a.

Doctrine: No cause of action exists pertinent to the injunction, which

requires a right to be protected, and a violation against said right. There
was no right in the first place because the issue was a boundary issue.
This did not concern petitioners being mere occupants.

b. Case Title: Guillermo Salvador vs. Patricia, Inc. GR. No. 195834; (J.
Bersamin); November 9, 2016

c. Facts: This is an action for injunction and quieting of title to determine

who owns the property occupied by the plaintiffs and intervenor, Ciriano
C. Mijares.

Additionally, to prevent the defendant Patricia Inc., from evicting the

plaintiffs from their respective improvements along Juan Luna Street,
plaintiffs applied for a preliminary injunction in their Complaint pending
the quieting of title on the merits.

The complaint was amended to include different branches of the

Metropolitan Trial Courts of Manila. A Complaint-in-Intervention was filed
by the City of Manila as owner of the land occupied by the plaintiffs.
Another Complaint-in-Intervention by Ciriano Mijares was also filed
alleging that he was similarly situated as the other plaintiffs.

Admitted via stipulation: TCT in the name of the City of MNL and the
TCT in Patricia inc., hence the only issue left was the matter of
boundaries based on the descriptive titles. The court appointed three
geodetic engineers who later submitted their respective reports. RTC
 rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners and against Patricia, Inc.,
permanently enjoining the latter from doing any act that would evict the
former from their respective premises, and from collecting any rentals
from them. The RTC deemed it more sound to side with two of the
commissioners who had found that the land belonged to the City of
Manila.

On appeal, CA reversed the judgment of the RTC and dismissed the

complaint. The CA declared that the petitioners were without the
necessary interest, either legal or equitable title, to maintain a suit for
quieting of title.

d. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners may file an action quieting of title.

e. Held: No. Jurisdiction over a real action depends on the assessed value
of the property involved as alleged in the complaint.

The complaint of the petitioners did not contain any averment of the
assessed value of the property. Such failure left the trial court bereft of
any basis to determine which court could validly take cognizance of the
cause of action for quieting of title. Thus, the RTC could not proceed
with the case and render judgment for lack of jurisdiction. Although
neither the parties nor the lower courts raised jurisdiction of the trial
court in the proceedings, the issue did not simply vanish because the
Court can hereby motu proprio consider and resolve it now by virtue of
jurisdiction being conferred only by law, and could not be vested by any
act or omission of any party.
The joinder of the action for injunction and the action to quiet title was
disallowed by the Rules of Court. The joinder shall not include special
civil actions or actions governed by special rules The RTC should have
severed the causes of action, either upon motion or motu proprio, and
tried them separately, assuming it had jurisdiction over both. Such
severance was pursuant to Section 6, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court,
which expressly provides: Section 6. Misjoinder of causes of action. --
Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action.
A misjoined cause of action may, on motion of a party or on the initiative
of the court, be severed and proceeded with separately.

The petitioners did not show either injunction or quieting of title that they
were real parties in interest to demand.

But "for an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites

must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an
equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting
cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. The first
requisite is absent since the petitioners did not claim ownership of the
land itself, and did not show their authority or other legal basis on which
they had anchored their alleged lawful occupation and superior
possession of the property.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on June
25, 2010 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86735; and
ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: An action is deemed an attack on a title when its objective is to
nullify the title, thereby challenging the judgment pursuant to which the
title was decreed. The attack is direct when the objective is to annul or
set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand,
the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different
relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident
thereof.

b. Case Title: Filipinas Eslon Manufacturing Corp. vs. Heirs of Basilio

Llanes, GR. No. 194114; (J. Caguioa); March 27, 2019

c. Facts: The parties are involved in a land dispute. To forestall any farther
attempt to interfere with its property rights, FEMCO filed on 1 September
1995, a Complaint against the respondents before the RTC of Lanao del
Norte for quieting of title and damages. In its complaint, FEMCO
asserted that it is the registered owner of a parcel of land and its title
thereto being evidenced by a valid transfer certificate of title and that the
titles presented by herein respondents are in truth and in fact invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable and are prejudicial to FEMCO's
title. The RTC ruled in favor of FEMCO and directed the register of
deeds to cancel all certificates of title by herein respondents. On appeal,
the CA ruled that petitioner FEMCO's assertions, allegations, and reliefs
sought in its Complaint for Quieting of Title that it is actually an indirect
action for annulment of title, the Complaint must be dismissed in
accordance with the doctrine that a certificate of title cannot be subject
to a collateral attack.
d. Issue: Whether the CA was correct in holding that the complaint for
Quieting of Title is a collateral attack to the certificate of title.

e. Held: No. An action to quiet title or to remove the clouds over a title is a
special civil action governed by the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule
63 of the Rules of Court. An action or proceeding is deemed an attack
on a title when its objective is to nullify the title, thereby challenging the
judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct
when the objective is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its
enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral
when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the
judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.

Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud,
doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property. Whenever there is a
cloud on title to real property or any interest in real property by reason of
any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is
apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said
title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
In such action, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective
rights of the complainant and the other claimants, not only to place
things in their proper places, and to make the claimant, who has no
rights to said immovable, respect and not disturb the one so entitled, but
also for the benefit of both. Hence, raising the invalidity of a certificate
of title in an action for quieting of title is NOT a collateral attack because
it is central, imperative, and essential in such an action that the
complainant shows the invalidity of the deed which casts cloud on his
title. In other words, at the heart of the Complaint for Quieting of Title
instituted by petitioner FEMCO is the nullification of OCT No. 0-1040 in
order to remove the cloud besetting its own title. This is manifestly a
direct attack.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED.

The assailed Decision dated August 23, 2010 promulgated by the Court
of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City, Twenty-First Division in CA-G.R. CV
No. 62936 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision dated
September 30, 1998 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Lanao Del
Norte, City of Iligan, Branch 6 in Civil Case No. 06-3337 is
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: For an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2) indispensable
requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a
legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject
of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his titles must be shown to
be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy.

In dación en pago, property is alienated to the creditor in satisfaction of

a debt in money. The debtor delivers and transmits to the creditor the
former's ownership over a thing as an accepted equivalent of the
payment or performance of an outstanding debt.

b. Case Title: Desiderio Dalisay Investments, Inc. vs. Social Security

System, GR. No. 231053; (J. Velasco, Jr.); April 4, 2018

c. Facts: Social Security System filed a case before the Social Security
Commission against the Dalisay Group of Companies (DGC) for the
collection of unremitted SSS premium contributions of the latter's
employees. The parties, however, failed to arrive at an agreement as to
the appraised value thereof. Thus, no negotiation took place. SSS'
Committee met with the corporation, represented by Atty. Cabarroguis.

During said meeting, Atty. Cabarroguis explained that he has "the

authority to offer in the amount of 2 million pesos. He also gave them an
 assurance that that they will turn the properties over to SSS free of liens
and encumbrances and that his clients are ready to vacate the premises
and you can have it occupied anytime.
In this respect, petitioner argues that Atty. Cabarroguis did not have the
requisite authority to make said representations and thereby bind the
corporation. DDII thus maintains that the offer to SSS remained at
P3,500,000. The RTC resolved the case in favor of DDII, holding that
there was no perfected dacion in payment between the parties.

d. Issue: Whether or not there was a perfected “Dacion en Pago”.

e. Held: We resolve to deny the petition.

Article 476 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any

interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but
is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable,
and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to
remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon
title to real property or any interest therein.

For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must

concur, namely:
 1. the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or
interest in the real property subject of the action; and
2. the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be
casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy.

Here, if it can be proved that the proposed dacion was perfected, or even
consummated, then SSS’ claim which allegedly casts a cloud on DDII’s title
is valid and operative, and consequently, the action for quieting of title filed
by DDII will not prosper.

Dacion en pago

Among other modes, an obligation is extinguished by payment or

performance. There is payment when there is delivery of money or
performance of an obligation. Corollary thereto, Article 1245 of the Civil
Code provides for a special mode of payment called dacion in payment
(dacion en pago).

In dacion en pago, property is alienated to the creditor in satisfaction of a

debt in money. The debtor delivers and transmits to the creditor the
former’s ownership over a thing as an accepted equivalent of the payment
or performance of an outstanding debt. In such cases, Article 1245
provides that the law on sales shall apply, since the undertaking really
partakes—in one sense—of the nature of sale; that is, the creditor is really
buying the thing or property of the debtor, the payment for which is to be
charged against the debtor’s obligation.

As a mode of payment, dacion en pago extinguishes the obligation to the

extent of the value of the thing delivered, either as agreed upon by the
parties or as may be proved, unless the parties by agreement—express or
implied, or by their silence—consider the thing as equivalent to the
obligation, in which case the obligation is totally extinguished. It requires
delivery and transmission of ownership of a thing owned by the debtor to
the creditor as an accepted equivalent of the performance of the obligation.
There is no dacion in payment when there is no transfer of ownership in the
creditor’s favor, as when the possession of the thing is merely given to the
creditor by way of security.

In the case at hand, in order to determine whether or not there was indeed
a perfected, or even consummated, dacion in payment, it is necessary to
review and assess the evidence and events that transpired and see
whether these correspond to the three stages of a contract of sale. This is
so since, as previously mentioned, dacion en pago agreements are
governed, among others, by the law on sales.

Stages of a contract of sale

Briefly, the stages of a contract of sale are:

 1. negotiation, covering the period from the time the prospective
contracting parties indicate interest in the contract to the time the
contract is perfected;

2. perfection, which takes place upon the concurrence of the essential

elements of the sale, which is the meeting of the minds of the parties
as to the object of the contract and upon the price; and

3. consummation, which begins when the parties perform their

respective undertakings under the contract of sale, culminating in the
extinguishment thereof.

Here, DDII having divested itself of any claim over the property in favor of
SSS by means of sale via dacion en pago, petitioner has lost its title over
the property which would give it legal personality to file the action for
quieting of title.

At this point, it is well to remind DDII that it cannot escape its liability from
SSS by giving the latter possession over the property with the
representation that it is doing so as partial settlement of its unremitted SSS
premiums and penalties due only to take the property back decades
thereafter, seek condonation of its obligations, and to make matters worse,
claim payment of back rentals from SSS. While it is true that the value of
the property has definitely significantly increased over the years compared
to the P2,000,000 amount for which it was offered to SSS, still, such is not
sufficient justification for DDII to turn its back on its obligations under the
dacion en pago agreement. In fact, the turn of events convinces Us that
DDII’s actions are tainted with bad faith.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed August 12,

2016 Decision and March 10, 2017 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 03233-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED. The complaint for
quieting of title, recovery of possession and damages, docketed as Civil
Case No. 29,353-02, is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Petitioner Desiderio Dalisay Investments, Inc. is hereby ordered to:

Execute the Deed of Sale over the properties in favor of respondent
Social Security System, consistent with the terms and conditions of
the dacion en pago agreed upon by the parties as embodied in SSC
Resolution No. 849 - s. 82 within ten (10) days from finality of this
Decision; and

Surrender the Owner's Duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.

T-18203, T-18204, T-255986, and T-255985, as well as the Tax
Declarations over said properties to respondent Social Security
System within ten (10) days from finality of this Decision.
Should petitioner Desiderio Dalisay Investments, Inc. refuse to
execute said Deed of Sale, the Clerk of Court shall execute such in
favor of respondent Social Security System.

The Register of Deeds of Davao City is directed to cancel the subject

titles and issue new ones in the name of respondent Social Security
System.

Respondent Social Security System is ordered to re-compute

petitioner's obligations accordingly, reckoned from June 17, 1982, the
date when respondent communicated its acceptance of the offer.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, it is
essential that the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or
interest in, the property which is the subject-matter of the action.
Legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means
beneficial ownership. In the absence of such legal or equitable title,
or interest, there is no cloud to be prevented or removed.

b. Case Title: Spouses Jaime and Catherine Basa vs. Angeline Loy vda.
de Senly Loy, GR. No. 204131; (J. Del Castillo); June 4, 2018

c. Facts: This case revolves around a 496-square meter residential lot

situated in New Lucban, Baguio City covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-30086 in the name of Manuel Carantes and herein
respondent Robert Carantes.

The subject property was mortgaged to respondent Angeline Loy and

her husband in 1994. Spouses Jaime and Catherine Basa, spouses
Juan and Erlinda Ogale, spouses Rogelio and Lucena Lagasca, and
spouses Cresencio and Eleadora Apostol filed before Branch 7 of the
Baguio RTC a petition for quieting of title with prayer for injunctive
relief and damages against respondents Angeline Loy, Robert
Carantes, the Registry of Deeds for Baguio City, and the Baguio City
Sheriff and Assessor's Office.

They thus prayed that the documents, instruments, and proceedings

relative to the sale of the subject property to respondent Angeline Loy
be cancelled and annulled, and that they be awarded damages and
declared owners of the respective portions sold to them. Considering
 that the petitioners failed to discharge their burden of proving the truth
of their claims even by preponderance of evidence, the court is left
with no recourse but to deny the reliefs prayed for in their petition.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the RTC denied it
thereafter.

The Court thus finds that the evidence adduced during the ex-parte
hearing was unsatisfactory and inconclusive affirming the RTC
decision.

d. Issue: Whether petitioners have proved, by preponderant evidence,

their case for quieting of title.

e. Held: No. In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, it is
essential that the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or
interest in, the property which is the subject-matter of the action.
Legal
title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means
beneficial ownership. In the absence of such legal or equitable title, or
interest, there is no cloud to be prevented or removed.

An action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy

grounded on equity. The competent court is tasked to determine the
respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, not only to
place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights
to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the
benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of
doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without
fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even to
abuse the property as he deems best. But 'for an action to quiet title
to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely:

1. the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or

interest in the real property subject of the action; and
 2. the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be
casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or
legal efficacy.

Petitioners' case for quieting of title was dismissed by the trial court
for the reason that they failed to present the originals of the purported
deeds of sale executed by respondent Robert Carantes in their favor.
In other words, short of saying that petitioners failed to prove the first
element in a suit for quieting of title - the existence of a legal or
equitable title - the trial court simply held that they failed to discharge
the burden of proof required in such case. Petitioners then attempted
to obtain a reversal by attaching the supposed originals of the deeds
of sale to their motion for reconsideration, but the trial court did not
reconsider as they failed to show that the reason for their failure to
present the original copies of the deeds fell within the exceptions
under the best evidence rule, or Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.

The trial court cannot be faulted for ruling the way it did. By
petitioners' failure to present the original copies of the purported
deeds of sale in their favor, the case for quieting of title did not have a
leg to stand on. Petitioners were unable to show their claimed right or
title to the disputed property, which is an essential element in a suit
for quieting of title. Their belated presentation of the supposed
originals of the deeds of sale by attaching the same to their motion for
reconsideration does not deserve consideration as well; the
documents hardly qualify as evidence.

To repeat, "for an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2)

indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance,
or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown
to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance
of validity or legal efficacy." "Legal title denotes registered ownership,
while equitable title means beneficial ownership."

Even if petitioners are in possession of the disputed property, this

does not necessarily prove their supposed title. It may be that their
possession of the disputed property is by lease or any other
agreement or arrangement with the owner - or simply by mere
tolerance. Without adequately proving their title or right to the
disputed portions of the property, their case for quieting of title simply
cannot prosper.

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the Petition is DENIED.

The assailed dispositions of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: Time and again, this Court has ruled that courts, under the
principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of
limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or
injustice would result.

b. Case Title: Jose S. Ocampo vs. Ricardo S. Ocampo, Sr., GR. No.
227894; (J. Velasco, Jr.); July 5, 2017

c. Facts: Petitioner Jose S. Ocampo and respondent Ricardo S. Ocampo

are full-blooded brothers being sons of the late Basilio Ocampo and
Juliana Sunglao. Ricardo filed a petition for partition and annulment of
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 102822. Ricardo alleged that he
and Jose are co-owners of the Subject Property, which was a conjugal
property left by their parents.

The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration and other supplemental
pleadings, but they were denied by the trial court. Respondent thus
elevated the matter to the CA, which declared the RTC's January 21,
1994 Order null and void. Petitioner filed a motion for extension of time
 to file a petition for review on certiorari before this Court, but the same
was denied in a minute resolution.

The RTC ruled in favor of respondent. Petitioner's motion for

reconsideration was denied in an Order dated May 21, 2012. Thus, he
filed a Notice of Appeal, which was granted in the Order dated July 10,
2012. Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of RTC
d. Issue: Whether or not the action for annulment of title and partition has
already prescribed.

e. Held: Under the Torrens System, the decree of registration and the
certificate of title issued become incontrovertible upon the expiration of 1
year from the date of entry of the decree of registration, without
prejudice to an action for damages against the applicant or any person
responsible for the fraud. However, actions for reconveyance based on
implied trusts may be allowed beyond the one-year period.

As elucidated in Walstrom v. Maps Jr., the irrevocability of the Torrens

title already issued in the name of another person, he can still be
compelled under the law to reconvey the subject property to the rightful
owner. The property registered is deemed to be held in trust for the real
owner by the person in whose name it is registered. In an action for
reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as
incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property,
which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s
name, to its rightful and legal owner, or to one with a better right. Yet,
the right to seek reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust
is not absolute nor is it imprescriptible. An action for reconveyance
based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in 10
years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.

By way of additional exception, the Court has permitted the filing of an

action for reconveyance despite the lapse of more than 10 years from
the issuance of title where the plaintiffs therein were in actual
possession of the disputed land, converting the action from
reconveyance of property into one for quieting of title. Imprescriptibility is
accorded to cases for quieting of title since the plaintiff has the right to
wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is questioned before
initiating an action to vindicate his right.

Given the falsity of the ESW, it becomes apparent that petitioner

obtained the registration through fraud. This wrongful registration gives
occasion to the creation of an implied or constructive trust under Article
1456 of the New Civil Code. An action for reconveyance based on an
implied trust generally prescribes in ten years. However, if the plaintiff
remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover
title of possession does not run against him. In such case, his action is
deemed in the nature of a quieting of title, an action that is
imprescriptible.

In this case, the complaint for partition and annulment of the title was
only more than twenty (20) years since the assailed title was issued.
However, both petitioner and respondent were residing at the subject
property at the time the complaint was filed. Considering that respondent
was in actual possession of the disputed land at the time of the filing of
the complaint, the present case may be treated as an action for quieting
of title.

Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud,
doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property.

Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure an

adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to
that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and those
claiming under him may be forever afterward free from any danger of
hostile claim. In an action for quieting of title, the court is tasked to
determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants,
not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has
no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also
for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every
cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards
without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and
even to abuse the property as he deems best.

For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must

concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an
equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting
cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
A cloud on a title exists when (1) there is an instrument (deed, or
contract) or record or claim or encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is
apparently valid or effective; (3) but is, in truth and in fact, invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable or extinguished or barred by
extinctive prescription; and (4) may be prejudicial to the title.

Since it was already established that respondent’s signature on the

ESW, which was the basis of petitioner’s title over the property, was
forged, then it is only necessary for the cloud on respondent’s title to be
removed. Thus, the trial court’s order to cancel TCT No. 102822 and
uphold the parties’ co-ownership was proper.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision

dated September 3 0, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55,
Manila in Civil Case No. 92-61716, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals
in its Decision dated June 28, 2016 in CA-G.R. CV No. 99908, is hereby
AFFIRMED.

The Regional Trial Court shall proceed with the partition of the subject
lot with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: Article 494 of the New Civil Code. No co-owner shall be
obliged to remain in the co- ownership. Each co-owner may demand at
any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share
is concerned.

In a co-ownership, the undivided thing or right belong to different

persons, with each of them holding the property pro indiviso and
exercising [his] rights over the whole property. Each co- owner may use
and enjoy the property with no other limitation than that he shall not
injure the interests of his co-owners.

Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property

from one who unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or
termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express
or implied.

b. Case Title: Fortunato Anzures vs. Erlinda Ventanilla, GR. No. 222297;
(J. Gesmundo); July 9, 2018

c. Facts: On October 12, 2012, Spouses Erlinda and Arturo Ventanilla file
a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer before the MTC of Bulacan against
the petitioner Fortunato Anzures. Spouses Ventanilla alleged that they
are the owners of a house in Brgy. Sta. Ines, Bulacan, Bulacan and that
the house is declared for taxation purposes. The house is stands on a
289 square meters parcel of land under OCT No. 2011000008 and
registered in the names of Fortunato and his wife Carolina Anzures.
Fortunato and Carolina donated 144 square meters of the land on March
21, 2011 to Spouses Ventanilla; that Erlinda Ventanilla "indicated to
partition the said property," but the house situated on said property
constitutes a stumbling block on the partition of the said property; that
being the owners of the property, Spouses Ventanilla merely tolerated
the occupation of the property; that they demanded Fortuanto to vacate
the house to give way to the subdivision and partition of the property but
to no avail; and that Spouses Ventanilla filed a complaint with the office
of the Barangay but no amicable settlement was effected.

Fortunato in his Answer moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of

cause of action alleging that they were the owners of the residential
house and lot containing 289 square meters having bought the said
property from Erlinda. Fortunato also denied the genuineness and
authenticity of the March 21,2011 deed of donation because at that time,
Carolina was mentally and physically incompetent to execute the same.
He contended that he had no knowledge of the deed and he never
affixed his signature thereon. The MTC ruled in favor of Spouses
Ventanilla and ordered Fortunato to vacate the house, surrender its
possession and to pay reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the subject property.
 The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC. On appeal the CA denied
the petition. The CA explained that the complaint sufficiently averred
the unlawful withholding of the subject residential house by petitioner,
constitutive of unlawful detainer, although the exact words "unlawful
withholding" were not used. It reiterated the ruling that a person who
occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied
promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary
action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.
Possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes
unlawful when the possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon
demand made by the owner.

d. Issue: whether or not respondents have a cause of action to eject

petitioner from the subject property.

e. Held:

From the documentary records, the property is co-owned by Carolina

and Erlinda. Being co-owners of the property, they are also the co-
owners of the improvement thereon, including the subject house. This is
clear from the Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land dated August
2, 2000, executed in favor of Erlinda and Carolina, whereby the three
heirs of Vicenta Galvez, namely, Filomena Rodriguez Rivera, Enriqueta
Rodriguez and Rosalina Rodriguez sold, transferred and conveyed,
absolutely and unconditionally, the subject “parcel of land, with
improvements” to the “two,” “their heirs or assigns, free from all liens and
encumbrances.”

Respondents cannot rely on the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with

Waiver of Rights dated October 11, 2011, whereby Filomena and
Rosalina waived their rights over the house in favor of Erlinda. On said
date, Filomena and Rosalina no longer had the right to convey the
house as they were no longer the owners thereof. As evidenced by the
August 2, 2000 deed of sale of unregistered land, they already sold the
property together with the improvements to the two sisters, Carolina and
Erlinda. In fact, the title has been placed in Carolina’s name, pursuant to
their agreement.

Being a co-owner of the property as heir of Carolina, petitioner cannot

be ejected from the subject property. In a co-ownership, the undivided
thing or right belong to different persons, with each of them holding the
property pro indiviso and exercising [his] rights over the whole property.
Each co-owner may use and enjoy the property with no other limitation
than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners. The
underlying rationale is that until a division is actually made, the
respective share of each cannot be determined, and every co-owner
exercise, together with his co-participants, joint ownership of the pro
indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of it.

Ultimately, respondents do not have a cause of action to eject petitioner

based on tolerance because the latter is also entitled to possess and
enjoy the subject property. Corollary, neither of the parties can assert
exclusive ownership and possession of the same prior to any partition. If
at all, the action for unlawful detainer only resulted in the recognition of
co-ownership between the parties over the residential house.

The parties, being co-owners of both the land and the building, the
remedy of the respondents is to file an action for partition. Article 494 of
the New Civil Code reads:
No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-
owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in
common, insofar as his share is concerned.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The July 24, 2015 Decision

and the December 18, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-
G.R. SP No. 136514, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint
for unlawful detainer is DISMISSED, without prejudice to the filing of the
appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: Article 1451 of the Civil Code, when land passes by
succession to any person and he causes the legal title to be put in the
name of another, a trust is established by implication of law for the
benefit of the true owner.

Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the

others. Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no
individual or co-owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All
that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota proportionate share
in the entire land or thing.

b. Case Title: Spouses Primo Inalvez vs. Bayang Nool, GR.No. 188145; (J.
Reyes); April 18, 2016

c. Facts: The records showed that the subject property was originally
covered by TCT No. 58398 originally registered in the names of
Spouses Nicolas and Francisca Nool and Spouses Comelio and
Bayang, with an area of 15.1441 ha. On May 3, 1965, Spouses Cornelio
and Bayang sold a large portion of their one-half share of the
landholding to the petitioners and Maria Zamora, which sale was
inscribed on the title as Entry No. 5-4972.Consequently, TCT No. 58398
was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 58439 was issued in the
names of the following co-owners: Spouses Nicolas and Francisca (one-
half share); Zamora (one-fourth share); Spouses Cornelio and Bayang
(one-eighth share); and the petitioners (one-eighth share).

On June 4, 1979, Spouses Nicolas and Francisca sold their entire one-
half share over the property in favor of Spouses Abraham and Olivia
Macayanan. The new set of owners, namely, Spouses Macayanan,
Zamora, Spouses Cornelio and Bayang, and the petitioners executed a
Real Estate Mortgage over the whole property in favor of Tarlac
Development Bank to secure a loan of Php 10,000.00.

Unfortunately, the mortgage was foreclosed, and TDB sold the parcel of
land to the petitioners and Spouses Jim and Liberty Baluyot. The
petitioners instituted a complaint for ejectment, collection of shares and
damages, against the respondents before the DARAB. The respondents'
cultivation thereof was purportedly conditioned upon the payment to the
petitioners of a rightful share in the produce. Thus, when the
respondents failed to fulfil their undertaking, the petitioners instituted an
ejectment complaint against them.

For her part, Bayang averred that she and her late husband were the
actual and registered co-owners of the subject property, which they
inherited from her father, together with the petitioners. Bayang denied
having sold portions of their property to the petitioners and Zamora. She
further denied having signed any document consenting to the mortgage
of the subject property and refuted the genuineness of her husband's
signature as appearing on the REM executed with TDB. Lastly, the
respondents argued that they are deemed to have already acquired the
subject property through ordinary acquisitive prescription since they
have
been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the subject
property for more than 30 years.
On January 14, 2002, the DARAB dismissed the case upon finding that
no tenancy relationship exists between the parties. Dissatisfied, the
petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of possession, damages with
an
application for preliminary injunction against the respondents before the
RTC. After trial, the court a quo rendered its judgment in favor of the
petitioners. The trial court dismissed the respondents' claim of
ownership
over the subject property taking note of the sale and transfer effected by
Spouses Cornelio and Bayang over a large portion of their inherited
property in favor of Zamora and the petitioners.

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and
dismissed the complaint for recovery of possession upon finding that a
co-ownership existed between the parties.

The petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied, hence, this
petition.
d. Issue: Whether or not a co-ownership exists between the petitioners and
the respondents.

e. Held: The petition has no merit.

In this case, the petitioners' cause of action for recovery of possession is

grounded on their alleged exclusive ownership of the subject property
which they merely purchased from TDB.

Here, records show that the subject property was originally owned by
Juliana and Bayang's father, Cleto Macayanan under Original Certificate
of Title No. 1665. "Pursuant to Article 1451 of the Civil Code, when land
passes by succession to any person and he causes the legal title to be
put in the name of another, a trust is established by implication of law for
the benefit of the true owner."

"Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the

others." "Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no
individual or co-owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All
that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota proportionate share
in the entire land or thing." "Should a co-owner alienate or mortgage the
co- owned property itself, the alienation or mortgage shall remain valid
but only to the extent of the portion which may be allotted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership. "In case of
foreclosure, a sale would result in the transmission only of whatever
rights the seller had over of the thing sold."
Indeed, a co-owner does not lose his part ownership of a co-owned
property when his share is mortgaged by another co-owner without the
former's knowledge and consent as in the case at bar. The mortgage of
the inherited property is not binding against co-heirs who never
benefited.

When the subject property was sold to and consolidated in the name of
TDB, the latter merely held the subject property in trust for the
respondents. When the petitioners and Spouses Baluyot bought back
the subject property, they merely stepped into the shoes of TDB and
acquired whatever rights and obligations appertain thereto.

Failure and intentional omission to disclose the fact of actual physical

possession by another person during registration proceedings
constitutes actual fraud. Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal
a fact, upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person.
The alleged incontrovertibility of title cannot be successfully invoked by
the petitioners because certificates of title merely confirm or record title
already existing and cannot be used as a shield for the commission of
fraud.

From the foregoing disquisitions, it is clear that the CA did not err in
declaring that the petitioners have no legal basis to recover possession
of the subject property. Except for their claim that they merely purchased
the subject property from TDB, the petitioners presented no other
justification to disprove co-ownership. Since the mortgage of the co-
owned property was done without the respondents' consent, they cannot
 be deemed to have lost their share as a consequence of the subsequent
foreclosure and sale of the co-owned property. In the same way, the
petitioners, as mere co-owners, had no right to mortgage the entire
property for their right to do so is limited only to that portion that may be
allotted to them upon termination.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 19,

2008 and the Resolution dated May 26, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 89378 are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: Certificate of Title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name
appears therein. It becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel of
land. Such principle of indefeasibility has long been well-settled in this
jurisdiction and it is only when the acquisition of the title is attended with
fraud or bad faith that the doctrine finds no application.

A document evidencing a sale transaction, such as a deed of sale,

which is duly notarized is considered a public document and therefore
enjoys the presumption of validity as to its authenticity and due
execution

b. Case Title: Rogelio Logrosa vs. Spouses Cleofe and Cesar Azares, GR.
No. 217611; (J. Caguioa); March 27, 2019

c. Facts: In his verified complaint for partition filed before the RTC,
petitioner Logrosa alleged that he, together with the respondents are co-
owners of eight (8) parcels of lands
Logrosa alleged that in 1987, the original owner of the subject
properties, one Benjamin A. Gonzales, sold the subject properties
collectively to petitioner Logrosa and the other respondents. The records
show that a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 14, 1987 was
executed by the parties, bearing the signatures of Gonzales, petitioner
Logrosa, respondents Cleofe, Nelson, Bonifacio, and Abundio.

Petitioner Logrosa likewise claimed that the aforementioned titles were

issued to the parties herein on May 19, 1987, hence the co- ownership
over the aforementioned properties had already existed for more than
ten (10) years, without the parties having entered into any subsequent
agreement to keep the above-said properties undivided. He anchored
his complaint on Article 494 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines
which provides:

"No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each

co-owner may demand a[t] any time the partition of the thing owned
in common, insofar as his share is concerned. [x x x]"

Summoned to plead, only respondents Sps. Azares filed their Answer to

the complaint, and opposed petitioner Logrosa's prayer for partition.
Other respondents did not file their answers.

Answering respondents Sps. Azares contended that while it may be true

that petitioner Logrosa's name appeared in the titles of the properties af
however, they belied petitioner Logrosa's claim that he is a co-owner of
the same, as he never contributed as to its acquisition and never
contributed for their maintenance, much less paid the taxes due thereon.

Answering respondents Sps. Azares further alleged that sometime in

1985, Petitioner Logrosa, being their cousin, used to work for them as
their trusted laborer together with the other [respondents] at their gold
mining tunnel in Mt. Diwata, Diwalwal, Monkayo. Petitioner Logrosa,
being young and inadequately schooled, was sent to school at the
expense of the answering respondents Sps. Azares. They also allowed
petitioner Logrosa to construct his house at Nova Tierra, Lanang, Davao
City upon condition that petitioner Logrosa would pay and reimburse
them for all his expenses thereto when petitioner Logrosa's finances
allow.

Sometime in 1986, answering respondents Sps. Azares purchased all

the properties subject of this case to provide one place for all the parties
herein to live near each other for easy access and mutual security.

Petitioner Logrosa and the other respondents have not contributed to

their acquisition. As time went by, petitioner Logrosa and the other
respondents turned hostile against the answering respondents Sps.
Azares.

During trial, petitioner Logrosa testified in court to support his claim. He

likewise presented to the witness stand respondent Antonieta to identify
the document in connection with the acquisition of the aforementioned
properties.
 Respondents Sps. Azares presented only one (1) witness, who
debunked the claims of petitioner Logrosa, asserting that he did not
make Logrosa as co-owners of the properties subject of this case.

Hence, petitioner Logrosa appealed the RTC's Decision before the CA,
alleging, in the main, that the RTC erred in holding that there is no co-
ownership that exists between petitioner Logrosa and respondents Sps.
Azares.

In its assailed Decision, the CA denied petitioner Logrosa's appeal

d. Issue: Whether or not the CA was correct in dismissing petitioner
Logrosa's complaint for partition because of its finding that the latter is
not a co- owner and is a mere trustee of the subject properties.

e. Held: The instant Petition is meritorious.

The Court notes that petitioner Logrosa does not rely merely on his own
testimony to prove that he is a co-owner of the subject properties. No
one disputes the fact that there are eight certificates of title, all of which
clearly and unequivocally identify petitioner Logrosa as one of the co-
owners of the subject properties.

It is a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title

serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the
property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. It becomes
the best proof of ownership of a parcel of land. Such principle of
indefeasibility has long been well-settled in this jurisdiction and it is only
when the acquisition of the title is attended with fraud or bad faith that
the doctrine finds no application.30 In the instant case, there is no
accusation whatsoever that petitioner Logrosa was included as co-
owner in the TCTs through means of fraud or bad faith.

Aside from the foregoing, it is also not disputed by any party that a duly
notarized Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 14, 1987 was executed by
all the parties, wherein it clearly states without ambiguity that one of the
vendees of the subject properties is petitioner Logrosa. It must be
stressed that respondents Sps. Azares do not deny whatsoever that
petitioner Logrosa is a co-vendee under the Deed of Absolute Sale. In
fact, respondent Cleofe was even a co-signatory of the said Deed of
Absolute Sale, evidencing her assent and consent to petitioner
Logrosa's status as a co-vendee of the subject properties.

The Court has previously held that a document evidencing a sale

transaction, such as a deed of sale, which is duly notarized is
considered a public document and therefore enjoys the presumption of
validity as to its authenticity and due execution. Section 23, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court likewise state that public documents are prima facie
evidence of the fact which gave rise to their execution.

Moreover, as held in Heirs of Santiago v. Heirs of Santiago,one's

assertion of ownership is further strengthened and buttressed by the fact
of possession, i.e., by building and occupying a house on the subject lot,
coupled with the lack of opposition of such possession on the part of the
other parties.In the instant case, it is not disputed that petitioner Logrosa
possesses a portion of the subject property with no opposition by the
other parties, aside from respondents Sps. Azares, who disclaimed
petitioner Logrosa's status as co-owner only after more than two
decades since the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, and only as a
mere reaction to the Complaint for Partition filed by petitioner Logrosa.

Hence, with the strong legal presumption created by the eight

certificates of title and duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale that
petitioner Logrosa is a co-buyer and co-owner of the subject properties,
the burden to prove otherwise was shifted to respondents Sps. Azares.

From the evidence on record, the Court finds that respondents Sps.
Azares have not successfully hurdled this burden.

To controvert the strong legal presumption in favor of petitioner

Logrosa's co-ownership over the subject properties, respondents Sps.
Azares can only muster the sole testimony of respondent Cesar. A
solitary, self-serving testimony cannot successfully overturn petitioner
Logrosa's prima facie status as co-owner brought about by the
execution of a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale and the issuance of the
certificates of title.

With respect to the tax declarations presented by respondents Sps.

Azares, jurisprudence holds that tax declarations and tax receipts as
evidence of ownership cannot prevail over a certificate of title which, to
reiterate, is an incontrovertible proof of ownership.36 Hence, in order for
respondents Sps. Azares' tax declarations to successfully overturn the
strong presumption of petitioner Logrosa's co-ownership, it was
incumbent upon respondents Sps. Azares to fortify their position with
other supporting evidence. As stated above, respondents Sps. Azares
were not able to do so.

A person may exercise the right to compel the partition of real estate if
he/she sets forth in his/her complaint the nature and extent of his title
and subsequently proves the same.

The law does not make a distinction as to how the co-owner derived
his/her title, may it be through gratuity or through onerous consideration.
In other words, a person who derived his title and was granted co-
ownership rights through gratuity may compel partition.

Respondents Sps. Azares maintain that there was no gratuitous granting

of title and co-ownership rights to petitioner Logrosa and that they only
intended to designate petitioner Logrosa as a mere trustee of the subject
properties. However, to reiterate, this self-serving testimony of
respondents Sps. Azares based on their mere say-so cannot stand, vis-
a- vis the strong legal presumption created by the certificates of title and
the notarized Deed of Absolute Sale that petitioner Logrosa is a co-
owner of the subject property.

As a rule, the burden of proving the existence of a trust is on the party

asserting its existence, and such proof must be clear and satisfactorily
show the existence of the trust and its elements. While implied trusts
may be proved by oral evidence, the evidence must be trustworthy and
received by the courts with extreme caution, and should not be made to
rest on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations. Trustworthy evidence
is required because oral evidence can easily be fabricated.

With this clear admission against interest on the part of respondents

Sps. Azares that there was indeed an intention on their part to make
petitioner Logrosa and the other respondents as co-owners of the
subject properties, the Court cannot subscribe to the CA's view that
there is insufficiency of evidence confirming petitioner Logrosa's status
as co- owner of the subject properties.

As a parting note, while it is true that the Court has previously held that
the mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person
does not foreclose the possibility that the registrant may only be a
trustee, to controvert the legal presumption brought about by the
execution and issuance of public documents pointing to the existence of
co-ownership, the opposing party must carry and satisfy the burden of
proving with clear, convincing and persuasive evidence to repudiate the
co-ownership. In this
case, the Court finds that respondents Sps. Azares failed to fulfill such
burden.

WHEREFORE, premised considered, the instant Petition is hereby

GRANTED. The Decision dated July 30,2014 and Resolution dated
February 26, 2015 promulgated by the Court of Appeals - Cagayan de
Oro Accordingly, the Decision dated February 27, 2012 promulgated by
Regional Trial Court of Tagum City, Davao del Norte, Branch 30 in Civil
 Case No. 4026 is likewise REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional
Trial Court is DIRECTED to issue an Order under Rule 69 of the Rules
of Court for the partition of the subject properties. SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: One who deals with property registered under the Torrens
system has a right to rely on what appears on the face of the certificate
of title and need not inquire further as to the property's ownership.

Article 448 of the Civil Code provides that if a person builds on another's
land in good faith, the land owner may either: (a) appropriate the works
as his own after paying indemnity; or (b) oblige the builder to pay the
price of the land.

Principle that a notarized document enjoys the presumption of regularity

b. Case Title: Rosario Victoria vs Normita Jacob Pidlaoan, GR. No.

196470; (J. Brion); April 20, 2016

c. Facts: Rosario and Elma lived together since 1978. In 1984, Elma
bought a parcel of land in Lucena City and was issued a TCT No. T-
50282. When Rosario came home from Saudi, she caused the
construction of a house on the lot. In 1989, Elma allegedly mortgaged
the house and lotto a Villanueva. When the properties were about to be
foreclosed, Elma allegedly asked for help from respondents her
sister-in-law Eufemia Pidlaoan, to redeem the property. Normita,
daughter of Eufemia agreed to lend money to Elma. Elma sought to sell
the land but failed. She offered to sell it to Eufemia or her daughter
instead. On 1993, Elma executed a deed of sale entitled “Panananto
ng Pagkatanggap ng Kahustuhang Bayad” transferring the
ownership of the lot to Normita.

When Elma and Normita were about to have the document notarized,
the notary public advised them to donate the lot instead to avoid capital
gains tax. Elma executed a deed of donation in Normita’s favor and had
it notarized. TCT No. T-50282 was cancelled and TCT No. T-
70990 was issued in Normita’s name.

Since then, Normita had been paying the real property taxes over the lot
but Elma continued to occupy the house. Rosario found out about the
donation. In 1997, the petitioners filed a complaint for reformation of
contract, cancellation of TCT No. T-70990, and damages with
prayer for preliminary injunction against respondents. Petitioners
argued that they co-owned the lot because both of them
contributed the money used to purchase it; Elma and Normita entered
into an equitable mortgage because they intended to constitute
a mortgage over the lot to secure Elma’s loan but they executed a
deed of sale instead; and the deed of donation was simulated because
Elma executed it upon the notary public’s advice to avoid capital gains
 tax. In their answer, respondents admitted that the deed of donation was
simulated and that the original transaction was a sale. They
argued, however, that there was no agreement to constitute a real
estate mortgage on the lot.

RTC ruled that Rosario and Elma co-owned the house and lot. Thus,
Elma could only donate her one-half share in the lot.
Respondents appealed to the CA.

The CA reversed RTC’s decision and dismissed the petitioner’s

complaint. CA held that Elma and Normita initially entered into two
agreements: a loan and a sale. They entered into a loan agreement
when Elma had to pay Thi Hong Villanueva to redeem the property.

Thereafter, Elma sold the property to Normita. They

subsequently superseded the contract of sale with the assailed
deed of donation. CA denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the present case. Petitioners maintain that the transaction was a
mere equitable mortgage.

d. Issue: Whether the transaction between Elma and Normita was that of
an equitable mortgage.

e. Held: No. The transaction involved does not fall within the ambit of
equitable mortgage.

An equitable mortgage is one which, although lacking in some formality

or other requisites demanded by statute, nevertheless reveals the
intention of the parties to charge real property as security for a debt, and
contains nothing impossible or contrary to law. Articles 1602 and 1604 of
the Civil Code provide that a contract of absolute sale shall be presumed
an equitable mortgage if any of the circumstances listed in Article 1602
is attendant. Two requisites must concur for Articles 1602 and 1604
of the Civil Code to apply: (i) the parties entered into a contract
denominated as a contract of sale; and (ii), their intention was to secure
an existing debt by way of mortgage. In the present case, the
unnotarized contract of sale between Elma and Normita is denominated
as “Pananantong Pagkatanggap ng Kahustuhang Bayad.” Its
contents show an unconditional sale of propertybetween Elma and
Normita. The document shows no intention to secure a debtor to grant a
right to repurchase.

Thus, there is no evidence that the parties agreed to mortgage the

property as contemplated in Article 1602 of the Civil Code. Clearly, the
contract is not one of equitable mortgage. Even assuming that Article
1602 of the Civil Code applies in this case, none of the circumstances
are present to give rise to the presumption of equitable mortgage. First,
the petitioners failed to substantiate their claim that the sale price
was unusually inadequate.

In fact, the sale price of Php 30,000.00 is not unusually inadequate

compared with the lot’s market value of P32,160 as stated in the 1994
tax declaration. Second, the petitioners continued occupation on
the property was coupled with the respondents’ continuous
demand for them to vacate it. Third, no other document was
executed for the petitioners to repurchase the lot after the sale contract
 was executed. Finally, the respondents paid the real property taxes on
the lot. These contradict the petitioners’ claim of equitable mortgage.

WHEREFORE, we hereby PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. The March

26, 2010 decision and March 15, 2011 resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 89235 are hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the parties entered into a contract of sale, not a
donation, and that petitioner Elma Pidlaoan sold the whole disputed
property to respondent Normita Jacob Pidlaoan. Costs against the
petitioners. SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: An heir may file an action for reconveyance of possession as a
co- owner thereof, provided that such heir recognizes and acknowledges
the other co-heirs as co-owners of the property as it will be assumed
that the heir is acting on behalf of all the co-heirs for the benefit of the
co- ownership.

b. Case Title: Socorro T. Clemente vs. Republic, GR. No. 220008; (J.
Carpio); February 20, 2019

c. Facts: Municipal Mayor Amado A. Clemente (Mayor Clemente), Dr.

Vicente A. Clemente, Judge Ramon A. Clemente, and Milagros A.
Clemente (Clemente Siblings) were the owners of a parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-50896. During their
lifetime, they executed a Deed of Donation dated 16 March 1963 over a
one-hectare portion of their property (Subject Property) in favor of the
Republic of the Philippines.
In 2004, almost forty-one (41) years after the Deed of Donation was
executed, Socorro, as heir and successor-in-interest of Mayor Clemente,
filed a Complaint, and subsequently an Amended Complaint, for
Revocation of Donation, Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession
alleging that the Republic of the Philippines failed to comply with the
condition imposed on the Deed of Donation, which was to use the
property “solely for hospital site only and for no other else, where a
government hospital shall be constructed”.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On 24 September 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision dismissing the

case on the ground of prematurity.

In a Resolution dated 4 April 2008, the RTC denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Socorro. Thus, Socorro appealed to the Court
of Appeals.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In a Decision dated 17 October 2014, the CA denied the appeal, finding

that while there may be basis for the recovery of the property, Socorro,
as an heir of a deceased co-donor, cannot assert the concept of heirship
to participate in the revocation of the property donated by her successor-
in-interest. The CA held, thus:
 Prescinding simply from the hypothetical effect of succession for
Socorro T. Clemente, neither was there any assertion on the initiatory
pleading nor evidence from the plaintiff-appellant as to any judicial or
extra-judicial settlement of the estate of her husband as co-donor.
And without any representation from Socorro T. Clemente on the
Amended Complaint as to previous determination of heirs, full
liquidation of the estate and payment of estate debts, if any, it cannot
be assumed, and the plaintiff’s representatives cannot assert
heirship, that a portion of the property donated was still part of the
estate of Socorro T. Clemente’s husband. Corollary thereto, Section
2, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court illuminates that until
liquidation of the property, neither the widow nor the heirs can sue for
participation therein.

d. Issue: Whether the full settlement of the estate is required before the
petitioner may institute an action for revocation of donation,
reconveyance, and recovery of possession of property.

e. Held: No.

There is no need for the settlement of the estate before one of the heirs
can institute an action on behalf of the other co-heirs. Although an heir’s
right in the estate of the decedent which has not been fully settled and
partitioned is merely inchoate, Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the heir
the right to exercise acts of ownership.
Thus, even before the settlement of the estate, an heir may file an action
for reconveyance of possession as a co-owner thereof, provided that
such heir recognizes and acknowledges the other co-heirs as co-owners
of the property as it will be assumed that the heir is acting on behalf of
all the co-heirs for the benefit of the co-ownership.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The 17 October 2014

Decision and the 14 August 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 91522 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court of Mauban, Quezon, Branch 64, is ORDERED to
cause the cancellation by the Register of Deeds of Quezon of TCT No.
T-51745 and the issuance, in lieu thereof, of the corresponding
certificate of title in the name of the heirs of Amado A. Clemente, Dr.
Vicente A. Clemente, Judge Ramon A. Clemente, and Milagros A.
Clemente.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: While under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, each co-owner
shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto and he may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, the effect of the alienation or
the mortgage with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited, by mandate
of the same article, to the portion which may be allotted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership. He has no right to sell
or alienate a concrete, specific, or determinate part of the thine; in
common to the exclusion of the other co-owners because his right over
the thing is represented by an abstract or ideal portion without any
physical adjudication.

An individual co-owner cannot adjudicate to himself or claim title to any

definite portion of the land or thing owned in common until its actual
partition by agreement or judicial decree. Prior to that time all that the
 co- owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the
entire thing owned in common by all the co-owners. What a co-owner
may dispose of is only his undivided aliquot share, which shall be limited
to the portion that may be allotted to him upon partition. Before partition,
a co-heir can only sell his successional rights.

b. Case Title: Heirs of Roger Jarque vs. Marcial Jarque, GR. No. 196733;
(J. Jardeleza); November 21, 2018

c. Facts: Petitioners claim that since their grandfather Laureano's death in

1946, their father, Roger, inherited Lot No. 2560 and exercised all
attributes of ownership and possession over it.Upon Servanda's death in
1975, their children orally partitioned among themselves the properties
of their parents' estate such that Lot No. 2560 and another parcel of land
in Busay, Sorsogon were ceded to Roger.

Later, Roger filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession,

against respondents. For their part, respondents claim that upon
Laureano's death in 1946, Servanda took charge of all the deceased's
properties. On December 21, 1972, Servanda sold Lot No. 2560 to
Benito, with a reservation of the right to repurchase the same within a
period of two years. When the period to repurchase was about to expire,
Servanda requested her granddaughter, Dominga to redeem the
property. Dominga yielded to her grandmother's request and
repurchased the property for P950.00 on April 2, 1974.
 Thereafter, she took possession of Lot No. 2560 and religiously paid the
taxes due on it. Later on, Dominga transferred all her rights over the
property to Lelia, who took possession of the property in the concept of
an owner.

On March 7, 2007, the MCTC rendered a Decision in favor of

petitioners. It: (1) declared petitioners as the rightful owners and
possessors of the property; and (2) directed respondents to vacate the
property and surrender ownership and possession to petitioners. The
MCTC concluded that redemption is not a mode of acquisition of
property and found no other instrument which shows that Lot No. 2560
was conveyed to Dominga. The RTC affirmed in toto the MCTC's
Decision. The CA reversed the RTC and the MCTC
d. Issue: Whether Dominga acquired the right to repurchase the subject lot.

e. Held: NO. To recall, Servanda sold the property with right to repurchase
the same within a period of two years on December 21, 1972.
Respondents claim that Servanda transferred her right to repurchase Lot
No. 2560 to Dominga, and requested that Dominga repurchase the
property within the period. Heeding the request, Dominga repurchased
Lot No. 2560 and took possession of it. For their part, petitioners assert
that redemption is not a mode of conveyance that would vest in
Dominga, as redemptioner, title to the property.

We hold that Dominga did not acquire ownership over Lot No. 2560
because it was not proven that Servanda's right to repurchase the same
was transferred to her.
In a sale with right to repurchase, the title and ownership of the property
sold are immediately vested in the vendee, subject to the resolutory
condition of repurchase by the vendor within the stipulated period. The
right of repurchase agreed upon is one of conventional redemption
governed by Article 1601, in relation to Article 1616, of title New Civil
Code. This right is separate and distinct from the legal redemption
granted to co-owners under Article 1620of the New Civil Code. More
importantly, the right to repurchase is separate from the title or
ownership over the property subject of the sale with pacto de retro.

As a rule, the right to repurchase under Article 1601 may only be

exercised by the vendor, or his successors. If so exercised, the
ownership of the property reverts back to the vendor or his successor.
On the other hand, if a third person redeems the property on behalf of
the vendor, he or she does not become owner of the property
redeemed, but only acquires a lien over the property for the amount
advanced for it repurchase. As such, the third persons right merely
consist of the right to be reimbursed for the price paid to the vendee.

In this case, the right to repurchase belonged to Servanda which she

may, undoubtedly, transfer to anyone, including Dominga. However, we
find that the claim that Servanda transferred her right of repurchase to
Dominga so as to make the latter acquire title to or ownership over the
aliquot share of Servandain her own right is not supported by evidence.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The MCTC Decision dated
March 7, 2007 is REINSTATED subject to the following
MODIFICATIONS: (1) The amount of P950.00 representing the payment
made by Dominga Jarque shall earn interest at the rate of 12% per
annum from the date of judicial demand on August 26, 200572 until
June 30, 2013, and interest at the rate of 6% per annum, computed from
July 1, 2013 up to the date of finality of this Decision; and (2) the awards
of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees shall likewise earn
interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the time of the finality of this
Decision. The total monetary awards shall thereafter earn interest at the
rate of 6% per annum from the finality of judgment until its satisfaction.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: If a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will
affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did
not consent to the sale. This is because the sale or other disposition of a
co-owner affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only
what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned
in common.

b. Case Title: Nicomedes Augusto vs. Antonio Carlota Dy, GR. No.
218731; (J. Reyes, Jr.); February 13, 2019

c. Facts: Spouses Sixto and Igoy are the original registered owner of a
parcel of land located in Lapu-Lapu City. Petitioner, Roberta Silawan, is
the only child of the Spouses Antonio Dy, filed a Complaint for
 Declaration of Nullity of Deed, Titles and Tax Declaration with Partition
and/or Recovery of Shares with Damages against petitioners. Antonio
alleged that while they were doing the necessary paper works to secure
a Certificate of Title in their name, he discovered that the subject land
was already issued in petitioner’s names. Antonio discovered that
Roberta declared that she was only heir of Spouses Igoy and she
adjudicated unto herself the ownership of the entire lot and confirmed
the disposition and subsequent transfers made by her father. It appears
that when Roberta executed the Extrajudicial settlement the property
was already previously sold by the Spouses Igoy to Antonio’s
predecessor-in-interest.

The RTC rendered a Decision granting the complaint and ordered the
new partition of the property.

The CA sustained the RTC. Hence, the appeal.

d. Issue: Whether Roberta is the sole owner of the property and she validly
conveyed the property to the petitioners.

e. Held: It must be stated at the outset that the disputed property, with an
area of 5,327 sq m and covered by OCT No. RO-3456, is conjugal in
nature being registered under the names of spouses Sixto and Marcosa.
Since Sixto and Marcosa were married prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code and no marriage settlement was provided, their property
relations were governed by the conjugal partnership of gains as
provided under Article 119 of the Civil Code. Thus, upon the death of
Marcosa on October 5, 1931, the conjugal nature of the property was
dissolved and the interest of Sixto (surviving spouse), with respect to his
undivided one-half share on the conjugal property, goes to and becomes
vested on him.

In other words, by virtue of such dissolution, one-half of the property

should pertain to Sixto as his share from the conjugal estate plus
another one-fourth representing his share as the surviving spouse of
Marcosa. Roberta, as the sole legitimate child of the spouses is entitled
to the other one-fourth of the property. This equal sharing between the
surviving spouse and the legitimate child to the deceased's estate is in
accordance with Article 996 of the Civil Code as clarified by this Court in
the case of In Re: Santillon v. Miranda.
Upon the death of Marcosa, co-ownership was formed between Sixto
and Roberta over the subject property

After the death of Marcosa (one of the registered owners), the subject
property became co-owned by Sixto and Roberta. In other words, before
the actual partition, co-ownership between Sixto and Roberta was
formed over the subject property. Thus, each co-owner of property
which is held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property
and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he
shall not injure the interests of his co-owners. Thus:

This Court has ruled in many cases that even if a co-owner sells the
whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not
those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. This is
 because the sale or other disposition of a co-owner affects only his
undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond
to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common.

Sale between Sixto and Severino is valid up to Sixto's rightful undivided

share in the subject property.

Hence, the sale transaction between Sixto and Severino could be legally
recognized only with respect to the former's pro indiviso share in the co-
ownership. Clearly then, at the time of sale by Sixto in favor of Severino,
the former could only dispose of his three-fourths undivided share of the
entire property. The remaining one-fourth belonging to Roberta has yet
to be partitioned. Hencje, the sale executed by Sixto in favor of Severino
in 1965 is valid up to three-fourths undivided portion of the property,
which is 3,995.25 sq m and void as to the remaining one- fourth or
1,331.75 sq m, which pertains to Roberta's undivided share. This is
consistent with the rule that one cannot sell what he does not own.
Severino's sale of one-half of the subject property to Isnani and Lily is
valid

Consistent with the said principle, it is logical then that all the
subsequent sales and conveyances made by Severino would only be
valid up to the portion that he owns.

Since Severino purchased the three-fourths undivided share of Sixto to

the property, then this is the extent of the area of the property
(consisting of 3,995.25 sq m) which he could validly dispose and sell.
Hence, the sale by Severino to Isnani and Lily on May 7, 1964 involving
the 2,663.5 sq m is valid as the area sold wholly covers what Severino
purchased from Sixto.

Severino's sale of another one-half of the subject property to Mariano is

void.

However, the subsequent sale by Severino to Mariano on September

15, 1965 can be given effect only to the extent of 1,331.75 sq m - the
remaining undivided portion of Severino's interest in the property that
was not sold to Isnani. Thus, as between Isnani and Mariano, the former
who is first in time (as the first vendee) is preferred in right. Prior
tempore, potior jure. This is true since there was no allegation
whatsoever of who between them first possessed and who first
registered the sale in good faith.

All subsequent sales made by spouses Isnani and Lily are valid.
At this point, we see no problem with the dispositions made by spouses
Isnani and Lily. Being the co-owner of 2,663.5 sq m undivided portion of
the subject land, their sale to Filomeno of the said portion of the property
is valid. In turn, Filomeno's subsequent sale to Antonio, involving
2,363.5 sq m of the property on November 25, 1989 and the sale to
Nicomedes involving 300 sq m of the property in October 1989 were all
valid and can be recognized as the areas sold were covered by the area
of the property which Filomeno owned. Mariano's sale of the undivided
portion of his purchased property is partly infirmed.
The problem now is the sale transactions made by Mariano to three
persons. Since Mariano had validly purchased from Severino 1,331.75
sq m of the property, it follows then that the sale transaction between
him (Mariano) and Nicolas on June 18, 1968 is valid up to the said
aliquot share, which is 1,331.75 sq m. This is the only area which he
could validly dispose. Equally valid is the subsequent sale made by
Nicolas to Gomercido up to the said undivided portion which is 1,331.75
sq m.

Since there was nothing more from the undivided portion that was left to
Mariano, his subsequent sale to Marcelino on July 14, 1987 and to
Rodulfo in May 1990 of the portion of the property cannot be given
effect. As discussed, the property was already sold by Mariano in favor
of Nicolas in 1968, who, in turn, sold the same to Gomercindo on
February 16, 1978. Jurisprudence teaches us that "a person can sell
only what he owns or is authorized to sell; the buyer can as a
consequence, acquire no more than what the seller can legally transfer."
No one can give what he does not have — nemo dat quod non habet.
The sale of the property to Marcelino and Rodulfo is null and void insofar
as it prejudiced Gomercindo's rights and interest as co-owner of the
subject property.

Clearly, as there was no valid sale that was consummated between

Mariano and Rodulfo, the latter has nothing to transmit to respondent
Mario. Thus, the sale between Rodulfo and Mario is likewise void and
cannot be recognized.
Marcelino, Rodulfo and Mario cannot claim that they are purchasers in
good faith. A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property without
notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property
and pays its fair price before he or she has notice of the adverse claims
and interest of another person in the same property. In this case, they
purchased the property knowing that it was registered in the name of
another person, not of the seller. This fact alone should put them in
inquiry as to the status of the property. It is axiomatic that one who buys
from a person who is not a registered owner is not a purchaser in good
faith. Hence, they cannot invoke good faith on their part. They are not,
however, without remedy. They can still go after their respective
transferors (sellers) and their heirs. Roberta is only entitled to one-fourth
undivided portion of the property.

It was equally erroneous for Roberta to adjudicate to herself the entire

property and make selective confirmation of the Deeds of Absolute Sale
executed by her father. As earlier discussed, Roberta is only entitled to
one-fourth of the subject property, which is her undivided share in the
estate of her mother (Marcosa) who had long passed away in the 1930s.
Roberta can no longer lay claim on the three-fourths undivided share of
her father (Sixto) to the subject property at the time of his death. As
records show, during the lifetime of Sixto, the latter had already sold his
undivided share in the subject property, hence, Roberta could no longer
inherit it. Hence, the "Extrajudicial Settlement by Sole and Only Heir"
executed by Roberta is void insofar as she adjudicated unto herself the
entire subject property, to the prejudice of those persons who have
already acquired proprietary rights over their respective shares. Also the
Confirmation of Deed of Absolute Sale which is also embodied in the
said

Extrajudicial Settlement cannot be given effect. Apart from the reasons

as exhaustively discussed earlier, it is not necessary for Roberta to
confirm said sales in order to validate them. Her father, being the rightful
owner of his undivided share in the co-owned property had all the rights
to dispose of the same (in his lifetime) without any need of subsequent
ratification from his co-owners/heirs.

Finally, it bears to stress that even if some of the existing titles that were
already issued (i.e., in the name of spouses Nicomedes and Gaudencia,
and Gomercindo) were consistent with the pronouncement of this Court
in this Decision, it is imperative that all of the said titles must still be
cancelled as they were based on erroneous partition of the rightful
owners' undivided share on the land. Registering a piece of land under
the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because registration is
not a mode of acquiring ownership. To be sure, a certificate of title is
merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property
described therein.[49] Its issuance in favor of a particular person does
not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be co-owned with
persons not named in the certificate, or that it may be held in trust for
another person by the registered owner.[50] In view of the Court's ruling,
the subject land is co-owned not only by Nicomedes and Gaudencia,
and Gomercindo and Estela, but also by Roberta, and Antonio and
Jean. Hence, a new partition is in order, to wit: (a) to Gomercindo,
married to Estela, an area containing 1,331.75 sq m, more or less; (b) to
spouses Antonio and Jean, an area containing 2,363.5 sq m, more or
less; (c) to spouses Nicomedes and Gaudencia, an area containing 300
sq m, more or less; and (d) to Roberta, an area containing 1,331.75 sq
m, more or less.

Considering the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is PARTLY

GRANTED. Hence, the appealed Decision dated November 20, 2014 of
the Court of Appeals-Cebu City in CA-G.R. CEB C.V. No. 04753 insofar
as it affirmed the RTC, is MODIFIED as follows:

1. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 16, 1978 executed

by Nicolas Aying, married to Maura Augusto in favor of
Gomercindo Jimenez to the extent of 1,331.75 square meters
of Lot No. 4277 is declared VALID;

2. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 25, 1989 executed

by Filomeno Augusto in favor of Antonio Carlota Dy involving
2,363.5 square meters of Lot No. 4277 is declared VALID;

3. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 10, 1989 executed

by Filomeno Augusto in favor of Nicomedes Augusto involving
300 square meters of Lot No. 4277 is declared VALID;

4. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated Julyl4, 1987 executed by

Mariano Silawan in favor of Marcelino Paquibot is declared
VOID;
 5. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 23, 1994 executed by
Rodulfo Augusto in favor of Mario Dy is declared VOID; and

6. The Extrajudicial Settlement by Sole and Only Heir executed by

Roberta Silawan insofar as the 1,331.75 square meters
representing one-fourth of her undivided share in Lot No. 4277
is declared VALID. The Confirmation of Sale embodied in the
said document is STRUCK DOWN.

Pursuant thereto, the subject property (Lot No. 4277) comprising an

area of 5,327 square meters shall be partitioned to the following
persons, in the following manner:

1. To Gomercindo Jimenez, married to Estela Jimenez, an area

containing 1,331.75 square meters, more or less;

2. To spouses Antonio Carlota Dy and Jean Dy, an area

containing 2,363.5 square meters, more or less;

3. To spouses Nicomedes Augusto and Gaudencia Augusto, an

area containing 300 square meters, more or less; and

4. To Roberta Silawan, an area containing 1,331.75 square

meters, more or less.

Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City is hereby

ORDERED to CANCEL all Transfer Certificates of Title issued replacing
 OCT No. RO-3456, as well as their corresponding Tax Declarations, as
follows: (a) TCT No. 48562 in the name of spouses Nicomedes Augusto
and Gaudencia Augusto; (b) TCT No. 48563 in the name of Gomercindo
Jimenez, married to Estela Jimenez; (c) TCT No. 48564 in the name of
Marcelino Paquibot, married to Elena Paquibot; and (d) TCT No. 48565
in the name of Roberta Silawan, and ISSUE new ones in accordance
with this Decision. SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption redemption shall not
be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the
prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case maybe. The deed of
sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless
accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written
notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.

The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners.

 In legal pre-emption or redemption under the Civil Code of the
Philippines, written notice of the sale to all possible redemptioners is
indispensable.

The Court in the case of Etcuban v. Court of Appeals has clarified that
even if it was not sent by the vendor as long as the redemptioners were
notified in writing, the same is sufficient for their right to redeem to
accrue.

b. Case Title: Angelina A. Bayan vs. Celia A. Bayan, GR. No. 220741, (J.
Reyes, Jr.); August 14, 2019

c. Facts: Petitioners, together with respondent Celia, are the registered co-
owners of three parcels of residential and commercial land. Celia, acting
for herself and as alleged Attorney-in-Fact of Angelina and Jaime, was
able to obtain loans on three different occasions from her co-
respondents Tanghal and Dy.

To secure the payment of her loans, Celia executed a fraudulent Special

Powers of Attorney which supposedly embodied her authority to act on
behalf of her frail mother Angelina and her brother, Jaime, who was
permanently living in the United States. With such spurious authority,
Celia executed in favor of Dy and Tanghal a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage.

Angelina and Jaime insisted that all the transactions made by Celia were
without their knowledge and consent and their signatures embodied in
the SPA were forged. This prompted them to file the instant action.
However, during the pendency of the case, Dy and Tanghal proceeded
to foreclose the mortgage.

Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of the petitioners declaring as

null and void the two SPAs and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
Contract. The CA issued the now appealed Decision partially granting
the appeal.

The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City: (a)
determine the exact extent of the respective rights, interests, shares,
and participation of Defendants-Appellants Tanghal and Dy and the
Plaintiffs¬- Appellees over the subject properties, and (b) thereafter, to
effect a final division, adjudication, and partition in accordance with law.

All the parties (Dy, Tanghal and Petitioners) filed their respective
Motions for Partial Reconsideration/Partial Motions for Reconsideration.

They prayed that the CA partially reconsider its Decision by granting

their right of legal redemption over the one-third (1/3) share of Celia
through the payment of one-third of the mortgage debt... the CA issued
a Resolution denying all the parties' Motions for Partial Reconsideration
for lack of merit Petitioners argued that they belatedly raised the issue of
their right of legal redemption because it was only on appeal that the
partial validity of the mortgage was entertained by the CA and that the
 latter had ruled that Celia had the right to sell or even mortgage her
undivided interest in the property pursuant to Article 493.

d. Issue: Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling

that the petitioners cannot raise their right of legal redemption for the
first time on appeal even though it was not relevant to raise the same
before the trial court's level.

e. Held: The issue of right of legal redemption was neither raised in the
RTC nor was even mentioned in the proceedings before the CA. As
mentioned, it was raised for the very first time only in petitioners' Motion
for Partial Reconsideration with the CA. The Supreme Court agree with
the CA that this is not allowed. No question will be considered on appeal
much more in the motion for reconsideration with the appellate court,
when it was not raised in the court below.

In legal pre-emption or redemption under the Civil Code of the

Philippines, written notice of the sale to all possible redemptioners is
indispensable.

The Court in the case of Etcuban v. Court of Appeals has clarified that
even if it was not sent by the vendor as long as the redemptioners were
notified in writing, the same is sufficient for their right to redeem to
accrue.

In the instant case, the fact that petitioners alleged in their complaint
about the foreclosure sale of the mortgage, the Sheriffs Certificate of
Sale and their annotation/inscription on TCT conclusively shows that
 petitioners were notified of the sale and were furnished said documents,
and is tantamount to an actual knowledge of such fact of sale. No other
notice is needed because the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale itself confirms
the fact of sale, its perfection and its due execution.

The bottomline is that petitioners need not wait for the Court to make a
definitive ruling on the validity or invalidity of the mortgage made by their
co-owner. They should have known that any co-owner can mortgage
their undivided share in the co-owned property in accordance with
Article 493[20] of the Civil Code. Upon notice of the foreclosure sale or
receipt of any written notice of the fact of sale, petitioners' right of legal
redemption had already accrued such that they should have included
said issue at the very onset in their complaint. Not having raised the
same with the lower court, it cannot be entertained for the first time in
the Motion for Reconsideration with the appellate court.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The appealed Decision

dated January 5, 2015 and the Resolution dated September 22, 2015 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CV No. 96204 are AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: A co-ownership is a form of trust, with each owner being a

trustee for each other. Mere actual possession by one will not give rise
to the inference that the possession was adverse because a co-owner
 is, after all, entitled to possession of the property. Thus, as a rule,
prescription does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership; and he cannot
acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear
repudiation of the co- ownership. An action to demand partition among
co-owners is imprescriptible, and each co-owner may demand at any
time the partition of the common property.

b. Case Title: Heirs of Feliciano Yambao vs. Heirs of Hermogenes

Yambao, GR. No. 194260, (J. Reyes); April 13, 2016

c. Facts: Hermogenes Yambao, a nephew Macaria de Ocampo, was the

administrator of a parcel of land originally possessed by the latter. The
former paid the realty taxes therefor. Hermogenes Yambao has eight
children, namely: Ulpiano, Dominic, Teofilo, Feliciano, Asesclo, Delia,
Amelia, and Melinda, all surnamed Yambao.

When Hermogenes died, it was claimed that his heirs are free to pick up
fruits from the fruit bearing trees planted thereon. The daughter of
Ulpiano, Eleonor, constructed a house on subject property.

In 2005, the Heirs of Feliciano Yambao, herein petitioners prohibited the

respondents in entering the subject property claiming that their father
was awarded of a free patent thereon evidenced by OCT No. P-10737
issued under the name of their father Feliciano.
Feeling desolated, the respondent filed a complaint for partition,
declaration of nullity of title/documents, and damages with the RTC
against the heirs of Feliciano. Claiming that they are co-owners of the
subject property.

The RTC dismissed the complaint. The RTC opined that the heirs of
Hermogenes failed to show that the subject property is owned by
Macaria, stating that tax declarations and receipts in Macaria's name are
not conclusive evidence of ownership. The RTC further held that even if
Macaria owned the subject property, the heirs of Hermogenes failed to
show that Hermogenes had the right to succeed over the estate of
Macaria. Aggrieved, the respondent elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals.

The CA reversed the decision of the RTC ratiocinating that the RTC, in
hastily dismissing the complaint for partition, failed to determine first
whether the subject property is indeed co-owned by the heirs of
Hermogenes and the heirs of Feliciano.

It further said that Feliciano's application for free patent, he

acknowledged that the source of his claim of possession over the
subject property was Hermogenes’ possession of the real property in
peaceful, open, continuous, and adverse manner and more importantly,
in the concept of an owner, since 1944. Feliciano's claim of sole
possession in his application for free patent did not therefore extinguish
the fact of co- ownership as claimed by the children of Hermogenes.
d. Issues: Whether or not the petitioners and the respondents were co-
owners of the subject property.

Whether or not the action for partitioned filed by the respondents is a

collateral attack to the title.

e. Held: Petition denied.

A co-ownership is a form of trust, with each owner being a trustee for

each other. Mere actual possession by one will not give rise to the
inference that the possession was adverse because a co-owner is, after
all, entitled to possession of the property. Thus, as a rule, prescription
does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership; and he cannot acquire by
prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation
of the co-ownership.

An action to demand partition among co-owners is imprescriptible, and

each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common
property.

Prescription may nevertheless run against a co-owner if there is

adverse, open, continuous and exclusive possession of the co-owned
property by the other co-owner/s.1âwphi1 In order that a co-owners
possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or other co-
owners, the following requisites must concur: (1) that he has performed
unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que
trust or other co-owners; (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have
been made known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners; and (3)
that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.

The issuance of the certificate of title would constitute an open and clear
repudiation of any trust. 13 In such a case, an action to demand partition
among co-owners prescribes in 10 years, the point of reference being
the date of the issuance of certificate of title over the property. But this
rule applies only when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property,
since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession
of the property, the right to demand partition does not prescribe.

There is likewise no merit to the claim that the action for partition filed by
the heirs of Hermogenes amounted to a collateral attack on the validity
of OCT No. P-10737. The complaint for partition filed by the heirs of
Hermogenes seeks first, a declaration that they are a co-owner of the
subject property, and second, the conveyance of their lawful shares. The
heirs of Hermogenes do not attack the title of Feliciano; they alleged no
fraud, mistake, or any other irregularity that would justify a review of the
registration decree in their favor. Their theory is that although the subject
property was registered solely in Feliciano's name, they are co-owners
of the property and as such is entitled to the conveyance of their shares.
On the premise that they are co-owners, they can validly seek the
partition of the property in co-ownership and the conveyance to them of
their respective shares.
 WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is
hereby DENIED. The Decision dated October 22, 2010 issued by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92755 is AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: The Water Code governs the ownership, appropriation,

utilization, exploitation, development, conservation and protection of
 water resources. Under Article 3 thereof, water resources are placed
under the control and regulation of the government through the National
Water Resources Council, now the NWRB. In turn, the privilege to
appropriate and use water is one which is exclusively granted and
regulated by the State through water permits issued by the NWRB.

b. Case Title: City of Batangas vs. Philippine Shell Petroleum Corp., GR.
No. 195003; (J. Caguioa); June 7, 2017

c. Facts: Batangas City is a local government unit created by virtue of its

charter, Republic Act No. 5495 (RA 5495). Under RA 5495, Batangas
City constitutes a political body corporate, and is endowed with powers
which pertain to a municipal corporation.9 The Sangguniang
Panlungsod is the legislative body of Batangas City. Philippine Shell
Petroleum Corporation (PSPC) is a duly organized Philippine
corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing, refining and
distribution of petroleum products. 10 PSPC owns and operates a
refinery situated in Tabangao, Batangas City (Tabangao Refinery). Shell
Philippines Exploration, B.V. (SPEX) is a foreign corporation licensed to
do business in the Philippines. In furtherance of the mandate of
Presidential Decree No. 87 (PD 87) to promote the discovery and
production of indigenous petroleum, the Department of Energy (DOE)
executed Service Contract No. 38 (SC 38) with SPEX under which
SPEX was tasked to explore and develop possible petroleum sources in
North Western Palawan. SPEX's exploration led to the discovery of an
abundant source of natural gas in the Malampaya field off the shores of
Palawan, which thereafter gave rise to the Malampaya Project. The
 Malampaya Project required the construction of a 504-kilometer offshore
pipeline for the transport of natural gas from Malampaya field to
Batangas, for treatment in PSPC's Tabangao Refinery.

On May 28, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted the Assailed

Ordinance which requires heavy industries operating along the portions
of Batangas Bay within the territorial jurisdiction of Batangas City to
construct desalination plants to facilitate the use of seawater as coolant
for their industrial facilities. The RTC concluded that the power granted
to the city mayor to cause the issuance of cease and desist orders
against the use of ground water without prior notice and hearing
constitutes a violation of the due process clause Batangas City and the
Sangguniang Panlungsod filed separate notices of appeal from the
decisions resolving the PSPC, JG Summit and First Gas petitions. On
the basis of the submissions of the parties, the CA Tenth Division issued
the Assailed Decision dismissing the appeal filed against PSPC and
SPEX for lack of merit.

d. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision which
declared the Assailed Ordinance invalid.

e. Held: The Assailed Ordinance is void for being ultra vires, for being
contrary to, and for lack of evidence showing the existence of factual
basis for its enactment. The requisites for a valid ordinance are well
established. Time and again, the Court has ruled that in order for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of
the concerned LGU to enact, but must also be passed in accordance
with the procedure prescribed by law.

Moreover, substantively, the ordinance (i) must not contravene the

Constitution or any statute; (ii) must not be unfair or oppressive; (iii)
must not be partial or discriminatory; (iv) must not prohibit, but may
regulate trade; (v) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(vi) must not be unreasonable. Batangas City claims that the enactment
of the Assailed Ordinance constitutes a valid exercise of its police
power.

This claim is erroneous. Police power is the power to prescribe

regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order,
safety, and general welfare of the people. As an inherent attribute of
sovereignty, police power primarily rests with the State. In furtherance of
the State's policy to foster genuine and meaningful local autonomy, the
national legislature delegated the exercise of police power to local
government units (LGUs) as agents of the State. Such delegation can
be found in Section 16 of the LGC, which embodies the general welfare
clause. In this Petition, the Court is called upon to determine whether the
control and regulation of the use of water may be made subject of a city
ordinance under the regime of the Water Code - a national statute
governing the same subject matter. The Water Code governs the
ownership, appropriation, utilization, exploitation, development,
conservation and protection of water resources. Under Article 3 thereof,
water resources are placed under the control and regulation of the
government through the National Water Resources Council, now the
NWRB.
In turn, the privilege to appropriate and use water is one which is
exclusively granted and regulated by the State through water permits
issued by the NWRB. Once granted, these water permits continue to be
valid save only for reasons spelled out under the Water Code itself.
There is no doubt, therefore, that the Assailed Ordinance effectively
contravenes the provisions of the Water Code as it arrogates unto
Batangas City the power to control and regulate the use of ground water
which, by virtue of the provisions of the Water Code, pertains solely to
the NWRB. By enacting the Assailed Ordinance, Batangas City acted in
excess of the powers granted to it as an LGU, rendering the Assailed
Ordinance ultra vires. Being ultra vires, the Assailed Ordinance, in its
entirety, is null and void. Thus, it becomes unnecessary to still determine
if it complies with the other substantive requirements for a valid
ordinance - i.e., that the ordinance is fair and reasonable. While the
Assailed Ordinance has been struck down as invalid, the
pronouncements hereunder should not be misconstrued by heavy
industries to be carte blanche to abuse their respective water rights at
the expense of the health and safety of the inhabitants of Batangas City,
the environment within which these inhabitants live, and the resources
upon which these inhabitants rely.

The Court recognizes fresh ground water as an invaluable natural

resource, and deems it necessary to emphasize that Batangas City is
not precluded from exercising its right to protect its inhabitants from
injurious effects which may result from the misuse of natural water
resources within its territorial jurisdiction, should these effects later arise,
provided that such exercise is done within the framework of applicable
national law, particularly, the Water Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari
is DENIED. The Decision dated May 25, 2010 and Resolution dated
December 30, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90373
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: Article 443 of the Civil Code, He who receives the fruits has
the obligation to pay the expenses made by a third person in their
production, gathering and preservation.

Art. 546 of the Civil Code, Necessary expenses shall be refunded to

every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the
thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.

Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith

with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the
possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses
or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by
reason thereof.

Art. 549 of the Civil Code, a possessor in bad faith has a specific
obligation to reimburse the legitimate possessor for everything that the
former received and that the latter could have received has its
possession not been interrupted.

b. Case Title: National Housing Authority vs. Manila Seedling Bank

Foundation, Inc., G.R. No. 183543; (CJ. Sereno); June 20, 2016

c. Facts: NHA is the owner of a 120-hectare piece of government property

in Diliman, Quezon City, reserved for the establishment of the National
Government Center. By virtue of Proclamation No. 1670[6] issued on 19
 September 1977, President Ferdinand Marcos reserved a seven-hectare
area thereof and granted respondent usufructuary rights over it.
MSBFI occupied a total of 16 hectares, thereby exceeding the seven-
hectare area it was allowed to occupy. It leased the excess private
tenants. Memo Order No. 127 was issued by Pres. Corazon Aquino
revoking the reserved status of the remaining 50 hectares of the 120-
heactares property. NHA was expressly authorized to commercialize the
area and sell it to the public through bidding. Pres. Fidel Ramos
subsequently issued EO No. 58 creating an inter-agency executive
committee (EXECOM) composed of petitioner and other government
agencies to oversee the comprehensive development of the remaining
50 hectares therein referred to as the North Triangle Property.

As MSBFI occupied a prime portion of the NTP, the EXECOM proposed

the transfer of MSBF to areas more suitable to its operations.

NHA prayed that MSBF be ordered to vacate the seven-hectare area

and the excess and to pay rent therefor on top of exemplary damages,
attorney’s fee and litigation expenses.

d. Issue: Whether or not NHA is entitled to recover rent from MSBF.

e. Held: This Court agrees with the trial court the MSBF has abused the
privilege given it under Proclamation No. 1670. Since MSBF had no right
to act beyond the confines of the 7-hectares area granted to it, and since
it was fully aware of this fact, its encroachment of 9 additional hectares
of NHA’s property rendered it a possessor in bad faith as to the excess.
While MSBF may have been allowed by then Minister of Natural
Resources Ernesto Maceda to lease the excess to various
establishments, such authority did not come from NHA, who is the
owner.

Under Art. 549 in relation to Articles 546 and 443 of the Civil Code, a
possessor in bad faith has a specific obligation to reimburse the
legitimate possessor for everything that the former received and that the
latter could have received has its possession not been interrupted. Art.
443 of the Civil Coode states:

Article 443. He who receives the fruits has the obligation to pay the
expenses made by a third person in their production, gathering and
preservation.

As provided in the law, NHA shall be made to account for the fruits it
received from the time it took possession until it surrendered the excess
to the petitioner. Having leased out the excess to various establishment
and earned profits therefrom, it is bound to pay the corresponding
amounts to NHA.

However, MSBF shall be entitled to a refund of the necessary expense it

incurred. Necessary expenses are those made for the preservation of
the land occupied.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision dated 8 April 2008 and
Resolution dated 30 June 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 85262 are hereby
SET ASIDE.
Let the case be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 104, for the reception of evidence for the purpose of determining
the amounts the parties are entitled to, as well as their respective rights
and obligations over the excess of the seven-hectare area, from the time
respondent took possession until the same was surrendered to
petitioner, in accordance with Articles 549, 546, and 433 of the Civil
Code. SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiffs must allege
and prove: (a) that they have prior physical possession of the property;
(b) that they were deprived of possession either by force, intimidation,
threat. strategy or stealth; and, (c) that the action was filed within one (1)
year from the time the owners or legal possessors learned of their
deprivation of the physical possession of the property.

Possession is coupled with tax declarations. While tax declarations are

not conclusive proof of possession of a parcel of land, they are good
indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right
mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or
constructive possession.

b. Case Title: Anacleto C. Mangaser vs. Dionisio Ugay, GR. No. 204926;
(J. Mendoza); December 03, 2014

c. Facts: On October 30, 2007, petitioner Anacleto Mangaser, represented

by his attorney-in-fact, Eustaquio Dugenia (petitioner), tiled a complaint
for Forcible Entry with Damages against respondent Dionisio Ugay
(respondent) before the Municipal Trial Court of Caba, La Union (MTC).

In his complaint, petitioner alleged that he was the registered owner and
possessor of a parcel of land situated in Santiago Sur, Caba, petitioner,
discovered that respondent stealthy intruded and occupied a portion of
his property by constructing a residential house thereon without his
knowledge and consent.
Respondent denied the material allegations of the complaint and put up
the following defenses, to wit: that he had been a resident of Samara,
Aringay, La Union, since birth and when he reached the age of reason,
he started occupying a parcel of land in that place then known as Sta.
Lucia, Aringay, La Union; that years later, this parcel of land was
designated as part of Santiago Sur, Caba, La Union due to a survey
made by the government; that he introduced more improvements on the
property by cultivating the land, and in March 2006, he put up a "bahay
kubo"; that in October 2006, he installed a fence made of "bolo" to
secure the property and to be indicators of the boundaries of petitioner's
property; that while he could not locate some of the monuments, he
based the boundaries on his recollection since he was around when
these were installed; that he knew the boundaries of petitioner's property
because he knew the extent of the "iron mining" activities done by a
company on the said property; that petitioner was never in actual
possession of the property occupied by him, and it was only on October
31, 2006 when he discovered the alleged intrusion.

On April 26, 2011, the MTC ruled in favor of respondent. It stated that
petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to prove that the lot occupied by
respondent was within his lot titled under OCT No. RP-174 ( 13789).

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La

Union RTC reversed the MTC decision and ruled in favor of petitioner.
which held that in ejectment cases, possession of the land. The RTC
 stated that petitioner had clearly shown his possession of the property
as evidenced by his OCT No. RP-174(13789) issued in March 1987 and
tax declaration, As the owner, petitioner knew the exact metes and
bounds of his property so that when respondent intruded stealthily, he
filed the subject suit.

Undaunted, respondent appealed to the CA.

The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. that petitioner
must allege and prove that he was in prior physical possession of the
property in dispute. The word "possession," as used in forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases, meant nothing more than physical possession.

d. Issue: Whether or not petitioner has established prior possession over

the subject property.

e. Held: There is only one issue in ejectment proceedings: who is entitled

to physical or material possession of the premises, that is, to possession
de facto, not possession de jure? Issues as to the right of possession or
ownership are not involved in the action; evidence thereon is not
admissible, except only for the purpose of determining the issue of
possession.

As a rule, the word “possession” in forcible entry suits indeed refers to

nothing more than prior physical possession or possession de facto, not
possession de jure or legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil
law. Title is not the issue, and the absence of it “is not a ground for the
courts to withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case.”

The Court, however, has consistently ruled in a number of cases that

while prior physical possession is an indispensable requirement in
forcible entry cases, the dearth of merit in respondent’s position is
evident from the principle that possession can be acquired not only by
material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the
action of one’s will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established
for acquiring such right.

Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts to which

the law gives the force of acts of possession. Examples of these are
donations, succession, execution and registration of public instruments,
inscription of possessory information titles and the like. The reason for
this exceptional rule is that possession in the eyes of the law does not
mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground
before it can be said that he is in possession. It is sufficient that
petitioner was able to subject the property to the action of his will. Here,
respondent failed to show that he falls under any of these
circumstances. He could not even say that the subject property was
leased to him except that he promised that he would vacate it if
petitioner would be able to show the boundaries of the titled lot.

In the case at bench, the Court finds that petitioner acquired possession
of the subject property by juridical act, specifically, through the issuance
 of a free patent under CA 141 and its subsequent registration with the
ROD on March 18, 1987.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 13, 2012 Decision and
the December 5, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 122153 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The August 23, 2011
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Bauang, La Union, is
hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is
entitled to its possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest
possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property.
To recover possession, he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and,
once he chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the
conditions necessary for such action to prosper.

b. Case Title: Carmencita A. Suarez vs. Mr. & Mrs. Felix Emboy Jr., GR.
No. 187944; (J. Reyes); March 12, 2014

c. Facts: The dispute relates to a 222-square meter parcel of land,

designated as Lot No. 1907-A2 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title in
the name of Carmencita. The subject lot used to be a part of Lot No.
1907-A, and was was partitioned among the heirs of Spouses Carlos
Padilla and Asuncion Pacres.

A house, which is occupied by respondents Felix and Marilou, stands in

the subject lot. The respondents claim that their mother, Claudia, had
occupied the subject lot during her lifetime and it was earmarked to
become her share. They had thereafter stayed in the subject lot for
decades after inheriting the same from Claudia, who had in turn
succeeded her own parents, Carlos and Asuncion. Respondents Felix
and Marilou were asked by their cousins, who are the Heirs of Vicente,
 to vacate the subject lot and to transfer another lot. They refused to
comply insisting that Claudia’s inheritance pertained to Lot they were
possessing.

A demand letter, dated February 23, 2004, requiring them to vacate the
subject lot. They were informed that Carmencita had already purchased
on February 12, 2004 the subject lot from the former’s relatives.
However, the respondents did not heed the demand. Carmencita filed
before the MTCC against the respondents a complaint for unlawful
detainer. She alleged that she bought the subject lot from Remedios,
Moreno, Veronica and Dionesia, the registered owners thereof and the
persons who allowed the respondents to occupy the same by mere
tolerance.

d. Issue: Whether or not the action for unlawful detainer will prosper.

e. Held: The petition is denied. Carmencita had not amply alleged and
proven that all the requisites for unlawful detainer are present in the
case at bar.

Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its

possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession
thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover
possession, he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he
chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions
necessary for such action to prosper.
In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following key jurisdictional facts
must be alleged and sufficiently established: (1) initially, possession of
property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff; (2) Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by
plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession;
(3) Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property
and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) Within one
year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

In the case at bar, the first requisite mentioned above is markedly

absent. Carmencita failed to clearly allege and prove how and when the
respondents entered the subject lot and constructed a house upon it.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED. The

Decision rendered on March 19, 2009 and Resolution issued on May 5,
2009 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03489 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: Article 428 of the New Civil Code. The owner has the right to
enjoy and dispose of a thing without other limitations than those
established by law.

The only issue in an ejectment case is the physical possession of real

property.

b. Case Title: Spouses Edmundo Dela Cruz vs. Spouses Rufino R. Capco,
GR. No. 176055; (J. Del Castillo); March 17, 2014

c. Facts: Sps. Dela Cruz filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against
Sps. Capco, alleging that Teodora, mother of petitioner Amelia Dela
Cruz, acquired a parcel of land by virtue of a land registration case. The
said property was eventually registered in her name.

Teodora, out of neighborliness and blood relationship, tolerated the Sps.

Capco’s occupation thereof. Eventually, the title to the property was
conveyed to Sps. Dela Cruz.

Intending to construct a house and utilize the space for balut and salted
egg business, they asked Sps. Capco to vacate the property.
 As Sps. Capco refused, the matter was brought to the Barangay Lupon
for conciliation but to no avail. Hence this complaint.

d. Issue: Whether or not Sps. Dela Cruz has a better right to possess such
property.
e. Held: Yes, the only issue in an ejectment case is the physical
possession of real property - possession de facto and not possession de
jure but where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of
ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue to determine who
between the parties has the better right to possess the property.”

Here, both parties anchor their right to possess based on ownership,

i.e., the spouses Dela Cruz by their own ownership while the spouses
Capco by the ownership of Rufino as one of the heirs of the alleged true
owner of the property. Thus, the MTC and the RTC correctly passed
upon the issue of ownership in this case to determine the issue of
possession.

However, it must be emphasized that “the adjudication of the issue of

ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the
same parties involving title to the property.”

Sps. Dela Cruz was able to prove that they are owners of the lot. Their
allegation that the subject property was adjudicated to Teodora and was
later conveyed in their favor was supported by:

1. A copy of the Decision of the land registration case;

 2. Title of the land issued to Teodora

3. The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Teodora

wherein the latter’s heir agreed to convey the said property to
Amelia. On the other hand, aside from Sps Capco’s bare
allegation that respondent Rufino is an heir of the true owners
thereof, presented nothing to support their claim.

All told, the Court agrees with the MeTC’s conclusion, as affirmed by the
RTC, that the spouses Dela Cruz are better entitled to the material
possession of themsubject property. As its present owners, they have a
right to the possession of the property which is one of the attributes of
ownership.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The August 18, 2006

Decision and the December 21, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA- G.R.No. 90736 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The January
20, 2005
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 153, and the
July 9, 2004 Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pateros, Branch
73 are REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: An ejectment case, based on the allegation of possession by
tolerance, falls under the category of unlawful detainer. Where the
plaintiff allows the defendant to use his/her property by
tolerance without any contract, the defendant is necessarily bound by an
implied promise that he/she will vacate on demand, failing which, an
action for unlawful detainer will lie.

a. Case Title: Bonifacio Piedad vs. Spouses Victorio Gurieza, GR. No.
207525; (J. Perlas-Bernabe); June 18, 2014

b. Facts: Petitioner filed an action for unlawful detainer against

respondents who were the assigned caretakers. Piedad alleged that the
property was acquired through intestate succession from his late father
who inherited the same from the latter's parents as evinced by a Deed
of Confirmation of an Adjudication and Partition (Deed of Confirmation).
Sps Gurieza on the other hand, had declared the subject lot under their
name for tax purposes and applied for titling with the DENR when they
learned it was public land. Upon learning of their acts, petitioner
demanded them to vacate but they refused.

The Metropolitan Trial Court ruled in favor of the petitioner finding that
Sps. Gurieza's continuous stay on the subject lot was by Bonifacio's
 mere tolerance and such stay became illegal when they refused to
vacate the said lot despite the latter's demand. This was affirmed by the
Regional Trial Court. However, the Court of Appeals reversed such
decision stating that the Deed of Confirmation was not credible proof
since not all of the heirs of Piedad’s grandparents had signed it.
c. Issue: 1. Whether or not Piedad had better right of possession over
subject property.

2. Whether or not there is cause of action for Unlawful Detainer

d. Held: The petition is meritorious.

First, the evidence shows that as early as the 1950s, Bonifacio already
had possession of the subject lot and even built a bungalow-type house
thereon. Moreover, when he migrated to Hawaii, Bonifacio appointed
numerous caretakers to the said house and lot, the last being Sps.
Gurieza. Thus, despite his migration to Hawaii, Bonifacio never
relinquished said possession over the house and lot. Consistent with
Article 524 of the Civil Code, it is well-settled that " it is not necessary
that the owner of a parcel of land should himself occupy the property as
someone in his name may perform the act. In other words, the owner of
real estate has possession, either when he himself is physically in
occupation of the property or when another person who
recognizes his rights as owner is in such occupancy." Thus, the Sps.
Gurieza's stay on the subject lot was only made possible through
the mere tolerance of Bonifacio.
 Second, when Bonifacio learned that Sps. Gurieza declared the subject
lot under their name for tax purposes, caused a subdivision survey of
Lot 1227, and filed an application for survey authority and titling with
the CENRO DENR Nueva Vizcaya, he immediately took steps to
terminate their tolerated stay on the subject lot and house and
demanded that they leave immediately, rendering the Sps. Gurieza's
stay on the subject lot is illegal.

2. Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real

property from one who unlawfully withholds possession thereof after
the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in
unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the
expiration or termination of the right to possess. The only issue to be
resolved in an unlawful detainer case is the physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of
ownership by any of the parties.

An ejectment case, based on the allegation of possession by tolerance,

falls under the category of unlawful detainer. Where the plaintiff allows
the defendant to use his/her property by tolerance without any
contract, the defendant is necessarily bound by an implied promise that
he/she will vacate on demand, failing which, an action for unlawful
detainer will lie.
In view of the foregoing, the Court thus holds that the CA erred in
dismissing Bonifacio's Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages
against Sps. Gurieza. Perforce, a reversal of its ruling is proper.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February

18, 2013 and the Resolution dated June 5, 2013 of the Court of A peals
in CA- G.R. SP No. 117686 are hereby REVERSED and SET A IDE.
Accordingly, the Decision dated October 27, 2010 of the Regional Trial
Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 28 in Civil Case No. 6974
is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: Article 497. The creditors or assignees of the co-owners may
take part in the division of the thing owned in common and object to its
being effected without their concurrence. But they cannot impugn any
partition already executed, unless there has been fraud, or in case it was
made notwithstanding a formal opposition presented to prevent it,
without prejudice to the right of the debtor or assignor to maintain its
validity.

b. Case Title: Fe U. Quijano vs. Atty. Daryll A. Amante, GR. No. 164277;
(J. Bersamin); October 8, 2014

c. Facts: Petitioners and her siblings inherited from their father a parcel of
land with an area of 15,790 sq m more or less. On April 23, 1990, prior
to any partition among the heirs, Eliseo sold a portion of his share to
respondent Atty. Daryll A. Amante.

On July 25, 1991, Eliseo, sickly and in need of money, sold an additional
1/3 portion of his share in the property to the respondent, with their deed
of absolute sale stating that the sale was with the approval of Eliseo’s
siblings, and describing the portion subject of the sale as right at the
back of the seminary facing Japer Memorial School and where the fence
and house of Atty. Amante is located.

On Sept. 30, 1992, Fe, Eliseo, Jose and Gloria executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition to divide their father’s estate among themselves.
The partition resulted in the portions earlier sold by Eliseo to the
respondent being adjudicated to the petitioner instead of to Eliseo.

Due to the petitioner’s needing her portion that was then occupied by the
respondent, she demanded that the latter vacate it. Despite several
demands, the respondent refused to vacate, prompting her to file
against him on February 14, 1995 a complaint for ejectment and
damages. She alleged therein that she was the registered owner of the
parcel of land covered by TCT No. 6555, a portion of which was being
occupied by the respondent, who had constructed a residential building
thereon by the mere tolerance of Eliseo when the property she and her
siblings had inherited from their father had not yet been subdivided, and
was thus still co-owned by them; and that the respondent’s occupation
had become illegal following his refusal to vacate despite repeated
demands.

The respondent denied that his possession of the disputed portion had
been by mere tolerance of Eliseo. He even asserted that he was in fact
the owner and lawful possessor of the property, having bought it from
Eliseo; that the petitioner and her siblings could not deny knowing about
the sale in his favor because they could plainly see his house from the
 road; and that the deed of absolute sale itself stated that the sale to him
was with their approval, and that they had already known that his house
and fence were existing; that before he purchased the property, Eliseo
informed him that he and his coheirs had already orally partitioned the
estate of their father, and that the portion being sold to him was Eliseo’s
share; and that with his having already purchased the property before
the petitioner acquired it under the deed of extrajudicial partition, she
should respect his ownership and possession of it.

d. Issue: Who has the better right to the possession of the disputed
property.
e. Held: The disputed property originally formed part of the estate of the
late Bibiano Quijano, and passed on to his heirs by operation of law
upon his death. Prior to the partition, the estate was owned in common
by the heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased. In a
co-ownership, the undivided thing or right belong to different persons,
with each of them holding the property pro indiviso and exercising her
rights over the whole property. Each co-owner may use and enjoy the
property with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests
of his co-owners. The underlying rationale is that until a division is
actually made, the respective share of each cannot be determined, and
every co-owner exercise, together with his co-participants, joint
ownership of the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and
enjoyment of it.

Even if an heir’s right in the estate of the decedent has not yet been fully
settled and partitioned and is thus merely inchoate, Article 493 of the
Civil Code gives the heir the right to exercise acts of ownership.
Accordingly, when Eliseo sold the disputed property to the respondent in
1990 and 1991, he was only a co-owner along with his siblings, and
could sell only that portion that would be allotted to him upon the
termination of the co-ownership. The sale did not vest ownership of the
disputed property in the respondent but transferred only the seller’s pro
indiviso share to him, consequently making him, as the buyer, a co-
owner of the disputed property until it is partitioned.

As Eliseo’s successor-in-interest or assignee, the respondent was

vested with the right under Article 497 of the Civil Code to take part in
the partition of the estate and to challenge the partition undertaken
without his consent.

For sure, the respondent was no stranger to the Quijanos, because he

himself had served as the lawyer of Eliseo and the petitioner herself. His
knowledge of Eliseo’s co-ownership with his coheirs, and of their oral
agreement of partition notwithstanding, the respondent still did not
exercise his right under Article 497. Although Eliseo made it appear to
the respondent that the partition had already been completed and
finalized, the coheirs had not taken possession yet of their respective
shares to signify that they had ratified their agreement, if any.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on May

26, 2004 subject to the MODIFICATION that the unlawful detainer action
is dismissed for being an improper remedy; and ORDERS the petitioner
to pay the costs of suit.
 SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: It is settled that a Torrens title is evidence of indefeasible title

to property in favor of the person in whose name the title appears. It is
conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land described
therein. It is also settled that the titleholder is entitled to... all the
attributes of ownership of the property, including possession. Thus, in
Arambulo v. Gungab, this Court declared that the "age-old rule is that
the person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to possession
thereof."

As a holder of a Torrens certificate of title, the law protects Crisologo

from a collateral attack on the same. Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, provides that a
certificate of title cannot be the subject of a collateral attack.

b. Case Title: Paul P. Gabriel, Jr. vs. Carmeling Crisologo, GR. No.
204626; (J. Mendoza); June 9, 2014
c. Facts: Carmeling Crisologo for Recovery of Possession and/or
Ownership with Damages against Juliet B. Pulkera, Paul P. Gabriel,
Ireneo C. Calwag, and Thomas L. Tingga-an. Crisologo alleged, among
others, that she was the registered owner of two parcels of land with a
total area of approximately 2,000 square meters, described in,
and covered by, two (2)certificates of title; that the properties were
covered by an Assessment of Real Property; that the payments of realty
taxes on the said properties were updated; that sometime in 2006, she
discovered that petitioners unlawfully entered, occupied her properties
by stealth, by force and without her prior consent and knowledge, and
constructed their houses thereon; that upon discovery of their illegal
occupation, her daughter, Atty. Carmelita Crisologo, and Isican
personally went to the properties and verbally demanded that petitioners
vacate the premises and remove their structures thereon; that the
petitioners begged and promised to buy the said properties for 3,500.00
per square meter; that she gave petitioners time to produce the said
amount, but they reneged on their promise to buy them; that petitioners
refused to vacate the subject properties despite several demands; that
the petitioners knew full well that the subject premises they were
occupying were titled properties but they insisted on unlawfully holding
the same; and that she was unlawfully dispossessed and displaced from
the subject properties due to petitioners’ illegal occupation.

d. Issue: Whether or not Crisologo has a better right of possession over the
subject parcels of land.
e. Held: Yes. Crisologo has a better right of possession over the subject
parcels of land. When it is shown that the plaintiff in a case of accion
publiciana had a valid title issued in her name in1967, within the period
which the Supreme Court held that titles issued over the same
properties were valid; that she has been paying the realty taxes on the
said properties since l969; that she likewise appointed an administrator
of the disputed lands, and more importantly, there is no question that
she offered to sell to petitioners the portions of the subject properties
occupied by them, then she deserves to be respected and restored to
her lawful possession as provided in Article 539 of the New Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: Article 559 of the Civil Code provides that possession of
movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title.
Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully
deprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the
same.

b. Case Title: Subic Bay Legend Resorts and Casinos, Inc. vs. Bernard C.
Fernandez, GR. No. 193426; (J. Del Castillo); September 29, 2014

c. Facts: On July 1, 1997, Bernard Fernandez, a brother of Ludwig and

Deoven, filed complaint for recovery of sum of money and damages
against the company. According to him he went to the casino on June
13, 1997; he handed to his brothers $6,000.00 worth of chips belonging
to him, for use at the casino; thereat, the company personnel accosted
his brothers and confiscated his casino chips worth $5,900.00, and
 failed to return the same to him despite demand. Brothers Deoven and
Ludwig Fernandez was accused of stealing casino chips from Subic Bay
Legend Resorts and Casinos Inc. They were made to confess that the
chips were supplied by a casino employee, Michael Cabrera.

d. Issue: Whether or not Bernard is the lawful possessor of the casino

chips, entitling him to collect from the casino and award of damages.

e. Held: There is no basis to suppose that the casino chips found in

Ludwin’s and Deoven’s possession were stolen; petitioner acted
arbitrarily in confiscating the same without basis. If it cannot be proved,
in the first place, that Cabrera stole these chips, then there is no more
reason to suppose that Ludwin and Deoven were dealing in or
possessed stolen goods; unless the independent fact that Cabrera stole
the chips can be proved, it cannot be said that they must be confiscated
when found to be in Ludwin’s and Deoven’s possession. Though casino
chips do not constitute legal tender, there is no law which prohibits their
use or trade outside of the casino which issues them. Since casino chips
are considered to have been exchanged with their corresponding
representative value – it is with more reason that the Court should
require SBL to prove convincingly and persuasively that the chips it
confiscated from Ludwin and Deoven were indeed stolen from it. If SBL
cannot prove its loss, then Article 559 cannot apply; the presumption
that the chips were exchanged for value remains.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed April 27, 2010

Decision and August 24, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
 G.R. CV No. 91758 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: There are three kinds of real actions affecting title to or

possession of real property, or interest therein, namely: accion de
reivindicacion, accion publiciana and accion interdictal.

The first seeks the recovery of ownership as well as possession of

realty. The second proposes to recover the right to possess and is a
plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding. The third refers to the
recovery of physical or actual possession only (through a special civil
action either for forcible entry or unlawful detainer).

b. Case Title: Penta Pacific Realty Corp. vs. Ley Construction and Devt.
Corp., GR. No. 161589; (J. Bersamin); November 24, 2014

c. Facts: Penta Pacific Realty Corporation filed a Complaint for Ejectment

against Ley Construction and Development Corporation for the latter’s
 failure to comply with the petitioner’s demands to pay and vacate the
25th floor of Pacific Star Building (PSB) owned by the petitioner.
Respondent and the petitioner’s authorized agent entered into a
Contract of Lease whereby the former leased a portion of the said 25th
floor. The respondent then decided to purchase from the petitioner the
25th floor of PSB by virtue of a Reservation Agreement. However, the
respondent started to default in its amortization payments on the said
purchase. Upon the respondent’s request, petitioner acceded that the
Reservation Agreement be cancelled and in lieu thereof, the above-
mentioned Contract of Lease be revived. Unfortunately, the respondent
failed to pay the rentals when they fell due. The respondent, on their
part, argued that the contract of lease had been simulated or, in the
alternative, had been repealed, negated, extinguished and/or novated by
the reservation agreement.

d. Issue: Whether the complaint was for unlawful detainer, or accion

publiciana, or accion reivindicatoria.

e. Held: In resolving, the Supreme Court ruled that, a defendant's claim of

possession de Jure or his averment of ownership does not render the
ejectment suit either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. The suit
remains an accion interdictal, a summary proceeding that can proceed
independently of any claim of ownership. Even when the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership,
the issue of ownership is to be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession.
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision
promulgated on October 9, 2003 by the Court of Appeals affirming the
decision rendered on June 10, 2002 by the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 58; REINSTATE the decision rendered on January
12, 2000 by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 64, of Makati City; and
ORDER the respondent to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.