Foundations of Industrial Dynamics 2 –

The transformation ahead: climate crisis and the

implications for innovation, management and
policy
Jan 19, 2024
Course ME2067

Staffan Laestadius
prof. em
School of Industrial Mgmt, KTH

2024-01-19 Laestadius/ME2067 1
 The Knowledge Sources
• Laestadius, 2013, Klimatet och
välfärden – mot en ny svensk modell,
Umeå: Boréa Bokförlag
• Laestadius, 2015, ”Transition paths:
assessing conditions and alternatives”,
in Fagerberg, Laestadius & Martin, eds.
Triple Challenge for Europe – Economic
Development, Climate Change, and
Governance, Oxford U.P.
• Laestadius, 2018, Klimatet och
omställningen (Borea bokförlag) .
• Laestadius, 2022, Industrial
Transformation in the Athropocene, in
Long et al , eds.Technological Change
and Industrial Transformation
• Laestadius,2021, En strimma av hopp
• Laestadius, 2023, Större än. Du nånsin
tror

2024-01-19 Laestadius/ME2067 2
 2023 – a year of global climate records

2024-01-19 Laestadius/ME2067 3
 … a consequence of GHG in the atmosphere
2024-01-19 Laestadius/ME2067 4
 The relation between CO2-content and
atmospheric temperature

2024-01-19 Laestadius/ME2067 5
 Sea temperature –
the sea absorbs 90% of heat ”surplus”

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 …with impact on the cryosphere…..
and the sea level..
Antarctic, Greenland and Switzerland
... sea level rise (there are several mechanisms
behind)

2024-01-19 Laestadius/ME2067 7
 EXPERT OPINION REFERENCES
This observational study is of major of the Greenland ice sheet’s mass balance. 1. Bierman, P. R., Shakun, J. D., Corbett, L. B.
importance in further improving This study is, to the best of my knowledge, the Zimmerman, S. R. & Rood, D. H. Nature 54
our quantitative evaluation of the most comprehensive effort to quantify this 256–260 (2016).
mass balance of the Greenland ice sheet. component.” (CC BY 4.0)
The evolution of terminal positions and, more 2. Fox-Kemper, B. et al. in Climate Change

Greenland: recent data on glacier melting

importantly, the associated mass changes are Vincent Verjans is at the IBS Center for 2021: The Physical Science Basis Ch. 9 (ed
a crucial but difficult-to-measure component Climate Physics, Busan, South Korea. Masson-Delmotte, V. et al.) 1211–1361 (IPCC
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2021).
Nature, 240117
FIGURE 3. Otosaka, I. N. et al. Earth Syst. Sci. Data 15
1597–1616 (2023).

4. Ditlevsen, P. & Ditlevsen, S.

Nature Commun. 14, 4254 (2023).

–100

–200 243 glaciers

–300

Steenstrup-Dietrichson
–400 Hayes Gletscher M Ss
Cumulative change in mass (Gt)

Ryder Gletscher
Upernavik Isstrom N
Hayes Gletscher N Nn
Sverdrup Gletscher
Ostenfeld Gletscher
–500
Tracy Gletscher
Helheimgletscher
Petermann Gletscher
Kangerlussuaq
–600
Kjer Gletscher

Alison Gletscher

Nioghalvfjerdsfjorden
–700

Jakobshavn Isbræ

–800
Humboldt Gletscher

–900

Zachariæ Isstrøm

–1,000
Greenland

1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022

2024-01-19 Laestadius/ME2067
Year 8
Figure 1 | Cumulative change in ice mass. Almost every glacier in Greenland has lost some of its mass
since 1985. This stacked-area time-series plot shows the change in mass (in gigatonnes; Gt) for each glacier
(represented by coloured lines) attributable to the retreat of glacier termini. Those glaciers that sustained
the greatest losses ( Jakobshavn Isbræ, Humboldt Gletscher and Zachariæ Isstrøm) are shown at the bottom.
Most glaciers advance in winter and retreat in summer, producing the oscillatory patterns seen here. We find
that seasonal variability is an effective predictor of a glacier’s sensitivity to the warming that occurs over
decades.
…our addiction to carbon started a long time ago…

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 …leading to the Great Acceleration after WW2
(Steffen m.fl. 2004)

Socioeconom. trends Geo-/bio-systemtrends

2nd half of the

chessboard

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Total global emissions by source – the great acceleration

Land-use change was the dominant source of annual CO2 emissions until around 1950.
Fossil CO2 emissions now dominate global changes.

Others: Emissions from cement production, gas flaring and carbonate decomposition
Source: Friedlingstein et al 2023; Global Carbon Project 2023
 … still increasing –

2024-01-19 Laestadius/ME2067 12
 (CO2) emissions — of which close to 90% stem from
fossil fuels — continue at the current pace, the world
could exceed the remaining emissions budget compatible
with a 50% chance of limiting long-term warming to 1.5°C
by 2030.
temperature goal within reach. Informed by the latest sci-
entific evidence, this report identifies global pathways for
coal, oil, and gas production from now until 2050 that are
consistent with this goal. It then assesses governments’
plans, projections, and policies for fossil fuel production
and how aligned — or misaligned — they are with respect
to these pathways.

Emissions impact of global fossil economy

Figure ES.1
The fossil fuel production gap — the difference between governments’ plans and projections and levels consistent with limiting warming
to 1.5°C and 2°C, as expressed in units of greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel extraction and burning — remains large and expands

SEI, nov 2023

over time. (See details in Chapter 2 and Figure 2.1.)

Global fossil fuel production

GtCO2eq/yr

40
Takes uas to a global
temperature of
3,2°C (2,2 – 3,5)
The surface beneath the, 30 The Production Gap
a,
curve is important
Not the final year 20

Government plans & projections

Stated policies
Announced pledges
10
a 2°C-consistent
1.5°C-consistent

0
2020 2030 2040 2050

2024-01-19 Laestadius/ME2067 13
Production Gap Report 2023 3
 climate mitigation ambitions. Second, global pathways for
fossil fuel production consistent with limiting warming to
1.5°C or 2°C have been updated using the new scenario
database compiled for the Working Group III contribution
to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)’s
Sixth Assessment Report (AR6).
The resulting analysis finds that, in aggregate, governments
are planning on producing around 110% more fossil fuels
total, government plans and projections would lead
to an increase in global production until 2030 for
coal, and until at least 2050 for oil and gas, creating
increasingly large production gaps over time.
To be consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C, global
coal, oil, and gas supply and demand must instead decline
rapidly and substantially between now and mid-century.
However, the increases estimated under the government

The production gap distributed on fuels

in 2030 than would be consistent with limiting warming
to 1.5°C, and 69% more than would be consistent with
plans and projections pathways would lead to global
production levels in 2030 that are 460%, 29%, and 82%
SEI, nov 2023
Figure ES.2
Government plans and projections would lead to an increase in global coal production until 2030, and in global oil and gas production
until at least 2050. (See details in Chapter 2 and Figure 2.2.)

Coal Production Oil Production Gas Production

EJ/yr Gt/yr EJ/yr Mb/d EJ/yr Tcm/yr

120
10
6
200 200 200
100
8 5

150 150 80 150

4
6
60
100 100 100 3
4
40
2
50 50 50
2
20 1

0 0 0 0 0 0
2020 2030 2040 2050 2020 2030 2040 2050 2020 2030 2040 2050

Government plans & projections 2°C-consistent

Stated policies 1.5°C-consistent
Announced pledges

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4 Production Gap Report 2023
 CO2 emissions – country breakdown
(GCP)

Top emitters Fossil CO2 emissions/cap

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 Remaining carbon budget 2023

The remaining carbon budget to limit global warming to 1.5°C , 1.7°C and 2°C is
275 GtCO2, 625 GtCO2, and 1150 GtCO2 respectively, equivalent to 7, 15 and 28 years from 2024.
2590 GtCO2 have been emitted since 1850

The remaining carbon budgets is the average of two estimates (IPCC AR6 and Forster et al., 2023), both updated by removing the most recent emissions.
Quantities are subject to additional uncertainties e.g., future mitigation choices of non-CO2 emissions
Source: IPCC AR6 WG1; Forster et al., 2023; Friedlingstein et al 2023; Global Carbon Project 2023
Remaining carbon budget – an illustration

Global CO2 emissions must reach zero to limit global warming

Source: Friedlingstein et al 2023; Global Carbon Project 2023

 RCB: the most recent illustration
(Forster et al, June 2023)

Probability to Pres. emiss. (Gt)

reach target 33% 50% 67% 83% GHG = 55 (CO2e)
Temperat. incr. (RCB Gt) CO2 = 37
1,5°C 300 250 150 100
1,7°C 800 600 500 350 3-10 years left!!
2°C 1450 1150 950 800

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Let us go back to the great acceleration

Land-use change was the dominant source of annual CO2 emissions until around 1950.
Fossil CO2 emissions now dominate global changes.

Others: Emissions from cement production, gas flaring and carbonate decomposition
Source: Friedlingstein et al 2023; Global Carbon Project 2023
 The Great Acceleration (rapid economic growth) –
- a short period in the history of mankind

Årl. tillv. 1-1000 1000-1500 1500-1820 1820-1870 1870-1913

(%)
BNP 0,01 0,15 0,32 0,94 2,12

BNP/cap 0,0 0,05 0,05 0,54 1,31

Årl. tillv. 1913-1950 1950-1973 1973-2003 2000-2015 2007-2015

(%)
BNP 1,82 4,90 3,17 2,25 1,61

BNP/cap 0,88 2,91 1,56 1,54 1,04

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..economic growth draws on planetary resources...

• The industrial metabolism uses more material than ever => world economy is
heavier than ever
• There is a strong correlation between economic growth and energy use in
general and fossil fuels in particular
• Even if there is a ”decoupling” between energy use and growth this is just in
relative terms – not in absolute terms
• Mankind has never, during two centuries, managed to combine long term
economic growth with reduced inputs of material and/or energy.

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The resource question – old and new approaches
• There is an old discourse on resource economics – focusing on whether there are
enough reserves: will they be depleted?
• The peak oil discussion is a recent illustration of that.
• This may have relevance in some cases on global level and in more cases on local
level (all countries do not have litium e.g.).
• The new approach relates to planetary boundaries, i.e. the carrying capacity and
resilience of our planet.
• This includes all human impact on planetary systems
• A core issue is whether the atmosphere can accomodate all GHG produced by
mankind.
• The problem is not lack of resources – we cannot use them without destroying the
planet.
• Let us look at the data

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 CO2 emissions and the chessboard phenomenon
(Mton, )
Year Total Coal Oil Gas Cement

1940 4763 3729 (78%) 840 154 40

1965 11478 5354 (47%) 4470 1236 216

1990 22240 8650 (39%) 9138 3762 543

2015 36050 14690 (40%) 12270 6843 1999

2020 34808 13974 11073 7401 1627

2022 (GCP) 37149 15220 11879 7749 1606

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No peak coal/oil: the social construction of reserves -
far beyond the planetary boundaries
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Year oil oil gas gas coal coal

Prod, Res, 1000 Prod, Res, tril. Prod, Res, 1000 Mt
mby mb 1000 kbm Mt
Mkbm

1992 24000 1039 (43) 2000 118 (59) 4557 n.a.

2000 27200 1301 (48) 2400 138 (57) 4708 1059 (223)
2010 30400 1637 (54) 3150 180 (57) 7460 897 (120)
2020 32260 1732 (54) 3850 188 (49) 7732 1074 (139)
2022 34255 n.a. 4040 n.a. 8803 n.a.

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 The resource question –production and reserves:
the social construction of resources (Zimmerman, 1933/1951)

1 2 3 4 5 6

Miner Reserves Production Reserves Production Reserves

al 1950 1950-1980 1980 2020 2020

Alumi 1400 1346 5200 65200 Very large

nium

Copp 100 156 494 26 890

er
Iron 19000 11040 93466 1300 Very large

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 Critical minerals – not that critical (yet)

1 2 3 4 5 6

Prod Res. 2000 Prod. 2022 Res. 2022 Res/2

2000 årsprod
2022

Cobalt 35 4700 166 8500 25

Litium 14 3400 130 23000 88
Natural 836 15000 1390 355700 128
grafite
Rare Earth 77 100000 299 125600 210
metals

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Productivity/growth accounting does not consider steeling
from the store, or storing in the air

• Brain power used to increase

fossil addiction => natural
resource excavation and
reserves

2024-01-19 Laestadius/ME2067 27
 A fundamental challenge for analysts and
politicians
.
• If historical productivity increase is not available for the future –
what about economic growth?
• If historical economic growth is not available for the future – what
about the unemployment problem?
• Is there a need to ”decouple” the ”transformation” and ”growth”
discourses?
• What kind of industrial/technical enginering does that require?
• Do we face a fundamental paradigm shift as regards our
understanding of economic life?

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 Back to the Great Acceleration –
the paradox of the ”great acceleration of freedom”

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 Becoming addict to carbon

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 Paradigms of modernity

Mastering nature Idea of progress

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 The growth paradigm: a look into the understanding of growth
among economists, track 1 (micro)
• Landes (The Unbound Prometheus): the dynamics of the industrial
revolution: machinery (brain power, (B); external power, (E); natural
resources (N); => O = f( B, E, N).
• The classical (and Marxian) production function: O = f(C, L)
• Technology: Abramowits (1956) & Solow (1957) => O = f(T, C, L)
• Endogenous Growth Theory: knowledge (=technology = brain
power) (Aghion & Howitt, 2009) => O = f(B, C, L) eller rent av O =
f(CB, LB)
• Do not neglect Schumpeter´s innovations
• But planetary services - energy and nature - got lost underways.
• Perfect substitution (linear and homogenous) => elegant but lack of
realism
• The economist´s disease: prices instead of quantities

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 … and a look into the understanding of growth among economists,
track 2 (macro)
• The context: WW1, the depression of • Kusnetz was hesitant towards this neglect
the 30´s, WW2, postwar reconstruction of the deficit side of activities.
• The economists: Kusnetz, Keynes… • But it worked as a short term model for
• The synthesis: OECD and the GDP accounting of economic activity and
employment
concept
• An ”economy” where
• All activities add up to each other
• Nature (The Planet) is absent
• Energy and resources are available
and /or can be constructed for
money
• The dustbin has no limits

2024-01-19 Laestadius/ME2067 33
 Instead of growth - Transformation in focus
• Transformation is the core action –
parameter
• The growth and decline of sectors,
industries, technologies, activities
• The engine is inovation in a broad
sense => brain power
• In line with Schumpeter and Dahmén.
• Aggregate growth (if any) is a residual
• Schumpeter did not write about
growth

2024-01-19 Laestadius/ME2067 34
 Macroeconomic conditions for transformation
Transformation not necessa-
Conditions for transformation rily compatible with growth

• A = Ds + Dse + Dc • The idea of unlimited

• A = activities
• Dc must decline relatively
and absolute 7% => Ds
should grow 10-12%.
• Dse generates emissions
now => must be
compensated by ➘Dc
• Dse relative rate of em.
probably twice Dc.
growth a child of the
Great Acceler.
• The idea of Green Growth
a straw on which you
cannot build policy.
• Transformation must
take place irrespective of
growth.
• Reduce all fossil based
activities - absolute
decoupling

2024-01-19 Laestadius/ME2067 35
 Let us focus on the energy question –
the cake illustrating our addiction to fossil fuel
Global energy consumption by fuel, 2021
EJ and %

7%
4% 7% oil, 184
31% nat.gas. 145
coal, 160
nucl. 25
27%
hydro. 40
24% ren. 40

2024-01-19 Laestadius/ME2067 36
 The mathematics of transformation –
do we have a chance?
• Basic assumption: we must reduce • Distribute 20 EJ to all non fossil
our emissions >7% annually. sectors (= 105 EJ) => ca 19% incr.
• Basic global data: ann. (excl. nuclear => 25%)
• Energy transf: 595 EJ • The transformation accelerator
• Of which fossil490 (=82%) • But take off time is high in
• Of which nucl. 25 EJ (=4%) nuclear and also in hydro.
• Of which hydro 38 EJ (=7%)
• Of which renew 29 EJ (7%) • Conclusion:
• Biofuels (= 0.7%) • Reduce activity levels (a)
• More efforts on efficiency (e)
• 7% reduction of fossils => 41 EJ • Totally approx 80% (a+e)
• Assume: • => the rest can trasnsform to
• 50% efficiency => 20 EJ renewables 7-8% annually
• 50% substitution => 20 EJ • Or we fail…
2024-01-19 Laestadius/ME2067 37
 The transformation accelerator –
the bus case

• Person transp. i Sv (145pkm):

• car 115 bil pkm (79%)
• rail 17 bil pkm (12%)
• Bus 10 bil pkm (7%)
• Dom. air 3,4 pil pkm (2,3%)
• Reduce car travel. Assume that
40% of this is transfered to
bus.
• 7% ann. => 32% ann. Incr.
• 8% ann. => 37% ann.incr.

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 Wind power
Bench marking vs Europe 2022 -
1 2 3 4 5 6
Land Install. vind Install. vind Install. Vind Install. Install.
onshore MW/000 off shore MW solkapacitet Solkap MW
(MW) sqkm on sh. MW /000 sqkm
Danmark 4782 111 2306 2490 58
Finland 5541 16 73 591 2
Frankrike 20638 37 482 17419 32
Grekland 4879 37 - 5557 42
Italien 11750 39 30 25083 83
Polen 7987 26 - 11167 36
Spanien 29303 59 5 20518 41
Storbrit. 14690 60 13848 14412 59
Sverige 14364 32 193 2606 6
Tyskland 58186 159 8129 66554 181
Österrike 3736 45 - 3548 42
 The energy system – wind power

• Large wind power program – rapid

NIMBY
climate pay off:
• Cf. Germany – en factor six, resp 20.
• On sh: 40-50 GW => 130 -160 TWh el
• Off sh: 30-50 GW => 130-220 TWh el
• Building permits.
• 500 forest based parks.
• Useful to:
• Electromobility
• Hydrogen, input to steel, trpt etc
• Base load energy

2024-01-19 Laestadius/ME2067 40
 The energy system - photovoltaics

• Sweden has > 300 km2 useful roofs

for photovoltaics => 30 000 ha
• If 100 km2 påhotovoltaics is
installed with 200 W/m2 => 20 GW
installed effect => 20 TWh el ann.
• One ha photocells can give 1750
MWh el annually.
• Two percent of non productive
peat = 480 km2. Photocells on
50% of those => 42 TWh

2024-01-19 Laestadius/ME2067 41
…growth of photovoltaics

2024-01-19 Laestadius/ME2067 42
 largest energy source for electricity generation globally
By 2028, potential renewable electricity generation is expected to reach around
14 400 TWh, an increase of almost 70% from 2022. Over the next five years,
several renewable energy milestones could be achieved:

In 2024, variable renewable generation surpasses hydropower.

The growth of renewables –

In 2025, renewables surpass coal-fired electricity generation.
In 2025, wind surpasses nuclear electricity generation.
fast but not fast enough
In 2026, solar PV surpasses nuclear electricity generation.
In 2028, solar PV surpasses wind electricity generation.

Electricity generation by technology, 2000-2028

45%
Solar PV
40%

35% Wind

30%
Variable
25% renewables

20% Hydropower

15%
Other
10% renewables
5% All renewables
0%
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028

IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Notes: Electricity generation from wind and solar PV indicate potential generation including current curtailment rates.
2024-01-19 However, it does not project future curtailment of windLaestadius/ME2067
and solar PV, which may be significant in a few countries by 2028. 43
The Curtailment section below discusses some of these recent trends.

Over the forecast period, potential renewable electricity generation growth

exceeds global demand growth, indicating a slow decline in coal-based generation
 Conclusion: we just need one nuclear power plant -
immediately available, and wasteless in addition.

2024-01-19 Laestadius/ME2067 44
 The role of mobility, transport and automotive
systems

Global CO2 emissions Emissions from transport

CO2 emissions Transport emissions

El ectricity and heat
production
Other energy
6%3% industry own use* 10%
7% Road
Manuf. industries
25% 42% and construction 9% mar. Bunk.
Transport av. Bunk.

74% other
19% Residential
5%

Commercial and public

services

2024-01-19 Laestadius/ME2067 45
 Mobility and transport–
Sweden
Sverige: CO2-utsläpp 2021
Trpt svarar för 50-57%
av utsläppen =>
11% ind Ingen omställningspolitik
7%
32% inr trpt kan runda trpt =>
19% utr trp reduktionskrav > 7% årl.
arb mask
31% övr sekt
=> Måste ta oss ur sociala
strukturella, mentala och
tekniska inlåsningar

2024-01-19 Laestadius/ME2067 46
 Transformation: potential and challenges –
the mobility system

• Consisting of
complementary segments:
• Aviation
• Railways
• Maritim transport
• Automotive system
• Supporting industries
• The need for new
sociotechnical solutions:
• Supply chain/sourcing mgmt
• Logistics
• Life styles

2024-01-19 Laestadius/ME2067 47
Climate crisis challenges the fundamental views on
transport…

2024-01-19 Laestadius/ME2067 48
 …and Swedish air travel

• Swed. Int.air travel ( dep. + arr. pass.)

• 2000 16,5 milj
• 2010 20,8 milj
• 2015 26,9 milj
• 2016 28,6 milj
• 2017 30,9 milj
Arlanda: + 67% • 2018 31,6 milj
• 2019 30,9 milj
• 2020 7.4 milj (covid)
• 2021 8.7 milj (covid)
• 2022 21.1 milj
• 2023 25,1 milj

Conclusion: int air travel increases 4-5%/år

Kastrup: + 100%%
2024-01-19 Laestadius/ME2067 49
 Illustrating the transformation of aviation
• Före pandemin: 45 milj. pass. Starter
& landn/årligen
• Nu 2023, ca 34,5 milj.
• Innebörden av att reducera flyget
med 7 procent/året => 2,4 milj.
• Första året, 2025, konkret:
• Halvera Kph => 0,6 milj.
• Halvera Oslo => 0,6 milj.
• Red. Inr.Malmö m 30% => 0,2 milj
• Red. Inr.Gtbg m. 30% => 0,2 milj.
• Red. Inr. Umeå m. 30% => 0, 2 milj
• Dessutom ytterligare ca 0,6 milj
• Så kommer år två
• Och år tre…
• Kräver mobilisering plus mkt.
kraftiga styrmedel.
• Start- och landn.avg. = 500-1000 kr
• P & D jfr. Canada => 6-12000/fam.
• Elflyg inget alternativ på kort sikt
• Bioflyg otillräckligt + ej CO2-fritt på
kort sikt.

240118 Laestadius/Transportforum 50
 Maritime transport,
forecast

2024-01-19 Laestadius/ME2067 51
 The struggle between technologies –
- the E car and the ICE car

• 1830:s – first electric cars

• succesful electric cars 1842
• 1899 – electric car faster that 100 km/h
(France)
• 1897: electric taxis in USA
• early 20th century: electric cars in majority or at
least a third
• 1908: a competiton on Rhode Island between
EV:s and ICE:s was clearly won by an EV.

2024-01-19 Laestadius/ME2067 52
 Towards a dominant technology and design

• The struggle between technologies turned into

another track:
• Ford, model T, 1912, became the dominant
design.
• An ICE solution (in fact made for ethanol)
• Why was there a closure into ICE technology?

2024-01-19 Laestadius/ME2067 53
 Illustration of the ”momentum” of a
”regime”: the automotive system – the
details
• The autoindustrial/technological
system
• The cars
• The car industry
• The fuel/oil industry
• The road system
• The service/fueling system
• Engineering visions
• But also
• Retail industry
• Service industry This is an arena for entrepre-
• Tourist industry
• Social planners neurship and innovative
management

2024-01-19 Laestadius/ME2067 54
 Automotive systems challenges

• From a privately owned one ”all purpose car” to a flexible

transport system:
• Trains and buses between hubs
• Busses for standardized trips in densely populated areas
• Plug in family size hybrids (el/bio) for the cottage (hytte) trip
• Electric small cars for non standardized short and medium
distance trips
• Towards a pph or ppkm model (cf. autolib)
• The system as a whole may have a similar performance as
the old car – but the old car will not survive as an Ecar????

2024-01-19 Laestadius/ME2067 55
 Box 1.1 The 2023 outlook for electric cars is bright
Early indications from first quarter sales of 2023 point to an upbeat market,
supported by cost declines as well as strengthened policy support in key markets
such as the United States. Globally, our current estimate is therefore for nearly
14 million electric cars to be sold in 2023, building on the more than 2.3 million

The growth of the global EV car market

already sold in the first quarter of the year. This represents a 35% increase in
electric car sales in 2023 compared to 2022 and would bring the global electric sales
share to around 18%, up from 14% in 2022.

Electric car sales, 2010-2023

16
Million

14

12

10

0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023E
China Europe United States Other

2024-01-19 Laestadius/ME2067 IEA. CC BY 4.0.56

Note: 2023 sales (“2023E”) are estimated based on market trends through the first quarter of 2023.
Source: IEA analysis based on EV Volumes.

Electric car sales in the first three months of 2023 have shown strong signs of
 The car makers´performance
Global EV Outlook 2023
Catching up with climate ambitions
Policy developments and corporate strategy

Figure 2.10. Share of global electric car markets by selected carmakers, 2016-2022
18%

15%

12%

9%

6%

3%

0%
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

BYD Tesla Volkswagen

General Motors Geely-Volvo Stellantis
Hyundai BMW Mercedez-Benz
Renault Nissan Mitsubishi
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IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Notes: Market share in terms of electric car sales. Includes battery electric and plug-in hybrid electric cars.
Source: IEA analysis based on EV Volumes.

In 2022, BYD and Tesla accounted for over 30% of global EV markets. BYD overtook Tesla
in terms of sales, while competition remains fierce among incumbent automakers.
 …transforming the railways system…
cf. the Stockholm – Oslo project

Important symbolic project–

Type of efforts
Cf Chinese speed of expansion.
• Maintainence debt
• Increased capacity
• What design speed?:
• 320 kmh
• 250 kmh
• 200 kmh
• Increase investments: triple
present level (from ca 50 mdr
=> 150/200 bil/year)
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…new systems solutions…

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 Natural resource related blocs
(Iron & steel)
Wood, forest, biomass..
• Dirty and needed
• Swedish capabilities

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transformation of forest based industries – struggle for biomass

• Eating
• Drinking
• Driving
• Heating
• Clothing
• Caring
• Constructing
• Packaging
• Reading
• Electricity generation

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The struggle for biomass…
not enough biomass on present level of demand +
the need to handle the bio diversity problem

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 Omställningens fokusområden 4 –
biomassan ”det enda vi har”
• Biomassan är en förnybar källa för
materialförsörjning
• Bioenergi/biobränsle är en
återvändsgränd. Släpper ut CO2.
• Biomassa är en god kolsänka
• Biodiversiteten kräver storskalig
vild natur.
• Biomassan och skogen möter
svårförenliga krav.
231119 Laestadius/Viskadalen
• Det svenska bioenergitricket:
• 151 TWh av totalt 538 från biomassa
• Tredubbling på 40 år
• Dvs 28 procent
• Biogena utsläpp har ökat med 30 Mt
från 23 till 53 Mt under perioden 1990-
2021.
• Dvs lika mycket som vi reducerat
våra fossila CO2-utsläpp, 31 Mt
63
 The ultimate carbon sinks

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 The transformation of forest industry

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Towards a hydrogen block: Steel

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Towards a hydrogen block

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 Reflections on technology and innovation 1 –

• Technology optimism – what is that?
• An increasing share of innovations are
reparation innovations, ie. repairing bads
rather than creating goods.
• We must transfom from linear technology
devpt. to innov. for sustainability. d=> away
from waste duping in the air, water or
underground
• Cf. CO2, nuclear waste and plastics
• Technology dvpt. for climate return during this
decade.
• Technoliogy dvpt. Iun line with nature
• Too much focus on future technology neglects
what we already know.
• We know what we need to start to transform
• Transformation not primarily a question of
tehnology. There is no tewchnoloy fix solution.

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We need innovations – but we have a lot of low
hanging fruit to capture
• Why is it so difficult to grasp them?
• We are ”locked in” in complex
carbon based ”path dependent”
systems.
• To get out necessitates policy
interventions:
• Relative prices
• Regulations
• Infrastructure planning
• A new ”regime”

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 The era of global warming has ended;
The era of global boiling has arrived.
Leaders must lead. No more hesitancy. No more excuses.
No more waiting for others to move first.
There is simply no more time for that.
It is still possible to limit global temperature rise to 1.5
degrees Celsius.
And avoid the very worst of climate change.
But only with dramatic, immediate climate action
(Antonio Guterrez, FN:s generalsekreterare, 230727)

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 The need for a vision

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 Det var det hele…
slae@kth.se

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