CHAPTER- 6

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

No single thesis can do justice to the complexity of Indian federalism. The

people of India reflect a religious, linguistic, cultural, and social diversity
that is unparalleled even when compared with what is found in the various
other continents of the world. Devising a Constitution for India was like
537
creating a Constitution for many civilizations rolled into one. At the same
time, the disparity between the rich and the poor is so great that, unless
adequate interregional transfers and allocations are made through some
measure of centralized planning, the disparities will remain.538

Notwithstanding the fact that ours is a detailed Constitution, the

Constitution-framers left certain matters to be governed by conventions,
thereby giving to the holders of constitutional offices some degree of
discretion in respect of such matters. Conventions lubricate the room left at
the joints in the constitutional structure and protect them against
ossification. "Conventions", as John Stuart Mill put it, "are unwritten
maxims of the Constitution by which the conduct of political authorities is
in fact regulated....without which the Constitution would soon lose its
stability". The main purpose of the Constitutional conventions is to ensure
that the legal framework of the Constitution retains its flexibility to operate
in tune with the prevailing constitutional values of the period. Although
conventions are not legally enforceable and the sanction behind them is
moral and political, yet some conventions of the constitution which set
norms of behaviour of those in power or which regulate the working of the
various parts of the Constitution and their relations to one another, may be
as important, if not of greater significance, as the written word of the
Constitution itself. This is particularly true of the role of 'conventions' in a
rin
' Rajeev Dhavan, A Constitution for a Civilization, M.N. Kapur Memorial Lecture, New
Delhi, 2000 (mimeo).
Supra note 203.

400
system of Parliamentary democracy having a Constitutional distribution of
powers between two or more levels of Government. The archetypical
convention which requires the Governor to appoint only that person as the
Chief Minister who can head a Council of Ministers commanding an
absolute majority in the Legislative Assembly, is the essence of the Cabinet
system of Parliamentary democracy, although a breach of this convention is
immune from challenge in a court of law. One unfortunate fact of the Indian
situation is that enough attention has not been paid to the evolution and
observance of the right codes of conduct and conventions. Even the codes
and conventions evolved in the earlier years have been broken too lightly in
the later years. Expediency has sometimes been given precedence over
widsom and short-term advantages over long-term benefits. Narrow,
personal or parochial interests have been given priority over larger national
interests. One unwise action has provoked an equally unwise reaction and
triggered off a whole chain of adversary relationships. There is an increasing
tendency to resort to violence and extra-Constitutional methods to force
settlement of political or economic issues—imagined or real. This would be
a cause for concern even in a small homogeneous country. In India, a
heterogenous country of huge dimensions, this cannot be a matter of grave
anxiety. A natural reaction of some people has been that all the loopholes in
the Constitution which have permitted aberrant developments, should be
plugged. It is urged that, if conventions do not work, appropriate
constitutional safeguards should be provided. If appropriate conventions are
not followed and the discretion provided under certain circumstances is
misused, the entire system may collapse. In order that appropriate
conventions and codes of conduct get evolved, it is essential that
incumbents of constitutional offices and other sentinels of the polity are
selected from among persons of admitted competence and integrity and
provided with reasonable security of tenure.539

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401
Indian federalism is characteristically complex, therefore an easily
misunderstood, model of federalism. It defies any singular generalization. It
is a complex amalgam of dual federalism, organic-interdependent
federalism, and cooperative federalism. As a result, the Indian model is
uniquely a Union model of federalism. It has in built tendency to
circumstantially centralize or decentralize. Imperatives of national unity and
political economy determine the extent of autonomy and degree of
centralization within the federal polity. It is precisely the reason that federal
praxis is varying from time to time.540

The founding fathers gave to India a Union model of federalism, which

critically blends the best features of all the important types of federalism.
The emerging Indian model reconciles the imperatives of a strong Centre
with the need for State autonomy. It distributes powers, yet does not effect a
rigid compartmentalization. Functionally it is an interdependent
arrangement, where Centre and States collectively aspire and work towards
the welfare of the people. Working aberrations have caused frictions in the
Centre-State relations, therefore, demands for decentralization. This,
however, does not require major changes but functional modifications in the
Constitution. Necessity of autonomy needs to be balanced with the
imperatives of integration.541

Adapting the revenue-based law-and-order approach to governance

bequeathed by the British to independent India, India’s Constitution makers
created a strong centrist model for planned development. It was also clear
that, while all States were entitled to equal respect, they had to be treated
unequally. According to their needs, specific provisions in the Constitution
ensured preferential provisions for some States and areas within States.

540Ajay Kumar Singh, Divergence of Perception but Convergence of Conclusion — How

Federal India Perceives Itself Indian Journal of Federal Studies
1/2004.
541
Ibid.

402
However, in the early 1950s the southern States demanded a language- and
culture-based federalism. From 1956 India's internal geographic boundaries
were restructured to provide for a multicultural federation - a process that is
ongoing. At one level, this suggests a weakness in Indian federal
governance in that even the geographic boundaries of a State can be
violated. But in some respects, this flexibility has proved to be strength of
Indian federalism. Federalism has been further fortified by the rise of
regional parties, which, in the era of coalitions, have preserved India’s
diversity within a negotiatory federal arrangement. The script of Indian
federalism has been further rewritten by the local Government amendments
of 1992, which require the States to devolve power and resources
permanently to the control of three-tier local panchayats from grassroot to
district levels. These local Governments are to be serviced by their own
bureaucracies borrowed from the State civil services.542

By keeping the federal characters, the Constitution framers chose to retain

the strong ‘national’ character. Though the term ‘federal’ or ‘federalism’ is
no where in our Constitution, or for that matter in the American Constitution
as well. Had the term also been used, then too it would not have made a
vital difference because federalism has several manifestations, depending
upon the location of the decisive authority and the dynamics of relationship
between the Centre and the States. We, in India aim for a democratic
society, wherein, Government even upto the grass roots is contemplated,
then for the management of such a Government, there judiciary has also to
be organized on similar lines.

Though the structure is such that at certain places, it allows percolation, but
that does not seem to be capable enough to allow the attempt towards the
concept of ‘judicial federalism’ to dismantle by certain wrong decisions and
some mis-interpretation of the Constitution. For this the Courts should

542Supra note 129.

403
deliver decisions in the backdrop of the theme of our Constitution. They
should be coherent with the Constitutional provisions as well.

As the Constitution does not emphasize on a strict separation of powers,

therefore in the same line we can say that the Constitution does not cannot
enforce strictly for the federalism principles as well. That we say after
looking into the limitations of our country, its features, and seeing to the
varying and growing needs of time, and thus in order to avoid friction there
needs to be adopted a federal approach keeping the federal structure intact.
This would also prevent our structure either from disintegrating or yielding
to the unitary forces. The classical theories of separation of powers,
federation, etc. cannot be adopted as they are. They need to be modified
according to the conditions prevailing in each different place.

Therefore, what kind of federalism do we have and how does it respond to

the basic realities and pressures and pulls of contemporary polity, what have
we learnt form our experience, what sort of realignment would be preferable
and efficient, do our Constitutional conventions and practices detract form
this model or go in its favour, what is the trend and how do we catalyse the
movement towards the desirable goals, all this needs to be given a thought.
This is, therefore, a grey area of Constitutional governance which requires a
thoughtful deliberation.

Since the 1949-50 Constitution of India came into being, several

amendments have been effected to bring about changes in the original
distribution of powers and responsibilities.543 Broadly, these amendments
cover four areas:

• enlarging the ambit of the federal Government’s powers;

541Supra note 139.

404
 • bringing items from the State list within the fold of the concurrent
list (specifically, items that had produced excessive diversity of laws
or had became too technical to be effectively handled by the States);
• introducing a new part into the Constitution - one that devolves
functions at the subState level, and
• making cosmetic changes to the phrases and explanations of
Constitutional provisions, thus avoiding ambiguities in the judicial
construction and interpretation of specific provisions.

At the federal and State levels, legislative authority emanates from the
Constitution itself, and the legislative distribution of competences is
generally based on the recognition of the principle of sovereignty of some
exclusive jurisdiction. The executive authority of each Government (federal
Government and States) has been made co-extensive with its legislative
competence. Legislative and executive authorities are complemented by the
Constitutionally ordained financial capacity of each unit. As the capacities
are constitutionally protected, the power relationships between the federal
Government and the States are difficult to change by other organs of
Government, including the judiciary. The judiciary is expected to provide
the interpretation of the boundary and domain of powers but not to
reallocate competences either by way of interscheduling legislative entries
or constricting the functional field of each entry in the schedule.544

However, at the intrastate level, the legislative competence of the

autonomous regional councils is only minimally defined and protected by
the Constitution. The councils’ rule-making powers usually emanate from
legislative and other validating acts of the respective State legislatures. And,
at the lowest level of governance (district and below), the local Government

544Supra note 129.

405
institutions are to prepare plans and implement schemes for economic
development and social justice.545

As is well known, in the first three decades after independence

centralization of powers was accentuated due to various factors such as the
predominance of a single political party at the Centre as well as in the
States; adoption of planning as a strategy of national development in which
investment decisions determined by the Union, albeit through a consultative
process, generally set the priorities for State budgets; the system of
industrial licensing and control and the nationalization of major banks. The
trend of judicial pronouncements during the period also tended to follow the
same spirit. The Finance Commission appointed periodically, however, did
endeavor to give evenhanded dispensation to States in the matter of revenue
sharing.

A. THE 80S - CENTRE-STATE RELATIONS REVISITED:

SARKARIA COMMISSION ON CENTRE-STATE
RELATIONS
While the polity enjoyed stability, barring insurgency in some areas, and the
economy registered good growth after a long period of stagnation, things
started changing by the close of the seventies. One party rule started giving
way to other parties and regional fonnations. The growth momentum also
faltered. Some Sections expressed their concern about the efficacy of overly
centralized planning in sustaining growth at a rapid pace. States became
vocal in their perception of the contraction of their powers and excessive use
of emergency provisions by the Centre.

The Constitution was in operation for the last 37 years. A review of the
administrative aspects of Union-State relations was made by the
Administrative Refonns Commission (1966-70). Much had happened since

545Ibid.

406
then in the realm of Union-State relations. In the wake of social, economic
and political developments over the years, new trends, tensions and issues
had arisen. 'Consensus and Cooperation' which is a pre-requisite for smooth
functioning of Union-State relations is threatened by politics of
confrontation. In this perspective, after mature consideration, the late Prime
Minister Smt. Indira Gandhi with great foresight and wisdom called for a
fresh comprehensive review of the arrangements between the Union and the
States, in all spheres. On March 24, 1983, she announced in Parliament the
proposal to appoint a Commission under the Chairmanship of R. S.
Sarkaria, a retired Judge of the Supreme Court. She declared that "the
Commission will review the existing arrangements between the Centre and
the States while keeping in view the social and economic developments that
have taken place over the years. The review will take into account the
importance of unity and integrity of the country for promoting the welfare
of the people". She further enunciated that the Commission would examine
"the working of the existing arrangements between the Centre and the States
and recommend such changes in the said arrangements as might be
appropriate within the present constitutional framework".

The Commission made a thorough enquiry into the State of inter

Governmental relations and came out with wide ranging recommendations.
Many of them were accepted and implemented. In certain areas, however,
the recommendations were not accepted or acted upon.

The Constitutional amendments having a bearing on Union-state relations,

suggested Commission, though significant, were not many. These pertain
to:-

• Article 155 (appointment of Governor);

• Article 217 (empowering the President to Frame Rules);
f j /

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407
 • Article 248 read with Entry 97, List I (residuary powers regarding
non-tax matters);
• Article 252(2) [regarding amendment of an Act passed under Clause
(i)];
• Article 269(1 )(f) and Entry 92, List I (enlargement of their scope);
• insertion of a provision regarding sharing of Corporation tax,
analogous to Article 272;
• Article 276(2) (for raising the tax-ceiling on professions, trades,
etc.);
• Article 356 (to ensure its proper and efficacious use) and shifting a
part of Entry 5 of List II to List III (for ensuring regular elections to
and working of local bodies by an all-India statute).

The changes proposed in the functional aspects of Union-State

arrangements, are far more substantial. The more important of these relate
to:-
• the role of Governor;
• reservation of State Bills for consideration of the President;
• use of the extraordinary powers under Articles 256, 257 and 356;
• establishment of a standing Inter-Governmental Council with a
comprehensive charter;
• National Economic and Development Council having a nexus with
the Planning Commission formalized under Article 263;
• limitation on Centrally Sponsored Schemes regarding subjects in the
exclusive State field;
• State Finance and Planning Boards;
• role of Zilla Parishads and Municipal Corporations regarding socio­
economic planning and development;
• restraint on excessive occupation by the Union of the Concurrent
field;

408
 • periodic review of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act,
1951;
• decentralisation of powers assumed by law under Entry 52, List I;
• loans of States and Municipalities etc.547

B. THE 90S AND THEREAFTER - GLOBALIZATION,

DECENTRALIZATION AND DEVOLUTION
Events however seemed to overtake the political configurations bringing
economic issues to the forefront. The economic crises of 1990-91 prompted
acceleration of the earlier liberalization process. Controls in many areas
were removed and operation of the market largely restored. The
entrepreneurship and management skills of the private sector were sought to
be utilized in a greater measure in almost all activities. Similarly, more
space in economic policy making was sought to be provided to the States.
Other factors were also at work with profound impact on systems of
governance everywhere. Countries were compelled to meet greater
obligations as a result of their membership of international bodies in a fast
globalizing world. The horror of terrorism around the world posed a serious
threat to integrity, stability and peace for which action had to be taken
through international cooperation. Similarly, global warming and
environmental concerns stared every nation in the face calling for concerted
action internationally.

On the other hand, inadequacy of public services in critical areas like health
and education, led to the demand for greater decentralization to bring
Governments closer to the people and for greater accountability. Although
Panchayats and Municipalities existed, they were not endowed with
adequate functions or resources of their own and were subjected to several
controls. Supersessions were not uncommon and timely elections were not
conducted. The Constitution was amended to rectify the situation by giving

541 Ibid.

409
these institutions Constitutional status, with the hope that they would
function as a third tier of governance. However, empowering them
adequately remained a challenge.

In many other respects the changes did not go far. Although the States were
expected to perform functions on a scale larger than before, their access to
tax powers and borrowing remained limited. The transfer system did help to
alleviate the regional disparities in the level of living and in public services,
but sharp imbalances remained. While liberalization and restoration of the
market helped to accelerate growth, regional disparities tended to widen. In
an attempt to counter the possible ill effects on fiscal discipline,
conditionalities came to be used increasingly with transfers. Fiscal
discipline was sought to be imposed on State Governments by tying debt
relief to enactment of fiscal responsibility laws. The proportion of central
revenues transferred to the States had increased substantially over the years
and dependence of relatively backward States on transfers had gone up
sharply. The planning strategy, it was argued, needed a radical shift to
reduce regional disparities and promote all round development.

C. THE RISE OF REGIONAL PARTIES AND COALITION

POLITICS
Politically however, with the rise of regional parties and coalitions, States
seemed to gain the upper hand in many matters. Centre’s powers of
intervention also came to be circumscribed by judicial pronouncements in
several areas such as imposition of President’s rule. The dictum of ‘basic
structure’ of the Constitution propounded by the Supreme Court in the
celebrated Keshavananda Bharati case also tied the hands of the Centre in
important ways.

The effect, inter alia, is that while the States feel handicapped in pursuing
development programmes of their own for lack of adequate funds, the

410
Centre finds itself hamstrung even when there is serious breakdown in law
and order in some areas. The growth of the common market which is one of
the main factors driving nations to come together to form federations or
economic unions is unable to gain the momentum warranted by its potential,
despite the mandate of freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse within
the Indian Union envisaged in Article 301.

Probably the best-recorded public document is the Part II of the Sarkaria

Commission's Report on Centre-State Relations. Synthesized reading of 986
pages gives the impression that federal partners hardly question the
legitimacy, relevance and effectiveness of Union model, but what they seek
is the modification in the power sharing arrangements between the Centre
C A O

and the States. The important conclusions that can be drawn include:

• Union is and should always be strong. Strength of the Union is

componentially related to the better growth and development of the
States. For this purpose power relationship between the two needs to
be rearranged from time to time. This may be done by making
functional changes in the Constitution. To this end, the Indian
Constitution has in built resilience and flexibility. Only select few
States and one commission suggests for the substantial changes in
the Constitution.
• Depoliticization of federal grants to the States. Fiscal help should not
be subjected to any non-Constitutional sanction and approval.
Federalism needs to be routed through democratic norms and
practices. This would help to restore the legitimacy of the federal
institutions and it would prevent arbitrary exercise of extraordinary
powers by the Centre. Procedural transparency would prevent the
misuse of extraordinary powers by the Centre.

548 Supra note 540.

411
 • Decentralization is the essence of federalism. And the Constitution
adequately provides for the delegation of powers. As a matter of
fact, as the States assert, States are the co-equal partners in the
exercise of nation building. What needs to be done is to work upon
the Constitution in its intent. For decentralization, followings are
suggested:

• decentralization of regulatory powers of the Centre;

• off-loading of administrative authority;
• territorial diversification of central agencies;
• jurisdictional partitioning of overgrown items of list I;
• extension of State's competence in the areas of
subordinate legislation on union laws;
• reshuffling of items in the three lists of seventh schedule;
• inter-scheduling of subjects between the 7th, 11th and
12th schedules of the Constitution;
• greater occupancy of States on the concurrent list;
• restructuring of federal institutions to ensure effective
participation of States;
• decentralization of governance down to the level of
grassroots; and
• decontrolling (of the Centre) of development
administration.

As mentioned above, one finds many interpretative complexities in

describing the nature of India federalism. In this context, responses of the
States to the Sarkaria Commission's Questionnaire are worth mentioning.
States' perceptions by and large remain the same even today. Some States
perceive it as a model of cooperative federalism and others seek to
radicalize it as dual federalism.

412
 D. SECOND COMMISSION ON CENTRE-STATE RELATIONS
Given this background it was felt that another look at the entire gamut of
Centre-State relations was called for. Keeping in view the sea-changes that
have been taken place in the polity and economy of India since the Sarkaria
Commission had last looked at the issue of Centre-State relations over two
decades ago the Government has set up a Commission on Centre-State
Relations to look into the new issues of Centre-State relations.

The Commission is examining and reviewing the working of the existing

arrangements between the Union and States as per the Constitution of India,
the healthy precedents being followed, various pronouncements of the
Courts in regard to powers, functions and responsibilities in all spheres
including legislative relations, administrative relations, role of Governors,
emergency provisions, financial relations, economic and social planning,
Panchayati Raj institutions, sharing of resources; including inter-State river
water and recommend such changes or other measures as may be
appropriate keeping in view the practical difficulties.

The present Commission has been constituted to perform this task. The
Commission is having inputs from all stakeholders, Governments at all
levels, major political parties, civil society groups and all persons interested
in the issues raised in the terms of reference. The basic question that the
Commission is required to address is:

“Are the existing arrangements governing Centre-State relations --

legislative, executive and financial - envisaged in the Constitution, as they
have evolved over the years, working in a manner that can meet the
aspirations of the Indian society as also the requirements of an increasingly
globalizing world? If not, what are the impediments and how can they be
remedied without violating the basic structure of the Constitution?”

413
Judicial stress has recently been on first defining the ambit of the States’
powers, as found under Lists II and III and in other parts of the
Constitution.549 Those found to be outside the constructed ambit of the
States’ powers belong to the federal Government. Entry 97 of List I ("any
other matter not enumerated in List II or List III, including any tax not
mentioned in either of those lists") and Article 248 elasticized the power
domain of the federal Government. Thus, the Court has upheld the
legislative competence of the federal Government to impose an expenditure
tax (distinguished from the State power to impose a luxury tax). The
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (since repealed),
which allows the deployment of armed forces for the purpose of maintaining
public order (either upon State request or federal initiative), has also
expanded the scope of List I, enabling the federal Government to encroach
upon what was formerly State jurisdiction.

Here again we find varying perceptions of Indian federalism. Thus, for the
Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC's) Report of the Study Team on
Centre-State Relations, (1968) the Indian polity is federal in form but lacks
much of the substance of a classical federation. The report lists out the
following six attributes of a classical federation in order to analyze and
characterize the form of Indian federalism. They are:550

• a compact between independent and sovereign units to surrender

partially their authority in their common interest and vest it in a
union;
• the retention of residual authority with the constituent units;
• a separate Constitution for each constituent unit to govern all matters
not surrendered to the union;

549 P.M. Bakshi, The Constitution of India, 2004.

550 Supra note 540.

414
 • the supremacy of the Constitution and its consequent immutability
except with the concurrence of the component units;
• the distribution of powers of the union and the units each in its
sphere, coordinate and independent of the other, the basis being the
entrustment of matters of national importance to the union and of
local importance to the units;
• the supreme authority of the Courts to interpret the Constitution and
to invalidate action violative of the Constitution, and to resolve
conflicts, as provided for in the Constitution, between one unit and
another and between a unit and the union." (pp. 3-4).

Out of six, the committee finds oniy the last attributes present in full
measures in the Indian federation. The first three attributes are totally absent
and the rest two are only partially available. As a consequence, within
Indian federalism States do not have the autonomy of sovereignty. State
legislatures do not have authority coordinate with and independent of union
Parliament. The division of powers, as the report observes "does indeed
make the polity partake of the federal character but the substance of this
division dilutes this character in many significant ways." (p.5) The seventh
schedule does allow to the States autonomy of legislation in the spheres
allotted to them, but the same gets diluted on account of the provision of the
Article 249, which empowers Parliament to legislate on any matter in the
State list provided the Rajya Sabha by a two-third majority authorizes to do
so. But the Rajya Sabha has functionally been so designed that the
individual autonomy of the State is subjected to the approval by the
collective wisdom of all the States of the union. Article 200, 201 and the
entire provisions of the emergency Articles further detract the polity from
the true spirit and essence of a federation. Further the physical entity and
political identity of the State is not sacrosanct. "Their boundaries can be
altered and, indeed, the existence of individual States can be brought to an
end by Parliament at will." "The autonomy", writes the report, "implicit in

415
the division of powers, on which the federal character of the union rests, can
thus be seen as a functional devolution rather than as conferment of
sovereign rights". The ARC notes that the Constitution lays down the
foundation of a functional federalism with in built flexibility of consented
mutual transference of powers and responsibilities. Dynamism is inherent
within the framework. Thus the basic question is not whether the
Constitution has been juridically doctrinaired in the classical sense of
federalism but to function as a federation. And to this end the Constitution is
well moulded. Functional and circumstantial devolution is the essence of
Indian federalism. What India requires is to w’ork upon it.551

On the other hand Report of the Rajamannar Committee, set up by the

Government of Tamil Nadu, in 1969 (report published in 1971), to review
the working of Centre-State relation, is singularly governed by the notion of
dual federalism, and thus accordingly it submits for the drastic amendments
in the Constitution. Federalism, in its opinion, is based on the notion of
equality and complete separation of authority. It writes "in a federation the
national and State Governments exist on a basis of equality and neither has
the power to make inroads on the definite authority and functions of the
other unilaterally". In its opinion, the Constitution of India by way of the
arrangements of power and through the rule of exceptions has made the
State a subordinate authority to the Centre. "There is a theme of
subordination of the States running right through the Constitution. There is a
large scope for Centre to intrude into State affairs and thus affect the
autonomy of the States. There are certain provisions in the Constitution,
which appear to confer on the union Government supervisory power over
the States even in well-defined and specified matters which are exclusively

551
Ibid.

416
in the State field'1. It is for this reason that the committee has recommended
for major deletion, revision, and amendments in the Constitution.552

Sarkaria Commission's report is probably the only exhaustive document

which generates a composite view of Indian federalism, uniquely framed for
India, therefore a special type of federalism. It blends "the imperatives of a
strong national control with the need for adequate local initiative. In a
country too large and diverse for a unitary form of Government, they [the
founding fathers] envisaged a system which would be worked in
cooperation by the two levels of Government - national and regional - as a
common endeavour to serve the people. Such a system, it was conceived,
would be most suited to Indian conditions at it would at once have the
advantages of a strong unified central power, and the essential values of
federalism".

E. SUGGESTIONS
Here there are some suggestions noted for the improvement of Centre-State
relations and for the benefit of the country as a whole.

(a) LAW, ORDER AND SECURITY SITUATION

There are several important security issues on which the central Government
seems helpless. For instance States like Bihar under RJD rule were
practically in the medieval age with organized crime becoming an industry.
Recent police brutality in Nandigram and Lalgarh (West Bengal) has been
much written and commented upon; separatist movements in several parts
of the country have become volatile and violent, threatening not only the
federal structure, but also posing a great danger to the nation; communal
riots in UP, Maharashtra and Gujarat could not be prevented; and Left-wing
extremists have spread their tentacles over several districts in the country
and control a large part of India, mainly in the interior, presenting a great

55:
Ibid.

417
danger to national security. Article 355 of the Constitution of India makes it
a Constitutional duty of the Union to protect the States against external
aggression and internal disturbance, and ensure that the Government of
States is carried out in accordance with the Constitution. The responsibility
cast on the Union has to be discharged by exercising all the powers at its
command before resorting to the ultimate device of imposing President's
rule under Article 356. In this realm there are strong grounds for drafting a
supporting legislation under Article 355 for deploying central forces in the
States if they fail to check widespread communal and caste violence, Left-
wing inspired violence and to ensure law and order. Similarly, there is a
need to set up a Central Law Enforcement Agency and empower it to
investigate inter-State crimes having serious implications for national
security. It would be too early, however, to say much as the commission
will take two years to complete its work and suggest recommendations.

One of the 'terms of reference' of this commission is the need for setting up
a Central Law Enforcement Agency empowered to take up suo moto
investigation of crimes having Inter-State and/or International ramifications
with serious implications on national security. The Malimath Committee
also examined the feasibility of introducing the concept of “federal crime”
(having Inter-State and/or International ramifications with serious
implications on national security) which can be put on List I in the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution. The suggestion to declare certain crimes as
federal crimes to enable a Central Agency to undertake investigation,
without any loss of time, was also referred to the Committee on Police
Reforms under the chairmanship of Shri K. Padmanabhaiya.

The Committee on Police Reforms felt that there was a case for declaring a
very few selected categories of cases as federal offences and cautioned that
great care and restraint needed to be exercised in identifying those crimes. It
suggested the following criteria for the selection of crimes:

418
 • They have international implications;
• They relate to the security of the nation (Treason);
• They relate to the activities of the Union Government;
• They relate to corruption in All-India Services;
• Protecting Government currency;
• Controlling national borders

The Committee Stated that the following categories of crime can be

declared as federal crime:

• Terrorism and organised crime having inter-State and

• international ramifications;
• Crimes in special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of India;
• Murder of Head of State, Central Government Minister, Judge of the
Supreme Court and internationally-protected persons;
• Frauds, embezzlement and cheating in nationalized banks/Central
PSUs; Financial institutions;
• Tax offences involving Union taxes like Income Tax, Customs,
• Central Excise, etc;
• Counterfeit currency; money laundering;
• Offences relating to art, treasures and antiquities;
• Offences relating to hijacking of aircraft/ships;
• Piracy on the high seas;
• Offences of the Central Government employees under the
Prevention of Corruption Act and related Sections of the IPC;
• Offences by officers of All-India Services under the Prevention of
Corruption Act, and related Sections of the IPC.

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In examining the concept of Federal offences/crimes and establishment of a
Federal Agency investigating those offences/crimes suo moto needs to be
examined with reference to the Constitutional Scheme on Relations between
the Union and the States. In The Framing of India's Constitution, it has been
observed that "The federal concept in India was not the product of a gradual
process of evolution but represented a decision which was somewhat
abruptly taken in 1930, as a result of the necessity of including the Indian
States within the Indian polity".

It has been the experience that the local law enforcement agencies, quite
often tend to look at the crimes from their own perception and with an
objective of crime control in their jurisdiction. In the process, the linkages
between ordinary looking crimes and crimes against the State escape
scrutiny or even attention.

Further, in majority of cases a full picture is not available to the State law
enforcement agencies. Even if the larger ramifications are understood, they
are evidently not shared with the Central Government and other affected
States. It has now become necessary to deal with crimes that will undermine
the national integrity within overall national security strategy.

In appreciation of the prevailing situation, suggestions have been made in

various fora that the Central Government should play a larger role in
internal security matters, particularly investigation of crimes against the
State. At present there is no Central Agency which can take up the
investigation of crimes having internal security dimensions. The Central
Bureau of Investigation does take up important cases on the request of the
concerned State Governments. The fact, however, remains that he primary
charter of CBI is to deal with corruption cases involving Central
Government employees. The CBI has, however, tried to manage criminal
cases by creating a separate cell but the pointed attention that is required to

420
be given to this aspect is not feasible in the present structure. Secondly, the
CBI does not have original jurisdiction and cannot take up investigation of
all cases due to organizational inadequacies. In appreciation of the situation
that stares us in the face, there is an imperative need to have a Central
Investigating Agency, empowered to take cognizance of crimes against the
Indian State. Maharashtra did well to enact legislation exclusively to deal
with Organised Crime, which has proved to be extremely effective during
the last four years. Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh and Karnataka
adopted their own legislations on Organised Crime. However, the question
remains whether the States be left to have their own legislation or a Central
Act be promulgated on the subject.

With a view to combating a transnational phenomenon where the likes of

Dawood Ibrahim, Tiger Menon, Iqbal Mirchi, all based in foreign countries
or operating from international lane of high seas, have to be neutralized.
They also quickly capitalize on estranged or hostile diplomatic relations
between countries to their advantage to escape the dragnets of law.

In this background, a unified framework to deal with Organised Crime,

there should be a Central legislation. Also, if it is left to the States to enact
their own laws, some of them would do it according to their time-frame and
some others may not do so at all. Even if they enact such a law, its
efficiency could remain questionable because of the nature of crime being
transnational or inter-State or both. To deal with organised crime
effectively, investigation has to be conducted with Interpol, letters of request
for extradition /deportation of criminals to India have to be processed by
Ministry of External Affairs with Foreign Embassies. Barring some States,
other States of the Union have yet to legislate upon such a sensitive matter.
It would, therefore, be prudent to have a Central legislation, which should
provide a uniform legal framework to deal with the problem on a national
level keeping in view the national interest. The power of registration and

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investigation of cases under a Central Act should be conferred on the State
Police and follow the legislation only when the States desire will they
transfer investigation of cases to Central Investigating Agencies, after due
process of law, like giving fonnal consent u/s 6 of the Delhi Special Police
Establishment Act by the State Government and obtaining consent of the
Central Government u/s 5 of the Act. Central legislation should also provide
adequate platform for international cooperation in consonance with
international treaties and conventions.

Such a system exists in other countries where Federal Governments have a

corresponding responsibility in prevention of crimes against the country. In
the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is entrusted
with the responsibility to take cognizance of offences affecting the security
of that country and investigate them. The FBI is the Federal Law
Enforcement Agency of the United States of America, authorized under law
to investigate federal crimes. About 200 crimes are listed in the Charter of
FBI. Such a system is not available in this country when the problems
facing us are more complicated than those in the United States of America.

To deal with organised crime effectively, investigation has to be conducted

with Interpol, letters of request for extradition / deportation of criminals to
India have to be processed by Ministry of External Affairs with Foreign
Embassies. It would, therefore, be prudent to have a Central legislation,
which should provide a uniform legal framework to deal with the problem
on a national level keeping in view the national interest. The power of
registration and investigation of cases under a Central Act should be
conferred on the State Police.

(b) ACCOUNTABILITY
The major areas of concern are the diminished level of accountability in the
Government sector. While the private sector’s performance is positive, that

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of the Government and public sector leave much to be desired. One of the
indices of the situation is the country’s low ranking in achievement of
Millennium Development Goals (MDG). The country’s position has slid
even below some of the smaller economies e.g. Bhutan and Vietnam. It is
suggested in this regard that India can have a legislation passed on
accountability as well on the lines of Canada which has recently passed the
Accountability Act to stand up for accountability and to change the way
Government works. Accountability Act is a significant and substantive step
to help restore people’s trust in Government and the democratic process.”
The salient features of Accountability Act in Canada include quarterly
updates of Government fiscal forecasts from the Department of Finance, A
consistent appointment process for Agents of Parliament with a meaningful
role for Parliament, A new Public Appointments Commission to oversee
appointments to agencies, boards, and commissions, A legislated
commitment to fairness, openness, and transparency in the procurement
process, Inclusion of integrity provisions in all Government contracts,
Tougher penalties for fraudulent misuse of public funds, A consistent
approach to promote legal and policy compliance and enforce disciplinary
measures, Strengthened internal audit functions within departments.

(c) WATER
In terms of the Constitutional provisions, the Central Government could
perhaps have played an important role in relation to inter-State rivers, if it
had got the necessary laws passed by parliament, particularly as most of
India’s important rivers are inter-State rivers. However, the Centre has not
made (or been able to make) significant use of the enabling provisions of
Entry 56.

A complaint often heard is: "Water is a State subject; the central

Government cannot do much; water should have been in the Concurrent list,
and should now be brought into it by amending the Constitution." The

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central Government has in fact failed to play even the role it could have
played on the basis of the existing provisions. Much can be done without
wasting time and energies on pursuing the chimera of restructuring the
Constitutional entries relating to water.

The Central Government can also acquire legislative powers on water when
two or more States desiring uniform water legislation request the Union
Government, with the approval of their respective Assemblies, to provide
such legislation.

The water issue has acquired a new dimension in already complicated

disputes between Punjab and Haryana with the construction of a new Hansi-
Butana canal by the Haryana Government. It is ready for use, but its
functioning is stalled by the Supreme Court of India, entertaining a Special
Leave Petition from the Punjab Government and referred the case to Central
Water Commission for examination. Now, More than two decades have
been elapsed of Rajiv-Longowal pact. The Punjab in this realm has
unilaterally abrogated all previous accords by passing an Act “Punjab
Termination of Agreement Act-2004” in Punjab Legislative Assembly, on
12 July 2004. It is said that the Punjab Act of 2004 violated the provisions
of the Constitution as well as the basic principles and tenets concerning
federalism and rule of law enshrined in the Constitution.

The Act it is alleged lacked legislative competence and was a coloured piece
of legislation intended only to project a flimsy legal cover for Punjab to
continue with its defiant and contumacious conduct against the apex Court
and the Constitution, the affidavit said.

The President had sought the Court's opinion on the Constitutional validity
of the Punjab law and had also asked whether the Act had discharged the
State from the two Supreme Court judgments directing the construction of
the Sutlej-Yamuna Link (SYL) canal.

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The legislation of Punjab Govt, needs to be taken very seriously when all
previous accords of water sharing with the neighbouring States have been
abrogated by the Punjab Govt. Unilaterally. What is the role of the Centre
here? The Centre can get the necessary laws passed by parliament by
making significant use of the enabling provisions of Entry 56, particularly
as most of India’s important rivers are inter-State rivers. However, the
Centre has not made (or been able to make) significant use of the enabling
provisions of Entry 56. Any legislation regarding inter-State river water
should be done by Centre only and not States. Cauvery water dispute
between the two neighbouring States is also looming large in the southern
part of this country The basic question was/is, however, according to
Constitutional provisions that who has the right to decide over river waters
and to allot it to neighbouring/needy States?

Although a State generally has broad authority over waters within its
borders, and little or no direct authority over waters in neighboring States,
exercise of its intraState authority over an interstate stream cannot be
entirely dismissive of the interests of downstream States. It stands to reason
that an upstream State cannot entirely deprive a downstream State of the
benefits of a shared river, but how much water can the upstream State use
before it crosses the line? Who decides, and how? States involved in an
interstate water dispute, whether they are negotiating a compact or poised to
litigate, must understand the legal dynamics affecting the answers to those
questions.

(d) PLANNING
As afore said already Planning was also emphasized a lot to be included in
the Union list by Sh. K.M. Munshi but was not included. The committee at
that recognized the necessity of uniformity and coordination in regard to
planning, but some how planning was not included in any of the Lists.
However Centre has implied power of Planning from the Residuary clause

425
of the List I, but still Planning as a whole should be particularly included in
the Union List.

(e) MORE STATE PARTICIPATION IN FINANCE

India is a unique but highly intricate case study in fiscal structure. There are
several unique aspects about the arrangements for fiscal transfer in Indian
federalism.

There should be provision available with the State Governments so that they
can raise funds on arising of any contingency like draught, flood etc.

(0 UNIFORMITY IN EXCAVATION OF MINERALS

In India, 80% of mining is in coal and the balance 20% is in various metals
and other raw materials such as gold, copper, iron, lead, bauxite, zinc and
uranium. India with diverse and significant mineral resources is the leading
producer of some of the minerals. India is not endowed with all the requisite
mineral resources. Of the 89 minerals produced in India, 4 are fuel minerals,
11 metallic, 52 non-metallic and 22 minor minerals.

Management of mineral resources in India is the responsibility of the

Central Government and the State Governments in terms of Entry 54 of the
Union List (List I) and Entry 23 of the State List (List II) of the Seventh
Schedule of the Constitution of India. The Central Government in
consultation with the State Governments, formulates the legal measures for
the regulation of mines and the development of mineral resources to ensure
basic uniformity in mineral administration and to ensure that the
development of mineral resources keeps pace, and is in consonance with the
national policy goals. The regulation of mines and development of mineral

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resources in accordance with the national goals and priorities is the
• CC1

responsibility of the Central and State Governments.

The role to be played by the Central and State Governments in regard to

mineral development has been extensively dealt in the Mines and Minerals
(Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 and rules made under the Act by
the Central Government and the State Governments in their respective
domains. The provisions of the Act and the Rules are reviewed from time to
time and harmonised with the policies governing industrial and socio­
economic developments in India.554

Generally what happens in almost all excavation processes that because the
excavations are generally done by the State Govt, machinery primarily in
the supervision of the Union, resultantly State officials sometimes
misappropriate the minerals excavated and there neither the State Govt, gets
benefited not the Centre. What should be done to prevent it is that
excavation of minerals should be placed under the authority of State with a
share to Centre from the income out of it. It will result in more efficient
excavation of minerals with a check on misappropriation.

(g) RESIDUARY POWERS WITH THE STATE GOVT.

For crystallizing the ideas into reality for improvement, reforms on
Constitutional side are required on a large scale. There is a need to carefully
revise the Seventh Schedule to suit the needs of modem administration. By
virtue of item 97 of List I, the residual subjects automatically vest in the
Union Government. At this point of time, it will be appropriate that all
residual subjects should vest with the States and local Governments instead
of Union. It remains a matter of consideration that whenever there is a
requirement of bringing any item to the Union List, that can be done by a

5x3 http://www. indiacore. com/mining, html

554 Ibid.

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Constitutional amendment. There is a great overlap between the Centre and
States with items falling under the Concurrent list. A division of items in the
Concurrent list so that the Union and State Govt, get clear demarcation will
be beneficial and convenient in the interest of the nation as a whole.

(h) APPOINTMENT OF GOVERNOR AND OTHER ISSUES

As already discussed, the institution of Governor is very important and
significant. There is an urgent need of reviewing the aspect of appointment
of the Governor. At present the Governors are nominated and the experience
so far shows that the appointment of Governors is often a partisan political
tool in the hands of the party in power at the Union level. For this reason the
balance of convenience lies in either electing the Governor as a head of
Government and State with clear separation of executive from the
legislature, or indirectly electing the Governor as the Constitutional head of
State.

The Governors power of reserving a Bill for President’s assent under Article
200 has been the reason of irritation, delay and foray into the legislative
powers of the States and causing unnecessary tension between the Centre
and the Union. There as been a strong feeling that this power of reserving a
Bill for President’s assent or severely limiting the power to only concurrent
subjects and fix a time limit of 60 days for President’s assent or otherwise.
There should be a provision that the Bill automatically becomes law after 60
days from the date of reservation for the President’s assent, if the rejection
of the President is not communicated with in that time period. In such cases,
however, the rejection should be justiciable in the Supreme Court.

(i) ITEMS NOT MENTIONED IN THE STATE LIST

Any other items not mentioned in the State List but if that particular State
Govt, feels legislating on it because of necessity and expediency of

428
legislating in view of needs arising in the State with prior concurrence of the
Union.

0) ADMINISTRATIVE RELATIONS
The basic premise governing the discussion on Administration Relations
was that autonomy and authority are neither rights nor gifts but means to a
desired end and hence there is an immediate need for bureaucratic refonn.

Instead of adhering to theoretical concepts like ‘true federalism’ or political

concepts like ‘utmost autonomy’, it has to be examined how the present
arrangement hampers the good governance and citizen welfare at the State
level and how any change would enhance the same.

On the issue of desirability of creation of a few more All India Services, it is

relevant to mention that the existing ones such as Indian Police Service and
the Indian Forest Service have become circumscribed to State level and
have substantially shed their all India character due to severely limited
rotation between the Centre and the States, there appears no justification for
bringing more services within the fold of All India Services. A need is also
felt to reinvigorate the existing All India Services.

Suitable strengthening of Article 316 should be made for greater care and
caution in the Constitution and composition of the Union and State Public
Service Commissions with the objective of ensuring much greater
professionalism and objectivity in recruitment to key public services.

(k) GREATER DECENTRALIZATION AND DEVOLUTION -

NEED OF THE HOUR
What is of still greater significance is that the framework of democratic
governance and the reach of representative institutions have percolated
down to the common man. The wisdom of the Founding Fathers of our

429
Constitution has been vindicated in that the process of democratic
decentralization has acquired healthy roots intimately encompassing village
panchayats and urban local bodies. Our endeavour should be to stamp out
the imperfections and entrench democratic decentralization to ensure
participative decision-making of the people in the planning process at the
grass-root level to build a more vibrant India. Along with such
decentralization it is equally important to provide a morally superior and
clean administration. This would empower every citizen, especially the
poor, the disadvantaged and the marginalized to enjoy the real fruits of
democracy.

Now, in respect of federalist structure of India, the objectives of reform

should be significant devolution of powers and resources to States, clearer
separation of powers between the Union and States minimizing overlap and
dual jurisdiction vesting the Union with special powers to preserve unity,
integrity and national security, steps to ensure accountability of the
administrative machinery and measures to ensure genuine self-governance
in States with in their legitimate sphere.

The republic of India comprises the union (federal) Government, 28 State

Governments, 7 union territories and about 6, 45,000 local Governments.
The local Governments are known as panchayats in rural areas and
municipal corporations, municipalities and nagar panchayats in urban areas.
India has a long tradition of panchayats, i.e. village councils, which
administered the affairs of villages. When India became independent in
1947, the Constitution of India mandated that "Organisation of village
panchayats - The State shall take steps to organise village panchayats and
endow them with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable
them to function as units of self-Govemment." (Directive Principles of State
Policy, Art. 40) There were many experiments with panchayati raj (rural
self-governance system) before 1993, when the 73rd and 74th Constitution

430
Amendments accorded Constitutional status to village and city councils and
created a national framework for local Governments by stipulating - fixed
five-year term, regular elections and State Finance Commissions to review
and augment their finances. In most States, panchayats have a three-tier
system - village, block (a group of villages, treated as a development unit)
and district, whereas cities and towns have municipal bodies. Women (33.3
per cent) and members of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Backward
Classes, etc. (in proportion to their population in a State) enjoy reservation
in all seats and posts.555

There is now substantial evidence that basic public services and

programmes meant for the poor and the weaker Sections function
inefficiently in India, especially in the poorer States. This is due to low
capacity of the local implementing organisations caused by poor
accountability, lack of motivation, absence of performance appraisal,
absence of system of incentives and penalties, poor working conditions, and
large-scale leakage due to corruption. At the receiving end, the poor are dis-
empowered, and are not included in the decision making processes. Delivery
will not improve in India unless the process simultaneously empowers the

common person.

Economic well being of the marginalised people can be achieved in several

ways. Growth, successful development project in health, education, or water
can all mitigate their misery without empowering them, at least directly.
Therefore empowerment can be conceptualised as a strategy as well as a
goal. It is desirable in itself, as it improves the confidence of the women and
other marginalised groups in themselves, but also

• makes bureaucracy more accountable and hence improves the

efficiency and effectiveness of Government programmes

555 http://www. localgovernmentindia. org/

431
 improves their awareness and hence makes them better recipients of
aid
reduces repression and exploitation

India is a vast country with various religions, regions, caste, areas and
boundaries, so it cannot be run by two-tiers of governments. In terms of
population and area, the states of India are as large as independent countries
of Europe. Many states of India are very diverse and so there was need for
power sharing within the state. The federal power sharing in India needed
another tier of level of government that could work below state
governments. This formed the foundation or basis for decentralisation of
power. It resulted into third tier or level of government called “local
government”. The basic idea behind “decentralisation” was to solve
problems and issues of residing citizens that can be best solved at local
level. It was easy to participate and manage domestic issues at local level
and even decision making become easier. It helped to instruct a habit of
democratic participation. The importance and need for decentralisation was
recognized by our constitution and there were several attempts to
decentralise power to the level of villages and towns. In villages, it resulted
in the form of “panchayats” while municipalities were set up in urban areas
of town and city in all the states. Both “panchayats” and municipalities were
directly under the control of state governments. These local governments
did not have any power or resources of their own and elections to these
governments were not held regularly. The decentralisation was very little in
effective terms but major steps were taken in 1992. The constitution was
therefore amended to make “local government” or the third tier of
government more powerful and effective.556

556 http://www.indiastudychannel.com/resources/100967-Federalism.aspx

432
An innovative approach is needed for taxation and fund mobilization for
Panchayats. There is an urgent need to transfer the task/function of levying
of taxes to local bodies. Strengthening of funding and tax collection, with
an emphasis on taxes collectable from within the geographical spread of the
local bodies like the land revenue, irrigation cess etc unlike those from
outside the area such as Octroi. A system of fixing the tax rates for different
areas and provision of a basket of taxes from which the local bodies could
choose the appropriate ones for themselves. Similarly, there is a need to
rationalize taxes by looking at differential taxes for large holdings (vertical
relation to be changed to horizontal relation). Therefore panchayats should
not only collect taxes on land, irrigation drinking water, power, and houses,
but also be given the authority to levy taxes on politically unpopular
subjects such as agricultural income tax on large holdings. Even if one
percent panchayats start doing it, the fear that collecting such taxes is a
political liability will disappear.

While parallel structures are not to be encouraged, the multiplicity and

enormity of tasks at the village requires that more and more villagers take
up ownership of various activities, developmental programmes and
functions in the village. It is suggested that for each function of the GP, the
Gram Sabha be a Forum where people can volunteer or be selected to be a
part of the Committee looking after a specific function, eg. MDM, PDS,
FFW, Health, Anganwadi, lights, water etc. In addition to the villagers, a
member of the GP can be identified for each of these Committees to ensure
good quality service delivery leading to development and overall excellence.
This will help at the time of the Panchayat Metric Grid (PMG) grading and
also bring in better right to information, participation with checks and
balances.

To sum up, effective panchayats/user groups would also require effective

district and block level administration. Hence efforts towards better

433
accountability and performance from local bureaucracy should go
simultaneously along with building local PRI capabilities, otherwise the
elected PRI leaders would not change their perception of the State being an
‘open treasury’. Thus civil service reforms that would strengthen district
administration must go hand in hand with empowerment of panchayats.
Professional and responsive public administration will be an asset for both
social sector, as well as for enabling panchayats to play the important role
that is mandated for them.

We need empowerment in India because much of development effort in

India is supply driven, top-down, does not involve people, non-transparent,
and hence full of leakages and not sustainable.

Infact, the seventy-third and seventy-fourth amendments merely provided

for local bodies and regular election, without empowering them as
institutions of local self-governance. Local self-Govemments for effective
functioning and governance require inviolable and clearly defined
legislative and executive jurisdiction, effective control of local bureaucracy
and adequate non-discretionary fiscal devolution, and direct empowerment
of stake-holders over local institutions and public services—surely these are
among the major initiatives needed to correct the serious distortions and
imbalances in our plural democracy. However it needs to be taken into
consideration that the State legislatures are reluctant to shed powers and
authority in favour of local Governments. At this point of time, the Eleventh
and Twelfth Schedules are merely recommendatory. The subjects
transferred to local Governments should be made mandatory in a manner
similar to List II of Seventh Schedule and the State legislatures should have
no discretion. The list of subjects in Eleventh and Twelfth Schedules should
be reviewed to make such a transfer uncomplicated and smooth. Genuine
empowerment of local Governments and fusion of authority and
accountability at the local level are the most important steps in resolving our

434
crisis of governance. There should be a proper framework for Local self-
Govemment and people’s empowerment should be constitutionally
mandated, and cannot be left to the sweet will and discretion of self-serving
coteries and power-brokers. Democracy and self-governance are not gifts of
legislators. The Constitutional principle of popular sovereignty should find
expression in the appropriate State structure.

Given mutual trust, confidence and under-standing between the two tiers of
the polity, will go a long way to ensure smooth and harmonious working of
the Union-State arrangements on principles of cooperative federalism. But,
it is not that they foreclose the need for a countrywide debate in political,
cc17
academic and other forums as to their merits, utility and viability.

From 1947, this country was ruled by only a single party. That era is over.
This country is not likely to be ruled by only one single party. The Centre of
governance is just like an atom of an element. Parliament is also the nucleus
of the Government. In this nucleus of the Government, there are different
orbitals and the orbitals are occupied by the electrons. Those States which
are far away from this nucleus are so far given a scanty respect and scanty
attention. Sometimes, they have been neglected and sometimes they have
even been deprived. That is the basic logic based on which there is an
emergence of these different regional political parties. There are causes of
anxiety and these causes must be removed. These anxieties must be
removed by our joint participation, collective participation, and by cutting
r co
across party lines. Then only these problems can be resolved.

5,7 http://commcentrestate.gov.in/writereaddata/ccsruploades/observation.pdf.
558
http://parliamentofindia.mc.in/lsdeb/hl l/ses4/2527029704.htm.

435