The factual and procedural antecedents, as culled from the records of the case, are as follows:

Leticia B. Nanay (Nanay), Nancy B. Barsubia (Barsubia), Gemma I. Bernal (Bernal), Maria Victoria
G. Ramirez, Crisanta S. Oxina (Oxina) and Adelaida H. Ebio (Ebio) (private complainants) are
among the ninety-three (93) families and members of "Samahang Magkakapitbisig" (Samahan), who
used to occupy a parcel of land in Barangay (Brgy.) Valencia, Quezon City as informal settlers. In
order to force them to vacate the property, a case was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 355 docketed as Civil (CV) Case No. 35-15452. But to reach a
peaceful resolution of the case, the parties entered into a "Kasunduan" to the effect that all the
93 families would voluntarily vacate the property in exchange for P2,250,000.00 as financial
assistance.4

The Samahan searched and was able to find an 8,250-square meter piece of land for their relocation
in Brgy. Burgos, Rodriguez, Rizal. On August 30, 2002, several members of the Samahan went to
Mayor Cuerpo to inform him about the impending relocation of the families. Mayor Cuerpo reacted
negatively and told them they could not be accepted in the Municipality. He further informed them
that before they could transfer, they should first apply for a development permit and develop the
property thereafter which means that the Samahan first have to subdivide the lots, build roads, install
water, and electrical facilities before they could move in.5 When the Samahan members inquired for
the list of requirements for the application for a development permit from the Municipal Zoning
Office, they were provided with a list applicable for a low-cost housing subdivision to be developed
by a real estate developer.6

On September 2, 2002, in view of the refusal of Mayor Cuerpo to allow the 93 families to relocate in
Brgy. Burgos, Rodriguez, Rizal, because he does not want squatters in Montalban, private
complainants instituted a petition docketed as Special Civil Action Case No. 091-02 for Prohibition,
Mandamus, and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO),
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal,
Branch 75.7 On September 10, 2002 and October 28, 2002, the RTC of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch
77 denied the prayer for TRO and the families were ordered to apply for building permits in
compliance with the National Building Code.8

On December 23, 2002, with the financial assistance given to them, the Samahan was able to
purchase the piece of land located in Brgy. Burgos, Rodriguez, Rizal. The sale was registered with
the Registry of Deeds of Marikina City and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 436865 was
issued9 to the families. The lot was then subdivided among the 93 families.10

On August 11, 2003, the Samahan, including the private complainants, filed 93 separate applications
for Building Permit with the Municipal Engineer. These applications were stamped "Received" by the
Office of the Municipal Engineer but were returned by Engr. Roño, the municipal engineer, for lack of
a development permit.11

On August 15, 2003, because of the refusal of Engr. Roño to process the application for building
permit, the applicants amended CV Case No. 091-02 impleading Engr. Roño and asked the trial
court to compel him to accept and process the applications for building permits.12

On September 17, 2003, the petition was granted by the trial court and directed Mayor Cuerpo and
Engr. Roño to accept and process the subject applications for building permits. However, these
applications were again returned unprocessed.13
On September 22, 2003, because of the Fifth Alias Writ of Demolition issued by the MeTC of
Quezon City, Branch 355, in CV Case No. 35-15452, the 93 families including private complainants
were forced to leave Barangay Valencia, Quezon City; moved to their purchased lot and built
temporary shelters made of lumber and tarpaulin despite the lack of building or development permit.
On even date, Brgy. Capt. Simbulan, upon the order of Mayor Cuerpo, arrived and asked for their
permit. When they told him they have none, Brgy. Capt. Simbulan informed them that there will be a
demolition that afternoon. At around 1:30 p.m., a demolition team consisting of Special Weapons
and Tactics and Police Officers led by Capt. Evasco arrived. The demolition team dismantled the
makeshift homes and took away lumber, tarpaulin, plywood, and appliances. The demolition team
returned the following day and confiscated the remaining lumber, leaving only their personal
belongings. During the demolition conducted on October 28, 2003, accused Capt. Evasco handed
them a Memorandum dated October 23, 2003 from petitioner Mayor Cuerpo showing that a
demolition should have been conducted on October 24, 2003.14

Private complainants filed a complaint, claiming that these demolitions were committed with evident
bad faith and manifest partiality, which deprived them of the lawful use of their land without due
process of law or any legal basis or court order. Consequently, an Information was filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman, where petitioners and Capt. Evasco were charged of violating Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

Upon arraignment, petitioners pleaded "not guilty."15 During the pre-trial, the parties stipulated on
the following facts:

1. At all times material to this case, the following [Petitioners] were then holding the positions
opposite their names, to wit:

a. Pedro Cuerpo Mayor

b. Fernando Roño Municipal Engineer

c. Salvador Sirnbulan - Barangay Chairman of Barangay Burgos all of Rodriguez,

Rizal.

2. On 11 August 2003 the six applicants mentioned in the Information went to the Office of
the Municipal Engineer of Rodriguez, Rizal, to submit individual applications for Building
Permits in line with their intention to build homes within their property.

3. On 19 September 2003, the Office of the Municipal Engineer accepted the letter dated
September 18, 2003, the Order of the RTC-Branch 75 of San Mateo Rizal, and a copy of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 436865.

4. On 22 September 2003, the families comprising "Samahan" were forced to transfer to their
property in Barangay Burgos, Rodriguez, Rizal, due to the Order issued by Branch 35 of the
[MeTC], Quezon City, directing the Sheriff to implement the fifth Alias Writ of Demolition
against the homes of "Samahan's" members.

5. Upon arrival at their parcel of land in Barangay Burgos, Rodriguez, Rizal, on 22

September 2003, the families put up tents and tarps to serve as their temporary shelter.
 6. On 22 and 23 September 2003, the temporary shelters put up by the families of
"Samahan" members Leticia Nanay, Nancy Barsubia, Gemma Bernal, Maria Victoria
Ramirez, Crisanta Oxina and Adelaida Ebio were demolished.

7. The private complainants in this case constructed their shanties or temporary shelters on
the land they owned in Rodriguez, Rizal.

8. The shanties or temporary shelters in question owned by private complainants in this case
were constructed on a strip of land described in Transfer Certificate Title No. 436865 issued
by the Register of Deeds of Marikina City.16

By way of defense, petitioners did not dispute the demolitions that transpired on specified dates but
justified that they were done because the families did not have the necessary permit to construct
their houses in the subject property.17

The SB Ruling

On January 31, 2012, the SB issued the assailed Decision.18 It found that there was sufficient
evidence to conclude the presence of conspiracy among the petitioners. It ruled that the requirement
of a development permit by petitioner Engr. Roño and the subsequent order to develop private
complainants' property before the issuance of a building permit was in concerted harmony with the
instructions of petitioner Mayor Cuerpo not to allow private complainants, who were former informal
settlers, to relocate to Burgos, Rodriguez.19 In the case of, Brgy. Chairman Simbulan, the SB
determined that he exceeded his authority in executing Mayor Cuerpo's demolition order. More than
the demolition, he confiscated private complainants' appliances depriving them of their simple
properties without due process.20 To the SB, the petitioners' coordinated acts, starting from the
instructions of Mayor Cuerpo to disallow private complainants to relocate in their property and the
refusal of Engr. Roño to issue the requested building permits until the carrying out of the directive of
Mayor Cuerpo addressed to Engr. Roño, Brgy. Chairman Simbulan and Capt. Evasco which
harmoniously and jointly achieved the common purpose of summarily demolishing private
complainants' structure constituted conspiracy.20

The SB likewise ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
concurrence of all the essential elements of the offense of Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
and accordingly convicted the petitioners as charged, viz.:

WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the Court finds [petitioners] Mayor PEDRO S.
CUERPO, Municipal Engineer FERNANDO ROÑO and Barangay Chairman SALVADOR
SIMBULAN GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, and
after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby imposes upon each of them the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) month as minimum, to nine (9) years, one (1)
month and one (1) day as maximum.

They are further perpetually disqualified from holding public office.

Considering that accused [Capt. Evasco] is still at large, let this case be archived with respect to
him, and let an Alias Warrant of Arrest be issued against him.

SO ORDERED.21 (Emphasis in the original)

Petitioners moved for reconsideration alleging that they merely acted in good faith and in compliance
with the law. Presenting new arguments, petitioners claimed that there was no demolition that took
place; they only prevented the private complainants from constructing their temporary shelters on
the subject property. Petitioners also added that they were just exercising their duty to secure the
safety of all residents by prohibiting construction on danger zones without the proper permits. They
further averred that the structures built may be legally considered nuisance which must be
prevented.22 The SB found no merit in the motion for reconsideration, thus denied the same in a
Resolution23 dated September 7, 2012.

Hence, this recourse.

In the instant petition, petitioners assert that the SB erred in convicting them for the crime of violation
of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. They claim that the prosecution failed to prove the elements of
manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence and undue injury. Petitioners
posit that they acted in good faith and in compliance with the law in preventing the 93 families from
constructing their houses for lack of development permit, building permit, and location clearance.25

Moreover, petitioners impute serious and reversible legal error on the part of the SB in ruling that
there was conspiracy among them.26

The Issue Before the Court

For the Court's resolution is whether or not the SB correctly convicted petitioners for violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

The Court's Ruling

We deny the petition.

The Rules of Court requires that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under Rule
45.27 Hence, questions "on whether the prosecution['s] evidence proved the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt; whether the presumption of innocence was properly accorded the
accused; whether there was sufficient evidence to support a charge of conspiracy; or whether the
defense of good faith was correctly appreciated are all, in varying degrees, questions of
fact,"28 should not be raised in appeals from the SB. This is because, as a rule, "the factual findings
of the SB are conclusive on this Court"29 save for several exceptions. In Maderazo, et al. v. People,
et al.,30 these exceptions are as follows:

(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2)
the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; and (6) the findings of fact are
premised on an absence of evidence on record.31 (Citation omitted)

None of these exceptions are present in this case.

This Court, thus, affirms the conviction of the petitioners by the SB for violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019.

Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 provides:

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with
the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

Based on the above-stated provision, the elements of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 are
the following:

(a) that the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or
official functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers);

(b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence;
and

(c) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or
giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of
his functions.32

There was concurrence of these elements in this case.

First element. It is undisputed that petitioners were public officers at the time the offense was
committed. This was stipulated on by the parties during the pre-trial.33

Second element. The prosecution claims that the demolition of their shanties were committed with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality, depriving them of the lawful use of their land without due
process of law or any legal basis or court order.

The law provides three (3) modes of commission of the crime, namely, through "manifest partiality,"
"evident bad faith," and/or "gross negligence."34 There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear,
notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. On the
other hand, "evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently
fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse
motive or ill will. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with
some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.35

The summary demolition caused the private complainants to file a complaint which was the basis of
the information filed before the Office of the Ombudsman. The manner by which the private
complainants were summarily displaced was the main justification of the SB in ruling that the
element of evident bad faith was present in this case.

We agree.
Section 10, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution provides the Philippine policy on eviction and
demolition, viz:

Section 10. Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished, except
in accordance with law and a just and humane manner.

No resettlement of urban and rural dwellers shall be undertaken without adequate consultation with
them and the communities where they are to be relocated. (Emphasis supplied)

In accordance with this policy, Section 28, Article VII of R.A. No. 727936 states that eviction or
demolition as a practice is discouraged. It, however, provides situations where eviction or demolition
is allowed but prescribes requirements that must be satisfied before an eviction or demolitions
involving underprivileged and homeless citizens37 are considered valid.

Section 28, Article VII of R.A. No. 7279 states:

Sec. 28. Eviction and Demolition. — Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be discouraged.
Eviction or demolition, however, may be allowed under the following situations:

(a) When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage
dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads,
parks, and playgrounds;

(b) When government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be
implemented; or

(c) When there is a court order for eviction and demolition.

In the execution of eviction or demolition orders involving underprivileged and homeless citizens, the
following shall be mandatory:

(1) Notice upon the effected persons or entities at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of
eviction or demolition;

(2) Adequate consultations on the matter of settlement with the duly designated
representatives of the families to be resettled and the affected communities in the areas
where they are to be relocated;

(3) Presence of local government officials or their representatives during eviction or

demolition;

(4) Proper identification of all persons taking part in the demolition;

(5) Execution of eviction or demolition only during regular office hours from Mondays to
Fridays and during good weather, unless the affected families consent otherwise;

(6) No use of heavy equipment for demolition except for structures that are permanent and
of concrete materials;
 (7) Proper uniforms for members of the Philippine National Police who shall occupy the first
line of law enforcement and observe proper disturbance control procedures; and

(8) Adequate relocation, whether temporary or permanent: Provided, however, That in

cases of eviction and demolition pursuant to a court order involving underprivileged and
homeless citizens, relocation shall be undertaken by the local government unit concerned
and the National Housing Authority with the assistance of other government agencies within
forty-five (45) days from service of notice of final judgment by the court, after which period
the said order shall be executed: Provided, further, That should relocation not be possible
within the said period, financial assistance in the amount equivalent to the prevailing
minimum daily wage multiplied by sixty (60) days shall be extended to the affected families
by the local government unit concerned.

This Department of the Interior and Local Government and the Housing and Urban Development
Coordinating Council shall jointly promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to carry out the
above provision. (Emphasis supplied)

Summary eviction and demolition are also allowed.38 However, they are permitted only in cases
pertaining to identified39 professional squatters, squatting syndicates and new squatter families,
which are not the case here.

"Professional squatters'" refer to individuals or groups who occupy lands without the express
consent of the landowner and who have sufficient income for legitimate housing. They are persons
who have previously been awarded homelots or housing units by the Government but who sold,
leased or transferred the same to settle illegally in the same place or in another urban area, and
non-bona fide occupants and intruders of lands reserved for socialized housing. The term shall not
apply to individuals or groups who simply rent land and housing from professional squatters or
squatting syndicates.40 "Squatting syndicates", on the other hand, refers to groups of persons
engaged in the business of squatter housing for profit or gain.41 While "new squatter" refers to
individual groups who occupy land without the express consent of the landowner after March 28,
1992. Their structures shall be dismantled and appropriate charges shall be filed against them by the
proper authorities if they refuse to vacate the premises.42

Records are bereft of information that any of the 93 families as members of the Samahan, including
private complainants, were identified by the Local Government Unit as squatter families, thus, they
cannot be considered professional squatters or members of a squatting syndicate. Neither can they
be considered new squatter families because the construction of makeshift homes was made on
their own property.

Also, private complainants who were just evicted from their previous dwelling place for squatting
may be considered "underprivileged and homeless citizens" or individuals or families residing in
urban and urbanizable areas whose income or combined household income falls within the poverty
threshold as defined by the National Economic and Development Authority and who do not own
housing facilities. This shall include those who live in makeshift dwelling units and do not enjoy
security of tenure.43 With no other place to go, private complainants were forced to transfer to the
lot they were able to purchase using the settlement money for voluntarily vacating the property
where they used to live. Unfortunately, on the day of their transfer, the temporary shelters they
constructed which were made of lumber and tarpaulin were summarily demolished for their failure to
present a building and development permit.
Based on the foregoing, petitioners' acts were clearly committed with evident bad faith. The
demolition of private complainants' houses was precipitated by the refusal of Engr. Roño to issue a
building permit for failure of the 93 families to secure a development permit. The summary removal
of private complainants' makeshift homes constructed in their private property by the demolition
team headed by Brgy. Chairman Simbulan and Capt. Evasco upon the instruction of Mayor Cuerpo
was made in blatant disregard of private complainants' right to due process and was done without
observance of the applicable laws on demolition. The summary demolition took place on September
22, 2003, a few hours after private complainants moved into their property. It went on the following
day, September 23, 2003, when the demolition team confiscated the remaining construction
materials leaving only private complainants' personal belongings. On October 23, 2003, Mayor
Cuerpo issued a Memorandum addressed to Engr. Roño, Brgy. Chairman Simbulan and Capt.
Evasco ordering them to undertake a second demolition on October 24, 2003, but actually took
place on October 28, 2003. Said demolition was also without prior notice or court order and was
aggravated by the confiscation by the demolition team of private complainant's lumber, tarpaulin and
some appliances. Clearly, their action contemplates ill will, which constitutes evident bad faith and in
blatant disregard of the state policy to uphold the constitutionally guaranteed rights of private
complainants as part of the disadvantaged sector of the society.

Granting that private complainants' shanties were constructed without the necessary building or
development permits, this fact does not automatically necessitate the summary demolition.
"[P]roperty rights are involved, thereby needing notices and opportunity to be heard as provided for
in the constitutionally guaranteed right of due process."44 Without compliance with the laws allowing
for eviction and demolition, petitioners were not justified in employing procedural sidesteps in
displacing private complainants from their property by a mere Memorandum ordering for summary
demolition issued by Mayor Cuerpo. Petitioners should have undergone the appropriate proceeding
as set out in the law.

Third and last element. Undue means illegal, immoral, unlawful, void of equity and moderations
while injury is defined as any wrong or damage done to another, either in his person, or in his rights,
reputation or property; the invasion of any legally protected interests of another. "It is required that
1aшphi1

the undue injury caused by the positive or passive acts of the accused be quantifiable and
demonstrable and proven to the point of moral certainty."45

In this case, the undue injury caused to the private complainant is evident from the testimonies of the
witnesses that the demolition team confiscated some of the private complainants' construction
materials, appliances, and personal belongings. As testified to, the private complainants' sustained
undue injury as a result of the summary demolition and confiscation in the following quantifiable
amounts: Nanay - P101,600.00;46 Barsubia - P100,000.00;47 Ramirez - P30,000.00;48 Oxina -
P120,000.00;49 and Ebio - P45,000.00.50 These were not controverted by the petitioners.

Moreover, "proof of the extent of damage is not essential, it being sufficient that the injury suffered or
the benefit received is perceived to be substantial enough and not merely negligible."51

Undoubtedly, all the elements of the crimes as charged are present in this case. Thus, "the Court
finds no reason to overturn the SB's findings, as there is no showing that it overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of this case, and considering
further the fact that it was in the best position to assess and determine the credibility of the parties'
witnesses."52 As such, petitioners' conviction for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 must
stand.

As regards the proper penalty to be imposed, Section 9(a) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, provides:
SECTION 9. Penalties for violations. — (a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the
unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall be punished
with imprisonment for not less than six years and one month nor more than fifteen years, perpetual
disqualification from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any
prohibited interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful
income.53 (Emphasis supplied)

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,54 the SB correctly sentenced petitioners to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum,
to nine (9) years, one (1) month, and one (1) day, as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from
public office.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit and
thereby AFFIRM the January 31, 2012 Decision and the September 7, 2012 Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0019.

SO ORDERED.

Leonen, (Acting Chairperson), Caguioa,* and Inting, JJ., concur.

Hernando J., on leave.

Before the Court is a novel Petition for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and
Injunction,1 filed by petitioner Samahan ng Masang Pilipino sa Makati, Inc. (SMPMI), to prohibit
respondent Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) from evicting its members from their
houses in Fort Bonifacio pursuant to Section 212 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7227,3 which grants sole
jurisdiction to this Court for the issuance of Injunction or Restraining Order against BCDA.

The facts are undisputed. The members of SMPMI, allegedly comprising over 20,000 families, are
residents of Fort Bonifacio occupying a portion of it specifically Lot 4, Lot 3, and Lot 1 with an
aggregate area of 97.58 hectares allegedly covered by SWO-00-001265 in the name of BCDA.
Petitioner maintains that its members have been occupying peacefully and continuously these lots in
Fort Bonifacio. It alleges that Fort Bonifacio is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2288
in the name of the United States of America (USA) which has not been duly cancelled. It further
alleges that BCDA, pursuant to RA 7227, otherwise known as "The Bases Conversion and Development
Act of 1992," and the Municipality of Taguig, through its Mayor, sent 30-day notices of eviction to its
members. It asserts the illegality of the imminent eviction, for which the present action was filed, as
the land which petitioner's members are occupying is still owned by the USA and not by the Philippine
Government.

It further asserts that Section 84 of RA 7227, which stipulates the area of Fort Bonifacio specifically
covering 2,276 hectares, did not provide any technical description on what is indeed covered. Besides,
it strongly argues that because of the lack of "tie line" locating the exact position claimed by BCDA,
the latter cannot illegally stake its claim on the whole of Fort Bonifacio to the prejudice not only of its
members but also of all persons or entities occupying said area. Petitioner also contends that what
complicates the controversy is the approval of the BCDA plan by the Bureau of Land without due
certification from the Land Registration Authority (LRA).

As a background, on March 13, 1992, RA 7227 created the BCDA to "accelerate the sound and
balanced conversion into alternative productive uses of the Clark and Subic military reservations and
their extensions (John Hay Station, Wallace Air Station, O Donnell Transmitter Station, San Miguel
Naval Communications Station, and Capas Relay Station)," 5 and "to raise funds by the sale of portions
of Metro Manila military camps."6 Pursuant to this Act, then President Ramos issued Executive Order
(EO) No. 40,7 series of 1992, specifying, among others, the portions of Metro Manila military camps to
be utilized to generate capital for the BCDA. Among these Metro Manila military camps is Fort
Bonifacio, located in the City of Makati and the Municipality of Taguig. Under EO No. 40, series of
1992, 214 hectares in Fort Bonifacio were earmarked for development and disposition to raise funds
for BCDA projects and to use such funds to accelerate the sound and balanced conversion into
alternative productive uses of the Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions.

In its Comment,8 BCDA asserts ownership of Fort Bonifacio through RA 7227. It posits that TCT No.
2288 in the name of the USA covering a little over 2,544 hectares of the then Hacienda Maricaban (30
hectares of the property was segregated, used, and occupied by the then Manila Railroad Company) is
government property. It cites Acting Registrars of Land Titles and Deeds of Pasay City, Pasig and
Makati v. RTC, Branch 57, Makati, where we conclusively held that the subject lot is government
property, thus:

The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the hectarage embraced by TCT No. 192 (OCT No. 291)
consists of Government property. Three things persuade the Court: (1) the decrees of Proclamations
Nos. 192 and 435; (2) the incontrovertible fact that OCT No. 291 has been duly cancelled; and (3) the
decision of the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. CV No. 00293, affirming the decision of Hon. Gregorio
Pineda, Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXI, in LRC (GLRO) Rec. No. 2484,
Case No. R-1467 thereof, entitled "In Re: Issuance of Owner's Duplicate of Certificate of Title No.
291," as well as our own Resolution, in G.R. No. 69834, entitled "Domingo Palomares, et al. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court".9
BCDA maintains that pursuant to Sec. 710 in relation to Sec. 811 of RA 7227, the ownership of the Metro
Manila military camp lots in question is transferred to BCDA by the President and specifically
earmarked for vital and important government infrastructure projects. In sum, it asserts that its
takeover of Fort Bonifacio is in accordance with law since the lots comprising it were originally part of
a military reservation, particularly Lot 1, Philippine Light Armour Regiment (PALAR) area; Lot 3,
Vetronix area; and Lot 4, Logistics Command (LOGCOM) area. These subject lots are covered by
special patents in favor of BCDA. In fact, it asserts that pursuant to RA 7227 and EO No. 40, series of
1992, then President Estrada issued on June 11, 1999 Special Patent No. 3610 covering Lots 3
(Vetronix) and 4 (LOGCOM) in Fort Bonifacio; while Lot No. 1 (PALAR) was issued Special Patent No.
3596 by then President Ramos and the corresponding OCT No. SP-001 issued in favor of Fort Bonifacio
Development Corporation (FBDC), a wholly owned subsidiary of BCDA.

BCDA further counters that SMPMI has no cause of action as it is not the real party in interest; on the
contrary, it should either be the USA or the individual persons affected by the eviction. Besides, it
argues that SMPMI or its members have not shown ownership over the lots they are occupying that
are to be accorded protection pursuant to Rule 58 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure on
preliminary injunction. Also, BCDA contends that in as much as the ownership of Fort Bonifacio was
determined with finality by this Court in Acting Registrars of Land Titles and Deeds of Pasay City,
Pasig and Makati12 and corresponding titles were issued to Fort Bonifacio, petitioner clearly has no
cause of action against BCDA.

BCDA then traced history which revealed the conveyance of then Fort William McKinley property to the
Philippine Government, specifically citing the July 4, 1946 Treaty of General Relations, the Preamble of
the Military Bases Agreement, and US Diplomatic Note No. 0634 where the USA acknowledged that
said Fort was owned by the Philippine Government.

Finally, BCDA raises the issue that petitioner cannot assail the title of the subject lots in Fort Bonifacio
collaterally, that is, in this proceeding for prohibition, and alleges petitioner's violation of the forum-
shopping rule. It contends that there was a pending case filed earlier by SMPMI involving the same
parties when on September 20, 1999, SMPMI filed a case against BCDA with the Commission on
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP), docketed as COSLAP Case No. 99-453, praying for the
issuance of an order against BCDA to cease the demolition operation. In said case, SMPMI similarly
alleged that the owner of the lands in question was the USA; thus, BCDA or the Philippine Government
had no authority to evict or harass complainants. More so, when COSLAP required the parties to file
their position papers, which BCDA complied with, SMPMI instead filed the instant petition.

The Issues

In its September 24, 2000 Memorandum, respondent BCDA raises the following issues for our

consideration:

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS HAVE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST RESPONDENTS

WHETHER OR NOT BCDA HAS A LAWFUL RIGHT OVER THE PROPERTY

C
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF FORUM-SHOPPING

WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE IS A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE TITLES OVER THE PROPERTIES IN

QUESTION13

On the other hand, petitioner raises in its November 27, 2000 Memorandum the following issues for
our consideration:

WHETHER OR NOT BCDA (RA 7227) CAN JUST LEGALLY STAKE ITS CLAIM IN ANY PART OF FORT

BONIFACIO WITHOUT ANY CLEAR TIE-LINES TO BASE ITS CLAIM? [SIC]

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE BCDA AND MUNICIPALITY OF TAGUIG CAN EXTRAJUDICIALY EJECT THE

MEMBERS OF PETITIONERS AND USE VIOLENCE TO ATTAIN ITS OBJECTIVE OF CLEARING THE

COMMUNITY OF OCCUPANTS? [SIC]

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE BCDA CAN EJECT THE MEMBERS OF THE PETITIONERS WITHOUT OFFERING

THEM A SUITABLE ALTERNATIVE OF HOMESITE AS PROVIDED UNDER PD 1576 (LINA LAW)? [SIC]

IV

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT MAY ISSUE A RESTRAINING

ORDER TO BCDA/MUNICIPALITY OF TAGUIG PENDING THE RESOLUTION OF THE CONTROVERSY TO

AVERT FUTURE VIOLENCE?14 [SIC]

The Court's Ruling

Relative to the issuance of a TRO or injunction, the core issue to be resolved is who between petitioner
SMPMI and BCDA has the right of possession over the particular parcels of land which are subject of
this petition. In this regard, SMPMI insists that if the ruling is in favor of respondent BCDA, then BCDA
and respondent Municipality of Taguig cannot extrajudicially eject its members; at the very least,
respondents must comply with RA 7279, commonly known as the "Lina Law," which provides a
suitable alternative homesite before eviction is enforced.

We rule in favor of BCDA.

The instant action is essentially for prohibition, which is the issuance of a restraining order or writ of
injunction against BCDA and the Municipality of Taguig. It is basic that in order for a restraining order
or the writ of injunction to issue, the petitioner is tasked to establish and convincingly show the
following: "(1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) a violation of that
right; (3) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage."15

In the absence of a clear legal right, the writ must not issue. Indeed, a restraining order or an
injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantial rights and interests, and it is not
designed to protect contingent or future rights. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of
adequate existing rights is not a ground for injunction. 16

A close scrutiny of the records at hand shows that petitioner's members have not shown a clear right
or a right in esse to retain possession of the parcels of land they are occupying inside Fort Bonifacio,
thus:

First, it is unequivocal that the Philippine Government, and now the BCDA, has title and ownership

over Fort Bonifacio. The case of Acting Registrars of Land Titles and Deeds of Pasay City, Pasig and

Makati17 is final and conclusive on the ownership of the then Hacienda de Maricaban estate by the

Republic of the Philippines. Clearly, the issue on the ownership of the subject lands in Fort Bonifacio is

laid to rest. Other than their view that the USA is still the owner of the subject lots, petitioner has not

put forward any claim of ownership or interest in them.

Second, respondent BCDA has convincingly shown that TCT No. 2288 in the name of the USA covering

Fort Bonifacio was cancelled by TCT No. 61524 18 issued on September 11, 1958 in the name of the

Republic of the Philippines. Thereafter, on January 3, 1995, TCT No. 61524 was cancelled by TCT Nos.

23888,19 23887,20 23886,21 22460,22 23889,23 23890,24 and 23891,25 all in the name of BCDA. Thus,

BCDA has valid titles over Fort Bonifacio which have become indefeasible and beyond question. On the

other hand, SMPMI has not presented any title or deed to demonstrate ownership or any interest in

the subject lots.

Third, it is clear from the records that BCDA has been granted a clear mandate by RA 7227,

specifically by its Sections 7 and 8, and re-enforced by EO No. 40, series of 1992, to take over and

administer Fort Bonifacio for its development and disposition to raise funds for BCDA projects, among

others, the conversion of Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions to alternative

productive uses. The fact that TCT No. 61524, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, was

cancelled and several Torrens Titles were issued in the name of BCDA, coupled with the explicit

authority from RA 7227, evidently points to the legal basis for BCDA's takeover and management of

the subject lots.

Fourth, it is basic that ownership or dominion includes the right of possession. In traditional Roman

law, jus possidendi or the right to possess is fundamentally not only an attribute of ownership but also

a direct consequence of ownership. Thus, from BCDA's ownership of the subject lots originates the

rights of possession, use, and disposition.

Fifth, prescription does not apply if the subject land is covered by a Torrens Title, as in the case at

bar. Moreover, the equitable remedy of laches has not been proven to have accrued in favor of the

members of petitioner for them to be accorded better right of possession of the subject lots. Laches is

evidentiary in nature and cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings. 26 As it is, in the

instant case, laches has not even been alleged, much less proved.

Sixth, of greater import is the basic tenet that neither prescription nor laches runs against the State.

Thus, even granting arguendo that the subject lands had been erroneously issued titles in favor of

third parties, which is definitely not the case; neither prescription nor estoppel by laches applies

against the State. In a catena of cases, we have consistently reiterated this hornbook doctrine. Thus,

in East Asia Traders, Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines,27 we reiterated the doctrine citing Reyes v.

Court of Appeals:28

In so far as the timeliness of the action of the Government is concerned, it is basic

that prescription does not run against the State. x x x The case law has also been:

'When the government is the real party in interest, and is proceeding mainly to assert its own rights
and recover its own property, there can be no defense on the ground of laches or limitation.' x x x

'Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to the
State in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. Prescription does not lie against the State
in such cases for the Statute of Limitations does not run against the State. The right of reversion or
reconveyance to the State is not barred by prescription. - 29 (Emphasis supplied.)

This doctrine applies even more in the instant case where the members of petitioners were not even
erroneously granted titles to the subject lots. As it is, petitioner can neither invoke prescription nor
estoppel by laches.

Seventh, the issue of lack of technical description and tie-lines is manifestly a dilatory excuse to
muddle the issue of possession of the subject lots occupied by petitioner's members. Verily, petitioner
admits that its members do not own the lot where they have erected their houses'they posit the USA
as its owner. But as aptly shown and proven by respondent BCDA, Fort Bonifacio is no longer owned
by the USA but by the Republic of the Philippines, which has conveyed, ceded, and passed on its
ownership, use, and administration to BCDA pursuant to RA 7227. As such, petitioner's members had
taken possession of the government land by illegal means without any legal basis and hence, cannot
claim adverse possession of public land. In a plethora of cases, we have reiterated the doctrine that
registered property could not be acquired through adverse possession. Thus, in Calimpong v. Heirs of
Filomena Gumela, we reiterated that a registered property from the time its registration has become
final could not be acquired by adverse possession. 30
Eighth, RA 7279,31 otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (UDHA) and
commonly known as the Lina Law, does not accord possession to squatters of public land. Section 3
(t) of RA 7279 defines "underprivileged and homeless citizens," who are the beneficiaries of said law,
as:

the beneficiaries of this Act and to individuals or families residing in urban and urbanizable areas
whose income or combined household income falls within the poverty threshold as defined by the
National Economic and Development Authority and who do not own housing facilities. This shall
include those who live in makeshift dwelling units and do not enjoy security of tenure.

Interestingly, members of petitioner have not been shown to be "underprivileged and homeless
citizens" to be accorded the benefits of RA 7279. In fact, the photos of the structures that were
demolished reveal that these were built with cement and other strong materials costing a lot of money
and such structures were not mere shanties of small value. As such, the owners of these structures,
the SMPMI members, have the financial capacity and resources to build their own housing facilities
which take them out of the ambit of protection under RA 7279. In fact, they would even be considered
as professional squatters under Section 3 (m) of RA 7279 which provides, thus:

'Professional squatters' refers to individuals or groups who occupy lands without the express consent
of the landowner and who have sufficient income for legitimate housing. The term shall also apply to
persons who have previously been awarded homelots or housing units by the Government but who
sold, leased or transferred the same to settle illegally in the same place or in another urban area, and
non-bona fide occupants and intruders of lands reserved for socialized housing. The term shall not
apply to individuals or groups who simply rent land and housing from professional squatters or
squatting syndicates.

Verily, the pieces of evidence before us would show that the affected members of petitioner SMPMI
are professional squatters who have sufficient income for legitimate housing but have illegally
occupied the subject lots without the consent of the government or the eventual owner, the BCDA.

Yet, despite the non-application of RA 7279, BCDA still offered cash compensation or relocation to
medium-rise buildings, including land-based relocation, and to persons who built their structures on
the subject premises before March 28, 1992, who would be affected by BCDA development projects.
BCDA claims that 31% of the pre-UHDA occupants already availed themselves of the cash
compensation or were relocated to Diego Silang, Centennial Village, and Lupang Katuparan, the sites
of the housing projects of BCDA. For the remainder, if they fail to avail of the magnanimous gesture of
BCDA for a relocation site or cash payment, they may eventually lose their right to enjoy said benefits
once the offer is withdrawn. In sum, we find that RA 7279 does not cover SMPMI's situation and even
if such is conceded, BCDA has already substantially complied with the beneficent provisions of the law.

Moreover, it is also undisputed by petitioner that the structures demolished on April 27, 2000 at the
Research and Development Center (RDC) Compound were also undergoing illegal construction, which
pursuant to Section 2 (a)32 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the UDHA, in relation to
Sections 2833 and 3034 of RA 7279, can be immediately dismantled. Besides, it is also undisputed that
seven (7) structures were left untouched as their owners were pre-UDHA occupants. Moreover,
through a 1997 census conducted by BCDA and Federation of Military and Civilian Residents
(FOMCRES) on the occupants of Philippine Light Armor Regiment (PALAR), Wildcat, and Sto. Niño
areas contiguous to the RDC Compound, pursuant to an Order issued by the Committee on Justice of
the House of Representatives, the BCDA has clearly shown that petitioner's officers could not be found
in said areas, which prove that they are new squatters. 35

Ninth, RA 7279 does allow extrajudicial summary demolition and eviction. Section 28 of said Act
pertinently provides, thus:

Section 28. Eviction and Demolition. Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be discouraged. Eviction
or demolition, however, may be allowed under the following situations:
(a) When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps,

riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and

playgrounds;

(b) When government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented; or

(c) When there is a court order for eviction and demolition.

A perusal of the above proviso clearly shows that the aforementioned law allows not only judicial
eviction and demolition through court action (e.g., court order), but also summary or extrajudicial
eviction and demolition where structures are built on public places, among others, esteros, railroad
tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, sidewalks, roads, parks and playground;
and when government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented. Of
the two instances of extrajudicial summary eviction and demolition, the first partake of an abatement
of public nuisance of illegal structures built on public places, and the second particularly partakes of a
government infrastructure project with available funding that is about to be implemented. In the
instant case, what is applicable is the second case of an extrajudicial summary eviction and
demolition.

Indeed, respondent BCDA has amply shown that the disposition and use of subject lots are required to
raise funds needed for the conversion of the Clark and Subic military reservations and their
extensions. Section 2 of RA 7227 clearly provides the government policy to "accelerate the sound and
balanced conversion into alternative productive uses of the Clark and Subic military reservations and
their extensions (John Hay Station, Wallace Air Station, O Donnell Transmitter Station, San Miguel
Naval Communications Station, and Capas Relay Station)," and "to raise funds by the sale of portions
of Metro Manila military camps." Pertinently, EO No. 40, series of 1992, was issued by then President
Ramos to implement this proviso and identified portions of Metro Manila military camps to be utilized
to generate capital for the BCDA. Among these Metro Manila military camps is Fort Bonifacio, which
was earmarked for development and disposition to raise funds for BCDA projects and use such funds
to convert into alternative productive uses, Clark and Subic military reservations, and their
extensions.

Thus, the development and disposition of portions of Fort Bonifacio, which include the subject lots,
partake of a government infrastructure project geared towards the raising of funds needed to
implement the conversion of military reservations. PD 1818 and RA 8975 36 pertinently provide what
government infrastructure projects are. Section 2 of RA 8975 defines "National government projects,"
thus:

"National government projects" shall refer to all current and future national government
infrastructure, engineering works and service contracts, including projects undertaken by government-
owned and -controlled corporations, all projects covered by Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7718, otherwise known as the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Law, and other related
and necessary activities such as site acquisition, supply and/or installation of equipment
and materials, implementation, construction, completion, operation, maintenance,
improvement, repair and rehabilitation, regardless of the source of funding. (Emphasis supplied.)

Based on the aforequoted provision, it is clear that the project for the conversion, development, and
disposition of Metro Manila military camps by the BCDA, a wholly government-owned corporation,
partakes of a national government infrastructure project. As such, the present controversy has not
only delayed and hampered such development and disposition of subject lots, but also directly
affected the more primordial purpose of the project which is to raise funds for the conversion of
military reservation that has been pushed by the government for over a decade. Therefore, the BCDA
and the Municipality of Taguig had ample authority to extrajudicially and summarily evict and
demolish the illegally constructed structures over the disputed lots.

Eviction and Demolition was done properly

Moreover, Section 27 of RA 7279 also provides a summary eviction and demolition against
professional squatters, thus:

Section 27. Action Against Professional Squatters and Squatting Syndicates. The local government
units, in cooperation with the Philippine National Police, the Presidential Commission for the Urban
Poor (PCUP), and the PCUP-accredited urban poor organization in the area, shall adopt measures to
identify and effectively curtail the nefarious and illegal activities of professional squatters and
squatting syndicates, as herein defined.

Any person or group identified as such shall be summarily evicted and their dwellings or
structures demolished, and shall be disqualified to avail of the benefits of the Program. A
public official who tolerates or abets the commission of the abovementioned acts shall be dealt with in
accordance with existing laws. (Emphasis supplied.)

While concededly there is no finding that petitioner's members are professional squatters, yet, as we
mentioned above, the evidence presented before us tend to show that the affected members of
petitioner SMPMI are professional squatters who have sufficient income for legitimate housing but
have illegally occupied the subject lots without the consent of the government or the eventual owner,
the BCDA. Be that as it may, respondent BCDA convincingly showed that the structures demolished
were new ones, and that Section 4437 of RA 7279 on moratorium on eviction and demolition does not
apply in the instant case. Thus, on the grounds of a much-delayed government infrastructure project
about to be implemented, and the structures demolished were new ones, BCDA and the Municipality of
Taguig do have the right to carry out, as it did, the summary eviction and demolition of the structures
on subject lots.

Tenth, belying petitioner's allegation of harassment, particularly in the alleged shooting incident of five
(5) of its members, is the March 25, 2002 Joint Resolution 38 of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for the Military, which dismissed two (2) criminal complaints docketed as OMB-MIL-CRIM-01-0028 and
OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0870 filed by two members of petitioner, Pacita L. Pecson and Robert L. Mora, Sr.,
petitioner's representative in this petition. The Ombudsman, citing separate investigations conducted
by the PNP Southern Police District and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), categorically found
that during the April 27, 2000 demolition of 27 ongoing and new structures inside the RDC Compound,
six (6) individuals were arrested and charged with Illegal Possession of Firearms.

The Ombudsman found evidence on record that the demolition was met with violent resistance by
affected squatters, some of whom were armed with unlicensed firearms. Thus, petitioner's assertion
that its members were harassed and no actual gun-battle happened is without factual support as the
records show that its members resisted and resorted to violence during the demolition. The
Ombudsman concluded that there was no showing that the demolition was conducted in an inhumane
manner considering that the measures taken by the respondents were commensurate reaction to the
actual resistance posed and violence used by the affected occupants.

Prescinding from this investigation, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military found that
the eviction and demolition were done in accordance with the rules and were valid exercises of police
power by respondent Municipality of Taguig.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, we find that petitioner has not shown its right in esse to
be protected by a restraining order or an injunctive writ. Without doubt, the instant petition must fail.

One last word. Through a Very Urgent Manifestation and Motion, 39 petitioner manifested that the Office
of the President issued EO No. 70, series of 2002, which declared some portions of Fort Bonifacio as
socialized housing sites to be implemented by the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating
Council (HUDCC). The BCDA was directed to effectuate the smooth turnover of certain lots to HUDCC
for socialized housing. Pursuant to said Order, respondent BCDA has taken the appropriate actions for
the survey and implementation of EO No. 70. Given these developments, petitioner and its members
have been bestowed a legal mode of acquiring lots for their cherished homes. Hopefully, this dispute
will be finally put to rest.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of meri