Secret telegram 25 November 1971 From: Amconsul Calcutta To: Secretary State Washington DC Sub: Bangladesh Contacts 1.

Summary: Qaiyum made "urgent" call on Poloff November 24 to say at entire BD Cabinet left for New Delhi November 22. Qaiyum did not rpt not know purpose of trip, but speculated GOI-BDG agreement imminent, perhaps on recognition of BD. He quoted BD leaders and Indians as saying that only rpt only release of Mujib would prevent Indo-Pak war. He said they believed if Mukti Bahini successes continued at present rate, Paks would be forced to declare war. He emphasised that BD leadership still thinks USG has only effective "lever" to push Yahya to free Sheikh. He commented on recent MB thrusts and overall strategy, denying that Indians doing most of fighting and claiming GOI has given M$ almost everything it desired in way of arms. End summary. 2. Qaiyum called on Political Officer evening November 24, saying he had urgent matter to discuss. He said he had tried unsuccessfully to reach Poloff previous day to tell him entire BD Cabinet left for New Delhi afternoon of November 22. Although he did not rpt not know purpose of leaders' trip, he said it believed by other Awami League members that GOI and BDG about to reach some sort of agreement, perhaps on recognition. He noted that MEA policy planning chairman D.P. Dhar was in Calcutta November 21 and may have accompanied group to capital. (Comment: We have heard from other sources that Dhar was here on that date and that BDG had been holding intense internal sessions - without Dhar for once.) 3. Qaiyum said that during recent days many BDG leaders (he named "Acting President" Islam, "Fonmin" Mushtaq and "Roving Ambassador" M.A. Samad) had been insisting that if rpt if Mujib were released, BD reps would be willing to talk to GOP anywhere about full range of issues. (French Consul General tells us he heard similar story from BD "Ambassador at large" Abdul Fateh.) Qaiyum said they had all agreed that if Mujib not released, Indo-Pak war is inescapable; if he is freed, situation would cool at once. They still believe USG is only government with effective "lever" in its hands which might push Yahya to free Mujib. They hope USG is still trying to use that "lever" before it too late. They argued that, if Mukti Bahini victories in east continued at present rate, Paks would be forced to declare war on India. 4. Turning to specific military actions, Qaiyum said "war has already started on this side," and claimed MB had "liberated" great deal of territory. He believed MB tactics were to surround Pak troop contingents and wipe them out or drive them out. After that, Indian army could come in if it wanted to provide artillery support for next MB attack. He claimed MB shelling Jessore November 24 with artillery it received from Indian army, that MB controlled almost all of Jessore district except for cantonment and center of town, that MB has "captured" Jessore-Khulna road, and that if Jessore

falls, Khulna will follow shortly. In eastern sector, he though MB would take control of Akhaura during night (November 24-25), cutting off last access to Sylhet He believed major thrusts would be directed toward Sylhet and Kushtia in next day or two. He said Dacca had been placed under curfew November 24. He denied that India army doing most of fighting "inside Bangladesh" saying, "we do not want Indian army in our country any more than we want Pak army." He allowed that Indian army might venture into east behind MB, since there would then be no Pak army to keep them out. Gordon

Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon House 1971, Enayetur Rahim and Joyce L. Rahim, Pustaka Dhaka, p 405 - 406