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Electric Utility Resource Planning
Electric Utility Resource Planning
Past, Present and Future

JOSEPH FERRARI
Elsevier
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Contents

Preface ix

1. Introduction to electric utilities and how they plan for the future 1
Introduction 1
Electric utilities: the basics 2
The early history of the electric utility 4
The early stages of the evolution of cost approaches 7
Varying technology types that made up (and still make up) the generation mix
of most utilities 8
Coal boiler plants 9
Combustion turbines 10
Combined-cycle combustion turbines 11
Reciprocating engines (Recips) 12
Hydro 14
Nuclear 14
Other 16
Long-range planning (also referred to as long-term planning or integrated
resource planning) 16
Basics of utility long-range planning 18
Major approaches to capacity expansion planning 25
Approach 1—capital cost 25
Approach 2—annual cost 26
Approach 3—levelized cost of energy 26
Approach 4—load duration curve-screening curve approach 27
Approach 5—all source-load duration curve approach 27
Approach 6—load duration curve-based capacity expansion models 29
Approach 7—modified load duration curve-based capacity expansion models 31
Approach 8—chronological capacity expansion models 32
Summary and timeline of capacity expansion planning approaches 33
References 35

2. Influx of variable renewable energy sources, the way things are

going 39
Introduction 39
Policy and incentives driving change 41
Brief history of solar power 43

v
vi Contents

Brief history of wind power 45

Trends in installed solar and wind capacity and pricing 47
How solar and wind impact dispatch and pricing 50
Variability of solar and wind 53
Net load versus load 55
Challenges renewables impose on baseload generators 61
Effect of geographic diversity 62
Time scale is important 63
Solar and wind degradation rates 65
Baseload is going away, enter residual loads 67
Ramifications for resource planning 69
References 71
3. Energy storage and conversion 73
Basic principles of energy storage 74
Size and duration 75
Types of energy storage 78
Pumped hydro 78
Flywheels 79
Thermal storage 81
Other forms of thermal energy storage 81
Battery energy storage 82
Compressed air energy storage 88
Liquid air energy storage 89
Trends in deployment of energy storage 90
Degradation issues 91
Reference metrics for common forms of energy storage 95
Resource planning considerations 95
Is storage even in the integrated resource plan? 96
The case for real-time considerations 97
Chronological capacity expansion to value flexibility 99
Mandates and subsidies 103
References 105

4. Renewable fuels for long-term energy storage 109

Introduction 109
Renewable fuels as long-term energy storage 110
What about biofuels? 112
Direct combustion 113
Recycled biofuels 114
Synthetic biofuels 114
 Contents vii

Resource planning considerations 115

Hydrogen 115
Power to hydrogen 116
Hydrogen to power 119
Resource planning considerations for hydrogen 121
Direct air carbon capture 126
High-temperature aqueous solution direct air capture 127
Low-temperature solid sorbent direct air capture 128
Resource planning considerations for direct air capture 128
Methanation: combining hydrogen and carbon 129
Catalytic/thermochemical methanation 130
Biological methanation 130
Resource planning considerations for methanation 130
Final thoughts on renewable fuels 131
References 134

5. Long-term capacity expansion planning 139

Introduction 139
Costs in capacity expansion 140
Operating expenditures 140
Fixed operations and maintenance 140
Capital expenditures 141
The supply stack and marginal cost 142
Net load and the supply stack 145
Real-time dispatch 145
Capacity factors 147
Screening curves 148
Load duration curve 151
Using the load duration curve for long-term planning 152
Generic five-step capacity expansion framework, traditional approach 153
Convergence contingent on reserve provision and reliability 155
Production cost models 157
Concerns related to traditional approaches, particularly for systems with
variable renewable energy 158
Importance of dynamic features 160
Attempted fixes to the traditional approach 162
Advanced approaches—chronological long-term planning models 163
Capacity expansion models for regional and policy initiatives 167
Final considerations for resource planners and analysts 168
References 170
viii Contents

6. Illustrating concepts with examples 173

How flexibility reduces curtailment and maximizes the value of variable
renewable energy sources 173
The impact of increasing variable renewable energy penetration on day
ahead and real-time pricing 177
Examples of variable renewable energy driving baseload and intermediate
resources out of the market 183
Resource planning considerations 184
Ancillary services 185
Flexible capacity in organized markets 186
Example from SPP (2014) 187
Example from NYISO (2016) 187
Example from ERCOT (2016) 188
Example from SPP (2018) 190
Example from CAISO (2019) 191
Resource planning considerations 192
Energy storage (and flexible capacity in general) in integrated resource plans 194
The future direction of integrated resource plans 197
References 200

7. Pathways to 100% decarbonization 203

Learning from the past 203
The definition of “100%”: the importance of semantics 206
Pathways to 100% 207
The path to 100% renewable 208
The path to 100% carbon-free 214
The path to 100% carbon-neutral (net-zero) 218
Summary of the pathways to 100% 223
A comparison of different pathways using capacity expansion analyses 224
New-build capacity by scenario 226
Land use 226
Generation, load, curtailment, and air emissions 227
Timing of use of power to methane in the 100% carbon-neutral scenario 228
Long-term storage potential of power to gas 229
Costs 230
Summary 231
Final thoughts on pathways to 100% and the importance of resource planning 232
References 234

Index 239
Preface

Electric utilities must continually reassess when and how they install new
generation capacity to meet load reliably. For many years the pool of
technologies utilities could choose from was rather narrow, and associated
costs, performance, and other factors were well understood. Accordingly,
they could use straightforward approaches toward valuation to make
choices they were confident in and were easily understood by share-
holders or regulators. These plans are most often contained in an inte-
grated resource plan, or IRP. The IRP is a document prepared on a
recurring basis that provides a roadmap of the utility’s plans for capacity
expansion, associated costs, and financial impacts, and a description of
how valuations were performed to justify choices. While all utilities are
not required to produce public versions of IRP documents, practically all
electric utilities prepare these plans on a regular basis.
Today the electric power sector is being driven by a common desire
to decarbonize, couched in terms of 100% renewable energy.
Commitments are made to gradually phase out fossil fuels and replace
energy production with solar, wind, hydroelectric, and other carbon-free
energy sources, such as nuclear. Energy storage is required to time-shift
overproduction of renewable energy to periods with lulls in the same.
However, serious complications arise when trying to apply legacy resource
planning approaches to more modern power systems. For example, equi-
librium energy balance assumptions embodied in load-duration-curve
capacity expansion approaches assume all resources are dispatchable and
only generate only when needed. Clean power systems, in contrast, have
large amounts of nondispatchable solar and wind, which have both sea-
sonal fluctuations and volatile output, requiring new and more explicitly
time-dependent approaches for planning purposes. The planning process
is made even more complex by the much wider pool of technologies to
choose from. For example, it was not too long ago that textbooks on
energy economics described electricity as a commodity that had to be
instantly consumed because it could not be stored. Today there are a host
of renewable energy storage technologies each with different attributes,
cost, performance, scaling capabilities, and so on. There is growing aware-
ness of land use requirements for renewables, a new dimension that raises
environmental concerns. The thought processes and mathematics behind

ix
x Preface

legacy planning approaches are simply insufficient to support this new

renewable dominated world.
While many electric utilities are exploring new and more dynamic
planning approaches to form the basis of their IRPs, my observation has
been that we “are not quite there” yet. Utilities use IRP planning
approaches they are familiar with, and often this is what is expected from
shareholders and regulators. But as we add more variable renewables, the
outcomes often fall short of what was expected, evidenced by cost over-
runs, higher emissions, and reliability issues. Changing modeling para-
digms can be a costly endeavor, involving learning curves not just for util-
ities, but also for policy makers and regulators. The cost is rather small,
however, considering that the outcome will be a far more efficient and
robust power system that will save ratepayers billions of dollars.
This book was written to provide guidance for the transition from
simple legacy planning to more dynamic state-of-the-art approaches
required for high renewable penetration. An overview of the origins of
electric utilities and simple planning approaches used in the past sets the
stage for how we got to where we are today. The evolution of solar,
wind, and other renewable technologies as well as energy storage is pre-
sented, with discussion of how their unique features necessitate new plan-
ning approaches. New planning approaches are presented along with
examples of utilities on the cutting edge of the planning space. Numerical
examples are provided to demonstrate concepts. And finally, a review of
different approaches to a 100% clean energy state is provided to guide
planners and policy makers. The target audience for this work includes
utility executives, staff, analysts, policy makers, consultants, regulators,
environmentalists, and academics interested in how we can reach 100%
clean energy targets.
CHAPTER 1

Introduction to electric utilities

and how they plan for the future
Introduction
Affordable and reliable electricity is a fundamental building block of
modern society. Electricity provides clean lighting in our homes, at our
workplaces, on the streets, with no smoke or fumes from open flames.
We use it to cool our homes in the summer and heat them in the winter.
It breathes life into industrial facilities. Silent and unseen, its unceasing
flow allows us to tap into the digital world with our televisions, compu-
ters, and smartphones [1].
Billions of people depend on the electrical grid every day without
thinking of where the electricity comes from. At most they might think
of it in passing when the electricity bill arrives from the local utility.
There is, however, a growing consensus, from everyday people through
the highest political bodies, to divest from fossil fuel use due to environ-
mental concerns related to CO2 emissions, which are believed to drive
climate change. Greater numbers of people are pressuring their govern-
ments and utilities to strive toward the use of carbon-free, renewable
resources, with some demanding that 100% of our electricity comes from
renewables such as wind and solar.
Most people are not aware of the complex industrial, engineering, and
economic hurdles that had to be overcome to get to where we are today,
let alone what it will take to get where they want to go. Understanding
the history of the utility industry, combined with the emergence of new
forms of energy production and storage and the analytics required to stitch
all the pieces together, is critical for modernizing and advancing toward a
world with 100% affordable renewable energy. We must understand fun-
damental questions and how to answer them—where does electricity
come from, and what does it cost?
While there are countless opinions and ideas around the production
and consumption of electricity, to understand the issues, we require a
common understanding of how electric utilities operate and plan for the

Electric Utility Resource Planning © 2021 Elsevier Inc.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-819873-5.00001-0 All rights reserved. 1
2 Electric Utility Resource Planning

future. Long-range plans (LRPs), also referred to in the industry as

integrated resource plans (IRPs), are planning documents used by utilities
to characterize their best view of the coming years; 5, 10, or more years
into the future, and to determine the optimal mix of resources they must
maintain to satisfy customer loads and maintain reliability. The plan typi-
cally accounts for changing load profiles, variations in expected fuel prices,
existing power plants, and potential retirement of the same as well as the
need for new resources, what they could potentially be, and their costs.
Once these factors are accounted for, they must be analyzed to answer
the following question: What mix of resources for some future date pro-
vides maximum reliability at lowest cost? As we will see, using the same
assumptions for a given utility, one can get dramatically different answers
depending on the analytical approach used to address the question.
Many utility systems today still use approaches that were modern
50 years ago, however, more rigorous approaches to planning provide a
more accurate picture in a world with high-renewable penetration.
Simple approaches that worked in the past do not strictly apply to modern
power systems because renewable sources such as wind and solar do not
behave at all like traditional fossil-fueled generation. This chapter
addresses the history of the electric utility industry and introduces the
thought processes and challenges utility planners, policymakers, regulators,
researchers, and politicians have faced in the past. It discusses how that
institutional momentum is driving some of the outcomes we see today
and influencing our plans for tomorrow.

Electric utilities: the basics

There are thousands of electric utilities across the planet, each with its
own technology mix in its power generation portfolio, from hydropower
to nuclear, from coal to natural gas, from biofuels to renewables. They
each have different localized idiosyncrasies to deal with and varying regu-
latory pressures. Depending on the utility, they can even have different
mission statements. For example, a municipal electric utility exists to pro-
vide reliable low-cost electricity to the residents of that city, and decisions
are made, to a large extent, by elected city councils and/or mayors who
must answer to voters. At a broader scale, some government-owned utili-
ties provide similar services to entire nations, with decisions made again
by elected officials. Electric cooperatives, member-owned utilities, tasked
with providing reliable electricity to residents within their footprint also
 Introduction to electric utilities and how they plan for the future 3

strive to minimize costs for customers, and decisions are made by their
board of directors. Then there are investor-owned utilities (IOUs). These
can be large or small. They are required to maintain reliability and com-
petitive pricing, which is generally capped or subject to market rates set
by regulatory bodies but are profit-making businesses. Across this, spec-
trum of utility types is an overlay of government regulations and govern-
ing bodies whose purpose is to ensure compliance with laws such as air
emission standards or renewable portfolio standards.
One common factor cuts across all utility types. They plan in a way
that minimizes costs, which is challenging as there are numerous costs to
consider; operational costs such as fuel, staffing, and maintenance; capital
costs such as new power plants or major overhauls; compliance costs such
as addition of complicated and expensive emission controls on an older
plant. Lower costs mean lower customer pricing or, for IOUs, greater
profit.
If the utilities are focused on reducing cost, it would be natural to ask
how “cost” is defined and/or calculated. This seems like a simple ques-
tion, until you dig into the details. Several factors were mentioned above
such as fuel, capital cost, compliance costs, etc. These are each compli-
cated, interrelated, and often time-dependent. For a utility to prove they
are minimizing cost, either to themselves, to regulators, or to customers
or voters, there must be some common basis, or so one would think. In
reality, the concept of quantifying costs is an evolving discipline. There
are countless peer-reviewed articles in engineering and economics journals
over the course of decades dedicated to questions related to how costs are
calculated for utilities. And there are a host of approaches used in practice
that can vary dramatically from one utility to the next. Given greater
resource choices, ever greater regulatory and societal pressures, and evolv-
ing technologies, the complexity of the question has only increased over
time.
All utilities are at some stage on the “evolutionary scale” of cost calcu-
lations that started with the simplistic approaches of the first utilities and
progressed through ever-more complex methodologies to what is consid-
ered the state-of-the-art today. The complexity of the cost question
increased as the number of power plants grew to keep pace with the dra-
matic explosion of electricity consumers across broader geographic
expanses. New technologies emerged with varying costs and reliant on a
wider array of fuels, in addition to having widely disparate technical fea-
tures such as start times, start costs, minimum up and downtimes,
4 Electric Utility Resource Planning

minimum stable loads, varying needs for emission controls, and water use.
Approaches that worked well for the early utilities are not applicable for
the large modern utility. There are, however, legacy issues. Utility staff
and management may be comfortable with a certain methodology and
apprehensive of investing in the training and software necessary to apply
more complex approaches. The trend toward modern cost optimization
approaches is happening, but not everyone is at the same place on the
evolutionary scale.
To understand how and why this range of cost-economic calculations
even exists requires understanding a bit about the early history of electric
utilities and the evolution of the approaches in time. This first chapter of
the book is dedicated to an exploration of the early history of electric util-
ities through the modern day and an introduction to basic planning
approaches. This information will form a building block for the following
chapters.

The early history of the electric utility

The first examples of electric utilities emerged in the 1870s with the
world’s first generating stations, facilities that used something, be it water/
hydropower, or combustion of fossil fuels, to generate electricity. The ini-
tial driver was to take advantage of the newly invented light bulb as an
alternative to gas/kerosene lamps and/or candles. One of the first generat-
ing stations was installed by Lord Armstrong to power his house in 1878.
Lord Armstrong built an estate called Cragside, located in
Northumberland, England, in which he integrated a hydroelectric genera-
tor to produce electricity to power everything from electric lights to a
dishwasher [2]. The nearby city of Godalming, in 1881, built the first
street lamps that took advantage of electricity from hydropower [3].
In 1882, Thomas Edison’s Edison Illuminating Company built the first
coal-fired generating station in Manhattan, United States. This facility was
called the Pearl Street Station and initially served fewer than 100 custo-
mers, including street lighting and building lighting. Within 2 years, the
number of customers had increased to 500. The concept of a generating
station within a municipality spread rapidly. For example, the Borough of
Chambersburg, PA, less than 300 miles from Manhattan, started official
discussions of what it would take to build a power plant in their town in
August of 1888. By September 1889, the residents of Chambersburg
voted on a bond resolution to fund the plant, and by February 1890,
 Introduction to electric utilities and how they plan for the future 5

the “lights went on,” powering a total of 40 street lamps. The Borough
of Chambersburg is still in the utility business and is one of the oldest
municipal utilities in the United States [4]. The emergence of municipal
utilities quickly spreads across North America. For example, while
Chambersburg, Pennsylvania was considering a power plant, the city of
Albuquerque opened its first electric light utility in 1883, almost 30 years
before the state of New Mexico was admitted to the United States as its
47th state [5]. In 1886, Japanese immigrant Hutchlon Ohnick was granted
a franchise for gas and electric service by the City Council of Phoenix,
Arizona, giving rise to the Phoenix Electric Light Company (Fig. 1.1).
The first power plant they built was a “fifty horsepower” unit that could
power 45 lights at 1500 candlepower each, by burning mesquite wood
collected in the surrounding desert and hauled to the site by mules [6].
The Phoenix Electric Light Company was the foundation of what would
later become Arizona Public Service, a regulated IOU now serving

Figure 1.1 Display in lobby of Arizona Public Service headquarters (Phoenix, AZ,
United States) commemorating the beginnings of the utility.
6 Electric Utility Resource Planning

2.7 million customers [7]. Emergence of utilities and expansion of electri-

cal power was mirrored across the globe in quick succession. For example,
Tokyo Electric Lighting commenced operation in Japan in 1886 [8].
The Municipal Council of Sydney (Australia) first powered electric lights
in 1904 [9]. Practically all of these first electric utilities started with a single
generating plant primarily dedicated to street lighting.
The commercial success of these small generating stations was not
guaranteed, as street lighting was traditionally provided by gas companies.
Fierce competition arose between the newly founded electric utilities and
gas suppliers particularly for lighting of public spaces such as streets [10].
As generation and distribution of electricity became more cost-effective, it
was natural for municipalities to consider electric lighting as a cost-
effective alternative to traditional sources. The invention of electric street
cars in the 1880s greatly expanded the potential need for electricity from
a strictly night-time service to something that was needed to some extent
all day, every day [11]. This, in turn, drove up demand, which led to
competition and technological advances, which in turn led to rapidly
growing economies of scale and reduction of electricity price.
In the United States, by 1900 electricity sales exceeded 100 million
US dollars [12], and the service was expanding beyond a few simple light
poles directly connected to a generating station. It became quickly appar-
ent that the industry had to provide infrastructure to serve the demand
based on three central pillars that are still the backbone of every electric
power system in existence today;
Generation: The sources that generate MW for delivery across transmis-
sion and distribution systems.
Transmission: The infrastructure needed to move large volumes of
high-voltage electricity from generators to the distribution system(s) to
serve load. Volumes of electricity are moved at high voltage because it
is more efficient and cost-effective to do so in this manner.
Distribution: The infrastructure needed to step-down high-voltage elec-
tricity to lower voltages that can be used directly by the end user(s).
Early on the electric needs of consumers were met by a mix of small
private enterprises, such as the Pearl Street Station, or municipals, such as
the Borough of Chambersburg. Municipals dominated in the United
States with more than 3000 municipally owned power companies in the
early 1920s. However, private utility holding companies were formed
and in the business of buying and consolidating to take advantage
of economies of scale. So much so that by the early 1930s more than
 Introduction to electric utilities and how they plan for the future 7

1200 municipal electric utilities had gone out of business or been sold
[11,13]. By 1932 in the United States privately held IOUs generated
and received revenues for more than 95% of all MWh sold in the
United States and provided electricity to more than 90% of all customers
[10,11,14]. Some or all of the transmission and distribution services were
retained by municipal or state agencies and have since been overtaken by
the same consolidation, so that today’s transmission and distribution are
often held by large IOUs as well. In 2019, the electricity generated by
IOUs in the United States served more than two-thirds of the US popu-
lation, with the remainder being provided by a mix of municipal utilities,
member-owned electric cooperatives, and a small number of federally
chartered, government-run utilities.

The early stages of the evolution of cost approaches

Regardless of the organization of an electric utility, public or private, eco-
nomic planning for a small station in the early 1900s was rather straight-
forward. The decision variables included at a minimum, and not taking
consideration of transmission or distribution, the following;
Capacity (MW): an estimate of capacity needs, how many kW or
MW the plant could be expected to serve at any one instant in time,
typically sized for the maximum or peak load.
Energy (MWh): an estimate of the energy that would be generated, in
terms of MW need times the time needed to provide for that load,
often expressed as MWh.
Owners’ cost ($ per kW of capacity): cost to build the power plant,
including the cost of the equipment, cost to install the equipment,
land purchase, any infrastructure improvements such as roads, and the
cost to connect the plant to transmission or distribution networks as
well as permitting and legal costs.
Fuel: type of fuel used and cost of the fuel.
Efficiency: efficiency of the power plant determines the amount and
subsequent cost of fuel needed to generate MWh.
Operational cost: annual costs to run and maintain the facility, from the
cost of payroll and benefits to property taxes and/or utilities such as
sewer or water.
Putting all of these factors together allows one, via a number of simple
algebraic approaches, to estimate the total cost of providing power to cus-
tomers. This allows the plant owner to determine what they must charge
8 Electric Utility Resource Planning

per MWh of electricity generated, also allowing for any profit margins or
required return on investment. If the cost per MWh to provide for street
lighting, for example, is less than the alternative gas-fired lamps then elec-
tric lighting is competitive.
In the early stages of utility development, the investment decisions
were rather straightforward as there were only a handful of companies
that made equipment that could generate electricity. The equipment was
based on a very narrow pool of technology choices and fuel options were
limited. As time went on, a host of changes happened across the electric
utility space, including the consolidation of smaller utilities into larger
ones and covering broader geographic ranges. Now cities became loads,
and the generators were not always near the load, requiring transmission
lines to move energy from where it was produced to step-down stations
that energize distribution systems. A utility could no longer simply say
they had 100 customers being served by 1 plant, they could have tens of
thousands of customers across broad expanses being served by 10, 20, 50,
or more generators. Power delivery increasingly became a network prob-
lem, with the loads considered as nodes or sinks (of MWh), the generators
being sources (of MWh) and the transmission system being the network
of physical cables moving MWh from sources to sinks. While complexi-
ties related to network systems are relevant, the idea of how changing
technology and fuel types complicate cost decisions was, and still is, a fun-
damental issue in utility planning, so let us look at some of the technolo-
gies that emerged during the early years, up to the 1960s and 1970s.

Varying technology types that made up (and still make up)

the generation mix of most utilities
Historically power generation relied on fuel combustion. Fuels such as
coal to oils of various types, to wood or other forms of biomass, to gas-
eous fuels (natural gas). In general, fuel is burned to provide a driving
force for a shaft that in turn spins a generator that generates electricity.
The same is true for hydroelectric and wind turbines, which simply use
water and wind for the same purpose. Regardless, power plants that burn
fuel are generally referred to as thermal plants.
In thermal plants, fuel is burned in a combustion chamber. The com-
bustion chamber admits air and fuel. Carbon in the fuel reacts with oxy-
gen in the air to provide heat and pressure, which are converted to
mechanical power that drives a shaft connected to the generator. In some
 Introduction to electric utilities and how they plan for the future 9

cases, as with combustion turbines (CTs), the products of combustion

drive turbine blades connected to the shaft. In others, such as reciprocat-
ing engines, combustion moves pistons that are connected to the shaft.
Boiler plants have a combustion chamber connected to heat exchangers
that convert water to steam, which is then used to spin a steam turbine
connected to a shaft (that turns a generator). In all cases, the heat of com-
bustion is converted to mechanical energy and then to electricity. The
combustion gases cool in the process, so that what comes out as exhaust is
very hot, but considerably cooler than the temperature in the combustion
chamber.

Coal boiler plants

Across the entire history of coal-fired power generation, one thing has
remained constant. In all cases, the coal is burned in a boiler that extracts
heat from the coal combustion and uses the heat to convert water to
steam. This boiler is often referred to as a heat recovery steam generator
(HRSG). The steam is then used to turn a steam turbine which is con-
nected to a generator, which makes electricity.
Coal-fired power plants are similar to most thermal technologies in
that bigger is better. The larger the plant, the greater the economy of
scale, and the lower the investment cost on a per kW basis simultaneous
with maximizing fuel efficiency. A 1000 MW coal plant will have
lower cost ($/kW owners’ cost, and higher efficiency) than a 10 MW
coal plant.
A coal-fired boiler plant in the early 1900s might be in the
1 10 MW size range [15] with an efficiency of 10% 15%. By 1930s,
coal-fired plants in the 300 MW range were available with higher effi-
ciencies. By 1970s, unit ratings in excess of 1000 MW were the norm,
with net efficiencies greater than 30%. Net efficiency refers to the fuel
needed per MWh of energy delivered to the transmission system and is
different than gross efficiency. Gross efficiency refers to the amount of
fuel needed per MWh as measured at the generator itself. Net efficiency
accounts for parasitic loads, losses across the step-up transformer, and
any loads within the plant itself, such as lighting. Net efficiency is the
metric of meaning for utility planners as it measures the fuel needed to
provide useable energy, while gross efficiency is often used by equip-
ment OEMs as that is the efficiency they can measure and test in
manufacturing facilities.
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to a revolted dependency until the danger of its being again
subjugated by the parent state has entirely passed away. This
extreme test was, in fact, applied in the case of Texas. The
Congress, to whom President Jackson referred the question as
one 'probably leading to war,' and therefore a proper subject
for 'a previous understanding with that body, by whom war can
alone be declared, and by whom all the provisions for
sustaining its perils must be furnished,' left the matter of
the recognition of Texas to the discretion of the Executive,
providing merely for the sending of a diplomatic agent when
the President should be satisfied that the Republic of Texas
had become 'an independent State.' It was so recognized by
President Van Buren, who commissioned a chargé d'affaires
March 7, 1837, after Mexico had abandoned an attempt to
reconquer the Texan territory, and when there was at the time
no bona fide contest going on between the insurgent province
and its former sovereign.

"I said in my message of December last, 'It is to be seriously

considered whether the Cuban insurrection possesses beyond
dispute the attributes of statehood which alone can demand the
recognition of belligerency in its favor.' The same
requirement must certainly be no less seriously considered
when the graver issue of recognizing independence is in
question, for no less positive test can be applied to the
greater act than to the lesser, while, on the other hand, the
influences and consequences of the struggle upon the internal
policy of the recognizing State, which form important factors
when the recognition of belligerency is concerned, are
secondary, if not rightly eliminable, factors when the real
question is whether the community claiming recognition is or
is not independent beyond peradventure.

"Nor from the standpoint of expediency do I think it would be

wise or prudent for this Government to recognize at the
present time the independence of the so-called Cuban republic.
Such recognition is not necessary in order to enable the United
States to intervene and pacify the island. To commit this
country now to the recognition of any particular government in
Cuba might subject us to embarrassing conditions of
international obligation toward the organization so
recognized. In case of intervention our conduct would be
subject to the approval or disapproval of such government. We
would be required to submit to its direction and to assume to
it the mere relation of a friendly ally. When it shall appear
hereafter that there is within the island a government capable
of performing the duties and discharging the functions of a
separate nation, and having, as a matter of fact, the proper
forms and attributes of nationality, such government can be
promptly and readily recognized and the relations and
interests of the United States with such nation adjusted.

"There remain the alternative forms of intervention to end the

war, either as an impartial neutral by imposing a rational
compromise between the contestants or as the active ally of
the one party or the other. As to the first, it is not to be
forgotten that during the last few months the relation of the
United States has virtually been one of friendly intervention
in many ways, each not of itself conclusive, but all tending
to the exertion of a potential influence toward an ultimate
pacific result just and honorable to all interests concerned.
The spirit of all our acts hitherto has been an earnest,
unselfish desire for peace and prosperity in Cuba untarnished
by differences between us and Spain and unstained by the blood
of American citizens. The forcible intervention of the United
States as a neutral to stop the war, according to the large
dictates of humanity and following many historical precedents
where neighboring states have interfered to check the hopeless
sacrifices of life by internecine conflicts beyond their
borders, is justifiable on rational grounds. It involves,
however, hostile constraint upon both the parties to the
contest, as well to enforce a truce as to guide the eventual
settlement.
{589}

"The grounds for such intervention may be briefly summarized

as follows:

First.
In the cause of humanity and to put an end to the barbarities,
bloodshed, starvation, and horrible miseries now existing there,
and which the parties to the conflict are either unable or
unwilling to stop or mitigate. It is no answer to say this is
all in another country, belonging to another nation, and is
therefore none of our business. It is specially our duty, for
it is right at our door.

Second.
We owe it to our citizens in Cuba to afford them that
protection and indemnity for life and property which no
government there can or will afford, and to that end to
terminate the conditions that deprive them of legal
protection.

Third.
The right to intervene may be justified by the very serious
injury to the commerce, trade, and business of our people and
by the wanton destruction of property and devastation of the
island.

Fourth,
and which is of the utmost importance. The present condition
of affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace, and
entails upon this Government an enormous expense.

With such a conflict waged for years in an island so near us

and with which our people have such trade and business
relations—when the lives and liberty of our citizens are in
constant danger and their property destroyed and themselves
ruined—where our trading vessels are liable to seizure and
are seized at our very door by warships of a foreign nation,
the expeditions of filibustering that we are powerless to
prevent altogether, and the irritating questions and
entanglements thus arising—all these and others that I need
not mention, with the resulting strained relations, are a
constant menace to our peace, and compel us to keep on a
semi-war footing with a nation with which we are at peace.

"These elements of danger and disorder already pointed out

have been strikingly illustrated by a tragic event which has
deeply and justly moved the American people. I have already
transmitted to Congress the report of the naval court of
inquiry on the destruction of the battleship 'Maine' in the
harbor of Habana during the night of the 15th of February. The
destruction of that noble vessel has filled the national heart
with inexpressible horror. Two hundred and fifty-eight brave
sailors and marines and two officers of our Navy, reposing in
the fancied security of a friendly harbor, have been hurled to
death, grief and want brought to their homes and sorrow to the
nation. The naval court of inquiry, which, it is needless to
say, commands the unqualified confidence of the Government,
was unanimous in its conclusion that the destruction of the
'Maine' was caused by an exterior explosion, that of a
submarine mine. It did not assume to place the responsibility:
that remains to be fixed. In any event the destruction of them
'Maine' by whatever exterior cause, is a patent and
impressive proof of a state of things in Cuba that is
intolerable. That condition is thus shown to be such that the
Spanish Government cannot assure safety and security to a
vessel of the American Navy in the harbor of Habana on a
mission of peace, and rightfully there.

"Further referring in this connection to recent diplomatic

correspondence, a dispatch from our minister to Spain, of the
26th ultimo, contained the statement that the Spanish minister
for foreign affairs assured him positively that Spain will do
all that the highest honor and justice require in the matter
of the 'Maine.' The reply above referred to of the 31st
ultimo, also contained an expression of the readiness of Spain
to submit to an arbitration all the differences which can
arise in this matter, which is subsequently explained by the
note of the Spanish minister at Washington of the 10th
instant, as follows: 'As to the question of fact which springs
from the diversity of views between the reports of the
American and Spanish boards, Spain proposes that the facts be
ascertained by an impartial investigation by experts, whose
decision Spain accepts in advance.' To this I have made no
reply.

"President Grant, in 1875, after discussing the phases of the

contest as it then appeared, and its hopeless and apparent
indefinite prolongation, said: 'In such an event, I am of
opinion that other nations will be compelled to assume the
responsibility which devolves upon them, and to seriously
consider the only remaining measures possible—mediation and
intervention. Owing, perhaps, to the large expanse of water
separating the island from the peninsula, … the contending
parties appear to have within themselves no depository of
common confidence, to suggest wisdom when passion and
excitement have their sway, and to assume the part of
peacemaker. In this view in the earlier days of the contest
the good offices of the United States as a mediator were
tendered in good faith, without any selfish purpose, in the
interest of humanity and in sincere friendship for both
parties, but were at the time declined by Spain, with the
declaration, nevertheless, that at a future time they would be
indispensable. No intimation has been received that in the
opinion of Spain that time has been reached. And yet the
strife continues with all its dread horrors and all its
injuries to the interests of the United States and of other
nations. Each party seems quite capable of working great
injury and damage to the other, as well as to all the
relations and interests dependent on the existence of peace in
the island; but they seem incapable of reaching any
 adjustment, and both have thus far failed of achieving any
success whereby one party shall possess and control the island
to the exclusion of the other. Under these circumstances, the
agency of others, either by mediation or by intervention,
seems to be the only alternative which must sooner or later be
invoked for the termination of the strife.'

"In the last annual message of my immediate predecessor during

the pending struggle, it was said: 'When the inability of
Spain to deal successfully with the insurrection has become
manifest, and it is demonstrated that her sovereignty is
extinct in Cuba for all purposes of its rightful existence,
and when a hopeless struggle for its re-establishment has
degenerated into a strife which means nothing more than the
useless sacrifice of human life and the utter destruction of
the very subject-matter of the conflict, a situation will be
presented in which our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain
will be superseded by higher obligations, which we can hardly
hesitate to recognize and discharge.'

{590}

"In my annual message to Congress, December last, speaking to

this question, I said: 'The near future will demonstrate
whether the indispensable condition of a righteous peace, just
alike to the Cubans and to Spain, as well as equitable to all
our interests so intimately involved in the welfare of Cuba,
is likely to be attained. If not, the exigency of further and
other action by the United States will remain to be taken.
When that time comes that action will be determined in the
line of indisputable right and duty. It will be faced, without
misgiving or hesitancy, in the light of the obligation this
Government owes to itself, to the people who have confided to
it the protection of their interests and honor, and to
humanity. Sure of the right, keeping free from all offense
ourselves, actuated only by upright and patriotic
considerations, moved neither by passion nor selfishness, the
Government will continue its watchful care over the rights and
property of American citizens and will abate none of its efforts
to bring about by peaceful agencies a peace which shall be
honorable and enduring. If it shall hereafter appear to be a
duty imposed by our obligations to ourselves, to civilization,
and humanity to intervene with force, it shall be without fault
on our part, and only because the necessity for such action
will be so clear as to command the support and approval of the
civilized world.'

"The long trial has proved that the object for which Spain has
waged the war cannot be attained. The fire of insurrection may
flame or may smoulder with varying seasons, but it has not
been and it is plain that it cannot be extinguished by present
methods. The only hope of relief and repose from a condition
which can no longer be endured is the enforced pacification of
Cuba. In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in
behalf of endangered American interests which give us the
right and the duty to speak and act, the War in Cuba must
stop.

"In view of these facts and of these considerations, I ask the

Congress to authorize and empower the President to take
measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities
between the Government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to
secure in the island the establishment of a stable government,
capable of maintaining order and observing its international
obligations, insuring peace and tranquillity and the security
of its citizens as well as our own, and to use the military
and naval forces of the United States as may be necessary for
these purposes. And in the interest of humanity and to aid in
preserving the lives of the starving people of the island I
recommend that the distribution of food and supplies be
continued, and that an appropriation be made out of the public
Treasury to supplement the charity of our citizens.

"The issue is now with the Congress. It is a solemn

 responsibility. I have exhausted every effort to relieve the
intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors.
Prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon me by the
Constitution and the law, I await your action.

"Yesterday, and since the preparation of the foregoing

message, official information was received by me that the
latest decree of the Queen Regent of Spain directs General
Blanco, in order to prepare and facilitate peace, to proclaim
a suspension of hostilities, the duration and details of which
have not yet been communicated to me. This fact with every
other pertinent consideration will, I am sure, have your just
and careful attention in the solemn deliberations upon which
you are about to enter. If this measure attains a successful
result, then our aspirations as a Christian, peace-loving
people will be realized. If it fails, it will be only another
justification for our contemplated action."

Congressional Record,
April 11, 1898.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (April).

Action of Congress empowering the President to expel
Spanish authority from the island of Cuba, and its result
in a state of war with Spain.

On the 13th of April, two days after receiving the President's

Message, as above, the House of Representatives adopted the
following resolution, by a vote of 324 against 19: "Resolved,
That the President is hereby authorized and directed to
intervene at once to stop the war in Cuba, to the end and with
the purpose of securing permanent peace and order there and
establishing by the free action of the people thereof a stable
and independent government of their own in the island of Cuba;
and the President is hereby authorized and empowered to use
the land and naval forces of the United States to execute the
purpose of this resolution."
 Congressional Record,
April 13, 1898, pages 4192-4196.

Three days later the Senate adopted the following, by 27 votes

against 21: "Resolved by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled,

First.
That the people of the Island of Cuba are, and of right ought
to be, free and independent, and that the Government of the
United States hereby recognizes the Republic of Cuba as the
true and lawful Government of that island.

"Second.
That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the
Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the
Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and
government in the Island of Cuba and withdraw its land and
naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

"Third.
That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is,
directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces
of the United States, and to call into the actual service of
the United States the militia of the several States, to such
extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into
effect.

"Fourth.
That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or
intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control
over said island except for the pacification thereof, and
asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave
the government and control of the island to its people."
 Congressional Record,
April 16, 1898, page 4386-4387.

The two Houses were in conflict, it will be seen, on the

question of the recognition of what claimed to be the
government of the Republic of Cuba, organized by the
insurgents. A majority of the House shared the doubts
expressed by the President in his message, as to the existence
of such a government in Cuba as could be recognized without
embarrassment; a majority of the Senate shut its eyes to that
doubt. After two days of heated controversy, the Senate gave
way, and the following resolution, recommended by conference
committees, was adopted in both Houses,—in the Senate by 42
yeas to 35 nays (12 not voting); in the House by 311 to 6 (39
not voting):

{591}

"Resolved, etc.

"First.
That the people of the Island of Cuba are and of right ought
to be free and independent.

"Second.
That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the
Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the
Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and
government in the Island of Cuba and withdraw its land and
naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

"Third.
That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is,
directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces
of the United States, and to call into the actual service of
the United States the militia of the several States, to such
extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into
effect.

"Fourth.
That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or
intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control
over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and
asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave
the government and control of the island to its people."

Congressional Record,
April 18, 1898, pages 4421-4422, and 4461-4462.

One week later, on the 25th of April, the President

communicated to Congress an account of his action in
accordance with this joint resolution, and its result in a
state of war between the United States and Spain as follows:

"Upon communicating to the Spanish minister in Washington the

demand which it became the duty of the Executive to address to
the Government of Spain in obedience to said resolution, the
minister asked for his passports and withdrew. The United
States minister at Madrid was in turn notified by the Spanish
minister for foreign affairs that the withdrawal of the
Spanish representative from the United States had terminated
diplomatic relations between the two countries, and that all
official communications between their respective
representatives ceased therewith.

"I commend to your special attention the note addressed to the

United States minister at Madrid by the Spanish minister for
foreign affairs on the 21st instant, whereby the foregoing
notification was conveyed. It will be perceived therefrom that
the Government of Spain, having cognizance of the joint
resolution of the United States Congress, and in view of the
things which the President is thereby required and authorized
to do, responds by treating the reasonable demands of this
Government as measures of hostility, following with that
instant and complete severance of relations by its action
which, by the usage of nations, accompanies an existent state
of war between sovereign powers.

"The position of Spain being thus made known and the demands
of the United States being denied with a complete rupture of
intercourse by the act of Spain, I have been constrained, in
exercise of the power and authority conferred upon me by the
joint resolution aforesaid, to proclaim under date of April
22, 1898, a blockade of certain ports of the north coast of
Cuba, lying between Cardenas and Bahia Honda and of the port
of Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba; and further, in
exercise of my constitutional powers and using the authority
conferred upon me by the act of Congress approved April 22,
1898, to issue my proclamation dated April 23, 1898, calling
forth volunteers in order to carry into effect the said
resolution of April 20, 1898. …

"In view of the measures so taken, and with a view to the

adoption of such other measures as may be necessary to enable
me to carry out the expressed will of the Congress of the
United States in the premises, I now recommend to your
honorable body the adoption of a joint resolution declaring
that a state of war exists between the United States of
America and the Kingdom of Spain, and I urge speedy action
thereon, to the end that the definition of the international
status of the United States as a belligerent power may be made
known, and the assertion of all its rights and the maintenance
of all its duties in the conduct of a public war may be
assured."

Congressional Record,
April 25, 1898, page 4671.

The recommendation of the President was carried out, on the

same day, by the passage in both Houses, unanimously, of an
enactment, "First. That war be, and the same is hereby,
 declared to exist, and that war has existed since the 21st day
of April, A. D. 1898, including said day, between the United
States of America and the Kingdom of Spain. Second. That the
President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed
and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the
United States, and to call into the actual service of the
United States the militia of the several States, to such
extent as may be necessary to carry this act into effect."

Congressional Record,
April 25, pages 4674 and 4693.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (April).

Cabinet changes.

Two resignations from the President's cabinet occurred in

April, both occasioned by failing health. Honorable James A.
Gary was succeeded as Postmaster-General by Honorable Charles
Emory Smith, and Honorable John Sherman was followed in the
Secretaryship of State by his First Assistant in that office,
Judge William R. Day.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (April-May).

War with Spain.
Military preparations.
Regular and Volunteer armies.
"The Rough Riders."

At the outbreak of the war, the Regular Army of the United

States numbered but 28,000 officers and men. Under authority
given by acts of Congress it was rapidly increased, and
returns for May, 1898, show 2,191 officers and nearly 42,000
men in the ranks. At the same time, a Volunteer Army was being
speedily raised and equipped. By proclamation of April 2-3d,
the President called for 125,000 volunteers, to be
apportioned, as far as practicable, among the states and
territories, according to population. On the 25th of May he
 called for 75,000 more. Before the end of May, 118,580
enlisted volunteers, with 6,224 officers, were reported to
have been mustered in. These were assembled in various camps
and prepared for service in a more or less hurried way. At the
beginning, six army corps were constituted, embracing both the
Regular and Volunteer branches of the army. The First Corps,
under Major General John R. Brooke, and the Third under Major
General James F. Wade, were organized at Camp Thomas, Georgia.
The Second was organized under Major General William M.
Graham, at Camp Alger, near Falls Church, Virginia. The
organization of the Fourth Corps, Major General John J.
Coppinger, commanding, was begun at Mobile, Alabama. The Fifth
Corps was organized at Tampa, Florid., under Major General
William R. Shafter.
{592}
A Sixth Corps, which had been provided for, was never
organized; but the Seventh was formed, at Tampa, Florida,
under Major General Fitzhugh Lee. Subsequently an Eighth Corps
was concentrated at San Francisco, and transported to the
Philippine Islands. Tampa, Florida, was the port chosen for
the shipment of troops to Cuba, and extensive preparations
were made for the transport service from that point. The
movement waited, first, for the preparation of newly levied
troops, and, secondly, for naval operations to make the voyage
of transports to Cuba safe from attack.

Annual Report of the Adjutant-General to the

Major-General Commanding the Army, 1898.

Among the Volunteer regiments organized, one known as that of

"the Rough Riders" excited public interest in the greatest
degree. "The moment that the newspapers sent broadcast the
tale that such a regiment was contemplated, excitement began
in nearly every State in the Union, and did not end until the
announcement was made that the regiment was complete. As it
stood, finished, the troops which made it up, theoretically
came from the following sections, although men from the East
and from other States and Territories were scattered through
each troop. Troops A, B, and C, from Arizona. Troop D, from
Oklahoma. Troops E, F, G, H, and I, from New Mexico. Troop K,
from Eastern colleges and cities. Troops L and M, from Indian
Territory.

"Senator Warren, of Iowa, is responsible for the idea of the

Rough Riders. He introduced and carried through Congress,
aided by Senators Kyle, Carter, and others, a bill authorizing
the enrollment of three regiments, to be made up of expert
hunters, riflemen, cow-men, frontiersmen, and such other hardy
characters as might care to enlist from the Territories.
Captain Leonard Wood, of the Medical Corps, was the
President's chief medical adviser, and had had much experience
in Indian fighting in the West. Theodore Roosevelt was
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and had had some knowledge of
men and things on the frontier, through his life on his Own
and other ranches. It was the President's intention to offer
to Wood the colonelcy of one regiment, to Roosevelt the
colonelcy of a second, and to Griggsby, of Montana, the
colonelcy of a third. Wood and Roosevelt received their offers
at about the same moment. Roosevelt promptly declined his, on
the theory that he had not had sufficient military experience
to warrant him in taking command of a regiment. He asked that
he might be given the second place in the regiment commanded
by Wood, which was done. Thus the Rough Riders began.

"Alexander Brodie, who afterwards became major of the

regiment, was probably the first man to systematically start
towards the organization of this particular regiment. … It was
on the 3d of May that the Arizona men started for San Antonio.
It was on the 8th of May that the very last men of all—those
of K Troop—left Washington for San Antonio. These were the
'dude warriors,' the 'dandy troopers,' the 'gilded gang.' When
their train pulled into San Antonio, and they started
stragglingly to march into camp, they encountered a contingent
of 340 cowboys from New Mexico. Oil and water are not farther
 removed than were the everyday natures of these two groups of
men. Yet, instantly they fraternized, and from that
moment—through the hardships of it all—these men were
brothers. … Probably no military organization has ever been
made up of men selected from so large a number of applicants,
or of men so carefully selected. … A large delegation of men
from Harvard College called upon Roosevelt one day in
Washington and offered their services in a body. Indeed,
delegations of that kind from most of the Eastern Colleges
went to him, but went to him in vain. His secretary answered
more than five thousand individual applications for places in
the regiment, and answered ninety-nine per cent. of them with
declinations."

E. Marshall,
The Story of the Rough Riders,
chapter 1
(Copyright, G. W. Dillingham & Co., New York).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (April-May: Cuba)

War with Spain.
Blockade of Cuban ports.

On the 21st of April, the following instructions were

despatched by the Secretary of the Navy to Rear-Admiral
Sampson, appointed that day to the command of the naval force
on the Atlantic Station: "You will immediately institute a
blockade of the north coast of Cuba, extending from Cardenas
on the east to Bahia Honda on the west; also, if in your
opinion your force warrants, the port of Cienfuegos, on the
south side of the island. It is considered doubtful if the
present force at your command would warrant a more extensive
blockade. It should be borne in mind that whenever the Army is
ready to embark for Cuba the Navy will be required to furnish
the necessary convoy for its transports. For this reason it
does not seem desirable that you should undertake at present
to blockade any more of the island than has been indicated. It
is believed that this blockade will cut off Havana almost
entirely from receiving supplies from the outside. The Navy
Department is considering the question of occupying the port
of Matanzas by a military force large enough to hold it and to
open communications with the insurgents, and this may be done
at an early date, even before the main party of the Army is
ready to embark. If this operation is decided upon, you are
directed to co-operate with the Army and assist with such
vessels as are necessary to cover and protect such a
movement."

Report of Secretary of Navy, 1898,

volume 2, page 175.

In previous confidential orders to the commander of the North

Atlantic squadron, issued April 6, in anticipation of
hostilities, the Department had directed as follows: "In the
event of hostilities with Spain, the Department wishes you to
do all in your power to capture or destroy the Spanish war
vessels in West Indian waters, including the small gunboats
which are stationed along the coast of Cuba.

"2. The Department does not wish the vessels of your squadron
to be exposed to the fire of the batteries at Havana, Santiago
de Cuba, or other strongly fortified ports in Cuba, unless the
more formidable Spanish vessels should take refuge within
those harbors. Even in this case the Department would suggest
that a rigid blockade and employment of our torpedo boats
might accomplish the desired object, viz, the destruction of
the enemy's vessels, without subjecting unnecessarily our own
men-of-war to the fire of the land batteries. There are two
reasons for this: First. There may be no United States troops
to occupy any captured stronghold, or to protect from riot and
arson, until after the dry season begins, about the first of
October. Second. The lack of docking facilities makes it
particularly desirable that our vessels should not be crippled
before the capture or destruction of Spain's most formidable
 vessels.

{593}

"3. The Department further desires that, in case of war, you

will maintain a strict blockade of Cuba, particularly at the
ports of Havana, Matanzas, and, if possible, of Santiago de
Cuba, Manzanillo, and Cienfuegos. Such a blockade may cause
the Spaniards to yield before the rainy season is over."

Report of Secretary of Navy, 1898,

volume 2, page 171.

The prudent policy here set forth restricted the action of the
fleet to blockading duty so closely, during the early weeks of
the war, that no serious demonstrations against the Spanish
land batteries were made. Admiral Sampson had been urgent for
permission to force the entrance to Havana harbor, before its
defenses were strengthened, expressing perfect confidence that
he could silence the western batteries, and reach a position
from which the city would be at the mercy of his guns; but he
was not allowed to make the attempt. The projected occupation
of Matanzas was not undertaken.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (April-May: Philippines).

Statements of the circumstances in which Aguinaldo, the
head of the insurrectionary movement in the Philippines,
went to Manila, to co-operate with the American forces.

On the 4th of May, 1898, the following was published in the

"Singapore Free Press": "General Emilio Aguinaldo, accompanied
by his aide-de-camp, Colonel Marcelo H. del Pilar, and his
private secretary, Mr. J. Leyba, arrived incognito in
Singapore from Saigon on April 21, 1898. In Saigon, where
Aguinaldo had remained for one week, he had interviews with
one or two old Philippino friends now resident there. The
special purpose of Aguinaldo's visit to Singapore was to
consult other friends here, particularly Mr. Howard W. Bray,
an old and intimate English friend, for fifteen years resident
in the Philippines, about the state of affairs in the islands
generally—particularly as to the possibility of war between
the United States and Spain, and whether, in such an event,
the United States would eventually recognize the independence
of the Philippines, provided he lent his co-operation to the
Americans in the conquest of the country. The situation of the
moment was this, that the conditions of the honorable peace
concluded on December 14, 1897, between President Aguinaldo,
on behalf of the Philippine rebels, and H. E. Governor-General
Primo di Rivera, on behalf of Spain, had not been carried out,
although their immediate execution had been vouched for in
that agreement. These reforms would have provided protection
to the people against the organized oppression and rapacity of
the religious fraternities, would have secured improved civil
and criminal procedure in courts, and have guaranteed, in many
ways, improvements in the fiscal and social conditions of the
people. The repudiation by the Spanish Government of these
conditions, made by General Primo di Rivera, now left the
rebel leaders, who had for the most part gone to Hongkong,
free to act. And it was in pursuance of that freedom of action
that Aguinaldo again sought counsel of his friends in Saigon
and Singapore, with a view to the immediate resumption of
operations in the Philippines.

"Meantime Mr. Bray, whose assistance to this journal on

matters connected with the Philippines has been very
considerable, as our readers will have seen, was introduced by
the editor of the Singapore Free Press to Mr. Spencer Pratt,
consul-general of the United States, who was anxious, in view
of contingencies, to learn as much as possible about the real
condition of the Philippines. It was a few days after this
that Aguinaldo arrived incognito in Singapore, when he at once
met his friends, including Mr. Bray. Affairs now becoming more
warlike, Mr. Bray, after conversation with Mr. Spencer Pratt,
eventually arranged an interview between that gentleman and
General Aguinaldo, which took place late on the evening of
Sunday, the 24th April, at 'The Mansion,' River Valley road.
There were present on that occasion General Emilio Aguinaldo y
Fami, Mr. E. Spencer Pratt, consul-general United States of
America; Mr. Howard W. Bray; Aguinaldo's private secretary,
Mr. J. Leyba; Colonel M. H. del Pilar, and Dr. Marcelino
Santos.

"During this conference, at which Mr. Bray acted as

interpreter, General Aguinaldo explained to the American
consul-general, Mr. Pratt, the incidents and objects of the
late rebellion, and described the present disturbed state of
the country. General Aguinaldo then proceeded to detail the
nature of the co-operation he could give, in which he, in the
event of the American forces from the squadron landing and
taking possession of Manila, would guarantee to maintain order
and discipline amongst the native troops and inhabitants in
the same humane way in which he had hitherto conducted the
war, and prevent them from committing outrages on defenceless
Spaniards beyond the inevitable in fair and honorable warfare.
He further declared his ability to establish a proper and
responsible government on liberal principles, and would be
willing to accept the same terms for the country as the United
States intend giving to Cuba.

"The consul-general of the United States, coinciding with the

general views expressed during the discussion, placed himself
at once in telegraphic communication with Admiral Dewey at
Hongkong, between whom and Mr. Pratt a frequent interchange of
telegrams consequently took place. As a result another private
interview was arranged at the American consular residence at
the Raffles Hotel between General Aguinaldo, Mr. Spencer
Pratt, Mr. Howard Bray, and Mr. Leyba, private secretary to
General Aguinaldo. As a sequel to this interview, and in
response to the urgent request of Admiral Dewey, General
Aguinaldo left Singapore for Hongkong by the first available
steamer, the Peninsular and Oriental 'Malacca,' on Tuesday,