The Leadership Quarterly xxx (xxxx) xxxx

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The Leadership Quarterly

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Full Length Article

A juggling act: CEO polychronicity and firm innovation

Jianhong Chen
Peter T. Paul College of Business and Economics, University of New Hampshire, Durham, NH 03824-9987, United States of America

ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT

Keywords: This study examines a unique CEO temporal characteristic—polychronicity (the extent to which CEOs prefer to
Upper echelons theory engage in multiple projects simultaneously and believe that this is the best way of doing things). I propose that
CEO temporal attributes CEO polychronicity is a double-edged sword for firm innovation and that this relationship is contingent on the
Polychronicity environmental and organizational contexts. Specifically, CEO polychronicity is positively related to firm in-
Firm innovation
novation when firms operate in more dynamic environments, are relatively large and have poor past perfor-
mance, but is negatively related to firm innovation when firms operate in less dynamic environments, are re-
latively small and have good past performance. Results based on survey data from 111 Chinese small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) largely support my hypotheses. This study makes contributions by being an
initial attempt to examine CEO polychronicity and by identifying essential boundary conditions of the effect of
CEO polychronicity on firm innovation.

Increased attention has been paid to executives' temporal con-
siderations recently (Chen, Miller, & Chen, 2019; Reilly, Souder, &
Ranucci, 2016). As technological advancements and market demands
change rapidly and competitive advantage becomes temporary, top
executives of a firm face significant temporal pressure (Ancona,
Goodman, Lawrence, & Tushman, 2001). Their inherent temporal
characteristics or preferences significantly influence how they attend to
strategic stimuli, gauge temporal demands, and allocate temporal re-
sources (Das, 1987). Focusing on CEOs as primary decision-makers,
studies have shown that CEO temporal characteristics such as temporal
focus (cognitive bias toward past, present and future), time urgency
(chronic hurriedness) and pacing style (patterns of effort distribution in
working toward deadline) are related to strategic planning, firm in-
novation, and corporate entrepreneurship (e.g., Chen & Nadkarni,
2017; Das, 1987; Gamache & McNamara, 2019; Nadkarni & Chen,
2014; Yadav, Prabhu, & Chandy, 2007).
Despite these insights, understanding of the strategic implications of
CEO temporal characteristics is still scanty. Whereas previous ex-
aminations of temporal characteristics have described CEOs' attentional
focus on past, present, and future (temporal focus), CEOs' tendency to
get work done fast (time urgency), and how CEOs space activities over
time (pacing style), none captures CEOs' preference for multitasking or
polychronicity. It is critical to examine CEO polychronicity because
scholars consider the preference for multitasking a “fundamental life
strategy representing underlying core assumptions about time usage”
(Bluedorn, 2002; Mohammed & Nadkarni, 2014: 402). In a strategic
setting, studies that examined polychronicity of top management teams
(TMTs) found that TMT polychronicity significantly influenced firm
performance (Ling, Wei, & Xia, 2016; Souitaris & Maestro, 2010).
In this study, I define CEO polychronicity as the extent to which
CEOs prefer to engage in multiple projects simultaneously instead of
one at a time and believe that this is the best way of doing things
(Alipour, Mohammed, & Martinez, 2017; Slocombe & Bluedorn, 1999).
Research investigating the role of polychronicity in strategy not only is
sparse but also has focused mainly on positive implications (e.g.,
Souitaris & Maestro, 2010). Such a one-sided view is inconsistent with
the complex two-sided conceptualization of polychronicity in psy-
chology. On the positive side, polychronicity has been argued to foster
creativity and cognitive variety by exposing individuals to a wide range
of ideas and by presenting opportunities for novel problem-solving
through cross-fertilization of diverse information domains (Kaplan,
2008; Persing, 1999). On the negative side, working on multiple pro-
jects concurrently and switching away from an unfinished project can
have detrimental effects such as causing attentional fragmentation and
a superficial rather than a deep evaluation of issues (Mohammed &
Harrison, 2013; Mohammed & Nadkarni, 2014). This body of research
in psychology suggests that the effects of polychronicity are likely to be
far more complex than those previously theorized in strategy.
To present a more nuanced and complete understanding of the
strategic implications of CEO polychronicity than previously exists, I
argue that CEO polychronicity is a double-edged sword for firm in-
novation and develop a complex model to examine the boundary con-

E-mail address: jianhong.chen@unh.edu.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2019.101380
Received 28 November 2018; Received in revised form 20 December 2019; Accepted 24 December 2019
1048-9843/ © 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Please cite this article as: Jianhong Chen, The Leadership Quarterly, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2019.101380
J. Chen
ditions of this relationship. Firm innovation,1 defined as the launch or
introduction of new products or services, is the primary vehicle through
which firms gain and maintain a competitive advantage and superior
performance (Cho & Pucik, 2005; Damanpour, 1996; Rubera & Kirca,
2012). The conviction that innovation is of great importance to the
survival and success of the firm is widely shared among strategy and
organizational researchers. Studies have found that CEO characteristics
are critical antecedents of firm innovation (e.g., Baron & Tang, 2011;
Tang, Li, & Yang, 2015; Tuncdogan, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2015;
Yadav et al., 2007; Zhang, Ou, Tsui, & Wang, 2017). I focus on CEO
polychronicity because the two-sided effects of CEO polychronicity on
innovation are likely to be evident. On the one hand, concentration and
depth (associated with monochronicity) foster immersion and con-
tinuous flow of thought as well as a deep understanding of existing
knowledge, all of which are key ingredients of the efficiency- and re-
liability-based approach to enhancing firm innovation (Katila, 2002;
Nerkar, 2003). On the other hand, the exposure to multiple projects and
cross-fertilization of diverse ideas associated with polychronicity pro-
mote consideration of distant information and creative thoughts es-
sential to generating new and unique solutions (Chandy & Tellis, 1998;
Katila & Chen, 2008).
Building on the executive job demands literature (Hambrick, 2007;
Hambrick, Finkelstein, & Mooney, 2005), I theorize the importance of
both environmental conditions (dynamism), and organizational condi-
tions (firm size and past performance) in clarifying the potentially op-
posing mechanisms underlying the relationship between CEO poly-
chronicity and firm innovation. I propose that CEO polychronicity will
be positively related to firm innovation in more dynamic environments,
where customer tastes, product or technologies are rapidly changing
and unpredictable but will be negatively related to firm innovation in
less dynamic environments, where changes in customer tastes, product
or technologies are relatively slow and predictable. Moreover, this re-
lationship will be positive when firms are larger and have poor past
performance but negative when firms are smaller and have good past
performance. I test the theoretical model using survey data from 111
Chinese small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
This study makes several theoretical contributions. First, it con-
tributes to the burgeoning temporal research in strategy in that it is an
initial attempt to study CEO polychronicity (an exception is Mauerer,
2014). Previous upper echelons studies have conceptualized poly-
chronicity as a culture shared by TMTs and focused on the main effects
of TMT polychronicity on firm performance (e.g., Souitaris & Maestro,
2010). This study extends the upper echelons theory by adopting the
alternative conceptualization of polychronicity as an individual trait. It
shows that CEO polychronicity could exert a significant impact on a key
strategic outcome—firm innovation—depending on specific environ-
mental and organizational conditions.
Second, unlike previous studies on executive polychronicity (e.g.,
Souitaris & Maestro, 2010), this study offers a more balanced view that
recognizes both the strengths and weaknesses of polychronicity in a
strategic setting. It highlights the pivotal role of boundary conditions in
reconciling the opposite effects of CEO polychronicity on firm innova-
tion. By illustrating how demands imposed by distinct environmental
and organizational facets interact uniquely with CEO polychronicity in
shaping innovation, this study supports the contention that “studying
job demands at the executive level will be significant in guiding our
understanding of strategic decision making and executive leadership”
(Hambrick et al., 2005: 474).
1
Firm innovation has been conceptualized in many ways. I choose to define
firm innovation as the introduction of new products because actual “new pro-
ducts that are available in the marketplace represent the revenue generation
potential of innovation” (Rubera & Kirca, 2012: 133). Meta-analyses have
shown that new product introduction is a robust indicator of innovation
(Damanpour, 1992; Rubera & Kirca, 2012).
2
The Leadership Quarterly xxx (xxxx) xxxx
Theory development
CEO polychronicity
The concept of polychronicity was introduced in the cultural an-
thropology literature by Hall (1959) as the temporal dimension of
culture. People in polychronic cultures prefer to be involved in several
tasks, activities, or projects simultaneously and switch their attention
back and forth among several projects, whereas people in monochronic
cultures prefer to organize projects sequentially and complete one
project before becoming involved with another (Hall, 1983).
Since Hall's original work, research on polychronicity has followed
two distinct trajectories. One stream has conceptualized polychronicity
as a type of group culture or a state of an individual and assumes that
polychronicity can be cultivated and learned (Bluedorn, 2002;
Bluedorn, Kalliath, Strube, & Martin, 1999; Waller, Giambatista, &
Zellmer-Bruhn, 1999). As individual group members interact and
communicate with each other over time, they develop shared beliefs
and preferences regarding how to order activities temporally in their
group (Bluedorn & Jaussi, 2008; Kaplan, 2008; Tinsley, 2001). In
strategy research, studies have found that TMT polychronicity influ-
ences firm performance (Ling et al., 2016; Souitaris & Maestro, 2010).
In contrast, another stream suggests that individuals are unique in their
polychronicity, even within one culture (Kaufman, Lane, & Lindquist,
1991; Kaufman-Scarborough & Lindquist, 1999; König & Waller, 2010;
Persing, 1999; Slocombe, 1999; Slocombe & Bluedorn, 1999). It con-
ceptualizes polychronicity as an innate and stable psychological trait of
an individual (Alipour et al., 2017; Benabou, 1999; Conte & Jacobs,
2003; Conte, Rizzuto, & Steiner, 1999; Hecht & Allen, 2005; Kirchberg,
Roe, & Van Eerde, 2015; Mohammed & Harrison, 2013; Palmer &
Schoorman, 1999). Conte and Jacobs (2003) found that polychronicity
is a stable trait with high test-retest reliability. However, few studies of
strategy have examined the role of individual-level polychronicity
(Mauerer, 2014).
Building on the trait perspective, I focus on the strategic implication
of CEO polychronicity, defined as the degree to which a CEO prefers to
engage in multiple projects2 simultaneously and believes that this is the
best way of doing things. Polychronicity and monochronicity represent
opposite poles of a continuum (Bluedorn et al., 1999). Polychronic
CEOs may switch back and forth among projects (stop A and begin B,
stop B and return to A, stop A and begin C); they are flexible and
spontaneous and consider unscheduled projects as part of normal ac-
tivities rather than as interruptions or deviations from the project at
hand. In contrast, monochronic CEOs may proceed by working on one
project, not moving to the next project until the first one is completed
(A is begun and finished before B is started, B is begun and completed
before C is begun). Because they are extremely dedicated to one par-
ticular project at a given time, monochronic CEOs emphasize sche-
duling and detailed planning. Here, it is worthy to note that switching
attention among projects should not be regarded as simply moving back
and forth among multiple projects with each project focused on
monochronically. Instead, this switching will involve the “simultaneous
interspersing or dovetailing” of two or more projects (Slocombe &
Bluedorn, 1999: 76).
In this study, I examine the relationship between CEO poly-
chronicity and firm innovation. I argue that CEO polychronicity is a
double-edged sword for firm innovation and whether CEO poly-
chronicity exerts positive or negative effects on firm innovation will
depend on several environmental and organizational factors.
2
Polychronicity could be conceptualized as preference for simultaneous en-
gagement in multiple tasks, activities, or projects. Because this study examines
polychronicity in a strategic setting, I follow Souitaris and Maestro (2010) in
defining polychronicity as preference for simultaneous involvement in multiple
projects instead of activities (e.g., checking emails, answering phone calls).
J. Chen The Leadership Quarterly xxx (xxxx) xxxx

CEO polychronicity and firm innovation requirements of the environment, undermining strategic behaviors and
outcomes. Studies have adopted this theoretical perspective to show
Firm innovation, or new product introduction, has been considered that a given executive characteristic may be functional in some contexts
a vital firm outcome that is essential to creating and maintaining sus- but dysfunctional in others (Baron & Tang, 2011; Nadkarni & Chen,
tainable competitive advantage and superior performance (Elenkov, 2014; Simsek, Heavey, & Veiga, 2010; Waldman, Ramírez, House, &
Judge, & Wright, 2005; Zhang et al., 2017). Research drawing on upper Puranam, 2001).
echelons theory and strategic leadership perspective suggests that be- This study draws on the executive job demand literature to propose
cause CEOs are the chief cognizers and key decision-makers who are that the relationship between CEO polychronicity and firm innovation
charged with the primary responsibility to craft the strategies of the will be moderated by environmental dynamism, firm size, and past
firm (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984), CEOs play a very performance. Environmental dynamism refers to the rate and un-
significant role in shaping firm innovation outcome (Elenkov et al., predictability of changes in customer tastes, products, or technologies
2005). CEOs vary in their attributes and these variations guide which (Dess & Beard, 1984). In more dynamic environments, customer de-
stimuli they attend to and which they choose to ignore in evaluating mands, technologies, and competitors change very rapidly and un-
innovative alternatives (Yadav et al., 2007). Also, firm innovation is a predictably, whereas in less dynamic environments, changes in cus-
complicated process, and CEO attributes could influence how they cu- tomer demands, products, technologies, and competitors are slow and
mulate and allocate essential resources needed to facilitate innovation predictable. I argue that environmental dynamism, firm size, and past
(Elenkov et al., 2005). Studies have found that CEO attributes such as performance embody distinct contingencies for CEOs and thus will in-
hubris, positive affect, temporal focus, and regulatory focus influenced teract uniquely with CEO polychronicity in shaping firm innovation.
firm innovation (Tang et al., 2015; Tuncdogan et al., 2015; Yadav et al.,
2007; Zhang et al., 2017).
Hypotheses
I extend this line of research to examine CEO polychronicity as a
critical antecedent of firm innovation. I argue that the relationship
Environmental dynamism
between CEO polychronicity and firm innovation is tenuous. On the
positive side, polychronicity exposes CEOs to various projects and al-
More dynamic and less dynamic environments impose distinct de-
lows them to borrow, transfer, and integrate information and ideas
mands and necessitate different approaches to innovation. In more
from a broad range of projects (Kaplan, 2008; Madjar & Oldham, 2006;
dynamic environments, future technological changes, market demands,
Persing, 1999). The ideas and information generated by the cross-ferti-
and competitors' moves cannot be anticipated or accurately predicted
lization of diverse projects are woven into unique interpretations and
(Bergh & Lawless, 1998), making flexibility and openness to multiple
creative solutions (Kaplan, 2008). Creativity and novelty are the core
projects central to achieving firm innovation (Garg, Walters, & Priem,
ingredients of firm innovation (Baron & Tang, 2011; Zhang et al.,
2003; Simerly & Li, 2000). The cognitive variety and cross-fertilization
2017). On the negative side, polychronicity creates attention fragmen-
of ideas from diverse projects associated with polychronicity are par-
tation and can inhibit a deep understanding of the project at hand.
ticularly beneficial to firm innovation in dynamic environments. By
Moving back and forth across multiple projects is subject to the costs of
concurrently considering multiple projects (Bluedorn, 2002; Madjar &
interruptions and distractions that fragment attention (Adams & van
Oldham, 2006), polychronic CEOs can obtain access to varied ideas as
Eerde, 2010; Jett & George, 2003). In contrast, concentration and
well as uniquely cross-fertilize these ideas. In dynamic environments, in
dedication to one project at a time foster continuity and deep under-
which action-outcome unpredictability is very high, consideration of
standing (Madjar & Shalley, 2008; Mohammed & Nadkarni, 2014). Such
multiple projects can increase the chance that at least a few of the ideas
continuity and deep understanding allow firms to increase in experi-
and projects can be successfully converted into concrete marketed
ence or familiarity, better comprehend product requirements, and ef-
products. The cross-fertilization of ideas from multiple projects can also
fectively eliminate unnecessary steps or costs, enhancing firm innova-
increase the possibilities of finding creative and useful solutions (Katila,
tion (Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Katila, 2002; Nerkar, 2003).
2002). Supporting these contentions, Souitaris and Maestro (2010)
Together, this research suggests that CEO polychronicity is likely to
found that TMT polychronicity was positively related to firm perfor-
be a double-edged sword for firm innovation; it may enhance firm in-
mance for new technology ventures, which operate in relatively dy-
novation by allowing cross-fertilization of diverse ideas from multiple
namic environments.
projects, but it may also hinder firm innovation by fragmenting atten-
In contrast, in less dynamic environments, in which the technolo-
tion. A potential resolution of these opposing mechanisms driving the
gical and market changes are relatively uncommon, firm innovation is
relationship between CEO polychronicity and firm innovation is to seek
often merely a reflection of how firms concentrate on strengthening
moderators of this relationship. Building on the executive job demand
their existing knowledge routines and capabilities (Richard, Murthi, &
literature, I theorize that the operating environments of a firm will
Ismail, 2007; Wang & Li, 2008). Efficiency is essential to firm innova-
determine whether CEO polychronicity enhances or hinders firm in-
tion in such environments (Helfat, 1994). Strategic decision-makers'
novation.
ability to precipitate firm innovation is associated with a deep under-
standing of established knowledge (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995; Katila &
Executive job demands perspective
Ahuja, 2002). CEO monochronicity rather than polychronicity is com-
patible with this requirement because intense and uninterrupted con-
I propose that CEOs' operating environments will determine the
centration on and commitment to one project at a time foster a deep
functionality or dysfunctionality of CEO polychronicity for firm in-
understanding of the issue at hand (Conte et al., 1999; Mohammed &
novation. This stance is consistent with the executive job demands lit-
Harrison, 2013). Monochronic CEOs focus on efficiency and depth ra-
erature, which maintains that “executives vary widely in their abilities
ther than on the spontaneity and flexibility that characterize poly-
and in the suitability of their talents for the specific conditions they
chronic CEOs. Such a carefully planned, thoughtful approach is essen-
face” (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009; Hambrick, 2007;
tial to firm innovation in less dynamic environments (Richard et al.,
Hambrick et al., 2005: 475). According to this perspective, different
2007). In contrast, interruptions and distractions based on the back-
environmental and organizational conditions impose unique demands
and-forth switching associated with polychronicity are likely to be
on CEOs and therefore require distinct sets of CEO attributes. The
detrimental to the depth and concentration essential to the fostering of
compatibility between executive job demands and CEO attributes pro-
firm innovation.
motes effective strategic behaviors and outcomes, whereas incompat-
ibility between the two results in failure of executives to meet the H1. CEO polychronicity will be positively related to firm innovation in

3
J. Chen
more dynamic environments, but negatively related to firm innovation
in less dynamic environments.
Firm size
Larger firms have advanced and sophisticated research capabilities
and market skills and complex organization structure so as well as a
relatively high level of slack resources compared with smaller firms
(Damanpour, 1996; Ling, Simsek, Lubatkin, & Veiga, 2008). Thus,
larger firms can accommodate more innovative initiatives or projects
(Zona, Zattoni, & Minichilli, 2013). CEO polychronicity is compatible
with such organizational contexts to foster firm innovation. Because
polychronic CEOs prefer to work on multiple projects simultaneously
(Alipour et al., 2017; Bluedorn, Kaufman, & Lane, 1992), they can ac-
cess skills, resources, and capabilities from different parts of organiza-
tions to support multiple projects in larger firms. Through cross-ferti-
lization of ideas from different projects, polychronic CEOs can connect
seemingly fragmented and disparate projects to come up with creative
solutions, facilitating innovation.
Conversely, smaller firms possess fewer slack resources, simple or-
ganization structures, and relatively narrow sets of market skills and
product development experience (Damanpour, 1992; Ling, Zhao, &
Baron, 2007). For smaller firms, simplicity and a focus on a narrow set
of ideas and projects is a successful recipe for firm innovation (Vaccaro,
Jansen, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2012). CEO monochronicity is
compatible with such organizational contexts. Because monochronic
individuals tend to focus on one project at a time (Bluedorn et al.,
1999), CEOs can concentrate on and commit to a narrow set of projects
to match the simplicity of small firms (Miller, 1988). CEO poly-
chronicity is likely to be superfluous and inconsistent with the re-
quirements of small SMEs. Instead, it may hurt firm innovation and
expose the firm to unnecessary risks because polychronic CEOs are
likely to pursue many different projects that could potentially deviate
from and disrupt the firm's core capability.
H2. CEO polychronicity will be positively related to firm innovation for
larger firms, but negatively related to firm innovation for smaller firms.
Past performance
Past performance feedback is subjectively construed by top execu-
tives depending on their intrinsic aspiration levels—the reference
points top executives subjectively set to simplify the classification of
evaluation of past performance into discrete categories of success or
failure (Greve, 2003). When actual performance exceeds their intrinsic
aspiration level, CEOs perceive past performance to be good and see
their current innovation strategies as effective (Audia, Locke, & Smith,
2000). Under such conditions, it seems imperative to stay focused on
tried-and-true innovation recipes and attain highly specialized expertise
in existing knowledge bases. Thus, the intense focus and commitment of
monochronic CEOs to a narrow set of projects is particularly suited to
such organizational contexts. The depth and consistency associated
with monochronic CEOs will allow them to selectively concentrate on
existing established knowledge and develop a detailed, in-depth un-
derstanding of current projects, facilitating firm innovation.
In contrast, when performance falls below the desired level, CEOs
realize that existing innovation strategies are failing (Greve, 2003).
Simultaneously trying out numerous projects is essential in such si-
tuations, to increase the chance of at least a few of them being suc-
cessful and thereby alleviating the negative performance situation.
Accommodation of multiple projects and cross-fertilization of ideas
fostered by polychronicity will allow CEOs to simultaneously sense and
seize a wide range of technology and market opportunities. Through
cross-fertilization and integration of ideas and projects, CEOs can
generate creative and novel solutions, fostering firm innovation.
4
The Leadership Quarterly xxx (xxxx) xxxx
H3. CEO polychronicity will be positively related to firm innovation for
firms with low past performance, but negatively related to firm
innovation for firms with high past performance.
Methods
Research settings
The hypotheses were tested using small and medium-sized en-
terprises (SMEs) located in the Shandong province of China, a context
chosen because China is the second-largest and fastest-growing (7.7%
in 2013) economy in the world. With a GDP annual growth of > 10%,
the Shandong province is one of the fastest-growing regions and has the
third-largest GDP in China (China Statistical Yearbook, 2012). It hosts
one of the largest clusters of SMEs in China, spanning a wide range of
industries (China's SME's Yearbook, 2016; Shandong Statistical Yearbook,
2016). Shandong, which has a large number of growing cities with
diverse demographics, industrial infrastructures, economic conditions,
and government policies, is considered China's third-largest “mega
cluster” of cities (following the Beijing and Shanghai clusters)
(McKinsey 2009 annual Chinese consumer study). Thus, Shandong
province is an appropriate setting for examining CEO polychronicity. In
addition, because SMEs have few intermediate levels of management
and external influences (e.g., board of directors, capital markets), their
CEOs enjoy more power and discretion than those in large, public firms
enjoy (Ling et al., 2008). CEOs play a pivotal role not only in making
strategic choices but also in initiating and implementing these choices.
Sample and data collection
I collected survey data from the Chinese SMEs, using a survey in-
strument developed in several steps. First, I designed an English-version
of a questionnaire. Next, following established back translation prac-
tices (Qian, Cao, & Takeuchi, 2013), two raters (not including the au-
thor) fluent in both English and Chinese independently translated the
survey instrument from English into Chinese. Two other raters then
independently translated the Chinese survey back to English. I dis-
cussed and resolved discrepancies among the four translators before
finalizing the Chinese version of the survey. Such back translation
avoids cultural bias and helps to ensure validity (Boyd, Bergh, Ireland,
& Ketchen, 2013). Finally, to improve the face validity of my measures,
I pilot tested the survey on ten senior Chinese managers (not included
in the main sample) and used feedback from this pilot test to modify the
wording of the survey.
My sample SMEs were in five industrial parks located in Shandong
province. One key task of such industrial parks is to encourage the
development of SMEs in growing industries such as electronics, che-
mical products, biotechnology, advanced materials, environmental
technology, electricity equipment, auto part manufacturing, automa-
tion, computer software, medical equipment, testing and measuring
devices, and information technology. These industrial parks have de-
veloped specific support policies for individual companies, built in-
dustrial clusters, and taken measures to help companies obtain more
resources. I obtained a list of SMEs with < 500 employees from the
administrative office of each industrial park (Arend, 2006; U.S. Small
Business Administration).
With the support of industrial park administrative personnel, the
author contacted the CEOs of 498 SMEs on the list to solicit their par-
ticipation. The author explained the research project and process, en-
sured the confidentiality of responses, and promised to send CEOs an
executive summary of findings when the research study was finished.
Consistent with prior CEO studies that used primary data (Cao, Simsek,
& Jansen, 2015), I hired an assistant from each administrative office to
facilitate data collection. These local assistants, all of whom had earned
college degrees, are assigned by the local Chinese government to
J. Chen
support the development of SMEs and have been working in an in-
dustrial park for at least three years. Thus, they knew the top executives
very well and had built strong personal relationships with them, which
significantly improved the response rate. The author hand-delivered the
questionnaires to these administrative assistants and asked them to
distribute questionnaires and collect responses in sealed envelopes that
had no visible identifiers such as names and job titles.
I collected data for the independent variable and dependent variable
during two time periods. In time t1, I asked CEOs to fill out scales on
polychronicity, environmental dynamism, past performance, and other
control variables. I also asked two other TMT members (identified by
the CEOs) to fill out scales on environmental dynamism and past per-
formance. In time t2, one year later, I requested objective new product
introduction records from industrial park administrative offices. Of the
498 SMEs in these industrial parks, 205 firms responded to surveys. I
did not find any significant mean differences in firm size (t = −0.66,
n.s.) or firm age (t = 0.72, n.s.) between non-responding firms and
responding firms. I dropped the 94 firms from which I did not receive
complete data. My final sample size is 111, reflecting a response rate of
22%, which is considerably higher than the typical response rates of 12
to 14% reported in previous survey studies of TMTs (Hambrick,
Geletkanycz, & Fredrickson, 1993).
Measures
CEO polychronicity
I used the five-item Likert scale of polychronicity developed by
Bluedorn and colleagues (Bluedorn et al., 1999; Kaufman et al., 1991)
(see Appendix). This scale has demonstrated strong validity and relia-
bility and has been used extensively in prior research (e.g., Hecht &
Allen, 2005; Mohammed & Nadkarni, 2014; Slocombe & Bluedorn,
1999). I asked CEOs to rate the scale (α = 0.74).
Environmental dynamism
I used perceptual measures of environmental dynamism. The en-
actment perspective has advocated and demonstrated that the en-
vironmental context does not shape behaviors unless it is perceived and
experienced by executives (Duncan, 1972; Nadkarni & Barr, 2008).
Milliken (1987: 134) stressed that the environmental context is “in-
herently in the ‘eyes of the beholder’ and ought to be studied as a
perceptual phenomenon…there is no reason to expect a one-to-one
correspondence between an objective indicator and a perceptual in-
dicator because perceptions of reality are likely to differ from ‘objective
reality’ because of limitations in our cognitive reasoning and abilities.”
Studies, therefore, increasingly examine perceived rather than objective
environmental dimensions (e.g., Agle, Nagarajan, Sonnenfeld, &
Srinivasan, 2006; Chen, Lin, & Michel, 2010; Waldman et al., 2001).
Consistent with previous research (Miller & Friesen, 1983; Simsek
et al., 2010), I used established perceptual measures of environmental
dynamism (on an eight-item scale), with four items capturing the rate of
changes and another four items capturing their unpredictability (see
Appendix). Specifically, I asked the CEO and at least two TMT members
of each firm to fill out the scale (individual-level α = 0.73; team-level
α = 0.73). Because aggregation indices revealed acceptable values
(ICC(1) = 0.44; ICC(2) = 0.70; rwg (j) = 0.92; F = 3.25, p < 0.001), I
measured environmental dimensions by averaging the responses of
CEOs and TMT members.
Firm size
I measured firm size by the logarithm of the number of employees.
Past performance
I asked the CEO and at least two TMT members of each firm to rate
the degree to which they were satisfied with firm performance in the
previous year, on a 1-to-5 Likert scale (Brouthers, Brouthers, & Werner,
2003) (see Appendix). Individual-level Cronbach's alpha was 0.90, and
5
The Leadership Quarterly xxx (xxxx) xxxx
team-level Cronbach's alpha was 0.93. Checks for aggregation revealed
acceptable values (ICC(1) = 0.48; ICC(2) = 0.73; medium rwg
(j) = 0.93; F = 3.17, p < 0.001). We averaged the responses of CEOs
and TMT members to derive a measure of past performance.
Firm innovation
Consistent with prior research (Baron & Tang, 2011; Nadkarni &
Chen, 2014; Yadav et al., 2007), I measured firm innovation as the
number of new product introductions. The new product introduction
data was obtained from objective records of the industrial park ad-
ministration offices. I used a log-transformation of this variable to
correct for skewness.
Control variables
I included several CEO-level, TMT-level, firm-level, and environ-
ment-level controls. First, I controlled for four CEO-level variables: CEO
age, CEO tenure (the average number of years CEO had been in the firm
and in the CEO position at the time of data collection), CEO education
(high school, bachelor, master, Ph.D.) and CEO gender. Second, I con-
trolled for TMT size and TMT functional diversity because these vari-
ables foster different ideas and points of view, yield a broader set of
skills and specializations, and provide exposure to various alternatives,
all of which foster innovative ideas (Qian et al., 2013). I measured TMT
size by the number of members constituting a TMT. Consistent with
prior research (Cannella, Park, & Lee, 2008), I measured TMT func-
tional background diversity by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index.
Third, I controlled for three firm-level variables: firm age, firm slack
resources, and R&D intensity. Firm age indicates firm experience and
could potentially influence firm innovation (Qian et al., 2013). Slack
resources give firms leeway in managing their responses to rivals and in
experimenting with creative ideas (Greve, 2003). I used a four-item
measure of slack resources developed by Ling et al. (2008). R&D in-
tensity indicates the R&D expenditure of a firm and is a significant
predictor of firm innovation (Qian et al., 2013; Tang et al., 2015). Fi-
nally, I controlled for environmental hostility, characterized by intense
competition and a relative lack of growth opportunities (Miller &
Friesen, 1983). Environmental hostility could potentially influence
firms' innovation (Jung, Wu, & Chow, 2008). I used a perceptual
measure of environmental hostility (Miller & Friesen, 1983).
Analysis and results
I used a hierarchical regression approach to test the moderation
hypotheses in several steps (Aiken & West, 1991). I mean-centered the
predictor and control variables in all regression models to minimize
multicollinearity (Aiken & West, 1991). After entering the controls, I
added the main effects of CEO polychronicity and finally added three
interaction terms. Table 1 reports mean, standard deviations, and cor-
relations for all variables studied. Table 2 reports the regression results.
Figs. 1–3 show the interaction plots.
H1 proposed that environmental dynamism moderated the re-
lationship between CEO polychronicity and firm innovation. As shown
in Table 2, CEO polychronicity did not have a main effect on firm in-
novation (Model 2) (B = 0.048, ns). Rather, in model 3, the interaction
between CEO polychronicity and environmental dynamism was posi-
tive and marginally significant (B = 0.329, p < 0.10). Thus, H1 was
marginally supported.
H2 proposed that firm size moderated the relationship between CEO
polychronicity and firm innovation. In model 4, the interaction be-
tween CEO polychronicity and firm size was positive and highly sig-
nificant (B = 0.23, p < 0.01). These results strongly supported H2.
H3 proposed that past performance moderated the relationship
between CEO polychronicity and firm innovation. Model 5 showed that
the interaction term CEO polychronicity X past performance was sig-
nificant for firm innovation (B = −0.386, p < 0.01). Thus, H3 was
supported.
 J. Chen

Table 1
Means, standard deviations, and correlationsa.
Mean S. D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

1. CEO age 43.04 8.10 1.00

2. CEO tenure 6.07 4.17 0.40 1.00
3. CEO education 2.88 0.79 0.02 −0.08 1.00
4. CEO gender 1.22 0.41 −0.11 −0.07 −0.06 1.00
5. TMT size 4.35 1.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 −0.13 1.00
6. TMT functional diversity 0.51 0.19 −0.06 0.11 0.03 −0.17 0.13 1.00
7. Firm age 7.36 5.42 0.26 0.78 −0.11 −0.04 0.15 0.24 1.00
8. Firm slack 3.55 0.53 −0.02 −0.03 −0.03 0.13 −0.04 0.11 0.05 1.00
9. R&D intensity 0.15 0.11 −0.13 −0.06 0.22 0.09 0.08 −0.06 −0.09 0.19 1.00
10. Environmental hostility 3.35 0.76 −0.11 0.12 −0.18 0.09 −0.04 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.00 1.00

6
11. Firm sizeb 3.92 1.37 0.39 0.45 −0.05 −0.15 0.37 0.22 0.53 0.07 −0.13 −0.17 1.00
12. Past performance 3.20 0.70 0.13 0.30 0.18 0.01 0.14 0.18 0.29 0.37 0.12 −0.02 0.32 1.00
13. Environmental dynamism 3.10 0.46 −0.03 0.09 −0.18 −0.05 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.00 −0.03 0.30 −0.02 0.03 1.00
14. CEO polychronicity 2.94 0.83 −0.08 0.07 0.11 −0.20 0.11 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.04 −0.22 −0.02 0.13 0.07 1.00
15. Interaction term1c −0.02 1.10 −0.10 0.15 −0.15 0.08 0.00 −0.05 0.06 −0.15 0.04 0.08 0.01 −0.12 0.00 −0.23 1.00
16. Interaction term2d 0.07 0.59 −0.02 −0.06 −0.22 −0.08 −0.15 −0.03 0.00 −0.02 −0.05 0.16 −0.12 −0.22 0.18 −0.06 0.33 1.00
17. Interaction term3e 0.03 0.43 −0.08 0.07 0.16 0.02 0.02 −0.24 0.08 0.22 0.23 −0.08 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.13 −0.15 −0.28 1.00
18. Firm innovationb 1.21 0.86 0.29 0.26 0.03 −0.04 0.12 0.10 0.23 0.08 0.18 0.00 0.36 0.09 −0.03 −0.01 0.15 −0.20 0.17

a
N = 111, Correlations > 0.19 are significant at p < 0.05; > 0.23 are significant at p < 0.01; > 0.30 are significant at p < 0.001.
b
Natural logarithm.
c
CEO polychronicity × firm size (created after mean-centering).
d
CEO polychronicity × past performance (created after mean-centering).
e
CEO polychronicity × environmental dynamism (created after mean-centering).
The Leadership Quarterly xxx (xxxx) xxxx
J. Chen The Leadership Quarterly xxx (xxxx) xxxx

Table 2
Regression results with CEO polychronicity and firm innovation.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6

+ +
CEO age 0.020 0.021 0.025⁎
0.022⁎
0.024 ⁎
0.033⁎⁎
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
CEO tenure 0.023 0.022 0.008 0.015 0.019 −0.013
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
CEO education 0.032 0.030 0.053 −0.000 −0.002 0.003
(0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.104) (0.105) (0.101)
Gender 0.022 0.041 0.027 −0.012 0.062 −0.035
(0.192) (0.197) (0.195) (0.195) (0.195) (0.188)
TMT size −0.033 −0.037 −0.043 −0.054 −0.038 −0.071
(0.076) (0.077) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.073)
TMT functional diversity 0.320 0.330 0.351 0.310 0.620 0.582
(0.435) (0.437) (0.432) (0.429) (0.454) (0.435)
Firm age −0.005 −0.006 −0.002 −0.000 −0.011 0.005
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
Firm slack 0.093 0.090 0.123 0.106 0.021 0.107
(0.163) (0.164) (0.163) (0.161) (0.165) (0.159)
R&D intensity 1.994⁎⁎ 1.997⁎⁎ 1.884⁎ 2.039⁎⁎ 1.806⁎ 1.697⁎
(0.722) (0.725) (0.720) (0.712) (0.720) (0.690)
Environmental hostility 0.079 0.094 0.105 0.115 0.110 0.153
(0.110) (0.115) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.109)
Firm size 0.212⁎⁎ 0.219⁎⁎ 0.216⁎⁎ 0.210⁎⁎ 0.218⁎⁎ 0.203⁎⁎
(0.078) (0.079) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.074)
Past performance −0.169 −0.175 −0.156 −0.221+ −0.187 −0.211+
(0.132) (0.133) (0.132) (0.133) (0.132) (0.127)
Environment dynamism −0.057 −0.068 −0.064 −0.018 −0.079 −0.007
(0.174) (0.176) (0.174) (0.175) (0.174) (0.167)
CEO polychronicity 0.048 0.091 0.042 0.039 0.106
(0.102) (0.103) (0.100) (0.100) (0.098)
CEO polychronicity × firm size 0.134+ 0.230⁎⁎
(0.075) (0.077)
CEO polychronicity × past performance −0.296⁎ −0.386⁎⁎
(0.138) (0.146)
CEO polychronicity × environmental dynamism 0.392⁎ 0.329+
(0.196) (0.195)
_cons 1.187⁎⁎⁎ 1.163⁎⁎⁎ 1.183⁎⁎⁎ 1.250⁎⁎⁎ 1.127⁎⁎⁎ 1.279⁎⁎⁎
(0.246) (0.252) (0.249) (0.250) (0.249) (0.242)
R-square 0.246 0.248 0.272 0.283 0.278 0.360
F-test for R-square change 0.22a 3.14+,b 4.63⁎,c 3.97⁎,d 5.45⁎⁎,e
F 2.433 2.257 2.363 2.495 2.437 3.078

Note: OLS regression; N = 111.

+
p < 0.1.
⁎
p < 0.05.
⁎⁎
p < 0.01.
⁎⁎⁎
p < 0.001.
a
Comparison between model 1 and model 2.
b
Comparison between model 2 and model 3.
c
Comparison between model 2 and model 4.
d
Comparison between model 2 and model 5.
e
Comparison between model 2 and model 6.

To further understand these hypothesized relationships, I graphed
the interaction plots by use of margins and marginsplot commands in
Stata. Fig. 1 indicates that the positive relationship between CEO
polychronicity and firm innovation was significant in more dynamic
environments. However, in less dynamic environments, this relation-
ship was negative and in the predicted direction but was not significant.
Fig. 2 shows a negative relationship between CEO polychronicity and
firm innovation for small firms and a positive relationship for large
firms. Fig. 3 shows that when past performance was low, CEO poly-
chronicity was positively related to firm innovation, and this relation-
ship was significant. However, when past performance was high, this
relationship was negative and in the predicted direction but was not
significant.
Robustness checks
To further establish robustness, I conducted additional analysis of
my main models without any controls, as well as with different subsets
of controls (i.e., CEO, TMT, firm, and environmental controls). The
results are largely consistent with my main results (see Table 3).
Endogeneity correction
The attraction-selection-attrition theory suggests that CEOs with
certain values may be attracted to some contexts but may avoid others
(Schneider, 1987). Thus, endogeneity may be an issue in my analysis
and results. Following Semadeni, Withers, and Trevis Certo (2014), I
used the instrumental variables approach to correct for endogeneity. A
good instrumental variable should be correlated with the potentially
endogenous variable but “uncorrelated with the residuals associated
with the dependent variable—and not the dependent variable itself”
(Semadeni et al., 2014: 1078). I selected two instruments: CEO
founding status (1 = founder; 0 = non-founder) and firm location.
Founder CEOs differ substantially from non-founder CEOs in terms of
“values and attitudes they bring to bear in managing the firm” (Souder,
Simsek, & Johnson, 2012: 24). However, whether the CEO is the
founder is not directly linked to firm innovation (Tang et al., 2015).
Similarly, certain geographic locations with strong industry

7
J. Chen The Leadership Quarterly xxx (xxxx) xxxx

Fig. 1. Interaction plot for the moderating effects of environmental dynamism.

Low environmental dynamism [−1 sd] = −0.46; Marginal effect: dy/dx = −0.045, s.e. = 0.134, p = 0.733.
High environmental dynamism [+1 sd] = 0.46; Marginal effect: dy/dx = 0.26, s.e. = 0.13, p = 0.05.

infrastructures, diverse labor markets, and heterogeneous government
policies may favor polychronic CEOs, whereas other locations may
favor monochronic CEOs. However, a firm's location is unlikely to affect
its innovation outcome directly. Because SMEs in our sample were lo-
cated in two cities, I created a dummy for the city in which the SMEs
were located.
I used CEO founding status and firm location as instruments for CEO
polychronicity. Following Wooldridge (2002), I also instrumented en-
dogenous interaction by use of moderator X CEO founding status and
moderator X firm location. Table 4 (Model 1–4) reports all results after
endogeneity correction has been done as well as first stage statistics of
instrument strength, Hausman endogeneity test, and overidentification
tests. It is noteworthy that the interaction term (CEO polychronicity X
environmental dynamism) was not significant in Model 4 when CEO
polychronicity and CEO polychronicity X environmental dynamism
were instrumented by CEO founding status, firm location, environ-
mental dynamism X CEO founding status, and environmental dyna-
mism X firm location. The statistics of instrument strength also shows

Fig. 2. Interaction plot for the moderating effect of firm size.

Low firm size [−1 sd] = −1.37; Marginal effect: dy/dx = −0.209, s.e. = 0.125, p = 0.10.
High firm size [+1 sd] = 1.37; Marginal effect: dy/dx = 0.42, s.e. = 0.159, p = 0.01.

8
J. Chen
Fig. 3. Interaction plot for the moderating effect of past performance.
Low past performance [−1 sd] = −0.70; Marginal effect: dy/dx = 0.376, s.e. = 0.146, p = 0.012.
High past performance [+1 sd] = 0.70; Marginal effect: dy/dx = −0.164, s.e. = 0.136, p = 0.232.
that these four instruments are very weak. I used the approach of
Lewbel (2012) (Stata command: ivreg2h), which enables the con-
struction of instruments as simple functions of the model's data when no
external instruments are available.3 This approach has also been used
widely in previous research (Bechtoldt, Bannier, & Rock, 2019; Kashyap
& Murtha, 2017). The results are consistent with my main results (See
Model 5, Table 4). It is also possible that endogeneity bias could
threaten my moderators. Because I could not find unique instruments
for each moderator, I then used the approach of Lewbel (2012)'s to
construct instruments for each moderator internally. The results remain
consistent.
Discussion
As an initial attempt to examine CEO polychronicity, this study
indicates that it is a double-edged sword for firm innovation, its effects
on firm innovation being dependent on environmental and organiza-
tional contexts. CEO polychronicity is positively related to firm in-
novation when firms operate in more dynamic environments, are large,
or have poor past performance, but it is negatively related to firm in-
novation when firms are relatively small.
Theoretical implications
This study has significant implications for temporal research in
strategy. Research on executive temporal characteristics has high-
lighted the role of CEO temporal characteristics, including CEO tem-
poral focus (Das, 1987; Gamache & McNamara, 2019; Nadkarni & Chen,
2014; Yadav et al., 2007), CEO temporal depth (Nadkarni, Chen, &
Chen, 2016), CEO time urgency, and CEO pacing style (Chen &
Nadkarni, 2017). However, very few studies have focused on the stra-
tegic implications of CEO polychronicity (an exception is Mauerer,
2014). This study makes an initial attempt to examine a prominent,
time-based CEO characteristic—polychronicity. Distinct from previous
3 this study builds on executive job demands research to clarify the
I thank the LQ method expert for this excellent suggestion.
9
The Leadership Quarterly xxx (xxxx) xxxx
research that treats polychronicity as a cultural norm within TMTs and
emphasizes the universally positive effect of TMT polychronicity (e.g.,
Souitaris & Maestro, 2010), this study conceptualizes polychronicity as
a stable trait and shows that CEOs vary in the degree to which they
prefer to engage in multiple projects simultaneously, a variation that
exerts significant effects on firm innovation, depending on environ-
mental and organizational factors.
A potential extension of this study is to examine the relationship
between CEO demographic variables and CEO polychronicity, in an
attempt to understand why some CEOs are more polychronic, while
others tend to be monochronic. Psychology studies have long proposed
that gender and age are related to an individual's polychronic orienta-
tion, but findings are mixed. For example, Kaufman et al. (1991) found
that neither gender nor age was correlated with polychronicity. Simi-
larly, using a sample from 134 executives from 19 firms in Spain,
Adams and van Eerde (2010) found no gender or age differences in
polychronicity. In contrast, Manrai and Manrai (1995) showed that
women were more polychronic than men in a student sample at a
university in the United States. Consistent with prior research, this
study has found that CEO age was not correlated with CEO poly-
chronicity (r = −0.08). However, it is interesting that CEO poly-
chronicity was negatively correlated with CEO gender (r = −0.20,
p < 0.05), which indicates that women CEOs tend to be less poly-
chronic than men CEOs in my sample. This finding could be due to the
distinct Chinese cultural context and the executive setting of my
sample.
This study also makes contributions to the upper echelons theory
and strategic leadership research by presenting boundary conditions for
the effects of CEO polychronicity on firm innovation. The executive job-
demand research (Hambrick et al., 2005) that this study draws on is
distinct from universal explanations of executive-environmental/orga-
nizational contexts interactions such as managerial discretion
(Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). Managerial discretion arguments
highlight that because executives matter more in some environments
than others, the relationships of CEO attributes influence strategic be-
haviors more strongly in some environments than others. In contrast,
J. Chen The Leadership Quarterly xxx (xxxx) xxxx

Table 3
Regression results (robustness check).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model10

CEO age 0.023⁎

0.026⁎

(0.011) (0.011)
CEO tenure 0.037+ 0.000
(0.021) (0.022)
CEO education 0.046 0.021
(0.100) (0.099)
CEO gender 0.003 −0.005
(0.196) (0.186)
TMT size 0.084 −0.045
(0.075) (0.074)
TMT functional diversity 0.409 0.418
(0.436) (0.423)
Firm age 0.040⁎⁎ 0.012
(0.015) (0.017)
Firm slack 0.052 0.122
(0.153) (0.156)
R&D intensity 1.539⁎ 1.524⁎
(0.716) (0.688)
Environmental hostility −0.002 0.123
(0.111) (0.108)
CEO polychronicity −0.002 0.034 −0.001 0.056 −0.015 0.039 −0.039 0.028 −0.002 0.062
(0.099) (0.094) (0.099) (0.096) (0.100) (0.095) (0.096) (0.093) (0.102) (0.097)
Firm size 0.224⁎⁎⁎ 0.167⁎ 0.227⁎⁎⁎ 0.226⁎⁎⁎ 0.237⁎⁎⁎
(0.057) (0.065) (0.062) (0.066) (0.058)
Past performance −0.097 −0.109 −0.115 −0.184 −0.108
(0.117) (0.120) (0.119) (0.126) (0.117)
Environmental dynamism 0.026 0.042 0.027 0.035 −0.034
(0.164) (0.166) (0.165) (0.162) (0.172)
CEO polychronicity × firm size 0.183⁎ 0.213⁎⁎ 0.190⁎ 0.171⁎ 0.183⁎
(0.073) (0.077) (0.074) (0.074) (0.073)
CEO polychronicity × past performance −0.311⁎ −0.329⁎ −0.316⁎ −0.337⁎ −0.323⁎
(0.143) (0.144) (0.145) (0.143) (0.144)
CEO polychronicity × environmental dynamism 0.315+ 0.351+ 0.365+ 0.191 0.326+
(0.181) (0.181) (0.190) (0.186) (0.181)
_cons 1.214⁎⁎⁎ 1.231⁎⁎⁎ 1.210⁎⁎⁎ 1.237⁎⁎⁎ 1.214⁎⁎⁎ 1.230⁎⁎⁎ 1.214⁎⁎⁎ 1.236⁎⁎⁎ 1.214⁎⁎⁎ 1.232⁎⁎⁎
(0.082) (0.075) (0.251) (0.239) (0.081) (0.075) (0.079) (0.074) (0.082) (0.075)
R-sq 0.000 0.228 0.113 0.277 0.022 0.238 0.100 0.274 0.000 0.238
F 0.000 4.348 2.684 3.448 0.813 3.502 2.929 3.769 0.000 3.978

Note: OLS regression; N = 111.

+
p < 0.1.
⁎
p < 0.05.
⁎⁎
p < 0.01.
⁎⁎⁎
p < 0.001.

unique two-sided mechanisms associated with the interactions of en-
vironmental dynamism, firm size, and past performance with CEO
polychronicity.
The findings of this study are especially notable because environ-
mental dynamism, firm size, and past performance impose unique de-
mands on CEOs, and the mechanisms driving the interactions between
CEO polychronicity and each condition are different. CEO poly-
chronicity promotes firm innovation in more dynamic environments, in
which action-outcome uncertainty is high, because simultaneously
trying out many different projects ensures that at least some of the
projects are successful. However, CEO polychronicity was not related to
firm innovation in less dynamic environments. Moreover, CEO poly-
chronicity enhanced firm innovation in larger firms by allowing for
cross-fertilization of ideas from multiple projects but hindered firm
innovation in smaller firms by creating a mismatch between the high
level of variety associated with polychronicity and the simplicity of
smaller firms. For firms with poor past performance, CEO poly-
chronicity promoted firm innovation through prompting the CEO to
engage in multiple projects and seize a wide range of opportunities, but
it was not related to firm innovation for firms with good past perfor-
mance, where a deep understanding of existing innovation recipes is
central to innovation.
Together, these results indicate that the influence of polychronicity
is not universally positive, as implied in a previous study (e.g., Souitaris
& Maestro, 2010). Accordingly, this study generates new theoretical
insights by proposing “key moderators with important theoretical and
empirical implications” (Souitaris & Maestro, 2010: 653) and by illus-
trating the unique mechanisms through which CEO polychronicity ad-
dresses the demands of different environmental and organizational
conditions. As argued by Carpenter, Geletkanycz, and Sanders (2004:
764), “the understanding of such (environmental) contingencies is
perhaps the single greatest advance in UE theorizing and application.”
Managerial implications
My results alert CEOs to differences in polychronicity needed to
maximize firm innovation in distinct environmental and firm contexts.
Polychronic CEOs promote firm innovation when firms operate in more
dynamic environments, are large or have poor past performance,
whereas monochronic CEOs facilitate firm innovation for small firms.
These results suggest that considering polychronicity may be important
in CEO selection decisions for firms in which innovation is a strategic
priority. Firms may need to incorporate polychronicity as a selection
criterion to improve their CEO hiring decisions.
Limitations and future directions
This study has several limitations, which may provide fruitful

10
J. Chen The Leadership Quarterly xxx (xxxx) xxxx

Table 4
Regression results (endogeneity correction).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5

+ +
CEO age 0.020 0.032 ⁎⁎
0.023⁎
0.024 0.023⁎
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010)
CEO tenure 0.023 −0.015 0.010 0.020 0.021
(0.030) (0.034) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029)
CEO education 0.033 0.097 −0.023 0.005 0.006
(0.099) (0.105) (0.101) (0.111) (0.098)
CEO gender 0.019 −0.028 −0.071 0.056 0.030
(0.196) (0.202) (0.199) (0.210) (0.183)
TMT size −0.032 −0.046 −0.066 −0.038 −0.032
(0.073) (0.076) (0.074) (0.073) (0.071)
TMT functional diversity 0.319 0.371 0.285 0.552 0.564
(0.408) (0.423) (0.405) (0.605) (0.423)
Firm age −0.005 0.007 0.006 −0.009 −0.008
(0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.023)
Firm slack 0.094 0.184 0.121 0.037 0.035
(0.153) (0.161) (0.152) (0.186) (0.153)
R&D intensity 1.993⁎⁎ 1.683⁎ 2.071⁎⁎ 1.850⁎⁎ 1.828⁎⁎
(0.675) (0.708) (0.671) (0.715) (0.669)
Environmental hostility 0.076 0.100 0.120 0.105 0.084
(0.120) (0.124) (0.119) (0.135) (0.108)
Firm size 0.211⁎⁎ 0.201⁎ 0.198⁎⁎ 0.218⁎⁎ 0.208⁎⁎
(0.077) (0.080) (0.077) (0.078) (0.073)
Past performance −0.168 −0.112 −0.254+ −0.184 −0.175
(0.126) (0.132) (0.131) (0.129) (0.122)
Environmental dynamism −0.055 −0.041 0.031 −0.076 −0.061
(0.168) (0.174) (0.172) (0.172) (0.162)
CEO polychronicity −0.007 0.089 −0.001 0.037 −0.034
(0.190) (0.202) (0.184) (0.224) (0.116)
CEO polychronicity × firm size 0.367⁎⁎
(0.141)
CEO polychronicity × past performance −0.542⁎
(0.252)
CEO polychronicity × environmental dynamism 0.301 0.337+
(0.575) (0.188)
Statistics of instrument strength 15.639 7.48 7.87 1.87 4.8
Durbin Wu-Hausman test (F) 0.096 1.998 0.57 0.02 N/A
(p = 0.75) (p = 0.14) (p = 0.56) (p = 0.97) N/A
Overidentification test (χ2) 0.88 0.87 0.264 3.8 28.95
(p = 0.34) (p = 0.64) (p = 0.87) (p = 0.15) (p = 0.22)
_cons 1.191⁎⁎⁎ 1.254⁎⁎⁎ 1.340⁎⁎⁎ 1.137⁎⁎⁎ 1.168⁎⁎⁎

Note: 2SLS regression; N = 111; I used STATA command ivregress 2sls in model 1–4. In model 1, CEO polychronicity was instrumented by CEO founder and firm
location; In model 2, 3, and 4, CEO polychronicity and interaction term were instrumented by CEO founder, firm location, moderator X CEO founder, moderator X
firm location.
In Model 5, I used STATA command ivreg2h. Please note that the estimates are biased because these internally constructed instruments are weak. The critical value of
5% maximal IV relative bias is 20.76; the critical value of 10% maximal IV relative bias is 11.06; the critical value of 20% maximal IV relative bias is 6.03; the critical
value of 30% maximal IV relative bias is 4.29.
+
p < 0.1.
⁎
p < 0.05.
⁎⁎
p < 0.01.
⁎⁎⁎
p < 0.001.

avenues for future research. First, because the sample used here was
drawn from China, the generalizability of the findings is limited and
requires that additional studies be conducted in other countries with
different socio-cultural contexts. For example, future studies could
further explore possible cultural effects to explain the strategic im-
plications of CEO polychronicity.
Second, this study included only SMEs and chose firm size as a key
moderator. It can be argued that a sample consisting of SMEs restricts
the range of firm size, making it difficult to detect significant effects of
firm size. If this is so, my sample provides a very conservative platform
for testing the moderating role of firm size in the relationship between
CEO polychronicity and firm innovation. Future studies could in-
corporate both SMEs and large and established firms to explore the
moderating role of firm size. Future studies could also examine other
firm (e.g., firm age) and industry (e.g., industry concentration) factors
that could serve as potential boundary conditions for the effect of CEO
polychronicity on strategic behaviors and outcomes (e.g., competitive
actions).
Third, I collected data from different sources in two time periods,
and CEO polychronicity was self-rated by the CEO in t1. However, the
study is cross-sectional. Future studies could use a longitudinal design
to measure CEO polychronicity from different time periods and to ex-
amine the relationship between CEO polychronicity and firm innova-
tion. Another future research direction is to measure CEO poly-
chronicity by use of TMT ratings. Researchers could also examine the
polychronicity of upper-level executives other than CEOs, such as heads
of departments, or divisional managers of the firm.
Finally, I found external instruments only for CEO polychronicity in
this study. However, environmental dynamism, past performance, and
firm size may also be subject to endogeneity concerns. Although I used
the approach of Lewbel (2012) to construct internal instruments, my
analysis cannot firmly establish causal relationships. Future studies may
seek unique external instruments for each of these predictors.

11
J. Chen
Conclusion
In conclusion, this study explores the effects of CEO polychronicity
on firm innovation under different environmental and organizational
contexts by drawing on the upper echelons theory, the strategic lea-
dership perspective, and the executive job demands literature.
Examining temporal characteristics and their interaction with en-
vironmental and organizational contexts show great promise for ad-
vancing temporal research. I hope that the findings can spur additional
research investigating executives' temporal considerations.
Appendix A. Measures of main variables
CEO polychronicity
1. I like to juggle several projects at the same time.
2. I would rather complete an entire project every day than complete
parts of several projects (reverse-coded).
3. I believe people should try to do many things at once.
4. I believe it is best to complete one project before beginning another
(reverse-coded).
5. I believe it is best for people to be given several projects to perform.
Environmental dynamism
1. Market activities of our key competitors have become unpredictable.
2. The tastes and preferences of our customers in our industry have
become very hard to forecast.
3. Our industry's downswings and upswings have become far less
predictable.
4. The product/service technology changes in our industry are almost
unpredictable.
5. Our firm must frequently change its marketing practices to keep up
with the market and competitors.
6. Our firm must frequently change its product/services technology to
keep up with competitors and/or customer preferences.
7. The rate at which product/services are getting obsolete in the in-
dustry is very high.
8. The rate of the product/service technology changes in our industry
has dramatically increased.
Past performance
1. Are you satisfied with the last year's sales of your company?
2. Are you satisfied with the last year's net profit increasing of your
company?
3. Are you satisfied with the last year's return on capital of your
company?
4. Are you satisfied with the last year's market share of your company?
5. Are you satisfied with the last year's return on assets of your com-
pany?
6. Are you satisfied with the last year's return on sales of your com-
pany?
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