CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM

A COMPLETE RESTATEMENT OF THE ENTIRE

AMERICAN LAW

Volume Seventy-Three
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The following is copyrighted by The American Law Book Company, Brooklyn, N.Y., in
association with West Publishing Co.
 CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM

A COMPLETE RESTATEMENT OF THE ENTIRE

AMERICAN LAW

This Title includes the nature and subject of rights of property in general; distinctions
between different kinds of party; evidence of title; and matters relating to acquisitions,
ownership, possession and transfer of property generally.

73 CJS Property §1

Matters not in this Title, treated elsewhere in the work, see Descriptive - Word Index
Analysis

§ 1. Definition and nature -- p.135

2. Subjects of property -- p. 150
3. General classification -- p. 154
4. --- Real and personal -- p. 155
5. --- Corporeal and incorporeal; tangible and intangible--p.155 [Ken's note --
see 26§2056A(c)(1)]
6. --- Public and private -- p. 157
7. Real property -- p. 157
8. Personal property -- p. 170
9. ---- Choses in action -- p. 175
10. Distinction between real and personal property -- p. 179
11. Conversion or change of form -- p. 179
12. What law governs -- p 180
13. Ownership and incidents thereof -- p. 180
14. Possession and incidents thereof -- p. 196
15. Title to property and modes of acquisition or loss -- p. 204
16. Evidence of ownership or title -- p. 210
17. --- Presumptions and burden of proof -- p. 210
18. --- Admissibility -- p. 213
19. --- Weight and sufficiency -- p. 214

See also descriptive word index in the back for this Volume

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§1 Definition and Nature

a. In general
b. As a legal term
c. Phrases
 a. In general

The word 'property' in its descriptive or qualitative sense, is briefly defined as

meaning any character always present in an individual or a class.

In its descriptive or qualitative sense, the term "property" has been defined as a
peculiarity, peculiar nature or quality, any character always present in an individual or a
class; any essential attribute; a peculiar quality, or a distinguishing quality, characteristic,
or mode of any substance; a peculiarity; also, a permanent or necessary quality. [1]

b. As a Legal Term
In a legal usage "property" is perhaps the most comprehensive word which can
be employed, and it may signify either the subject matter in which rights or interest
exist, or it may signify valuable rights and interest protected by law, or it may
signify both. It is generally recognized that property includes certain rights such as
the right of acquisition, possession, use, enjoyment, and disposition.

In a legal usage the word "property" is a generic term. [2]. According to the authorities
on the question, it is a term of broad[3] and extensive [4] application, and it is also a term
of large import,[5] with the very broadest[6] and most extensive[7] signification. It is a
very comprehensive word[8] having broad[9], comprehensive[10], and exceedingly
complex[11] meanings, and is, perhaps, the most comprehensive of all terms which can be
used[12]. However, it has been said that dictionaries as well as courts have given the term
a well-established and definite meaning[13].

The word "property" is derived from the Latin word "proprius" meaning belonging to
one; one's own[14]. It is often called "nomen generalissimum[15]," and is employed at
different times to express many varying ideas[16], and its meaning is not and cannot be
fixed and unchanging[17]. The term may have different meanings depending on the
connection in which, and the purposes for which, it is used[18], as indicating the intention
of the parties[19] or the proper construction or application of constitutional or statutory
provisions[20], and the meaning of the word "property" when used in a legislative act,
must be gathered from the then prevailing concepts as reflected by contemporaneous
construction[21].

Ordinarily the meaning that will be attributed to the word "property" depends on the
sense in which it is used[22], as gathered from the context and the nature of the things to
which it is intended to refer and include[23], and, as a general rule, the term is to be
interpreted in its ordinary and popular sense[24] unless the context shows that it is used in
a technical or more arbitrary sense[25]. However, the meaning of the word may be
restricted, not only by the application of the maxim, Noscitur a sociis, but by the evident
use of the term as a word of art, or by its use in a technical sense[26].

It has been said that the very generality of the word requires restriction, and the
meaning of the term may be restricted[27] by the context of the writing in
which it is used[28], so that it is not always applied in its most comprehensive sense[29],
but it may have a meaning sometimes broad and sometimes quite restricted[30]. Where
the word is used in a written instrument, all the terms of the enstrument must be
considered in determining whether from the context it is used with a restricted
meaning[31].

A more comprehensive meaning is presumed to have been intended in the use of

the word “property” in a constitution than in a statute, for, the former being the organic
instrument, it is presumed to have been couched in broader language than is the case in a
statute, which usually concerns itself with precise matters[32]. In statutes a broader or
restricted meaning will be given according to the purpose of the legislature[33].
Generally, as used in statutes, the term “property” should be given its ordinary meaning,
and it should not be given a limited or restricted meaning[34], but the meaning of the term
may be restricted by the context of the particular statute[35], or it may be necessary so to
restrict its application in on section of a statute in order to give effect to another[36].

The word “property” includes both real and personal property[37], and ordinarily
will be construed as meaning both real and personal property[38], and in some
jurisdictions it is expressly provided by statutory or constitutional provisions that the
signification to be attached to the use of the word “property” shall include, unless
otherwise apparent from the text, property real and personal[39]. However, in a particular
case the meaning may be restricted to real property[40], or to personal property[41] only.

Property is divisible into different species, including physical things, such as

lands, good, money; and intangible things, such as franchises, patent rights, copyrights,
trade-marks, trade-names, business good will, rights of action, etc.[42], and the word
“property” may be construed to include both intangible rights and physical things[43],
although in some instances it is restricted to a tangible res[44], or only to property capable
of manual delivery[45], or some tangible evidence of debt or share in property[46]. The
word “property” as commonly[47] used and understood by many people[48] denotes the
subject matter in which rights and interest exist[49], or the thing itself[50], that is,
tangible[51], physical[52] things or objects; a corporeal thing, as an automobile, a horse,
land, etc. Thus, in what is sometimes referred to as its broadest sense, the word
“property” means the thing owned, the physical thing which is a subject of ownership, as
distinguished from the right to possess and use the thing.

In law it is not the physical material object which constitutes property. The term
means something more than the mere thing which a person owns, and in its more
appropriate and true legal sense property is not alone the corporeal thing or physical
object itself, and is not alone the land or chattel itself. In fact, it has been said that there
are no property rights innate in objects themselves. The physical objects constitute only
the foundation and material of property, and, although the subjects of property, they are,
when coupled with possession, only the indicia, the visible manifestations of invisible
rights, the evidence of things not seen, and the idea of property springs out of the
connection, or control, or interest which, according to law, may be acquired in or over
things.
 In the strict legal sense the word “property signifies valuable rights or interest
protected by law, and this is the primary, appropriate, and broader signification of the
term.

In modern legal systems, property includes practically all valuable rights, the term
being indicative and descriptive of every possible interest which a person can have, in
any and every thing that is the subject of ownership by man, including every valuable
interest which can be enjoyed as property, and recognized as such, equitable interest as
well as legal interest, and extending to every species of valuable right or interest in either
real or personal property, or in easements, franchises, and incorporeal hereditaments.
Too, the term comprises all rights which are incident to the use, enjoyment and
disposition of tangible things; the bare possession, with color of right, of anything of
value; the right to be protected in one’s possession of a thing or in one’s privileges
belonging to him as an individual, or secured to him as a member of the commonwealth;
and including the right to contest judicially any invasion of that which one possesses or
owns.

While the word “property” may signify the physical corporeal thing, or it may
denote rights and interest, when the term is used without qualification, expressly made or
plainly implied, it may reasonably be construed to include obligations, rights, and other
intangibles, as well as physical things; and thus the word “property” means not only the
thing possessed, that is, the physical corporeal thing, but also rights in the physical
corporeal thing which are created and sanctioned by law.

The word “property” embraces everything which is or may be the subject of

ownership, whether a legal ownership, or whether beneficial, or private, ownership, or to
which the right of property may legally attach, no matter how infinitesimal in quantity;
and the term is legally understood to include every class of acquisitions which a man can
own or have an interest in; everything of value which may be lawfully acquired and
owned or which is capable of being the subject of individual right or ownership;
everything which may belong to a man and in the ownership of which he has a right to be
protected by law; everything which has exchangeable or intrinsic value, or goes to make
up wealth or estate; anything which is the proper subject of legal transfer.

The courts have said that the word “property” is all-embracing so as to include
every intangible benefit and prerogative susceptible of possession or disposition, and
every interest or estate which the law regards of sufficient value for judicial recognition.
The word “property” even extends to every aspect of right and interest capable of being
enjoyed as such on which it is practicable to place a money value, and thus the term
includes everything, every species of valuable right or interest, and every species of
estate, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, choate or inchoate, visible or
invisible, real or personal or mixed, which may be the subject of ownership of all
inanimate things which are capable of appropriation or of manual delivery.

Property is considered to be the highest right which a man can have to anything,
real or personal, being a complex bundle of rights, duties, powers, and immunities,
comprising a vast variety of rights, with certain rights such as the right of use, the right of
enjoyment, and the right of disposal considered to be the constituent elements or essential
attributes of property. It is generally recognized that property includes the right of
acquisition, the right of dominion, the right of possession, the right of use and enjoyment,
the right of exclusion, and the right of disposition. There are frequent statements to the
effect that these rights may be exercised to the exclusion of all others, freely, and without
restriction, and without control or diminution save only by the laws of the land, and that
anything which destroys one or more of the elements of property to that extent destroys
the property itself, although title and possession remain undisturbed.

While the right of disposition is generally regarded as one of the constituent

elements of property, the fact that a thing may not be bartered away or sold does not
establish conclusively that there are no property rights in such thing, for in some things
property rights are more limited than in other things, but even in the absence of the right
to barter away or sell a thing, if any right of control over or interest in an inanimate
material thing exists, it would be proper to say that a property right exists in such thing.

The very essence of the nature of property is the right to its exclusive beneficial
use, and, in its final analysis, the property in anything consists in the use, and the right of
user is such an essential quality or attribute of absolute property that without it absolute
property has no legal existence, and no beneficial right remains. There can be conception
of property aside from its control and use, and on its use depends its value. If the right of
use be denied the value of property is annihilated and ownership is rendered a barren
right.

The principle is well established that property is a creature and creation of law; a
brief expression denoting the rights over things conferred by the law or custom of some
given society, and the individual right of dominion over things extends only as far as the
welfare of the community permits it to extend, and thus the rights which constitute
property may be exercised only in such manner as is not inconsistent with law.

The word “property” has been subject to innumerable and various definitions, and
its meaning has been determined by many court decisions, and many courts and writers in
attempting to define the term have employed different words, but it has been said that in
essence they have meant the same thing. Since “property,” in its strict legal sense does
not mean the physical object itself, but rather certain right over the physical object, it is
necessary to look beyond the physical object for the true definition of the word, and thus
in terms of right, interest, dominion, or domination, “property” is defined as meaning the
exclusive right to possess, enjoy, and dispose of a thing in such manner as is not
inconsistent with the law of the land; that dominion or indefinite right of use, enjoyment,
and disposition which one may lawfully exercise over particular things, objects, or
subjects, animate or inanimate, and generally to the exclusion of all others, and without
control or diminution save only by the laws of the land; the right and interest or
domination which is rightfully and lawfully obtained over the physical or material object,
with the unrestricted right to its use, enjoyment, and disposition, either limited or
unlimited in duration; the right and interest which a man has in lands and chattels to the
exclusion of others; certain rights in things which pertain to persons, and which are
created and sanctioned by law.

“Property” is also defined as that sole and despotic dominion which one man
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right
of any other individual in the universe. It has been said that, while this definition, in the
light of present-day situations, would necessarily have to be rather liberally construed, it
nevertheless states the essential characteristics of property. The word “property” is
further defined as meaning the right which a person has in relation to something, as
distinguished from the thing itself, the unrestricted and exclusive right to a thing; a right
over a determinate thing; the right of property in, and dominion over, the specific thing;
rightful dominion over external objects; the aggregate of the owner’s rights to control and
dispose of the physical thing; an aggregate of rights which are guaranteed and protected
by the government.

It has been said that there is no definition of the word “property” which can be
reconciled with the idea that it is not something of value, and, expressing the value
concept, “property” is defined as meaning any valuable right or interest considered
primarily as a source or element of wealth, any valuable interest in or to any object of
value which a person may lawfully acquire or hold; everything of value which a person
owns that is or may be the subject of sale or exchange or which, when offered for sale,
will bring some price; all things which have a pecuniary value; any civil right of
pecuniary nature.

The word “property” means ownership and it also means the right of ownership.
In one sense “property” signifies the sum of all the rights and powers which are incident
to ownership, and it means every right which accompanies ownership and is its incident,
which all rights which pertain to the ownership of property are property. In the narrower
sense “property” implies exclusive ownership of things, as where a man owns a piece of
land or a horse, and the thing of which there may be ownership is called “property”, as is
whatever is exclusively one’s own. The term is further defined as meaning that to which
a person has a legal title, whether or not in his possession; but property in a thing does
not consist merely in its ownership and possession. “Property” is sometimes defined as
meaning estate, whether in lands, goods, money or intangible rights; and in the
Blackstonian sense “property” means those things which one has the right to hold,
possess, and enjoy to the exclusion of any other individual in the universe.

Comparisons and distinctions. “Property” is sometimes regarded as synonymous

with “land,” although it has been said that “property” has a much broader meaning than
does “land”. “Property” has been held to be synonymous with “money,” and the terms
have also been distinguished. “Property” is not necessarily synonymous with “capital,”
and both in common usage and in the law is employed in contradistinction to “income”
and is considered to have a much broader meaning than “real property”

c. Phrases
The word “property’ is employed in such phrases as “general property,” “perishable property,”
“right of property,” and “special property.”
 “General property” is a term sometimes used to refer not to the property itself, but
the interest which a person may have in it. It has been said that it is an established rule
that the right of general property in chattels draws after it the right of possession.
Perishable property. A relative term, which is defined as meaning goods which
decay and lose their value, if not speedily put to their intended use; property which from
its nature decays in a brief time notwithstanding the care it may receive. The term
“perishable property” means personal property as distinguished from real property, and
all perishable property is personal property, although all personal property is not
perishable property. Ordinarily property is regarded as only if perishable by its own
nature or character, and it is not so regarded if it is subject to loss in some other manner,
as by trespass larceny, or fire. Sheep and growing lettuce crop are examples of what is
commonly regarded as perishable property, and, under peculiar circumstances, the term
has been applied to a leasehold. For other matter which have been held to be or not to be
perishable property see 48 CJ p 814 notes 70-83.

Right of property. The right of property is sometimes considered to be a right

cum onere, although it is referred to as a perfect and exclusive right. It is a legal right
and not a natural right, and it must be measured by reference to the rights of others and of
the public. It is that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises
over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other
individual in the universe, and it consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all
his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land; the
right to acquire, possess, and enjoy in any way consistent with the equal rights of others
and the just exactions and demands of the state. There is a recognized distinction
between a power and a right of property.

Special property. In a strict sense, it is property said to consist in the lawful custody of
the goods with the right of detention against the genuine or absolute owner; property
where he who has the possession holds it subject to the claims of other persons; some
fixed interest or right in a thing, distinct from, and subordinate to, the absolute property
or interest in the general owner. In other words, it may be said to be a qualified or
limited right, such as that of a bailee or lienor.

Other phrases employing the word “property are set out in the note, and for
additional phases as to which more recent adjudications have not been found see 50 CJ p
733 note 83, p 735 note 85

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[1] D.C. - D & C Co., v. Everett Fruit Products Co., 20 F.2d 279, 57 App. D.C. 263.
[2] Cal. -- Hunt v. Authier, 169 P.2d 913, 917, 28 Cal.2d 288, 171 A.L.R. 1379--Ponsonby v. Sacramento Suburban
Fruit Lands Co., 291 P. 167, 168, 210, Cal. 329 -- Canfield v. Security First Nat. Bank of Las Angeles, 48 P.2d 133,
136, 8 Cal. App.2d 277.
Ky. Corpus Suris quoted in Button v. Drake, 195 S.W.2d 66, 69, 362, Ky. 517, 167, A.L.R. 1046 -- Commonwealth
v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 136, S.W. 1032, 1036, 143 Ky. 314.
Ohio -- Squire v. Guardian Trust Co., Com Pl., 84 N.E.2d 99, 104.
S.C -- CJS quoted in Gibbes v. National Hospital Service, 24, S.E.2d 513, 515, 202 S.C. 304, - State v. Broad River
Power Co.,, 181 S.E.
50 CJ. p 729 note 5.
[3] U.S. -- Tri-Lakes S.S. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C. C.A. 6, 146 F.2d 970, 972
Very wide term
U.S. -- Wilson v. Ward Lumber Co., C.C. Mo., 67 F. 674, 677.
[4] KY -- CJ in Button v. Drake, 195 S.W.2d 66, 69, 302 Ky. 517, 167 A.L.R. 1046-- Commonwealth v. Kentucky
Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 136 S.W. 1032, 1036, 143 Ky. 314.
S.C. -- CJ in Gibbes v. National Hospital Service, 24 S.E.2d 513, 515, 202, S.C. 304.
50 CJ p. 729 note 5
[5] Ky. -- CJ in Button v. Drake, 195 S.W.2d 66, 69, 302 Ky. 517, 167 A.L.R. 1046--
S.C. -- CJ in Gibbes v. National Hospital Service, 24 S.E.2d 513, 515, 202, S.C. 304.
50 CJ p. 729 note 6
Large meaning
Ky. Commonwealth v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 136 S.W. 1032, 1036, 143 Ky. 314.
[6] U.S -- Globe Indemnity Co. v. Bruce, C.C.A.Okl., 81 F.2d 143, 150
In re Brown, D.C.Iowa, 21 F.Supp. 935, 937 - Hendler v. U.S., D.C.Md., 17 F.Supp. 558, 562.
Ky.- CJ in Button v. Drake, 195 S.W.2d 66, 69, 302 Ky. 517, 167 A.L.R. 1046--
N.C.-- C.T.H. Corporation v. Maxwell, 195 S.E. 36, 42, 212 N.C. 803 - Vann v. Edwards, 47 S.E. 784,786,135 N.C.
L.R.A. 451
Or. -- State v. Broom, 297 P. 340, 342, 135 Or. 641
S.C. -- CJ in Gibbes v. National Hospital Service, 24 S.E.2d 513, 515, 202, S.C. 304.
Wash. -- Washington Fruit & Produce Co. v. City of Yakima, 100 P. 2d 8, 13, 3 Wash 2d 152, 128 A.L.R. 159 York v.
Stone, 34 P.2d 911, 913, 178 Wash. 280
50 C.J. p 729 note 9
[7] U.S. Texas Co. v. Hauptman, C. C.A. Cal., 91 F2d 449, 451.
Fla. -- Tatum Bros. Real Estate & Investment Co. v. Watson, 109 So 623, 626, 92 Fla. 278
Ky. -- Button v. Drake, 195 S.W.2d 66, 69, 302 Ky. 517, 167 A.L.R. 1046
Ohio -- Squire v. Guardian Trust Co., Com. Pl., 84 N.E.2d 99, 104.
S.C. -- CJ in Gibbes v. National Hospital Service, 24 S.E.2d 513, 515, 202, S.C. 304.
50 C.J. p. 729 note 10
[8] Button v. Drake, 195 S.W.2d 66, 69, 302 Ky. 517, 167 A.L.R. 1046
S.C. CJ in Gibbes v. National Hospital Service, 24 S.E.2d 513, 515, 202, S.C. 304.
50 C.J. p. 729 note 10
[9] U.S. – Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Arenz, Or., 54 S.Ct 16, 17, 200 US 66, 78 L.Ed. 176 – Citizens State
Bank of Barstow Tex. V. Vidal, C.C.A.N.M., 114 F.2d 380, 382 – Texas Co. v. Hauptman, C.C.A.Cal., 91 F.2d 449,
451 – Investment & Securities Co., v. Robbins, D.C.Wash., 49 F.Supp 620, 623 – In re Brown, D.C.Iowa, 21 F.Supp.
935, 937.
Ky.- CJ in Button v. Drake, 195 S.W.2d 66, 69, 302 Ky. 517, 167 A.L.R. 1046.
S.C. CJ in Gibbes v. National Hospital Service, 24 S.E.2d 513, 515, 202, S.C. 304.
Wash. – Great Northern Ry, Co. v. Washington Electric Co., 86, P.2d 208, 217, 197, Wash. 627.
50 C.J. p 729 note 7
[10]. U.S. – Globe Indemnity Co. v. Bruce, C.C.A.Okl., 81 F.2d 143, 150.
Mass – Titus v. Terkeisen, 19 N.E.2d 444, 445, 302 Mass 84.
Tex. – Womack v. Womack, 172 S.W. 2d 307, 308, 141 Tex. 299
[11] Ky.- CJ in Button v. Drake, 195 S.W.2d 66, 69, 302 Ky. 517, 167 A.L.R. 1046.
S.C. CJ in Gibbes v. National Hospital Service, 24 S.E.2d 513, 515, 202, S.C. 304.
50 C.J. p 729 note 8.
[12] Ky.- CJ in Button v. Drake, 195 S.W.2d 66, 69, 302 Ky. 517, 167 A.L.R. 1046.
S.C. CJ in Gibbes v. National Hospital Service, 24 S.E.2d 513, 515, 202, S.C. 304.
50 C.J. p 729 note 12
“Whatever the lay view may be, it is universally known as a matter of law that ‘property’ is in all probability
our most comprehensive modern legal term”. Senior v. Braden, 193 N.E. 614, 618, 128 Ohio St. 597.
[13] Iowa. – State v. Cowen, 3 N.W. 2d 176, 180 231 Iowa 1117 – Greenendyke v. Fowler, 215 N.W. 718, 719, 204,
Iowa 598.
Ky.- CJ in Button v. Drake, 195 S.W.2d 66, 69, 302 Ky. 517, 167 A.L.R. 1046.
[14] Miss – Thompson v. Kreutzer, 72 So. 891, 112 Miss. 165.
50 C.J. p 729 note 5[a].
[15] U.S. – Hoyd v. Citizens Bank of Albany Co., C.C.A.Ohio. 89 F.2d 105, 107 – Globe Indemnity Co. v. Bruce,
C.C.A.Okl., 81 F.2d 148, 150 – Lucas v. Schneider, C.C.A.Ky 47 F.2d 1006, 1008 – In re Brown, D.C.Iowa, 21
F.Supp. 935, 937.
Cal. – Ponsonby v. Sacramento Suburban Fruit Lands Co., 291 P. 167, 168, 210 Cal. 229.
Iowa. – State v. Cowen, 3 N.W. 2d 176, 180 231 Iowa 1117 – State v. Evans, 295 N.W. 433, 435, 229 Iowa 932.
Ky.- CJ in Button v. Drake, 195 S.W.2d 66, 69, 302 Ky. 517, 167 A.L.R. 1046.
Mo. – State ex rel. Reid v. Barrett, 118 S.W.2d 33, 37, 234 Mo.App 684
S.C. CJ in Gibbes v. National Hospital Service, 24 S.E.2d 513, 515, 202, S.C. 304.
50 C.J. p 739 note 13.
Literally taken
“The word ‘property,’ literally taken, is nomen generalissimum, but it is not always so used.” – Wells Fargo
& Co. v. Jersey City, D.C.N.J., 207 F. 871, 876.
[16] Ariz. – In re Forestrom, 38 P.2d 878, 882, 44 Ariz. 472.
[17] N.Y. – People v. La Fetra, 185 N.Y.S. 632, 635, 113 Misc. 527.
50 C.J. p 739 note 5.
[18] U.S. – In re Blalock, D.C.Ga., 81 F.2d 612, 615.
50 C.J. p 736 note 86
[19] Mass. – Stony Brook R. Corp. v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 157 N.E. 607, 609, 260 Mass. 370, 53 A.L.R. 700.
50 C.J. p 736 note 87
[20] U.S. Glenson v. Thaw, N.Y., 35 S.Ct. 287, 288, 236 U.S. 558, 59 L. Ed. 717.
50 C.J. p 736 note 88
[21] Ky. – Button v. Hikes, 176 S.W.2d 112, 115, 296 Ky 168.
[22] Cal. – Hunt v. Authier, 169 P.2d 913, 917, 28 Cal.2d 288, 171 A.L.R. 1379 – Ponsonby v. Sacramento Suburban
Fruit Lands Co., 291 P. 167, 168, 210 Cal. 229 – Fields v. Michael, 205 P.2d 402, 407, 91 Cal. App.2d 443 – Bogan v.
Wiley, 202 P.2d 824, 827, 90 Cal.App.2d 288 – Franklin v. Franklin, 155 P.2d 637, 641, 67 Cal.App.2d 717.
[23] Cal. – Fields v. Michael, 205 P.2d 402, 407, 91 Cal.App.2d 443 -- Bogan v. Wiley, 202 P.2d 824, 827, 90
Cal.App.2d 288 – Franklin v. Franklin, 155 P.2d 637, 641, 67 Cal.App.2d 717.
The construction of the word ‘property’ depends on the context with which it is used. – Downing v.
Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, 198 P.2d 923, 926, 88 Cal.App.2d 345.
[24] U.S.— Hoyd v. Citizens Bank of Albany Co., C.C.A.Ohio. 89 F.2d 105, 107 – In re Brown, C.C.Iowa, 21 F.Supp
935, 937.
Cal. – Yuba River Power Co. v. Nevada Irr. Dist., 279 P. 128, 129, 207 Cal. 521 – People v. Eddy, 43 Cal. 231, 336, 13
Am.R. 143
[25] Cal. -- Yuba River Power Co. v. Nevada Irr. Dist., 279 P. 128, 129, 207 Cal. 521 – People v. Eddy, 43 Cal. 231,
336, 13 Am.R. 143 – People v. Eddy, 43 Cal. 231, 336, 13 Am.R. 143
[26] Glenson v. Thaw, N.Y., 35 S.Ct. 287, 288, 236 U.S. 558, 59 L. Ed. 717.
[27] Glenson v. Thaw, N.Y., 35 S.Ct. 287, 288, 236 U.S. 558, 59 L. Ed. 717 -- Glenson v. Thaw, Pa., 185 F. 345, 347,
107 C.C.A. 463, 34 L.R.A., N.S., 894.
[28] Cal. -- Boston v. Wiley, 202 P.2d 824, 827, 90 Cal.App.2d 288.
50 C.J. p 736 note 91
[29] ILL. – Clark v. Leavitt, 161 N.E. 751, 754, 330 Ill. 350
50 C.J. p 736 note 91
[30] Mo. – Carter v. Bolster, 98 S.W. 105, 106, 122 Mo.App. 135.
[31] ILL. – Clark v. Leavitt, 161 N.E. 751, 754, 330 ILL. 350
[32] U.S. -- Fargo & Co. v. Jersey City, D.C.N.J., 207 F. 871, 876.
[33] U.S. -- Fargo & Co. v. Jersey City, supra.
[34] La. – State v. Frusha, 91 So. 430, 431, 150 La. 995, 24 L.R.A. 394.
[35] Cal. -- Bogan v. Wiley, 202 P.2d 824, 827, 90 Cal.App.2d 288.
50 C.J. p 736 note 91.
[36] U.S. -- In re Blalock, D.C.Ga., 81 F.2d 612, 615. Miss. – Hickman v. Ruff, 55 Miss. 549, 551.
[37] U.S. – Hoyd v. Citizens Bank of Albany Co., C.C.A.Ohio. 89 F.2d 105, 107 – Globe Indemnity Co. v. Bruce,
C.C.A.Okl., 81 F.2d 148, 150 – Lucas v. Schneider, C.C.A.Ky 47 F.2d 1006, 1008 – In re Brown, D.C.Iowa, 21
F.Supp. 935, 937.
Ky. -- Button v. Drake, 195 S.W.2d 66, 69, 362, Ky. 517, 167, A.L.R. 1046 -- Commonwealth v. Kentucky Distilleries
& Warehouse Co., 136, S.W. 1032, 1036, 143 Ky. 314.
M.o. – State ex rel. Reid v. Barrett 118 S.W.2d 33, 27, 234 Mo.App. 684.
N.J. – Application for awarding of Process of Subpoena Prusuant to R.S. 54:4-16, 34 A.2d 239, 242, 21 N.J.Misc. 387.
Ohio – Senior v. Braden, 193 N.E. 614, 618, 128 Ohio St. 597.
50 C.J. p 738 note 40
[38] Mo. – Howerton v. Iowa State Ins. Co., 80 S.W. 27, 29, 105, Mo.App 575.
50 C.J. p 742 note 8.
[39] Cal. – Canfield v. Security First Nat. Bank of Los Angeles, 48 P.2d 133, 136, 8 Cal.App2d 277.
50 C.J. p 742 note 9
[40] U.S. – McCaleb v. Fox Film Corp., C.C.A.La., 299 F. 48, 51.
50 C.J. p 742 note 10
[41] Wash. – State v. Klinkenberg 136 P. 692, 694, 76 Wash. 465, 49 L.R.A.N.S., 965, Ann.Cas.1915D468.
50 C.J. p 742 note 11.
[42] Mo. -- Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co., v. Wollbrinck, 205 S.W. 196, 198, 275, Mo. 339 – State ex rel. Reid v. Barrett,
118 S.W.2d 33, 37, 234, Mo.App. 684
[43] U.S. – Texas Co. v. Hauptman, C.C.A.Cal., 91 F.2d 449, 451.
50 C.J. p 742 note 15.
[44] U.S. – American Exech. Nat. Bank v. Palmer, D.C.N.Y., 256 F. 680, 683.
50 C.J. p 742 note 16
[45] ILL. – Chicago v. Hulbert, 8 N.E. 812, 815, 118 ILL 632, 49 Am.R. 400.
[46] U.S. – American Exech. Nat. Bank v. Palmer, D.C.N.Y., 256 F. 680, 683.
[47] Idaho. – Diefendorf v. Gallet, 10 P.2d 307, 310, 51 Idaho 619.
50 C.J. p 732 note 70
“When used subjectively, “property” means that to which the exclusive right of possessing, enjoying, and
disposing of a thing exists, or that which is one’s own. Vann v. Edwards, 47 S.E. 784, 786, 135 N.C. 661, 67 L.R.A.
461.
[48] Ohio – Callen v. Columbus Edison Electric Light Co., 64 N.E. 141, 143, 66 Ohio St. 166, 58 L.R.A. 782 – Squire
v Guardian Trust Co., ComPl., 84 N.E.2d 99, 104.
Loose and vulgar acceptance
Sometimes the word “property” is taken “in the loose and vulgar acceptances to denote not the right of
property or dominium, but the subject of such a right; as where a horse or piece of land is called my property.” –
Liddick v. City of Council Bluffs, 5 N.W.2d 361, 372, 232 Iowa 197.
“Property loosely used as a substitute for articles, land, etc., -- State v. Cowen, 3 N.W.2d 176, 180, 231
Iowa 1117.
[49] U.S. Texas Co. v. Hauptman, C. C.A. Cal., 91 F2d 449, 451.
Ky. Corpus Suris quoted in Button v. Drake, 195 S.W.2d 66, 69, 362, Ky. 517, 167, A.L.R. 1046 -- Commonwealth
v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 136, S.W. 1032, 1036, 143 Ky. 314.
S.C -- CJS quoted in Gibbes v. National Hospital Service, 24, S.E.2d 513, 515, 202 S.C. 304.
50 C.J. p 732 note 80
[50] U.S. Texas Co. v. Hauptman, C. C.A. Cal., 91 F2d 449, 451.
Ky. Corpus Suris quoted in Button v. Drake, 195 S.W.2d 66, 69, 362, Ky. 517, 167, A.L.R. 1046 -- Commonwealth
v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 136, S.W. 1032, 1036, 143 Ky. 314.
N.H. – Newmarket Mfg. Co. v. Town of Tottingham, 168 A. 892, 894, 86 N.H. 321
S.C. -- CJS quoted in Gibbes v. National Hospital Service, 24, S.E.2d 513, 515, 202 S.C. 304.
50 C.J. p 732 note 80
In the ordinary sense, “property is used to indicate the thing itself rather than the rights attached to it. –
Fulton Light, etc., Co. v. State, 121 N.Y.S. 536, 65 Misc. 263.
As ordinarily used, it means the thing possessed.” Wells Fargo & Co. v. Jersey City, D.C.N.J., 207 F. 871,
876.
Corpus of estate or investment
Idaho. – Diefendorf v. Gallet, 10 P.2d 307, 310, 51 Idaho 619.
[51] Fla. -- Tatum Bros. Real Estate & Investment Co. v. Watson, 109 So 623, 626, 92 Fla. 278.
ILL. – Shedd v. Patterson, 144 N.E. 5, 6, 312 ILL 371.
[52] U.S. – Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Arenz, Or., 54 S.Ct 16, 17, 200 US 66, 78 L.Ed. 176 – Citizens State
Bank of Barstow Tex. V. Vidal, C.C.A.N.M., 114 F.2d 380, 382 – Texas Co. v. Hauptman, C.C.A.Cal., 91 F.2d 449,
451 – Investment & Securities Co., v. Robbins, D.C.Wash., 49 F.Supp 620, 623.
Fla. -- Tatum Bros. Real Estate & Investment Co. v. Watson, 109 So 623, 626, 92 Fla. 278.
ILL. – Shedd v. Patterson, 144 N.E. 5, 6, 312 ILL 371.
Md. – Mouse v. Hutzler, 26 A.2d 767, 769, 180 Md. 682, 141 A.L.R. 843.
§ 2. Subject of Property
The subject of