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Does Promising Freebies Amount To Bribing Voters
Does Promising Freebies Amount To Bribing Voters
Despite pathbreaking work on information and voting, there is still uncertainty about how voters
interpret and respond to campaign information, especially in consolidating democracies where policy
promises are rarely the currency of electoral competition. Although campaign promises and their
fulfillment are central to foundational models of electoral accountability, our understanding of how
voters process this information and incorporate it into their vote choice is limited. Results from
pathbreaking field experiments providing information to voters reinforce this conclusion: while some
interventions significantly affect voter behavior, others do not.1 Furthermore, there is no consensus
on the precise mechanisms through which information interventions affect vote choice.
Further, CJI Ramana insisted that voters are not easily enamoured
by freebies. He stated that voters choose to have a dignified
source of income. Schemes such as MGNREGA, offered a
dignified livelihood and created public assets in rural India. He
pointed out that many political parties who have made attractive
promises or distributed freebies have lost elections. The voter’s
concerns go far beyond promises of freebies.
Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, representing the Union
government, argued that freebies were being used to ‘lure’ voters
during elections and deprive them of the ability to make an informed
decision.
Sr. Adv. Prashant Bhusan appeared on behalf of the Centre for
Public Interest Litigation as an intervenor in the case. Mr. Bhushan
submitted that there were three kinds of freebies that must be seen
as illegal—those which were discriminatory and violated
fundamental rights, those that violated public policy, and those
which were handed out immediately before elections were
conducted. Mr. Bhushan argued that the last are akin to bribing
voters.
Sr. Adv. Prashant Bhusan appeared on behalf of the Centre for
Public Interest Litigation as an intervenor in the case. Mr. Bhushan
submitted that there were three kinds of freebies that must be seen
as illegal—those which were discriminatory and violated
fundamental rights, those that violated public policy, and those
which were handed out immediately before elections were
conducted. Mr. Bhushan argued that the last are akin to bribing
voters.
Section 123 of ROPA defines “bribery” as a “gift, offer or promise” by a
candidate, candidate’s agent or “any other person” to an elector inducing a
vote in the elections. In Subramaniam Balaji, the Supreme Court held that
the provision only extends to individual candidates and not political
parties, which can include many individuals. Hansaria argued that this
reasoning was flawed and that “persons” under Section 123 must include a
political party.
Hansaria then referred to Section 100(b) of ROPA which includes “corrupt
practices” as a ground for declaring an election as void. Presumably,
Hansaria was pointing out that electoral freebies—if declared as a “corrupt
practice”—are grounds for challenging an election.
Hansaria claimed that the ECI is unable to keep check on these political
parties due to the decision in Indian National Congress (I) v Institute of
Social Welfare (2002). Indian National Congress (I) had laid down three
exhaustive grounds for deregistering a political party but did not include
freebies as valid grounds.
CJI Chandrachud asked whether including political parties as “any other
person” under Section 123 would consequentially include contesting
individual candidates within the political party.
Hansaria stated that electoral freebies in the form of promises within the
manifesto are construed as an “inducement to bribery.” Senior Advocate
Arvind Datar and Hansaria iterated the fundamental principle that “what
cannot be done directly, could also not be done indirectly.” They claimed
that freebies by political parties were essentially an indirect inducement of
bribery by a candidate.