1. Leano vs.

Domingo
Facts:
Petitioner Nenita Leano files a petition for review on certiorari seeking the annulment of
the decision of the Commission on Audit(COA) denying the request for relief from
accountability for the loss, thru alleged robbery, of the amount representing the year-
end bonus of several employees of the Bureau of Quarantine. The alleged negligence of
herein petitioner happened while she was the appointed Acting Cashier 1 of the said
bureau. It was found out that she did not use the safe in keeping the collections and
other cash items, but utilized instead a steel cabinet. Change of safe combination was
recommended several times.

She was found liable by COA for the said negligence as in violation of sec. 105 of P.D.
1445 which holds every person accountable for government funds shall be liable for all
losses resulting from the unlawful or improper deposit, use or application thereof and
for all loss attributable to negligence in keeping of the same. Petitioner requested for
reconsideration but was denied hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether petitioner is liable for the loss of the government funds by reason her
negligence or not.

Ruling:
Yes, Leano is liable for the loss of the government funds by reason of her negligence. The
existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The Law considers what would be
reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence
and determines liability by that. It is evident that petitioner fell short of the demands
inherent in her position. As aptly argued by the Solicitor General, an exercise of proper
diligence expected of her position would have compelled petitioner to request an
immediate change of the combination of the safe. However, the record is bare of any
showing that petitioner had, at least, exerted any effort to have the combination
changed, content with the fact that, according to her, the former cashier also used the
steel cabinet as depository of the funds.

2. Vergara vs CA
Facts:
A vehicular accident occurred on when Martin Belmonte, while driving a cargo truck
belonging to petitioner Vicente Vergara, rammed the store-residence of private
respondent Amadeo Azarcon, causing damage. The trial court rendered decision in favor
of private respondent, ordering the petitioner to pay, jointly and severally with
Traveller’s Insurance and Surety Corporation a sum of money representing actual
 damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and the costs of the suit.
The insurance company was sentenced to pay to the petitioner for third party liability
under its comprehensive accident insurance policy, and plus attorney's fees. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision in toto; hence, this instant petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether the petitioner is guilty of quasi-delict or not.

Ruling:
Yes, the petitioner is guilty of quasi-delict. It was established by competent evidence
that the requisites of a quasi-delict are present in the case at bar. These requisites are:
(1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or
some person for whose acts he must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of
cause and effect between such negligence and the damages. The fact of negligence may
be deduced from the surrounding circumstances thereof. According to the police report,
"the cargo truck was travelling on the right side of the road going to Manila and then it
crossed to the center line and went to the left side of the highway; it then bumped a
tricycle; and then another bicycle; and then said cargo truck rammed the store
warehouse of the plaintiff." According to the driver of the cargo truck, he applied the
brakes but the latter did not work due to mechanical defect. Contrary to the claim of the
petitioner, a mishap caused by defective brakes can not be consideration as fortuitous in
character. Certainly, the defects were curable and the accident preventable.

3. Phoenix Construction vs IAC

Facts:
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 15, 1975, private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on
his way home from cocktails and dinner meeting with his boss. He was proceeding down
General Lacuna Street when he saw a Ford dump truck parked askew, partly blocking the
way of oncoming traffic, with no lights or early warning reflector devices. The truck was
driven earlier by Armando Carbonel, a regular driver of the petitioner company. Dionisio
tried to swerve his car to the left, but it was too late. He suffered some physical injuries
and nervous breakdown. Dionision filed an action for damages against Carbonel and
Phoenix Insurance. Petitioners countered the claim by imputing the accident to
respondent’s own negligence in driving at high speed without curfew pass and
headlights, and while intoxicated. The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor
of private respondent.

Issue:
Whether Dionisio’s negligence is only contributory or not.
 Ruling:
Yes, Dionisio’s negligence is only contributory. Dionisio's negligence was "only
contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the
truckdriver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover
damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts.

4. RCPI vs CA
24th of January 1983 private respondent spouses sent a telegram of condolence to their
cousins through the herein petioner RCPI. The telegram was in perfect resemblance as
to what was intended by the spouses however, it was written on a birthday card and was
sealed in on a “Christmasgram” envelope. The spouses contended there was a breach of
contract on the part of the RCPI, they in turn filed complaint on the trial court where it
rendered its decision in favor of the spouses whereas, it was appealed in the CA where
also the judgment in the lower court was affirmed in toto. Thus, the RCPI came to this
Court for relief contending issues that the CA erred in rendering such judgment.

Issue:
Whether RCPI is liable for damages or not.

Ruling:
Yes, RCPI is liable for damages. Its excuse that it had run out of social condolence cards
and envelopes is flimsy and unacceptable. It could not have been faulted had it delivered
the message in the ordinary form and reimbursed the difference in the cost to the
private respondents. But by transmitting it unfittingly—through other special forms
clearly, albeit outwardly, portraying the opposite feelings of joy and happiness and
thanksgiving—RCPI only exacerbated the sorrowful situation of the addressees and the
senders. It bears stress that this botchery exposed not only the petitioner’s gross
negligence but also its callousness and disregard for the sentiments of its clientele,
which tantamount to wanton misconduct, for which it must be held liable for damages.

5. Nakpil and Sons vs CA

Facts:
Private respondents – Philippine Bar Association (PBA) – a non-profit organization
formed under the corporation law decided to put up a building in Intramuros, Manila.
Hired to plan the specifications of the building were Juan Nakpil & Sons, while United
Construction was hired to construct it. The proposal was approved by the Board of
Directors and signed by the President, Ramon Ozaeta. The building was completed in
1966. In 1968, there was an unusually strong earthquake which caused the building
heavy damage, which led the building to tilt forward, leading the tenants to vacate the
 premises. United Construction took remedial measures to sustain the building. PBA filed
a suit for damages against United Construction, but United Construction subsequently
filed a suit against Nakpil and Sons, alleging defects in the plans and specifications.
Technical Issues in the case were referred to Mr. Hizon, as a court appointed
Commissioner. PBA moved for the demolition of the building but was opposed. PBA
eventually paid for the demolition after the building suffered more damages in 1970 due
to previous earthquakes. The Commissioner found that there were deviations in the
specifications and plans, as well as defects in the construction of the building.

Issue:
Whether a fortuitous event exempts from liability parties who would otherwise be due
to negligence or not.

Ruling:
No, a fortuitous event does not exempt from liability parties who would otherwise be
due to negligence. Although Art. 1174 of the New Civil Code, states that no person shall
be responsible for events which could not be foreseen. But to be exempt from liability
due to an act of God, the following must occur: 1) cause of breach must be independent
of the will of the debtor 2) event must be unforeseeable or unavoidable 3) event must
be such that it would render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation 4)
debtor must be free from any participation or aggravation of the industry to the creditor.
Although the general rule for fortuitous events exempts liability when there is an Act of
God, but if in the concurrence of such event there be fraud, negligence, delay in the
performance of the obligation, the obligor cannot escape liability therefore there can be
an action for recovery of damages. The negligence of the defendant was shown when
and proved that there was an alteration of the plans and specification that had been so
stipulated among them. Therefore, therefore there should be no question that NAKPIL
and UNITED are liable for damages because of the collapse of the building.

6. Elcano vs Hill
Facts:
Reginald Hill was accused of killing Agapito Elcano. Hill was subsequently acquitted on
the ground that his act was not considered criminal because of “lack of intent to kill,
coupled with mistake.” Pedro Elcano, father of the victim Agapito, filed a case for
recovery of damages instead against Reginald and his father, Marvin Hill, before the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City.

The Hills filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging, among others, that the action is barred by a
prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata. The CFI granted said motion.
Hence, the instant petition.
 Issue:
Whether the action for recovery of damages by the Elcanos is barred by the acquittal of
Reginald Hill in the criminal case filed against him or not.

Ruling:
No, the action for recovery of damages by the Elcanos is barred by the acquittal of
Reginald Hill in the criminal case filed against him. The acquittal of Reginald Hill does not
extinguish his liability for quasi-delict, and the acquittal is not a bar for civil action for
damages. Under Art 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, shall not
be a bar to a subsequent civil action, nor for civil liability arising from criminal
negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

Art 2177 means that a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that
the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.

7. Astudillo vs Manila Electric Co.

Facts:
A young man by the name of Juan Astudillo met his death through electrocution when
he placed his right hand on a wire connected to an electric light pole situated near Sta
Lucia Gate, Intramuros, in the City of Manila. Shortly thereafter, the mother of the
deceased instituted an action in the CFI Mla to secure from the defendant, Manila
Electric Company, damages. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff.

Issue:
Whether defendant exercised due care and diligence or not.

Ruling:
No, defendant did not exercise due care and diligence. It is well established that the
liability of electric light companies for damages for personal injuries is governed by the
rules of negligence. The negligence came from the act of the Manila Electric Company in
so placing its pole and wires as to be within proximity to a place frequented by many
people, with the possibility ever present of one of them losing his life by coming in
contact with a highly charged and defectively insulated wire. Considering that electricity
is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies must
be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high
degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to be.
The poles must be so erected and the wires and appliances must be so located that
persons rightfully near the place will not be injured. Particularly must there be proper
 insulation of the wires and appliances in places where there is probable likelihood of
human contact therewith.

8. La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co. vs Valentin De Jesus, et al

Facts:
In October 1959, Lolita de Jesus was riding a bus owned by La Mallorca and Pampanga
Bus Company which had a head on collision against a freight truck. Apparently, the bus
had a tire blow out which resulted to the accident. Lolita died and so her father, Valentin
de Jesus, filed a civil case for damages against La Mallorca. The lower court rendered
judgment in favor of De Jesus and ordered La Mallorca to pay for actual, compensatory,
and moral damages including attorney’s fees. This decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. La Mallorca assailed the decision as it argued that a tire blow out is a fortuitous
event and should not be taken as negligence.

Issue:
Whether a tire blow-out is a fortuitous event or not.

Ruling:
No, a tire blow-out is not a fortuitous event. As found by the lower court, the tire blow
out in this case was due to the fact that the inner circle of the wheel of the bus was
pressed so closely to the rim which caused it to eventually explode. This mechanical
defect in the installation of the wheel could have been easily discovered had the bus
been subjected to a thorough check up before it was allowed to hit the road. La Mallorca
is therefore negligent and the tire explosion is not a fortuitous event for it could have
been avoided had the bus been properly maintained.

9. GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., andHERBERT C. HENDRY, petitioners, vs.
THEHONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTOM. TOBIAS, respondents.
Facts:
Tobias was an employee of globe mackay who allegedly discovered and reported to
his immediate superiors some fictitious purchases and fraudulent transactions. He
was told that he is the number one suspect and was asked by Hendry to take a
forced leave and to leave his office table drawers open and to leave the office keys.

When Tobias returned to work, Hendry went up to him and called him a crook and a
swindler. He was terminated from his employment. He was cleared by the police
during investigation but still cases were filed against him.
 When he sought employment with another company, Hendry without being asked,
wrote the RETELCO that Tobias was dismissed due to dishonesty. Tobias filed a civil
case for damages.

Issue:
Whether petitioners have abused their right and are liable for damages or not.

Ruling:
Yes, petitioners have abused their right. The imputation of guilt without basis and
the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the
standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has
already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be
confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing
therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages
to the employee. Under the circumstances of this case, the petitioners clearly failed
to exercise in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the
right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to Article21 of the Civil Code.

10. Heirs of John Sycip vs CA

Facts:
Melencio Yu is the husband of Talinanap Matualaga. By reason of jealousy, Matualaga
left Yu and returned to her parents. Five years after, they reconciled and lived together.
Yu asked Matualaga if a certain Non have approached her regarding the sale of their land
to John Sycip. Matualaga answered in the negative. Yu explained that while they were
separated, Alfonso Non approached him and told him that there was a buyer interested
in their land for a price. Melencio was convinced by Non that he would only sign the
documents prepared by Non who in turn will secure Matualaga’s signature otherwise, it
will be null and void. However, no such documents were signed by his wife so they
instituted this suit for the return of their land to them and the declaration of nullity of
the documents in question. The court ruled in their favor declaring the documents void
ab initio. The RTC ruling was affirmed in toto upon appeal.

Issue:
Whether the documents signed by Yu are void ab initio or not.

Ruling:
Yes, the documents signed by Yu are void ab initio. The Section 145 of the Revised
Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu provides that any transaction involving real
 property with said non-Christian tribes shall bear the approval of the provincial governor
wherein the same was executed or of his representative duly authorized in writing for
such purpose, indorsed upon it.

All the documents declared null and void or inexistent by the trial court and affirmed by
the Court of Appeals were found to have been falsified, without consideration and more
importantly without approval by any of the following officials: the Provincial Governor of
Cotabato, Commissioner of Mindanao and Sulu, or the Chairman of the Commission on
National Integration and therefore null and void.

11. Ledesma vs CA
Facts:
A college student was scheduled to graduate with magna cum laude honors. However,
this was deprived of her because her lending of money to members of an organization of
which she was a member, purportedly in violation of existing school rules and
regulations, according to the President of the State College. This was done although the
Bureau of Public Schools already intervened and instructed give her said honors. Despite
this, she was made to graduate as a plain student. The Supreme Court held the President
liable for damages.

Issue:
Whether the school president is liable for damages or not.

Ruling:
Yes, the school president is liable for damages. It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo
went through a painful ordeal which was brought about by the petitioner’s neglect of
duty and callousness. Thus, moral damages are but proper. Defendant, being a public
officer should have acted with circumspection and due regard to the rights of Miss
Delmo. Inasmuch as he exceeded the scope of his authority by defiantly disobeying the
lawful directive of his superior, Director Bernardino, defendant is liable for damages in
his personal capacity.

12. Urbano vs IAC

Facts:
On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his ricefield. He
found the place where he stored palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation
canal. Urbano went to the elevated portion to see what happened, and there he saw
Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier admitted that he was the one who
opened the canal. A quarrel ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with his
bolo, and again on the leg with the back of the bolo. On October 27, 1980, Urbano and
 Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano paid P700 for the medical expenses of Javier.
On November 14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the hospital where he had lockjaw and
convulsions. The doctor found the condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which
infected the healing wound in his palm. He died the following day. Urbano was charged
with homicide and was found guilty both by the trial court and on appeal by the Court of
Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on the affidavit of the Barangay
Captain who stated that he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation
canals on November 5. The motion was denied; hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the latter’s
death or not.

Ruling:
No, the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was not the proximate cause of the latter’s
death. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. The infection of the
wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier
was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign
to the crime. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have
been the proximate cause of Javier’s death with which the petitioner had nothing to do.

13. Padua vs Robles

Facts:
In the early morning of New Year's Day of 1969, a taxicab... struck ten-year old
Normandy Padua on the national road in barrio Barretto, Olongapo City. The impact
hurled Normandy and as a result of which, he died. Normandy's parents (Paulino and
Lucena Bebin Padua), by complaint filed with the Courtof First Instance of Zambales,
sought damages from Punzalan and the Bay Taxi Cab; likewise, the City Fiscal of
Olongapo, by information filed with the same court charged Punzalan with homicide
through reckless imprudence. On October 27, 1969 the court a quo, in civil case,
adjudged for the Padua’s... ordering the defendant Romeo Punzalan to pay actual
damages, moral and exemplary damages, and dismissing the complaint insofar as the
Bay Taxicab Company is concerned.Almost a year later, the court a quo, in criminal case
1158-0), convicted Punzalan... of thecrime of homicide through reckless
imprudence.After the judgment in civil case 427-0 became final, the Paduas sought
execution thereof. This proved futile; the corresponding court officer returned
the writ of executionunsatisfied.Unable to collect the amount... awarded in their
favor, the Paduas instituted action in the same court against Gregorio N. Robles to
enforce the latter's subsidiary responsibility. Robles filed a motion... to dismiss based
 on (1) bar of the cause of action by a prior judgment and (2) failure of the complaint to
state a cause of action. The court a quo, granted Robles' motion to dismiss on
the ground that the Paduas' complaint states no cause of action.

Issue:
Whether civil liability coexists with criminal liability or not.

Ruling:
Yes, civil liability coexists with criminal liability. In negligence cases, the offended party
(or his heirs) has the option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based on
culpa criminal under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for recovery of
damages based on culpa aquiliana under article 2177 of the Civil Code. The action for
enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal section 1of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court deems simultaneously instituted with the criminal action, unless expressly waived
or reserved for a separate application by the offended party. Article 2177 of the Civil
Code, however, precludes recovery of damages twice for the same negligent act or
omission.

14. Landicho vs Relova

Facts:
Elvira charged Rolando with bigamy on the ground that being then lawfully married to
her, he then contracted a second marriage with Fe Lourdes. After sometime, the second
spouse also filed an action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation
against Rolando. Then, as defendant in said case, Rolando filed a third-party complaint,
against the third-party defendant Elvira, praying that his marriage with her be declared
null and void, on the ground that by means of threats, force and intimidation, she
compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her. Afterwards, petitioner moved
to suspend the hearing of the criminal case. He argued that his civil suit for annulment
constitute a prejudicial question in the pending bigamy case. But the respondent Judge
denied the motion for lack of merit, and eventually the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the civil suit for the annulment of marriage constitutes a prejudicial
question in a pending suit for bigamy.

Ruling:
No, actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does
not mean that 'prejudicial questions' are automatically raised in said civil actions as to
warrant the suspension of the criminal case for bigamy To be a prejudicial question, the
 action for bigamy must be determinable from the civil action because to be found guilty
of bigamy, the second marriage one contracted must first be declared valid. And an
action for annulment of marriage is prejudicial to a bigamy case only if the accused in
the bigamy charged is also the one asking for annulment of the second marriage.

15. Quiambao vs Osorio

Facts:
In a civil case filed with the MTC of Malabon, private respondents claims to own a land
which the petitioner, through force, intimidation, strategy, and stealth entered and
thereafter began the construction of a house on the subject lot.

Petitioner raised in his affirmative defense as a ground for dismissing the case that an
administrative case is pending before the office of Land Authority between the same
parties and involving the same lot. Petitioner disputed the right of the private
respondents over the property for default in payments for the purchase of lot. Petitioner
argue that the administrative case was determinative of private respondent’s right to
eject petitioner from the lot in question, hence, a prejudicial question which bars a
judicial action until after its termination.

Issue:
Whether there exist a prejudicial question or none.

Ruling:
No, there is no prejudicial question in this case. A prejudicial question. is understood in
law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of
the issue involved in said case and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play generally in a situation where civil
and criminal actions are pending and the issues involved in both cases are similar or so
closely-related that an issue must be preemptively resolved in the civil case before the
criminal action can proceed. However, if a pending civil case may be considered to be in
the nature of a prejudicial question to an administrative case, We see no reason why the
reverse may not be so considered in the proper case, such as in the petition at bar.

16. Bengzon vs Province of Pangasinan

Facts:
This is an action for damages for maintaining a nuisance continuously injurious to the
plaintiff and his family by reason of the maintenance and operation of a stand pipe,
pumping station and open reservoir for the storage of water. Plaintiff and his family lived
in a two-story nipa and wooden house constructed on a lot also owned by plaintiff. He
had been living there for 27 years. Defendant constructed a reinforced concrete stand
pipe 28 meters high and 9 meters in diameter. Within the base of the cylindrical tank
 were three machines. In the side of the tank nearest the plaintiff’s residence and at a
distance of 3.4 meters was a chimney which rose to about the height of the gable of the
house. The tank itself was 3.8 meters from plaintiff’s house. Plaintiff claimed that the
plant emitted smoke and a disagreeable odor; that the chimney emitted sparks which, if
carried by the wind, might cause his house to catch fire; and that in case of an
earthquake the tank might fall and crush his house and its occupants. The lower court
decided against the plaintiff.

Issue:
Whether the maintaining and operating of the apparatus for pumping water in close
proximity to the house of the plaintiff is a nuisance or not.

Ruling:
Yes, the maintaining and operating of the apparatus for pumping water in close
proximity to the house of the plaintiff is a nuisance. “In locating its pumping station
within 3.8 meters from the house of the plaintiff, the defendant should reasonably have
foreseen that the noise, vibrations, smoke, odor and sparks coming from the plant
during its operation, not only during the day but during the night as well, would cause a
constant annoyance,, discomfort and danger both to the property of the plaintiff and the
health and comfort of himself and his family. The chimney which is just opposite the
plaintiff’s house at a distance of only 3.4 meters emits smoke, gases of crude oil and
gasoline and occasionally sparks as well…. But the evidence as a whole leaves us with
the clear conviction that the construction and operation of this pumping plant in such
close proximity to the plaintiff’s residence has rendered the same practically
uninhabitable without exposing to risk the comfort, health and in cases of fire, even the
lives of the plaintiff and his family.

17. Ramcar vs Millar

Facts:
Ramcar operates and maintains an auto repair and body building while the seven private
respondents reside near or around the shop. Respondents brought an action before the
Court of First Instance of Manila to abate the said establishment as a nuisance. That
Court, after trial, dismissed the complaint, and not satisfied with the decision, the
plaintiffs (respondents now) appealed the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate
court reversed the trial court's decision and entered judgment against Ramcar declaring
that the operation and maintenance of the establishment of the defendant corporation
is a public nuisance and violates the provisions of a Zonification Ordinance of the City of
Manila; ordering the defendants-appellees to remove the said establishment and all
buildings and structures built therein within 30 days from the finality of this judgment;
and, condemning defendant-appellee Ramcar, Inc., to pay plaintiffs-appellants a sum as
special damages and attorney's fees, without costs in this instance. Whereupon, Ramcar,
Inc. petitioned this Court for a review on certiorari. As found by the Appeals Court, the
 nature of the corporation's activities, actually engaged in, consists in repairing and
building bodies of motor vehicles, and involves the use of tools and machinery that give
rise to much noise and annoyance during all hours of the day up to nighttime; and its
employees oftentimes work on Sundays and holidays.

Issue:
Whether the abatement of nuisance precludes the right to recover damages or not.

Ruling:
No, the abatement of nuisance does not preclude the right to recover damages. ART.
697 of the Civil Code provides that the abatement of a nuisance does not preclude the
right of any person injured to recover damages for its past existence. The business of the
petitioner is not a nuisance per se. It is only on account of its location that it is a public
nuisance. To abate it, it is not necessary, as the appealed decision decrees, to remove all
building an structures built in the place where it is presently located as these, or parts
thereof, may be utilized for pursuit that are not forbidden by law or ordinance.

18.
Facts:
Tuason is the owner of the lots leased by De La Viña. A suit was filed by petitioner where
the court ordered De La Viña and others to vacate the said lot, remove the buildings
thereon, and return possession of the said lots to Tuason.

Through the incredible turnings and twistings of this lawsuit one circumstance starkly
juts out, though apparently ignored by the respondent judge; that a final judgment,
directing de la Viña to vacate the lot she leased from petitioner, to remove her buildings
thereon, and to restore possession to petitioner stands to this day unimplemented and
not executed. Contrary to the terms of the judgment, the respondent court, which is
duty bound to enforce it, has, on one pretext or another, ordered possession of one
building of her choice restored to the judgment debtor, and refused to order its
demolition, although the creditor has asked for it, and it is directed in the final
judgment. Clearly, such action is in plain abuse of discretion.

19. Banal vs Tadeo

Facts:
Petitioner filed a case against the private respondent for violation of BP 22. After
numerous changes in the presiding judges, the public respondent assumed jurisdiction.
Public respondent then rejects the appearance of petitioner’s private prosecutor
claiming that as the BP 22 Law do not prescribe civil liability, only the criminal case may
be prosecuted. Hence this case.
 Issue:
Whether complainant in a BP 22 case is entitled for civil indemnity or not.

Ruling:
Yes, complainant in a BP 22 case is entitled for civil indemnity. Article 20 of the New Civil
Code provides that every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. Regardless, therefore, of
whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of the offended party may be
had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the
wrongful act of another. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an
integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of a crime. Every crime
gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party, and also to
civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and indemnification for
the losses.
Indeed one cannot disregard the private party in the case at bar who suffered the
offenses committed against her. Not only the State but the petitioner too is entitled to
relief as a member of the public which the law seeks to protect. She was assured that
the checks were good when she parted with money, property or services. She suffered
with the State when the checks bounced.

20. Biscocho vs People

Facts:
Biscocho is the Municipal Development Coordinator and Head of the Planning and
Development Staff of the Office of the Mayor of the Municipality of Pola, Province of
Oriental Mindoro. She was charged before the Sandiganbayan of a criminal case.
Allegedly she took advantage of her official position and functions by recommending to
the Municipal officials of Pola, Oriental Mindoro, and the Ministry of Public Works and
Highways, the construction of a barrio road that would traverse Complainant’s property
which would give access and road way to the adjacent parcel of land owned by herein
accused, knowing fully well that there is no prior expropriation proceedings nor a
negotiated sale of the portion of the land to be traversed by the road, and with evident
bad faith, said accused represented herself to be the owner of the land to be traversed
by the road, when in truth and in fact, she is not the owner thereof, and gave permission
to the personnel of the road contractor to proceed with the construction of the road.
She was acquitted but was ordered to pay actual damages.

Issue:
Whether Biscocho can be held liable for damages for injuries which were not her doing
or not.

Ruling:
 No, Biscocho cannot be held liable for damages for injuries which were not her doing.
Petitioner did not authorize the construction of the road in question over the land of
complainant. The decision to build such road in complainant’s land was made solely by
the project engineers of the Bureau of Public Highways, without petitioner’s
participation. Thus, petitioner can not be held civilly liable for acts which were not of her
own doing.

21. Occena vs Icamina

Facts:
Petitioner Eulogio Occena filed a criminal complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against
private respondent Cristina Vegafria alleging that the latter had openly, publicly and
maliciously insulted him by uttering that he is a “foolish Barangay Captain, traitor, tyrant
and Judas” which caused great and irreparable injury to his person and honor. After trial,
Cristina was found guilty of Slight Oral Defamation and was sentenced to pay the fine.
However, the trial court did not award damages to petitioner stating that the facts and
circumstances did not warrant the awarding of moral damages. Petitioner appealed the
civil liability of Cristina but was denied.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to moral damages.

Ruling:
YES, petitioner is entitled to moral damages. Article 2219, par. (7) of the Civil Code
allows the recovery of moral damages in case of libel, slander or any other form of
defamation This provision of law establishes the right of an offended party in a case for
oral defamation to recover from the guilty party damages for injury to his feelings and
reputation. The offended party is likewise allowed to recover punitive or exemplary
damages.

It must be remembered that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious,

even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. And
malice may be inferred from the style and tone of publication subject to certain
exceptions which are not present in the case at bar. Calling petitioner who was a
barangay captain an ignoramus, traitor, tyrant and Judas is clearly an imputation of
defects in petitioner’s character sufficient to cause him embarrassment and social
humiliation. Petitioner testified to the feelings of shame and anguish he suffered as a
result of the incident complained of.

22. Yumul vs Juliano

Facts:
 Teresita Yumul was struck by a truck of the Pampanga Bus Co., as it was being driven by
Juliano.
• Juliano was prosecuted and convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence.
However, no pronouncement was made as to the civil liability since the private
prosecution reserved its right to file a separate action.
• Juliano was declared in default, and the CFI sentenced him to pay P2,000.00, but
absolved Pampanga Bus Co. on the ground that it is exempted from responsibility under
Articles 1903 of the Civil Code, since it appears that it exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent the damage.
• Upon appeal to the CA, the case was certified to this court, it involving only a question
of law.

Issue:
Whether Pampanga Bus Co. can be held subsidiarily liable for damages in the
event that Juliano is found to be insolvent or not.
Ruling:
Yes, Pampanga Bus Co. can be held subsidiarily liable for damages in the
event that Juliano is found to be insolvent. Article 1902 provides: “Civil obligations
arising from crimes and misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal
Code.”
• The lower court should have applied Articles 10218 and 10319 to the case at bar.
• While it is true that Article 1903 provides that the subsidiary liability shall cease in case
the persons mentioned prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage,” such liability refers to fault or negligence
not punishable by law.
• It is admitted by Pampanga Bus Co. that Juliano was its employee and the chauffeur
of its truck. It follows then that Pampanga Bus Co. is subsidiarily liable for the damages
caused by the said Juliano under the provisions of the Articles 102 and 103 of the RPC,
and it is no defense for the Pampanga Bus Co. to allege or prove that it exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the employment and training of Juliano in order
to prevent the damage.

23. Yusay vs Adil

Facts:
A cargo truck or log loader driven by Rodolfo Guillen figured in a traffic mishap in Jaro,
Iloilo City with another cargo truck owned by Igmedio Sumbanon. Thereafter, Guillen
was charged in a criminal case for less serious physical injuries and damage to property
through reckless imprudence. Upon arraignment, Guillen pleaded guilty and was
likewise found guilty by the respondent judge. Accused was ordered by the court to pay
a sum of money representing unearned income, moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorneys fees and for the repairs of the damaged truck.
 A writ of execution was issued but was unsatisfied on the ground of the accused’s
insolvency. Thus, Sumbanon filed a motion for the execution of owner/employer’s
subsidiary liability.

Issue:
Whether owner/employer is subsidiarily liable or not.

Ruling:
Yes, owner/employers are subsidiarily liable. A decision convicting the employee is
binding and conclusive upon the employer “not only with regard to its civil liability but
also with regard to its amount because the liability of an employer cannot be separated
but follows that of his employee. That is why the law says that his liability is subsidiary.

24. Rubio vs CA
Facts:
Rubio owned shares of stock in Hacienda Bonito. These shares of stock were sold to
Robert O. Phillips and Sons, Inc. (PS) on instalment basis. In the meantime, PS entered
into negotiations for the sale of their shares of stock in Hacienda Benito, Inc. to Alfonso
Yuchengco. Upon learning this, Rubio reminded PS of their obligations under the
contract of sale and reminded them in particular that the shares subject matter thereof
were still subject to the payment of the unpaid balance of the sale price. They gave a
similar notice to Alfonso Yuchengco, but expressed no objection to the sale provided the
obligations in their favor were satisfied. PS filed for a writ of preliminary injunction to
prevent Rubio from interfering with the sale of shares of stock of Hacienda Benito. The
trial court issued a permanent writ of preliminary injunction and ordered Rubio to pay
PS actual, exemplary and moral damages.

Issue:
Whether Perez Rubio unlawfully interfered in the transaction between Philips and
Yuchengco or not.

Ruling:
No, Perez Rubio did not interfere in the transaction between Philips and Yuchengco. A
thorough examination of the record reveals that the factual findings of the appellate
court are incomplete and do not reflect the actual events that transpired concerning the
sale of shares of stock of Hacienda Benito to Alfonso Yuchengco.
• The important point left out by the appellate court refers to the controversial letter of
the petitioner to Phillips and Sons and to the Phillips spouses wherein the petition stated
that he has a vendor's lien over the shares of stock of Hacienda Benito and that he still
has the option to rescind the contract as regards his sale of stock of the Hacienda. All the
 details of the negotiations in the sale of the shares of stock of Hacienda Benito, Inc. from
Phillips and Sons to Mr. Yuchengco, there is no factual or legal basis for the appellate
court's conclusion that the petitioner unlawfully and inofficiously interfered with the
negotiations.

25. Cariaga vs Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co.

Facts:
An LTB bus driven by Alfredo Moncada, figured in a vehicular accident where it bumped
against the engine of a train then passing by with such terrific force that the first six
wheels of the latter were derailed, the engine and front part of the body of the bus were
wrecked, the driver of the bus died instantly, with Edgardo Cariaga. A fourth-year
medical student of the University of Santos Tomas, was one of its passengers. Edgardo,
one of the passengers, were severely injured and hospitalized.

The present action was filed to recover for Edgardo Cariaga, from the LTB and the MRR
Co., the total sum representing actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages,
and for his parents, another sum in the same concepts. The LTB disclaimed liability
claiming that the accident was due to the negligence of its co-defendant,the Manila
Railroad Company, for not providing a crossing bar at the point where the national
highway crossed the railway track, and for this reason filed the corresponding cross-
claim against the latter company to recover a sum representing the expenses paid to
Edgardo Cariaga. The Manila RailroadCompany, in turn, denied liability upon the
complaint and cross-claim, alleging that it was the reckless negligence of the bus driver
that caused the accident.

Issue:
Whether the plaintiff’s parents are entitled to compensatory damages or not.

Ruling:
No, the plaintiff’s parents are not entitled to compensatory damages. Since the present
action is based upon a breach of contract of carriage and plaintiff's parents were not a
party thereto and were not themselves injured as a result of the collision, their claim for
actual and compensatory damages is without merit.

26. Sy vs CA
Facts:
Filipina Sy is the wife of Fernando Sy. They become estranged and Fernando left their
home. Filipina filed a legal separation suit which was granted by the court along with the
custody of their children. A year after, she filed a criminal case against her husband. The
 court however, convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries and
sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment. Then, after another year, she filed a new action
for legal separation which was granted and awarded her the custody of their children.
Then after another year she filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
RTC denied the petition for having stated alleged acts that does not constitute
psychological incapacity which may warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage. During appeal with the SC, Filipina raised for the first time the issue that the
marriage is void ab initio due to lack of marriage license at the time of the ceremony.

Issue:
Whether a party may raise an issue for the first time on appeal or not.

Ruling:
No, as a general rule, a party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal.
However, in a number of instances, the court have relaxed observance of procedural
rules, noting that technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist to protect and
promote substantive rights of litigants. We said that certain rules ought not to be
applied with severity and rigidity if by so doing, the very reason for their existence would
be defeated. Hence, when substantial justice plainly requires, exempting a particular
case from the operation of technicalities should not be subject to cavil. In our view, this
case requires that we address the issue of the validity of the marriage between Filipina
and Fernando which petitioner claims is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage
license, in order to arrive at a just resolution of a deeply seated and violent conflict
between the parties.

27. Batong Buhay Goldmines vs. CA

Facts:
Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. issued a Stock Certificate covering shares with a par
value to Francisco Aguac who was then legally married to Paula G. Aguac, but the said
spouses had lived separately for more than fourteen (14) years prior to the said date.
Francisco Aguac sold his shares covered by Stock Certificate for a sum in favor of Inco
Mining, the said transaction being evidenced by a deed of sale. The said sale was made
by Francisco Aguac without the knowledge or consent of his wife Paula G. Aguac. Paula
called up Batong Buhay Gold Mines telling them to withhold the transfer of stock to
Inco. Since the stocks were conjugal property. Batong buhay did just that. Inco is suing
why Batong buhay withheld. CFI ordered that Batong Buhay effect the transfer of stock
certificates to Inco. However Inco appealed to the CA citing that the lower court failed to
award damages for the wrongful refusal of petitioner to transfer the subject shares of
stock and alleged failure to award attorney’s fees , cost of injunction bond and expenses
of litigation.
 Issues:
Whether the court may award unrealized profits or not.

Ruling:
No, the court may not award unrealized profits. The Court has ruled that speculative
damages cannot be recovered. While it is true that shares of stock may go up or down in
value, still whatever profits could have been made are purely SPECULATIVE, for it was
difficult to predict with any decree of certainty the rise and fall in the value of the
shares.

28. Chiang Kai Shek School vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:
Fausta F. Oh had been teaching in the Chiang Kai Shek School since 1932 for a
continuous period of almost 33 years. She was told she had no assignment for the
next semester. For no apparent or given reason, she was dismissed from her work. As
a result, she sued and demanded separation pay, social security benefits, salary
differentials, maternity benefits and moral and exemplary damages. The original
defendant was the Chiang Kai Shek School but when it filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that it could not be sued, the complaint was amended. Certain officials of
the school were also impleaded to make them solidarily liable with the school.

The Court of First Instance of Sorsogon dismissed the complaint. On appeal, its
decision was set aside by the respondent court, which held the school suable and
liable while absolving the other defendants. The motion for reconsideration having
been denied, the school then came to this Court in this petition for review on
certiorari.

Issue:
Whether Oh is entitled to damages or not.

Ruling:
Yes, Oh is entitled to damages. For the wrongful act of the petitioner, the private
respondent is entitled to moral damages. As a proximate result of her illegal
dismissal, she suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and even
besmirched reputation as an experienced teacher for more than three decades. We
 also find that the respondent court did not err in awarding her exemplary damages
because the petitioner acted in a wanton and oppressive manner when it dismissed
her.

29. China Airlines vs IAC

Facts:
After a four-hour delay due to an engine malfunction, respondent Osorio boarded in
Manila a China Airlines, Ltd. (CAL) flight for Taipei. The flight was to bring Osorio and 9
other passengers to Taipei in time for their flight to LAX. As this schedule had been
rendered impossible, it was agreed that Osorio, et.al. would spend the night in Taipei at
CAL’s expense, and would be brought the following day to San Francisco, where they
would be furnished an immediate flight connection to LAX. Upon Osorio et.al.’s arrival in
San Francisco, CAL asked Osorio, et.al. to wait as no instructions have been received
regarding respondent’s accommodation due to the delay in the transmission of
telex messages. CAL tried to contact the Manila office, but it could not be done
immediately because of the time difference. Seeing that they would need to spend the
night, respondent asked that they be provided food and overnight accommodations as
transit passengers, but were refused by CAL’s passenger service agent,
Dennis Cheng. Because of such, they angrily left CAL’s San Francisco office without
leaving a contact address. Thus, when word came in from Manila, the respondent could
not be informed of the issuance of the tickets.

The following day, after spending the night at YMCA, they learned that their tickets and
luggage are ready for pick-up. However, Osorio preferred to pick up her luggage after
another day, and preferred to fly to LAX with a Western Airlines ticket which she
purchased. Osorio then filed a complaint for damages arising from breach of contract
against CAL. The trial court absolved CAL from any liability except the actual sum spent
by Osorio as reimbursement. On appeal, IAC reversed the trial court’s decision, finding a
palpable breach of contract of carriage. IAC considered CAL as wanting in human care
and foresight in not having taken other steps.

Issue:
Whether award of damages is proper or not.

Ruling:
Yes, the award of damages is proper. The breach of contract under consideration having
been incurred in good faith, CAL is liable for damages which are the natural and
probable consequences of said breach and which the parties have foreseen at the time
the obligation was constituted.
30. Pan American World Airways, Inc. vs. IAC
Facts:
Rene Pangan entered into 2 agreements for the exhibition of films and preparation of
the required promotional materials in San Francisco and Guam. On the date of his
flight, his luggages which contained the promotional materials did not arrive which
allegedly caused the cancellation of his agreements. Pangan filed a complaint against
Pan American for actual damages consisting of alleged lost profits due to the loss of
baggage.

Pan American contends that its liability for the lost baggage as provided in the
Warsaw Convention is $600 because Pangan did not declare a higher value for his
baggage and pay the corresponding additional charges.

Issue:
Whether the liability of Pan American is limited as provided in the printed stipulation
at the back of the airline ticket or not.

Ruling:
Yes, the liability of Pan American is limited as provided in the printed stipulation at
the back of the airline ticket. There is no dispute that petitioner did not declare any
higher value for his luggage, much less did he pay any additional transportation
charge. In the absence of a showing that petitioner’s attention was called to the
special circumstances requiring prompt delivery of private respondent Pangan’s
luggages, petitioner cannot be held liable for the cancellation of private respondents’
contracts as it could not have foreseen such an eventuality when it accepted the
luggages for transit.

31. MANUEL S. ARANETA, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JUAN ARREGLADO, ET AL., Defendants-

Appellees.
G.R. No. L-11394. September 9, 1958.
Facts:
Benjamin Araneta was talking with the other students of the Ateneo de Manila while
seated atop a low ruined wall bordering the Ateneo grounds. Dario Arreglado, a former
student of the Ateneo, chanced to pass by. Those on the wall called Dario and conversed
with him, and in the course of their talk, twitted him on his leaving the Ateneo and
enrolling in the De La Salle College. Apparently, Arreglado resented the banter and
suddenly pulling from his pocket a Japanese Lugar pistol licensed in the name of his
father Juan Arreglado, fired the same at Araneta, hitting him in the lower jaw, and
 causing him to drop backward, bleeding profusely. His friends took him to the school
infirmary and later to the hospital. He later recovered but sustained degenerative injury
to his jaw and the lower portion of his face. His behavior was likewise affected.

Dario was later indicted for the crime of frustrated homicide and pleaded guilty. The
proceedings was suspended by the court due to the latter’s young age and placed under
custody of Mr. Lerma under supervision by the Commissioner of Social Welfare.

Manuel and his father instituted an action against the father of Dario to recover
material, moral, and exemplary damages due to the latter’s negligence in allowing his
son access to his pistol. The court ruled in the positive. The trial Judge also overruled
the claim of the defense that because the court failed to award any damages to Araneta
in the criminal case, a separate civil action for their recovery is now foreclosed. The
Arreglados did not appeal the decision but the Aranetas did; and in view of the amount
originally claimed (P112,000), the case was taken directly to this Court.

Issue:
Whether the father may recover moral damages in case of physical injuries sustained by
a child or not.

Ruling:
No, the father may not recover moral damages in case of physical injuries sustained by a
child. moral damages in case of physical injuries are only recoverable by the party who
suffered them and not by his next of kin, unless there is statutory provision to the
contrary.

32. SIMEX INTERNATIONAL (MANILA),INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. THE

HONORABLECOURT OF APPEALS and TRADERS ROYAL BANK, respondents.
G.R. No. 88013. March 19, 1990
Facts:
Petitioner, a private corporation engaged in the exportation of food products, was a
depositor maintaining a checking account with respondent Traders Royal Bank.
Petitioner deposited to its account increasing its balance and subsequently, issued
several checks but was surprised to learn that it had been dishonored for insufficient
funds. As a consequence, petitioner received demand letters from its suppliers for
the dishonored checks. Investigation disclosed that the deposit was not credited to
it. The error was rectified and the dishonored checks were consequently paid.
 Petitioner demanded reparation from respondent bank for its gross and wanton
negligence but the later did not heed. Petitioner then filed before the RTC which
later held that respondent bank was guilty of negligence but petitioner nonetheless
was not entitled to moral damages. CA affirmed..

Issue:
Whether a corporation maybe awarded moral damages or not.

Ruling:
No, as a general rule, a corporation maybe not be awarded moral damages. As an
exception to this rule however, is where the corporation has a good reputation that is
debased, resulting in its social humiliation. It is recognized that the petitioner did
suffer injury because of the private respondent’s negligence that caused the
dishonor of the checks issued by it. The immediate consequence was that its prestige
was impaired because of the bouncing checks and confidence in it as a reliable
debtor was diminished. Thus, petitioner corporation is entitled to moral damages.

33. ESTELITA S. MONZON, EDGARDO MONZON,RAMON MONZON, BEATRIZ MONZON,

CARMENMONZON, LOURDES MONZON, MANUEL MONZON,ARTURO MONZON JR.,
and CRISTINA MONZON,petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT& THEO H.
DAVIES & CO., FAR EAST LTD.,respondents.
G.R. No. 72828. January 31, 1989
Facts:
Aircraft pilot, met an accident where the plane he flies crashed. He perished along
with the passengers. The cause of the crash is the loss of the plane’s right head
aileron, an essential part of the plane’s control mechanism. The widows and children
of the deceased passengers filed a suit against the owner of the plane, Dole and
Theo Davies, Co. After trial, the court awarded to the petitioners a sum of money for
indemnity, loss of earning capacity, moral, exemplary, attorney’s fees and cost of
litigation. Both parties filed a motion for reconsideration but the court denied Theo
Davies’ motion and added a legal interest in its prior award by reason of inflationary
tendencies of all currencies. The IAC affirmed the award in toto but upon motion for
reconsideration, it was drastically reduced and deleted the legal interest.

Issue:
 Whether the use of a generally accepted formula for the loss of earning capacity due
to death is proper or not.

Ruling:
Yes, the use of a generally accepted formula for the loss of earning capacity due to
death is proper. Life expectancy “fluctuates with several factors” but it is for that very
reason that a generally accepted formula cited earlier was established by this court
in a long line of cases. Otherwise stated, while respondent court suggests that Arturo
Monzon might have lived for less than 26.4 years more, or until the age of 66, there
is also the possibility that he would have lived for much more than 26.4 years. Hence,
the need of the formula by way of arriving at a logical and workable average.

34. PAN MALAYAN INSURANCE CORPORATION,petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

ERLINDAFABIE AND HER UNKNOWN DRIVER, respondents.
G.R. No. 81026. April 3, 1990
Facts:
PANMALAY filed a complaint for damages with the RTC of Makati against private
respondents Erlinda Fabie and her driver. PANMALAY averred the following: that it
insured a Mitsubishi Colt Lancer car registered in the name of Canlubang Automotive
Resources Corporation [CANLUBANG]; that on May 26, 1985, due to the
“carelessness, recklessness, and imprudence” of the unknown driver of a pick-up the
insured car was hit and suffered damages; that PANMALAY defrayed the cost of
repair of the insured car and, therefore, was subrogated to the rights of CANLUBANG
against the driver of the pick-up and his employer, Erlinda Fabie; and that, despite
repeated demands, defendants, failed and refused to pay the claim of PANMALAY.

Private respondents, thereafter, filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars and a

supplemental motion thereto. In compliance therewith, PANMALAY clarified, among
others, that the damage caused to the insured car was settled under the “own
damage” coverage of the insurance policy, and that the driver of the insured car was,
at the time of the accident, an authorized driver duly licensed to drive the vehicle.
PANMALAY also submitted a copy of the insurance policy and the Release of Claim
and Subrogation Receipt executed by CANLUBANG in favor of PANMALAY.

Private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that PANMALAY had no cause
of action against them. They argued that payment under the “own damage” clause
 of the insurance policy precluded subrogation under Article 2207 of the Civil Code,
since indemnification thereunder was made on the assumption that there was no
wrongdoer or no third party at fault.

After hearings conducted on the motion, opposition thereto, reply and rejoinder, the
RTC issued an order dismissing PANMALAY’s complaint for no cause of action. The
RTC denied PANMALAY’s motion for reconsideration.

On appeal taken by PANMALAY, these orders were upheld by the Court of Appeals.
Consequently, PANMALAY filed the present petition for review.

Issue:
Whether PANMALAY was legally subrogated to the rights of Canlubang or not.

Ruling:
Yes, PANMALAY was legally subrogated to the rights of Canlubang. Article 2207 of the
Civil Code provides that if the plaintiffs property has been insured, and he has
received indemnity from the insurance company for the injury or loss arising out of
the wrong or breach of contract complained of, the insurance company shall be
subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person who has
violated the contract.

35. VIRGILIO SIY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SERGIO VALDEZ, AND VIRGINIA
VALDEZ, respondents.
No. L-39778. September 13, 1985.
Facts:
Spouses Valdez are the owners of the parcel of land with a house constructed therein
situated in Makati. There is no dispute that the parties entered into a contract of sale
regarding the said property. The controversy arose from subsequent agreement
executed by the parties. The first agreement was the deed of conditional sale
whereby for and in consideration of P22,000, spouse Valdez as vendors agreed to sell
to Siy the said property. The sale was subject to the condition that immediately upon
the approval of the loan of Siy with SSS and its payment to Spouse Valdez, the
Vendor shall execute deed of absolute sale in favor of the Vendee. Subsequently, the
parties execute three more contracts.
 After the lapse of the 45-day deadline stated in the last contract, the petitioner failed
to pay both the 12,000 which was supposed to be received by the respondent upon
the execution of the agreement and the balance amount. Thus, when the
petitioner’s loan from SSS was released, he requested the respondent to sign the
deed of absolute sale but the respondent refused on the ground that the petitioner
had already breached their latest agreement. Thus, the defendant-spouses rescinded
their agreement of purchase and sale with damages.

Issue:
Whether a party who seeks rescission can seek fulfillment of contract under the
guise of damages or not.

Ruling:
No, a party who seeks rescission cannot seek fulfillment of contract under the guise
of damages. Under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, “the injured party may choose
between the fulfillment and rescission of the obligation, with the payment of
damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen
fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.” The law, however, does not
authorize the injured party to rescind the obligation and at the same time seek its
partial fulfillment under the guise of recovering damages.

36. IRENE TAC-AN-DANO, FELIPE G. TAC-AN,DIOSDADO G. TAC-AN and SOCORRO TAC-

ANGENOBATEN, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OFAPPEALS and ALFONSO G. TAC-AN,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-62251. July 29, 1985
Facts:
After the death of their widowed mother, Diosdado and the other siblings instituted an
intestate proceedings for a settlement of Luisa’s estate before the CFI. Alfonso opposed
the petition contending that half of the new 6,159 coconut trees at the San Isidro
property was his in accordance with the agreement between him and their mother. It
was only in January of 1973 that a petition was ordered by the intestate court pursuant
to the compromise agreement arrived at among the heirs. Alfonso claimed however that
the partition was without prejudice to the prosecution of his claim in a separate suit.

Alfonso filed a suit for the recovery of ownership of Coconut Trees and Damages against
petitioners with the then Court of First Instance. He alleged that upon the request of his
late mother, and with the consent of petitioners, he planted coconut trees on their
agricultural land the agreement was that the coconut trees including the fruits and
 produce thereof, would be equally divided between them; that their equal sharing
continued for fifteen (15) years; that upon the death of their mother, petitioner
Diosdado Tac-an filed a Special Proceeding with the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental, Branch III, for the partition of the real and personal properties left by their
parents, which he opposed. The siblings stated that ALFONSO's claim for improvements
is barred by prior judgment in Special Proceedings rendered by the intestate Court on
the basis of the amicable compromise agreement entered into by the parties after
concessions were given to respondent for the settlement of said claim; that by virtue of
said Decision, the land in San Isidro was subdivided and adjudicated in equal shares
among them; that the claim of respondent for one-half (½) of the produce of the
coconut trees was denied by the intestate Court in its Order which had already became
final; that the complaint states no cause of action; that the claim is unenforceable under
the Statute of Frauds, and is barred by the Statute of Limitations and/or prescription.

ISSUES:
Whether the award of moral damages is proper or not.

Ruling:
No, the award of moral damages is not proper. There being no evidence of fraud and bad
faith committed by ALFONSO, the elimination by respondent Appellate Court of the
award of moral damages, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation to petitioners should
be affirmed.

37. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. THEHONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,

NAPOLEON C.NAVARRO, PATRICIA CRUZ, VICENTE B. MEDINA and LETICIA LOPEZ,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-45770. March 30,1988

Facts:
Petitioner bank filed before the then Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
Civil Case against Napoleon Navarro to recover the sum defalcated by the latter with
a prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against the properties of Napoleon
Navarro. While the writ of preliminary attachment was in the process of issuance, a
Deed of Sale of Real Property and Dwelling House was executed by respondents
Napoleon Navarro and Patricia Cruz in favor of the other respondents spouses
Vicente Medina and Leticia Lopez over the former’s properties and was registered in
the Office of the Register of Deeds. Subsequently, PNB filed a civil case against the
respondents for the cancellation of the transfer certificate title issued as a
consequence of the sale.
 An answer with counterclaim was filed by the defendants Medina and Lopez alleging
good faith in the acquisition of the property in question and seeking payment of
damages, claiming that the filing of the complaint was without legal factual basis and
that it besmirched their reputation causing them damages and lawyer’s fees. The
lower court ruled that said claim for damages was proper and was affirmed on
appeal.

Issue:
Whether the award of damages is proper or not.

Ruling:
No, the award of damages is not proper. In the absence of malice and bad faith, the
mental anguish suffered by respondents spouses Medina and Lopez for having been
made defendants in a civil case is not that kind of anxiety which would warrant the
award of moral damages. The worries and anxieties suffered by respondents spouses
Medina and Lopez were only such as are usually, caused to a party haled into court
as a defendant in a litigation. Therefore, there is no sufficient justification for the
award of moral damages, more so, exemplary damages. In the same manner, there is
no basis for the award of moral damages to respondents spouses Medina and Lopez,
and neither liable for attorney’s fees.

It is not sound public policy to place a penalty on the right to litigate. To compel the
defeated party to pay the fees of counsel for his successful opponent would throw
wide open the door of temptation to the opposing party and his counsel to swell the
fees to undue proportions.

38. LEONARDO D. SUARIO, Petitioner, v. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Davao

Branch/or The Manager/Cashier and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
Respondents.
G.R. No. L-50459. August 25, 1989
Facts:
The petitioner, with himself as his own counsel, filed this petition for review of the
decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which denied his claim
for damages arising from an alleged illegal dismissal. The controversy arose from the
application of the herein petitioner for a 6-month leave with BPI, the bank he is working
for which was ultimately disapproved but since he was already on 1-month leave due to
the advice of his former manager. The leave was applied by the respondent for his
review prior to the taking of the bar exam. When he went to the respondent bank, he
was verbally informed that he was already dismissed.
 the complainant formally wrote a letter to the respondent bank requesting for a written
and formal advise as to his real status and the respondent bank replied that the matter
was still referred to the Personnel Department at Head Office leading again the
complainant to believe that his case was not yet hopeless.

The complainant wrote another letter pressing for a categorical answer and the lawyers
of the respondent bank replied that as far as the bank is concerned the services of the
complainant was considered terminated contrary to the respondent bank’s
manifestation that his case was still pending before the Personnel Department. When
the case was instituted with the labor arbiter, the said arbiter decided that the
petitioner be paid his separation pay but his claim for damages was dismissed for lack of
merit. The order was affirmed by the Executive Labor Arbiter upon appeal.

Issue:
Whether the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC may award actual, moral and exemplary
damages plus attorney’s fees or not.

Ruling:
Yes, the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC may award actual, moral and exemplary damages
plus attorney’s fees in labor cases. It is now well settled that money claims of workers
provided by law over which the labor arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction are
comprehensive enough to include claims for moral damages of a dismissed employee
against his employer.

The legislative intent appears clear to allow recovery in proceedings before Labor
Arbiters of moral and other forms of damages, in all cases or matters arising from
employer-employee relations. This would no doubt include, particularly, instances
where an employee has been unlawfully dismissed. In such a case the Labor Arbiter
has jurisdiction to award to the dismissed employee not only the reliefs specifically
provided by labor laws, but also moral and the forms of damages governed by the
Civil Code.

39. CARMEN L. MADEJA, petitioner, vs. HON. FELIX T.CARO and EVA ARELLANO-JAPZON,
respondents.
GR No. L-51183. December 21, 1983
Facts:
Dra. Eva A. Japzon was accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death
of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. Carmen L. Madeja, the complaining witness is
the widow of the deceased. The information filed states that: "The offended party
Carmen L. Madeja reserved her right to file a separate civil action for damages." While
 the criminal case was still pending, Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr, Eva A. Japzon for
damages in the same court. She alleged that her husband died because of the gross
negligence of Dr. Japzon. The judge granted the defendant's motion to dismiss which
motion invoked Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. According to the
respondent judge, "under the foregoing Sec. 3 (a), Rule 111, New Rules of Court, the
instant civil action may be instituted only after final judgment has been rendered in the
criminal action.

Issue:
Whether petitioner may file an independent civil action from a criminal action against
the private respondent or not.

Ruling:
Yes, the petitioner may file an independent civil action from a criminal action against the
private respondent. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of
the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.

40. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and appellee, vs. CRISPIN IMAN,
defendant and appellant.
GR No. 42660. September 12, 1935
Facts:
Herein appellant, Iman, was accused with the crime of seduction for having, on
several occasions, carnal knowledge of the private complainant Corazon Arcadio.
Iman was able to succeed doing the deed by promising to Arcadio the he was going
to marry her. When the girl got pregnant and gave birth to a baby boy, Iman no
longer want to marry her contending that his parents and confessor does not
approve of the said marriage.

Issue:
Whether the promise to marry made 11 months before carnal knowledge nullifies
the existence of the offense of seduction or not.
 Ruling:
No, the promise to marry made 11 months before carnal knowledge does not nullify
the existence of the offense of seduction. In order to hold that the offense of
seduction has been committed, there is no need for positive and direct testimony of
the offended person that she yielded to the sexual embraces of the accused because
she was seduced and deceived by the promise of marriage given by him, and not for
the mere satisfaction of carnal desires, it being sufficient that the conduct of the
offended person and the accused and the other circumstances of the case as a
whole, show that her consent was secured through said promise.

41. RODOLFO SUAREZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OFAPPEALS and CESARIO MANIGBAS,
respondents.
G.R. No. 80199. June 6, 1990
Facts:
Respondent Manigbas used to be a security guard of the D’Robe Security Agency of
which petitioner, Capt. Rodolfo Suarez, was the general manager. He was assigned to
the Security Bank and Trust Agency branch. During his tour of duty with the said bank,
he alleged that his employer pulled him out of his assignment and later dismissed him.
This dismissal was contested by him before the National Labor Relations Commission.

Respondent found another employment with the RPGuardian Security Agency. While he
was there Suarez wrote the association of security agencies concerning the
misdemeanor committed by several of its guards, including the respondent.
Consequently, Manigbas was dismissed by the RP Guardian Security Agency.

Manigbas claimed that the letter of defendant Suarez to the PADPAO exposed him to
public ridicule, inconvenience, humiliation and contempt which resulted in his being
blacklisted by security agencies giving him difficulty in finding employment and
causing him mental torture and anguish.

Issue:
Whether Suarez is liable for damages or not.

Ruling:
Yes, Suarez is liable for damages. A private communication, maliciously made by one
person to another, although in the performance of a legal, moral or social duty, is not
privileged. Malice is a “term used to indicate the fact that the defamer is prompted
by personal ill-will or spite, and speaks not merely in response to duty, but merely to
injure the reputation of the person defamed.
42. PEDRO D. DIOQUINO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FEDERICO LAUREANO, AIDA DE LAUREANO and
JUANITO LAUREANO, defendants-appellants.
GR No. L-25906. May 28, 1907
Facts:
Atty. Dioquino went to the MVO office in Masbate to register the said car. There he met
Laureano, a patrol officer of the office who was about to leave for the Provincial Commander’s
office. Laureano introduced Dioquino to one of the clerks to facilitate the registration and then
rode Dioquino’s car along with the driver when the car was stoned by some boys and the
windshield was broken.

Issue:
Whether the incident was force majeure or not.

Ruling:
Yes, the incident was force majeure. The express language of Article1174 of the present Civil
Code which is a restatement of Article 1105 of the old Civil Code, except for the addition of the
nature of an obligation requiring the assumption of risk, compels the conclusion that in the
absence of a legal provision or an express covenant, "no one should be held to account for
fortuitous cases.

43.
Ramos vs. Ramos,
61 SCRA 284, No. L-19872 December 3, 1974
Facts:
Plainttif Emiliano Ramos was one of the 7 natural children of their father, Martin Ramos while
defendant Gregoria is the widow of Jose Ramos, one of the 3 legitimate children of Martin
Ramos and Candida Tanate. After the death of their father, a special proceeding was instituted
to settle the intestate estate of spouses Martin and Candida. Rafael Ramos , younger brother of
Martin was appointed administrator of the estate for 6 years. Thereafter, a partition was
submitted in 1913 indicating the legal shares of the legitimate children as well as the 7 natural
children of Martin Ramos.

An action for reconveyance was filed by the then alleged minor natural children in their favor
was filed against defendants Gregoria and daughter Candida in whose names the 8 lots are now
registered which amounts to the 1/6 portion of his legally acknowledged natural children. It is
predicated on the theory that plaintiffs’ shares were held in trust by the defendants. However,
after an unfavorable decision, the defendants appealed the lower court’s decision in so far as it
ignored their counterclaim for damages and attorney’s fees.

Issue:
Whether award of attorney’s fees is a matter of right or not.
 Ruling:
No, the award of attorney’s fees is not a matter of right. It is not sound public policy to set a
premium on the right to litigate. An adverse decision does not ipso facto justify the award of
attorney’s fees to the winning party. No attorney’s fees should be granted to the defendants.
Under the facts of the case, it cannot be asseverated with dogmatic finality that plaintiffs’ action
was manifestly unfounded or was maliciously filed to harass and embarrass the defendants. All
indications point to the fact that the plaintiffs honestly thought that they had a good cause of
action.

44. BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-

appellant.
GR No. No. L-20089. December 26, 1964.
Facts:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love decided
to get married on September 4, 1954. Wassmer made the necessary preparations for
the wedding including making and sending wedding invitations, buying of wedding
dress and other apparels, and other wedding necessities.

However, 2 days before the wedding Velez left a note for his bride-to-be advising her
that he will not be able to attend the wedding because his mom was opposed to said
wedding. And one day before the wedding, he sent another message to Wassmer
advising her that nothing has changed and that he will be returning soon. Therefore,
Velez did not appear and was not heard from again.

Wassmer sued Velez for damages and he failed to answer and was declared in
default. A judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff actual
damages, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and the costs.

On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was
because of fortuitous events. He further argued that he cannot be held civilly liable
for breaching his promise to marry Wassmer because there is no law upon which
such an action may be grounded. He also contested the award of exemplary and
moral damages against him.

Issue:
Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong in this case.
 Ruling:
Yes, breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong in this case. As stated, mere
breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding
and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the
matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable
in damages in accordance with Article 21 which provides in part “any person who
willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”

And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an
award for moral damages as properly awarded by the lower court in this case.
Further, the award of exemplary damages is also proper. Here, the circumstances of
this case show that Velez, in breaching his promise to Wassmer, acted in wanton,
reckless, and oppressive manner – this warrants the imposition of exemplary
damages against him.

45. ARTURO P. VALENZUELA and HOSPITALITA N.VALENZUELA, petitioners, vs. THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BIENVENIDO M. ARAGON,ROBERT E. PARNELL,
CARLOS K. CATOLICO and THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 83122. October 19, 1990.
Facts:
Petitioner Valenzuela, a General Agent respondent Philamgen, was authorized to solicit
and sell all kinds of non-life insurance. He had a 32.5% commission rate. From 1973 to
1975, Valenzuela solicited marine insurance from Delta Motors, Inc. from which he was
entitled to a commission of 32%. However, Valenzuela did not receive his full
commission. The premium payments amounting were paid directly to Philamgen.

Philamgen wanted to cut Valenzuela’s commission to 50% of the amount to which he

declined. When Philamgen offered again, Valenzuela firmly reiterated his objection.
Philamgen took drastic action against Valenzuela. They: reversed the commission due
him by not crediting the amount to his account, threatened the cancellation of policies
issued by his agency, and started to leak out news that Valenzuela has a substantial
debt with Philamgen. His agency contract was terminated. The petitioners sought relief
by filing the complaint against the private respondents. The trial court found that the
principal cause of the termination as agent was his refusal to share his Delta
commission.
The court considered these acts as harassment and ordered the company to pay for the
resulting damage in the value of the commission. They also ordered the company to pay
350,000 in moral damages. The company appealed. The CA ordered Valenzuela to pay
the entire amount of the commission. Hence, this appeal by Valenzuela.

Issue:
Whether Philamgen can be held liable for damages due to the termination of the General
Agency Agreement it entered into with the petitioners or not.

Ruling:
Yes, Philamgen can be held liable for damages due to the termination of the General Agency
Agreement it entered into with the petitioners. If a principal acts in bad faith and with abuse of
right in terminating the agency, then he is liable in damages. This is in accordance with the
precepts in Human Relations enshrined in our Civil Code that “every person must in the exercise
of his rights and in the performance of his duties act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith: (Art. 19, Civil Code), and every person who, contrary to law,
willfully or negligently causes damages to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same (Art.
20, id). “Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs and public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages”(Art. 21,
id.).
 CA
SE for

TORTS and DAMAGES

DI
GE GERALD M. BADILLO
RUDY

ST JD-III

Atty. MERLENE FERNANDEZ

Professor