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R450221147 Indra Sawhney V Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 477 & Minerva Mills Ltd. and O
R450221147 Indra Sawhney V Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 477 & Minerva Mills Ltd. and O
Bench: M.H. Kania, M.N. Venkatachaliah, S. Ratnavel Pandian, Dr. T.K. Thommen,
A.M.Ahmadi, Kuldip Singh, P.B. Sawant, R.M. Sahai, B.J. Reddy.
Introduction
The Kaka Kalelkar Commission, sometimes called the Backward Class Commission, was
founded on January 29, 1953, in accordance with Article 340(2) of the Indian Constitution.
2,399 castes were classified as socially and economically backward by the committee in its
report, which was turned in on March 30, 1955. Sadly, in 1961, the government disregarded
the commission's recommendations.
Established on January 1, 1979, the Mandal Commission, commonly referred to as the second
backward classes commission, was a creation of Prime Minister Morarji Desai's Janata Party.
This committee, which was led by Sir B.P. Mandal, was entrusted with establishing the
standards for reserving positions in the public sector for members of the socially and
economically disadvantaged classes (SEBCs).
In December 1980, the Mandal Commission declared 3,746 castes to be economically and
socially disadvantaged in its report. The commission suggested allocating 10% more for
chances for socially and economically disadvantaged groups (SEBCs) and 27% for Other
Backward groups (OBCs).
Issues Raised
1. Does the caste-based reservation policy adhere to Article 16 of the Indian Constitution or is
it unconstitutional?
3. What is the upper bound or ceiling on the total number of reservations for government
employment and educational institutions?
Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, the petitioners' senior attorney made a number of
significant points. First of all, they said that the caste-based recommendations made by the
Mandal Commission were against secularism and would impede India's rapid progress.
Second, they emphasized the Commission's focus on caste-related social backwardness while
acknowledging the importance of social, educational, and economic variables.
Thirdly, they demanded a new survey to determine the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and
criticized the use of out-of-date 1931 census data. They also asserted that putting the ideas
into practice will demoralize people and replace excellence with mediocrity. They said that
the plans would sow dissatisfaction, split the country, and revive the caste system. They
claimed that these modifications would reduce administrative efficiency and cited the "equal
protection" principle.
Arguments Made by the Recipient
In the case of Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, the respondents brought up the following
issues in response to the petitioners' arguments:
1. if the petitioners in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India are right in their argument, the
Socially and Economically Backward Classes (SEBCs) will no longer have the legal
right to the protection of Article 16(4), a basic right.
2. The assertion that the study only uses data from the 1931 census is refuted by the
inclusion of data from the 1961 census as well as a nationwide socio-educational field
survey, which is especially useful for identifying tribal and indigenous communities.
3. It is made clear that systematic caste-wise enumeration was abandoned after 1931 and
that the 1931 census was not the main source for identifying OBCs.
4. The Commission's utilization of 1931 census data is consistent with previous rulings
such as the "BALARAM CASE."
5. In line with court-established standards, the Commission's recommendations take
social, educational, and economic backwardness into account.
6. Because of legal restrictions, the study suggested that 27% of Central Government
employment be reserved for OBCs, instead of the desired 52%.
7. The Commission's proposals seek to rectify historical disadvantages and offer
equitable opportunity.
8. Giving historically disadvantaged populations essentially equal opportunity is not
prohibited by the concept of "equal protection."
9. There has been no attempt to amend the Constitution; the Commission operated
within its jurisdiction.
Judgement
In the case of Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, the Supreme Court of India affirmed the idea
of reservations as a way to advance social justice and elevate disadvantaged groups within
society. It did, however, emphasize how crucial it is to strike a balance between the welfare
of the country as a whole and the interests of the underprivileged. The ruling made it clear
that reservations under Article 16(4) should not go over 50% since doing so might
compromise equity and result in the opposite treatment of worthy candidates.
In the case of Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, the court recognized that social and
educational aspects should be taken into account in addition to economic ones when
assessing backwardness. The National Commission for Backward Classes was suggested as a
means of identifying and classifying these individuals, with a focus on the necessity of
regular updates to guarantee that reserves are granted to the rightful.
In the case of Indra Sawhney v Union of India, the court decided that reservation benefits
should not be extended to the "creamy layer." It was emphasized that reserves had to be made
for those who are actually underprivileged—those who have historically experienced social
prejudice and are denied opportunity. The creamy layer's inclusion would undermine the
goals of affirmative action and maintain inequality by benefiting the already well-off socially
and economically.
Analysis
A significant court case in India was Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, sometimes referred to
as the Mandal Commission case. The Supreme Court emphasized the significance of reserves
for economically and socially disadvantaged groups in attaining social justice and
advancement, upholding the notion of such policies. In order to prohibit reverse
discrimination, it established a 50% reservation cap under Article 16(4).
The National Commission for Backward Classes' suggestion came about as a result of the
court's recognition in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India that backwardness must take into
account social and educational elements in addition to economic ones. In order to guarantee
that affirmative action helps those who have experienced past prejudice and lack equal
chances, preventing additional inequality, it was decided that the "creamy layer" should be
excluded from reservations.
&
Minerva Mills Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors, AIR 1980
SC 1789.
Bench: Chandrachud, Y.V. ((Cj), Bhagwati, P.N., Gupta, A.C., Untwalia, N.L., Kailasam, P.S.
Introduction
The Court has the authority to enforce them, Fundamental Rights are the cornerstone of the
Constitution and ought to be regarded as more than just a set of guidelines. The Constitution's
three branches are the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. It is crucial that they are
properly balanced with one another. There have been occasions when the legislative and
executive branches have taken steps to increase their authority over the other branches. The
judiciary has often taken action to defend the rights of the person. A similar attempt to abuse
the Parliament's authority occurred in the Minerva Mills v. Union of India case.
Background
One of the most significant rulings in the Indian Constitution's history was rendered by the
Supreme Court on April 24, 1973.
A textile mill called Minerva Mills is situated close to Bengaluru. In 1970, the Central
Government established a committee in accordance with Section 15 of the Industries
Development Act, 1951, in light of the notable decline in Minerva mill production. In
October 1971, the committee sent in its findings to the Central Government. The National
Textile Corporation Limited, an organization established by the Industries Development Act
of 1951, was given permission by the Central Government to assume control of the Minerva
mills. Nationalization was covered under the 39th Amendment's ninth schedule, which was
exempt from judicial scrutiny. The 42nd amendment, which changed Article 31C by Section
4 of the Constitutional Amendment Act, 1976, was approved by the parliament following a
significant defeat in the Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain case for supreme authority. Additionally,
Article 368 was amended by Section 55 of the 42nd Constitutional Amendment Act of 1976.
Article 31C was amended to read as:
No law containing a declaration that it is giving effect to such policy shall be called in
question in any court on the grounds that it does not give effect to such policy. It is the State's
policy to secure all or any of the principles outlined in Part (IV); no law giving effect to such
policy shall be deemed void on the grounds that it is inconsistent or abridges any right
conferred under Article 14 or Article 19.
1. They contested the legality of the Nationalization Act of 1974's Sections 5(b), 19(3),
21,25 and 27 (read in conjunction with the Second Schedule).
2. The 42nd Amendment Act of 1976 (Sections 4 and 55).
3. The Central Government issued an order to nationalize Minerva Mills.
4. The Directive Principle of State Policy takes precedence over the Fundamental
Rights.
1. Does the fundamental structure concept suffer from the insertion made in accordance with
Articles 31C and 368 through Sections 4 and 55 of the 42nd Amendment Act, 1976?
2. Does the Indian Constitution's Fundamental Right supersede the Directive Principle of
State policy?
Nani Palkhivala, the Janata Government's ambassador, defended the case on behalf of the
Minerva Mills' former owners on behalf of the petitioners after feeling compelled to return to
India to defend human rights.
1. Article 368 places restrictions on the parliament's ability to change laws. With this
change, parliament, the Constitution's creature, would be able to take control of it.
2. The Kesavananda Bharati case ruling said that the Parliament lacks the power to alter
the fundamental provisions of the Constitution.
3. The State was required to enact legislation based on the Directive Principle of State
policy, but it could only do so via legal methods; the Fundamental Rights could not be
superseded.
4. The balance between the Parliament and the Judiciary would be harmed since no
court would have the authority to examine a constitutional amendment enacted by the
Parliament as a result of section 55 of the 42nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1976.
5. A harmonious structure must be made since there would be an imbalance between the
Directive Principles of State Policy and the Fundamental Rights.
6. Almost all laws passed by the government are connected to the Directive Principles in
one way or another.
7. The Indian Constitution's Articles 19 and 14 would be nullified if the Directive
Principle were granted immunity.
Judgement
over seven years after the Central Government's directive to start the probe was approved. A
five-judge Supreme Court, the court rendered the ruling with a majority of 4:1.
Majority opinion
On behalf of Justice A.C. Gupta, N.L. Untwalia, and P.S. Kailasam, Justice Chandrachud
delivered the majority decision.
1. Although the parliament has the authority to change the Constitution, it must stay
within its fundamental parameters.
2. The idea that the Constitution could be amended indefinitely would be antagonistic to
democracy and lead to the establishment of an authoritarian state.
3. The fundamental framework of the Constitution is compromised by Article (5),
rendering it invalid.
4. The reason the provision (50) was overturned was because it limited the court's ability
to conduct judicial review and modification.
Minority opinion
The fundamental framework of the Constitution was enhanced rather than undermined
by Article 31C.
A violation of the people's trust and an unlawful act would be the Directive Principle's
noncompliance.
The vegetarian principle cannot be in conflict with any legislation that directly
implements the Directive Principle.
The legislation would be overturned if it had no major connection to the State Policy's
Directive Principle. Otherwise, it would remain in effect.
Overall Judgement
The Court decided that the Constitution can be changed by the Parliament without
impairing the fundamental structural theory.
The Parliament has the authority to modify fundamental rights, provided that they
align with the basic structural concept.
The Court overturned the section that limited judicial review.
Since this ruling conflicted with the statute, the 42nd Amendment Act of 1976 was passed,
which stated that all Directive Principles of State Policy would take precedence over Article
14 and 19 Fundamental Rights. Further included provisions (4) and (5) declared that judicial
review does not apply to the Constitutional Amendment under Article 368. This amendment
was passed in order to overturn the Kesavananda Bharati case ruling and allow any law to be
adopted without worrying about being scrutinized by the courts
Analysis
The 42nd Amendment was unanimously declared unconstitutional, even to the point of
invalidating Section 55 of the Amendment Act of 1976. Parliament attempted to unbalance
the connection between the Directive Principle of State Policy and the Fundamental Rights
by passing the 42nd Amendment. However, the majority of judges believed that decisions and
amendments would be biased against an individual's freedom if Directive Principles took
precedence over Fundamental Rights in the sake of welfare. Section 55 of the 42nd
Amendment Act, which grants the parliament unlimited authority to amend the constitution,
was overturned by the majority because it attempted to create an imbalance between the three
branches of government and would have given the parliament more power without allowing
the courts to conduct judicial review.