Islam and The West Narratives of Conflict and Conflict Transformation

ISLAM AND THE WEST: NARRATIVES OF CONFLICT AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION
Author(s): Nathan C. Funk and Abdul Aziz Said

Source: International Journal of Peace Studies , Spring/Summer 2004, Vol. 9, No. 1
(Spring/Summer 2004), pp. 1-28
Published by: International Peace Research Association (IPRA)
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41852908
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International Journal of Peace Studies , Volume 9 , Number 1 , Spring/Summer 2004
ISLAM AND THE WEST:

NARRATIVES OF CONFLICT AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION
Nathan C. Funk and Abdul Aziz Said
Abstract
This article addresses one of the more vexing questions facing analysts of relations between the Islamic
world and the West: How can we speak about deeply divisive cultural and political issues in ways that
foster conflict transformation rather than an intensification of conflict? Using narrative analysis as an
approach, we examine the most common "stories'' that actors identifying with Islam and the West use to
organize their thinking about conflict: a story of intercultural confrontation and a story of intercultural
compatibility. After noting that both Western and Muslim narrators of these stories make a number of
strikingly similar claims, we conclude by suggesting that a "new story" emphasizing intercultural
complementarity can help agents of conflict transformation reframe differences and advance the cause of
peaceful coexistence.
It has become commonplace to observe that the Islamic world and the West appear
to be mired in an intensifying cycle of political and cultural conflict, and that the most
significant source of rivalry is the profoundly unsettled nature of American relations with
the Muslim Middle East. In matters related to Persian Gulf geopolitics, Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, and the politics of Islamic revivalism, American policy preferences
for maintaining stability and control through a system of regional alliances are met with
contrary regional preferences for dramatic change. Frictions generated by conflicting
interests and desires spill over into the cultural domain, resulting in the politicization of
identities and an escalatory conflict dynamic in which the basic value commitments,
beliefs and mores of the "other" are regarded as threatening and problematic. The result
is an atmosphere of doubt, distrust, and disrespect in which efforts to dominate and
coerce adversaries displace initiatives to collaborate in a search for intercultural
understanding and means of mutual political accommodation. On both sides of the
troubled relationship between Americans and the Muslim Middle East, there is deep
estrangement and a growing belief in the futility of communication.
As they seek to analyze the complexity of relations between America and the
Muslim Middle East, social scientists face a dilemma: How can they make the cultural
aspects of conflict more intelligible to policymakers and to the public without

176.88.34.250 on Thu, 01 Feb 2024 12:09:14 +00:00
2 Islam and the West
reproducing the prov

"clash of civilization
global level, after
traditional discourse
with these cultural d
variables, usually wit
fail to provide an ad
can easily serve to a
account for the vola
alike, however, in th
or political relations,
largely retrospectiv
and "is" than with w
weight to adversarial
The present study
between Islam and t
than with exploring
representing cultura
narratives are 1) s
significance and plur
with the constituti
contributing to dan
transformation.
In any situation o
become trapped ins
unjustifiable sufferi
more useful to help
counterparts' framin
neutral frame of r
convergence betw
experiences" of co
antagonists to shift f
anew relationship (W
Such an approach to
needed if there is to
West. Recent event
macro-cultural relati
At the popular level
To avoid becoming "t
origins of these pola
narratives of inter

176.88.34.250 on Thu, 01 Feb 2024 12:09:14 +00:00
Nathan C. Funk and Abdul Aziz Said 3
remarkable cross-cultural parallels be

opportunity. Parallel themes of peren
escalation of conflict remains a genu
intercultural compatibility and even
relations.
The Power of Narratives
According to Marc Howard Ross (2002, p. 303), narratives may be defined as

"frameworks for action" through which members of particular identity groups
"understand the social and political worlds in which they live, and explain the conflicts in
which they are involved." Narratives, then, are the stories that members of social and
political groups tell about themselves and their relations with selected "others," to create
or reinforce a sense of collective identity and shared purpose. Dynamic rather than static,
narratives bind individuals together within an active and adaptive community, and change
in response to traumatic events and emergent challenges. Despite their dynamism,
however, narratives manifest consistency over time because group members draw upon a
shared stock of cultural symbols and historical experiences to create meaningful bonds,
shared social goals, and maps of the world that are infused with emotion and metaphor
(e.g., September 11 = Pearl Harbor). Though contested by rival factions and leaders
within a group, the narratives which come to dominate public discourse are often those
which serve most effectively to give definition to in-group identity and values through
reference to an out-group. Such narratives provide authoritative, commonsense
understandings about the nature of perceived threats to the group and its values, and
connect the fears, insecurities, and problems of the moment both with past tribulations
and with a forward-looking political program.
As Ross (2002) emphasizes, analysis of narratives can provide considerable
insight into conflict situations. First, narratives play an undeniable causal role in conflict
dynamics, by ruling certain political options either "in" or "out" for communal groups
and for those who claim to advance their interests. Narratives that promote exclusive in-
group loyalties, negative images of adversaries, and escalatory conflict moves can easily
exacerbate tensions, while narratives that highlight common ground shared by disputants
can make resolution of conflict more likely. Second, narratives provide invaluable
information about the understandings that disputants have concerning the nature of their
conflict and the driving motivations of each party. They manifest the emotional fears and
visceral threats experienced by conflict protagonists, and therefore provide criteria for
effective settlements. An essential part of the search for constructive responses to
conflict, Ross (2002, p. 304, emphasis added) notes, is "the development of new
narratives , ones which do not directly challenge older ones, but which reframe them in

176.88.34.250 on Thu, 01 Feb 2024 12:09:14 +00:00
more inclusive terms

groups and identify
In contemporary te
of narratives about "
of the cultural divi
identity issues, adv
responsibility for co
may be found on eac
also substantive agre
memory. The existe
conflict provides ins
story" that reaffir
experiences of the "o
The Story of In
Images of the "Other
American relations
that Americans hold
America. These image
prevailing American
West." When Americ
interaction is not lim
an economic transact
that the protagonists
Dominant Middle Eastern and American narratives about relations between Islam
and the West focus on the manner in which their respective civilizations have defined
themselves in opposition to each other. Though the narratives differ with respect to their
invocation of historical facts, their overarching themes are so similar that we may refer to
them as constituting a single "story" of intercultural confrontation.
Despite centuries of relations defined as much by commerce in goods and ideas as
by intermittent warfare and strife, the historical memories and imaginations of Islamic
and Western civilizations tend to cast each other in adversarial roles. Quite regularly,
Muslims and Westerners have viewed the "other" as unassimilable - as a "mirror on the
wall" personage who speaks only to confirm their own greatness, virtue, and self-
sufficiency. This idea of the "other" as an inferior rival or shadow of the "self' has led to
dehumanizing stereotypes as well as to habits of selective perception in which negative
interactions are remembered while more positive encounters are forgotten.1 The resultant
images are implicated in the violent excesses of such low points in Islamic-Western

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relations as the wholesale slaughter of

the Crusader army in 1099 C.E. (Arm
51), and, more recently, the terroris
World Trade Center.
Narratives of competition between Islamic and Western civilizations derive their
subject matter both from the geopolitical tensions of the present and from the politicized
cultural legacies of the past. For European Christians developing a sense of collective
self-consciousness amidst tumultuous internal rivalries, the idea of an Islamic "other" -
be it "Saracen," "Moorish," "Turk," or "Muslim" - provided a basis for articulating a
shared identity, a set of common values and, at times, a common political program. The
notion of a struggle between "Islamic civilization" and "the West" is a recent
transmutation of a much older theme; the terms of reference for Western Christian
cultures have been redefined by secularization of the public sphere and of collective
identity, and by the simultaneous definition of an "East," or "Orient" through which
Europeans and their descendants on other continents might come to know their own
contrasting distinctiveness (Neumann, 1999). Likewise, Muslims in the Middle East and
beyond have developed a greater sense of their own identity and values through
competition with "Frankish," "Christian," and "Western" "others." The "other," then, is
integral to the way each cultural grouping has understood itself. The preferred label for
the "other" of the present is applied retroactively, and conjures up images of conflict
from the past.
Although the term "Middle East" is of quite recent provenance, it evokes rich and
varied associations in what we may refer to as the "collective imagination" of the West.
Despite the fact that the Middle East accounts for only a small fraction of the world's
Muslims (a plurality of whom may be found in South and Southeast Asia), Western
images of the Middle East (especially the Arab Middle East) and of Islam are deeply
intertwined.2 These associations are laden with vivid and often contradictory images:
peaceful desert oases and enormous oil refineries, fabulous newfound wealth and
interminable religious conflicts, luxury vehicles and camel caravans, sword-bearing
Arabs in traditional Bedouin dress and military leaders in starched khakis, inarticulate
veiled women and immodest belly dancers, world-changing prophets and fanatical
charismatic leaders, shrouded saints in sandals and tyrants in palatial estates. While more
romantic and colorfully exotic images often prevailed during the colonial era, when
European supremacy was unquestioned, the return of Islamic discourse to the
international political stage since the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the eclipse of Cold
War ideological rivalries in the late 1980s has cast these images in a darker hue. Though
diverse, these images are united by the same idea of "otherness" that has haunted
Europe's relations with the Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa in the past. The
Muslim Middle East, Westerners are inclined to believe, is a land of harsh extremes.
They are tempted to view it as a part of the world that may justifiably be considered
strange and even arbitrary - a place that runs in accordance with unfamiliar rules that

176.88.34.250 on Thu, 01 Feb 2024 12:09:14 +00:00
only learned histori

generally held princip
If Americans and W
as a foil - a means of
are not - Middle Easte
toward a Western "ot
associations that most
of sexual morality, f
Muslim Middle East,
more representative o
In the dominant "s
Muslims, real cultura
the reality of the oth
political discourses m
sensational, and the s
programming, for ex
theories of American
complex disputations
"moderate vs. extrem
"strict" and even dist
widely accepted. With
that emerge in times
East neglect common
taken to symbolize t
value systems. "Oth
motivations and pref
and overbearing, wh
adverse circumstances.
Muslims and Westerners who narrate the story of confrontation seek to place
Islamic-Western relations within an "us versus them" framework that posits continuous
historical antagonism from the rise of Islam in the seventh century to the present day.
They project a world of protracted conflict between incompatible civilizations defined by
religious allegiance, cultural affinity, and historical bonds. To underscore the allegedly
violence-prone character of boundaries between civilizations and explain current tensions
between America and contemporary Muslim movements, they highlight instances of
conflict between leading powers of each camp - the Arab tribes versus the Byzantines in
the seventh century, the "Saracens" versus the Franks during the era of the Crusades, and
Ottoman Turks versus European empires in more recent times. To support speculations
concerning the future volatility of cross-cultural relationships, conflicts between groups
identified with each civilizational camp are emphasized at the expense of more numerous
conflicts within civilizations.3

176.88.34.250 on Thu, 01 Feb 2024 12:09:14 +00:00
As distasteful as crude enemy im

apolitical majorities in both cultura
sensationalists with instances of co
widespread attitudes of distrust and
stemming from irreconcilable diff
compelling to many in the wake of t
and the escalation of Israeli-Palestinian violence that followed the breakdown of the Oslo
process. As a result, competition and violence are taken for granted as part of the natural
state of things, rather than regarded as problems worthy of fact-finding and soul-
searching investigation. All who would seek to understand conflict between Middle
Eastern Muslims and the West must therefore face widespread and powerful perceptions
that "our reality" and "their reality" cannot meet, and that authentic security is to be
found in cultural retrenchment combined with vigorous efforts to repress, repel, or
convert the adversary.
When conflict intensifies, discussion of competing interests and areas of possible
compromise gives way to a reframing of conflict in terms of opposed values and
essences. "Our values" and "their values" are deemed mutually exclusive, and the latest
frictions become yet another episode in a centuries-old chronicle of untoward events.
Militant Muslim groups liken U.S. hegemony over the Middle East to Crusader
occupation and cite Western speculations concerning a "the clash of civilizations" as
proof of hostile intent.4 For their part, influential American pundits often float references
to the notion of an irreconcilable "clash of civilizations" before proposing that a World
War II or Cold War analogy is more strategically appropriate; the appeal of militant
Islamic "counter-imperialism" ideologies and the capabilities of "jihad" groups signal a
need for policies similar to those used to "roll back" fascism and communism (Goldberg,
2001). Rather than engage their counterparts in dialogue, powerful voices in both
cultural camps utilize strained historical analogies to argue that the necessary lessons for
dealing with contemporary problems are to be found in epic struggles against the
communal adversaries of times past.
Nearly twenty-five years after the Iranian revolution, American doubts concerning
the ability of Middle Eastern Muslims to govern themselves and Muslim mistrust of
American intentions appear to be interacting in a more precarious manner than ever
before, and the perceptual gap appears to be widening (Halliday, 2002). Middle Eastern
Muslim analysts, on the one hand, tend to view militant groups such as al Qaeda as
byproducts of foreign hegemony, distorted processes of change, and the defeat of secular
Arab nationalist movements in the Arab-Israeli conflict. American commentators, on the
other hand, tend to view extremist groups as evidence of inherent backwardness - i.e., of
cultural intolerance and an associated inability or unwillingness to assimilate into the
international system by adopting Western liberal models of thought and governance
(Lewis, 1990, 1993). Where Muslim voices argue that cultural and political change
proceed best when people are allowed to learn from their own trial and error process,

176.88.34.250 on Thu, 01 Feb 2024 12:09:14 +00:00
without external man

controls on Middle Ea
forceable regime cha
policy convictions is
for democratic refor
imposed on the regi
second by encouragi
eventually proceed to
(Zakaria, 2001).
The Construction of D
To understand narra
we must be attentive
of human psychology
members of commu
affirmation of posi
members, but also thr
traits of out-group m
sense of bounded id
strengthens individu
common purposes. I
defining its own qual
group is formed by d
therefore rejected in
who is, at best, outsid
group.
This is another way
profound role in con
down-to-earth, mat
intergroup conflict, c
symbolized and condu
estranged groups give
imagined differences
history - to the exten
shaping relations betw
the record-keepers, p
challenges that the g
about who "we" are,
to our present affairs

176.88.34.250 on Thu, 01 Feb 2024 12:09:14 +00:00
Because Islam appeared on the sta

Christianity to political prominence w
been a factor in the definition of We
role of "rival" and theological/ ideolo
conquests of Byzantine and Sassani
Christians with both a political and
the conception of Islam as a "relig
however, immediately conceive of Is
From the beginning, their images of
relations between Muslim and Christi
preoccupations. The "Islamic other" w
a Moor, Saracen, or Turks - and used
1993).
Western images of Islam have long been based as much on imagination and
presumption as on knowledge. In the Middle Ages, when the greatest threats to
Christians were political anarchy or failure to live up to religious ideals, European
Christian writers represented Islam as a force of chaotic and violent passions of the flesh.
At the time of the Crusades, Christian chroniclers referred to the "Saracens" as idolaters
who worshipped the sun and Muhammad rather than as fellow monotheists; yet during
the Protestant Reformation and the Counter-Reformation characterizations of Islam
shifted to accentuate theological deviation, heresy, and corruption - the same sins that
Protestants and Catholics were vigorously attributing to each other. By the time of the
Enlightenment, a newer and more familiar Islamic "other" began to appear. This time it
embodied fanaticism, intolerant backwardness, and obscurantist despotism in the face of
rational faith and liberty.5 More recently, images of Islam have been shaped by the
perception that Islamic culture represses women, encourages intolerant fundamentalism
(a term that was originally associated with a twentieth-century Protestant movement in
favor of literal Bible interpretation), and incites terrorism. Although the emphasis has
differed in accordance with the salient issue of the day, the idea of Islam as "other" or as
an "exception" to Western standards has remained constant. This idea grows in cultural
prominence during times of direct political conflict, when Islam is viewed as alien,
intrusive, and aggressive.
Like Western impressions of Islam, Muslim images of the West have varied in
accordance with cultural and political circumstances. Prior to the Western expansion in
the modern age, Muslim thinkers lacked elaborate notions of a "Western other," and
indeed took little interest in their European neighbors. Where initial Western ideas about
Islam were shaped by insecurity in the face of a theological and political challenge, early
Islamic ideas about European neighbors developed within a context of political
dynamism and cultural self-confidence. Muslims, after all, interpreted the rise of Islam to
a world-historical force as a sign of divine favor, just as Christian interpreters of Islam
viewed the good fortunes of their counterparts with great existential discomfort. For

176.88.34.250 on Thu, 01 Feb 2024 12:09:14 +00:00
1 0 Islam and the West
Western chroniclers,
watershed moment, w
and presumably backw
"other" was perhaps a
Christian peoples livin
forerunners to a more
least, was the state o
jeopardized far more
Europeans. The princ
complacency) vis-à-vis
armies during the 1 1th
narrative motif for und
Israeli conflict.
Muslim self-confide
Spain in the 1 5th centu
large swath of Eastern
under the Spanish f
remember the year 149
fall of the kingdom of
this year marks the b
periphery of an increa
phenomenon. With th
Kaynarji in 1774, the
passivity in world polit
As Muslims see it, they
by increasingly intrus
during Napoleon's reig
To this day, the exp
framework within whi
shared impression amo
international stature af
From Algiers in Nort
powers such as Fran
conquering indigenous
lands that came under
represented for early E
Particularly in the Mid
of colonialism, in no sm
and the Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts.
Recent decades have witnessed the slow and often painful reemergence of Muslim
peoples in world politics. The end of colonialism brought Muslim "nation-states" into

176.88.34.250 on Thu, 01 Feb 2024 12:09:14 +00:00
Nathan C. Funk and Abdul Aziz Said 1 1
existence for the first time, but m

establishing political legitimacy. Chall
only from the cultural and ethnic dive
traditional subordination of principles
implicit basis of modern states) to the
Arab Middle East, the legitimacy of po
Islamic affinities and by the crosscutti
they are associated. Division among Ar
Today's Muslims face the challeng
within the context of a world order th
way in which the modern world order
Muslims may be found in the term "M
has been used minimalistically for the
expansively for a swath of territory
widely accepted today among Arab, Is
East" was originally formulated from
usage when the British chose to use it
the Nile and the Oxus rivers, under a s
1998, p. 5; Hodgson, 1974, pp. 60-61).
Middle Eastern Muslim images of th
and fear, admiration and suspicion.
achievements are appealing, while th
economic power creates feelings of di
penetration generates deep ambival
enthusiasm are coupled with a resid
Western civilization is seen as an exam
East examine Western culture through
decadence in the forms of sensuality
religious values. From a Middle East
atomized and fragmented because ther
Muslim societies, in contrast, are
transformation while maintaining the fa
While Muslim critics look to the We
family values, Western pundits acce
critiques of contemporary Islam. In th
subordinate to the collective and to
freedom of the individual from politic
social system that limits arbitrary abu
such criticism, contemporary Muslims
argue that the West has become estra
other values. These critiques of the "ot

176.88.34.250 on Thu, 01 Feb 2024 12:09:14 +00:00
and the politics of ideo

more than the effects o
for example, has often
Islamic spiritual and c
their antithesis (Tavak
Although there is not
adversarial images mo
political disputes becom
America as a land of
opportunity, on the o
influence over the Mid
admiration and respec
treated them well - t
righteous indignation.
widely. At times of te
American and Western
the latest Hollywood r
of colonialism are aw
images depicting the d
circulate, a climate of
power that must be co
even Understood as it f
economic status quo:
Israeli settlers build n
for the safety of thei
disenchantment with
Muslims to sacrifice not
Such is the climate
"fundamentalist" hav
popular sympathy for
by confronting a polit
West" or "anti-Amer
"Western" and "Islamic
foreign capitals than c
Muslim images of m
problems is the West d
hear nuances in what W
Whereas most midd
through education, i
Westerner or Americ
through scattered med

176.88.34.250 on Thu, 01 Feb 2024 12:09:14 +00:00
not routinely exposed to Islamic cult

images of radicalism, which predomina
the popular media. These images are
Westerners to retreat into defensivenes
Muslim views. In effect, the West hear
of those who reject and profess to d
available (albeit superficial) informatio
Western cultures are irreconcilable.
Because the media tends to focus on extremism and terrorism, moderate and
peaceful Muslims rarely make the news. In effect, Islam is portrayed through a lens of
intolerance and violence, to such an extent that many of those who seek to add
complexity to ideas of an "Islamic threat" end up staking out a simplistic "good Muslim"
(secular, moderate, pro-American)/ "bad Muslim" (militant, backward, anti-American)
dichotomy. The governments of Muslim countries often play into this idea when
soliciting economic and military support.
The dominant image of Islam in the West conveys the idea that the religion of
approximately one fifth of humanity is an intolerantly ideological and prone to violence.
Instead of taking critical analyses of Western attitudes toward Islam and the Middle East
seriously, many who claim knowledge of the Islamic world focus overwhelmingly on
threads of hatred and fear articulated through religious discourse, without reflection on
the complex and deeply conflicted situations in which these sentiments emerge. This
reinforces a background of deep suspicion against which Muslims must acquit
themselves in order to be heard in policymaking circles.
To a considerable extent, Islam has come to represent the "irrational" for
Westerners - a symbol for that which cannot be understood, and must therefore be
distrusted and controlled. The Muslim world is reduced to a set of forms and images that
appear in essence to be antithetical to Western ideals, goals, and values. This generates a
temptation to recoil from all things Islamic, and to project a self-image of superiority in
which material strength and moral authority are inseparably wedded. Insofar as dialogue
with the "other" is embraced, it is regarded as a means of mollifying an aggravated
adversary, to manage conflict rather than resolve it (conflict being viewed as inevitable so
long as cultural differences persist), and to establish the Tightness of existing positions.
The goals of such an approach to dialogue are propagandistic and oriented toward
conversion and public relations rather than mutual understanding and respect.
The idea that the "other" is noteworthy first and foremost as a threat to cherished
values and interests is now firmly established in relations between Western and Muslim
cultures. America's War on Terrorism, for example, reflects both a reasonable concern to
provide safety for U.S. citizens and a deeply rooted conviction that the existence of
hatred for America has more to do with Islam itself than with the tragic history of
America's relationships with Arabs and Middle Eastern Muslims. In the aftermath of
September 1 1 , many columnists interpreted the shocking acts of al Qaeda militants as a

176.88.34.250 on Thu, 01 Feb 2024 12:09:14 +00:00
confirmation of the "

emphatically denounc
civilians and servicem
sins" in distant lands.
Like the American r
emotional than imagin
guilt by association
recrimination and pol
the War on Terroris
understandable given
foreign policy discour
Eastern leaders and i
through which options
Why Do They Hate Us
Why do they hate

increased frequency in
visitor to the Islamic
interlocutors - from
In the dominant app
"other," whether Wes
not shared by the "se
governments and insurg
conceived as an entire
and political system. T
doing, and everything
hate, greed, and antipa
peaceful approaches to
The conflict is about i
interests, and needs tha
Such selective and bi
"useful," after all, not
and opportunistic do
ourselves with sins
concerning our own c
West," "Americans h
frequency with which
cultural dynamics of c
the "other" as a foil.
"other" embodying th

176.88.34.250 on Thu, 01 Feb 2024 12:09:14 +00:00
When the story of intercultural c

Westerners and Muslims fall back on at
narratives of light and darkness, toget
within the West evoke Cold War parad
World War II imagery of a war aga
clashing religions or civilizations, whi
world divided into a "zone of peace"
The Western idea that Islam is violence-
that the West is inherently oppress
construing history - ways that are intend
The story of intercultural rivalry or
service of policies characterized by do
applied for in-group members, and an
members, be they "Muslim fanatics" or
become a security threat or an insult
unless converted to in-group values
dominant narrative frame for conflict
The Story of Intercultural C
Affirmation of Shared Values
Fortunately, alternatives to narrat

expression in Western and Middle E
common manifestation of these inclus
"second story" of intercultural compat
whose numbers include academicians
commentators, value differences bet
predispose Muslims and Westerners to
Islam partake in a common human h
which provide a basis for understandin
for learning, desire for peace, esteem f
dignity.
Though narrators of the story of compatibility seldom fail to note the shared status
of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam as Abrahamic monotheist traditions, they often place
greater emphasis on the fact that both Islam and the West have drawn heavily upon the
Greek cultural heritage as well. Classical Islamic civilization, after all, was constructed
out of Arab, Biblicist, and Hellenic cultures, and cast an even wider net by integrating
Persian and Central Asian as well as Indian components within its cultural synthesis.
Culturally and intellectually, Islam formed a bridge between East and West, and

176.88.34.250 on Thu, 01 Feb 2024 12:09:14 +00:00
Europeans were willing

turn, profited from trad
Islam's Hellenism was
circles, and Muslim phi
field linking Late An
beyond mere preservati
al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun
Republic, or by the He
Copernicus by means of
may assert with much
as an integral part of the
In addition to point
collaboration, the seco
labels such as "Islami
categories; the diversity
are as significant as con
and Western states or
real sense, Islam is pres
West is commercially a
higher education have b
elites have been educated at Western universities.
Because Islam and the West partake in common bonding cultures, they can coexist
if a clash of symbols is not mistaken for a clash of substances. Preventing this cognitive
error is possible, provided that spokespersons for Muslims and Westerners act to
demystify conflicts and emphasize cultural commonalities while accommodating
differences, and differentiate between constructive and destructive means of redressing
grievances. Many existing problems between Muslims and Westerners have much less to
do with religion or culture than with nationalism, gaps in levels of development,
historical disadvantages of Muslims countries, and protracted conflicts over territory and
natural resources (Halliday, 1996). Such gaps can be bridged through goodwill, dialogue
directed toward understanding, and practical problem solving (Ansari and Esposito,
2001).
Advocates of this second story, the story of compatibility, seek to place a check on
forms of cultural hubris and fanaticism that exaggerate differences, instill fear, and
inflame conflict (Esposito, 1999). With regard to dangers of cultural triumphalism,
narrators of this story are particularly attuned to the dangers of foreign policies that
humiliate or antagonize adversaries, giving rise to religious nationalism. While
acknowledging that, from a historical perspective, Middle Eastern Islamic and Western
cultures are both guilty of totalistic pretensions, they propose that present tensions are
complicated by the highly asymmetrical nature of relations that have produced a
dominant and a subordinate culture (Falk, 1997).

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Whereas the first story seeks to tr

cultural differences, the second story
It proposes that, at the turn of the tw
Westerners find themselves enmeshed
one hand, the West remains unrivale
capability. In the absence of a superp
more deeply entwined in the politics a
alternately supporting or margina
generating foreign satellite television
class households on a daily basis. O
American role in the region has engage
of these activists hold the United Stat
omission, for the status of the Pale
corruption and incompetence of reg
democratic participation and accountab
According to the second story, cu
political and economic relations blem
leaving the latter arrogant and insen
Contemporary Muslims feel deeply th
Western civilization that melds Hebrai
holds out the European and North A
cultural development as universal mo
accept the idea that Western innovat
administrative systems can be a source
object to what they view as the pre
democratic governance, development
embodied in the practices of Western
played a disproportionate role in shapi
condescending attitude that favors and
produces a displacement of Islamic cult
By controlling symbols of legit
educational institutions, Western cultu
shapes the way in which the world i
century, the assimilation and diffusion
has begun to redress the balance betw
unwillingness of Western great power
Israel/Palestine, Bosnia, Chechnya, and
that the Western world is not sym
technological and political factors, com
longer to the cultural humiliation o
contributed to the growth in a tide of

176.88.34.250 on Thu, 01 Feb 2024 12:09:14 +00:00
Middle East and other r

cultures. Probably the
fundamentalism by Wes
Differentiating Between
While the first story

primordial religious no
mundane, political inspi
values. Contemporary
anti-imperialist discou
colonized countries. W
revived as well, the w
political issues such as g
foreign masters. Likew
War than from the Cr
movements in the sam
perceptions underlie th
uniformly intolerant and
In addition to highlig
drama of Islamic-Weste
seek to differentiate
(Moussalli, 1999). Wit
containment of Islamic
movement to renew the
Islamic values, and terr
Whereas Islamic revivalism manifests a constructive concern with matters of social
justice, political participation, and cultural authenticity - that is, the practical challenge of
constructing an Islamic future. Terrorism channels feelings of crisis, besiegement, and
despair into acts that are intrinsically destructive in character.
As narrators of the second story observe, Islamic revivalism is a broad-based
social and political movement. First and foremost, it is a response to a widely felt
malaise that has left Muslim societies weak and unable to meet the modern world on their
own terms. Although its manifestations are remarkably widespread, Islamic revivalism is
not a monolithic movement, nor is it equivalent to the militant fundamentalism and
terrorism that capture the attention of the media. Among the world's historical powers,
only the Muslims, as a people, have not reversed the decline in their global status. The
Japanese, the Chinese, and the Europeans have all regained their world influence. Beset
by a failure of secular nationalist movements to restore a sense of dignity and self-respect
to the Islamic world, Muslim peoples of diverse nationalities have turned to Islamic
revivalism as a way of defining who they are. Under conditions of cultural, economic,

176.88.34.250 on Thu, 01 Feb 2024 12:09:14 +00:00
and political marginalization, large num

religious discourses as they search
responding to their problems (Voll, 19
The issues that motivate Islamic r
impetus to popular revival movements
the tension between secular nationa
Islamic world bears a similarity to sp
latent dissatisfaction with what material
failures of national governments to of
"fixes" which amount to tinkering
institutions (Juergensmeyer, 1993).
Adherents of the second story pro
better understood as an attempt to
rejection of the modern world (Euben,
a strongly felt expression of cultural i
well as international political orders.
culture, they emphasize that it is natu
other predominantly Muslim regions
Islam provides a language that address
Islamic revivalism equips Muslims wit
their identity, project themselves polit
root causes of instability - social excl
legitimate, accountable, and participat
revivalism in the modernization proc
to comparison with the role of reli
(Weber, 1930; Walzer, 1965).
Extremism in the Islamic world should not be viewed as an autonomous
phenomenon, but rather as a reaction to genuine political, economic and cultu
contradictions. Many contemporary Muslims feel that they are adrift in the moder
world, cut off from the past by colonialism and yet also devoid of a hopeful future to
which they might confidently aspire. Many Western observers, unsettled by the b
appeal of Islamic slogans and failing to grasp the context of political action, have m
the mistake of tarring all Muslim political movements with the same brush.
When policymakers fail to discriminate between Muslim movements or recogn
possibilities for them to play a positive role, there is a danger of sanctioning repre
actions that exacerbate conflict and radicalize opposition. This drives the impuls
revivalism into narrower channels born of pain, frustration, and hopelessn
Particularly in the Middle East, the lack of political space for the expression of dissid
views is a leading source of radicalization; often the only "safe" space for dissent is
mosque. Opening political space and taking actions that ameliorate key grievances ca
help to correct this problem by providing a sense of political efficacy that insp

176.88.34.250 on Thu, 01 Feb 2024 12:09:14 +00:00
creative thought and

an absence of desire for
Fundamentalism as a Shared Problem
From the standpoint of the second story, Islam and the West are dangerously out
of touch with each other, and misperceptions and mistrust have led to an ever-deepening
estrangement. Each civilization has transformed symbols of the "other" into receptacles
for their own fears. A form of psychopathy is operating at this symbolic level, in which
self-referential systems of meaning are constructed around symbols of "otherness."
These systems of meaning operate independently of larger understandings of the material
conditions that heighten conflict, and without reference to common spiritual aspirations
that unite members of seemingly distant cultures. The result is a relationship based on
competition for power and control, accompanied by cultural insularity, retreat, and the
negativistic tendency to define the "self' in relation to an adversarial "other" rather than
in relation to autonomously defined values.
In this relationship, a "clash of symbols" is being waged between Islam and the
West: Westerners are finding headscarves, turbans and other symbols of Islamic religious
expression repellent; similarly fundamentalist Muslims see blue jeans and other
manifestations of Western culture as explicit anti-Islamic statements. Belief systems are
being simplified into images to be either rejected or absorbed in their entirety, resulting in
deeply impoverished notions of both Islam and the West. Muslims are failing to
recognize such subtle manifestations of Western morality as regulations to accommodate
the handicapped; Westerners are reducing Islam to a set of fundamentalist practices that
denigrate women and reject religious tolerance. In the post-September 1 1 media drama,
Taliban and al Qaeda extremists have been portrayed as "strict" (i.e., observant and
authentic) Muslims, yet the beliefs and practices of non-militant Muslims have been left
virtually unexplored. This leads the uninformed viewer to conclude that so-called
"moderates" are compromisers, and that Islam as a religion is uniquely susceptible to the
contagion of militant fundamentalism. Middle Eastern Muslim media commentary, in
turn, does little to correct the misguided ideas about Western culture that viewers pick up
while watching satellite television.
Under the stress of conflict, people react by reducing their own beliefs to a small,
workable subset in order to fight and protect themselves, assuming a form of
fundamentalism that reads preprogrammed symbolic meanings into all forms of
intercultural contact. While fundamentalism is usually understood to have an exclusively
religious denotation, we have found it more analytically useful to define fundamentalism
as a cultural pathology of intergroup conflict in which the ability to hear and
communicate with others shuts down. Fundamentalism consists of a politicization of
group values and symbols, in which a community takes a subset of basic tenets of a
tradition and, either under pressure of insecurity or in the pursuit of political dominance,

176.88.34.250 on Thu, 01 Feb 2024 12:09:14 +00:00
uses them to seal off others or mainta

take on an explicitly religious colorat
choice, in light of past frustrations w
compromise with foreign intrusions a
religious nationalism that seeks to
Westerners, the fundamentalist impul
order with military dominance, and f
of democracy and free market econom
Both tendencies deny any responsibili
experienced and reject the possibility
expanded. In each case, the world is d
dogmatically representing their own
Euben, 1999, p. 19).
Significantly, both Western and Isl
arguable though that Western thinke
ideological tendencies place non-Weste
Muslims and other groups to make a
to practices that cannot fully emb
possibility that non-Western cultures ma
advancement of peace and human solid
Narrators of the story of compatibi
West is not the result of cultural esse
on both sides. Although obsession wit
expense of disciplined analysis has led
need not be understood as inevitable or final. If Muslims were to hold themselves
accountable to their tradition of ethical monotheism and Westerners were to adhere to
democratic values at home and abroad, there would be no cultural and political clash.
Moreover, if dialogue were preferred to coercive measures, areas of convergence might
be found.
As they manifest in the story of confrontation, attitudes of fundamentalism project
the idea that goodness, truth, and beauty are scarce and unevenly distributed commodities
that a particular privileged community has a comparative advantage in producing. From
this assumption it is only a short step to the conclusion that those who are not allies are in
fact enemies. Because the virtue of the in-group is presumed to be manifest and self-
evident, reflective self-examination becomes unnecessary and listening to sift through the
surprising and uncomfortable claims of others becomes superfluous (what is the use, after
all, of engaging a "barbarian" in dialogue?). The complexity of global politics is reduced
to a morality play.
The story of compatibility questions the comfortable assumptions of the story of
confrontation, and seeks to counteract misperceptions and double standards. This means
replacing moral "self '-images and immoral "other'Mmages with images that are closer to

176.88.34.250 on Thu, 01 Feb 2024 12:09:14 +00:00
the complexity of rea

own cultural ideal (be
abandon particularism
that is necessary is re
with the "other" is im
and the existential reali
In addition to recon
speaks of a need to c
order to impose limi
expanding them. Wh
emotion, they allow a
such an outcome, bot
intent to deal with sh
implies a closing off of
of a culture and its hu
understanding, coopera
The story of conf
conversion/assimilatio
with areas of conflict
and strategic analyses
truths of the second s
Islamic and Western c
Where the first story
futility, the second st
facile, stereotypical la
The Need for a Ne
Although the secon

reference for underst
be adequate to overcom
on "Islam and the W
"otherness," and tend
"they" become like
categories; cultural an
"clash" is inevitable, a
From both humanist
Islam and the West i
American military cam
both of each other an

176.88.34.250 on Thu, 01 Feb 2024 12:09:14 +00:00
traditions. At the same time, Western

"Western" way of life without peacef
"Western" is intended to evoke respect
Likewise, many Muslims are discoveri
their faith tradition as long as they fi
"Western other." Such relations em
jeopardize the rich and diverse herit
elusive ideal of cultural purity. To
Westerners must achieve some form
differences and for mutual learning. T
The possibility of a new story o
function of deep changes in the chara
modern history rule out pretensions b
through worldwide hegemony. We ha
collective life as fragments of the wh
whole - a humanity that must come t
spheres of economics, ecology, cultur
good of a particular state and nation th
public good that can only be achieved
and reciprocity within a framework o
first century, security cannot be atta
cultural dominance; porous boundarie
insure that there can be no escape fro
transactions that is considered "just
"unjust" policies to great risk.
While interdependence provides th
the weak, it also increases the potentia
To become more secure, Westerners
establish a positive, proactive basis fo
way not only to tolerate each other
discover ways in which their cultures m
Individuals on both sides of the cul
beyond preoccupation with tired im
openness to a new experience of th
images, inflexible doctrines, and f
important for both communities at t
impulses triggered by symbols (turban
To fixate on symbols that trigger
psychopathic condition. This confus
what drove the terrorists who struck
United States is not a series of build

176.88.34.250 on Thu, 01 Feb 2024 12:09:14 +00:00
external forms does n

Muslim attitudes towa
simply by eliminat
Preoccupation with de
- no matter how dese
engagement through
concealed by symbols
Moving beyond react
and Islam know one a
serves to strengthen t
world, retreat to a c
Buddhist, or Hindu -
cultural experience, bu
of retreating into de
capable of generating
commitment to susta
quick end of conflict,
understand how the o
both sides work toget
This would challenge W
ideals as they learn to
Because the present w
through empire, Musl
rather than "out of rel
estrangement as well
traditional ways of co
"individualism versu
"materialism versus sp
freedom to be." Whe
complementarities, t
relationships with th
opposed values can a
intercultural relations a
Conclusion: Imp
Establishing peace in
claims of inherent cul
Middle Eastern narra
images through select

176.88.34.250 on Thu, 01 Feb 2024 12:09:14 +00:00
alternate versions of the story of con

natural when parties to conflict rem
awareness. Peace, in contrast to war,
from the superficial to the essential, f
openness, from a competitive focus
positive possibilities, and from the po
Positive change requires full engageme
awareness that Islamic and Western cu
of past conflicts but also resources for
Whereas the story of confrontation
intensification of conflict between se
West," the story of compatibility an
discursive options for agents seeking
and their relation to political action
peacemaking might counter the claim
effectively and act as cultural and poli
An affirmative approach to relation
peace as a shared ideal of both civil
possibility of choice. Muslims and We
cultural traditions that formulate and
commensurable. The West, for exam
"absence" of particular conditions, wh
no real meaning unless it signifies a "
of war, terrorism, and gross violations
a presence of justice, self-determinat
least, are central tendencies of though
in value articulation and formulatio
significant as differences between civ
paradigms of thought and action o
Kadayifci, 2001), and it is only by rec
we will be able to construct narratives
The time has come for Muslims
Muslims and Americans - to place thei
cross-cultural dialogue, so as to gain d
of "the good" and of the instrumentali
positive social values can be furthered
the basis of what we might create tog
fear and desire to avoid.
Islam and the West are truly betwee
the story that they must now create
West can become coauthors of this new

176.88.34.250 on Thu, 01 Feb 2024 12:09:14 +00:00
we leave aside tired g

architects of a truly ne
Notes
1. For analysis of how images of "self' and "other" affect intergroup conflict, see Kelman (1997) and Stein
(2001).
2. In reality, only about one sixth of the world's 1 .2 billion Muslims are Arab, and the Middle East has long hosted
indigenous Christian and Jewish populations as well as Muslims. Nonetheless, the Middle East is the traditional
heartland of Islam, to which millions of pilgrims travel each year to the Arabian peninsula for the rites of the haj in
Mecca. Muslims around the world monitor political events and ideological trends in the Middle East closely. While
one should be careful not to over-generalize the Middle Eastern experience, the region plays a leading and crucial
role in Muslim relations with the West.
3. As the Cold War waned, the historian Bernard Lewis (1990) proposed that Islam would become the next major
rival of America and of Western civilization in general. He predicted a "clash of civilizations" - "the perhaps
irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present,
and the worldwide expansion of both" (p. 60). Political scientist Samuel Huntington (1993) embellished on this
prediction in his much-debated article, "The Clash of Civilizations."
4. Huntington's credentials as a Harvard University professor and an advisor to past U.S. administrations led many
to view his thesis as indicative of American perceptions more generally.
5. Western political theorists of liberty and limited, constitutionalist governance, for example, found in Islam
examples of that which they opposed in Europe. Montesquieu (1977, pp. 145-146), writing on failures of despotic
states to accommodate peaceful succession to executive power, chose to focus particularly on the practices of
Turkish, Persian, and Mogul aspirants to supreme authority.
6. The contributions of Avicenna, Averroes, and other Muslim thinkers to the scholastic tradition of the West are
notable in this regard, particularly in such fields as medicine, chemistry, and philosophy.
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Islam and The West Narratives of Conflict and Conflict Transformation

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ISLAM AND THE WEST: NARRATIVES OF CONFLICT AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

Author(s): Nathan C. Funk and Abdul Aziz Said

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