China and South Asia: Threats, Strategies, Cooperation and Expectations

Author(s): Muhammad Shahrukh Shahnawaz

Source: Pakistan Horizon , April 2011, Vol. 64, No. 2 (April 2011), pp. 65-80
Published by: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24711178

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China and South Asia: Threats, Strategies,
Cooperation and Expectations
Muhammad Shahrukh Shahnawaz

Introduction

South Asia and China have much to gain from each other in the pre
century, especially in light of the developments of the last decade.
emergence of China as an economic power has been noticed by many
not welcomed by all. Many see it as a challenge to their supremacy
for others, China's economic impact is beneficial. They see it as the cen
of a 'virtuous trade cycle' that is helpful to most developing economies
the region. Many South Asian countries, but not all, fall in the sec
category. China is affecting South Asia both directly and indirectly
direct impact can be seen in its emerging role in the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), its involvement in the
efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and its possible role in bringing SAARC
and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) closer to each
other.

Ethnic separatism, religious extremism and terrorism are the 'three

evil forces' which China aims to eradicate. These issues align the
interests of China and South Asian countries in an indirect manner.
Another development which has the potential to enhance China's
involvement in South Asia is the emergence of a 'nuclear belt'. This belt
stretches from North Korea and China to India, Pakistan and, possibly,
Iran. All these countries, except Iran, have formally declared themselves
as nuclear powers. Except China, none of them are deemed 'legitimate'
nuclear powers by the international community. All of them share more
than just nuclear ambitions such as borders and a hostile past. China
may be treated as a 'stabilizer' if hostilities emerge in this 'nuclear belt'.
China's role in the Six-Party Talks to resolve the North Korean nuclear
issue and its 'silk route diplomacy' provide enough evidence of its capacity
and willingness to play such a role.

China is in the process of ensuring its economic and political stability

by pursuing the 'Strings of Pearls' strategy and by efforts to eliminate the
'three evil forces'. Although China and India have forged greater
economic linkages in recent times, their mutual distrust remains which
will hamper China's involvement in South Asia. In the backdrop of these

Muhammad Shahrukh Shahnawaz is a researcher based in Karachi.

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66 PAKISTAN HORIZON

developments, the future of South Asia would be incomplete witho

China.

China's war against the 'three evil forces'

SAARC and SCO

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) was founded in 2001. It

current members are China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikist
and Uzbekistan. Observers include India and Pakistan while Sri Lanka is
a dialogue partner and Afghanistan attends its meetings as a guest.

While India is supported by Russia in its bid to become a member of

SCO,1 Pakistan has the support of China and Uzbekistan.2 The expansion
of SCO is a two-fold deal as Russia is also keen for an observer status in
SAARC and, when this happens, India will be more than just willing to
support it.3 China's role in SAARC is increasing and it already enjoys
observer status. Many members of SAARC support China's membership.
Unlike India's opposition to China's membership of SAARC, Beijing is
open to the idea of New Delhi as a SCO member.4

China's regional activism in South and Central Asia and efforts for
greater cooperation between SAARC and SCO augment China's war
against the 'three evil forces' of ethnic separatism, religious extremism
and terrorism.5 China is ready to sit with Russia, win the trust of Central
Asian states and accept India as a member of SCO in order to neutralize
this threat. Separatism, extremism and terrorism threaten both regions.
Effective cooperation between the countries of the two regions, through
the platforms of SAARC and SCO, has not materialized because of the
trust deficit between China and India. Also, growing influence of China in
the Indian Ocean and the so-called encirclement of India through the
policy of 'String of Pearls' has made India wary of greater Chinese
involvement in South Asia and has left China without the support of an
important actor in the region. The element of mutual distrust is present,

1 " Russia backs India's case for SCO membership', The Times of India (New
Delhi), 12 June 2010.
2 Jefferson E. Turner, What is Driving India's and Pakistan's Interest in Joining
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization?', Strategic Insights, vol. IV, no. 8,
August 2005, available on www.nps.edu
3 Manish Chand, 'Russia keen on observer status at SAARC', Hindustan Times
(New Delhi), 11 April, 2007, www.hindustantimes.com
4 Rahul Karmakar, 'China seeks bigger role in SAARC', Hindustan Times, 23
May 2008, www.hindustantimes.com
5 Sam DuPont, 'China's war on the "Three Evil Forces'", 25 July 2007,
www.blog.foreignpolicy.com

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CHINA AND SOUTH ASIA 67

albeit at a lower scale, in China's relations with Russia too and the
Central Asian members of SCO. In fact, many analysts view SCO as 'a
forum for elite interactions between heads of states, foreign ministries
and security apparatuses and making its main mechanism only
summitry.'6 The inefficiency of SCO is a result of more than just lack of
trust. BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) and Collective Security
Treaty Organisation (CSTO) have overshadowed SCO. But, still, it is the
only platform at the regional level comprising of China, Russia and the
Central Asian states. This naturally raises expectations for a much
greater role of SCO in the ongoing developments of the region.

Terrorism and ethnic separatism are common problems of China,

Russia and Central Asian members of SCO. SCO was expected to play an
effective role in countering these threats. The fact that the charter of
SCO covers military and economic assistance raised expectations in this
regard.7 In the case of South Asia, SAARC is unable to play such a role
because there is no provision in its charter for economic and military
assistance. The growing involvement of SAARC member states in the
SCO holds promise for greater cooperation among the members of
SAARC and SCO in eradicating terrorism and ethnic separatism. China,
given its vital interests in both South and Central Asia, is in a position to
play a pioneering role in fostering such cooperation among the countries
of the two regions.

With the increasing pace of economic integration between the two

regions, especially in the form of trans-border gas pipelines,8 threats to
such pipelines have also increased. Keeping in view the imperatives of
their economic development, joint efforts on the part of the members of
SAARC and SCO will prove more effective than individual efforts.
Similarly, vulnerable trade routes can form another area of cooperation
between the countries of the two regions. The combined military efforts of
the member countries of SAARC and SCO can effectively thwart these
threats and may also lessen the dependence of these countries on the US
and NATO. China does not look favourably to the presence of US and
NATO forces in Afghanistan but it deems terrorism and ethnic
separatism as greater threats to the regions' and its own stability. Anti
terrorism efforts and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations by US and
NATO forces have so far not yielded any tangible results. Collective

6 David Kerr, 'Central Asian and Russian Perspectives on China's Strategic

Emergence', International Affairs, vol. 86, no. 1, January 2010, p. 146.
7 Ehsan Ahrari, 'Copycatting the US "war on terrorism", ,3 September 2003,
www.atimes.com
8 They include the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline and the Turkmenistan
Afghanistan- Pakistan- India (TAPI) gas pipeline.

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68 PAKISTAN HORIZON

efforts on the part of the members of SAARC and SCO, with a gre
understanding of the sensitivities of these regions, may prove mo
fruitful in countering these threats.

To win its war on the 'three evil forces', China would have to m
greater efforts in making SCO an effective organization. It would have
seek the cooperation of members of SAARC and SCO in protecting t
and supply lines from terrorist attacks. Such collective efforts at
mitigating shared threats will engender trust among the countries of both
regions and organizations. They may also lead to a scaling down of extra
regional presence in the region.

China and South Asia: Prospects for cooperation in post-NATO

Afghanistan

The changed US approach, under the Obama administration, to involve

regional stakeholders in a solution to the Afghan imbroglio has generated
prospects for enhanced coordination among the regional countries. This
emphasis on multilateralism does not only hold promise for greater role
for China and Russia but also for other regional powers.

China's involvement in Afghanistan

This was recognized for the first time by US Secretary of State, Hillary
Clinton, on her first visit to Beijing when she said that 'China as a
regional stakeholder can play a greater role in stabilizing Afghanistan
and Pakistan.'9 This recognition of China's role in efforts to stabilize
Afghanistan coupled with its commitment to fight ethnic separatism,
religious extremism and terrorism augurs well for regional efforts in
mitigating shared threats.

It appears that after the withdrawal of US and NATO forces from

Afghanistan, China would emerge as a strong contender for an enhanced
role in Afghanistan. An indication of such a role is China's 3.5 billion
dollars' investment in Afghanistan's Aynak copper fields. It is the largest
FDI project in Afghanistan's history and has generated hope that it may
change the approach to fighting terrorism away from the current
emphasis on COIN operations and towards long-term solutions such as
creation of employment opportunities.10 Perhaps, more than the
increasing US involvement in the region or the economic potential it

9 Kevin Slaten, 'China's Bigger Role in Pakistan, Afghanistan', 12 February

2009, available on www.carnegieendowment.org
10 Ron Synovitz, 'Afghanistan: China's $3.5 billion contract to develop
Afghanistan copper fiels, reveals wider agenda', 2 June 2008,
www.ionglobaltrends.blogspot.com

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CHINA AND SOUTH ASIA 69

possesses, the need to engage China was actually felt by the NATO
leadership.11 On the other hand, China's official policy is to call for
withdrawal of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan.12 With this, we
have a complete picture of what is expected of China and what China
expects from the international community. Clearly, an external presence
in the region is not acceptable to an emerging power like China.

The international community has welcomed China's role in the region.

One needs to see what course of action China has adopted and what are
its expectations? China was never comfortable with the Soviet presence
in Afghanistan. It did not support the Taliban regime. China views
Islamic separatist tendencies in the context of their impact on its
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and the movement for the East
Turkestan Islamic Republic. Chinese authorities foiled 'terrorist' plots to
kidnap foreigners and carry out suicide attacks during the Beijing
Olympics, thus highlighting the threat to its internal stability and its
resolve to deal firmly with it.13 The likelihood of Taliban ascendancy in
Afghanistan and the continued existence of militants' sanctuaries is a
matter of considerable concern for China. Moreover, the threat to energy
pipelines coming from its Central Asian neighbours explains China's
resolve to eradicate terrorism from what it calls its 'periphery'.

Another undesired result from the war against terrorism, and a cause
of concern for China, is the production and cross-border smuggling of
opium. China's trade and economic interests are affected by the
emergence of the so-called 'Golden Crescent'. 14 Given its past bitter
experience with the Golden Triangle (Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos, Thailand
and China's Yunnan Province), China is expected to play a leading role in
curbing this menace.15

11 'NATO may ask China to help with Afghanistan war effort: report', 2 March
2009, www.cbc.ca
12 M. K. Bhadrakumar, 'China maps an end to the Afghan war', 2 October 2009,
www.atimes.com
13 Chris Buckley, 'Chinese anger and terror warnings cloud Olympics', 12 April
2008, www.uk.reuters.com
14 Located at the crossroads of Central, South and Western Asia, the Golden
Crescent overlaps three parts of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Afghanistan
and Pakistan produce opium while Iran is a consumer and 'trans-shipment
route for the smuggled opiates', www.cia.gov
15 'Drug trade in Asia', 'Golden Crescent', 'Golden Triangle', updated versions of
Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy's articles published in David Levinson and Karen
Christensen (eds.), Encyclopedia of Modern Asia, Volume II (Chicago:
Scribners, 2002), available on www.geopium.org

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70 PAKISTAN HORIZON

China has extended support to the Afghan government to fi

Taliban and to strengthen Afghanistan's role in regional affairs. 16
same time, China does not support long-term presence of Western
in Afghanistan. It is reluctant to involve its military but ther
expectations, especially after its investment in the Aynak copp
and other development projects, China may consider maintain
military presence in Afghanistan. For the time being, it appears
on NATO forces to protect its investment and critical infrastructur

South Asian compromise

Pakistan is a key player and a negotiator in the efforts for pe

Afghanistan. Pakistan is apprehensive of India's growing clout in
Afghanistan and it may view China as a neutralizer of sorts. The
question of post-NATO Afghanistan is a critical one as China is not in
favour of the Taliban joining any future unity government. China and
India can agree to support a strong Afghan government against the
growing power and influence of the Taliban and can take Pakistan along.
This 'compromise' is, perhaps, the only solution available to China and
South Asian countries to ensure peace and stability in Afghanistan. Also,
it might be the only scenario in which the US and NATO can execute
their exit strategy from Afghanistan.

Cooperation of and with South Asian countries

After its establishment in 1985, SAARC has been nothing more than a
platform for India to conduct its bilateral relations. The rivalry between
India and Pakistan is often cited for its poor performance. The fact that
India share borders with almost all members of SAARC while these
countries do not share borders with each other, gives India consid
space to establish its hegemony in the region and it has never shied aw
from treating South Asia as its backyard. However, Afghanistan's
inclusion in SAARC and China's observer status has not only changed the
dynamics of the organization but also of the region.18

Fresh membership in SAARC

It is obvious that China will not limit itself to an observer status. It has
already expressed its desire for full membership and has initiated efforts

16'China pledges continued support to Afghanistan's reconstruction', 20 July 2007,

www.news.xinhuanet.com
17 Richard Weitz, 'The Limits of Partnership: China, NATO and the Afghan War',
ChinaSecurity, no. 16, 2010, www.chinasecurity.us
18 'China's Observer Status: Implications for SAARC', 21 November 2005,
www.india-defence.com

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CHINA AND SOUTH ASIA 71

in that regard. While most members of SAARC are open to China as a

member, India has blocked its bid.19 The inclusion of China as a member
holds promise for a new chapter in the functioning of SAARC as it will
neutralize India's hegemonic role.

Many are of the opinion that all the members of SAARC share a
common past and China fails to satisfy that condition. This notion is not
entirely true as India and China have a common past linked through the
mountains of Tibet. They both cherish the teachings of Buddha. The
miniature art of the Mughals is a combination of Persian and Chinese
painting styles. Both fought on the same side in the Second World War.
Jawaharlal Nehru was of the view that India will always remain grateful
for China's help during the worse drought faced in times of war. 20 The
Chinese Boxer Rebellion and Indian war of independence were similar in
nature. In short, China does share a common past with South Asian
countries and qualifies for membership in SAARC. Obviously, there are
more pressing concerns than a fixation with a common past that
necessitate China's membership.

Exploring new possibilities with ASEAN

The South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) has not brought about the
economic integration that it envisioned. Most SAARC countries blame
India for creating barriers against their exports and thereby impede,
rather than spur, regional economic integration. 21 China, on the other
hand, is now heavily investing in all South Asian countries, including
India. It is only a matter of time before the South Asian countries become
economically integrated with China, even if the integration among them
is at a lower level.

Some quarters in South Asia fear that allowing tariff-free access to

Chinese goods would ruin South Asian economies. Instead of developing
trade and economic relations with China on their own, the SAARC
countries would do well to follow a regional approach and implement
effective mechanisms for the economic integration of South Asia. As a
bloc, they would be in a more advantageous position vis-à-vis the influx of
Chinese products. This can be done by fully implementing SAFTA. South
Asian countries can follow the example of ASEAN Plus Three (APT)
which include members of ASEAN and China, Japan and South Korea.

19 'India Blocks China SAARC Membership', 27 April 2010,

www.2point6billion.com
20 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (Calcutta: The Signet Press, 1946),
p. 17.
21 Harsh V. Pant, 'How China changes Saarc', 28 April 2010, www.livemint.com

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72 PAKISTAN HORIZON

This trade grouping is bigger than the previous ASEAN Plus On

included ASEAN and China. Through APT, all major trading riv
become integrated with China.22 A similar arrangement can be
considered between China and SAARC.

Other measures include indirect non-tariff barriers which need proper

implementation for concrete results. These non-tariff barriers can be
onerous quality standards, child labour, working conditions and anti
dumping. Anti-Dumping can be a collective effort and may save SAFTA
from market monopoly by India and China.

The inclusion of China can enhance the scope of SAFTA. When it

comes to trade, ASEAN countries are facing tough competition from
China in the international market, especially the US and Japan. It has
witnessed a decline in its exports and FDI flow but, at the same time, has
seen an increase in exports of primary components to China and stocks of
FDI.23 In the face of a common threat, SAARC and ASEAN can cooperat
in upgrading their skills and infrastructure and improve governance and
institutional performance. SAARC and ASEAN can allow free inter
regional movement of factors of production such as labour and capital.
Also, they can agree on common tariffs and barriers for countries outside
their regimes. The two regions can support each other through FDI and
the involvement of locals can result in enhanced institutional
performance.

China and South Asia have much to gain from each other. How
must be kept in mind that only an effective institutional arrangem
ensure that opportunities for mutual growth and developm
availed.

Bilateral relations between China and South Asian countries

China and Nepal

There is not much difference between the past and present st

relationship between China and Nepal. Nepal's stance on Tibet an
choice between India and China is at the heart of their relations. The
Border Agreement of 1960 which led to the Border Treaty of 1961, with
the intention of respecting and scientifically demarcating the customary
boundary, was the highpoint of bilateral relations as every claim and

22 'Gov't to counter trade agreement among China, Japan, South Korea', 28

August 2010, www.chinapost.com
23 John Ravenhill, 'Is China an economic threat to Southeast Asia?', Asian Survey,
vol. XLVI, no. 5, September/October 2006, pp. 653-674.

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CHINA AND SOUTH ASIA 73

counter claim was resolved peacefully except Nepal-India-China Tri

junction Points.24 Nepal's neutrality, its recognition of Tibet as a part of
China and construction of a road connecting Tibet and Kathmandu was
the beginning of friendship and the end of Indian influence in Nepal.25
China supported the monarchy against the Maoists in during the civil
war. The new Maoist-led government decided to scrap the 1950 treaty
with India and to move forward with China.26 The construction of a
railway between Lhasa (Tibet) and Khasa (Nepal) will only bring the two
countries closer to each other.

China and Sri Lanka

China has made its place among the allies of Sri Lanka with aid an
military assistance. Its military collaboration with Sri Lanka has
significantly increased in the past few years. Sri Lanka is receiving larg
sums as aid from both China and Japan. China and Pakistan are
suppliers of modern military equipment to Sri Lanka and close ties exis
among the armed forces of the three countries. The recent news of Sr
Lanka preparing to open a Chinese-funded billion dollars port project h
fuelled Indian concerns about strategic Chinese investment in South
Asia.27 Both China and Sri Lanka have described the project as a
commercial venture. Many India analysts are of the opinion that Delhi
will closely monitor the port's development and will not rule out the
possibility of its utility as China's strategic asset and India's security
concern.

China and India

There was a time when it was feared that India might join the communist
bloc for it was already close to the former Soviet Union and was comin
closer to the People's Republic of China after 1949. The decision to n
join the communist bloc was a wise one as the two countries became
estranged after the Sino-Indian war of 1962. Since then, the two
countries are viewed as competitors in South Asia. Although many think
India is on its way to becoming a major power, many others believe that
India is being propped up to contain China. Regardless of what is made of
their regional role, the two countries have made significant progress in
their bilateral relations, especially in the last few years. The most

24 Buddhi Narayan Shrestha, "Nepal-China Border Demarcation: Token of

Friendship', 19 January 2007, www.bordernepal.wordpress.com
25 'Nepal', www.lcweb2.loc.gov
26' Maoists to scrap 1950 Indo-Nepal treaty', 24 April 2008, www.rediff.com
27 Mel Gunasekera, 'S. Lanka pins hopes on China-funded port, as India watches',
Dawn (Karachi), 16 August 2010.

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74 PAKISTAN HORIZON

significant progress was China's recognition of India's sovereignty

Sikkim. The two countries also agreed to open Nathula and Jele
passes in Sikkim and their bilateral trade has grown to more than
billion dollars annually.

Although the first decade of the 21st century was very productive f
both countries, there were moments when their bilateral relations
appeared to be weak. Verbal spat over Arunachal Pradesh,28 British
recognition of China's claim over Tibet 29 and China's displeasure over
the development loan to India by the Asian Development Bank (ADB),30
indicated that all was not well between the countries.

The issues of Tibet and Kashmir are basic motives behind India's
attempts to balance China as a regional power. Also, both countries
competing for energy resources in the region and elsewhere. Chin
one of the largest energy consumers, and India, as the future's fou
largest energy consumer, are interested in the energy resources
Myanmar. Both are working to increase their influence in the In
Ocean. India is developing Iran's Chah Bahar port on the Gulf of Om
secure its energy supply. China has invested in Pakistan's Gwadar
and plans to connect it with Pasni through a highway. It is build
fuelling station in Sri Lanka and a container port facility in Chitta
Bangladesh.31

China is aware of India's capabilities and is apprehensive that the

islands of Andaman and Nicobar Archipelago could be used as a 'metal
chain' to block China's access to the Straits of Malacca and disrupt its sea
lines of communication (SLOC).32 For South Asia, much is dependent on
the cooperation and competition between China and India. There are
signs that the two countries would intensify efforts to strengthen their
bilateral relations despite their mutual distrust. The recent visit of Prime
Minister Wen Jiabao is a case in point. During this visit, the two
countries pledged to raise the volume of their bilateral trade to 100
million dollars by 2015, promote exchanges between the Communist

28 'India and China row over border', 14 November 2006, www.bbc.co.uk

29 Robert Barnett, 'Did Britain Just Sell Tibet?', 24 November 2008,
www.nytimes.com
30 China objected to ADB loan to India for Arunachal project: Krishna', 9 July
2009, www.thaindian.com
31 Robert D. Kaplan, 'Center Stage for the Twenty-first Century: Power Plays in
the Indian Ocean', Foreign Affairs, vol. 88, no. 2, March/April 2009, p. 22.
32 Ranjit B. Rai, 'China's String of Pearls Vs India's Iron Curtain in the Indian
Ocean, It is a C3IC issue', IDU Update, April 2010,
www.indiadefenceupdate.com

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CHINA AND SOUTH ASIA 75

Party of China and the Indian National Congress and open a telephone
hotline between the premiers of the two countries. 33

China and Maldives

President Gayoom of Maldives stated in 1982: 'Let us not forget, the

Portuguese invaded us because of strategic position. Many covetous eye
are focused on us right now for the same reason.' These words ring tru
as China plans to build naval camps in Marao, Maldives. 34 Many
consider it to be an attempt to bloc India's plans to build a blue-water
navy. 35 It remains to be seen whether Maldives' role in China's 'Strings
of Pearls' strategy would prove beneficial for South Asia as a region or it
would be another source of contention between China and India.

China and Afghanistan

Afghanistan and China established diplomatic relations in 1955.

However, China showed little interest in Afghanistan for most part of the
20th century. China did not recognize the Taliban regime. 36. It was only
after its 3.5 billion dollars' investment in the Aynak copper fields that
China emerged as the third major stakeholder in Afghanistan, after the
US and NATO.37 This scale of investment is expected to bring stability in
the region by countering extremism through creating employment
opportunities for the people of the war torn country. President Karzai
hopes that China will persuade Pakistan's leadership to stop their
support for the Afghan Taliban and promote peace talks to end the
insurgency, paving way for further cooperation in the fields of trade and
investment.

China and Bhutan

China and Bhutan share a long series of border disputes and infamy for
the ill-treatment of their minorities, Tibetans and Nepalese

33 'Pakistan, China want conflict-free region: Gilani', Dawn, 19 December 2010.

34 Satheesan Kumaaran, 'Sri Lanka and Maldives fall victims to regional and
international hegemonic powers', 29 February 2008, www.tamilcanadian.com
35 A. B. Mahapatra, 'China: Base Strategy — China acquires a base in Maldives
against India with some help from Pakistan', 9 December 2005,
www.dhivehiobserver.com
36 'Factbox: Relations between China and Afghanistan', 22 March 2010,
www.reuters.com

37 Nicklas Norling, 'The Emerging China-Afghanistan Relationship', CA

Analyst, 14 May 2008, www.cacianalyst.org

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76 PAKISTAN HORIZON

respectively.38 M. Taylor Fravel's argument that China has settled

border disputes with all countries except India and Bhutan39 is gain
acceptance. Although Bhutan supported China for UN membership a
also favours 'One China', the two countries do not have any officia
diplomatic relations. For long, Bhutan has tried to stay neutral in
face of pressures from both China and India. The Dolam Valley incid
a violation of the 1998 treaty between Bhutan and China, has led t
increased apprehensions in the newly democratized Bhutan. 40

China and Bangladesh

Initially, China did not recognize Bangladesh. The two countries

established diplomatic relations in 1979. Since then, a number of high
level bilateral visits have taken place. President Ziaur Rahman visited
China in 1977.41 President Husaain Muhammad Ershad paid five visits
to China, in November 1982, July 1985, July 1987, November 1988 and
June 1990.42 During his visit to Bangladesh, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao
declared 2005 as the 'Bangladesh-China Friendship Year'.43 In 2007,
China donated one million dollars to Bangladesh for relief, rehabilitation
and reconstruction.44

China and Bangladesh cooperate in the fields of trade, culture,

education, science, technology and military contacts and cooperation.
With the opening of the Confucius Institute in Bangladesh, a new chapter
of cooperation in tourism and culture was opened between the two
countries.45 Bangladesh fits perfectly in the growing strategic importance
of the region for China and it has proposed to help Bangladesh build a
deep-sea port in Chittagong and agreed to exchange data about the
Brahmaputra River which flows from Tibet to Bangladesh through

38 Meenakshi Ganguly, 'China and Bhutan: Crushing Dissent', 4 July 2007,

www.opendemocracy.net
39 'China has settled all land border disputes except with India and Bhutan', 13
October 2009, www.news.rediff.com
40 Mohan Balaji. 'In Bhutan, China and India collide', 12 January 2008,
www.atimes.com
41 'Ziaur Rahman', www.virtualbangladesh.com
42 'China-Bangladesh Relations', 16 May 2007, www.bd2.mofcom.gov.cn
43 Haroon Habib, 'Bangladesh, China sign nine agreements', 9 April 2005,
www.hindu.com
44 'China donates US$1 mln to Bangladesh cyclone relief, 21 November 2007,
www.china.org.cn
45 'Confucius Institute in Bangladesh cements relations', 21 August 2009,
www.chinadaily.com

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CHINA AND SOUTH ASIA 77

India.46 Bangladesh invited China to SAARC as observer and supports its

full membership in the organization.47

China and Pakistan

China-Pakistan friendship is a time-tested one. The relationship between

Pakistan and China began in 1950 and, since then, it has been beneficial
to both countries. By supporting China's membership in the UN Security
Council, ending its relationship with Taiwan in favour of 'One China' and
by accepting China's sovereignty over Tibet, Taiwan and Xinjiang,
Pakistan laid a strong foundation for this relationship. Kissinger's secret
visit to Beijing48 and China's refusal to recognize Bangladesh are only
two examples of the support which the two countries have extended to
each other. Both have peacefully settled their borders issues and with the
construction of the Gwadar Port, the two countries expected to forge
enhanced cooperation in various fields including trade, energy,
infrastructure development and defence cooperation.49

During his three-day visit to Pakistan in December 2010, Prime

Minister Wen Jiabao held comprehensive discussions with President Asif
Ali Zardari, Prime Minster Yousuf Raza Gilani and the three services'
chiefs. Addressing a joint session of the parliament, he described
Pakistan and China as 'brothers forever'. During this visit, China pledged
400 million dollars for post-flood reconstruction in Pakistan and the two
countries signed a number of trade deals worth around 10 billion
dollars.50

China's South Asia policy and bilateral relations

The growing influence of China in South Asia is driven by economic,

strategic and security imperatives. In order to fuel its growing economy,
China requires natural resources such as oil and other essential
minerals. Furthermore, it requires new markets for its products.
Strategically, China needs to balance India's influence in the region. It
appears that China would be more willing to win India's trust through

46 'China makes strategic forays into Bangladesh', 15 June 2010,

www.zeenews.com

47 'China pledges to further promote China-Banglad

www. engli sh.people.com.cn
48 'The Beijing-Washington Back Channel and Henry
China: September 1970 to 1971' in William Burr (ed
Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 66, 27 February 2
49 'CM hopes China would bolster mine exploration in
(Karachi), 20 December 2010
50 'Pakistan, China want conflict-free region: Gilani', Dawn, 19 December 2010.

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78 PAKISTAN HORIZON

enhanced bilateral trade than encircle it through the 'Strings of Pe

strategy. China-India collaboration can ensure strategic stabilit
South Asia and may pave the way forward for a peaceful post-NA
Afghanistan. To counter the 'three evil forces', China requires gre
cooperation with South Asian countries.

Emergence of 'nuclear belt' and China's probable role

An area of strategic significance where China can play an important role

is the emergence of a 'nuclear belt'. This belt consists of nuclear aspirants
(Iran and North Korea), non-veto nuclear powers (India and Pakistan)
and China as the only 'legitimate' nuclear power. It encompasses three
regions: East Asia, South Asia and West Asia. As if the rivalry between
India and Pakistan was not enough to destabilize South Asia, this new
development, linking five countries not only in their nuclear ambitions
but also through their shared borders, is a cause for new security
concerns. Not only does it have the potential to further destabilize South
Asia but also East and West Asia. At the same time, it holds promise for
greater cooperation among all the stakeholders. China, having played a
positive role in addressing the Iranian and North Korean nuclear crises
and given its level of involvement in South Asia, is in a good position to
play the role of a cooling agent. Also, 'China's economic, diplomatic and
military weight together with its strategically important geographical
position has contributed to its enhanced international stature.'51
Therefore, the possibility of China playing a stabilizing role in this
'nuclear belt' cannot be ruled out.

The US presence in the Pacific Ocean was good enough reason for
North Korea to pursue nuclear weapons. Similarly, Pakistan cannot
afford a balance of power tilted in favour of India.52 Iran's continuous
testing of short and long range missiles has further increased tension and
insecurity in the region.53

51 Gulraiz Afzal Khan, 'Nuclear South Asia', p. 34, www.theblackvault.com

52 According to a CRS Report for Congress, Pakistan is 'producing fissile material,
adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional delivery
vehicles. See for details Paul K. Kerr and Marry Beth Nikitin, 'Pakistan's
Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues', Congressional Research
Service, RL34248, 13 January 2011.
53 'Iran tests missiles amid nuclear tension', 27 September 2009,
www.articles.ccn.com

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CHINA AND SOUTH ASIA 79

Nuclear belt extends from North Korea to Iran.

China played an important role in the Six-Party Talks to resolve t

North Korean nuclear crisis.54 As Pyongyang's long time ally and main
trading partner, China has used its influence with Kim's regime to bring
North Korea to the negotiating table.55 Similarly, China has appeared
more willing to play a prominent role to contain Iran's nuclear ambitions.
China has been insisting on a 'peaceful resolution' of the issue and
recognizes Iran's right to peaceful use of nuclear energy. However, it has
been urging Iran to fulfill its obligations under the Nuclear Non
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) with regard to cooperation with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).56 Given its close diplomatic
and trade relations with Iran, especially its imports of Iranian energy
resources, China's position remains key to the future of the long-running
standoff.

Given its clout with Pakistan and the fast pace of its economic
integration with India together with its willingness to play a more
responsible role on the international scene, China may be in a position to
persuade both Pakistan and India to move towards some kind of nuclear

54 Joseph A. DeTrani, 'Six-Party Talks and China's Role as an Intermediary in th

Process', remarks to US-China Economic Security Review Commission,
Washington D. C., 10 March 2005.
55 Jayshree Bajoria, 'The Six-Party Talks on North Korea's Nuclear Program',
1 July 2009, www.cfr.org
56 'China urges peaceful solution to the Iranian nuclear issue', 15 September 2010,
www.china-embassy.org

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80 PAKISTAN HORIZON

restraint regime in South Asia. However, it remains to be seen whe

or not the growing trade linkages between China and India lead to
resolution of their border disputes and a lowering of mutual distr
Only then, would China be in a position to use its influence with
India and Pakistan for a resolution of long-standing conflicts between t
two countries.

China has played a proactive role in the Six-Party Talks to resolve the
North Korean nuclear issue. It remains a key part of the efforts to resolve
the Iranian nuclear challenge. It has played a major role in stabilizing
Central Asia after the demise of the Soviet Union. In an age when the
international community is gripped by the fear of nuclear weapons
getting into the hands of terrorists, China's declared stance against the
'three evil forces' and its willingness to play a more mature role, one can
expect to see China helping, assisting and guiding the international
community in addressing newly emerging security concerns.

Conclusion

The future of South Asia holds many questions and China is a cr

part of most of the answers. From its increasing role in Afghanistan
utility as a bridge between SAARC and ASEAN, its probable r
stabilizing the emerging 'nuclear belt' to its resolve to eradicate
terrorism, ethnic separatism and religious extremism, China has
emerged as a vital component of the strategic equations of South Asia.
China's emphasis on collective efforts at the regional level through its
involvement in SAARC and its fast developing bilateral relations with
South Asian countries enable it to secure its interests in the region and,
at the same time, help in securing peace and stability in South Asia. The
cooperation between China and India holds promise for a peaceful and
more developed South Asia. However, the two countries need to move
beyond their trade relations and engage in meaningful dialogue to resolve
their border dispute and remove the wariness in their interactions. When
the element of distrust in China-India interactions is removed, it can be
expected that South Asia would benefit more by the involvement of China
in the long term, despite challenges arising in the short term.

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