Fuhr 2012

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Perspectives on resource politics

in a climate constrained world:
how ‘resource curse’ activists
view climate change
a b
Lili Fuhr & Sarah Wykes
a
Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung , Berlin , Germany
b
CAFOD (Catholic Agency For Overseas Development) ,
London , United Kingdom
Published online: 22 Oct 2012.
To cite this article: Lili Fuhr & Sarah Wykes (2012) Perspectives on resource politics
in a climate constrained world: how ‘resource curse’ activists view climate change,
Democratization, 19:5, 1014-1037, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2012.709693
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Democratization
Vol. 19, No. 5, October 2012, 1014 –1037
Perspectives on resource politics in a climate constrained world:

how ‘resource curse’ activists view climate change
Lili Fuhra∗ and Sarah Wykesb
a
Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, Berlin, Germany; bCAFOD (Catholic Agency For Overseas
Development), London, United Kingdom
(Received 19 March 2012; final version received 25 June 2012)
This examination of the views of activists combating the oil ‘resource curse’ in
Africa inquires whether their efforts to improve resource governance are
challenged by the imperatives of climate protection. After outlining the
‘resource curse’, namely the ‘rentier effect’ whereby resource rich governments
dampen democratic pressures, it outlines why current development models are
questioned by the need to decarbonize economies to combat climate change
and related environmental threats. Activists say lack of political will and
appropriate institutional frameworks are the main obstacles to better oil
governance. Most see connections between improved revenue transparency and
greater accountability of state and corporate actors but are less clear on links to
democratization. The relevance of improving climate protection is not grasped
uniformly: some think greater prioritization of climate protection could weaken
their countries’ development progress; others see it as integral to ‘sustainable
development’. This last point provides a potential basis for greater interaction
between ‘resource curse’ activists and activists working for improved climate
protection, possibly benefiting the objectives of both sets of actors.
Keywords: ‘resource curse’; revenue transparency; climate protection;
resource advocacy; resource governance; climate change advocacy
Introduction: forewritten is forewarned

This study asks whether (and how) the objectives of activists working to combat
the ‘resource curse’ in sub-Saharan Africa are challenged by their awareness of
the urgent need for climate protection1 globally or by climate change impacts
locally. Rather than scientifically surveying large numbers of ‘resource curse’ acti-
vists, it offers a ‘snapshot’ of the views of experienced activists working mainly in
or on oil producing countries whose work focuses primarily on improving revenue
and contract transparency and, by this means, the accountability of state and cor-
porate actors. The analysis is based on interviews with activists working within
the framework of the global Publish What You Pay (PWYP) campaign, selected
∗
Corresponding author. Email: fuhr@boell.de
ISSN 1351-0347 print/ISSN 1743-890X online

# 2012 Taylor & Francis
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2012.709693
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Democratization 1015
on the basis of the authors’ experience of working in this field over the past
decade.2 The study’s intention is to provide a catalyst for further and more systema-
tic exploration of whether the strategies adopted by activists to combat the
‘resource curse’ require revision in light of the climate crisis.
The project arose out of an attempt at self-reflection on the part of the authors.
First, there is a need to consider the question of whether the goal of redirecting
resource revenues towards socially productive uses (including addressing the nega-
tive social and environmental externalities of decades of oil production) could be
achieved through improvements to institutional transparency without wider
societal pressure for reforms leading to more inclusive decision-making in these

states. In other words, is there a roadmap leading from increased revenue transpar-
ency to the emergence of more democratic governance structures? Can these wider
pressures for reform emerge without structural changes to the rentier economic
model pertaining in such states – Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea being
leading examples?
Next, could such governance reforms be achieved on the timescale needed for
states in the region to develop the institutional capacity to address emerging
environmental threats to the well-being of their citizens, including climate
change and intensifying resource scarcity? The context as reported by the Inter-
national Energy Agency (IEA) in 2011 is that current energy consumption pat-
terns put the world on track to 68C of global warming,3 with carbon lock-in
from existing infrastructure likely within five years.4 This in turn raises the
more pragmatic question of whether and how a transition away from a ‘brown’
(fossil fuel) export-based model of development towards a low-carbon
economy could be catalysed through improvements in the transparency and
accountability of state and corporate actors.
These questions led in turn to curiosity about whether such concerns were
shared, in part or whole, by other advocates or activists (terms used as synonyms)
working in the field. Do views differ between African and non-African activists?
What should, or could, be the next steps for exploring the potential overlaps –
or dissonances – between those who want to combat the ‘resource curse’ and advo-
cates of better climate protection? These questions were explored in interviews
with ‘resource curse’ activists.
This study is only a first small step. Nevertheless, the ‘snapshot’ evidence
confirms an interest on the part of the activists in exploring further the linkages
between their work and that of climate protection advocates, particularly around
developing a common understanding of the concept of sustainable development
in a context of climate change and other global environmental threats.
The following three sections discuss the ‘resource curse’ and oil production as
a basis for sustainable development by African producers in an era of climate
change. The central sections that follow on reprise the views of the activists. A con-
clusion briefly sums up the main findings.
1016 L. Fuhr and S. Wykes
Oil for export as the basis for sustainable development?
In sub-Saharan Africa, nearly half the population lives in ‘resource rich’ countries,5
accounting for about 70% of Africa’s gross domestic product (GDP) and receiving
most of the continent’s foreign direct investment (FDI).6 A vibrant and diverse civil
society movement mainly organized around the global PWYP campaign (see
below) has been working for several decades on improving the governance of
the resource sector, with member groups in over 40 countries including 28 in
sub-Saharan Africa advocating on such issues as revenue transparency, conflict
prevention, human rights protection, environmental integrity and more equitable
investment regimes.7 The main reason for this well documented engagement is
that such countries are usually associated with the ‘resource curse’ – a phenom-
enon whereby the influx of rents from resource exploitation gives rise to uneven
economic development, continuing high levels of poverty, low human develop-
ment and a tendency to authoritarian rule, corruption and conflict.8
Oil producers are particularly prone to such outcomes. Equatorial Guinea, often
referred to as the ‘Kuwait of Africa’, has a GDP per capita similar to that of Euro-
pean countries like Germany or the United Kingdom.9 Yet its human development
indicators are some of the lowest in the world.10 Another example is Nigeria, the
most populous country in Africa11 and the world’s fourteenth largest producer,12
accounting for around 3.4% of global reserves.13 Oil revenues contribute over
90% of the country’s foreign exchange earnings.14 Yet over 55% of Nigerians
live below the poverty line15 and less than 50% currently have access to electricity.16
Oil production in the Niger Delta has resulted in the destruction of the environment
and livelihoods with minimal social returns.17 To cite one recent analysis:
Nigeria’s hydrocarbon natural resource (crude oil and natural gas) in spite of its abun-
dance and as the mainstay of over 80% of revenues to the nation, has NOT served as a
catalyst for economic growth neither has it served as the major source of energy in the
mix of energy supplies. Indeed petroleum only contributes about 10% as share to total
domestic energy supply/consumption with over 83% arising from combustible
energy, wood burning in particular.18
Indeed, a World Bank study concluded in 2004 that extractive investments can
only contribute to achieving the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs) if a number of good governance conditions are met in host countries.19
More recently, the UK’s The Economist invented the term ‘Middle Income but
Fragile or Failing States (MIFFs)’ to describe such countries.20
Many analysts have claimed that there is a connection between such resource
rich states and authoritarian regimes. In the case of oil producing countries, a
‘rentier effect’ has been suggested whereby governments use low tax rates and
patronage to dampen democratic pressures, along with a ‘repression effect’ where
governments strengthen their internal security forces and hence repress popular
movements. Finally, a ‘modernization effect’ has been argued, whereby growth
based on the export of oil and minerals fails to bring about the social and cultural
changes that often tend to produce democratic government.21 However, this analysis
has been revisited recently by Michael Ross, a principal proponent, using new data
sets and methodological approaches, with interesting results:
[There is] evidence that oil wealth strongly inhibits democratic transitions in authoritar-
ian states, that this pattern is reasonably robust, and that regardless of any possible coun-
tervailing pro-democracy effects, oil’s net impact on democratic transitions is strongly
negative. [However,] oil’s undemocratic effects are uneven: they seem to have grown
stronger over time [. . .] due to the rising prevalence of state ownership; but in Latin
America, oil has not inhibited democratic transitions. [In addition, both the ‘repression’
and the ‘modernization’ effects] either lack statistical support, or are logically unpersua-
sive. The only one that seems to account for the oil-autocracy link is the ‘rentier effect’.22
The premise of PWYP, the largest and best known civil society movement
working to combat the ‘resource curse’, is that greater transparency of revenues
flows is crucial to improving accountability on the part of state and corporate
actors. In turn this should open more political space for discussion over revenue
use. Hence revenue transparency is a democratizing tool:
The call for companies to ‘publish what you pay’ and for governments to ‘publish
what you earn’ is a necessary first step towards a more accountable system for the
management of natural resource revenues. If companies disclose what they pay,
and governments disclose their receipts of such revenues, then members of civil
society in resource-rich countries will be able to compare the two and thus hold
their governments accountable for the management of this valuable source of
income. Revenue transparency will also help civil society groups to work towards
a democratic debate over the effective use and allocation of resource revenues.23
PWYP has achieved some notable successes, principally the establishment of a

voluntary multi-stakeholder framework, plus legislation in the United States – and
now potentially in the European Union (EU)24 – aimed at greater disclosure by
extractive companies of revenues paid to host governments for resource access.
Reform of disclosure rules is now firmly on the political agenda in a number of
oil importing and producer countries despite the resistance of the oil industry.25
However, is there a direct or incontrovertible link between increased access to
fiscal information and citizen empowerment in African ‘resource curse’ countries?
The ability of citizens to hold state and corporate actors to account, even given
better and increased information on fiscal flows, can be limited by financial, tech-
nical and political constraints, some of them linked to the anti-democratic impacts
of the ‘rentier’ effect referred to above (views expressed by African advocates
interviewed on this subject are reported below).26
In addition, despite the demands by African and international civil society for
better management of oil wealth, many negative externalities of oil production in
the region remain largely unaddressed. Even in Nigeria, which has arguably the
highest level of civil society advocacy and significant space for democratic
debate, the international oil company Shell has finally accepted responsibility
for environmental damage caused by its activities in Ogoniland after years of
relentless campaigning. Following an assessment by the United Nations Environ-
ment Programme (UNEP), Shell has now pledged to clean up the damage (which
will take approximately 30 years).27
The strategic direction of advocacy to combat the oil curse should at least be
put under the spotlight in many African producer countries, for instance in
Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Republic of Congo, where the pace of implemen-
tation of revenue transparency reforms and improvements in social and environ-
mental protection is slow,28 mainly due to lack of political will and institutional
capacity, according to those interviewed (see below). The geopolitical reality of

growing global demand for fossil fuels driven by emerging economies, especially
China,29 coupled with declining production from some established oil fields like
Britain’s North Sea, will likely increase the pressure to develop new sources of
oil as a matter of priority, including in Africa.30
The vast majority of the world’s remaining ‘easy to access’ oil is under the
control of states belonging to the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), with international oil companies such as Shell and Exxon enjoying
more limited access than in the past (for a variety of reasons, mainly increasing
resource nationalism).31 So, unless global energy policies change significantly,
there will likely be intensifying competition by oil companies to access the remain-
ing conventional resources along with investment in new ‘unconventional’ forms of
oil, where these exist.32 Unconventional oil investments pose an even higher risk to
the climate, as well as to the local environment and host communities than conven-
tional oil.33 New investment in sub-Saharan Africa targets both traditional produ-
cers like Nigeria and Angola and new producers such as Ghana and Uganda.34
Companies also have licences to explore tar sands and/or extra heavy oil in Mada-
gascar and the Republic of Congo.35 The increasing demand for all of Africa’s stra-
tegic resources to fuel modern technologies in communication, renewable energies
and transport is driving increased foreign investment. 36
Energy, climate and global environmental threats

Climate change represents perhaps the greatest challenge to human survival to date
and has been described as a ‘threat multiplier’, amplifying existing social, political
and resource stresses – and potentially rendering them unmanageable.37 However,
it is only one of several environmental threats perhaps most usefully defined by the
concept of ‘planetary boundaries’.38 All these threats are symptoms of a fundamen-
tal developmental crisis that is already undermining gains in poverty reduction in
poor countries and threatening future progress.39
Adapting to the threats from a changing climate will be a particularly pressing
concern for sub-Saharan African countries, in light of evidence from bodies like the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the World Bank.40
According to the latter:
Climate change threatens all countries, with developing countries the most vulner-
able. Estimates are that they would bear some 75 to 80 percent of the costs of
damages caused by the changing climate. Even 28C warming above preindustrial
temperatures – the minimum the world is likely to experience – could result in per-
manent reductions in GDP of 4 to 5 percent for Africa and South Asia. Most devel-
oping countries lack sufficient financial and technical capacities to manage increasing
climate risk. They also depend more directly on climate-sensitive natural resources
for income and well-being. And most are in tropical and subtropical regions
already subject to highly variable climate.41
Earlier, in 2007, the IPCC cited the following probable impacts of global warming
on Africa:
. By 2020, between 75 and 250 million of people are projected to be exposed

to increased water stress due to climate change.
. By 2020, in some countries, yields from rain-fed agriculture could be
reduced by up to 50%. Agricultural production, including access to food,
in many African countries is projected to be severely compromised. This
would further adversely affect food security and exacerbate malnutrition.
. Towards the end of the twenty-first century, projected sea level rise will
affect low-lying coastal areas with large populations. The cost of adaptation
could amount to at least 5 to 10% of GDP.
. By 2080 an increase of 5 – 8% of arid and semi-arid land in Africa is pro-
jected under a range of climate scenarios (high confidence).42
In recognition of this, the MDG Africa Steering Group in 2008 called for better
‘climate proofing’ of efforts to achieve the MDGs.43 Although initiatives such as
PWYP assume that resource wealth can fund human development, the harm that
oil extraction can do to human development in sub-Saharan African states is
now being compounded by the negative climate and other eco-system externalities
caused by fossil fuel use globally. A consensus is thus emerging that ‘business-as-
usual is no longer a viable option’ for future development strategies.44
On the ascendant is the idea that an urgent ‘greening’ of economies is required.
UNEP defines a ‘green’ economy not just in environmental terms but as ‘one that
results in improved human well-being and social equity, while significantly redu-
cing environmental risks and ecological scarcities’.45 It puts human wellbeing –
and the social inclusion of poor actors – at the heart of any transition to sustainable
development:
The concept of a ‘green economy’ does not replace sustainable development, but
there is now a growing recognition that achieving sustainability rests almost entirely
on getting the economy right. Decades of creating new wealth through a ‘brown [i.e.
fossil fuel-based] economy’ model have not substantially addressed social margina-
lization and resource depletion, and we are still far from delivering to [sic] the Mil-
lennium Development Goals. Sustainability is still a vital long-term goal, but we
must work on greening the economy to get us there.46
Indeed, Evans among others argues that increasing resource scarcity and decreasing
scope for safe carbon release into the atmosphere adds greater urgency to the need to
ensure access by poor men and women to their ‘fair share’ of global resources.47
Central to ‘greening’ economies is decarbonization of energy systems, since
60% of global carbon emissions come from energy-related use.48 The ‘alternative’–
no energy policy change49 – will only ensure ‘rapidly increasing dependence on
fossil fuels, with alarming consequences for climate change and energy security’.50
Therefore ‘the weaker the response to the climate challenge, the greater the risk of oil
scarcity and the higher the economic cost for consuming countries’.51
The key challenge facing policymakers in industrialized and emerging econom-

ies largely dependent on imports of fossil fuels is therefore how to manage this struc-
tural transition while ensuring security of energy supply for their citizens. For
citizens in many developing countries, access to affordable, secure modern energy
for basic and productive use is critical. According to the IEA, ‘globally, over 1.3
billion people lack access to electricity and 2.7 billion people lack clean cooking
facilities. More than 95% of these people are either in sub-Saharan Africa or devel-
oping Asia and 84% in rural areas’.52 The United Nations (UN) declared 2012 the
International Year of Sustainable Energy for All.53,54
Many African countries, including oil producers, are net oil importers, at the
mercy of rising and volatile prices for fossil fuels. In Nigeria ‘over 90% of
petrol is imported in order to meet domestic consumption needs . . . A full cost –
benefit analysis of the fuel subsidy system would reveal costs beyond the annual
US$8 billion in subsidy for imported products, as this relates only to primary
costs’.55 However most African countries are not yet ‘locked into’ to high-
carbon models of development.
‘Carbon lock-in’ occurs where ‘industrial economies have been locked into
fossil fuel-based energy systems through a process of technological and insti-
tutional co-evolution driven by path-dependent increasing returns to scale.
[This] condition . . . creates persistent market and policy failures that can inhibit
the diffusion of carbon-saving technologies’.56 In contrast, there is evidence that
clean energy technologies can promote social and economic inclusion of poor
actors while reducing environmental impacts. For instance, ‘[c]lean, decentralized
renewable energy is often the most appropriate means of providing holistic energy
services in rural areas that support both economic and social development’ – and
such investment can also be cost-effective.57 Overall, the IEA found (1) traditional
centralized supply and grid extension approaches to rural electrification will barely
outpace population growth, achieving only a 14 % reduction in the unelectrified
population worldwide by 2030; (2) for universal energy access to occur by
2030, 70% of rural populations will need to be served by decentralized renewable
energy; and (3) electrification strategies should focus heavily on decentralized
renewable energy systems in order to achieve universal energy access by 2030.58
Shifting to a green economy makes good sense, but it will be particularly chal-
lenging for ‘resource curse’ countries. In undemocratic rentier states, there may be
neither the political will nor the institutional capacity to provide the ‘enabling
conditions’ required to do this or to try to influence global energy policy.59 Just as
they seem unlikely to direct today’s oil rents towards meeting their citizens’ human
development needs, many rentier states show little evidence of serious commit-
ment to mitigating the impacts of environmental threats on their citizens. State
actors may be in synergy here with the corporate and other vested interests
based in countries like the United States and Canada who have a history of lobby-
ing against climate protection reforms. In theory, greater democratic progress in
Africa might empower citizens to act against this state of affairs. But as Lynch
and Crawford argue, although on balance recent decades have seen democratic pro-
gress in Africa overall, there have been setbacks and delays; advances in socio-
economic rights and physical security of citizens lag behind the moderate achieve-
ments in civil and political rights.60
Impact of future energy trends and climate finance

Would policy action to address global CO2 emissions by reducing the global
demand for oil – for example by removing price and production subsidies61 –
inevitably lead to greater democratic reform in Africa’s oil rentier states? Would
it reduce the rents underpinning the ‘rentier effect’ that dampens democratic press-
ures and keeps authoritarian elites in power?62 In the short term at least the answer
is likely to be no, for the following reasons.
First, the IEA believes fossil fuels will remain the dominant energy sources in
2035, with oil being the most dominant, although its share in total primary energy
demand falls progressively in each of the IEA’s three scenarios, especially under
the most radical policy change (so-called 450 Scenario), where it falls to 26% in
2035 from 33% in 2009.63 Secondly, the removal of subsidies or other policies
that reduce demand would impact first production that is most price sensitive,
such as unconventional oil: ‘The prospect of lower demand is much less of a
threat to [Middle Eastern and North African (MENA)] producers [and, concomi-
tantly, to producers of conventional oil in sub-Saharan Africa] and the resource
remains sufficient, especially at lower rates of demand’.64
Nevertheless, according to the IEA ‘[t]he global outlook for oil remains highly
sensitive to policy action to curb rising demand and emissions’.65 In addition, the
450 Scenario has only a 50% chance of limiting temperature rise to 28C, with many
scientists and civil society groups advocating that any rise should be kept to a much
lower level.66 Indeed, UNEP finds that ‘substituting investments in carbon-inten-
sive energy sources with investments in clean energy would almost triple the pen-
etration of renewable sources used in power generation from 16% to 45% by 2050’
and their share in the overall energy mix could double ‘to provide more than 25%
of total supply’.67
Nevertheless, even if democracy’s supporters in Africa cannot realistically
expect major reductions in demand for their ‘easy to access’ oil exports or
depletion of reserves to exert indirect pressure for democratic reform in the next
few decades, the possibility exists for activists working on the oil curse to take
advantage of the world’s need to tackle climate change and growing resource scar-
city to advocate for clean, pro-poor development, at the local, country and regional
level – particularly if the funds now promised for climate action are actually forth-
coming from developed countries.68
This may be particularly pertinent as a subject for public debate in countries
facing new oil investment but not yet ‘locked in’ to high-carbon export depen-
dency, Uganda for example. However, even in a long-standing producer like
Nigeria, an analysis now exists of what a ‘green economy’ transition might
entail, showing evidence of interest in promoting a ‘paradigm shift, diversifying
the economic base towards sustainable renewable sources’.69 The authors of that
analysis argue this is needed both because the economy’s fossil fuel resource
base is declining and because of climate change.70 One of the first steps could
be for ‘resource curse’ activists to shake off ‘the most widespread myth . . . that
there is an inescapable trade-off between environmental sustainability and econ-
omic progress’.71 To explore this further, the following sections turn to reporting
the views of ‘resource curse’ activists on the issues outlined above, as revealed
by the authors’ survey.72
‘Resource curse’ activists’ views on the climate challenge

This section and those following report the findings from interviews with resource
course activists.73 They were first asked about their current advocacy and then
whether they regarded climate change as a challenge to their objectives. Finally,
they were asked how, if at all, they were adapting their strategies in light of any
challenges they identified.
All respondents said their overarching goal was bringing good governance to
the natural resource sector with, as a first step, promoting revenue transparency.
Most felt they had already achieved the objectives of creating a global consensus
on the need for greater transparency and greater civil society understanding of sec-
toral norms and emerging ‘soft law’74 (e.g. the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative or EITI75) in producer countries. Overall, the principal objectives now
were: ensuring greater transparency along the value chain, particularly disclosure
of contracts; ensuring the EITI process is institutionalized and establishing a
common ‘standard’ for its reporting; building civil society capacity to understand
and use data disclosed under the EITI; ensuring proper implementation of ‘hard
law’ reforms such as recent changes to stock exchange rules; and extending
such reforms to other jurisdictions, for example the EU.76
Most respondents saw transparency and monitoring of expenditure as key
objectives, and as building blocks for more effective civil society participation
in budgetary processes and establishing democratic accountability more widely.
They also raised the issue of addressing the social and environmental impacts of
resource exploitation. In addition, most African activists saw EITI primarily as a
means of broadening the political space for civil society to raise governance
issues. In this sense, they wanted more analysis of whether EITI had in fact enabled
greater civil society scrutiny of the management of the resource sector.
Thus many activists clearly see links between their work and what can be
termed wider processes of democratization. Some actually said revenue transpar-
ency was driving democratization by building a ‘state of law’ in their country,
including enhancing the capacity of civil society and media to perform independent
oversight. But only two African respondents called for a more holistic analysis of
how their work linked to wider sustainable development processes.
Drivers of better governance in the natural resource sector

Most respondents identified the same key drivers of change, the first being
increased civil society awareness and capacity: building an ‘internal constituency’
for reform and greater civil society expertise to perform oversight of a complex
sector. Also, all respondents cited the adoption of regulatory frameworks at
global, regional and national levels.77 The creation of international soft law
norms (principally the EITI) was seen as important – but insufficient – by all.
Several respondents highlighted the need for greater commitment by business
to go beyond corporate social responsibility and the potentially positive role of
international actors like the World Bank and trade agreements like the US
African Growth and Opportunity Act (2000) in incentivizing reforms. Many
respondents also highlighted the role of oil importing states and their parastatal
agencies in supporting or conversely inhibiting governance reforms, particularly
the ‘new’ players in Africa – China and the other BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India,
China) countries. The growing power of China as a purchaser of natural resources
was seen mainly as negative, given its willingness to offer credit with few govern-
ance ‘strings’ attached, weakening the incentives for producer governments to
reform.
Strategies for better natural resource governance

The respondents identified multiple strategies employed by their organizations for
pursuing better resource governance, involving different actors. The first strategy
was building civil society’s technical capacity for oversight and advocacy and
raising public awareness of the importance of revenue transparency. Two
African respondents advocated a greater focus on the contradictions between use
of resource revenues and governments’ stated policy priorities to reduce poverty,
so as to broaden the range of civil society groups supporting revenue transparency.
Several African and international respondents called for more resources to protect
activists from repressive measures, in Africa.
In terms of regulation, at the international level the main tactic involved using
the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules to leverage comparable
action in other jurisdictions and, at national level, pushing for improved access to
information in national law (e.g. in Ghana). Respondents also saw documenting the
negative social, environmental and human rights impacts of specific investments as
crucial. This included raising public awareness about the weakness of existing
accountability mechanisms and using data from EITI reports to highlight account-
ing discrepancies. Work on a new international accounting standard combined with
more effective interventions by international financial institutions was mentioned.
In terms of alliances, outreach to national and regional civil society actors,
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), donors, parliamentarians
and investors was mentioned. Some respondents saw EITI stakeholders as key
allies and, under certain circumstances, corporate actors too. Several respondents
saw faith-based networks as important allies. Some African respondents high-

lighted developing regional-level alliances up to the level of the African Union
as a way to overcome political obstacles at the national level. Most felt it would
be difficult to obtain national-level reforms without reforms to corporate reporting
and contract laws being agreed at either the regional or global level.
Key challenges
All the interviewee respondents identified lack of political will to reform on the part
of producer governments and inadequate institutional frameworks for ensuring
democratic accountability as major obstacles. One African respondent stated that
‘resource curse’ governments ‘usually get involved with these [transparency]
initiatives because of an explicit or implicit conditionality in International Finan-
cial Institution (IFI) agreements’. A minority felt governments’ responsiveness
to calls for reform depended on creating the right incentives. The policies and
actions of international aid donors were seen as crucial in driving the transparency
– and wider democratization – agenda.
Secondly, most respondents pointed to the lack of support for improved gov-
ernance – linked to a lack of perceived impact on the ‘bottom line’ – by corporate
actors as a key challenge. Some saw companies actively exploiting existing trans-
parency ‘gaps’ for their own commercial advantage. Most called for more effective
policing of corporate behaviour. Several African respondents argued that commu-
nities suffering harm from extractive operations must become politically empow-
ered before they could even begin to counter the influence of companies and the
ruling elites, who are perceived to collaborate in predatory practices. Two Northern
respondents thought that intensifying international competition for natural
resources made it even more urgent to ‘ensure that transparency doesn’t get
pushed off the agenda’. One believed the current economic crisis in industrialized
countries would make the sector more prone to human rights and environmental
abuses, and undermine pressures for democratic reform more generally. Finally,
most respondents linked the lack of government and corporate will to reform to
civil society’s inability to perform effective oversight. According to some
African respondents, this is symptomatic of the lack of democratic space generally
for civil society and other potential pro-reform actors like the independent press,
national parliaments, and academics.
In conclusion, most interviewees felt there was a link (actual or potential)
between improving revenue transparency and building democratic accountability
in their societies, but offered little detail on how to chart a path from securing
their short-term objectives on reforming oil sector governance to addressing
wider political and societal issues.
Climate change: opportunity or threat to tackling the ‘resource curse’?

[Climate change] is a challenge to our work in so far as dealing with it could improve
the quality of our environment, reform our governance, and improve the governance
of multinationals. And in the case of my country, improve forest management. It reaf-
firms the need to establish transparency and accountability mechanisms and to reduce
corruption and diversify our economy [away from oil]. In our continent in particular,
protecting the climate is essential as we are already suffering from the impacts of
climate change and we are the least prepared to react to this problem. (Activist
from Central Africa)
All those interviewed78 felt that the climate crisis had implications for their work,
but most lacked a clear grasp of how exactly and, with a few notable exceptions,
none had a detailed understanding of the complex field of climate management
at either UN, regional or national level.
Some respondents saw the climate crisis as raising fundamental questions for
their work, saying it ‘put a whole new spotlight on resource governance’ by
‘serving notice that [oil dependent] countries cannot profit to the extent they are
now with economies fuelled by hydrocarbons so they need to diversify’. One
African respondent identified climate change as a ‘risk multiplier’, exacerbating
existing social, economic and political problems in his country. Several others
(both Northern and African) felt that the links between improved governance of
extractive resources, particularly oil, and addressing the climate crisis was not
clear in the African context, especially given Africa’s lack of historical responsibil-
ity for climate change. However, this was a minority view. Only two respondents
(one African, one Northern) stated they could not see any current connection
between their work and climate issues; even they thought there were potential lin-
kages (see below).
Exploring common concerns between ‘resource curse’ and climate

activism
The overall view expressed by respondents was that areas for concrete advocacy
collaboration between resource activists and climate change activists had yet to
be clearly identified. One African respondent commented: ‘perhaps [the lack of
strategic thinking] is because as yet [climate change] hasn’t directly impacted
our campaigning work. We work more on the social impacts of the “resource
curse”. But it’s obvious that climate change has already impacted the dynamics
in the [energy and forestry] sectors, so we should be taking a more analytical
approach to this question’. In fact most respondents echoed this view. One African
commented: ‘we need a strategic process through which to consider these issues in
a holistic way, not just piecemeal and at the national level’. Some respondents
expressed uncertainty as to what the right forum and timing would be for such a
process: one Northern interviewee questioned the suitability of PWYP as a plat-
form for such a discussion: ‘PWYP is very one-issue [i.e. revenue transparency]
driven’.
The main exception to this general failure to identify specific links between the
two advocacy areas was the UN’s programme on Reducing Emissions from Defor-
estation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD).79 REDD was

cited as an initiative where cooperation – and, indeed, shared advocacy strategies
– exist between activists working on forest governance and climate protection keen
both to protect forests from illegal or excessive industrial logging and viewing
forests as vital sources of bio-diversity and carbon sinks. Aside from this excep-
tion, what stands in the way of resource activists taking greater account of the
issue of climate protection?
One obstacle cited by several Northern and African activists was that it was
‘hard enough for civil society organisations to understand basic revenue transpar-
ency issues let alone [climate change]’. One Northern activist described this as ‘the
next generation of issues’. Most of the African respondents felt they had only
limited knowledge of climate science or climate policy debates. Respondents
identified a concrete information/knowledge gap both within the PWYP move-
ment and a lack of structured information exchange and communication with acti-
vists working on climate protection. They advocated more public outreach by
states and donors to educate the public, especially the most vulnerable commu-
nities, on climate change and related issues like planning for climate adaptation
and low carbon development strategies. Some African respondents said there
was no organization working on ‘climate change issues’ in their country, although
for one: ‘Debate is starting at the national level, in some countries and we are seeing a
growing interest in this issue, we just don’t have a worked-out position yet’.
Lack of knowledge was linked by some African respondents to insufficient
‘demand’ from their communities, who sometimes think that adapting to climate
change impacts is less important than more immediate developmental challenges.
In the words of one, ‘climate change seems like an abstract, long-term issue not
something communities have to live with day-to-day, whereas the impacts of a
mining project are immediate and visible’. However, opinion was divided on
whether this was because climate change had not (yet) had an impact or because
there was inadequate understanding of/reliable information about the impacts.
Some African and Northern respondents said it was difficult to ‘isolate’ climate
impacts from all the other determinants of vulnerability afflicting poor commu-
nities, such as not enough assets in the form of title to land or access to credit
and technical assistance.
Most respondents pointed to a disconnection within their own institutional
setting between advocacy on resource governance and action on climate change,
with most organizations treating these as ‘two separate strands’. Indeed, some
African respondents saw a similar disconnect occurring within their governments,
donor bodies and their INGO partners, where it is a fact that different actors work
on natural resources and climate protection. One African and one Northern respon-
dent stated that while there was an internal debate among INGOs involved in
PWYP, discussions about the implications of climate change mainly take place
internationally and at very high level. The technical complexity of the UN
climate negotiations was seen as a major barrier.
Tackling the oil curse and protecting the climate: the trade-offs?
How do you reform a whole economy based on rent seeking? If there is a demand for
oil, the producing countries in the South are going to supply it. As we have no inter-
national governance mechanisms, the competition to access energy resources will
continue as long as demand remains high. (European activist)
Around 20% of respondents only appeared to sense there may be ‘trade-offs’ and
tensions between the two areas of work compared to the opportunities. For
instance, one question raised by an African respondent was whether climate pol-
icies in developed countries (setting emissions reduction targets; imposing
carbon taxes) that reduced demand for fossil fuels would produce knock-on
effects on revenue generation in Africa’s oil producing countries. But several
African respondents highlighted a potential tension arising from the difference
in priorities of Northern and Southern NGOs, one stating: ‘PWYP/EITI always
talk about a win-win situation, but it is difficult to see how on this issue
the North and South would have the same objectives’. One respondent even felt
the climate change debate risked diverting attention and resources away from
the need to increase government transparency at a time when Africa has no real
power – or responsibility – to promote decarbonization. Most African respondents
echoed the view that African oil producers cannot determine global energy policy:
in that sense, they are powerless. In addition, they felt that in the presence of poor
governance at home their governments would seek the highest possible rents with
the least constraints irrespective of any global climate crisis and the harm to
Africans.
However, the issue of income substitution was also raised by a few respon-
dents: ‘You can’t tell producers that they don’t have a right to sell their assets on
the international markets, the solution has to be demand-driven not supply side
. . . New producers in Africa want to benefit from oil extraction and their opportu-
nity costs need to be valued and they would need to be compensated to diversify or
move to a low-carbon economy’. In other words, there are major questions of social
justice that must be addressed here.
Finally, two African respondents felt that, as a long-term objective, reform of
oil governance in their country depended on greater democratization. This perspec-
tive was felt to be in conflict with any call by climate protection activists to give
priority to decarbonization. Nevertheless, a common response to the question
about possible ‘trade-offs’ was to highlight the broad relevance to both movements
of systemic improvements in the accountability of state and corporate actors. This
reflects a widely shared if not always fully articulated sense among the respondents
that there are some more (and some less) useful ways for activists to frame their
concerns about climate protection and the ‘resource curse’. In fact, one African
respondent argued that because ‘resource governance could be represented as
more of an issue for organizations in the South while climate protection is more
important for Northern [environmental] NGOs’, activists must ‘frame the debate
as not being a case of either climate protection or development but ask what
kind of development we need, given the different crises we face, including
climate change’. This insightful contribution to the discussion suggests that
more effort should be put into highlighting how current (energy-intensive) devel-
opment models are unlikely to resolve the climate crisis but instead will lead to ever
greater natural resource constraints/scarcity, damage to local eco-systems and
failure to address the social and economic exclusion experienced by poor men
and women.80
Concrete ways to promote discussion on the links between tackling the

‘resource curse’ and climate protection
It’s not as if the existing economic model [in ‘resource curse’ countries] is delivering
for the people, so if this is going into decline because of the impact of climate policies,
this could be an opportunity to move to a different development path. (Activist from
West Africa)
Several interviewees identified the shortcomings of current developmental

models – intensified by the climate crisis – as a starting point for an informed dis-
cussion around renewed action to tackle climate change impacts and better natural
resource governance, both integral elements of sustainable development in African
countries.
Some respondents thought there should first be an internal discussion within
PWYP to build understanding and capacity around climate protection issues.
Two Northern respondents suggested this should take place among ‘an emerging
group of activists that are going to be influential in the future [in Africa]’. An
entry point suggested by an African respondent was to organize discussion
around the monitoring of resource revenue expenditures and provision for future
generations, the idea being to consider whether revenues should be invested in
national climate change planning that would benefit the majority of citizens includ-
ing the poor.
Several Northern and African respondents believed such a debate would be
most effective in the context of new investments or emerging oil production
centres as in Ghana and Uganda, and where local concern about the impact of
climate change overlaps with concern that individual investments could do
social or environmental harm. One African respondent summarized it thus: ‘there
are many areas where mineral or oil development doesn’t make sense for climate
protection reasons, but also because of its local impacts. At the moment, it is these
immediate impacts that concern local communities, the destruction of their liveli-
hoods and infringement of other rights, whereas the climate change issue is often
too abstract’. But some respondents felt that in many localities the impact of chan-
ging weather patterns was already a real concern, even if human-induced climate
change is not the only cause. Prolonged drought in parts of East Africa was cited as
an example.
Other respondents agreed on the logic of having both an internal (PWYP) learn-
ing process and engaging (informally or formally) in dialogue with climate activists
and experts, with a view to developing common strategies. This could take place at
international, regional, and national levels, depending on which groups showed the
most interest. The starting point should be, according to one African respondent, ‘a
common understanding of the links between the two areas, ideally, with examples
from particular country contexts’. Examples of suggested topics for discussion
included understanding ‘climate resilient’ or low carbon development, with con-
crete examples of what such development might look like and identifying ‘false sol-
utions’ to the climate crisis and to overcoming resource constraints (large hydro-
power dams was cited here). A few Northern respondents mentioned investments
in ever-dirtier forms of oil production such as tar sands as a development where
there is a crossover between the concerns of climate protection and resource acti-
vists. More detailed research into other areas of potential crossover, in terms both
of concrete advocacy objectives or strategies and issues of common concern, was
felt by several Northern and African respondents to be overdue. According to
one African respondent the building of better links between activists and academic
institutions or think-tanks could help here.
Conclusions
The interviews that form the primary new evidence in this study clearly show a
growing recognition amongst leading ‘resource curse’ activists of the importance
of thinking through the meaning of the climate crisis for their advocacy, systemi-
cally or in relation to particular investments. Most respondents accept that a next
step is to build their understanding of climate change with its effects in their
own context, especially for communities on the ground, and of the potential
links between their own work and climate protection policies on a national and
global level.
The interviews revealed that a major potential entry point for discussion
between the two communities is the concept of sustainable development in a
climate constrained world. This refers to the kinds of development strategy
required to build climate resilience while also achieving the goal of poverty
reduction, especially the social inclusion of poor people, with concrete policy fra-
meworks to achieve these ends. One immediate and practical area for potential
collaboration could be in tracking international financial flows for climate adap-
tation and low carbon development, so as to establish whether they serve environ-
mental and poverty-reduction objectives. PWYP’s advocates have long-standing
experience with budget monitoring and tracking of financial flows from the
resource sector, and the climate protection community is now starting to address
these issues too. Also, collaboration on resistance to exceptionally carbon-inten-
sive as well as socially and environmentally harmful investments in ‘resource
curse’ countries could be an important step to developing more ‘joined up’ advo-
cacy approaches. The main conclusion is that although ‘resource curse’ activists do
not yet have a detailed strategy for engaging with climate protection activists the
potential for developing this does exist. The larger gains for democracy may be
hard to visualize let alone measure. But greater coordination still offers one way
for activists to try to influence governments more, in the interests of both better
resource governance and climate protection, especially where there is some demo-
cratic progress already under way.
Notes
1. Climate protection is defined here as policies aimed at reducing the levels of green-
house gas emissions globally, in accordance with the levels demanded by climate
science and in this context refers to advocacy aimed at generating public and political
support for such policies.
2. Interviews conducted by Sarah Wykes and by Samuel Nguiffo, Director of Centre for
Environment and Development (CED), Cameroon (member of PWYP Cameroon and
EITI Committee Cameroon), in person, by phone or email between August and
November 2010. Thirty-five potential interviewees were contacted, of whom 24
responded positively. All the interviewees were professionals with at least three
years’ work experience with the global PWYP campaign and/or membership of its
national committees, or the international Board of the Extractive Industries Transpar-
ency Initiative (EITI), or supporting one or both organizations through funding or
activities like investor engagement. Ten worked for organizations based in Europe
or North America, one was based in Latin America and 13 were Africans holding lea-
dership positions with organizations based in sub-Saharan Africa. Interviews lasted
45–90 minutes. This account also incorporates comments made during discussion
of the interview findings by activists at workshops convened by Heinrich Böll Foun-
dation and CED in Berlin, 17 November 2010. In order to guarantee the security of the
African respondents, all responses are reported anonymously.
3. ‘With current policies in place, global temperatures are set to increase 6 8C which has
catastrophic implications’. Fatih Birol, IEA Chief Economist, Launch of World
Energy Outlook 2011, 1 December 2011.
4. At the launch of the World Energy Outlook 2011 the IEA stressed that: ‘Without
further action, by 2017 all CO2 emissions permitted in the 450 Scenario will be
‘locked-in’ by existing power plants, factories, buildings, etc.’. London Press
Launch, November 2011. The IEA’s ‘450 Scenario’ forecasts the trajectory of
energy supply and demand necessary to stabilize the concentration of CO2-equivalent
in the atmosphere at 450 parts per million (ppm) or the level necessary to prevent
average global temperatures rising more than 28C, which it claims will constrain
climate change at a manageable level. However, no consensus exists on the 450
ppm figure and many commentators say a ‘safe’ level of CO2 concentration is the
much lower 350 ppm – see for example www.350.org.
5. International Monetary Fund (IMF), Guide on Resource Revenue Transparency, clas-
sify a country as ‘resource rich’ if it meets either an average share of hydrocarbon and/
or mineral fiscal revenues in total fiscal revenue of at least 25% during the period
2000–5, or an average share of hydrocarbon and/or mineral export proceeds in
total export proceeds of at least 25% during 2000–5.
6. World Bank, Fact Sheet.
7. See www.publishwhatyoupay.org.
8. See for instance Gelb, Oil Windfalls; Auty, Sustaining Development in Mineral Econ-
omies; Karl, The Paradox of Plenty; Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap, Chap-
ters 5–6; Ganesan and Vines, Engine of War, 301–23; Ballentine, ‘Peace before
Profit’, 447– 84; Humphreys, ‘Natural Resources’.
9. See http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/GNQ.html. According to the the
World Bank’s Doing Business indictators for 2012, Equatorial Guinea is rated high
income with a gross national income (GNI) per capita of US$14,680. See http://
www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/equatorial-guinea/.
10. The United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Index
ranks Equatorial Guinea 136th out of 187 countries in 2011.
11. Population estimated around 155 million, July 2011. CIA, World Factbook 2011.
12. 2009 figures available at http://www.eia.gov/countries/.
13. BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy. Figures are for end 2010.
14. Energy Information Agency (EIA), US Department of Energy, Nigeria Country Brief.
15. World Bank (2011) at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC/countries/
NG?display=graph.
16. Data for 2009 put electrification rates for Nigeria at 50%. Around 76 million Nigerians
lack access to electricity and over 100 million lack access to clean cooking facilities.
IEA, World Energy Outlook 2011.
17. See for instance Amnesty International, Nigeria; UNEP, Environmental Assessment;
and Heinrich Böll Foundation, ‘Green Deal Nigeria’.
18. Heinrich Böll Foundation, ‘Green Deal Nigeria’.
19. World Bank, Striking a Better Balance.
20. ‘MIFFed by Misrule: A New Category of Countries Mixes Modest Affluence with
Miserable Governance’, The Economist, July 21, 2011.
21. Ross finds evidence supporting the theory, in ‘Does Oil Hinder Democracy?’
22. Ross, ‘Oil and Democracy Revisited’, emphasis added; also Andersen and Ross, ‘The
Big Oil Change’.
23. See http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/mission; also Gary and Karl, Bottom of the
Barrel; Collier, The Bottom Billion; Alba, ‘Extractive Industries Value Chain’.
24. ‘EU Transparency Rules Tougher than Expected’, Financial Times, October
24, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ba484354-fe66-11e0-bac4-00144feabdc0.
html#axzz1bjNnKFfQ.
25. Recently some ground-breaking legal cases allege misappropriation of assets by
several African leaders of oil producing states. See for example Association Sherpa,
L’affaire. Also Open Society Justice Initiative, Litigation: APDHE v. Equatorial
Guinea.
26. For discussion of this in Uganda see Schwarte, Public Participation and Oil Exploita-
tion in Uganda.
27. UNEP, Environmental Assessment.
28. See for instance AllAfrica.com, ‘Equatorial Guinea: Obiang Seeks to Protect Son
From Law’; Clark, The Failure of Democracy in the Republic of Congo; Roque,
‘Angola’s Facade Democracy’; Sturman, Unconstitutional Changes of Government.
29. According to the IEA, World Energy Outlook 2010: ‘Non-OECD countries generate
the bulk of the increase in global demand for all primary energy sources . . . Oil
demand increases the most in China . . . now the world’s largest energy consumer
. . . In terms of total global energy-related emissions, China will account for three quar-
ters of the projected 11 gigatonnes (Gt) increase to 2030’. The IEA’s World Energy
Outlook 2009, 14, said: ‘[n]on-OECD countries account for all of the projected
growth in energy-related emissions to 2030’.
30. The IEA estimated in 2008 that of the 70 million barrels per day (Mbpd) of conven-
tional oil in production in 2007, 43 Mbpd would not be available in 2030. To meet
rising demand in an unchanged policy environment an extra 64 Mbpd of new capacity
(equal to almost six times the current capacity of Saudi Arabia) will be needed. IEA,
World Energy Outlook 2008, 18.

31. The international oil companies’ access to around 85% of global oil reserves in the
1960s declined to only 6% in 2010. Arthur D. Little Management Consultants,
‘New Business Models’.
32. These resources are more technically difficult, expensive and energy intensive to
extract and process into petroleum products. The most commercially advanced is
oil derived from tar/oil sands deposits in Alberta, Canada. Heinrich Böll Foundation,
‘Marginal Oil’ provides an overview. See also Financial Times, ‘Oil groups Chase
Elusive Production Growth’.
33. Fuels produced from tar sands have on average 23% higher greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions, compared to conventional oil currently used in the EU, according to
Brandt, Upstream Greenhouse Gas Emissions.
34. See for example Oxfam America and Isodec, Ghana’s Big Test.
35. See Friends of the Earth Europe, ‘Tar Sands’.
36. See http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/raw-materials/files/docs/communication_en.
pdf and http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/africa.html.
37. Terminology used by Britain’s Ministry of Defence among others. See International
Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), Climate Change and Security in
Africa, for discussion in relation to Africa. For detailed analysis in relation to food
security impacts, see Oxfam, Growing a Better Future.
38. The nine boundaries are: climate change, stratospheric ozone, land use changes, fresh-
water use, biological diversity, ocean acidification, nitrogen and phosphorus inputs to
the biosphere and to oceans, aerosol loading and chemical pollution. See Stockholm
Resilience Centre (2009), ‘Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating Space
for Humanity’ and ‘Tipping Towards the Unknown’.
39. Brown, World on the Edge: How to Prevent Economic and Environmental Collapse.
Also Stern, ‘Managing Climate Change’ and World Wildlife Fund, Living Planet
Report.
40. See IPCC, Synthesis Report, 2007. Also World Bank Development Report 2010 and
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), Climate Change and
Security in Africa, and Toulmin, Climate Change in Africa.
41. World Bank Development Report 2010.
42. IPCC, Synthesis Report, 2007, Sections 3:3:2 ‘Impacts on Regions’, 28 and 3.3.3
‘Especially Affected Systems, Sectors and Regions’, 30.
43. UNEP, ‘Achieving the Millennium Development Goals in Africa’; also Scott and
Shepherd, Climate Change.
44. High-level Panel on Global Sustainability, Report on Third Meeting of the Panel, Hel-
sinki, Finland, May 16– 17, 2011.
45. UNEP, ‘Towards a Green Economy’.
46. Ibid.
47. Evans, Resource Scarcity.
48. IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2008, 3–5, says energy-related emissions will double by
2030 on a business-as-usual scenario. See also Nair, Consumptionomics.
49. The IEA’s ‘Current Policies Scenario’ is the most conservative scenario that takes
account only of measures that governments had formally adopted in 2010 in pursuit
of energy and environmental policies. Its ‘New Policies Scenario’ takes account of
broad policy commitments and announced plans but does not assume full implemen-
tation. The IEA’s most optimistic scenario (‘450 Scenario’) specifies an energy
pathway consistent with limiting the parts per million (ppm) of carbon dioxide in
the atmosphere to 450, in order to limit global warming to 28C as agreed at the
2010 UNFCCC Summit. See IEA, World Energy Outlook 2010, ‘Global Energy
Trends’.
50. IEA, World Energy Outlook 2009, 44.

51. IEA, World Energy Outlook 2010.
52. IEA, World Energy Outlook 2011, ‘Energy for All: Financing Access for the Poor’.
53. IEA, World Energy Outlook 2011. The three objectives by 2030 are ensuring universal
access to modern energy services; doubling the rate of improvement in energy effi-
ciency; and doubling the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix.
54. See United Nations, Sustainable Energy.
55. Heinrich Böll Foundation, ‘Green Deal Nigeria’, Chapter 6.
56. Unruh, ‘Understanding Carbon Lock-in’, p. 817.
57. IEA, World Energy Outlook 2011, ‘Energy for All: Financing Access for the Poor’.
58. IEA, World Energy Outlook 2010: ‘Energy Poverty – How to Make Modern Energy
Access Universal’.
59. UNEP’s ‘Towards a Green Economy’ mentions such enabling conditions at the
national level as changes to fiscal policy, reform and reduction of environmentallly
harmful subsidies; employing new market-based instruments; targeting public invest-
ments to green key sectors; greening public procurement; and improving environ-
mental rules and their enforcement. At the international level they include
improvements to market infrastructure, trade and aid flows and greater international
cooperation.
60. Lynch and Crawford, ‘Democratization in Africa 1990–2010’.
61. For instance the report by the World Bank Group for the G20 Finance Ministers on
ways to mobilize US$100 billion annually for climate action in developing countries
recommended removing subsidies on fossil fuel use, ‘estimated by the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in Annex II countries
(members of the OECD in 1992) to amount to about $40-60 billion per year in
2005–2010’. World Bank –IMF–OECD –Regional Development Banks, ‘Mobiliz-
ing Climate Finance’, p. 22.
62. For instance, the IEA estimates direct subsidies to consumers in developing countries as
$557 billion in 2008 and $312 billion in 2009. Under all three of its policy scenarios it
envisages some reduction in fossil fuel subsidies. IEA, World Energy Outlook 2010.
63. The share of fossil fuels in the overall primary fuel mix varies markedly, from 62% in
the IEA’s ‘450 Scenario’ to 79% in the ‘Current Policies Scenario’, compared with
74% in the ‘New Policies Scenario’ and an actual figure for 2008 of 78%. IEA,
World Energy Outlook 2010, ‘Global Energy Trends’.
64. IEA, World Energy Outlook 2010.
65. Ibid.
66. See Hansen et al., ‘Target Atmospheric CO2’.
67. Other analyses go much further, including Friends of the Earth Europe and Stockholm
Environment Institute, ‘The 40% Study’.
68. Developed countries pledged under the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) to provide US $100 billion annually by 2020 and $30 billion in
fast start financing for 2010–12 for climate action in developing countries, but disagree
over sources and timetable for mobilizing the 2020 target. See for instance the progress
report in December 2011 by the World Resources Institute, ‘Reflections on COP 17 in
Durban’. http://insights.wri.org/news/2011/12/reflections-cop-17-durban#finance.
69. Heinrich Böll Foundation, ‘Green Deal Nigeria’.
70. Ibid.
71. UNEP (Environmental Assessment, 1–2) claims: ‘there is now substantial evidence
that the ‘greening’ of economies inhibits neither wealth creation nor employment
opportunities, and many green sectors show significant opportunities for investment
and growth in wealth and jobs’.
72. See note 2 for interview details.
73. Sixteen questions were asked including about: the interviewee’s organizational objec-
tives and strategies for achieving these objectives (allies, blockers, targets); key
drivers overall for improving management of Africa’s natural resource sector;
whether/how they see climate change impacting on these objectives and strategies,
with specific examples; the trade-offs between climate protection policies and policies
to improve governance in the oil sector; factors conditioning the development pro-
spects for oil rich developing countries; current linkages between their work and
that of climate activists; and how to ensure greater information-sharing and coherence
with advocacy objectives.
74. The term soft law is used here to distinguish some emerging international governance
mechanisms that contrast with hard law as defined by Abbott and Snidal, ‘Hard and
Soft Law’, i.e. legally binding obligations that are precise (or can be made precise
through adjudication or the issuance of detailed regulations) and that delegate auth-
ority for interpreting and implementing the law.
75. EITI is an emerging global reporting standard for revenue payments and receipts in
resource rich countries. See http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/en/about/objectives/
transparency-company-payments and also http://eiti.org/.
76. The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 requires energy and
mining companies registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to
disclose payments made to US and foreign governments on a country by country basis.
77. Examples additional to the US SEC legislation are the Economic Community of West
African States’ Mining Directive and, at a national level, disclosure of revenues and
contracts as a legal requirement in Liberia and new petroleum management laws in
Ghana.
78. See note 2.
79. See: www.un-redd.org.
80. On the latter, see Sanchez, The Hidden Energy Crisis and the discussion in Heinrich
Böll Foundation, ‘Green Deal Nigeria’.
Notes on contributors
Lili Fuhr is Department Head, Ecology and Sustainable Development at the Heinrich-Böll-
Stiftung’s head office in Berlin, Germany. She works on International Climate and Resource
Politics.
Dr Sarah Wykes has many years’ experience researching and campaigning on corporate
accountability, human rights and environmental issues in sub-Saharan Africa, and is cur-
rently Lead Environment and Climate Analyst at CAFOD (Catholic Agency For Overseas
Development), London and a board member of the NGO Sherpa, which works on combating
economic crimes including corruption in resource-rich states. This contribution does not
reflect the views of CAFOD but her personal views.
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Perspectives on resource politics

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2012.709693

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Perspectives on resource politics in a climate constrained world:

Introduction: forewritten is forewarned

ISSN 1351-0347 print/ISSN 1743-890X online

societal pressure for reforms leading to more inclusive decision-making in these

PWYP has achieved some notable successes, principally the establishment of a

capacity, according to those interviewed (see below). The geopolitical reality of

Energy, climate and global environmental threats

. By 2020, between 75 and 250 million of people are projected to be exposed

The key challenge facing policymakers in industrialized and emerging econom-

Impact of future energy trends and climate ﬁnance

‘Resource curse’ activists’ views on the climate challenge

Drivers of better governance in the natural resource sector

Strategies for better natural resource governance

saw faith-based networks as important allies. Some African respondents high-

Climate change: opportunity or threat to tackling the ‘resource curse’?

Exploring common concerns between ‘resource curse’ and climate

estation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD).79 REDD was

Concrete ways to promote discussion on the links between tackling the

Several interviewees identiﬁed the shortcomings of current developmental

World Energy Outlook 2008, 18.

50. IEA, World Energy Outlook 2009, 44.

a0810301/AndersenRoss2011.pdf (accessed August 10, 2012).

html (accessed August 10, 2012).

UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme). ‘Achieving the Millennium

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