which
stockholders] cannot exercise . . . except through a
derivative suit. What the Marcelino, Jr. Group asks is
the complete reversal of a number of corporate acts
undertaken by People' Broadcasting's different
boards of directors. These boards supposedly
engaged in outright fraud or, at the very least, acted
in such a manner that amounts to wanton
mismanagement of People's Broadcasting's affairs.
The ultimate effect of the remedy they seek is the
reconfiguration of People's Broadcasting's capital
structure. The remedies that the Marcelino, Jr. Group
seeks are for People's Broadcasting itself to avail. The
specific provisions adverted to by the Marcelino, Jr.
Group signify alleged wrongdoing committed against
the corporation itself and not uniquely to those
stockholders who now comprise the Marcelino, Jr.
Group. A violation of Sections 23 and 25 of the
Corporation Code—on how decision-making is vested
in the board of directors and on the board's quorum
requirement—implies that a decision was wrongly
made for the entire corporation, not just with respect
to a handful of stockholders. Section 65 specifically
mentions that a director's or officer's liability for the
issuance of watered stocks in violation of Section 62
is solidary "to the corporation and its creditors," not to
any specific stockholder. Transfers of shares made in
violation of the registration requirement in Section 63
are invalid and, thus, enable the corporation to
impugn the transfer. Notably, those in the Marcelino,
Jr. Group have not shown any specific interest in, or
unique entitlement or right to, the shares supposedly
transferred in violation of Section 63. Accordingly, it
was upon People's Broadcasting itself that the causes
of action now claimed by the Marcelino Jr. Group
accrued. While stockholders in the Marcelino, Jr.
Group were permitted to seek relief, they should have
done so not in their unique capacity as individuals or
as a group of stockholders but in place of the
corporation itself through a derivative suit. As they,
instead, sought relief in their individual capacity, they
did so bereft of a cause of action. Likewise, they did
so without even the slightest averment that the
requisites for the filing of a derivative suit, as spelled
out in Rule 8, Section 1 of the Interim Rules of
Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies, have
been satisfied. Since the Complaint lacked a cause of
action and failed to comply with the requirements of
the Marcelino, Jr. Group's vehicle for relief, it was only
proper for the Complaint to have been dismissed.
Erroneously pursuing a derivative suit as a class suit
not only meant that the Marcelino, Jr. Group lacked a
cause of action; it also meant that they failed to
implead an indispensable party. In derivative suits,
the corporation concerned must be impleaded as a
party. Hence, the Marcellino Jr. Group’s complaint
must fail for failure to implead People's Broadcasting,
Inc.
2. No, the award of moral and exemplary damages in
favor of Rogelio, Sr. cannot be executed.
There are two consequences of a finding on appeal that
indispensable parties have not been joined. First, all
subsequent actions of the lower courts are null and void
for lack of jurisdiction. Second, the case should be
remanded to the trial court for the inclusion of
indispensable parties. It is only upon the plaintiff's
refusal to comply with an order to join indispensable
parties that the case may be dismissed. The second
consequence is unavailing in this case. While "neither
misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for
dismissal of an action" and is, thus, not fatal to the
Marcelino, Jr. Group's action, it was shown that they lack
a cause of action. This warrants the dismissal of their
Complaint. The first consequence, however, is crucial. It
determines the validity of the Regional Trial Court's
award of damages to Rogelio, Sr. Since the Regional Trial
Court did not have jurisdiction, the decision awarding
damages in favor of Rogelio, Sr. is void. Apart from this,
there is no basis in jurisprudence for awarding moral
and exemplary damages in cases where individual suits
that were erroneously filed were dismissed.
Divinagracia v. Parilla, et al.
[G.R. No. 196750, March 11, 2015]
Facts:
Conrado Nobleza, Sr. (Conrado, Sr.) owned a 313-
square meter parcel of land located at Cor. Fuentes-
Delgado Streets, Iloilo City. During his lifetime, Conrado
Sr. was legally married twice, first to Lolita Palermom,
and later to Eusela Niangar, with whom he had the
following children
Lolita (2):
• Cresencio
• Conrado, Jr
Eusela (7)
• Mateo, Sr. (deceased; survived by Felcon,
Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni, Mateo, Jr., Tito, and
Gaylord)
• Coronacion
• Cecilia
• Celestial
• Celedonio
• Ceruleo,
• Cebeleo, Sr. (deceased; survived by wife
Maude, and children Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel)
illegitimate
• Eduardo
• Rogelio
 • Ricardo
Upon Conrado, Sr.’s death, his children from his
marriage to Lolita, as well as Felcon (representing his
father and siblings), Coronacion, Celestial, Cecilia, and
his three illegitimate children sold their respective
interests over the subject land to now-deceased
petitioner Santiago Divinagracia for a consideration of
447,695.66. However, respondents Ceruleo, Celedonio,
and Maude (representing Cebeleo, Sr., and their
children), did not sign the Adjudication with Deed of Sale
as they did not sell their respective shares. As a result,
Santiago was unable to have the TCT No. over the
subject property cancelled and the subject document
registered because of respondent’s refusal to surrender
the said title. This fact, coupled with respondent’s failure
to partition the subject land, prompted Santiago to file a
Complaint for judicial partition and for receivership.
Respondents’s allegations is that that Santiago had no
legal right to file an action for judicial partition nor
compel them to surrender the TCT No. because, inter
alia: (a) Santiago did not pay the full purchase price of
the shares sold to him; and (b) the subject land is a
conjugal asset of Conrado Sr. and Eusela Niangar and,
thus, only their legitimate issues may ñlidly inherit the
same. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner, ordering the
cancellation of TCT No. T- 12255 and the issuance of a
new owner’s duplicate certificate in favor of Santiago
and the group of Ceruleo, Celedonio, Maude, and the
heirs of Mateo, Sr. The RTC found that through the
subject document, Santiago became a co-owner of the
subject land and, as such, has the right to demand the
partition of the same. However, the RTC held that
Santiago did not validly acquire Mateo, Sr.’s share over
the subject land, considering that Felcon admitted the
lack of authority to bind his siblings with regard to
Mateo, Sr.’s share thereon. On appeal to the CA, the
court reversed the RTC’s ruling, stating that that
Felcon’s siblings, as well as Maude’s children, are
indispensable parties to the judicial partition of the
subject land, and their non-inclusion as defendants in
Santiago’s complaint would necessarily result in its
dismissal. Hence the current petition before the SC
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly: (a) ruled that Felcon’s
siblings and Cebeleo, Sr. and Maude’s children are
indispensable parties to Santiago’s complaint for
judicial partition; and (b) dismissed Santiago’s
complaint for his failure to implead said omitted heirs.
Held:
Petition partly granted.
An indispensable party is one whose interest will be
affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and
without whom no final determination of the case can be
had. The party’s interest in the subject matter of the suit
and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined
with the other parties’ that his legal presence as a party
to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his
absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of
the parties before the court which is effective, complete,
or equitable. Thus, the absence of an indispensable
party renders all subsequent actions of the court null
and void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the
absent parties but even as to those present.
In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue
an order to divide the property, unless it first makes a
determination as to the existence of co-ownership. The
court must initially settle the issue of ownership, which
is the first stage in an action for partition. Until and
unless this issue of co-ownership is resolved, it would be
premature to effect a partition of the disputed
properties.
In the current case, while Santiago bought the interests
of majority of the heirs of Conrado, Sr., as a vendee, he
merely steps into the shoes of the vendors-heirs. Since
his interest over the subject land is merely derived from
that of the vendors-heirs, the latter should first be
determined as co-owners thereof, thus necessitating the
joinder of all those who have vested interests in such
land, i.e., the aforesaid heirs of Conrado, Sr., in
Santiago’s complaint. The absence of the
aforementioned indispensable parties in the instant
complaint for judicial partition renders all subsequent
actions of the RTC null and void for want of authority to
act, not only as to the absent parties, but even as to
those present.
However, the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the
complaint on account of Santiago’s failure to implead all
the indispensable parties in his complaint. The non-
joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial
proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may
be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of
the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead
an indispensable party despite the order of the court,
that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s
failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to
implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.
31. HEIRS OF AGARRADO versus AGARRADO, G.R.
No. 212413, June 06, 2018
Facts: Petitioners are children of the late spouses
Rodrigo and Emilia Agarrado, who, during their lifetime,
acquired a 287 square meter land (subject property) in
Bacolod City. Negros Occidental. The subject property
was registered in the name of the spouses: Rodrigo
and Emilia On August 1978, Emilia died intestafe,
leaving Rodrigo and their children as her compulsory
heirs.
Respondents Cristita and Ana Lou is the second family
of Rodrigo where Ana Lou was conceived during his
previous marriage to Emilia and was born one month
after its death.
On December 2000, Rodrigo died.
On January 23, 2003, respondents filed for an action
for partition of the subject land which was granted by
the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City Branch 44
despite the failure to indicate in the complaint the
market value of the property.
Eventually, the RTC rendered its January 17, 2007
Decision, which ordered the parties to partition the
subject property "among themselves by proper
instruments of conveyance or any other means or
method"
Aggrieved, the petitioners elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals, which, through the assailed April 19,
2013 Decision, affirmed with modification the January
17, 2007 Decision of the RTC.
Issue: Whether the action for partition is incapable of
pecuniary estimation justifying the trial court's
jurisdiction.
Held: No. For actions on partition, the subject matter is
two-phased. In Bagayas vs. Bagayas, the Court ruled
that partition is at once an action (1) for declaration of
co-ownership and (2) for segregation and conveyance
of a determinate portion of the properties involved.
Jurisprudence has ruled that an action for partition,
while one not capable of pecuniary estimation, falls
under the jurisdiction of either the first or second level
courts depending on the amounts specified in Secs,
19(2) and 33(3) of B.P. 129, as amended. Jurisdiction
over cases for partition of real properties therefore, like
all others, is determined by law. Consequently, a failure
by the plaintiff to indicate the assessed value of the
subject property in his/her complaint, or at the very
least, in the attachments in the complaint as ruled in
Foronda-Crystal, is dismissible because the court which
would exercise jurisdiction over the same could not be
identified,
The provisions state that in all civil actions which
involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, the TC shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction where the assessed value of the property
exceeds P20,000.00 ar, for civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such value exceeds P50,000.00.
For those below the foregoing threshold amounts,
exclusive jurisdiction lies with the Metropolitan Trial
Courts (MeTC), Municipal Trial Courts (MTC), or
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTC).
Thus, the determination of the assessed value of the
property, which is the subject matter of the partition, is
essential. This, the courts could identify through an
examination of the allegations of the complaint to
determine whether a suit is within its jurisdiction.
On the basis of this most recent ruling, the Court is
without any recourse but to agree with the petitioners
in dismissing the complaint filed before the RTC for
lack of jurisdiction. A scouring of the records of this
case revealed that the complaint did indeed lack any
indication as to the assessed value of the subject
property.
 32. BANK OF AMERICA NT & SA versus CA, G.R. No.
78017 June 8, 1990
FACTS:
Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA) was
established in accordance with a Memorandum of
Agreement dated March 25, 1974 executed by three
(3) other banks, namely:
- First Insular Bank of Cebu,
- Bank of Asia
- Bank of America NT & SA (nag sell og shares of
stock kay Gotianun).
- A fourth bank, Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, acquired
10% of the issued capital stock of the new bank
shortly after its formation
4 yrs. Later (July 19, 1978) - a class action was
commenced in the Securities & Exchange Commission
against
a. Bank of America NT & SA (hereafter simply
BA),
b. Andrew Gotianun, and
c. six (6) other unknown defendants said to be
relatives of Gotianun and Identified only as
Mario Doe, Danilo Doe, etc
What is the complaint all about?
- The complaint described defendant Gotianun,
and his relatives "and their corporations" as
owning and controlling the Family Saving
Bank, referred to them collectively as the
"Family Savings Bank Group."
- Also included among the defendants as
"nominal party" was Manuel Escaler, the
Corporate Secretary of IBAA.
- In the complaint, BA was charged, essentially,
with having violated the Agreement of March
25, 1974 stipulating inter alia that "none of
the parties ... shall sell their shares in the
consolidated bank to any other party without
first offering the shares proportionately to the
other two or their nominees"
- The basic accusation against Gotianun and his
Family Savings Bank Group, on the other hand,
was that, although aware of the Agreement of
March 25, 1974 and "in complete and utter
disregard and violation thereof," they had
induced their co-defendant BA "to sell to them,
as in fact they claim they have purchased, the
IBAA shares of defendant BA." 4 That illicit
transfer, the complaint alleged, had made all
said defendants (except Escaler) liable to the
plaintiffs for actual, moral, and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney's fees, in the
aggregate sum of not less than
P16,000,000.00. 5 The class action was
docketed as SEC Case No. 1613.
Who brought the complaint? ASIA GROUP (Majority of
the successors of Bank of Asia)
- The class suit was brought by about 40
persons, Potenciano Ilusorio, Conrado
Alcantara, etc. (private respondents herein),
allegedly constituting "a majority of the
successors in interest of the former Bank of
Asia," and calling themselves the ASIA GROUP.
In the course of the proceedings, three (3) orders of
SEC Associate Commissioner Sixto de Guzman were
rendered and then challenged before this Court
through special civil actions of certiorari.
Joint Motion (September 25, 1985) filed in SEC by
ASIA Group and Potenciano Ilusorio et. al. and one of
the defendants, Andrew Gotianun praying for the
dismissal:
1. of the complaint as against defendant Andrew
Gotianun in toto and with prejudice, as well as
2. of Gotianun's "counterclaim against plaintiffs
in toto and with prejudice, ... (both) without
pronouncements as to costs and attorney's
fees."
The joint motion set out the following additional
stipulations:
- Plaintiffs hereby reserve their right to pursue all
their causes of action pleaded in the complaint
against Bank of America NT & SA, it being the
position of the plaintiffs that the defendant
Bank of America NT & SA and Andrew Gotianun
were sued on different causes of action (i.e.,
plaintiffs sued defendant Bank of America NT &
SA for violation of contract and sued defendant
Andrew Gotianun for tort). Furthermore,
plaintiffs contend that defendants Bank of
America NT & SA and Andrew Gotianun are not
indispensable parties to the adjudication of the
distinct separate and independent causes of
 action pleaded against each one. The
plaintiffs, however, waive their cause of
action for rescission/annulment of the
subject sale of IBAA shares of stock by Bank
of America NT & SA to Andrew Gotianun.
Defendant Andrew Gotianun likewise reserves
his right to pursue his cross-claim against
defendant Bank of America NT & SA.
September 25, 1989 - Benjamin Limso, Eduardo
Aboitiz, Andrew Gotianun and Potenciano Ilusorio (ASIA
GROUP) had an amicable settlement between
themselves and filed with the court separate motions
jointly praying for the dismissal of G.R. No. 51651 and
G.R. No. 51678 (The petition of Benjamin challenging
the first order of SEC Commissioner). Another Joint
Motion: They also settled amicably all disputes in the
2nd Order of the Commissioner and asked for dismissal
of the petition (G.R. Nos. 53493) because it would
thereby be rendered moot and academic.
BA Opposed the dismissal of the SEC Case No. 1613
- BA argued that by thus moving for dismissal,
plaintiffs had "effectively conceded that the
subject sale was a lawful and valid sale and was
not tainted with any legal infirmities" and "if the
sale is considered valid and effective as
against, the buyer, Andrew Gotianun, then it
must likewise be considered valid and effective
as against the seller, BA," what was involved
being "a single, indivisible sales transaction by
virtue of which ... Gotianun acquired ownership
from BA of the subject shares," and plaintiffs'
causes of action against BA and Gotianun "are
not distinct, separate and independent."
SEC Granted the Join Motion and DISMISSED the
complaint against Andrew Gotianum on October 29,
1985. BA moved for reconsideration but was denied by
Order Dated January 22, 1986.
BA filed in the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
praying for the invalidation of the October 29, 1983 and
January 22, 1986 in the SEC Case No. 1613. The CA
dismissed the petition by a Resolution dated January 8,
1987 because laches had set in against BA and it waited
107 days from denial of its motion for reconsideration
before it filed its certiorari suit on May 9, 1986.
ISSUE: WoN BA and Gontianum had been sued under a
common cause of action and are both indispensable
parties in the SEC case and dismissing the proceedings
against Gotianun must necessarily extend to the benefit
of BA? NO.
HELD: The challenged SEC Order of October 29, 1985
was such a final order, in the sense that it finally
disposed of the case as between the plaintiffs, the ASIA
GROUP, and defendant Andrew Gotianun and his
relatives and business partners. It left nothing more for
the SEC to adjudicate in so far as the case affected the
ASIA GROUP vis a vis Andrew Gotianun and his group.
Implicit in the order of dismissal of the action as
between the ASIA and Gotianun groups-leaving the
action to proceed as between the ASIA GROUP and BA-
is the proposition that the interest of the Gotianun Group
is distinct and severable from that of BA, making
applicable the rule set forth in Section 4, Rule 36 of the
Rules of Court on several judgment, viz.:
SEC. 4. Several judgments. — In an action against
several defendants, the court may, when a several
judgment is proper, render judgment against one
or more of them, leaving the action to proceed
against the others.
What is the remedy of the aggrieved party?
Seek its reversal by appealing therefrom. But it is appeal
that is the remedy against a final order or judgment, not
a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65. Appeal
is in fact antithetical (opposed) to the special civil action
of certiorari. Section 1, Rule 65 clearly and explicitly lays
down the rule that certiorari is proper only if "there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law;" and the rule has been
consistently applied except only in those rare instances
where appeal is satisfactorily shown to be an
inadequate remedy under the circumstances.
In the case at bar, BA did not appeal, either to the
Commission en banc or to the Court of Appeals. Actually,
the law is that from an adverse judgment or order of a
Commissioner, an appeal may be taken to the
Commission en banc, and thence, to the Court of
Appeals. There is no showing whatever in this case that
such an appeal court not have been taken by BA on
account of some insuperable cause, or that it would not
have been adequate in the premises, BA simply failed to
avail, within the prescribed period, of that plain remedy
indicated by law from the adverse Order of October 29,
1985. As a result, the final Order of October 29, 1985
became final, and unalterable.
Having become final because never appealed, the Order
of October 29, 1985 may no longer be modified in any
substantial respect. The issues thereby resolved may no
longer be relitigated. Any attempt to do so through
another action or proceeding would be barred by the
familiar doctrine of res adjudicata, even if the
subsequent proceeding resorted to were the special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65. Well known is the rule,
too, that certiorari as a special civil action may not be
resorted to as a substitute for a lost appeal — whether
the appeal prescribed by law be by certiorari or by writ
of error
The Cause of Action of ASIA GROUP against BA is
distinct and separate from its cause of action against
Gotianun Group.
- In BA, It is the contractual commitment under
the agreement of March 25, 1974, not to sell
its stock in IBAA to any 3rd person without first
offering it to the other parties to the agreement
(breach of agreement and makes it liable to the
parties to the agreement)
- In Gotianun Group, it is inducing BA to sell, and
actually purchasing its IBAA stock despite
awareness of the provisions of the agreement.
Gotianun will only be liabel if it bought the stock
with knowledge of the prohibition in the
agreement, not if it was awaree thereof.
From which allegations it is necessarily inferred that if
the Gotianun Group were in reality unaware of the
agreement, no cause of action could arise against it.
In other words, it is not alone the act of negotiating for,
and subsequently consummating, the purchase of BA's
stock in IBAA that would make the Gotianun Group liable
to the ASIA GROUP, but also the Gotianun Group's
knowledge of the right of first refusal stipulated in the
agreement; so that the absence of such knowledge
would remove any basis for holding the Gotianun Group
responsible in damages to the ASIA GROUP. Stated
otherwise, BA's act of selling its stock to the Gotianun
Group, without first having offered it for sale to ASIA
GROUP or the other parties to the Agreement of March
25, 1974, is a breach of the agreement and makes it
liable in damages to said parties. It does not however
make the Gotianun Group necessarily liable; it would be
liable only if it bought the stock with knowledge of the
prohibition in the agreement, not if it was unaware
thereof.
The waiver, therefore, of ASIA GROUP of its cause of
action against the Gotianun Group-evidently founded on
the acknowledgment that the latter had no knowledge
of the right of first refusal stipulated in the Agreement of
March 25, 1974-had no relevance and no possible
effect on the ASIA GROUP's right to proceed against BA
for violation of such right of first refusal. Hence, the
correctness of the rendition by the SEC of the order
approving the compromise agreement between the ASIA
and Gotianun Groups and dismissing the former's
complaint against the latter-an order in the nature of a
several or separate judgment in accordance with
Section 4, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court, supra-cannot
thus be gainsaid.
Besides, it would seem an obvious proposition that a
plaintiff has the right to choose which of several persons
to implead as defendant in, or to drop from, his
complaint. None of the defendants has the right to
compel said plaintiff to prosecute the action against a
party if he does not wish to do so. Of course, the plaintiff
will have to suffer the consequences of any error he
might commit in exercising his option. For the defendant
that he does not implead, or drops from the action, may
well be an indispensable party, in which event his action
will have to be dismissed, since according to the law, no
final adjudication can be had of the action without such
an indispensable party. 34 The remedy of a co-
defendant who is not dropped, therefore, is not to insist
that the plaintiff continue to prosecute his action against
the dropped defendant, but to move for dismissal of the
action against himself, or take such appropriate action
as might otherwise be proper.
33. MIGUEL AND FERMIN CARAM vs CA and ROSARIO
MONTILLA
FACTS: During the lifetime of Spouses Juan Caram and
Maria Gacibe, they owned Hacienda Montelibano. Upon
their death, they left, two sons and three daughters as
their legal heirs (Miguel, Fermin, Magdalena, Elena and
Salud).
Salud Caram sold to Rosario Montilla a 10-hectare
portion of her share in the Hacienda Montelibano
(Exhibit P – May 25, 1949). Thereafter, she executed
another document (Exhibit Q – September 19, 1949)
whereby she conveyed to Rosario Montilla her whole
share in the Hacienda Montelibano.
Subsequently, Elena Caram also sold ten-hectares of
her share in the same Hacienda to Rosario Montilla
(October 19, 1949).
On December 9, 1949, the five Caram heirs executed a
partition agreement wherein they agreed to subdivide
Hacienda Montelibano into 5 equal lots to be distributed
among them. They asked for the court’s approval of said
partition agreement and also requested that they be
declared the sole heirs of the late spouses.
On December 19, 1949, Salud Caram and Rosario
Montilla annulled the two previous documents (Exhibits
P & Q), and agreed on a sale by the former to Rosario
Montilla of her entire share of the Hacienda
Montelibano at P1000 per hectare.
On January 26, 1950, the court granted the partition.
On February 15, 1950, Miguel and Fermin Caram
addressed a telegram to Rosario Montilla stating that
they had just heard rumors that their sisters, Salud and
Elena, had sold to Rosario their respective shares in the
Hacienda and they notified Rosario that they had
resolved to repurchase or redeem as co-heirs. But
Rosario replied that everybody knows about the sales,
and that she was unwilling to resell.
So Miguel Caram and Fermin Caram filed an action to
repurchase from Rosario Montilla the portions of
Hacienda Montelibano which had been sold to Rosario
by their sisters Elena and Salud. They invoked Article
1067 of the Civil Code providing that if any of the heirs
should sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the
partition any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to
the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the
price of the sale.
They contend that Exhibits P and Q could not be
annulled legally by Salud and Rosario, because after
their execution, Miguel and Fermin Caram acquired the
right to repurchase, which would thereby be affected.
They argue that the partition was null and void
because they had affixed their signature thereto
without having been previously informed of the
executed sales contracts by their co-heir Salud.
ISSUE: WON the partition could be annulled.
RULING: Annulment of partition could not be decreed
unless the other heirs – Magdalena, Elena and Salud –
are made parties defendant herein, which they are not.
34. SANIDAD V. CABOTAJE
On the 12th of June, 1903, counsel for plaintiff Cipriano
Sanidad presented a petition to the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur for the partition of the property set
forth in the petition, alleging that he had inherited the
same from his daughter, Maria Sanidad, who in turn
inherited it from her mother, Sergia Cabotaje, the wife of
the plaintiff, both deceased, said partition to be made
subject to the rights of the respective parties; and for
judgments against the defendant in the sum of 520
pesos, Mexican currency, as profits accruing to plaintiff
from the said property and that in case a partition could
not be had without detriment to the rights of both parties
the property be sold at public auction and the proceeds
divided between the parties, after deducting the cost of
the proceedings.
The defendant, Simon Cabotaje, having been duly
summoned, on the 18th of July, 1903, demurred to the
complaint upon the ground set forth in paragraph 4 of
section 91 of the Code of Civil Procedure, alleging that
he was not a necessary party to the action and had no
interest therein and requesting that the complaint be
amended, making the Rev. Adriano Garces, who had an
interest adverse to that of the plaintiff, the only party
defendant.
The demurrer was overruled and on the 20th of August
of the same year the defendant filed his answer to the
complaint, praying that the case be dismissed, with
costs to the plaintiff, denying the allegations in
paragraph 1,5,7, and 8, and averring that he had no
knowledge of the statements contained in paragraph 9,
and that Father Garces, a resident of Dagupan,
Pangasinan, was the sole owner of the property claimed,
and was therefore the only necessary party to the action;
and that he, the defendant, Simon Cabotaje, was a mere
administrator of the said party to the action.
ISSUE: WON
Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:
"Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest. . . .
"Otherwise than as provided in this section, all persons
having an interest in the subject of the action, and in
obtaining the relief demanded, shall be joined as
plaintiffs.
"Any person should be made a defendant who has or
claims an interest in the controversy or subject-matter
thereof adverse to the plaintiff, or who is necessary party
to a complete determination or settlement of the
questions involved therein."
Section 122 of the same code provides:
"The court may determine any controversy between
parties before it, if can be done without prejudice to the
rights of others, or by preserving their rights for future
action; but when a complete determination of the
controversy can not be had without the presence of
other parties, the court must order them to be brought
in, and to that end may order amended or supplemental
pleadings, or cross complaint, to be filed, and summons
therein to be duly issued and served."
The failure to comply with the rules laid down by the
Code of Civil Procedure for the trial and proper
determination of cases involving questions controverted
by the parties prevents the court from duly deciding said
questions and arriving at a conclusion upon the merits
of the case, and makes it necessary to decide, in the first
place, such questions as relate to the form of the action
- that is to say, as to whether or not the procedure laid
down by the law he has been complied with.
It is not necessary, therefore, to pass upon the validity
of the transfer of the property to Father Garces, nor to
decide the other questions raised by the plaintiff. The
decision of this court must be confined to the question
of form raised by the demurrer and urged in the answer.
It is the duty of this court to decide whether or not, under
the sections of the Code of Civil Procedure above
quoted, Father Adriano Garces should be joined with the
defendant, Simon Cabotaje, as a necessary party to this
action.
Assuming, without deciding, that the property claimed in
the complaint was actually in the possession of the said
Father Garces, any judgment that might be rendered in
this case in favor of the plaintiff would be necessarily
void and no effect if Simon Cabotaje were the only party
defendant to the suit, since the property claimed is in
the possession of a third party. For that reason it
becomes impossible to arrive at a final determination of
the case unless Father Garces is joined as a party
defendant therein. This case comes within provisions of
the latter part of section 122 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, and it should therefore be directed that the
complaint be amended so as to include all necessary
parties for the final settlement of the case.
For the foregoing reasons we are of opinion that the
judgment of the court below should be reversed, the
proceedings in this case set aside, and the plaintiff is
hereby allowed to amend his complaint as aforesaid.
After the expiration of twenty days from the date hereof
let judgment be entered accordingly, and the case
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in
accordance with the law. So ordered.
 35. VALMONTE v. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Petitioners are spouses Lourdes and Alfredo
Valmonte who reside at Washington, USA. Atty. Alfredo
Valmonte was a member of the Philippine Bar, practicing
his profession in the Philippines. Private respondent
Rosita Dimalanta, sister of Lourdes Valmonte, filed a
complaint for partition of real property (a three-door
apartment located in Paco, Manila) and accounting of
rentals against petitioners Lourdes A. Valmonte and
Alfredo D. Valmonte before the RTC of Manila.
In a letter previously sent by Lourdes to Rosita, she
mentioned that in regard to the partition of the property
in question, all communications intended for her should
be sent to her husband. In line with the complaint for
partition and accounting of rentals, service of summons
was made upon petitioner Alfredo Valmonte, who at the
time, was at his office in Manila. Petitioner Alfredo
Valmonte accepted the summons, insofar as he was
concerned, but refused to accept the summons for his
wife on the ground that he was not authorized to accept
the process on her behalf. Accordingly the process
server left without leaving a copy of the summons and
complaint for petitioner Lourdes Valmonte.
Petitioner Alfredo Valmonte thereafter filed his Answer
with Counterclaim. Petitioner Lourdes Valmonte,
however, was not able to file her Answer. For this reason
private respondent moved to declare her in default.
Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte entered a special
appearance in behalf of his wife and opposed the
private respondent’s motion.
The trial court denied private respondents motion to
declare petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in default as well
as the subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Whereupon, private respondent filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the Court of
Appeals. The CA granted Dimalanta’s petition and
declared Lourdes Valmonte in default.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was valid service of
summons as against the person of Lourdes Valmonte.
RULING: NO.
In an action in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is not essential for giving the
court jurisdiction so long as the court acquires
jurisdiction over the res. If the defendant is a
nonresident and he is not found in the country,
summons may be served extraterritorially in accordance
with Rule 14, Section 17.
Service of summons is not for the purpose of vesting it
with jurisdiction but for complying with the requirements
of fair play or due process, so that he will be informed of
the pendency of the action against him and the
possibility that property in the Philippines belonging to
him or in which he has an interest may be subjected to
a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and he can thereby
take steps to protect his interest if he is so minded.
In the case at bar, private respondents action, which
is for partition and accounting under Rule 69, is in the
nature of an action quasi in rem. Such an action is
essentially for the purpose of affecting the defendants
interest in a specific property and not to render a
judgment against him.
As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who
is not found in the Philippines, service of summons on
her must be in accordance with Rule 14, Section 17.
Such service, to be effective outside the Philippines,
must be made either (1) by personal service; (2) by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such
places and for such time as the court may order, in
which case a copy of the summons and order of the
court should be sent by registered mail to the last known
address of the defendant; or (3) in any other manner
which the court may deem sufficient.
The SC held that service upon Atty. Valmonte does not
constitute valid service against Lourdes Valmonte. The
third mode of service provided in the Rules, like the first
two, must be made outside the Philippines, such as
through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign country
where the defendant resides.
 39. GABATIN versus LAND BANK, G.R. No. 148223,
November 25, 2004
There would never be a judicial determination of just
compensation absent respondent land bank’s
participation. Logically, it follows that respondent is an
indispensable party in an action for the determination
of just compensation in cases arising from agrarian
reform programs.
FACTS: Petitioners Fernando, Alberto, and Jose, all
surnamed Gabatin, were registered owners of three
parcels of rice land situated in Sariaya, Quezon. In 1989,
the properties, pursuant to the Land Reform Program of
the Government as defined under P.D. No. 27 and E.O.
No. 228, were placed by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) under its Operation Land Transfer (OLT).
The properties were distributed to deserving farmer
beneficiaries through the issuance of emancipation
patents. The determination for the Land Value of rice
lands commenced. However, petitioners rejected the
valuation.
On 16 April 1996, petitioners filed a case for the
determination of just compensation of their lands with
the RTC of Lucena City, naming the DAR and Land Bank
as respondents. Petitioners prayed that the just
compensation be fixed in accordance with the formula
in P.D. No. 27, with 6% compounded annual interest to
be paid based on the price of palay at the time of
payment (GSP at P 400) and not at the time of taking
(GSP at P 35) which results to a higher valuation of PHP
P 342,362.46 than P 29,956.54.
Respondent Land Bank filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the trial court in its
Order. Of the two respondents in the trial court, only
Land Bank appealed to the CA under Rule 41. (DAR,
indispensable party did not)
Petitioners filed a motion to remand the records to the
SAC and to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that the
decision of the SAC became final and executory, and
that the appeal raised issues involving purely questions
of law. They maintained that the appeal of respondent,
not being an indispensable party, did not stop the
running of the period to appeal, thereby making the
decision final.
The CA rendered a decision denying the motion to
dismiss and reversing the decision of the SAC. As to the
personality of Land Bank to file the said appeal, the
CA made a finding that respondent was a necessary
party; hence, it had a personality to appeal the SAC
decision.
Petitioners argued that DAR, being the only agency
authorized by law to represent the Republic of the
Philippines in the acquisition of private agricultural
lands for agrarian reform, as stated under Section 51(1)
of Republic Act No. 3844 and amended by Rep. Act No.
6389, is an indispensable party in expropriation
proceedings. Petitioners allege that Land Bank is only a
necessary party, thus, the Court of Appeals should have
dismissed the appeal.
ISSUE: WON Land Bank is an indispensable party?
May the Court of Appeals give due course to the appeal
filed by a necessary party without being joined by the
indispensable party which did not appeal the decision?
RULING: YES. The Court agrees with Land Bank.
Respondent answered that it can file an appeal
independently of the DAR in land valuation or in just
compensation cases arising from the agrarian reform
program. In support of its argument, respondent avers
that it is an agency created primarily to provide
financial support in all phases of agrarian reform
pursuant to Section 74 of Rep. Act No. 3844 and
Section 64 of Rep. Act No. 6657. It is also vested with
the primary responsibility and authority in the
valuation and compensation of covered landholdings
to carry out the full implementation of the Agrarian
Reform Program. It may agree with the DAR and the
landowner as to the amount of just compensation to be
paid to the latter and may also disagree with them and
bring the matter to court for judicial determination.
Respondent cited jurisprudence pronouncing that it is
not just a "mere rubber stamp" but a "necessary cog" in
agrarian reform as it does not just exercise a ministerial
function but has an "independent discretionary role" in
the valuation process of the land covered by land
reform. Respondent further stressed that this Court, in
the Decision, has recognized its right to appeal from an
adverse decision in a just compensation case.
It must be observed that once an expropriation
proceeding for the acquisition of private agricultural
lands is commenced by the DAR, the indispensable role
of Land Bank begins.
E.O. No. 405 provides that the DAR is required to make
use of the determination of the land valuation and
compensation by the Land Bank as the latter is primarily
responsible for the determination of the land valuation
and compensation for all private lands under Rep. Act
No. 6657.
More telling is the fact that Land Bank can disagree with
the decision of the DAR in the determination of just
compensation, and bring the matter to the RTC
designated as a SAC for final determination of just
compensation.
The foregoing clearly shows that there would never be a
judicial determination of just compensation absent
respondent Land Bank's participation. Logically, it
follows that respondent is an indispensable party in
an action for the determination of just compensation
in cases arising from agrarian reform program.
40. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GO and DELA ROSA
By: Hector Gaela
FACTS:
On September 2000, an INFORMATION was filed
by Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation (PDIC) before the RTC against Go
and Dela Rosa charging them of ESTAFA
THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF COMMERCIAL
DOCUMENTS for allegedly defrauding Orient
Commercial Banking Corporation of P159 M.
After numerous postponements, Go & Dela
Rosa were finally arraigned on November
2001.
Trial of the case was marred by
postponements/cancellations of hearings
caused by the PROSECUTION, resulting in the
inability to finish its presentation of evidence
despite the lapse of almost five (5) years.

Assuming arguendo that respondent is not an
indispensable party but only a necessary party as is
being imposed upon us by the petitioners, we find the
argument of the petitioners that only indispensable
parties can appeal to be incorrect.
This prompted Go & Dela Rosa to file, on
December 2007, a Motion to Dismiss for failure
to prosecute, and for violation of their right to
speedy trial.

There is nothing in the Rules of Court that prohibits a

party in an action before the lower court to make an
appeal merely on the ground that he is not an On January 2008, the RTC dismissed the
criminal case, ruling that Go & Dela Rosa’s right
indispensable party. The Rules of Court does not
to speedy trial was violated.
distinguish whether the appellant is an indispensable
party or not. To avail of the remedy, the only requirement The PROSECUTION moved for reconsideration
is that the person appealing must have a present which was granted.
interest in the subject matter of the litigation and must
be aggrieved or prejudiced by the judgment.A party, in
turn, is deemed aggrieved or prejudiced when his
Go & Dela Rosa subsequently moved for
interest, recognized by law in the subject matter of the reconsideration but was denied.
lawsuit, is injuriously affected by the judgment, order or
decree.The fact that a person is made a party to a case
before the lower court, and eventually be made liable if This prompted them to file a Petition for
the judgment be against him, necessarily entitles him to Certiorari before the CA. A copy of said petition
exercise his right to appeal. To prohibit such party to was served on PDIC, and not the People of the
Philippines thru the OSG as it was not even
appeal is nothing less than an outright violation of the
impleaded as party to the case.
rules on fair play.

The CA annulled and set aside the orders of the
RTC, and consequently dismissed the criminal
case against Go & Dela Rosa. It ruled that the
Prosecution's prolonged delay in presenting its
witnesses and exhibits, and in filing its formal
offer of evidence was vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive. It further held that double jeopardy
had already attached in favor of Go & Dela
Rosa, considering that the criminal cases
against them were dismissed due to violation of
the right to speedy trial.
PDIC moved for reconsideration but was
denied.
On May 2012, PDIC transmitted copies of the
CA Decision to the OSG.
Thereafter, the OSG filed this instant petition
contending that the People of the Philippines
was neither impleaded nor served a copy of the
petition thereby violating its Right to Due
Process of Law and rendering the CA without
any authority or jurisdiction to promulgate its
issuances.
ISSUE:
W/N the criminal case against Go & Dela
Rosa was properly dismissed without
impleading The People of the Philippines. NO
RULING:
The court cited Vda. de Manguerra v. Risos where
it said: It is undisputed that in the
Petition for Certiorari before the CA, Risos failed to
implead the People of the Philippines as a
party thereto. Because of this, the petition was
defective. As provided in Section 5, Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, all
criminal actions are prosecuted under the
direction and control of the Public Prosecutor.
Therefore, it behooved Risos to implead the
People of the Philippines to enable the Solicitor
General to comment on the petition. While the
failure to implead an indispensable party is not per
se a ground for the dismissal,
considering that said party may still be added by
order of the court, on motion of the
party or on its own initiative at any stage of the
action and/or such times as are just, it
remains essential, as it is jurisdictional. The
absence of such indispensable party renders
all subsequent actions of the court null and void for
want of authority to act, not only as
to the absent parties but even as to those present.
Furthermore, the Court cited Lotte Phil. Co., Inc.
v. Dela Cruz where it said: An indispensable
party is a party-in-interest without whom no final
determination can be had. The joinder of
indispensable parties is mandatory and the
presence of indispensable parties is necessary
to vest the court with jurisdiction.
DISPOSITIVE:
Petition GRANTED
43.POLICE SENIOR SUPERINTENDENT DIMAPINTO
MACAWADIB, Petitioner, vs. THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTORATE FOR PERSONNEL
AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT
FACTS:
Petitioner Dimapinto Macawadib was a police officer
with the rank of Police Senior Superintendent. On July
30, 2001, pursuant to the provisions of Section 39 of
Republic Act 6975, otherwise known as the
"Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of
1990," the Chief of Directorial Staff of the PNP issued
General Order No. 1168, enumerating the names of
commissioned officers who were subject to compulsory
retirement on various dates in the month of January
2002 by virtue of their attainment of the compulsory
retirement age of 56. Among the names included in the
said Order was that of petitioner, who was supposed to
retire on January 11, 2002, as the files of the PNP
Records Management Division indicate that he was born
on January 11, 1946.
On September 3, 2001, petitioner filed an application
for late registration of his birth with the Municipal Civil
Registrar's Office of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur. In the said
application, petitioner swore under oath that he was
born on January 11, 1956. The application was,
subsequently, approved.
On October 15, 2001, petitioner filed with the RTC of
Marawi City, Branch 8, a Petition for Correction of Entry
in the Public Service Records Regarding the Birth Date.
Pertinent portions of his allegations are as follows:
1. That herein petitioner is 45 years old, married,
Filipino citizen, PNP (Police Superintendent) by
occupation and resident of Camp Bagong Amai, Pakpak,
Marawi City. x x x;
2. That on January 11, 1956, herein petitioner was
born in Mulondo, Lanao del Sur, x x x,
3. That when petitioner herein joined with (sic) the
government service… he erroneously entered his birth
date as January 11, 1946, which entry are honestly
based on estimation, as Muslim (sic) in the south do
not register their marriages and births before;
4. That herein petitioner has correctly entered his true
and correct birth date, January 11, 1956, in his Service
Record at the National Headquarters, Philippine
National Police, Directorate for Personnel and Records
Management, Camp Crame, Quezon City.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner.
Respondent filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment
with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the CA,
seeking to nullify the Decision of the RTC on the ground
that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the
PNP, AN UNIMPLEADED INDISPENSABLE PARTY.
CA overturned the RTC’s decision. Petitioner contends
that respondent is NOT an indispensable party.
ISSUE: WoN it was necessary to implead PNP,
NAPOLCOM and CSC
HELD: YES
The Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that it is the
integrity and correctness of the public records in the
custody of the PNP, National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM) and Civil Service Commission (CSC) which
are involved and which would be affected by any
decision rendered in the petition for correction filed by
herein petitioner. The NAPOLCOM and CSC are, thus,
required to be made parties to the proceeding. They
are INDISPENSABLE PARTIES, without whom no final
determination of the case can be had.
An INDISPENSABLE PARTY is defined as one who has
such an interest in the controversy or subject matter
that a final adjudication CANNOT be made in his
absence, without injuring or affecting that interest.
In Go v. Distinction Properties Development and
Construction, Inc; the Court had the occasion to
reiterate the principle that:
Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court:
"parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action
shall be joined as plaintiffs or defendants."
If there is a FAILURE to implead an indispensable party,
any judgment rendered would have NO effectiveness.
It is precisely when an indispensable party is not before
the court (that) an action should be dismissed.
The absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void
for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even to those present.
The purpose of the rules on JOINDER OF
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES
is a complete determination of all issues
NOT ONLY between the parties themselves,
BUT ALSO as regards other persons who may be
affected by the judgment.
A decision valid on its face cannot attain real finality
where there is want of indispensable parties.
The general rule with reference to the making of
parties in a civil action
REQUIRES the joinder of all indispensable parties
under any and all conditions,
their presence being a sine qua non of the exercise of
judicial power.
For this reason, the SC has held that when it appears
of record that there are other persons interested in the
subject matter of the litigation, who are not made
parties to the action, it is the duty of the court to
suspend the trial until such parties are made either
plaintiffs or defendants. Where the petition failed to
join as party defendant the person interested in
sustaining the proceeding in the court, the same
should be dismissed.
When an indispensable party is NOT before the court,
the action should be DISMISSED.
The burden of procuring the presence of all
indispensable parties is on the plaintiff.
In the instant case, there is a NECESSITY TO IMPLEAD
the PNP, NAPOLCOM and CSC because they stand to
be adversely affected by petitioner's petition which
involves substantial and controversial alterations in
petitioner's service records.
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), if petitioner's service is
extended by ten years, the government, through the
PNP, shall be burdened by the additional salary and
benefits that would have to be given to petitioner
during such extension.
Thus, aside from the OSG, all other agencies which
may be affected by the change should be notified or
represented as the truth is best ascertained under an
adversary system of justice.
As the agencies were NOT IMPLEADED in this case
much less given notice of the proceedings,
the decision of the trial court granting petitioner's
prayer for the correction of entries in his service
records,
is VOID.
As mentioned above, the ABSENCE of an indispensable
party
renders all subsequent actions of the court NULL AND
VOID
for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present.
The petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The
Decision dated December 17, 2008 and the Resolution
dated February 25, 2009 of the Court of Appeals, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 02120-MIN, are hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 106194 January 28, 1997
SANTIAGO LAND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. The HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
and the HEIRS OF NORBERTO J.
QUISUMBING, respondents
Facts:
• Norberto J. Quisumbing brought an action
against the Philippine National Bank to
enforce an alleged right to redeem certain
real properties foreclosed by the Philippine
National Bank. Quisumbing brought the suit
as assignee of the mortgagor, Komatsu
Industries (Phils.), Incorporated.
• With notice of pending civil action, Santiago
Land Devt Corp purchased from PNB one of
the properties subject to litigation for 90
million.
• Petitioner SLDC filed a motion to
intervene, with its answer in intervention
attached, alleging that it was the
transferee pendente lite of the property
and that any adverse ruling or decision,
which might be rendered against PNB,
would necessarily affect it (petitioner). In
its attached answer, SLDC, aside from
adopting the answer filed by PNB, raised
as affirmative defenses the trial court's
lack of jurisdiction based on the alleged
failure of plaintiff Quisumbing to pay the
docket fee and Quisumbing's alleged lack
of cause of action against the PNB due to
the invalidity of the deed of assignment to
him.
• Quisumbing opposed SLDC's motion for
intervention. He argued that SLDC's
interest in the subject property was a
mere contingency or expectancy, which
was dependent on any judgment which
might be rendered for or against PNB as
transferor.
• The court then granted petitioner’s motion
for intervention and directed the
substitution of heirs in view of Norberto
Quisumbing’s demise and submitted for
resolution PNBs motion to dismiss.
• SLDC then served interrogatories
upon respondents and moved for the
production, inspection and copying of
 certain documents.
• Private respondents filed a motion to
quash or disallow the interrogatories
but it was denied by the court.
Issue: WON petitioner, as transferee pendente lite of
the property in litigation has a right to intervene.
Held: No.
Rule 12, § 2 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Intervention. — A person may, before or during
a trial be permitted by the court, in its discretion, to
intervene in an action, if he has legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in the custody of the court
or of an officer thereof.
The question is whether this provision applies
to petitioner in view of Rule 3, §20 governing
transfers of interest pendente lite such as was
alleged in the trial court by petitioner. This
provision reads:
Sec. 20. Transfer of interest. — In case of any transfer
of interest, the action may be continued by or against
the original party, unless the court upon motion directs
the person to whom the interest is transferred to be
substituted in the action or joined with the original
party.
In applying the rule on transfer of interest pendente lite
(Rule 3, §20) rather than the rule on intervention (Rule
12, §2), the Court of Appeals stated:
It has been consistently held that a transferee
pendente lite stands in exactly the same position as
its predecessor-in-interest, that is, the original
defendant.
.....................................................................................
However, should the transferee
pendente lite choose to participate in the
proceedings, it can only do so as a substituted
defendant or as a joint party-defendant. The
transferee pendente lite is a proper but not an
indispensable party as it would in any event be
bound by the judgment against his predecessor- in-
interest. This would be true even if respondent
SLDC is not formally included as a party- defendant
through an amendment of the complaint. As such,
the transferee pendente lite is bound by the
proceedings already had in the case before the
property was transferred to it
The purpose of Rule 12, §2 on intervention is to
enable a stranger to an action to become a party
to protect his interest and the court incidentally to
settle all conflicting claims. On the other hand, the
purpose of Rule 3, §20 is to provide for the
substitution of the transferee pendente lite
precisely because he is not a stranger but a
successor-in-interest of the transferor, who is a
party to the action. As such, a transferee's title to
the property is subject to the incidents and results
of the pending litigation and is in no better
position than the vendor in whose shoes he now
stands.

While it may be that respondent SLDC has a legal

interest in the subject matter of the litigation, its
interest as transferee pendente lite is different from
that of an intervenor. Section 2 of Rule 12 refers to
all other persons or entities whose legal interests
stand to be affected by a litigation, but it does not
cover a transferee pendente lite because such
transferee is already specifically governed by Section
20 of Rule 3. Otherwise, Section 20 of Rule 3 on
transferees pendente lite would be rendered
ineffectual and useless. Since it specifically covers
transferees pendente lite, any such transferee
cannot just disregard said provision and instead, opt
to participate as an intervenor when it is more
convenient for it to do so. Indeed, there has never
been a rule, authority or decision holding that a
transferee pendente lite has the option to avail of
either Rule 3, Section 20 or Rule 12, Section 2.
 44. Vaño vs Alo
[GR No. L-7220, 95 Phil. 495, | July 30, 1954]
Facts:
The petitioner (Teodoro Vaño) instituted an Action of
Certiorari to reverse an order of the Court of First
Instance of Bohol refusing to admit his fourth
amended complaint. The record discloses the
following facts and circumstances as a background
for the petition:
(1) 1947: Respondents herein Pedro Dumadag
(Dumagdag) and Esmenio Jumamuy
(Jumamuy), purporting to be the president
and general manager, respectively, of an
unregistered corporation or association
denominated APBA Cinematographic Shows,
Inc., (APBA):
a) Leased certain theatrical equipments from
the late Jose Vaño at an agreed monthly
rental of P200.
b) Jose Vaño having died, his administrator,
the present petitioner (Teodoro Vaño),
filed an action in the Court of First
Instance of Bohol for the return of the
theatrical equipments and the payment of
the agreed rentals.
c) The original complaint was filed in
September, 1947. Upon the filing of this
complaint the association was dissolved.
Counsel for the defendants below,
respondents herein, appears to have
insisted that all the members of the
association (APBA) should be made
parties defendants, but petitioner was not
inclined to do so.
(2) January 28, 1953, the court ordered
petitioner's (Teodoro Vaño) counsel to submit
a fourth amended complaint. This complaint
in part alleges:
That in or about February 1947, defendants
purporting to be the president (Dumagdag) and
general manager (Jumamoy), respectively of the so-
called "APBA" Cinematographic Shows Inc., leased
from the late Jose Vaño, the aforementioned
Theatrical Equipments at an agreed monthly rental
of TWO HUNDRED (P200) pesos and that he (Jose
Vaño) shall pay the expenses in the installation, for
the same shall be returned on his demand;
That said Theatrical Equipments mentioned in
paragraph 1, had been completely installed at the
beginning of the month of February, 1947, at the
"APBA" building Calape, Bohol, and since then the
said show house begun its operation;
That upon inquiry, the plaintiff was informed and so
allege that the "APBA" Cinematographic Shows Inc.,
has never been registered, hence Dumadag and
Jumamoy who acted as the president and general
manager respectively are the ones made as party
defendants.
(3) Plaintiff (T. Vaño) did not include the
members of the unregistered corporation as
parties defendants, and so they were not
summoned.
(4) On September 14, 1953, the court a quo
entered the order complained of, which is as
follows:’
(a) The association represented by
defendants Pedro Dumadag and
Esmenio Jumamuy, is not included as
party defendant in the fourth
amended complaint. It is a legal
requirement that any action should
be brought against the real party in
interest.
(5) In view of the opposition filed by the
defendants Pedro Dumadag and Esmenio
Jumamuy, the Court denies the admission of
plaintiffs’ (Vaño) fourth amended complaint
dated February 17, 1953, and objected to on
the date of the trial.
(6) The fourth amended complaint (paragraph 2,
supra) alleges that defendants, purporting to
be the president and general manager of the
unregistered corporation, leased the
theatrical equipments from the plaintiff,
petitioner herein. Said defendants, according
to the complaint, did not enter into the
contract in the name or on behalf of the
 corporation; consequently, the law applicable
is Article 287 of the Code of Commerce, which
provides:
Art. 287. A contract entered into by the factor in his
own name shall bind him directly to the person with
whom it was made; but if the transaction was made
for the account of the principal, the other contracting
party may bring his action either against the factor or
against the principal.
(7) The opposition of the respondents to the
admission of the fourth amended complaint
is procedural in nature, i.e., that
notwithstanding the fact that the APBA was
not registered, all its members should be
included as parties defendants as provided in
Section 15 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
(a) The trial court was of the opinion that
the inclusion of the members was
necessary as it considered them as
"real parties in interest." In this
respect, the trial court committed an
error as the rule requiring real parties
to be impleaded is applicable to
parties plaintiffs, not to parties
defendants.
Rule 3. Parties to Civil Actions
Sec. 15. Entity without juridical personality as
defendant. - When two (2) or more persons not
organized as an entity with juridical personality enter
into a transaction, they may be sued under the name
by which they are generally known or commonly
shown.
In the answer of such defendant, the names
and addresses of the persons composing said entity
must all be revealed.
(8) It is the absolute prerogative of the plaintiff to
choose the theory upon which he predicates
his right of action, or the parties he desires to
sue, without dictation or imposition by the
court or the adverse party. If he makes a
mistake in the choice of his right of action, or
in that of the parties against whom he seeks
to enforce it, that is his own concern as he
alone suffers therefrom.
(9) Granting that the members of the
unregistered corporation may be held
responsible, partly or wholly, for the
agreement entered into by the officers who
acted for the corporation, the fact remains
that the plaintiff in the case at bar chose not
to implead them, suing the officers alone.
(a) If the officers desire to implead them
and make them equally responsible
in the action, their remedy is by
means of a third-party complaint.
(b) But they can not compel the plaintiff
to choose his defendants. He may
not, at his own expense, be forced to
implead any one who, under adverse
party's theory, is to answer for the
defendants' liability. Neither may the
court compel him to furnish the
means by which defendants may
avoid or mitigate their liability.
(c) This was in effect what counsel for
respondents (Dumagdag & Jumamuy
of APBA) wanted to compel the
petitioner to do, and which the court
(CFI-Bohol) persuaded to do—force
the plaintiff to include the members
of the unregistered corporation as
parties defendants—and when
plaintiff refused to do so, it rejected
his fourth amended complaint.
(10) The court's order (CFI-Bulacan),
insofar as it demands the inclusion of the
members of the unregistered corporation,
has evidently been induced by a confusion
between an indispensable party and a party
jointly or ultimately responsible for the
obligation which is the subject of an action.
(11) The members of the unregistered
corporation could be responsible for the
rentals of the equipments jointly with their
officers. But the complaint specifically alleges
 that said officers (Dumadag, Jumamuy)
entered into the contract by themselves,
hence the presence of the members is not
essential to the final determination of the
issue presented,
a) The evident intent of the complaint being to
make the officers directly responsible.
(Article 287, Code of Commerce, supra.)
b) The alleged responsibility of the members of
the corporation for the contract to the
officers, who acted as their agents, is not
in issue and need not be determined in
the action to fix the responsibility of the
officers to plaintiff's intestate, hence said
members are not indispensable in the
action instituted.
ISSUE: WON inclusion of all members of the
unregistered APBA Cinematographics, Inc. should be
included as parties defendants, pursuant to Rule 3,
Sec. 15
Answer: NO. The trial court committed an error as the
rule requiring real parties to be impleaded is
applicable to parties plaintiffs, not to parties
defendants.
It is the absolute prerogative of the plaintiff to choose
the theory upon which he predicates his right of
action, or the parties he desires to sue, without
dictation or imposition by the court or the adverse
party.
The fact remains that the plaintiff in the case at bar
chose not to implead them, suing the officers alone
(Dumagdag [President] and Jumamoy [General
Manager]).
HELD: SC GRANTED the Writ of Certiorari.
Complained Order is REVERSED.
The court a quo (CFI-Bohol) is directed to
proceed according to the rules.
SC: We find that the trial court abused its discretion in
refusing to admit plaintiff's fourth amended
complaint. The writ prayed for is hereby granted, the
order complained of reversed, and the complaint
ordered admitted, and the court a quo is hereby
directed to proceed thereon according to the rules.
46. G.R. No. L-42754 October 30, 1935
ENRIQUE SOMES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
represented by THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and the
SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA, Defendants-
Appellants.
NIEVES CHOFRE, intervenor-appellee.
Facts:
Vicente Somes, son of the herein plaintiff, instituted
civil case No. 30590 against his wife Nieves Chofre,
the intervenor. Nieves Chofre, intervenor, obtained
judgment for support against her husband, Vicente
Somes, also the son of Enrique Somes. She applied for
and obtained a writ of execution of the judgment
rendered in her favor and the sheriff, on March 22,
1928, attached having been noted on transfer
certificate of title No. 25909 on said date. On May 6,
1927, a petition of the intervenor, filed in civil case No.
30590, praying that Vicente Somes be restrained from
alienating or encumbering the property mortgaged, was
noted on the title in question as notice of lis pendens.
Sometime later, the plaintiff instituted civil case No.
33265 in said Court of First Instance of Manila against
his son Vicente Somes praying in his complaint for the
annullment of the deed of sale of the property and the
improvements thereon described in original certificate
of title No. 5069, executed by him in favor of his son.
He amended his complaint by joining the Director of
Lands as defendant, in representation of the
Government of the Philippine Islands and prayed,
furthermore, for the annulment of the mortgage
constituted by his son in favor of the Government. The
mortgage was constituted to secure the loan of P8,000
granted by the Government to Vicente Somes who then
appeared to said transfer certificate of title No. 25909.
Nieves Chofre intervened in the case, Manuel Pellicer
was appointed receiver of the property.
Pending the case, the Government of the Philippine
Islands, represented by the Director of Lands, brought
action against Vicente Somes to foreclosure the
mortgage executed by the latter. However, neither the
receiver Manuel Pellicer, nor the plaintiff Enrique
Somes, nor the intervenor Nieves Chofre were joined
therein as defendants.
Issue:
W/N the plaintiff Enrique Somes, the intervenor Nieves
Chofre and the receiver Manuel Pellicer should be
joined as defendants in the complaint for foreclosure of
mortgage? NO.
Ruling:
The contention that the parties should be joined as
defendants is untenable because their interest, if any,
was subordinate and inferior to the Government's
mortgage right. The precept of section 255 relative to
the joinder of the person claiming an interest
subordinate to a mortgage as defendant is not
mandatory in character but merely directory.
In Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada vs. Gonzalez Diez
(52 Phil., 271), this court reiterated the same doctrine
in the following terms:
A second mortgagee acquires only a mortgage lien
upon what is called the equity of redemption vested in
the mortgagor, and his rights are strictly subordinate
to the superior lien of the first mortgagee. Having
acquired this right to the second mortgagee is a
proper and in a sense even a necessary party to a
foreclosure proceeding brought by the first
mortgagee; for, in the closing words of section 255 of
our Civil Code Procedure, it is expressly provided that
all persons having or claiming an interest in the
mortgaged premises subordinate in right to that of the
holder of the foreclosing mortgage creditor shall be
made of defendants in the foreclosure proceeding.
Accordingly, if in the original foreclosure proceeding the
attention of the court had been directed to the fact that
a second mortgage had been executed in favor of
Gonzalez Diez, it would have been peremptorily
required that the second mortgagee should be made a
party.
But the second mortgagee was not an indispensable
party to the proceeding to foreclose the first
mortgage, because appropriate relief could be
granted by the court to the first mortgagee, in the
original foreclosure proceeding, without affecting the
rights of the second mortgagee. But the failure on the
part of the first mortgagee to make the second
mortgagee a defendant was that the decree entered in
the original foreclosure proceeding did not have the
effect of depriving the second mortgagee of his right of
redemption.
While the subordinate lienholder is a proper party
defendant in order to make a decree of foreclosure
completely binding on all interests, he is not an
absolutely indispensable party in the foreclosure
proceeding.
It will be seen that while section 255 requires the
joinder as defendants of persons claiming an interest
subordinate to the mortgage sought to be foreclosed,
failure to comply therewith does not invalidate the
foreclosure proceeding had because the jurisdiction of
the court was not in the least affected thereby.
We hold, therefore, that the failure to implead the
plaintiff, the intervenor and the receiver as defendants
did not constitute sufficient cause to prevent the
execution of the judgment rendered in the foreclosure
suit.
 48. SPS. ROBERTO ABOITIZ AND MARIA CRISTINA
CABARRUS
vs. SPS. PETER L. PO AND VICTORIA L. PO
By: Geronilla, Stephen
Topic: Rule 3, Section 8
FACTS: This case involves a parcel of land that was
allegedly first sold by the Heirs of Mariano to defendant-
Spouses Po.
The petitioner-spouses Aboitiz here alleges that the
Spouses Po were not the rightful owners of the parcel of
land because there was a double sale made to them
made by the Heirs of Mariano and that they were buyers
in good faith.
The Spouses Po claim that respondents were not
"innocent purchasers for value." They allegedly knew of
the defective title of Roberto because his tax declaration
had the following annotation: "This tax declaration is
also declared in the name of Mrs. VICTORIA LEE PO,
married to PETER PO.
their rights. Their interest has, thus, become separable
from that of the petitioners. Thus, the Mariano Heirs are
not indispensable parties.
The Mariano Heirs may only be considered material
witnesses to the action to testify on the "main fact which
was the subject of the inquiry" or any circumstance or
fact "which tends to prove" the fact subject of the inquiry,
"which tends to corroborate or strengthen the testimony
relative to such inquiry," and "which legitimately affects
the credit of any witness who testifies." The validity of
the Deeds of Sale allegedly executed by the parties, in
this case, is a material matter in determining who the
true owner of the property is. Thus, the Mariano Heirs,
including Ciriaco, may testify as to the Deeds of Sale
they executed to prove which sale is the valid one.

ISSUE: Whether the Mariano Heirs, as sellers in a deed

of conveyance of realty, are indispensable parties;

RULING: No. The Mariano Heirs, as the alleged sellers of

the property, are not indispensable parties.

The Court ruled that they are at best necessary parties,

which are covered by Rule 3, Section 8 of the Rules of
Court:
Section 8. Necessary Party. - A
necessary party is one who is not
indispensable but who ought to be
joined as a party if complete relief is to
be accorded as to those already
parties, or for a complete
determination or settlement of the
claim subject of the action.

Here, it is clear that the Mariano Heirs are not

indispensable parties because they have already sold
all their interests in the property to the Spouses
Aboitiz. They will no longer be affected, benefited, or
injured by any ruling of this Court on the matter,
whether it grants or denies the complaint for
reconveyance. The ruling of this Court as to whether the
Spouses Po are entitled to reconveyance will not affect