PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SALVADOR TULAGAN, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 227363 | March 12, 2019

FACTS

● Tulagan, by means of force, intimidation and with abuse of superior

strength,forcibly laid the nine-year-old victim in a cement pavement and inserted

his finger into her private part and in another instance a few months after, he

inserted his penis to her vagina, against her will and consent.

● The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found the accused guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of the crimes of sexual assault and statutory rape as defined and penalized

under Article 266-A, paragraphs 2 and 1 (d) of the Revised Penal Code

(RPC),respectively, in relation to Article 266-B. The Court of Appeals (CA)

affirmed the RTC’s decision with modification on the imposable penalty from

prision correccional as minimum and prision mayor as maximum to reclusion

temporal as well as modification in the amount of damages. Hence, this appeal

ISSUE

Whether or not the appeal should be granted?

HELD

No, however modification of the nomenclature and penalty for the crime of Sexual

Assault and a reduction of damages of the crime of Statutory Rape are in order.It should
be Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, in

relation to Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 as R.A. 7610 must be applied to all

children victims. Since AAA, the victim, is a child therefore the crime of Sexual Assault

must be imposed in relation with the penalty prescribed by R.A. 7610.

The Court holds that if the acts constituting sexual assaultare committed against a

victim under 12 years of age or is demented, the nomenclature of the offense should

now be"Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of theRPC in relation to

Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610" and no longer "Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336

of the RPC in relation to Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610," because sexual assault as a

form of acts of lasciviousness is no longer covered by Article 336 for it was transferred

as a separate crime of “sexual assault”, from a mere crime against chastity to a crime

against persons akin to rape,under the former.

Rape by sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A is committed by “inserting

penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the

genital or anal orifice of another person". Such an element is present in the case at bar

for the accused inserted his finger in the victim’s private part who was 9 years old when

the crime was committed.

Wherefore, the appeal was dismissed. The Regional Trial Court February 10, 2014 Joint

Decision, in Criminal Case Nos. SCC-6210 and SCC-6211, and the Court of Appeals

August 17, 2015 Decision, in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06679, should be AFFIRMED with
the necessary modifications.

OPINION

Consent is immaterial in sexual intercourse with children under twelve (12) years of age,

because they are presumed to be incapable of giving consent. The gap in the ages

between twelve (12) and eighteen (18) years old was addressed by R.A. No. 7610,

which provided criminal liability for acts of prostitution or other forms of sexual abuse

done with a child between twelve (12) and eighteen (18) years old. Nevertheless, R.A.

7610 takes into consideration that the age of sexual consent remains at twelve (12)

years old. This is "one of the lowest globally and the lowest in the Asia-Pacific Region.

While the average age of consent is sixteen (16) years old." This is despite the fact that

under our laws, minors do not have the capacity to enter contracts or marriage. Thus, in

sexual intercourse with children between twelve (12) and eighteen (18) years of age, as

Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 leaves room for a child to give consent. But this

must be read with the policy espoused by the law, which states that "the best interests

of children shall be the paramount consideration.” This obliges the courts to determine

how consent to sexual conduct was given by the child, despite reaching an age where

they could have reasonable "discernment. Factors such as age difference, the victim

and perpetrators' relationship, and the child's psychological disposition must be

considered by this Court, having in mind the child's best interest. There is thus an

apparent need to increase the threshold age of a victim for purposes of criminal liability

on the part of the accused for statutory rape.

 People vs Efren Agao

GR NO. 248049 OCTOBER 4, 2022

Facts:

Efren Agao is a step-father of AAA who was charged of two counts of statutory rape,

under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 and Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code.AAA

stated that sometime in 2009, when she was 10 years old, the accused first molested

her by touching her private parts.On 2010, AAA was raped by the accused by trying to

insert his organ into her vagina managing toreach to her labia majora but was unable to

fully penetrate because AAA was fighting.She testified that the accused continued to

molest her 3 times a week and on 2012, the accusedalso tried to penetrate her vagina

but was unable to do so because she was fighting back.AAA kept these incidents from

her mother because she was afraid that they might harm her and her mother and she

was also afraid that her mother might not believer her.On 2014, when her mother left

the accused and over two years since the last assault, AAA muster the courage to tell

her aunt about the sexual assault of the accused and able to file a complaintagainst

him.In her genital examination by Police Chief Inspector Jocelyn P. Cruz, it was found

that there is no injury nor hymenal laceration but according to her it is possible that the

injury has healed as two years has passed.However, the accused denied all the

allegations and stated that he treated AAA as his own daughter and AAA allegations

was coached by CCC, her father.

Issue:

Whether the CA correctly affirmed the RTC decision which found appellant guilty of two

counts of rape through sexual intercourse as defined under Article 266-A, paragraph 1

and Article 266-B of the RPC as amended by R.A. 8353 in conjunction with R.A. 7610.

Held:

The appeal is without merit. Appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review,

with the reviewing tribunal vested with the duty to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in

the appealed judgment, whether assigned or unassigned.

According to the Supreme Court in this new landmark case, rape is consummated by as

soon as the penis penetrates the CLEFT of the labia majora, also known as the VULVAL

OR PUDENDAL CLEFT, or the fleshy outer lip of the vulva, in EVEN THE SLIGHTEST

DEGREE. Meaning, to consummate the rape, it is not necessary that there should be

full penetration of the vagina or ejaculation of the penis.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the appeal and ADOPTS with MODIFICATION

the findings of fact of Branch 172, Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, as affirmed

by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated January 15, 2019 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.

09405, and AFFIRMS said Decision with MODIFICATION, and hereby finds appellant

Efren Agao y Afionuevo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of Statutory

Rape in Criminal Case No. 1453-V-14, and one (1) count of Simple Rape in Criminal

Case No. 1454-V-l 4 through sexual intercourse, for which he is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.153 The Court further AFFIRMS the award

of damages pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.

OPINION

Before Agao’s case, there was a lot of legal ambiguities when it comes to rape—one

that the Supreme Court recognizes and seeks to change with this latest ruling. It noted

that the law on rape cases is “euphemistic but largely inaccurate” which have “only

convoluted matters regarding the act of rape that should have been kept definitive.”

Section 2.2 of the Anti-Rape Law states that rape is “an act of sexual assault by

inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or

object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.” Without insertion, the crime is

usually viewed with less severity than consummated rape and is therefore considered

as attempted (or unsuccessful) rape.

“Fully aware of the detestable fact that the crime of rape is a violence of power and an

ordeal of unspeakable trauma, the Court deems it fit that a clarification is necessary,

crucial even, if it is to ensure that the detestable act of consummated rape by sexual

intercourse or through penile penetration is not passed off as a mere attempt,” the

Supreme Court said in a 40-page ruling.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. LUDIVICO PATRIMONIO

BANDOJO, JR. AND KENNY JOY VILLACORTA ILETO, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

Facts

The accused-appellants were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,

Branch 29 in two separate Informations with the crimes of Qualified Trafficking in

Persons and Trafficking in Persons.

That on or about and sometime prior to November 8, 2012, in the City of Manila,

Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually

helping each another , did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly, recruit and

hire [AAA],[5] a 17[-]year[-]old minor to engage in sexual intercourse with a police officer

and other male clients for monetary consideration, by means of taking advantage of her

vulnerability and for the purpose of prostitution and sexual exploitation.

Upon arraignment, both accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. A

pre-trial conference was subsequently conducted and concluded. Thereafter, trial on the

merits ensued.

Issue

Whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the

accused-appellants for the crime of human trafficking

Held

The Court affirms the accused-appellants' conviction. Pertinent to this case are Sections

4(a) and 6(a) of R.A. No. 9208. the prosecution was able to establish the presence of all

the elements of the crime by testimonial and documentary evidence.

Consent of the minor is not a defense under R.A. No. 9208 . Contrary to the

accused-appellants' submission, the fact that AAA had asked Kenny Joy for a raket and

that she visited the said accused-appellant in prison does not negate their criminal

liability.

As previously cited, Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 9208 clearly states that trafficking in

persons may be committed with or without the victim's consent or knowledge.

Furthermore, in Casio, the Court ruled that the victim's consent is rendered meaningless

due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive means employed by perpetrators of human

trafficking. Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minor's

consent is not given out of his or her own free will.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of

merit. The Decision dated May 15, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.

08276, convicting accused-appellants Ludivico Patrimonio Bandojo, Jr. and Kenny Joy

Villacorta Ileto of the crime of Qualified Human Trafficking, as defined and penalized
under Section 4(a), in relation to Section 6(a), of Republic Act No. 9208, is hereby

AFFIRMED.
LINA TALOCOD, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

Facts

This case stemmed from an Information6 dated October 23, 2012 filed before the RTC

accusing petitioner of committing acts of child abuse, defined and penalized under

Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7610.

That on or about November 5, 2011, the above-named accused, did then and there

willfully, unlawfully committed (sic) acts of child abuse against one [AAA], 11 years old

(DOB: September 9, 2000), by uttering the following words "Huwag Mong Pansinin Yan.

At Putang Ina Yan (while angrily pointing her finger at him)...Mga Walang Kwenta Yan,

Mana-Mana Lang Yan!", thereby subjecting said minor to psychological abuse, cruelty

and emotional maltreatment prejudicial to his natural development.

The prosecution alleged that, in the morning of November 5, 2011, AAA,8 an 11-year

old with other children along the road near his residence. As his playmates were

bothering passing motorists by throwing sand and gravel on the road, AAA berated and

told them to stop. Upset by AAA's reprimand, one of the children, EEE, reported the

incident to her mother, herein petitioner.Ꮮαwρhi৷ Together with EEE, petitioner

immediately confronted AAA about his behavior, and while pointing a finger at the latter,

furiously shouted: "Huwag mong pansinin yan. At putang ina yan. Mga walang kwenta

yan. Mana-mana lang yan!" Upset by what petitioner said, AAA ran home and cried,

later relaying the incident to his mother, BBB. Allegedly, AAA was traumatized as a
result of petitioner's utterance of harsh words and expletives, since after the purported

incident, he no longer went out to play with other children and started to suffer from

nightmares.9

In defense, petitioner claimed that the words she actually uttered were: "anak wag mo

na patulan yan walang kwenta makipag-away," and that the same were addressed to

EEE, not to AAA.

Issue

WON the petitioner is guilty of violating Section 10(a) Art VI of RA 7610?

Held

No. The act of petitioner in shouting invectives against private complainants does not

constitute child abuse under the foregoing provisions of RA 7610. Petitioner had no

intention of debasing the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child. It was an act of

carelessness done in the heat of anger.

For one to be criminally liable for commission of acts of Child Abuse under Sec 10(a)

Art VI of RA 7610, the prosecution must prove a specific intent to debase the intrinsic

worth and dignity of the child as a human being on the part of the offender.

Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse

under RA 7610.
Wherefore, petitioner was acquitted.