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04 - Metaphysics (Highlighted)
04 - Metaphysics (Highlighted)
UNIT 4. METAPHYSICS:
THE NATURE OF REALITY
INDEX
3. THEORIES ABOUT THE REALITY OR UNREALITY OF THE WORLD: REALISM AND ANTI-REALISM.
3.1. Realism.
3.2. Anti-realism.
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Unit 4. Metaphysics: The nature of reality
1.2. Reality.
An intuitive definition of reality will lead us to say that it is constituted by the set of
everything that exists or is. This statement, on the other hand, is still problematic, since: do unicorns
exist? And the idea of beauty? Although they cannot be seen with the naked eye, do atoms exist in
the same way that trees or horses exist? And freedom or the mind, do they exist?
Answering these questions is not easy, because, although it seems clear that the unicorn and
the horse do not exist in the same way, we cannot deny that both have some kind of existence. We
can outline, in a general way, two basic conceptions of reality:
- 1) In a strict sense , reality is everything that surrounds us and what we can have experience
of, which can be:
a) direct experience through senses (trees, animals, rocks) or instruments such as
microscopes or telescopes (viruses, planets),
b) indirect experience because we can verify the consequences of its existence
(atoms, gravitational force, Big- Bang ).
This conception of reality coincides with the scientific conception of physical reality.
- 2) In a broad sense, it is considered that not only physical or observable beings of science
exist, but also subjective realities that we know intimately (feelings, ideas, beliefs...), cultural
products (literary or mythological characters...), immaterial or spiritual realities (the mind, God,
freedom...). Even the own essence of things is considered real: that is, that which we cannot observe
but that makes things what they are.
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Unit 4. Metaphysics: The nature of reality
Regarding this distinction, there are various philosophical positions depending on the
assessment made about the relationship between appearances and reality:
-a) Appearances deceive and hide reality. According to this conception, our senses can and
often do deceive us, hiding the true reality from us. For example, when introducing a pen into a
medium denser than air, it does not break, but only appears to break. In this case, it is easy to
discover the deception, since we only have to take the pen out of the water. In other cases, it may
not be so easy.
-b) Appearances are not deceiving and are the only way to access reality. According to this
conception, appearances do not hide reality, but are the only way we have of representing it to
ourselves and, therefore, of accessing it. Without a doubt, the pen is not broken, but the senses
make us see it that way. However, this only shows that reality and how it appears to us do not fully
coincide, but that is not why we should consider appearances a deception. The perception of the
broken pen is not a gratuitous illusion, but responds to the optical laws of refraction. Knowing and
analyzing appearances allows us to better understand reality.
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Unit 4. Metaphysics: The nature of reality
The branch of metaphysics that deals with the study of the ultimate nature of Being is known
as “ontology ” (from the Greek ontos , Being, and logos , study). In this unit, due to its impact on the
history of thought in general, we are going to focus on spiritualist and materialist metaphysics. These
are great metaphysical theories, and specifically ontological ones, since they offer different answers
about the ultimate nature of Being (or reality in a broad sense):
-a) Metaphysical idealists or spiritualists consider that the material principles are insufficient
to explain reality. They defend the existence of ideal or spiritual principles (ideas, souls, God) that
structure or shape material reality.
-b) Materialistic or naturalistic metaphysics their study of reality on the material, since they
consider that for explaining reality it is not necessary to resort to spiritual principles. Most
materialists deny the existence of spiritual realities: essences, souls, God...
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Unit 4. Metaphysics: The nature of reality
never remains the same and is therefore unpredictable, the human being feels confused and
unprotected, which makes them feel anguish and anxiety. If the landscape changes, if my clothes, my
house decay and are destroyed..., if animals get sick, if I myself grow old and die, what security can I
have? Only the one provided by the existence of an ideal world. Plato defends a dualistic idealism,
because for him reality is divided into two Worlds:
-a) The World of Ideas, which is made up of eternal ideas (neither are born nor die),
immutable (do not change) and perfect, such as the idea of Human Being, Justice or Goodness. These
ideas, which are the true reality, are imperceptible by the senses, since only reason can capture
them.
-b) The Sensible World, the material world that surrounds us, is imperfect, changing,
temporary and mortal. It is only a shadow, a pale reflection of the ideal world, just as the actions and
people that we consider just are only so because they participate in the perfect idea of Justice.
In the 20th century, the psychoanalyst Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961) was a follower of Plato's
idealism. He called “archetypes” the Platonic ideas that each of us has in the unconscious. According
to Jung, if we bring these archetypes out to our consciousness, we will be able to fully realize
ourselves as people and overcome our vital and emotional problems.
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Unit 4. Metaphysics: The nature of reality
evolve towards collective consciousness. All this evolutionary and dialectical process has a final
purpose or objective: to achieve full Cosmic Self-awareness.
In the 20th century, the quantum physicist and Nobel Prize winner Werner Heisenberg
(1901-1976) was a follower of Hegelian absolute idealism. For Heisenberg , everything that exists is
Spirit, and quantum physics shows that atoms and subatomic particles are spiritual realities.
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Unit 4. Metaphysics: The nature of reality
materialisms claim that physical mater is not the only real substance and that there are other types
of realities (although they have their origin in physical matter).
- A) Monistic materialism (or physicalist materialism).
Democritus (c. 460-370 BC) is an early proponent of monistic or physicalistic materialism. For
Democritus, and for modern atomic theory, reality is reduced to atoms and emptiness. Atoms are
tiny particles, so small that they are imperceptible to the naked eye, but they make up everything
real. They have the following characteristics: they are indivisible, homogeneous and unchanging.
Everything that exists, all the beings that we can perceive (trees, houses, people...) are groups of
atoms. The changes we observe in nature are the result of the reorganization of these groups. These
changes, made possible by the existence of a vacuum (space between atoms), are random, since
atoms move freely and spontaneously.
In the contemporary era, monistic or physicalist materialism has been advocated by top-
notch scientists, such as the physicist Stephen Hawking (1942-2018). It is a physicalist materialism
because it claims that physical matter is the only thing that exists, and it is reductionist because it
defends that all sciences can be reduced to Physics. For this reason, atomism is a monism: it states
that there is only one single substance, and it is physical matter.
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Unit 4. Metaphysics: The nature of reality
Today the dialectical materialism of Marx, combined with the psychoanalysis of Freud, is
supported by philosophers such as Slavoj Žižek (1949 -) and the feminist Catherine Malabou (1959-).
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Unit 4. Metaphysics: The nature of reality
3. PHENOMENALISM.
Both spiritualism and materialism present a series of unsolvable problems. This is why another
metaphysical theory known as “phenomenalism” asserts that metaphysics is impossible (asserting
that metaphysics is impossible is also a metaphysical position, just as rejecting philosophy is a
philosophical position!). Phenomenalism denies that we can know what the ultimate nature of reality
is: we cannot know if it is spiritual or material.
Phenomenism is a position supported, among others, by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), who
poses an alternative to both idealism and materialism. Phenomenalism does not deny the existence
of the real world, but states that it is impossible for us to know things in themselves (which Kant calls
“noumena”). The only thing we know are the “phenomena” or phenomenons, that is, things as they
appear to us or as we perceive them with our senses. We can only know the world as we perceive it,
and in no way can we know it as it really is. For example, real space might not be three-dimensional –
which is how it “appears to us”—, nor could time be irreversible.
Kant said that the condition of human beings is like that of shipwrecked people who live on a
small island in the middle of the ocean. That island is surrounded by mist on all sides, and
furthermore the castaways can't get through this mist at all, so all they know is the island they live
on. This island and the small piece of sea that lies beyond the fog are the “phenomenal world”, the
world of “phenomena” or of things as they appear to us or as we perceive them. The unknown ocean
beyond the mist is the "noumenal world", the world of "noumena" or things in themselves, which
we do not know and will never know. Therefore, we cannot know whether the things themselves are
material, spiritual, or whatever. So metaphysics is impossible, since metaphysics tries to know
precisely the noumenal world, which is unknowable.
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Unit 4. Metaphysics: The nature of reality
PLURALISTIC -Matter
(CARTESIAN) -Mind God
-God
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Unit 4. Metaphysics: The nature of reality
3. THEORIES ABOUT THE REALITY OR UNREALITY OF THE WORLD: REALISM AND ANTI-REALISM.
3.1. Realism.
Realism holds that the world is an external reality independent of us, which we can access
through senses, know and categorize rationally. Therefore, reality has primacy over the subject who
knows it and it can be known as it is. Materialist realism (Aristotle) defines "truth" as the adequacy or
correspondence between knowledge and reality, and holds that universal concepts or ideas are
found within things themselves, as their "essence" (the universal concept of "horse" is found within
each of the concrete horses). Idealistic realism (Plato), defends that universal concepts or ideas exist
separately from things and, therefore, their existence is independent of the same things and the
subject that knows them (the concept of "horse" exists in the World of the Ideas, separated from the
concrete horses).
3.2. Antirealism.
Antirealism is a philosophical position opposed to realism. Reality is not accessible in itself,
since it is mediated by the subject who knows it. The external world or reality, therefore, is a mental
representation. The existence of reality is not independent of the subject who knows it, so it cannot
be known as it is. This is the position of Kant 's phenomenalism.
The branch of metaphysics which studies the nature and existence of God is known as
"theology" (from the Greek theos, god, and logos, study). There are five metaphysical views on the
nature and existence of God: theism, pantheism, deism, agnosticism, and atheism.
4.1. Theism.
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Unit 4. Metaphysics: The nature of reality
Theists believe in a God creator of the universe, who can also intervene in the events that
happen in it. He is a personal God with qualities such as goodness, intelligence, and power: in fact,
He is omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect. As a personal being, He can reveal himself to
human beings, who can thus access it. Let us see the main arguments in favor of the existence of God
proposed by theistic philosophers. Almost all of them are idealists or spiritualists.
4.2. Pantheism.
Pantheists believe in a God who is identified with the unity of everything that exists, that is,
with Nature or the Universe. God and Nature are the same, and each of us is part of God. Contrary to
theism, which views God as personal and transcendent (ie, superior and external) to the world,
pantheism conceives of God as non-personal and immanent (ie, intrinsic and internal) to the world .
Some Eastern religions, such as the Taoism of Lao-tzu, are pantheistic. In the West, the most
important pantheistic philosophers are Spinoza and Hegel. Most pantheists are idealists or
spiritualists, except for Spinoza, who can be considered a materialist.
4.3. Deism.
Deists believe in a God who is the cause and foundation of the world, but who never
intervenes or has intervened in it. He is not a revealed God (he has no Holy Books, no priests, no
organized religions of any kind), unlike theism. Human beings can access God exclusively throug
reason, never through faith or prayer: that is why He is known as the "God of philosophers", very
different from the God of monotheistic religions. Unlike pantheism, deism does not consider God to
be the same as Nature, but thinks of Him as a Being transcendent to the world, that is, a Being
superior to the world and external to it. The main deistic philosophers are Aristotle and the
Enlightenment philosophers of the 18th century: Voltaire, Rousseau, Hume and Kant.
4.4. Agnosticism.
Agnostics believe that since the existence of God cannot be proved or disproved, we cannot
know whether God exists or not. This does not mean that we should suspend all judgment on the
matter. Some agnostics are materialists, but most are phenomenalists along the lines of Kant,
believing that we cannot know how things really are, or whether the ultimate nature of reality is
material or spiritual. In this sense, agnosticism is a type of skepticism, which holds that we can know
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Unit 4. Metaphysics: The nature of reality
nothing or almost nothing in matters of metaphysics. Kant was an agnostic in theory (holding that it
was impossible to prove or disprove the existence of God), and a deist in practice (he believed in a
rational and non-personal God, although he recognized that he could not prove his existence). Other
important agnostic thinkers were the great evolutionary biologist Charles Darwin (1809-1882) and
the British philosopher and Nobel laureate Bertrand Russell (1872-1970).
4 .5. Atheism.
Atheists (such as the current representatives of the so-called “New Atheism”: Richard
Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris, Christopher Hitchens and Steven Pinker) defend the non-
existence of God, either categorically or with a high degree of probability. By rejecting the existence
of God, they not only reject the personal God of theism, but also the natural God of pantheism and
the rational God of deism. Most atheists are materialists.
Atheists do not consider the ontological argument as a valid one. They point out that this
argument is cheating, since existence cannot be considered a property or quality, but rather as a
predicate (if we say "Peter, a tall, thin man, exists", we are not saying that Peter, in addition to the
properties of human being, male, tall and thin, has the property of existing; "exist" is not a property,
but a predicate). Second, the ontological argument is invalid because it starts from an unproven
assumption: that existing is better than not existing, and that an existing being is superior to a
nonexistent being.
As for the cosmological argument, atheists do not accept that there has to be a First Cause of
everything that exists. What applies to a concrete and individual being –having been caused by
another being– does not have to apply to the Universe as a whole. And even accepting that there has
been a First Cause of everything that exists, why should we suppose that it is God? The First Cause
could have been some kind of matter without any consciousness or purpose.
The Greek materialist philosopher Epicurus (341 BC - 270 BC) famously argued for atheism. He
proposed the "argument for incompatibility between the existence of God and evil". In our world
there are innumerable evils and suffering of all kinds, including the appalling deaths of children and
innocent people. God is defined as a Being that is both omnipotent and infinitely good. So, Epicurus
says, why doesn't God, if He is omnipotent and good, eliminate forever all evil and suffering from the
world? If God wants to put an end to evil and He cannot, then He is good but not omnipotent; and if
he can erase evil but doesn't want to, then He is omnipotent but not good. What is impossible,
Epicurus says, is that God be omnipotent and good at the same time: in conclusion, God does not
exist.
What is your mind and what is its relationship to your body? The ancient Greeks struggled with
this mystery and were unable to solve it to everyone's satisfaction. The difficulty of the problem is
revealed by the fact that it is still with us, with many competing alternative solutions. There are
basically three positions: dualism, monism and emergentism.
5.1. Dualism.
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Unit 4. Metaphysics: The nature of reality
Dualism is a position that holds that the mind (or soul) and the body are two completely
different and independent substances, which may or may not be related to each other. In discussing
dualism, we will assume that the terms "soul" and "mind" can be used interchangeably, because they
both refer to the non-physical component within us that constitutes the real person.
For Plato, immaterial things cannot causally interact with material things. The mind and the
body are two separate entities, only temporarily united during a person's lifetime. The body is a
material thing, while the mind is an immaterial or spiritual thing, which survives the death of the
body to reincarnate in a different body. Platonic psychologist Carl Jung, while not believing in
reincarnation, accepts that there is a part of the mind that transcends the body and is completely
independent of it.
Descartes defends the most common version of dualism, called "interactionism".
Interactionism adds to the dualist thesis the claim that mind and body, although different, causally
interact with each other. Descartes identifies the real person with his soul, conceived as a non-
physical or spiritual entity.
Philosopher David Chalmers (1966-) has proposed a new
dualism, from a naturalist approach. For Chalmers, consciousness
cannot be identified with physical processes in the brain; this is so
because consciousness is a basic element of nature, although it cannot
be reduced to physical processes. Chalmers defends this position with a
thought experiment: we can imagine a world physically identical to our
own, but whose people lack consciousness. That world would contain
"philosophical zombies," who have brains and act exactly like us in our
world. But those philosophical zombies would not be aware. We can
clearly conceive or imagine a zombie world like this, Chalmers says. So a
zombie world physically identical to ours but without consciousness is
Zombie (non-philosophical) at least possible. But if consciousness is a physical feature of our world,
then a world that contains all the physical features of our world should
contain consciousness. However, it is possible for a zombie world to contain all the physical features
of our world –including humans with brains– without containing consciousness. So consciousness is
not a physical feature of our world or a function of the brain. In other words, consciousness must be
a non-physical property of our world.
5.2. Monism.
Monism, originating among others from Democritus, holds that mind and body are not two
different substances, but the same thing. There are idealistic monists (such as Hegel), for whom mind
and brain are the same spiritual reality. But most monists are materialists: they think that if we can
explain all "mental" phenomena in terms of brain events, then the notion of a non-material mind is
unnecessary. There are two main monistic theories: mind-brain identity theory and eliminativism.
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Unit 4. Metaphysics: The nature of reality
-B) Eliminativism.
Eliminativist theory, proposed by Paul (1942-) and Patricia Churchland (1943-), claims that our
mentalistic language is so imperfect and unscientific that it must be abandoned. Before the rise of
modern science, people believed in strange popular theories about the causes of events in the world.
For example, ancient Greeks explained the fall of a stone by saying that the stone wanted to return
to its mother, the earth. Likewise, fate was thought to be a real force in the world that caused
events. Beliefs in the wishes of stones or the activity of fate cannot be translated into the
terminology of modern physics, and so we have abandoned those beliefs. Likewise, as our brain
research progresses, we will abandon our traditional mentalistic language, just as we have
abandoned the popular mythology of Greeks. Eliminativism literally asserts that we have no beliefs
or desires, nor that there are actually activities such as believing or desiring going on within us. We
just have certain types of brain states and processes. And nothing more.
5.3. Emergentism.
Emergentism, whose precursor is Aristotle, is a metaphysical theory that tries to carry out a
synthesis between dualism and monism. The mind cannot exist independently of the brain, but it has
new properties that the brain does not have and that cannot be explained in terms of brain states
and processes. These new properties that the mind possesses are called “emergent” properties:
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Unit 4. Metaphysics: The nature of reality
because the mind arises or emerges from the brain, but once it arises it acquires a series of
properties (computation, multiple realizability, intentionality) that are not in the brain.
This is a very common phenomenon in nature: for example, water arises or emerges from the
union of an oxygen atom and two hydrogen atoms, and once it arises it has new properties that
neither oxygen nor hydrogen have separately (such as liquidity, the ability to quench thirst or put out
fires, etc.). There are two main emergentist theories: functionalism (or computationalism) and
biological naturalism.
- A) Functionalism or computationalism.
Functionalism, proposed by Hilary Putnam (1926-2016) and Daniel Dennett (1942-), argues
that we can explain the mind in terms of sensory inputs, behavioral outputs, and internal processes.
The inputs of the human mind are the stimuli that affect our nervous system through our senses; that
is, the inputs are what we see, hear, taste, smell, etc. The outputs of the human mind are the
external behaviors that result: running, walking, sitting, standing, etc. So, we can think of a mental
process as an inner connection that the brain makes between certain inputs and certain outputs; this
connection is a mental representation or “belief”. For example, suppose that when a man sees a dog
(input), he runs away (output). And suppose we explain this behavior by saying that he ran "he thinks
dogs bite people." So we can say that man's belief that dogs bite people is something in his brain that
connects his sensory input (seeing a dog) with his behavior (running away). In other words, we can
explain mental processes in terms of their function: connecting our sensory inputs with our
behavioral outputs. Since inputs are information, the mind is an information processing or
computation system that connects inputs and outputs through inner mental representations.
Likewise, functionalism affirms the thesis of the "multiple realizability" of the mind: this one, as
an information processing system that connects inputs and outputs, can not only be realized or
executed in a brain but also in a computer. Therefore, any computer has an artificial mind.
Functionalism defends the so-called “computational model of the mind”: the brain is like the
hardware or physical support of a computer; while the mind is like the software or set of programs
(such as Windows operating system) that direct the processing of inputs and outputs. Human
consciousness would be a byproduct of software, which is unconscious: for this reason we can say
that consciousness is basically an illusion and that human beings behave like robots. We are
computational automata similar to computers and robots, except that we are biological. This model
is the basis of modern cognitive neuroscience.
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Unit 4. Metaphysics: The nature of reality
- B) Biological naturalism.
Biological naturalism is defended by John Searle (1932-), who denies that mind is like a
computer. For Searle, a computer is not (and never will be) capable of thinking or having
consciousness. Searle posits the "Chinese room" thought experiment: a person in a room receives
questions in Chinese through a crack in the wall, looks up the answer in a Chinese manual on the
table, writes down the answer, and then returns it through the slit. That person does not understand
Chinese, but merely copies the signs that appear in the manual: therefore, the person passing the
questions to him from outside the room would be mistaken if he thought that he really understood
Chinese. Searle points out that computers act in the same way: they receive inputs from the outside
and, through a series of internal logical programs or instructions, they emit outputs in response; but
in no case can it be said that computers understand the inputs they are processing but rather, like
the person in the “Chinese room”, they limit themselves to automatically relating some signs to other
signs.
For Searle, only the brain of a living being is capable of having a mind and, consequently, of
having consciousness, expectations, desires, and emotions. Searle points out that the main
characteristic of mind is “intentionality”, something that computers will never be able to simulate.
Intentionality refers to the most important emergent property of the mind: that of always referring
or pointing to objects or things that are not the own mind. Any mental process, such as thinking,
remembering or imagining, always involves thinking, remembering or imagining something, be it an
external object or an imaginary object: consciousness does not exist by itself, but is always
necessarily consciousness of something other than itself (of an object, a fact, a mental image, etc.).
Intentionality implies that a mind can understand the meaning of things, whereas a computer
cannot. This property is what differentiates mind from all other things in the world.
Theory of Mind and brain are the Mental states are NO. We have
identity same, with different identical to those of the consciousness even if it's
MONISM names brain. a brain state.
Mind does not exist. You Mind is a myth. Only the YES. Mind and
Eliminativism have to abandon the brain exists. consciousness do not
mentalistic language. exist.
Mind and brain are -Mind is like a computer IN PART. Consciousness is
Functionalism or different, but mind does software. an illusion, and there are
computationalism not exist without a -It is characterized by only automatic
EMERGENTISM material support (brain, multiple realizability and computing processes.
computer, etc.). computation.
Mind and brain are -Mind is not a software. NO. Consciousness is not
Biological different, but the mind -It is characterized by an illusion, but a property
naturalism cannot exist without the intentionality and of complex brains.
brain. meaning.
Perhaps there is no more controversial question in metaphysics than this one: is human
freedom a reality? Or are human actions completely determined by who we are and what the laws of
nature make us do? There are three theories about it: determinism, libertarianism, and
compatibilism.
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Unit 4. Metaphysics: The nature of reality
6.1. Determinism.
Many philosophers and scientists, mostly materialists, think that our actions are not free.
Human actions are events like any other, they point out. And every event is caused or "determined"
by previous conditions and events and by the physical, biological and psychological laws that govern
reality. In this vision of reality there can be no freedom. A person's action is only free if the person
controls what they do and also has the ability to do something else. Freedom is the ability to choose
something different from what we choose. So our acts are not free if they are completely determined
by prior events and conditions, and by the scientific laws that determine what causes those events
and conditions. We are not free because we do not have the possibility to choose anything other
than what we choose.
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Unit 4. Metaphysics: The nature of reality
terrible crimes they commit. Our behaviors are totally determined by genetic, neurological,
psychological and social causes. Harris tells us that we are like puppets or marionettes, and that we
believe we are free only when we like the strings that drive us; or, what is the same, we believe we
are free only when things are going well for us.
6.2. Libertarianism.
No philosopher has argued as passionately for freedom as Jean-Paul
Sartre (1905-1980). Sartre completely rejects determinism and espouses a
theory that is sometimes known as libertarianism. A libertarian holds that
people have control over what they do and are free to make choices other
than the ones they make. Sartre claims that we are free to choose the
actions that make us who we are. Therefore, he also claims that we are
totally responsible for what we have become and what we will be. Sartre
says that we are radically and absolutely free. But how does Sartre respond
to determinism? How does he defend our freedom against a universe of
causes that act according to the laws of nature?
Sartre Sartre's argument is fascinating. It points out that when a person does
something, he intends to achieve something through his action. And this
means that, when a person acts, he has in mind a future situation that does not yet exist but which
he wants to reach. Suppose, for example, that I decide to change jobs. So I have to think about
moving from my current job situation to a future job situation that doesn't exist yet. We can do this,
Sartre asserts, because we are conscious beings. Our human consciousness has the ability to
mentally distance itself from our current situation and think of a different future that does not yet
exist. When we think that a different future is possible, we begin to see our current situation in a
new way. For example, when I realize that I could have a different job, I begin to see what my current
job lacks and the possibilities that a different future job offers. In addition, my conscience can turn
the possibilities of the future situation and the shortcomings of my current situation into reasons
that will move me to act. I do this by creating the intention to change my situation, that is, by making
a free choice within my consciousness. This ability of our consciousness to move away from its
current situation, to conceive of a different situation that does not yet exist, and to convert what is
lacking in the present and the possibilities of the future into a motive that leads me to act, is the
basis of our freedom.
6.3. Compatibilism.
Many philosophers, such as Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant, and
Daniel Dennett, advocate compatibilism, which accepts determinism and,
at the same time, freedom and moral responsibility. Compatibilism argues:
causal determinism is compatible with freedom. How is this possible?
Compatibilism saves freedom by redefining it. According to
compatibilists, to say that a person is free is to say that that person is not
hindered by restrictions or limitations. A person chained or in prison, for
example, is not free. But a person who is not prevented from doing what
his own desires or character tell him to do is free. Still, because a person's
desires and character are shaped by heredity and upbringing, they are
Hobbes causally determined by external factors. Ultimately, a person's actions are
determined by the prior causes that formed his desires and character. But
as long as the person is not impeded or forced to act by external forces, we can say that he acts
freely.
Compatibilists acknowledge moral responsibility. According to Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), to
say that a person is morally responsible for an action is to say that the action originated within that
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Unit 4. Metaphysics: The nature of reality
person. When a person's actions are caused by his inner desires and character, they originate from
that person and are therefore free actions. Then the person is morally responsible for his actions.
"Free" actions are determined because our wills and desires are caused by previous events or
conditions (genetic, biological, psychological...). Thus, all actions are ultimately caused by prior
events and conditions, acting in accordance with the laws of nature. But this does not prevent
actions from being free, because they continue to originate within us.
According to Daniel Dennett (1942-), human
beings and other animals are a kind of information-
processing biorobots. But that doesn't mean we don't
have any freedom at all. Even a device as simple as a
thermostat is capable of self-regulation (turning on or
off as temperature goes down or up), so a complex
biorobot like the human being is capable of exercising
some self-control. For Dennett, the freedom of human
beings is determined: it consists of a series of second-
order programs that control the first-order programs in
“A self-regulated robot is free”. charge of processing information. Second-order
programs allow planning, decision making and
correcting decisions if they are wrong. Our freedom is basically a form of self-regulation or self-
control, determined and limited but undoubtedly real.
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