MAHARASHTRA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, NAGPUR

Reading Material (Part 2)

For Module 3 and 4

2.4 CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL SCIENCE

B.A.LL.B. (Honours in Adjudication and Justicing)
Five-Year Integrated Degree Course
Academic Year: 2023-24
1st YEAR, SEMESTER-II
Compiled by
Prof. Aditya Satpute,
Assistant Professor, Political Science
January 2024

(Strictly for Private Circulation)

 Charles E Merriam
A significant political scientist who made valuable contribution to behavioural approach was
Charles E Merriam, known as the founder of Chicago School. His objection to the traditional
approaches to politics was the usual one i.e. they suffer from the absence of thorough scientific
inquiry. He was also critical of the works of those historians who did not take into account the
role of psychological, sociological and economic aspects of human existence. He vociferously
advocated an inter-disciplinary approach to the study of political science, which would endow
the discipline with a true scientific character. He favoured the use of quantitative techniques in
the study of politics and encouraged political scientists to treat political behaviour as the
cardinal issue in the studies. Since he was a resolute admirer of democracy, he strived to employ
science to disseminate the message of democracy. He did not see any inconsistency to advance
the cause of a specific form of government through an approach to politics. It was William B
Munro, another supporter of modern approach who made it plain that it was improper for
political science to encourage the spread of any specific form of government, democracy or
otherwise. One more proponent of behavioural approach, G E G Catlin spoke of making
politics a value-free social science in his notable work, Science and Method of Politics,
published in 1927.
Behaviouralism is one of the most significant modern approaches to the study of political
science. Behaviouralism is an approach in political science which seeks to provide an objective,
quantified approach to explaining and predicting political behaviour. Its emergence in politics
coincides with the rise of the behavioural social sciences that were given shape after the natural
sciences. Behaviouralism is mainly concerned to examine the behaviour, actions, and acts of
individuals rather than the characteristics of institutions such as legislatures, executives, and
judiciaries. Behaviouralism underscores the systematic inquiry of all exclusive expression of
political behaviour. Some scholars insist that behaviouralism implies the application of
meticulous scientific and statistical methods in order to standardise means of investigation. It
is also an exercise in ensuring a value-free study of the discipline of politics. It is usually argued
that by the adherents of behavioural approach that political science should be studied in manner
similar to the study of natural sciences. In this context, the supporters of behavioural approach
insist that the main role of a political scientist is to collect and analyse factual data in an
objective manner.
The major point of criticism against the traditional approaches has been that they have been
deficient in applying scientific methods to the study of politics that has rendered its very claim
to be a science at all. Therefore, the behaviouralists recommended the application of exacting
methodology and empirical studies to make the discipline of political science a true social
science. The behavioural approach has without doubt given a totally ground-breaking purpose
to the study of politics by taking it towards an inquiry based on research-supported verifiable
data. The behaviouralists have challenged the realist and liberal approaches by labelling them
traditional as they fail to substantiate their conclusion with verifiable facts. In order to
understand political behaviour of individual the supporters of behavioural approach prescribe
the methods like sampling, interviewing, scoring, scaling and statistical analysis.
The behavioural approach came to be exceedingly favoured in the study of political science
after the World War II. Nonetheless, it originated with the publication in 1908 of the works of
two political scientists, Graham Wallas (Human Nature in Politics) and Arthur Bentley (The
Process of Government). Both these political scientists preferred to underscored the informal
political processes and diminished the significance of the study of political institutions in
isolation. Wallas, moved by the new findings of modern psychology, strived to introduce
similar realism in the study of political science. The major breakthrough provided by modern
psychology was that an individual, after all, was not that much a rational being as the traditional
political scientists and classical economists had tried to make him out. Consequently, he
emphasised that, more often than not, an individual’s political action were not given direction
by rationality and self-interest. Wallas pointed out that human nature was a complex
phenomenon and for an objective understanding of human nature suggested gathering and
analysis of factual data of human behaviour. The other political scientist, Bentley was credited
for inventing ‘group approach’ in the study of politics. He also prescribed that there should be
a shift from description of political activity to the application of new tools of investigation.
Bentley had sought greater inspiration from modern sociology that made him emphasise the
role of the informal groups such as pressure groups, elections and political opinion in political
processes.
These were the most important attempts to transform politics into a scientific discipline prior
to World War II. In the post-War period quite a few American political scientists such as David
B Truman, Robert Dahl, Evron M Kirkpatrich, Heinz Eulau made outstanding contributions to
behaviouralism that elaborated and expanded the extent of behavioural approach beyond the
analysis of political behaviour. Therefore, it is pertinent to quote here the contemporary
definition of behavioural approach as provided by Geoffrey K Roberts in A Dictionary of
Political Analysis, published in 1971: “Political behaviour, as an area of study within political
science, is concerned with those aspects of human behaviour that take place within a state or
other political community, for political purposes or with political motivation. Its focus is the
individual person- as voter, leader, revolutionary, party member, opinion leader etc. rather than
the group or the political system, but it necessarily takes account of the influences of the group
on the individual’s behaviour, the constraints of the system on the individual’s opportunities
for action, and the effects of the political culture on his attitude and political habits.”
In view of this definition the political scientists who subscribe to behavioural approach
investigate the psychological and sociological bearings on the behaviour of the individual in a
political situation. Such an approach makes it imperative to make investigation of certain
processes and political aspects such as political socialisation, political ideologies, political
culture, political participation, political communication, leadership, decision making and also
political violence. It goes without saying that the study of most of these processes demands an
inter-disciplinary or multi- disciplinary approach. Thus, in the post-War scenario behavioural
approach went beyond the confines of the research of individual centric political behaviour. In
the contemporary sense it is identified with an array of points of reference, procedures and
methods of analysis.

Graham Wallas - Human Nature in Politics

When first published in 1908, Graham Wallas’s Human Nature in Politics created a stir among
students of political and social history; and in estimating the permanent impact of the book an
eminent student of British politics once said: “I am inclined to argue that no English thinker
since Hobbes had seen more clearly the importance of the psychological foundation of
politics; and since that book, few treatises on this theme have been usefully written that have
not been coloured by its conclusions,” Why did the book produce such an impact? In what way
did the book open a new vista in socio-political studies? And, what is the relevance of Human
Nature in Politics to the political problems, especially, those of India, of the mid-twentieth
century? Such are the questions one may ask today on reading Graham Wallas.
The “curiously unsatisfactory position” of the study of politics in the opening decade of this
century led Wallas, an active politician, to re-examine the method of enquiry in political studies.
He found that politicians and students of politics everywhere were puzzled and disappointed
with the operation of Representative Democracy, a system of polity which had been generally
accepted by the nations of Europe and America by the end of the nineteenth century. In the
United States it was becoming common to refer to the electoral system as “the electoral
machine,” while in Britain, Wallas noticed that his own canvassers in an election said among
themselves that the work of electioneering was “a queer business,” To explain the causes of
disillusion and dissatisfaction produced by experience of the actual working of representative
democracy, nearly all contemporary students of politics had turned to the analysis of the
institutions in a democracy, and avoided the analysis of man. In Wallas’s view, the current
tendency to separate the study of politics from the study of human nature was harmful, because
it did not permit political science to grow efficient or useful in a practical way. Though
pedagogy was improving itself by utilising the knowledge offered by the new psychology, the
lessons of the latter were neglected by political scientists. Since society now enjoys new
opportunities for a better life created by the mechanical inventions of the nineteenth century,
politics would, in all probability, play an ever-increasing role in human affairs. As a
consequence, the need for efficiency of politics, for the power of politics to forecast the results
of political causes, would be felt ever more. And to increase the efficiency of politics as a
science of practical implications would require the employment of a method of political enquiry
which would be scientific as far as possible. This is, in brief, the theme of “The Conditions of
the Problem,” the first part Wallas’s book.

The method of studying politics scientifically would be governed, says Wallas, by the subject
matter itself, which includes not only political principles but also man. Man is ever engaged,
by way of reaction to his environment, in invention of ideas and institutions, which, in turn, act
on his life in society. The entities which man thus creates in the process of maintaining the
political organisation of society are included in the material for study in politics. To be
scientific, a study in politics needs to adopt, says Wallas, several general characteristics of the
method of natural science; these are: first, observation of the significant facts relating to a
phenomenon or event; second, the framing of a hypothesis to account for the occurrence of
these facts; and third, deducing from the hypothesis general laws to explain the behaviour of
similar facts or probable occurrences in the future. In the application of the above principles of
scientific method there are, however, certain limitations; one of these, to which Wallas would
invite our attention, is that the student of politics can never assume uniformity, or produce an
artificial uniformity in man. Exact comparisons like those made in natural science, therefore,
cannot be made in a study of politics.
Bentham and his followers, who strove to make politics a science, held that the motives of
pleasure and pain were fundamental, and that these two motives established in politics, as well
as in life generally, a rule of uniformity between man and man. The Benthamites failed to
perceive that pleasure and pain were not the only facts about human nature. In their zeal for the
pleasure and pain principle, they urged that instinctive impulse, habit, and tradition, were
also forms of pleasure and pain. They did not see that calculation of pleasure and pain
assumes a prior conception of the end to which human action is directed for pleasure, or for
avoidance of pain, while in action prompted by an instinctive impulse there is really no
foresight of the end. By his reading of modern psychology, Wallas was convinced of the
inadequacy of the Benthamite standard of pleasure and pain in politics: “the search for a basis
of valid political reasoning has to begin again.”
Political reasoning, says Wallas, must be based on a close observation of human nature in
politics, of man as he reacts to, and reacts upon, the political entities that constitute his political
environment. Like a biologist, the student of politics must discover how many common
qualities can be observed and measured in a group of related beings. The facts thus collected
could be arranged under three main heads: first, descriptive facts as to the human type; second,
quantitative facts as to inherited variations from the type observed either in individuals or in
groups; and third, facts, both quantitative and descriptive, as to the environment into which
men are born, and the observed effect of that environment upon their political actions and
impulses. Much knowledge of facts about the human type could be obtained from a study of
modern psychology.
The old psychology has tended to explain human nature by a few simple formulas, and to
exaggerate the intellectuality of man: the idea that every activity of man is determined by
an intellectual process, involving a reasoned calculation of the probable consequences of
each action. Under the influence of Willialm James’s Principles of Psychology, Wallas was led
to study the role of the non-rational motives behind human acts. There are many acts, Wallas
found, in which motives do not occur from any idea of an end to be gained by them; such acts
are guided by instincts: “impulses towards definite acts or series of acts, independent of any
conscious anticipation of their probable effects.” Because during the lifetime of each
individual, such factors as memory, habit and thought, increasingly modify instincts, their non-
rational character is not easily perceived. Nevertheless instincts exist as inherited dispositions,
and are manifested in behaviour in response to stimuli supplied by the environment. A few
instincts, which Wallas discusses in detail, because of their bearing on politics, are: personal
affection, fear, desire for property, aversion to repetition, desire for privacy, racial love and
hatred.
The part played by the impulse of personal affection in the success or failure of a candidate in
an election is a fact hard to deny. “The tactics of an election” says Wallas “consist largely of
contrivances by which this immediate emotion of personal affection may be set up.” The
Monarchy in Britain though intellectualised by many organs and agencies, was strong because
of its power to stimulate easily the instinct of personal affection among the British people. A
swing in the electoral pendulum could be accounted for, not so much by a reasoned change of
opinion, as by the impulse of aversion to monotonous repetitions of stereotyped political
opinions and slogans. The desire for privacy was seldom appreciated, especially in democratic
politics, where “privacy is most neglected, most difficult and most necessary.” Continuous lack
of privacy in public life told seriously upon the health of public workers, particularly leaders.
As a consequence, people who were otherwise able, but not for a life without privacy, did not
often survive in democratic politics. Wallas would draw our attention to the desire for property
also, because, according to him, the whole issue between socialism and Individualism turned
on the nature and limitation of this particular instinct. It was important to realise that the
instinctive desire for property was perhaps too basic to be eliminated, though the mode of
satisfying the desire for possession could be altered in shape by replacing old means of
satisfaction by new ones. The racial feelings of love and hatred revealed in international politics
constituted amn important section in the total psychology of political impulse; they deserve
consideration because they have an obvious bearing on international relations and world peace.

Till this point in his statement of the non-rational in politics, Wallas has attempted to throw
light on those instincts or impulses which, even without our being fully conscious of their
existence, actively motivate certain aspects of our political behaviour. These instincts, it must
be admitted, do not exhaust the list of all human instincts which might, under suitable stimuli,
shape political action of consequence or importance. But this criticism points only to the
limitations of Wallas’s probe into the non-rational springs in political attitudes and behaviour;
it does not refute the thesis of Wallas that every political action is not motivated by
intellectuality or reasoning in man, that the irrational, or non-rational, plays a larger role in
politics than it is commonly supposed, or known, to play.
This thesis would be better appreciated if we turn to Wallas’s view of political environment in
relation to human nature. The political environment, like other aspects of social environment,
has undergone tremendous changes through time; seemingly unaltered and old, parts of it are
built of new habits of thought and feeling, and of new entities which are the objects of political
thought and feeling. How these new political entities affect the instincts of man should be
studied in order to get a complete picture of human nature in politics.
The significant political entities discussed by Wallas are related to the modern nation-state and
the party-system. Wallas foundthat the prevailing pattern of analysing the state as an abstract
organisation of human beings did not explain satisfactorily the emotional fervour inspired by a
nation-state among its citizens. The phenomenon was easily explained when studied from a
psychological approach. The new nation-states of Europe made their existence felt, and easily
recognized, through symbols like new flags, new coins, and new national names. And as these
symbols acquired associations in course of time, a modern nation-state came to hold a
permanent place of emotional significance in the minds of its citizens. Through their symbols,
the modern nation-states have become agencies of stimulating variously the thoughts and
feelings of their citizens.
Within a modern nation-state, a political party, according to Wallas, was the most effective
entity, for: “it represents the most vigorous attempt which has been made to adapt the form of
our political institutions to the actual facts of human nature,” The majority of voters in a
democracy were hardly aware of the, raison d’etre of a political party. Then how did a political
party manage to exist through successive generations and enjoy the loyalty of its supporters in
successive elections? The explanation offered by Wallas is plausible: as an object of thought
and feeling, a political party was simple enough to be loved, trusted and recognised easily in
successive elections. The emotional response evoked by its name was intensified by party
colour and tunes. The feeling of affection thus generated became a habit which tended to exist
irrespective of party policies and programmes. From this analysis of loyalty to party, Wallas
draws two lessons which are of special interest: first, the policy and programme of a party has
little effect on those whose loyalty is determined by habitual affection for the party; second,
party leaders should remember that the organisation they guide is no abstract idea but an entity
having an existence in the memory and emotions of the electors, and, as such, does not depend
entirely on the opinions and actions of the leaders.
As preparatory to his observations on the role of reason, as distinct from instinct, Wallas next
analyses the issue of inference in politics. Deduction of conclusion from observed facts was a
necessary step in scientific investigation. Deduction involved inference, a process of reasoning
logically to a conclusion. Inference in politics could be non-rational even though its rationality
was taken for granted by the person involved. His personal observation of active politics led
Wallas to maintain that most of the political opinions most people held were the result, not of
reasoning from their individual experience, but of unconscious or half-conscious inference by
habit. Habit extended its power in politics through formation of tracks of thought. Occasionally
inferences were drawn from suggestions broadcast by posters, slogans and other contrivances
used at the time of elections. Newspapers also had a share in the responsibility for urging the
public, especially readers devoted to particular newspapers, to non-rational inference. In
academic political thinking, too, inference tended to be irrational when drawn by deduction
from broad, untried generalisations. Conclusions derived through such reasoning were
unscientific, often absurd. For instance, the logical democrats in America argued that because
all men are equal, political offices ought to go by rotation. The student of politics, therefore,
has to guard himself against errors of inference from sweeping generalisations. Wallas would
ask him to abandon old-fashioned deductive reasoning in favour of the quantitative method of
reasoning.
The quantitative method in politics demanded: first, exact collection of detailed political facts;
and second, the application of these facts quantitatively in political reasoning. Wallas shows
that quantitative reasoning could be used by changing on occasions the nature of a question
relating to practical policy. For example, on the issue between Individualism and Socialism,
instead of asking in the ordinary way to choose “either Socialism or Individualism,” one should
ask: “How much Socialism” or “How much Individualism?” This quantitative approach has an
advantage for the student of political theory as well as the practical politician; the former could
use it to explore the sphere in which each of the two, Socialism and Individualism, has an
objective necessity; the latter could use this approach to find a basis for real discussion as to
how much of Socialism and Individualism could be combined in one system.
The efficacy of any branch of knowledge could be judged by a pragmatic estimate of the ability
or power it affords us, first, in understanding, as far as possible and in the right perspective, the
facts coming within its scope; and second, in perceiving their probable consequences so that
practice might be modified or improved further. To bring real efficacy in a branch of
knowledge, its students should be required to make a conscious and systematic effort of thought
in a suitable method. To outline such a method had been the object of Wallas in the first part of
his book; in the second part, which he entitles “Possibilities of Progress,” the author studied
the scope of rational reform in the practice of political morality, representative government,
official thought, and nationality and humanity.
What should be the ideals of political morality? Should the politician abandon ethical traditions
and adopt methods of exploiting the irrational elements of human nature? Should the student
of politics view reason as the opposite of passion? Or, should he consider one of the two as
superior to the other? Such problems must arise with a fuller knowledge of the obscurer
impulses of the human personality and of channels of their manifestation in politics. In solving
these problems, the approach which Wallas regards as correct is to aim at a harmony of reason
and passion, of thought and impulse. “In politics, indeed, the preaching of reason as opposed
to feeling is peculiarly ineffective, because the feelings of mankind not only provide a motive
for political thought but also fix the scale of values which must be used in political judgment.”
Deliberate, scientific education in the emotional and intellectual facts of man’s nature could
gradually lead men to conceive of the co-ordination of reason and passion as a moral ideal.

While the political strength of the individual citizen stood in constant need of an increase
through moral and educational changes, the democratic structure was ever in need of repair or
improvement through a critical awareness, on the part of its advocates, of its current ills and
draws. Considering the operation of the democratic system in Britain in the first decade of the
present century, Wallas suggested several practical improvements. While recommending strict
enforcement of the Acts against corrupt practices, Wallas made a plea for holding elections on
one and the same day in order to save energy and time, and to prevent hindrances to effective
political reasoning. The practice of holding elections on Saturdays had the unhappy effect of
drawing people away from their work in offices, farms and factories. This could be avoided by
holding elections on Sundays, a day on which religious fervour of duty to God might be
combined with zeal for the democratic system. Regarding the political parties, Wallas urged
that in view of the growing aspiration for social equality, there was need for giving a share in
the Control of party committees and local bodies to the rank and file of a party.
The efficiency of British representative democracy depended in no small measure on the
permanent civil service which satisfied the psychological need among the British people for a
second base in politics. The civil service was expected by the nation to function also as an
instrument of effective political thinking. Its effectiveness in this respect was hampered by the
narrowness of official life and a habit of narrow, departmental thinking. These defects should
be removed, according to Wallas, through adequate contacts with other sections of the people,
variety in civil service training, and encouragement of the habits of research and organised
work among its members.
How can we promote international and inter-racial understanding? This question seemed to
Wallas especially pertinent in the context of the peculiar psychological basis of the modern
nation-state. As an entity of the mind, an object of thought and feeling of the people, the modern
nation-state was a factor which had come to stay. In promoting political consciousness,
nationalism had considerable value, but it was proving inadequate in solving many of the
problems of the twentieth century. Nationalism tended to develop into national egoism and
vanity, of White Man Imperialism, which overlooked the demands of humanity on modern
nation-state, and contributed to conflict and war. The findings of evolutionists should teach us,
says Wallas, that biological expansion and improvement of any community was to be hoped
for not from ruthless struggle but from a stimulation, deliberate and systematic, of the social
impulse to co-operation. This would hold good of individual nation-states as much as of
individuals in a community. There was an imperative need of developing a feeling of affection
for humanity as a new entity of thought and feeling. The value of stimulating such an impulse
would be two-fold: first; it would counteract the irrational race hatred among nations; and
second, it would promote among them a positive feeling of co-operation for the progress of
humanity as a whole. In the development of this new conception of a man’s or a nation’s
relation to the whole human community, reason or conscious thinking would be of great aid.
The future of humanity, which could be anticipated from a happy co-ordination, in international
politics, of the forces of reason and passion would not be unreal, for the different parts of the
world are being brought close by modern scientific inventions.

Such in brief are the principal ideas and arguments of Human Nature in Politics. Ernest Barker
has noticed in Wallas’s book “a fallacy to derationalise political society because it is not an
explicit organisation of conscious reason.” Other critics, too, have complained that reason does
not receive from Wallas the recognition which is its due as a fundamental factor in organised
social life. Surely it was because of his attempt to persuade the student of politics to revise the
nineteenth-century conception of the role of reason in politics that Wallas is remembered as a
political thinker. We have noticed earlier in this essay that Wallas criticises the tendency among
political scientists and politicians to “exaggerate the intellectuality of mankind.” The main
argument in Human Nature in Politics is that the irrational, the instincts and impulses, play in
the totality of human behaviour and thinking in politics, as in other aspects of life, a part which
is greater than ordinarily realised by political scientists and politicians; that in the light of
modern psychology, and of the author’s personal experience in active politics, the assumption,
held by students of politics generally when the book was published, that political entities have
a base in reason only, or very largely in reason, the process of deliberate, conscious reasoning,
is not an adequate, valid basis of reasoning in politics. We have seen that Wallas also urges that
politics, to become effective in guiding human development in rational manner, should adopt
the quantitative method in reasoning; that reason can, and does, produce in course of time new
tracks of thought, or new entities and instincts in man. Wallas is aware of the power of reason
in making the human type better than what we find him; though reasoning is only one of the
processes of the mind, in human affairs it is the instrument of progress, of new achievement in
civilization. It seems to us that Wallas does not deny or minimise unduly the part played by
reason in politics. In this connection one should remember that Wallas makes a plea for the
idea of the Co-ordination of reason and passion as a moral ideal. This ideal is as old as the
Greeks; Plato, and even more than Plato, Aristotle conceived of such harmony as ideal. What
is significant in Wallas’s suggestion is the point that such a harmony shouldcome neither from
an assumption of the dominance of reason nor from a hatred of the passions, but from a
sufficient realisation of the useful role each can play when combined, under appropriate
conditions, with the other.

Another line of criticism indicated by Barker is that by his insistence on the quantitative method
of enquiry in politics Wallas is running out of the arena of political theory into that of the art of
the practical statesman. Barker seems to think that Wallas requires us to employ in politics the
quantitative method of statistics. What Wallas really means by the quantitative method as
applied to politics is that in an investigation, or piece of reasoning, a student of politics needs
to take into consideration as many facts as to uniformity as well as variations in political
behaviour as might be relevantto the problem under study. Since this is suggested by Wallas as
a necessary condition of effective reasoning especially in the context of modern times, the
method is, as we see it, a concern of the political theorists of today. Barker’s idea that theory
in politics “studies the ‘pure’ instance” which has little to do with the political art of the
practical statesman can no longer be accepted as a rule. A political thinker can hardly think
effectively or purposefully about a subject matter without considering possible results of its
application to conditions of actual life. Wallas is a political theorist in a true sense, for he has a
vision of the future and of the ideal, and at thesame time he enjoins us to study the habits of
ordinary men in politics, for, as Wallas said, theory as a way of understanding must be effective
or useful in a practical way. An exercise in theoretical speculation without meaningful reference
to current political entities need not be regarded as the only kind of essay which deserves to be
classified as a work in political theory.

Wallas is now recognized as a pioneer in the modern socio-psychological approach in politics.

This method had been tried by Gustave Le Bon in his The Crowd, A Study of the Popular Mind,
published in 1900; but the work was, as suggested by the main title, of limited scope. A more
significant study in social psychology was William McDougall’s Introduction to Social
Psychology, published in the same year in which Wallas published his Human Nature in
Politics. McDougall drew attention to the supremacy of instincts and impulses over reason as
prime movers of human action, but he did not study their effects on political inference, nor did
he say how co-ordination of reason and instincts could serve to improve political thinking.
Wallas was a pioneer in the sense that his book was the first important attempt to apply in detail
contemporary psychological knowledge to the institutions of the democratic state. But Wallas
was not merely a pioneer but also a rescuer; he rescued the socio-psychological method from
developing into a cult of loose anti-intellectualism. The latter tendency was strong in
McDougall, who held that reason was secondary and hence a servant of instincts and impulses.
Wallas, on the other hand, did not regard human nature as a bundle of instincts and passions
only; he recognized the role of reason in human progress, in the creation of new social entities.
This point was elaborated further in Wallas’s The Great Society published in 1914; in it he
argued that the instinct to reason as manifested in thinking was, under appropriate conditions,
as original and independent in man as the instinct to run away from danger.

The Great Society was an attempt on Wallas’s part to supply some of the gaps in the
investigations of Human Nature in Polilics. For in the Human Nature Wallas did not deal
exhaustively with many instincts which, under appropriate stimuli, might issue in political
behaviour. For example, Wallas did not study such instincts as sex, self-preservation, self-
abasement and parental affection. And he said little of the effect of his socio-psychological
method on the conceptions of Liberty Rights, Authority, Law, and the State as a type in relation
to other social and political types. In Human Nature Wallas studied human nature in relation to
political environment; the Great Society, as the title signified, depicted human nature against
the wider ground of society as a whole.
What is the relevance of Human Nature in Politics to the present day political problems? The
relevance of the book in this respect seems to lie in its value as an analysis of the danger for all
human activities, especially for the working of democracy, of the “intellectualist assumption”
that every human action is the result of an intellectual process. The experiment of democracy
in Asia and Africa is based on political values developed in Europe and America; the working
of democracy in new areas has either failed or attained only partial success. In India, our three
general elections have shown clearly how easily electoral opinion is moulded by non-rational
forces like casteism, communalism, all forms of sectarianism, love of monetary or other
reward, and the fear of the evil and the wicked, which tend to weaken a democratic polity.
Disappointment with the political parties, which have deliberately aroused the less desirable
instincts among the voters, has, in some quarters, given rise to the idea of a party-less
democracy in India. Those who advocate this change, however, have failed to answer
satisfactorily the question whether parliamentary democracy as envisaged in the present
Constitution can be run without political parties. Would it be possible to keep political parties
away from the village Panchayats? What changes in their organisation are likely to make the
existing political parties better suited to serve the true interests of Indian democracy? These
and similar questions await a socio-psychological probe on the lines indicated by Wallas in
Human Nature in Politics. Wallas’s quantitative method in political reasoning may prove
especially useful in solving, among others, the peculiar problem raised by the introduction of
a scheme for democratic decentralisation side by side state planning of economy in India. A
tendency towards centralisation is implicit in our planning for a Welfare State, but the clamour
for more and more decentralisation of governmental power is growing louder. Both state
planning and democratic decentralisation are novel ideas to the Indian masses; the
psychological demands of a planned economy along with a decentralised democracy might
prove too heavy for our people at the present level of education, political training and economic
condition. We should approach the problem quantitatively, and ask: how much of
decentralisation at what level of the planned development of economy in Indian democracy?
Looking beyond our national frontiers, the problem of peaceful progress of humanity as a
whole looms large before all. The race for empires has, in our times, been replaced by a race
for nuclear armaments of tremendous destructive potentiality. The evil of national egoism has
to be counteracted, in all parts of the world, by a superior faith and intelligent concern for
survival and peaceful progress of humanity as a whole. How to achieve this end is a problem
to be tackled by conscious and systematic effort of thought following the method which
Wallas’s Human Nature in Politics has offered over half a century ago as an antidote to an
overdose of reason or unreason in politics.

Harold Lasswell - "Politics: Who Gets What, When, How"

Harold Lasswell's book "Politics: Who Gets What, When, How" is a seminal work in political
science that delves into the fundamental questions of power, distribution, and decision-
making in politics. Lasswell defines politics as the process of determining "who gets what,
when, and how." This concise definition encapsulates the essence of political activity, focusing
on the allocation of resources, benefits, and authority within society. A central theme in
Lasswell's book is the concept of power and its role in politics. He explores how power is
acquired, exercised, and contested by individuals, groups, and institutions. Lasswell analyzes
different forms of power, including political power, economic power, and social power,
highlighting their interplay in shaping political outcomes.
Lasswell emphasizes the importance of understanding how resources are distributed in society.
He examines the processes through which goods, services, opportunities, and privileges are
allocated among individuals and groups. This analysis sheds light on issues of inequality, social
justice, and economic distribution. Another key aspect of Lasswell's book is the study of
decision-making in politics. He explores how decisions are made, who participates in decision-
making processes, and what factors influence the outcomes of decisions. Lasswell's analysis
considers the role of institutions, interests, ideologies, and values in shaping decision-making
dynamics.
At its broadest, politics concerns the production, distribution and use of resources in the course
of social existence. Politics, in essence, is power: the ability to achieve a desired outcome,
through whatever means. This notion was neatly summed up in the title of Harold Lasswell's
book Politics: Who Gets What, When, How? True, politics is about diversity and conflict, but
this is enriched by the existence of scarcity, by the simple fact that while human needs and
desires are infinite, the resources available to satisfy them are always limited. Politics is
therefore a struggle over scarce resources, and power is the means through which this struggle
is conducted.
Lasswell defined power as the ability to influence others' behavior and decisions. He
emphasized that power can take different forms, including political power, economic power,
social power, and psychological power. This broad definition allowed Lasswell to analyze
power dynamics across different spheres of society.
According to Lasswell, power can derive from various sources, such as: Coercive Power:
Power based on the use of force, threats, or sanctions to compel compliance. Incentive Power:
Power based on offering rewards, benefits, or incentives to induce desired behavior. Normative
Power: Power based on shared values, norms, beliefs, and legitimacy that influence behavior
without coercion or incentives. Expert Power: Power based on knowledge, expertise, skills,
or information that confers influence and authority. Referent Power: Power based on personal
charisma, admiration, or identification with a leader or influential figure.
Lasswell's recognition of these diverse sources of power highlights the complexity of power
dynamics in social and political contexts.
Lasswell discusses different political systems and structures, including democracies,
autocracies, and mixed systems. He examines how these systems function, how power is
exercised within them, and how they respond to societal needs and demands. Lasswell's
comparative approach helps readers understand the diversity of political arrangements across
different contexts. Lasswell also delves into policy analysis and implementation, exploring how
public policies are formulated, implemented, and evaluated. He examines the role of
government agencies, stakeholders, interest groups, and public opinion in shaping policy
outcomes. Lasswell's insights contribute to understanding the complexities of policymaking in
modern societies.
Lasswell viewed democracies as political systems characterized by popular participation,
representation, and accountability. He believed that in democratic systems, power is ideally
distributed among elected representatives who act on behalf of the people. Lasswell
emphasized the importance of free and fair elections, political pluralism, civil liberties, and the
rule of law in sustaining democratic governance.
In terms of power dynamics, Lasswell recognized that democracies involve a balance of power
between different branches of government (such as the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches) and between state and non-state actors (such as political parties, interest groups, and
media). He also acknowledged the influence of public opinion, electoral competition, and
democratic institutions in shaping policy outcomes. Regarding responsiveness to societal needs
and demands, Lasswell argued that democracies have mechanisms for feedback and
accountability that allow them to adjust policies in response to changing circumstances and
public preferences. However, he also acknowledged challenges such as gridlock, polarization,
and the influence of money in politics that can hinder democratic responsiveness
Lasswell's views on autocracies highlight their concentration of power in the hands of a single
individual or ruling elite. He recognized that autocratic systems can take various forms,
including monarchies, dictatorships, and one-party states, each with its own dynamics of power
and governance. Within autocracies, power is often centralized, and decision-making authority
rests with the ruling elite or the leader. Lasswell noted that autocratic regimes may suppress
dissent, limit political competition, and prioritize regime stability over individual liberties and
democratic norms. In terms of responsiveness, Lasswell argued that autocratic systems may be
less responsive to societal needs and demands compared to democracies. The lack of
competitive elections, independent media, and civil society organizations can limit the avenues
for public input and accountability.
Lasswell's work is characterized by its interdisciplinary approach, drawing insights from
political science, sociology, economics, psychology, and other disciplines. This
interdisciplinary perspective enriches the analysis of political phenomena and provides a
comprehensive understanding of the factors influencing political processes.

Foucault
Foucault concept of ‘power/knowledge’

Michel Foucault, the French postmodernist, has been hugely influential in shaping
understandings of power, leading away from the analysis of actors who use power as an
instrument of coercion, and even away from the discreet structures in which those actors
operate, toward the idea that ‘power is everywhere’, diffused and embodied in discourse,
knowledge and ‘regimes of truth’. Conventional understanding of power is ‘restrictive power’.
Foucault gives the idea of ‘Normative Power’. Defining what constitutes normal behaviour in
society. Power for Foucault is what makes us what we are, operating on a quite different level
from other theories. His work marks a radical departure from previous modes of conceiving
power and cannot be easily integrated with previous ideas, as power is diffuse rather than
concentrated, embodied and enacted rather than possessed, discursive rather than purely
coercive, and constitutes agents rather than being deployed by them.
Foucault challenges the idea that power is wielded by people or groups by way of ‘episodic’ or
‘sovereign’ acts of domination or coercion, seeing it instead as dispersed and pervasive. ‘Power
is everywhere’ and ‘comes from everywhere’ so in this sense is neither an agency nor a
structure. Instead it is a kind of ‘metapower’ or ‘regime of truth’ that pervades society, and
which is in constant flux and negotiation. Foucault uses the term ‘power/knowledge’ to signify
that power is constituted through accepted forms of knowledge, scientific understanding
and ‘truth’
Each society has its regime of truth, its “general politics” of truth: that is, the types of discourse
which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one
to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques
and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged
with saying what counts as true
These ‘general politics’ and ‘regimes of truth’ are the result of scientific discourse and
institutions, and are reinforced (and redefined) constantly through the education system, the
media, and the flux of political and economic ideologies. In this sense, the ‘battle for truth’ is
not for some absolute truth that can be discovered and accepted, but is a battle about ‘the rules
according to which the true and false are separated and specific effects of power are attached
to the true’… a battle about ‘the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays’.
Michel Foucault's conception of power revolves around the idea that power is not just a top-
down force exerted by authorities but is intricately woven into social relationships, institutions,
and discourses. He argued that power operates in a decentralized manner, permeating every
aspect of society and shaping individuals' behaviors, beliefs, and identities. Foucault's concept
of power is often referred to as "biopower" or "disciplinary power," emphasizing its role in
regulating bodies and populations. For example, Foucault's analysis of the modern prison
system demonstrates how power is exercised through surveillance, discipline, and
normalization, influencing not only the behavior of inmates but also the broader societal
understanding of crime, punishment, and social control.
According to Foucault, ‘We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in
negative terms: it ‘excludes’, it ‘represses’, it ‘censors’, it ‘abstracts’, it ‘masks’, it ‘conceals’.
In fact power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth.
The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production’
Power is also a major source of social discipline and conformity. In shifting attention away
from the ‘sovereign’ and ‘episodic’ exercise of power, traditionally centred in feudal states to
coerce their subjects, Foucault pointed to a new kind of ‘disciplinary power’ that could be
observed in the administrative systems and social services that were created in 18th century
Europe, such as prisons, schools and mental hospitals. Their systems of surveillance and
assessment no longer required force or violence, as people learned to discipline themselves and
behave in expected ways.
Foucault was fascinated by the mechanisms of prison surveillance, school discipline, systems
for the administration and control of populations, and the promotion of norms about bodily
conduct, including sex. He studied psychology, medicine and criminology and their roles as
bodies of knowledge that define norms of behaviour and deviance.
A key point about Foucault’s approach to power is that it transcends politics and sees power as
an everyday, socialised and embodied phenomenon. This is why state-centric power struggles,
including revolutions, do not always lead to change in the social order. For some, Foucault’s
concept of power is so elusive and removed from agency or structure that there seems to be
little scope for practical action. But he has been hugely influential in pointing to the ways that
norms can be so embedded as to be beyond our perception – causing us to discipline ourselves
without any wilful coercion from others.
Contrary to many interpretations, Foucault believed in possibilities for action and resistance.
He was an active social and political commentator who saw a role for the ‘organic intellectual’.
His ideas about action were, like Hayward’s, concerned with our capacities to recognise and
question socialised norms and constraints. To challenge power is not a matter of seeking some
‘absolute truth’ (which is in any case a socially produced power), but ‘of detaching the power
of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic, and cultural, within which it operates
at the present time’. Discourse can be a site of both power and resistance, with scope to ‘evade,
subvert or contest strategies of power’. According to Foucault, ‘Discourses are not once and
for all subservient to power or raised up against it… We must make allowances for the complex
and unstable process whereby a discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power,
but also a hindrance, a stumbling point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing
strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and
exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to.’

Hans Morgenthau was a prominent political theorist and scholar who is often associated with
the school of thought known as realism in international relations. Morgenthau believed that
power is the primary factor in international politics, and that states must always act to secure
their national interests in a competitive and often hostile world. He argued that power is not
only necessary for a state's survival, but also for maintaining its independence and ability to
pursue its own interests.
Morgenthau believed that human nature is a key factor in shaping international politics, and
that the pursuit of power is a universal human tendency. He argued that states must recognize
this reality and act accordingly, rather than relying on moral principles or appeals to conscience.
Morgenthau believed that the balance of power is a key factor in maintaining international
stability, and that states must constantly seek to balance against potential threats. He argued
that an imbalance of power can lead to aggression and conflict, while a balance of power can
help prevent war and promote stability. Morgenthau was skeptical of the ability of international
law and institutions to prevent conflict or promote peace, arguing that they are often ineffective
in the face of competing national interests and the pursuit of power. He believed that states
must rely on their own power and capabilities to ensure their security and advance their
interests. Morgenthau's realism emphasizes the importance of power and national interests in
international politics, and remains a significant influence on contemporary debates in
international relations theory.
Morgenthau’s views on realism can be understood through his six principles of political realism
as explained below.
1. Politics is governed by objective laws which have their roots in unchanging human
nature.

Human nature is fairly constant and therefore a review of the history of human relations
and actions can help us to know these objective laws. These can be then used for
evaluating the nature of relations. History of human relations can provide us facts for
understanding politics. politics is governed by some objective laws which have their
roots in human nature. By understanding these objective laws, we can understand and
study International Politics. For knowing these objective laws we have to study the
history of human relations. Through this an empirical and rational theory of foreign
policy can be formulated which can guide the actions of states in international relations.
2. Realism perceives the world through the concept of ‘interest defined in terms of power’.

The main sign-post that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of
international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. This concept
provides the link between reason trying to understand international politics and the facts
to be understood. National Interest is always secured by the use of National Power.
Each nation conceptualizes its national interests in terms of power and then acts to
secure these by means of power.

3. Universally, interest is to be defined in terms of power; however, its meaning and

interest may change.

The content of national interest is always changing in nature and scope. It is not static.
It changes with changes in political and social environment. National interest is
dynamic and has to be continuously analyzed for examining the policies and actions of
a state. The kind of interest which determines political action in a particular period of
history depends upon the political and cultural context within which a foreign policy is
formulated.

4. Abstract Moral Principles cannot be applied to Politics.

Realism is a perspective which is aware of moral importance of political action.

Political realism realizes the importance of moral principles but holds that in their
abstract and universal formulations these cannot be applied to state actions. The moral
significance of political action is undisputed but the universal moral principles cannot
be applied to the actions of states, unless these are analyzed in the light of specific
conditions of time and space. Moral principles do not determine policies and actions of
states. These are simply a source of some influence.

5. Moral aspirations of a community or state may not find universal acceptance.

Difference between Moral Aspirations of a Nation and the Universal Moral Principles.
Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the
moral principles that govern the universe. It refuses to accept that the national interests
and policies of any particular nation reflect universally applied moral principles.
 6. As a tradition of thought, realism was distinct in its focus on the autonomy of the
political realm and the decisions made within it.

A political realist always thinks in terms of interest defined as power, as an economist

thinks of interest defined as wealth; the lawyer, of the conformity of action with legal
rules and the moralist, of the conformity of action with moral principles. Political
realism is neither idealistic nor legalistic and nor even moralistic in its approach to
International Politics. It is concerned with national interest defined in terms of power
as its sole concern.

Morton Kaplan
Systems Theory of Morton Kaplan
• It is indeed Morton Kaplan who gave most comprehensive and successful
characterisation of international politics in terms of systems theory.
• He lays greatest stress on the pattern of the behaviour of states. But as the character of
state has been changing since its birth (in its size, objectives, leader¬ship, population, role and
so on), so has the International System been changing correspondingly. International System is
thus never static. The shape system at a particular time reflects the conditions prevailing at that
time.
• Thus, systems approach takes into consideration the action of nations, structure and
functioning of the system, and the environ¬mental factors that not only condition the actions
of nations but also the interaction among them and the working of the system itself. The system
approach covers both the past and present of the International System.
• The international System has various smaller international systems at the lower scale
working as sub-systems or dependent systems. Each sub-system or the dependent system
affects the functioning of the bigger system and vice versa. Thus each system, in addition to
being a system in itself, can be a sub-system of a larger or dominant system.
• Kaplan believes that International System is the most important of all the systems. He
does not regard International System as a poli¬tical system because, in his view, the role of
decision makers in the international system is subordinate to their role in the national domestic
system affirms that the behaviour of the national actors in the field of international affairs is
invariably governed and guided by the basic consecration of national interest.
• He divides international actors into two categories. The first category is that of the
national actors while the second is that of supranational actors. The U.S.A., India, China etc.
are the examples of national actors while the NATO is an example supranational actors.
According to Kaplan, International action takes places between international actors. It is the
interaction between these two types of actors that ultimately gives birth to the International
system.
• Kaplan considers that there are five models major international system : (i) the balance
of power system, (ii) the bipolar system, (iii) the universal actor system, (iv) the hierarchical
international system, and (v) the unit veto system.
(1) Balance of Power System:
Kaplan's balance of power system is similar to the one which prevailed in the Western World
in the 18th and 19th centuries. The actors who work within this system are international actors.
They are also national actors. In this system there should be 5 or 6 essential actors. Before the
First World War England, Germany. France, Italy and the United States etc. were the essential
national actors.
The operation of the balance of power system, according to Kaplan has six instant rules:
(i) Each actor should try to increase its capabilities but through negotiations and not through
war.
(ii) The foremost obligation of each actor must be to itself. It should achieve its national interest
even at the risk of war, if necessary.
(iii) The participant who is threatened of its own existence should stop fighting. It is to ensure
that no essential participant is eliminated altogether.
(iv) The participant should oppose any coalition of other partici¬pants in order to avoid
predominance of that group in relation to the rest of the system.
(v) The participant should prevent other participants from sub¬scribing to the supranational
principles, and
(vi) The defeated participants should be permitted to re-enter the system.
The balance of power system worked in the 18th and 19th centuries as an absolute system and
it appeared as a rule of universal applicabi¬lity. But this system has undergone a change as a
result of the world wars. Mrs Indira Gandhi also spoke of this concept as a thing of the past
while speaking on the role of the U.S.A. in the Indo-Pak War of December, 1971.
When the participants in the system, individually or collectively, do not play according to these
six rules, the system becomes unstable. The moment this system becomes unstable, it is bound
to be changed into a different system.
(2) The Bipolar System:
According to Kaplan, the unstable balance of power system changes itself into a bipolar system.
This change occurs if two national actors and their co-operating actors come to constitute
dominance over two different blocs. Kaplan conceives of two types of bipolar system.
(a) The loose bipolar system and (b) the tight bipolar system.
(a) The Loose Bipolar System:
It means roughly what we see in the modern world. The two super-powers are surrounded by
a group of smaller powers and non-aligned States. The existence of non-aligned States makes
the lower of the two major actors loose. The loose bipolar system differs from the balance of
power system in many ways.
(i) Both the supranational actors and the national actors partici¬pate in the loose bipolar system.
(ii) Supranational actors are divided into a sub-class of bloc actors like, NATO, CENTO, the
Communist Bloc, and into universal actors like the United Nations. In the loose bipolar system,
each bloc has leading actor.
(iii) The norms of the system among the actors differ according to their roles.
Thus the loose bipolar system is characterised by the presence of two major bloc actors (Soviet
Union and the U.S.A.), non-member actors (the Non-aligned States) and the universal actor
(U.N.).
All of them perform unique and distinctive role within the system. This system has a great
degree of inherent instability because the action of non-member actors is rarely of decisive
importance.
(b) The Tight Bipolar System:
The loose bipolar system will be transformed, according to Kaplan, into tight bipolar system.
In this system, the non-aligned states, will disappear and the system will operate only around
two super blocs.
But its stability will be guaranteed only when both bloc actors are hierarchically organised,
otherwise the system will again revert to the loose bipolar system. The most important thing
about the tight bipolar system is the virtual disappearance of the category of non-member
national actors and the universal actor (U.N.)
(3) The Universal Actor System:
The Universal Actor System comes into existence with the extension of functions of essential
actors in a Loose Bipolar System. The most striking feature of this system is that even though
the national actors constantly try for more power, they are prevented effectively from going to
war with each other by the U.N.
So this system envisages that the universal actor (the United Nations) is sufficiently powerful
to prevent war among national actors. But the national actors retain their individuality. The
universal international system will be an integrated system.
It will possess integrated mechanism and will perform judicial, economic, political and
administrative functions. National actors will try to achieve their objectives only within the
framework of the universal actor.
The national actors will use only peaceful means to get their objectives in view of the fact that
the universal actor will be quite powerful to prevent national actors to resort to force.
National interest will have to be subordinated to international objectives like peace and
existence of humanity. This system is not likely to be achieved under the present circumstances.
A long spell of instability is bound to precede the establishment of this type of system.
(4) Hierarchical International System:
It is a system in which practically the whole of the world, except one nation, is brought under
the control of one universal actor.
So, in this system; the universal actor absorbs practically the whole of the world except only
one nation. The hierarchical international system can be both directive and non- directive.
It will be directive if it is formed as a consequence of world conquest by a national actor like
Nazi system. The national actors lose their primary function of transmitting the rules of the
national systems.
The states become merely territorial sub-division of the system instead of being independent
political systems. Once established, it will be impossible to displace this system.
On the other hand, it will be non-directive if it is based on political rules generally operative in
democracies. As a result, there will be great tension in a directive hierarchical system than in a
non-directive system.

(5) Unit Veto System:

In this system weapons play the most important role. Unit Veto System is possible only under
the condition that ail actors (states) possess such weapons individually as to destroy any other
actor even though it cannot avoid its own destruction.
It conceives of weapons of such a nature that any national actor can destroy any other before
being destroyed itself. This is a very peculiar system, and corresponds to the State of nature
described by Hobbes in which interests of all are opposed and in which all are at war with one
another.
The essence of this system is that each State will be equally able to destroy each other. The
only condition in which such a system is possible is the possession by all actors of the weapons
of such a nature that any actor is able to destroy any other actor, even though at the risk of its
own destruction. In this system, however, universal actor cannot exist.
Criticism
1. The balance of power system worked in the 18th and 19th centuries and is still working in
some form or the other. Like-wise, the loose bipolar system is also in operation. But the other
four models pertain to future and may never come into operation. Kaplan makes only a
prediction and to this extent his theory is defective.
2. Kaplan believes that the balance of power system passes into loose bipolar system and then
into tight bipolar system which in turn transforms itself into universal, international and then
into hierarchical international system. But at present, in the age of loose bipolar system the
trends are in favour of the stability of non-aligned States rather than in that of their
disappearance. The Super-power blocs are experiencing intra-bloc dissensions represented in
the most acute form by China's defection from the Soviet bloc and the critical attitude of France
adopted towards the U.S.A.
3. Kaplan’s theory appears to be wrong also because he envisages the transformation of the
universal actor system into the hierarchical international system in which only one nation will
be left as the universal actor. Such a transformation is possible only in the revival of
imperialism and colonialism. The possibility of such a revival means misunderstanding the
entire process of international politics.
4. Kaplan does not discuss the forces which determine the scale of nation's behaviour. He omits
altogether the forces and factors at work wit is in the State. He also does not take into account
the factors and conditions which lead nations to behave collectively. He also ignores how
national interests affect the behaviour of States. This is a serious omission from the point of
view of the completeness of the system.
5. The theory fails to give the exact number of international systems. It is not clear whether all
the nations form one international system or they form several participating systems. We also
hear of the Communist System, Latin American System and so on. Our approach is likely to
be affected by our own views in this regard.
6. Suppose there is only one international System. Then it must react with the environment.
But what is the environment in that case- only outer space? Is it possible for this international
system to react with outer space?

Immanuel Wallerstein

World-systems theory
• "World-system" refers to the inter-regional and transnational division of labour, which
divides the world into core countries, semi-periphery countries, and the periphery
countries. Core countries focus on higher skill, capital-intensive production, and the
rest of the world focuses on low-skill, labour-intensive production and extraction of raw
materials. This constantly reinforces the dominance of the core countries. Nonetheless,
the system has dynamic characteristics, in part as a result of revolutions in
transport technology, and individual states can gain or lose their core (semi-periphery,
periphery) status over time.
• Immanuel Wallerstein has developed the best-known version of world-systems
analysis, beginning in the 1970s. Wallerstein sees the development of the capitalist
world economy as detrimental to a large proportion of the world's population. World-
systems thinkers include Samir Amin, Giovanni Arrighi, Andre Gunder Frank,
and Immanuel Wallerstein.

Dependency theory
• World-systems analysis builds upon but also differs fundamentally from dependency
theory. While accepting world inequality, the world market and imperialism as
fundamental features of historical capitalism, Wallerstein broke with orthodox
dependency theory's central proposition. For Wallerstein, core countries do not exploit
poor countries for two basic reasons.
• Firstly, core capitalists exploit workers in all zones of the capitalist world economy (not
just the periphery) and therefore, the crucial redistribution between core and periphery
is surplus value, not "wealth" or "resources" abstractly conceived.
• Secondly, core states do not exploit poor states, as dependency theory proposes, because
capitalism is organised around an inter-regional and transnational division of labour
rather than an international division of labour.
• From a largely Weberian perspective, Fernando Henrique Cardoso described the main
tenets of dependency theory as follows:

➢ There is a financial and technological penetration of the periphery and semi-periphery

countries by the developed capitalist core countries.

➢ That produces an unbalanced economic structure within the peripheral societies and
between them and the central countries.

➢ That leads to limitations upon self-sustained growth in the periphery.

➢ That helps the appearance of specific patterns of class relations.

➢ They require modifications in the role of the state to guarantee the functioning of the
economy and the political articulation of a society, which contains, within itself, foci of
inarticulateness and structural imbalance.

• Dependency and world system theory propose that the poverty and backwardness of
poor countries are caused by their peripheral position in the international division of
labour. Since the capitalist world system evolved, the distinction between the central
and the peripheral nations has grown and diverged.In recognizing a tripartite pattern in
division of labour, world-systems analysis criticized dependency theory with its
bimodal system of only cores and peripheries.
• Wallerstein defines four temporal features of the world system. Cyclical
rhythms represent the short-term fluctuation of economy, and secular trends mean
deeper long run tendencies, such as general economic growth or decline. The
term contradiction means a general controversy in the system, usually concerning some
short term versus long term trade-offs. For example, the problem of under consumption,
wherein the driving down of wages increases the profit for capitalists in the short term,
but in the long term, the decreasing of wages may have a crucially harmful effect by
reducing the demand for the product. The last temporal feature is the crisis: a crisis
occurs if a constellation of circumstances brings about the end of the system.
• World-systems analysis argues that capitalism, as a historical system, has always
integrated a variety of labour forms within a functioning division of labour (world
economy). Countries do not have economies but are part of the world economy. Far
from being separate societies or worlds, the world economy manifests a
tripartite division of labour, with core, semi peripheral and peripheral zones. In the core
zones, businesses, with the support of states they operate within, monopolise the most
profitable activities of the division of labour.
• Proponents of world-systems analysis see the world stratification system the same
way Karl Marx viewed class (ownership versus non ownership of the means of
production) and Max Weber viewed class (which, in addition to ownership, stressed
occupational skill level in the production process). The core nations primarily own and
 control the major means of production in the world and perform the higher-level
production tasks. The periphery nations own very little of the world's means of
production (even when they are located in periphery nations) and provide less-skilled
labour. Like a class system with a nation, class positions in the world economy result
in an unequal distribution of rewards or resources. The core nations receive the greatest
share of surplus production, and periphery nations receive the smallest share.
Furthermore, core nations are usually able to purchase raw materials and other goods
from non-core nations at low prices and demand higher prices for their exports to non-
core nations.
• Chirot (1986) lists the five most important benefits coming to core nations from their
domination of periphery nations:Access to a large quantity of raw material, Cheap
labour, Enormous profits from direct capital investments, A market for exports and
Skilled professional labour through migration of these people from the non-core to the
core.

Core nations
➢ Are the most economically diversified, wealthy, and powerful (economically and
militarily)

➢ Have strong central governments, controlling extensive bureaucracies and powerful

militaries

➢ Have stronger and more complex state institutions that help manage economic affairs
internally and externally

➢ Have a sufficient tax base so state institutions can provide infrastructure for a strong
economy

➢ Highly industrialised and produce manufactured goods rather than raw materials for
export

➢ Increasingly tend to specialise in information, finance and service industries

➢ More often in the forefront of new technologies and new industries

➢ Has strong bourgeois and working classes

➢ Have significant means of influence over non-core nations

➢ Relatively independent of outside control

Throughout the history of the modern world system, there has been a group of core nations
competing with one another for access to the world's resources, economic dominance
and hegemony over periphery nations. Occasionally, there has been one core nation with clear
dominance over others. According to Immanuel Wallerstein, a core nation is dominant over all
the others when it has a lead in three forms of economic dominance over a period of time:
 1. Productivity dominance allows a country to produce products of greater quality at a
cheaper price, compared to other countries.

2. Productivity dominance may lead to trade dominance. Now, there is a favourable

balance of trade for the dominant nation since more countries are buying the products
of the dominant country than buying from them.

3. Trade dominance may lead to financial dominance. Now, more money is coming into
the country than going out. Bankers of the dominant nation tend to receive more control
of the world's financial resources.

Military dominance is also likely after a nation reaches these three rankings. However, it has
been posited that throughout the modern world system, no nation has been able to use its
military to gain economic dominance. Each of the past dominant nations became dominant
with fairly small levels of military spending and began to lose economic dominance with
military expansion later on. Historically, cores were found in North-western Europe (England,
France, and Netherlands) but were later in other parts of the world (such as the United States).
Peripheral nations
• Are the least economically diversified

• Have relatively weak governments

• Have relatively weak institutions, with tax bases too small to support infrastructure
development

• Tend to depend on one type of economic activity, often by extracting and exporting raw
materials to core nations

• Tend to be the least industrialised

• Are often targets for investments

from multinational (or transnational) corporations from core nations that come into the
country to exploit cheap unskilled labour for export back to core nations

• Have small bourgeois and large peasant classes

• Tend to have populations with high percentages of poor and uneducated people

• Tend to have very high social inequality because of small upper classes that own most
of the land and have profitable ties to multinational corporations

• Tend to be extensively influenced by core nations and their multinational corporations

and often forced to follow economic policies that help core nations and harm the long-
term economic prospects of peripheral nations.

Historically, peripheries were found outside Europe, such as in Latin America and today in sub-
Saharan Africa.
Semi peripheral nations
Semi peripheral nations are those that are midway between the core and periphery. Thus, they
have to keep themselves from falling to the category of peripheral nations and at the same time,
they strive to join the category of core nations. Therefore, they tend to apply protectionist
policies most aggressively among the three categories of nations. They tend to be countries
moving towards industrialization and more diversified economies. Those regions often have
relatively developed and diversified economies but are not dominant in international
trade. They tend to export more to peripheral nations and import more from core nations in
trade.

According to some scholars, such as Chirot, they are not as subject to outside manipulation as
peripheral societies; but according to others (Barfield), they have "peripheral-like" relations to
the core. While in the sphere of influence of some cores, semi peripheries also tend to exert
their own control over some peripheries. Further, semi-peripheries act as buffers between cores
and peripheries and thus "partially deflect the political pressures which groups primarily
located in peripheral areas might otherwise direct against core-states" and stabilise the world
system.
Semi-peripheries can come into existence from developing peripheries and declining cores. In
the 21st century, nations like Brazil, Russia, India, Israel, China, South Korea and South Africa
(BRICS) are usually considered semi peripheral.
Criticisms
➢ World-systems theory has attracted criticisms from its rivals; notably for being too
focused on economy and not enough on culture and for being too core-centric and state-
centric.
➢ The positivists criticise the approach as too prone to generalization, lacking quantitative
data and failing to put forth a falsifiable proposition.
 ➢ Orthodox Marxists find the world-systems approach deviating too far from orthodox
Marxist principles, such as by not giving enough weight to the concept of social class.
➢ The state autonomists criticize the theory for blurring the boundaries between state and
businesses. Further, the positivists, the orthodox Marxists and the state autonomists
argue that state should be the central unit of analysis. Finally, the culturists argue that
world-systems theory puts too much importance on the economy and not enough on the
culture.
➢
Robert Brenner has pointed out that the prioritization of the world market means the
neglect of local class structures and class strugglesAnother criticism is that of
reductionism made by Theda Skocpol: she believes the interstate system is far from
being a simple superstructure of the capitalist world economy: "The international states
system as a transnational structure of military competition was not originally created
by capitalism. Throughout modern world history, it represents an analytically
autonomous level of world capitalism, but is not reducible to it."

Fareed Zakaria
Fareed Zakaria's idea of "illiberal democracy"

Democratically elected regimes, often ones that have been reelected or reaffirmed through
referenda, are routinely ignoring constitutional limits on their power and depriving their
citizens of basic rights and freedoms. From Peru to the Palestinian Authority, from Sierra Leone
to Slovakia, from Pakistan to the Philippines, we see the rise of a disturbing phenomenon in
international life— illiberal democracy.
Suppose the election was declared free and fair and those elected are “racists, fascists,
separatists, who are publicly opposed to peace and reintegration. That is the dilemma. In the
West, democracy has meant liberal democracy—a political system marked not only by free and
fair elections, but also by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic
liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property.
“Liberalism, either as a conception of political liberty, or as a doctrine about economic policy,
may have coincided with the rise of democracy. But it has never been immutably or
unambiguously linked to its practice.” Today the two strands of liberal democracy, interwoven
in the Western political fabric, are coming apart in the rest of the world. Democracy is
flourishing; constitutional liberalism is not. Half of the “democratizing” countries in the world
today are illiberal democracies. Many countries are settling into a form of government that
mixes a substantial degree of democracy with a substantial degree of illiberalism.
If a country holds competitive, multiparty elections, we call it democratic. When public
participation in politics is increased, for example through the enfranchisement of women, it is
seen as more democratic. Constitutional liberalism, on the other hand, is not about the
procedures for selecting government, but rather government’s goals. It refers to the tradition,
deep in Western history, that seeks to protect an individual’s autonomy and dignity against
coercion, whatever the source— state, church, or society. The term marries two closely
connected ideas. It is liberal because it draws on the philosophical strain, beginning with the
Greeks, that emphasizes individual liberty. It is constitutional because it rests on the tradition,
beginning with the Romans, of the rule of law.
Since 1945 Western governments have, for the most part, embodied both democracy and
constitutional liberalism. Thus it is difficult to imagine the two apart, in the form of either
illiberal democracy or liberal autocracy. Constitutional liberalism has led to democracy, but
democracy does not seem to bring constitutional liberalism. In contrast to the Western and East
Asian paths, during the last two decades in Latin America, Africa, and parts of Asia,
dictatorships with little background in constitutional liberalism have given way to democracy.
John Stuart Mill opened his classic On Liberty by noting that as countries became democratic,
people tended to believe that “too much importance had been attached to the limitation of
power itself. That . . . was a response against rulers whose interests were opposed to those of
the people.” Once the people were themselves in charge, caution was unnecessary. “The nation
did not need to be protected against its own will.” As if confirming Mill’s fears, consider the
words of Alexandr Lukashenko after being elected president of Belarus with an overwhelming
majority in a free election in 1994, when asked about limiting his powers: “There will be no
dictatorship. I am of the people, and I am going to be for the people.”
The tension between constitutional liberalism and democracy centers on the scope of
governmental authority. Constitutional liberalism is about the limitation of power, democracy
about its accumulation and use. For this reason, many eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
liberals saw in democracy a force that could undermine liberty. James Madison explained in
The Federalist that “the danger of oppression” in a democracy came from “the majority of the
community.” Tocqueville warned of the “tyranny of the majority,” writing, “The very essence
of democratic government consists in the absolute sovereignty of the majority.”
The tendency for a democratic government to believe it has absolute sovereignty (that is,
power) can result in the centralization of authority, often by extraconstitutional means and with
grim results. Over the last decade, elected governments claiming to represent the people have
steadily encroached on the powers and rights of other elements in society, a usurpation that is
both horizontal (from other branches of the national government) and vertical (from regional
and local authorities as well as private businesses and other nongovernmental groups)
Many Western governments and scholars have encouraged the creation of strong and
centralized states in the Third World. Leaders in these countries have argued that they need the
authority to break down feudalism, split entrenched coalitions, override vested interests, and
bring order to chaotic societies. But this confuses the need for a legitimate government with
that for a powerful one. Governments that are seen as legitimate can usually maintain order
and pursue tough policies, albeit slowly, by building coalitions. After all, few claim that
governments in developing countries should not have adequate police powers; the trouble
comes from all the other political, social, and economic powers that they accumulate. In crises
like civil wars, constitutional governments might not be able to rule effectively, but the
alternative— states with vast security apparatuses that suspend constitutional rights—has
usually produced neither order nor good government. More often, such states have become
predatory, maintaining some order but also arresting opponents, muzzling dissent, nationalizing
industries, and confiscating property. While anarchy has its dangers, the greatest threats to
human liberty and happiness in this century have been caused not by disorder but by brutally
strong, centralized states, like Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and Maoist China. The Third
World is littered with the bloody handiwork of strong states.
Fareed Zakaria's analysis of "illiberal democracy" in his book "The Future of Freedom"
concludes with a cautionary note about the potential dangers of democratic systems that lack
strong liberal institutions and protections. He argues that while democracy is essential for
political participation and accountability, it must be accompanied by robust liberal values such
as the rule of law, protection of individual rights, independent judiciary, and a free press.
Without these liberal safeguards, Zakaria warns that democracies can devolve into "illiberal
democracies" where majority rule tramples on minority rights, institutions become weak or
corrupt, and personal freedoms are eroded. Zakaria advocates for a balance between democracy
and liberalism, emphasizing the importance of checks and balances, constitutional protections,
and a vibrant civil society to safeguard democratic values and prevent the rise of
authoritarianism in the guise of democracy.

John Rawls

John Rawls was born in Baltimore, Maryland, in 1921. After graduating with a degree in
philosophy in 1943, he enlisted in the Army and served in the South Pacific for two years in
an infantry intelligence unit. After his discharge from the Army following the war, he
returned to Princeton and pursued an advanced degree in philosophy under the GI Bill of
Rights. He earned his PhD in 1948. Rawls was mainly an academic man, involved in abstract
thinking and writing. During the Vietnam War, however, he led an effort at Harvard that
questioned the fairness of student military draft deferments. Why, he asked, should college
students, many with social and economic advantages, avoid the draft while others without
these advantages had to go to war? He preferred a lottery system, which the United States
eventually adopted late in the Vietnam War. During the 1960s, he mainly concentrated on
writing A Theory of Justice, published in 1971. This complex work attempted to develop
standards or principles of social justice that could apply to real societies.

Justice as Fairness
Rawls called his concept of social justice "Justice as Fairness." It consists of two principles.
Since he first published A Theory of Justice, he changed the wording of these principles
several times. He published his last version in 2001.
The First Principle of social justice concerns political institutions:
Each person has the same and indefeasible [permanent] claim to a fully adequate
scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of
liberties for all.

This principle means that everyone has the same basic liberties, which can never be taken
away. Rawls included most of the liberties in the U.S. Bill of Rights, such as freedom of
speech and due process of law. He added some liberties from the broader area of human
rights, like freedom of travel. Rawls recognized the right of private individuals, corporations,
or workers to own private property. But he omitted the right to own the "means of
production" (e.g., mines, factories, farms). He also left out the right to inherit wealth. These
things were not basic liberties in his view.
Rawls agreed that basic liberties could be limited, but "only for the sake of liberty." Thus,
curbing the liberties of an intolerant group that intended to harm the liberties of others may be
justified.
The Second Principle of social justice concerns social and economic institutions:
Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions:
first, they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair
equality of opportunity; and
second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society
(the Difference Principle).
This Second Principle focused on equality. Rawls realized that a society could not avoid
inequalities among its people. Inequalities result from such things as one's inherited
characteristics, social class, personal motivation, and even luck. Even so, Rawls insisted that
a just society should find ways to reduce inequalities in areas where it can act.
By "offices and positions" in his Second Principle, Rawls meant especially the best jobs in
private business and public employment. He said that these jobs should be "open" to
everyone by the society providing "fair equality of opportunity." One way for a society to do
this would be to eliminate discrimination. Another way would be to provide everyone easy
access to education.
The most controversial element of his theory of social justice was his Difference Principle.
He first defined it in a 1968 essay. "All differences in wealth and income, all social and
economic inequalities," he wrote, "should work for the good of the least favored."
Later, when he wrote A Theory of Justice, he used the phrase, "least-advantaged members of
society" to refer to those at the bottom of economic ladder. These might be unskilled
individuals, earning the lowest wages in the society.
Under the Difference Principle, Rawls favored maximizing the improvement of the "least-
advantaged" group in society. He would do this not only by providing "fair equality of
opportunity," but also by such possible ways as a guaranteed minimum income or minimum
wage (his preference). Rawls agreed that this Difference Principle gave his theory of social
justice a liberal character.
Finally, Rawls ranked his principles of social justice in the order of their priority. The First
Principle ("basic liberties") holds priority over the Second Principle. The first part of the
Second Principle ("fair equality of opportunity") holds priority over the second part
(Difference Principle). But he believed that both the First and Second Principles together are
necessary for a just society.
The "Thought Experiment"
Rawls was interested in political philosophy. Thus he focused on the basic institutions of
society. Unless such institutions as the constitution, economy, and education system operated
in a fair way for all, he argued, social justice would not exist in a society.
Rawls set out to discover an impartial way to decide what the best principles for a just society
were. He reached back several hundred years to philosophers like John Locke and Jean
Jacques Rousseau who had developed the idea of a social contract.
Locke and Rousseau had written that people in the distant past had formed a contract between
themselves and their leader. The people would obey their leader, usually a king, and he would
guarantee their natural rights. This would be the basis for a just society. Thomas Jefferson
relied on this social contract idea in writing the Declaration of Independence.
By the 20th century, most philosophers had dismissed the social contract as a quaint myth.
Rawls, however, revived the social contract concept of people agreeing what constitutes a just
society.
Rawls devised a hypothetical version of the social contract. Some have called it a "thought
experiment" (Rawls called it the "Original Position"). This was not a real gathering with
real people, bargaining over an agreement. Instead, it was an imaginary meeting held under
strict conditions that permitted individuals to deliberate only by using their reason and logic.
Their task was to evaluate principles of social justice and choose the best ones. Their decision
would be binding on their society forever.
Rawls added a requirement to assure that the choice of social justice principles would truly be
impartial. The persons in this mental exercise had to choose their justice principles under a
"veil of ignorance." This meant that these individuals would know nothing about their
particular positions in society. It was as if some force had plucked these people from a society
and caused them to experience severe amnesia.
Under the "veil of ignorance," these imaginary people would not know their own age, sex,
race, social class, religion, abilities, preferences, life goals, or anything else about themselves.
They would also be ignorant of the society from which they came. They would, however,
have general knowledge about how such institutions as economic systems and governments
worked.
Rawls argued that only under a "veil of ignorance" could human beings reach a fair and
impartial agreement (contract) as true equals not biased by their place in society. They would
have to rely only on the human powers of reason to choose principles of social justice for
their society.
Rawls set up his "thought experiment" with several given systems of social justice principles.
The task of the imaginary group members under the "veil of ignorance" was to choose one
system of principles for their own society.

Rawls was mainly interested to see what choice the group would make between his own
Justice as Fairness concept and another called "Average Utility." This concept of justice
called for maximizing the average wealth of the people.

Making the Choice

The fictional persons in the experiment, using their powers of reason and logic, would first
have to decide what most people in most societies want. Rawls reasoned that rational human
beings would choose four things, which he called the "primary goods":• wealth and income
• rights and liberties • opportunities for advancement • self-respect

In the next and crucial step, the participants would have to decide how a society should go
about justly distributing these "primary goods" among its people.
Clearly, designing economic, political, and social institutions that favored the "most
advantaged" members of the society would not be justice for all. On the other hand, the
members of the experiment group would rationally agree that equal rights and liberties,
opportunities, and self-respect for all would be just.
But what about everyone having equal wealth and income? Rawls was sure the parties would
reasonably conclude that some (but not extreme) inequality of wealth and income is
necessary in a just society. Entrepreneurs, innovators, and leaders should be rewarded for
working to improve the economy and wealth of the society.
Similarly, Rawls believed the persons in his experiment would rationally choose principles of
social justice that maximized benefits for the "least advantaged." The individuals under the
"veil of ignorance" do not know what position they really occupy in their society. Any one of
them might be Bill Gates or an unemployed high school dropout.
To be on the safe side, Rawls maintained, the rational-thinking members of the imaginary
group would choose the principles of justice that most benefited those at the bottom. In this
way, Rawls believed, he had demonstrated that his Justice as Fairness principles, skewed
toward the "least advantaged," were the best for building or reforming institutions for a just
society.
Rawls did not think the United States was yet a just society since it did not satisfy his
Difference Principle. To Rawls, wealth and power in the United States were concentrated too
much in the hands of the "most advantaged."
 Amartya Sen

What is justice? What does a just society look like? And what principles should guide us there?
These questions have occupied an entire tradition - the dominant tradition - of political
philosophy, led above all by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacque Rousseau, Immanuel
Kant, and among contemporary philosophers by John Rawls and Robert Nozick. But ask
Amartya Sen and he will tell you they are precisely the wrong ones to ask. In his most recent
book, The Idea of Justice, he argues that this traditional strain of political philosophy, which
seeks to identify ‘the just’, or a single set of just principles that can then be used to design
perfectly just institutions for governing society, reveals little about how we can identify and
reduce injustices in the here and now.

According to Sen, the dominant approach, which he refers to as ‘transcendental

institutionalism’, is beleaguered by two central problems: the problem of feasibility and the
problem of redundancy. The first is a result of the practical difficulty, even impossibility, of
arriving at a single set of principles that can help us to select just institutions through a process
of impartial reasoning. In Rawls’ theory of justice, for instance, his two lexically ordered
principles of justice are, it is argued, those that would be unanimously selected through an
impartial decision procedure - through the hypothetical original position using the ‘veil of
ignorance’ device. These principles then provide the basis for choosing actual institutions in
the ‘legislative stage’. Clearly, however, much depends on the assumption that Rawls’ two
principles of justice are those that would indeed emerge from the original position. And Sen is
skeptical that this is so.

In fact, Sen maintains that there are many principles that can pass the test of impartiality. He
illustrates this point, first, using an anecdote about the competing claims of three children over
the distribution of a single flute. One child argues that they should receive the flute because
they are the best flautist; the second, because they are the poorest of the lot; and the third,
because they crafted the flute without help from the others. The three arguments are based, in
turn, on principles of utility, economic equity, and the entitlement to the fruits of one’s unaided
efforts. Each can be defended with strong, impartial arguments. And, returning to Rawls, it is
similarly possible, for example, to provide substantial reasons for selecting Harsanyi’s
utilitarian principle in the place of Rawls’ maximin principle as the basis for resolving
distributional questions within a situation similar to the original position.
But this indeterminacy has profound implications for Rawls’ theory of justice, for ‘if there is
no unique emergence of a given set of principles of justice that together identify the institutions
needed for the basic structure of society, then the entire procedure of justice as fairness, as
developed in Rawls’ classic theory, would be hard to use’. Sen even suggests that Rawls’ basic
claim about the emergence of a unique set of principles of justice from the original position (as
defended in A Theory of Justice) was considerably qualified in his later writings, such as The
Law of Peoples, and that accepting the full implications of these qualifications would mean
abandoning the stage-by-stage theory of justice.

The second problem - the redundancy problem - is that the identification of fully just social
arrangements is neither a necessary nor sufficient guide to reasoned choice of just policies,
strategies or institutions. It is insufficient because, as Sen explains, ‘the characterization of
spotless justice, even if such a characterization were to emerge clearly, would not entail any
delineation whatsoever of how diverse departures from spotlessness would be compared and
ranked’. In other words, using an analogy with paintings, the fact that a person regards Da
Vinci’s Mona Lisa as the most perfect picture in the world does not reveal anything about how
they would rank a Picasso against a Van Gogh. But it is also unnecessary because in
adjudicating between the various merits of a Picasso and a Van Gogh there is no reason to
identify the most perfect picture in the world, just as when determining the relative heights of
Mount Kilimanjaro and Mount McKinley knowing that Mount Everest is taller than both is an
entirely redundant fact.

In contrast to transcendental institutionalism, Sen advocates what he calls a ‘realization-

focused comparative approach’. In doing so, he sides with thinkers such as Adam Smith,
Marquis de Condorcet, Jeremy Bentham, Mary Wollstonecraft, Karl Marx, and JS Mill, among
others, who each attempted to evaluate the desirability of particular ‘social realizations’, rather
than search for a set of perfectly just first principles. It may not be possible to agree on perfectly
just institutions, but, Sen contends, using a comparative approach we can at least arrive at
widespread consensus on the injustice of certain practices or outcomes relative to others.

Such a comparative approach to questions of justice, he believes, is closely aligned with social
choice theory, one of the many fields in which Sen made his mark as an economist, earning
him a Nobel-prize in 1998. Social choice theory assumes that, like the plurality of impartial
principles of justice that can plausibly sustain critical scrutiny, there can be a variety of
competing principles that figure in our assessments of various social orderings. And while it
may sometimes appear to be impossible to satisfy all or even most of these competing
principles at once - as in Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem, for example - such impasses
can often be resolved by incorporating more information about interpersonal comparisons of
well-being and relative advantages. Similarly, Sen insists, ‘for an adequate understanding of
the demands of justice, the needs of social organizations and institutions, and the satisfactory
making of public policies, we have to seek much more information and scrutinizing evidence’.
This, in particular, is something that Sen believes that Rawls’ theory does not do well. Sen
offers Rawls’ use of the original position as an example of what he calls ‘closed impartiality’.
The ‘veil of ignorance’ device is, Sen admits, a useful, if hypothetical, way of reaching an
impartial social choice, free of various vested interests. But it does not ensure the open scrutiny
of the values of the people within the original position. The vast plurality of alternative views
held by outsiders - their unique moral perspectives and rankings of social realizations that can
reveal hidden biases in our choice of basic principles - are simply beyond the scope of Rawls’
theory. Furthermore, by limiting moral claims of outsiders we may be doing an injustice to
those that fall outside the artificially closed circle of the original position.

Sen contrasts this example of ‘closed impartiality’ with the ‘open impartiality’ of Adam Smith’s
‘impartial spectator’. Smith’s reflective device, which asks us to observe our actions and
institutions from the standpoint of an outsider, specifically refrains from limiting the extent to
which the views of others can be considered, refusing to confine moral discussion within the
boundaries of a nation-state or any other locality. And, as in social choice theory, such openness
to, and critical reflection upon, alternative views and different ways of approaching social
problems, Sen believes, can provide a more solid ground for ranking the ‘just-ness’ or, at least,
manifest injustice of certain social realizations, even if they are merely partial and ordinal rather
than comprehensive, cardinal rankings.

Of course, an engagement with contrary arguments does not imply that we will be able to arrive
at agreed positions on every issue (and Sen does not see this as a drawback in his theory - not
at all), nor does it oblige us to accept any of them. But there is a connection between what Sen
calls the ‘objectivity’ of an ethical judgment and its ability to withstand open public scrutiny.
Sen thus underscores the importance of public reasoning for justice throughout the book, and
he regards democracy, especially when understood as ‘government by discussion’ rather than
the Schumpeterian ‘government by elections’, as a particularly appropriate form of public
reasoning, which can serve to increase the ‘objectivity’ of political solutions.

Without doubt, the argument Sen presents in the The Idea of Justice deserves to be seriously
considered by contemporary political philosophers and lay-readers alike. It commands respect,
for even if it fails to convince it will surely sharpen the arguments of others. Much of what
passes for philosophy, including political philosophy, has been repeatedly accused of being
irrelevant to the real choices and concerns of those outside of philosophy departments. And in
The Idea of Justice Sen presents a serious challenge to those departments, forcing them to prove
their relevance and demonstrate how they can actually inform tough decision-making.

However, if we are convinced by Sen’s argument, this raises interesting questions about the
role of the philosopher and their claim to any authority or special knowledge. According to
Sen, ‘philosophers’ should not - and cannot - strive to become the architects of castles in the
sky. Instead, he asks us all to start right at the foundations: to share, explore, and debate our
perspectives on how to repair the edifices in which we currently live. Justice arises not from a
blueprint, but from a process of open public reasoning in which as many potential policies,
strategies or institutions are considered as possible. However, in this process it is not clear that
the people who currently occupy philosophy departments have any special standing. They
become, according to Sen, purveyors rather than adjudicators of wisdom, on an even standing
with economists, doctors, scientists and lawyers, with whom they should collaborate intensely.
Sen’s Philosopher turns out to be anyone willing to cross boundaries, willing to explore
alternative ways of thinking and living across disciplines, communities and time. What matters
is that people know more about what’s out there and make more informed choices - that they
are smarter - because, for Sen, smarter is better.

Francis Fukuyama

The End of History and the Last Man by political scientist Francis Fukuyama is a widely read
and controversial book on political philosophy published in 1992. In it, Fukuyama argues that
the end of the Cold War in 1991 established Western liberal democracy as the final and most
successful form of government, thus marking the conclusion of “mankind’s ideological
evolution.”
The book asserts that the end of the Cold War signals the end of history. The term “history”
does not refer to a series of events, which, of course, continue to occur. Instead, the text focuses
on an endpoint in the evolution of history. This approach is akin to a linear, secular eschatology,
the branch of theology concerned with God’s final judgment and the afterlife. According to
Fukuyama, this endpoint constitutes the eventual political transition into liberal democracies
and their economic system, capitalism, all around the world. He believes that the world would
still comprise different states as individual political entities with certain national
characteristics. However, their internal dynamics would be similar in terms of their relative
material abundance, equal and free elections, and egalitarianism in the legal system. The author
also suggests that the transition of all countries to this political model may signal the end of
military conflicts because during the Cold War liberal democracies maintained amicable
international relations.

The book is divided into five parts. Each part addresses an important theme or group of themes.
The first part focuses on general ideological trends in in the Modern period and the possibility
of a universal history of humankind.
The second part discusses in more detail the ideological battle that took part during the Cold
War between Communism and Liberalism, as well as the question of prerequisites for
establishing a liberal democracy such as education and technological growth.
The third part of the book examines the question of identity and its recognition, and how this
question transformed throughout the history of Western thought.
Part 4 describes attitudes toward work and obstacles to liberal democracy such as political
nationalism and religion.
Finally, the end of the book examines the negative aspects of liberal democracies, including
socioeconomic inequality.

The author situates his argument about the end of history in the work of 19th century German
philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Specifically, Fukuyama borrows Hegelian
historicism and its evolutionary approach driven by the Spirit of History but adapted to the
realities of the 20th century. To establish Liberalism as the optimal ideology, Fukuyama
examines the Modern period in broad strokes, including: the scientific revolution and the
Enlightenment, European colonial conquest, world wars and the Holocaust, the Cold War, and
nuclear weapons. He asserts that the Modern period produced three key ideologies: Liberalism,
Communism, and Fascism. The author examines each ideology. They feature a distinct focal
point and a historical driving force like Hegel’s Spirit of History. For Fascism, this focal point
was the state or race. Communism focused on class. Liberalism, the oldest and the only
remaining ideology of Modernity, on the other hand, uses the individual as its historic subject.
Fukuyama then underscores the collapse of Fascism in 1945 and Communism in the late 1980s
by characterizing them as ideologies with global ambitions. He concludes that it is not
coincidental that Liberalism remained the only Modern ideology capable of conquering the
world.
Hegel is not the only philosopher of note in The End of History and the Last Man. Fukuyama
examines other Western thinkers including Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Karl Marx, and
Friedrich Nietzsche. By examining the transformation of key concepts in political philosophy,
such as the question of individual human identity and the social contract between the state and
those it governs, the author ambitiously seeks to establish a universal history of humankind.
He outlines this universal history strictly from a Western perspective and then applies it to non-
Western parts of the world. The author assesses non-Western regions using several categories
such as technological innovation. In doing so, he automatically places the West in the Modern
period ahead of the curve and ranks many countries in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and
Africa as underdeveloped. The author’s assumption that there is a single, unified human history
written from a Western perspective, rather than culturally specific local and regional histories,
is in line with Modern thinking. This runs counter to the Postmodern destruction of such a
“grand narrative.” Yet technological advancement is not a guarantee of moral behavior, as the
examples of the Holocaust and the U.S. atomic bombings of the Japanese cities Hiroshima and
Nagasaki demonstrate.

Whereas equal rights, education, and economic development are key rational elements in a
liberal democracy, the need for recognition of one’s identity by others is another, less rational,
feature. The author typically uses the ancient Greek term thymos to denote this concept. He
traces the Modern development of thymos from Hegel’s concept of a bloody battle, in which
recognition was worth dying for, to the present-day, peaceful way of recognizing the Other as
an equal.
Fukuyama believes that the two essential obstacles to establishing a liberal democracy are
nationalism and religion, especially in their political expression. He asserts that these
traditional forms of communal relationships should be made compliant with liberal
democracies. For example, for culture this would mean removing its political aspects and
reducing it to benign forms like ethnic cuisines. At the same time, Fukuyama admits that
traditional ties are what made communities strong, and there is a danger of atomization and
loneliness in the most advanced liberal democracies.
The author dedicates the final chapters to examining some of the drawbacks of his preferred
political system. These drawbacks include economic inequalities, crime, and substance abuse.
On a deeper level, Fukuyama wonders whether the material abundance and the safety and
security of liberal democracies would produce the so-called last men whom Friedrich Nietzsche
disparaged. These are passive individuals solely focused on material comforts rather than risk-
taking and great creative passions which made humans great in the past.
The End of History and the Last Man is an important contribution to 20th century political
philosophy. The author is well versed in the history of Western thought which he presents in an
accessible way. The book comprises dozens of historical examples to back up his claims
showing the author’s erudition. At the same time, The End of History sparked discussion and
criticism. In the three decades since its initial publication, the world transformed significantly
and not necessarily in favor of liberal democracy. For example, the rise of China with its
alternative social and political system in the 21st century presents a serious challenge to the
end-of-history thesis.

Samuel Huntington

The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order is an expansion of the 1993
Foreign Affairs article written by Samuel Huntington that hypothesized a new post-Cold War
world order. Prior to the end of the Cold War, societies were divided by ideological differences,
such as the struggle between democracy and communism. Huntington's main thesis argues,
"The most important distinctions among peoples are [no longer] ideological, political, or
economic. They are cultural". New patterns of conflict will occur along the boundaries of
different cultures and patterns of cohesion will be found within the cultural boundaries.
A World of Civilizations
To begin his argument, Huntington refutes past paradigms that have been ineffective in
explaining or predicting the reality of the global political order. "We need a map," Huntington
says, "that both portrays reality and simplifies reality in a way that best serves our purposes".
Huntington develops a new "Civilization paradigm" to create a new understanding of the
post-Cold War order, and to fill the gaps of the already existing paradigms. To begin with,
Huntington divides the world into eight "major" civilizations:
1. Sinic: the common culture of China and Chinese communities in Southeast Asia.
Includes Vietnam and Korea.
2. Japanese: Japanese culture as distinctively different from the rest of Asia.
3. Hindu: identified as the core Indian civilization.
4. Islamic: Originating on the Arabian Peninsula, spread across North Africa, Iberian
Peninsula and Central Asia. Arab, Turkic, Persian and Malay are among the many distinct
subdivisions within Islam.
5. Orthodox: centered in Russia. Separate from Western Christendom.
6. Western: centered in Europe and North America.
7. Latin American: Central and South American countries with a past of a corporatist,
authoritarian culture. Majority of countries are of a Catholic majority.
8. Africa: while the continent lacks a sense of a pan-African identity, Huntington claims
that Africans are also increasingly developing a sense of African Identity.
Following the explanations of the separate civilizations in the new paradigm, Huntington
describes the relations among civilizations. Before 1500 A.D., civilizations were separated
geographically and the spread of ideas and technology took centuries. Huntington argues that
research and technology are the catalyst for civilization creation and development. By 1500
A.D., evolution in ocean navigation by Western cultures led to rapid expansion and eventual
domination of ideas, values, and religion.
Twentieth century relations among civilizations have moved beyond the unidirectional
influence of the west on the rest. Instead, "multidirectional interactions among all civilization"
has been maintained. In other words, cultural influence is interdependent; western civilizations
influence and are influenced by smaller, less powerful civilizations around the world.
Huntington then refutes the idea of a Western cultural hegemony and the concept of an
established universal civilization. He states that "global communications are dominated by the
West" and is "a major source of the resentment and hostility of non-Western peoples against
the West". The notion of a single, universal culture is not helpful creating an explanation or a
description of global political order. However, Huntington also argues that as modernization
increases cross-cultural communication, the similarities among cultures also increase. The key
to this chapter is Huntington's severance of modernization from Westernization. While the
world is becoming more modern, it is simultaneously becoming less Western, an idea he
expands upon in part two of the book.

The Shifting Balance of Civilizations

Huntington starts this section by arguing that Western power and influence is fading. There are
contrasting views on the West's hold on power. One side argues that the West still has a
monopoly on technological research and development, military strength, and economic
consumption. The other side argues that the relative power and influence of Western countries
is declining. Huntington adopts the latter view and describes three characteristics of the
Western decline:
1. The current Western decline is a very slow process and is not an immediate threat to
World powers today.
2. Decline of power does not occur in a straight line; it may reverse, speed up, or pause.
3. The power of a state is controlled and influenced by the behavior and decisions of those
holding power.
Huntington asserts the increased role and importance of religion in world politics. Religion is
the societal factor that has filled the vacuum created by a loss of political ideology. Major
religions around the world "experienced new surges in commitment, relevance and practice by
erstwhile casual believers". Huntington goes on to say that replacing politics with religion was
also the result of increased communication among societies and cultures. People "need new
sources of identity, new forms of stable community, and new sets of moral precepts to provide
them with a sense of meaning and purpose". Religion is able to meet these needs.
Economics, Demography and the Challenger Civilizations, discusses the relative rise in power
and influence of non-Western countries. Huntington specifically focuses on Japan, the Four
Tigers (Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore), and China as countries, which asserted
cultural relevance through economic successes. "Asian societies are decreasingly responsive
to United States demands and interests and [are] increasingly able to resist pressure from the
U.S. or other Western countries" . The ability of Asian countries to successfully modernize and
develop economically without adopting western values supports Huntington's assertion that the
world is becoming more modernized, but less Westernized.
Muslim societies, unlike Asian societies, have asserted cultural identity through the
reaffirmation and resurgence of religion. Huntington argues that the resurgence of Islam
"embodies the acceptance of modernity, rejection of Western culture, and the recommitment to
Islam as the guide to life in the modern world" . Religion is the primary factor that distinguishes
Muslim politics and society from other countries. Huntington also argues that the failure of
state economies, the large young population, and the authoritarian style of governance have all
contributed to the resurgence of Islam in society.
The Emerging Order of Civilizations
During the Cold War, the bipolar world order enabled countries to identify themselves as either
aligned or non-aligned. In the post-Cold War world order, countries are no longer able to easily
categorize themselves and have entered into an identity crisis. To cope with this crisis, countries
started "rallying to those [cultures] with similar ancestry, religion, language, values, and
institutions and distance themselves from those with different ones". Regional organizations
have formed that reflect political and economic alliances. These include Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the European Union (EU) and the North American Fair
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Huntington also describes the idea of "torn countries," or countries
that have yet to entirely claim or create an identity. These countries include Russia, Turkey,
Mexico, and Australia.
Huntington discusses the new structure of civilizations as centered around a small number of
powerful core states. "Culture commonality legitimates the leadership and order-imposing role
of the core states for both member state and core external powers and institutions" . Examples
of core states are France and Germany for the EU. Their sphere of influence ends where
Western Christendom ends. In other words, civilizations are strictly bound to religious
affiliation. Huntington argues that the Islamic civilization, which he identified earlier in the
book, lacks a core state and is the factor that disallows these societies to successfully develop
and modernize. The remainder of this section goes into great detail to explain the different
divisions of core states throughout the world.
Clashes of Civilizations
Huntington predicts and describes the great clashes that will occur among civilizations. First,
he anticipates a coalition or cooperation between Islamic and Sinic cultures to work against a
common enemy, the West. Three issues that separate the West from the rest are identified by
Huntington as:
1. The West's ability to maintain military superiority through the non-proliferation of
emerging powers.
2. The promotion of Western political values such as human rights and democracy.
3. The Restriction of non-Western immigrants and refugees into Western societies.
Non-Western countries see all three aspects as the Western countries attempt to enforce and
maintain their status as the cultural hegemony.
In the chapter The Global Politics of Civilizations, Huntington predicts the conflict between
Islam and the West to be a "small, fault line war," and the conflict between the America and
China having the potential to be an "intercivilizational war of core states".
Islam and the West
Huntington goes into a brief historical explanation of the conflictual nature of Islam and
Christianity and then lists five factors that have exacerbated conflict between the two religions
in the late twentieth century. These factors are:
• the Muslim population growth has generated large numbers of unemployed and
dissatisfied youth that become recruits to Islamic causes,
• the recent resurgence of Islam has given Muslims a reaffirmation of the relevance of
Islam compared to other religions,
• the West's attempt to universalize values and institutions, and maintain military
superiority has generated intense resentment within Muslim communities,
• without the common threat of communism, the West and Islam now perceive each other
as enemies, and
• increased communication and interaction between Islam and the West has exaggerated
the perceived differences between the two societies.
Asia, China, and America
Economic development in Asia and China has resulted in an antagonistic relationship with
America. As discussed in previous sections, economic success in Asia and China has created
an increased sense of cultural relevancy. Huntington predicts that the combination of economic
success of the East Asian countries and the heightened military power of China could result in
a major world conflict. This conflict would be intensified even more by alignments between
Islamic and Sinic civilizations. The end of chapter nine provides a detailed diagram (The
Global Politics of Civilizations: Emerging Alliances) which helps explain the complexity of
the political relationships in the post-Cold War era,

Huntington defines the Soviet-Afghan war and the First Gulf War as the emergence of
civilization wars. Huntington interprets the Afghan War as a civilization war because it was
seen as the first successful resistance to a foreign power, which boosted the self-confidence,
and power of many fighters in the Islamic world. The war also "left behind an uneasy coalition
of Islamic organizations intent on promoting Islam against all non-Muslim forces". In other
words, the war created a generation of fighters that perceived the West to be a major threat to
their way of life.
The First Gulf War was a Muslim conflict in which the West intervened; the war was widely
opposed by non-Westerners and widely supported by Westerners. Huntington states that
"Islamic fundamentalist groups denounced [the war] as a war against 'Islam and its civilization'
by an alliance of 'Crusaders and Zionists' and proclaimed their backing of Iraq in the face of
'military and economic aggression against its people". The war was interpreted as a war of us
vs. them; Islam v. Christianity.
To better understand the definition of the fault line between civilizations, Huntington provides
a description of characteristics and dynamics of fault line conflicts. They can be described by
the following:
• Communal conflicts between states or groups from different civilizations
• Almost always between people of different religions
• Prolonged duration
• Violent in nature
• Identity wars (us vs. them), eventually breaks down to religious identity
• Encouraged and financed by Diaspora communities
• Violence rarely ends permanently
• Propensity for peace is increased with third party intervention

The Future of Civilizations

In the concluding sections of his book, Huntington discusses the challengers of the West, and
whether or not external and internal challenges will erode the West's power. External challenges
include the emerging cultural identities in the non-Western world. Internal challenges include
the erosion of principle values, morals, and beliefs within Western culture. He also contributes
to the debate between multiculturalists and monoculturalists and states that, "A multicultural
world is unavoidable because global empire is impossible. The preservation of the United
States and the West requires the renewal of Western identity" . The ability for the West to remain
a global political power, it needs to adapt to increasing power and influence of different
civilizations. Without adapting, the West is destined to decline in power and influence, or it
will clash with other powerful civilizations. According to Huntington, the West clashing with
another civilization is "the greatest threat to world peace, and an international order".

4.1 Development of world Politics

World War I
World War I (WW I), also known as the Great War, lasted from 28 July 1914 to 11 November
1918. WW I was fought between the Allied Powers and the Central Powers. The main members
of the Allied Powers were France, Russia, and Britain. The United States also fought on the
side of the Allies after 1917. The main members of the Central Powers were Germany, Austria-
Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and Bulgaria.
Causes of the War
There was no single event that led to World War I. The war happened because of several
different events that took place in the years building up to 1914.
The new international expansionist policy of Germany: In 1890 the new emperor of
Germany, Wilhelm II, began an international policy that sought to turn his country into a world
power. Germany was seen as a threat by the other powers and destabilized the international
situation.
Mutual Defense Alliances: Countries throughout Europe made mutual defence agreements.
These treaties meant that if one country was attacked, allied countries were bound to defend
them. The Triple Alliance-1882 linking Germany with Austria-Hungary and Italy. The Triple
Entente, which was made up of Britain, France, and Russia, concluded by 1907. Thus, there
were two rival groups in Europe. Alliances at the beginning of the War
Imperialism: Before World War I, Africa and parts of Asia were points of contention among
the European countries because of their raw materials. The increasing competition and desire
for greater empires led to an increase in the confrontation that helped push the world into World
War I.
Militarism: As the world entered the 20th century, an arms race had begun. By 1914, Germany
had the greatest increase in military buildup. Great Britain and Germany both greatly increased
their navies in this time period. This increase in militarism helped push the countries involved
into war.
Nationalism: Much of the origin of the war was based on the desire of the Slavic peoples in
Bosnia and Herzegovina to no longer be part of Austria Hungary but instead be part of Serbia.
In this way, nationalism led to the War.
Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand: In June 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the
heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, was shot while he was visiting Sarajevo in Bosnia. He
was killed by a Serbian person, who thought that Serbia should control Bosnia instead of
Austria. Because its leader had been shot, AustriaHungary declared war on Serbia. As a result:
Russia got involved as it had an alliance with Serbia. Germany then declared war on Russia
because Germany had an alliance with Austria-Hungary. Britain declared war on Germany
because of its invasion of neutral Belgium - Britain had agreements to protect both Belgium
and France.
Phases of the War
The conflict developed on several fronts in Europe, Africa, and Asia. The two main scenarios
were the Western front, where the Germans confronted Britain, France and, after 1917, the
Americans. The second front was the Eastern front in which the Russians fought against
Germans and Austro-Hungarians. After a brief German advance in 1914, the western front was
stabilized and a long and brutal trench warfare started: it was a "war of attrition" (the western
front remained immovable). Meanwhile on the Eastern Front the Germans advanced but not
decisively. In 1917, two events changed the course of the war: the United States joined the
Allies and Russia, after the Russian revolution, abandoned the conflict and signed a separate
peace. Finally after the German offensive in the spring of 1918, the Allied counterattack
managed to force a decisive retreat of the German army. The defeat of its Germany’s allies and
the revolution in Germany that dethroned Wilhem II (German Emperor), brought about the
signing of the armistice on November 11, 1918. The Great War was over.
Consequences of the war
Economic consequences: World War I cost the participating countries a lot of money.
Germany and Great Britain spent about 60% of the money their economy produced. Countries
had to raise taxes and borrow money from their citizens. They also printed money in order to
buy weapons and other things they needed for war. This led to inflation after the war.
Political Consequences: World War I brought an end to four monarchies: Czar Nicholas II of
Russia, Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany, Emperor Charles of Austria and the sultan of the Ottoman
Empire had to step down. New countries were created out of old empires. Austria- Hungary
was carved up into a number of independent states. Russia and Germany gave land to Poland.
Countries in the Middle East were put under the control of Great Britain and France. What was
left of Ottoman Empire became Turkey.
Social Consequences: World war changed society completely. Birth rates declined because
millions of young men died (eight million died, millions wounded, maimed, widows and
orphans). Civilians lost their land and fled to other countries. The role of women also changed.
They played a major part in replacing men in factories and offices. Many countries gave women
more rights after the war had ended, including the right to vote. The upper classes lost their
leading role in society. Young middle and lower class men and women demnded a say in
forming their country after the war.
Treaty of Versailles: On June 28, 1919, World War I officially ended with the signing of the
Treaty of Versailles. The Treaty of Versailles was an attempt to prevent the world from going
into another war. Treaty of Versailles It is organized in several chapters each having different
clauses. Territorial clauses: France regained Alsace and Lorraine Eupen and Malmedy passed
into the hands of Belgium Eastern territories were annexed by Poland which caused East
Prussia to become territorially isolated. Danzig and Memel, former Baltic German cities were
declared free cities Denmark annexed northern Schleswig-Holstein Germany lost all of its
colonies and the victors annexed them Military clauses: Drastic limitation of the German navy.
Dramatic reduction of the Army (only 100,000 troops, prohibition of having tanks, aircraft and
heavy artillery). Demilitarization of the Rhineland region. War Reparations: The treaty
declared Germany and its allies responsible for all 'loss and damage' suffered by the Allies and
as a consequence they were forced to pay war reparations to the victors.
However, the war also brought other important social and ideological changes. The U.S.,
which had won the war but had not experienced the conflict on its territory, became a first
world power. The mass mobilization of men led to the incorporation of women into the
workforce, which was a major step forward for women's rights. The triumph of the Soviet
Revolution (Russian Revolution) and the social crisis that followed the war encouraged
workers in many countries to protest, creating a pre-revolutionary climate. The extreme
nationalism experienced during the war, coupled with fear of a Communist revolution,
encouraged the middle-class populations of some countries to move to the extreme right. This
created a hotbed of fascist movements. Creation of the League of Nations: The League of
Nations was an international diplomatic group developed after World War I as a way to solve
disputes between countries before they erupted into open warfare. A precursor to the United
Nations, the League achieved some victories but had a mixed record of success. By ensuring
Germany’s economic ruin and political humiliation through the Treaty of Versatile, the post-
war settlement provided fertile ground for World War II.
World War II
World War II, also called Second World War, was a conflict that involved virtually every part
of the world during the years 1939–45. The principal belligerents were the Axis powers—
Germany, Italy, and Japan—and the Allies— France, Great Britain, the United States, the
Soviet Union, and, to a lesser extent, China. It was the biggest conflict in history that had lasted
almost six years. Nearly some 100 million people had been militarised, and 50 million had been
killed (around 3% of the world's population).
The major causes of World War II
They include the impact of the Treaty of Versailles following WWI, the worldwide economic
depression, failure of appeasement, the rise of militarism in Germany and Japan, and the failure
of the League of Nations.
Treaty of Versailles
Following World War I, the victorious Allied Powers met to decide Germany’s future. Germany
was forced to sign the Treaty of Versailles. Under this treaty, Germany had to accept guilt for
the war and to pay reparations. Germany lost territory and was prohibited from having a large
military. The humiliation faced by Germany under this treaty, paved the way for the spread of
UltraNationalism in Germany.
Failure of the League of Nations The League of Nations was an international organization set
up in 1919 to keep world peace. It was intended that all countries would be members and that
if there were disputes between countries, they could be settled by negotiation rather than by
force. The League of Nations was a good idea, but ultimately a failure, as not all countries
joined the league. Also, the League had no army to prevent military aggression such as Italy’s
invasion of Ethiopia in Africa or Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in China.
Great Depression of 1929 The worldwide economic depression of the 1930s took its toll in
different ways in Europe and Asia. In Europe, political power shifted to totalitarian and
imperialist governments in several countries, including Germany, Italy, and Spain. In Asia, a
resource-starved Japan began to expand aggressively, invading China and maneuvering to
control a sphere of influence in the Pacific.
Rise of Fascism Victors’ stated aims in World War I had been “to make the world safe for
democracy,” and postwar Germany was made to adopt a democratic constitution, as did most
of the other states restored or created after the war. In the 1920s, however, the wave of
nationalistic, militaristic totalitarianism known by its Italian name, fascism. It promised to
minister to peoples’ wants more effectively than democracy and presented itself as the one sure
defense against communism. Benito Mussolini established the first Fascist, European
dictatorship during the interwar period in Italy in 1922.
Rise of Nazism Adolf Hitler, the Leader of the German National Socialist (Nazi) party,
preached a racist brand of fascism. Hitler promised to overturn the Versailles Treaty, restore
German wealth & glory and secure additional Lebensraum (“living space”) for the German
people, who he contended deserve more as members of a superior race. In 1933 Hitler became
the German Chancellor, and in a series of subsequent moves established himself as dictator.
Moreover, in 1941 the Nazi regime unleashed a war of extermination against Slavs, Jews, and
other elements deemed inferior by Hitler’s ideology.
Policy of Appeasement Hitler openly denounced the Treaty of Versailles and began secretly
building up Germany’s army and weapons. Although Britain and France knew of Hitler’s
actions, they thought a stronger Germany would stop the spread of Communism from Russia.
An example of appeasement was the Munich Agreement of September 1938. In the Agreement,
Britain and France allowed Germany to annex areas in Czechoslovakia where German-
speakers lived. Germany agreed not to invade the rest of Czechoslovakia or any other country.
However, in March 1939, Germany broke its promise and invaded the rest of Czechoslovakia.
Even then, neither Britain nor France was prepared to take military action.
Key Turning Points of the World War II
The Start Three years of mounting international tension - encompassing the Spanish Civil
War, the union of Germany and Austria, Hitler's occupation of the Sudetenland and the invasion
of Czechoslovakia led to deterioration of ties between Axis Power and Allied Powers.
However, the German invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939 and subsequently two days
later, Britain and France declared war on Germany. This marked the beginning of World War
II. Phoney War The western Europe was very quiet during the first few months of the war.
This period of war is known as 'phoney war'. Preparations for war continued in earnest, but
there were few signs of conflict, and civilians of the western european countries (allied powers)
evacuated to safe places. Ribbentrop Pact By the early part of 1939 the German dictator Adolf
Hitler had become determined to invade and occupy Poland. Poland, for its part, had guarantees
of French and British military support should it be attacked by Germany. Hitler intended to
invade Poland anyway, but first he had to neutralize the possibility that the Soviet Union would
resist the invasion of its western neighbour. Secret negotiations in August 1939, led to the
signing of the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact in Moscow. Further, Russia followed
Germany into Poland in September and Poland was carved up between the two invaders before
the end of the year. Winter War 1940 The 'winter war' between Russia and Finland concluded
in March, and in the following month Germany invaded Denmark and Norway. Denmark
surrendered immediately, but the Norwegians fought on - with British and French assistance -
surrendering in June 1940. Fall of France 1940 After war with scandenavian countries got
over, Germany invaded France, Belgium and Holland. During this phase, the western Europe
encountered the Blitzkrieg - or 'lightning war'. Blitzkrieg: Germany's combination of fast
armoured tanks on land, and superiority in the air, made a unified attacking force that was both
innovative and effective. Despite greater numbers of air and army personnel in Allied powers,
they proved no match for German Forces. In France an armistice was signed with Germany,
with the puppet French Vichy government. Having conquered France, Hitler turned his
attention to Britain, and began preparations for an invasion. Battle of Britain 1940 Lasting
from July to September 1940, it was the first war to be fought solely in the air. German took
decisions to attack from airfields and factories to the major cities, but somehow the Royal Air
Force managed to squeak a narrow victory. This ensured the - ultimately indefinite -
postponement of the German invasion plans. War Getting Global With continental Europe
under Nazi control, and Britain safe - for the time being - the war took on a more global
dimension in 1941. Following the defeat of Mussolini's armies in Greece and Tobruk, German
forces arrived in North Africa and invaded Greece and Yugoslavia in April 1941. Operation
Barbarossa After facing defeat in Britain, Hitler broke the Ribbentrop Pact and invaded Russia
in 1941. The initial advance was swift, with the fall of Sebastopol at the end of October, and
Moscow coming under attack at the end of the year. The bitter Russian winter, however, like
the one that Napoleon had experienced a century and a half earlier, crippled the Germans. The
Soviets counterattacked in December and the Eastern Front stagnated until the spring. Pearl
Harbour The Japanese, tired of American trade embargoes, mounted a surprise attack on the
US Navy base of Pearl Harbor, in Hawaii, on 7 December 1941. This ensured that global
conflict commenced, with Germany declaring war on the US, a few days later. Also, within a
week of Pearl Harbor, Japan had invaded the Philippines, Burma and Hong Kong.
Reversal of German Fortunes By the second half of 1942, British forces gained the initiative
in North Africa and Russian forces counterattacked at Stalingrad. In February 1943, Germany
surrendered at Stalingrad to Soviet Union. This was the first major defeat of Hitler's armies.
Further, German and Italian forces in North Africa surrendered to the Allies. As the Russian
advance on the Eastern Front gathered pace, recapturing Kharkiv and Kiev from Germany.
Moreover, Allied bombers began to attack German cities in enormous daylight air raids. The
Russians reached Berlin (capital of Germany) on 21 April 1945. Hitler killed himself on the 30
, two days after Mussolini had been captured and hanged by Italian partisans. Germany
surrendered unconditionally on 7 May, and the following day was celebrated as VE (Victory in
Europe) day. The war in Europe was over.

Cold war
The Cold War was a lengthy struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union that
began in the aftermath of the surrender of Hitler’s Germany. In 1941, Nazi aggression against
the USSR turned the Soviet regime into an ally of the Western democracies. But in the post-
war world, increasingly divergent viewpoints created rifts between those who had once been
allies.
The United States and the USSR gradually built up their own zones of influence, dividing the
world into two opposing camps. The Cold War was therefore not exclusively a struggle between
the US and the USSR but a global conflict that affected many countries, particularly the
continent of Europe. Indeed, Europe, divided into two blocs, became one of the main theatres
of the war. In Western Europe, the European integration process began with the support of the
United States, while the countries of Eastern Europe became satellites of the USSR.
From 1947 onwards, the two adversaries, employing all the resources at their disposal for
intimidation and subversion, clashed in a lengthy strategic and ideological conflict punctuated
by crises of varying intensity. Although the two Great Powers never fought directly, they
pushed the world to the brink of nuclear war on several occasions. Nuclear deterrence was the
only effective means of preventing a military confrontation. Ironically, this ‘balance of terror’
actually served as a stimulus for the arms race. Periods of tension alternated between moments
of détente or improved relations between the two camps. Political expert Raymond Aron
perfectly defined the Cold War system with a phrase that hits the nail on the head: ‘impossible
peace, improbable war’.
The Cold War finally came to an end in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse
of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe.
I. Towards a bipolar world (1945–1953)
The end of the Second World War did not signal a return to normality; on the contrary, it
resulted in a new conflict. The major European powers that had been at the forefront of the
international stage in the 1930s were left exhausted and ruined by the war, setting the scene
for the emergence of two new global superpowers. Two blocs developed around the Soviet
Union and the United States, with other countries being forced to choose between the two
camps.
The USSR came out of the war territorially enlarged and with an aura of prestige from
having fought Hitler’s Germany. The country was given a new lease of life by its heroic
resistance to the enemy, exemplified by the victory at Stalingrad. The USSR also offered
an ideological, economic and social model extending as never before to the rest of Europe.
Furthermore, the Red Army, unlike the US army, was not demobilised at the end of the war.
The Soviet Union thus had a real numerical superiority in terms of men and heavy weapons.
The United States was the great victor of the Second World War. Its human and material
losses were relatively low, and even though the US Army was almost completely
demobilised a few months after the end of hostilities, the United States remained the
world’s leading military power. Its navy and air force were unrivalled, and until 1949 it was
the only country with the capacity to produce nuclear weapons. It also confirmed its status
as the world’s leading economic power, in terms of both the volume of trade and industrial
and agricultural production. The US now owned more than two thirds of the world’s gold
reserves and the dollar became the primary international currency.
The conflicts of interest between the new world powers gradually multiplied, and a climate
of fear and suspicion reigned. Each country feared the newfound power of the other. The
Soviets felt surrounded and threatened by the West and accused the United States of
spearheading ‘imperialist expansion’. For their part, the Americans were concerned at
Communist expansion and accused Stalin of breaching the Yalta Agreement on the right of
free peoples to self determination. The result was a long period of international tension
interspersed with dramatic crises which, from time to time, led to localised armed conflicts
without actually causing a full scale war between the United States and the USSR. From
1947, Europe, divided into two blocs, was at the heart of the struggle between the two
superpowers. The Cold War reached its first climax with the Soviet blockade of Berlin. The
explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb in the summer of 1949 reinforced the USSR in
its role as a world power. This situation confirmed the predictions of Winston Churchill,
who, in March 1946, had been the first Western statesman to speak of an ‘Iron Curtain’ that
now divided Europe in two.
The Yalta Conference
From 4 to 11 February 1945, Winston Churchill, Joseph Stalin and Franklin D. Roosevelt
met in Yalta, in the Crimea on the Black Sea, to settle the questions raised by the inevitable
German defeat. Roosevelt was particularly anxious to secure the cooperation of Stalin,
while Churchill was apprehensive of the Soviet power. He wanted to avoid the Red Army
exerting too widespread an influence over Central Europe. At this time, the Soviet troops
had already reached the centre of Europe, whereas the British and Americans had not yet
crossed the Rhine.
The Potsdam Conference
The last of the Allied conferences took place from 17 July to 2 August 1945 in Potsdam,
near Berlin. Six months earlier, in the Crimea, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin had laid the
preparations for the post-war period, but the promises made in Yalta were unable to stand
up to the balance of power on the ground. The climate had changed significantly in the
intervening period: Germany had surrendered on 8 May 1945 and the war in Europe had
come to an end. Japan stubbornly resisted US bomb attacks but the United States had a
final trump card: on 16 July, the first atomic bomb test explosion took place in the desert
in New Mexico. At the Potsdam Conference, Harry Truman replaced Franklin D.
Roosevelt, who had died on 12 April 1945, and Clement Attlee took over as head of the
British delegation after Winston Churchill’s defeat in the general elections of 26 July. Only
Joseph Stalin was personally present at all the Allied conferences.
The United States and the Western bloc
From 1947 onwards, the Western powers were increasingly concerned at the advance of
Communism: in several European countries, Communist parties played an active role in
coalition governments (for example in Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, France,
Belgium and Italy), sometimes even excluding other parties from power. Greece was in the
midst of a civil war since the autumn of 1946, and Turkey was threatened in turn.
The Truman Doctrine
In this tense international atmosphere, US President Harry S. Truman broke with the policy
of his predecessor Franklin D. Roosevelt and redefined the country’s foreign policy
guidelines. On 12 March 1947, in a speech to the US Congress, the President presented his
doctrine of containment, which aimed to provide financial and military aid to the countries
threatened by Soviet expansion. Clearly aimed at stopping the spread of Communism, the
Truman Doctrine positioned the United States as the defender of a free world in the face of
Soviet aggression. An aid package of around 400 million dollars was granted to Greece and
Turkey. This new doctrine provided a legitimate basis for the United States’ activism during
the Cold War. These changes to external policy marked a real turnaround in the history of
the United States, which had previously remained on the sidelines of European disputes.
For the US, isolationism was no longer an option.
The Marshall Plan
At the same time, the US Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, was concerned at the
economic difficulties in Europe. In the aftermath of the Second World War, intra-European
trade was hindered by a lack of foreign exchange and the absence of an international
economic authority capable of effectively organising worldwide trade. The United States,
whose interests lay in promoting such trade in order to increase its own exports, decided to
help the European economy via a large-scale structural recovery programme. The United
States wanted to protect American prosperity and stave off the threat of national
overproduction. But its desire to give Europe massive economic aid was also politically
motivated. The fear of Communist expansion in Western Europe was undoubtedly a
decisive factor that was just as important as that of conquering new markets. The Americans
therefore decided to fight poverty and hunger in Europe, factors which they felt encouraged
the spread of Communism.
The USSR and the Eastern bloc
In August 1949, the USSR exploded its first atomic bomb, then, in 1953, its first hydrogen
bomb. Its claim to be a world power could no longer be disputed. In the Soviet Union,
Stalin continued to govern alone. Liberalising tendencies which had appeared during the
war disappeared once again, and Stalin’s personality cult reached its height. A further wave
of repression was interrupted, however, by the death of Stalin on 5 March 1953.
The creation of the Soviet buffer zone
Territorially enlarged, the USSR came out of the war with an aura of prestige from having
fought Hitler’s Germany. Although in 1945 the Communist world was limited to the Soviet
Union, it rapidly spread to Central and Eastern Europe, forming a protective buffer zone
for the USSR. Communist propaganda was greatly helped by the presence of the Soviet
army in the countries that it had liberated in Central and Eastern Europe.
The leaders of non-Communist parties were progressively removed: they were either
discredited, intimidated or subjected to show trials leading to their imprisonment or even
execution. Three years was enough for the USSR to establish people’s democracies ruled
by Communist parties. Poland, Hungary, Romania and Czechoslovakia were more or less
brutally forced into the Soviet embrace. Nevertheless, the refusal in 1948 of the Yugoslav
Communists to follow the line decreed by the Cominform showed that the USSR had some
difficulty keeping control of all its satellite countries.
The Zhdanov Doctrine and the Cominform
On 22 September 1947, delegates from the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union, Poland,
Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Italy and France gathered near
Warsaw and created the Cominform, an information bureau located in Belgrade. It quickly
became the Communist movement’s agent for spreading its ideology through its newspaper
For a lasting peace, for a people’s democracy. Presented as a ‘revival’ of the Comintern,
the Cominform actually served as an instrument for the USSR to keep close control over
Western Communist parties. The aim was to close ranks around Moscow and to ensure that
European Communists were in line with Soviet policies. Tito’s Yugoslavia, accused of
deviationism, would soon be excluded from the Cominform.
The division of Germany
During 1945, the Allies began organising their respective occupation zones in Germany.
The Americans occupied the South, the British the West and North, France the South-West,
and the Soviets Central Germany. The Eastern part was administered by Poland, except the
town of Königsberg (renamed Kaliningrad) and its surrounding area, which were annexed
by the USSR. On 30 August 1945, the Inter-Allied Control Council was founded. Berlin
was divided into four sectors and placed under the administrative control of the Allied
Kommandatura. In 1946, the main war criminals were tried in Nuremberg by Allied judges.
In the same year, the fate of the German satellite states and of Italy, Bulgaria, Romania,
Hungary and Finland was determined in Paris by separate peace treaties. On 28 July 1946,
the United States proposed a plan for economic unification of the occupied zones. Faced
with the refusal of France and the Soviet Union, the British and Americans decided to unite
their zones economically and, in December of the same year, created the Bizone. On 1
August 1948, the French occupation zone joined the Bizone, which then became the
Trizone. Gradually, relations between the Allies deteriorated, and the quadripartite
structures became unmanageable. In March 1948, the Inter-Allied Control Council ceased
to operate, as did, in June 1948, the Kommandatura.
The Berlin Blockade
Hoping to keep Berlin united in the heart of the Soviet zone, and denouncing what it called
the Anglo-American policy of acting without consultation, the USSR reacted to this
initiative on 24 June 1948 by imposing a total blockade of the Western sectors of Berlin.
The city lay in the Soviet zone, but the Americans, the British and the French were
established in their respective occupation zones. Access to Berlin by road, rail and water
was impossible until 12 May 1949. Food supplies and electricity were cut. Each day,
thousands of aircraft (more than 270 000 flights in total) brought food, fuel and other
essential goods to the beleaguered city. In all, over 13 000 tonnes of goods were delivered
every day. Berlin became one of the main theatres of confrontation between East and West.
The division of Europe into two blocs was confirmed.
The strengthening of alliances
On 11 June 1948, the US Congress passed the Vandenberg resolution, which put an end to
American isolationism by authorising the United States to be involved in international
alliances even in peacetime. This paved the way for the Atlantic Alliance. On 4 April 1949,
twelve Foreign Ministers signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, thereby
establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The Five of Western Union
were joined by the United States, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal.
The creation of a Euro-American alliance was strongly contested by Communists across
the world. Negotiations on the North Atlantic Treaty were marred by threats and barely
veiled intimidation from the Kremlin towards the Western powers. But the climate of fear
surrounding the ratification of the accession treaties by the Western Parliaments only served
to speed up the process. The North Atlantic Treaty came into force on 23 August 1949 and
established a transatlantic framework for the defence of Western Europe. In 1953, the new
US President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles extended
the Truman Doctrine by introducing the ‘rollback’ policy, which aimed not merely to
contain Communism but to actively drive it back. This required the formation of military
alliances with countries threatened by Communist expansion. The early 1950s were
characterised by a phenomenon termed ‘pactomania’. Several treaties similar to the North
Atlantic Treaty were signed: the ANZUS Treaty (Australia, New Zealand and the United
States) in 1951, SEATO (the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation) in 1954 and the Baghdad
Pact in 1955.
The USSR responded in 1955 with the creation of the Warsaw Pact. Following the FRG’s
accession to the North Atlantic Treaty on 9 May 1955, the Socialist countries of Eastern
Europe also united to form a military alliance. The members of this mutual defence pact to
counter aggression were the USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary,
Poland and Romania.
The first confrontations
From 1947 onwards, the Cold War gave rise to localised conflicts that opposed the two
camps without triggering an outright war between the United States and the USSR. Greece
was in the midst of a civil war since the autumn of 1946, and after initially having let the
United Kingdom act alone, the United States later intervened actively to help the
antiCommunist forces. In China, American aid was given to the Nationalist Chang Kai-
Shek, but that failed to halt the advance of the Communists, supported by the Soviet Union.
The Cold War reached its first climax with the Soviet blockade of Berlin. In June 1950 the
stage moved from Europe to South-East Asia as Communist North Korean troops invaded
South Korea. The region became a bloody ideological battleground, pitting the West against
the Communist world. This indirectly precipitated the rearmament of the Federal Republic
of Germany.
The Korean War
On 25 June 1950, Communist troops from North Korea crossed the 38th parallel, which
since 1945 had been the military demarcation line between the North of the country (under
Soviet influence) and the South (under US influence). The confrontations along the border
and the invasion of the South of the peninsula would mark the beginning of the Korean
War. The United States, determined to support the authorities in the South, were able to
take advantage of a moment when the Soviet delegate was temporarily absent from a United
Nations Security Council meeting to commit the United Nations (UN) to defending South
Korea. They called on the UN to apply the principle of collective security and to vote for
sanctions against North Korea. In June 1950, US air and naval forces landed on the
peninsula. Sixteen countries, including the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium and
Luxembourg, were involved in the creation of an international force under US command.
North Korea, on the other hand, enjoyed the diplomatic support of the Soviet Union and
military aid from Communist China.
Although his forces had been able to drive the North Korean troops back to the Chinese
border, US General Douglas MacArthur was confronted by a massive counter-attack led by
Chinese reinforcements from the beginning of 1951. He therefore put to the US President,
Harry Truman, a proposal to bomb Communist China, resorting to atomic weapons if need
be. The situation became truly dramatic — a new world conflict seemed imminent. But
Truman refused to use the atomic bomb and the war continued, despite constant diplomatic
efforts to broker a ceasefire. An armistice was finally signed in July 1953 in the climate of
international détente brought about by the death of Stalin four months earlier. However, as
the United States continued to offer substantial economic aid to South Korea, whilst the
Soviet Union supported North Korea, the reunification of the country would clearly be
impossible for some time to come.
From peaceful coexistence to the paroxysms of the Cold War (1953–1962)
After the death of Stalin in March 1953, his successors adopted a more conciliatory attitude
to the West. From 1955, Nikita Khrushchev, the new First Secretary of the CPSU,
developed a policy of peaceful coexistence. Boosted by the advances that it had made in
thermonuclear power and the space race, the USSR wanted to use the new climate of peace
in the world to take the rivalry between itself and the United States onto a purely ideological
and economic level. In the United States, President Eisenhower had to make allowance for
the risk of escalation and the hazards of direct nuclear confrontation with the Soviets. In
1953 he opted for the so-called ‘new look’ strategy. This combined diplomacy with the
threat of massive retaliation. To complicate matters further, the United States was no longer
the only country with nuclear weapons. It had to come to terms with technological progress
made by the Soviet Union, which tested its first atomic weapon in 1949, with the first
hydrogen bomb following in 1953.
But despite certain encouraging signs, the distrust and ideological opposition between the
two blocs continued. In Central and Eastern Europe, the populations of several satellite
states attempted to cast off the Russian yoke, and the Cold War reached its peak in the early
1960s. In Europe, the status of the city of Berlin remained a major stumbling block for the
two superpowers. The construction of the Berlin Wall in the summer of 1961 closed the last
crossing point between West and East. Elsewhere in the world, the tension surrounding
Cuba culminated in a trial of strength played out between John F. Kennedy and Nikita S.
Khrushchev in October 1962 over the stationing of Soviet nuclear missiles on the island.
By the mid-1950s, East-West relations had certainly evolved and were characterised by the
principle of peaceful coexistence, but the Cold War was not over and the ideological
tensions between the two blocs prevailed.
The building of the Berlin Wall
During the 1950s, the City of Berlin was still divided into a Western zone, consisting of the
American, British and French sectors, and a Soviet zone. Berlin constituted a thermometer
during every international crisis, registering the degree of seriousness of the crisis. The
Western Allied powers were determined to uphold their rights in the former capital of the
Reich. For the Communist Government of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), West
Berlin was a constant provocation, as it was an easy escape route for many East Germans
who wanted to flee the country. In 1953, production levels in the German Democratic
Republic (GDR) were poor. In order to stimulate production, the Socialist Unity Party
(SED), led by the Stalinist Walter Ulbricht, imposed increasingly severe working
conditions on the workforce. However, he did not offer in exchange any prospect of an
improvement in the people’s standard of living. East Berliners noted with envy the ever-
increasing economic prosperity in the Western sectors.
On 16 and 17 June 1953, strikes broke out in East Berlin and spread rapidly throughout
East Germany. These uprisings, however, were brutally put down by Soviet troops, leaving
many dead and injured. The defeat of the June 1953 riots resulted in several hundred
thousand East Germans fleeing to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). More than two
million people had crossed from East to West in less than ten years. In order to stop this
mass exodus, which particularly weakened the country’s economy, the GDR finally
prevented people crossing to the West.
During the night of 12 to 13 August 1961, East German workers, flanked by soldiers, built
a wall between East and West Berlin that made passage impossible. The Western powers,
resigned, could only register their verbal protests. During a visit to Berlin on 26 June 1963,
US President John F. Kennedy expressed his sympathy for West Berlin by declaring ‘Ich
bin ein Berliner’. In practice, it was virtually impossible to cross the ‘wall of shame’. This
closed border became the most tangible symbol of the Cold War and the division of Europe.
The Cuban Crisis
In 1962, a new trial of strength unfolded in Cuba: for two weeks, the world teetered on the
brink of nuclear war.
Since the overthrow of Fulgencio Batista’s military dictatorship in January 1959, Cuba had
been ruled by Fidel Castro. In the course of agricultural reform, Castro nationalised the
Cuban property of American undertakings on the island, thereby incurring the wrath of
Washington. In response, the pro-Communist Cuban leader moved closer to the USSR,
which was delighted to find a new ally in the western hemisphere and inside the American
security zone. The Cuban and Soviet regimes signed successive agreements on trade and
military cooperation. In April 1961, the United States attempted to overthrow the new
regime by arranging for anti-Castro exiles to land in the Bay of Pigs. The operation failed
and ultimately only strengthened Castro’s position. He enticed many Latin American
revolutionaries to Cuba, which was the only Communist country in the Americas, and
threatened the United States’ prestige in the region. Khrushchev decided to secretly provide
the Cubans with intermediate-range offensive missiles that could pose a direct threat to the
territory of the United States
 On 14 October 1962, after Soviet freighters carrying missiles had been identified on their
way to Cuba, American spy planes also photographed launchers for Soviet intermediate-
range rockets.
The US President, John F. Kennedy, therefore decided to impose a naval blockade, closing
off access to Cuba. Any attempt by Soviet ships to force their way through could have
ignited the powder keg, provoking open conflict between the United States and the Soviet
Union. Europe, and in particular Germany, would inevitably have then become a theatre of
war. However, at the eleventh hour, and after repeated contact between Moscow and
Washington, largely through the intermediary of the United Nations, a compromise
emerged: the Soviet ships agreed to turn back, and the Americans undertook not to invade
Cuba and to remove their rockets from Turkey. On 28 October, the world avoided nuclear
war by a whisker and the two Great Powers returned to disarmament negotiations. In
Europe, Franco-German links were strengthened by the crisis.

From détente to renewed tensions (1962–1985)

Having narrowly avoided nuclear war, the United States and the USSR drew conclusions
from the Cuban Crisis. This direct clash between the two superpowers brought about a sort
of truce in the Cold War. In 1963, a direct line — the famous ‘red telephone’ — was
established between Washington and Moscow and the two Great Powers opened
discussions on limiting the arms race. There were other reasons behind the moderate
approach adopted by the two parties. The United States was finding it increasingly difficult
to finance its global military presence, and its growing involvement in the Vietnam War
from 1964 onwards met with strong criticism from the general public. In Europe, all eyes
now turned to the Ostpolitik: the Federal Republic of Germany was developing closer
relations with the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the USSR.
As Europe remained at the heart of the East-West confrontation, it sought to promote
détente between the two military blocs. It also contributed to the maintenance of world
peace and raised hopes of a reunification of the continent at the Helsinki Summit in 1975.
However, the attempt by Alexander Dubček to liberalise the Communist regime in
Czechoslovakia was crushed in August 1968 by the troops of the Warsaw Pact. In the late
1970s, the two superpowers sought to extend their respective influence. The Soviet policy
in Africa and the USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan led to a cooling of relations between the
US and the USSR. In the United States, the ‘America is back’ rhetoric adopted by new
President Ronald Reagan set the tone for the Cold War in the 1980s. This period was
marked by a new arms race.
The Vietnam War
The period of détente was not without localised conflicts, but these did not directly
jeopardise relations between the United States and the USSR. The most notable of these
was the Vietnam War, which hung heavily over the 1960s and early 1970s. It was part of
the overall Cold War confrontation and the American struggle against the spread of
Communism in the world, but did not involve a direct confrontation between the two
superpowers. The US justified its military intervention in Vietnam by the domino theory,
which stated that if one country fell under the influence of Communism, the surrounding
countries would inevitably follow. The aim was to prevent Communist domination of
South-East Asia.
In 1961, President John F. Kennedy, convinced that Communist China was actively
supporting North Vietnam, approved a US military campaign in Vietnam to help the
nationalist government stave off the Communist rebellion. His successor, Lyndon B.
Johnson, who was keen to see peace in South-East Asia and to maintain America’s
economic and political interests in the region, stepped up his country’s involvement,
massively expanding the American presence from 23 000 troops in 1965 to over 540 000
in 1969. The Viet Cong Communist rebels, supported by the North Vietnamese Army, were
supplied along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which consisted of a network of paths, tunnels and
bunkers that the Americans tried in vain to destroy. This only led the USSR and China to
intensify their assistance to the Communist National Liberation Front (NLF), which they
supplied with arms and food; however, they did not intervene directly. In February 1965,
the United States began bombing military and industrial targets in North Vietnam. This was
followed by a protracted guerrilla war, despite some fruitless attempts at international
mediation.
Following new carpet bombing raids carried out by the US Air Force on the orders of
President Nixon, peace negotiations began in Paris in May 1968. The Paris Agreements of
27 January 1973 finally provided the United States with an opportunity to pull out from the
conflict. Their South Vietnamese ally would stand alone for only two years before falling
to the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese. The fall of Saigon on 30 April 1975 marked
the true end of the Vietnam War. The American military intervention in the Vietnamese
quagmire weighed heavily on US policy and caused serious damage to the country’s
international standing, especially in Western Europe.
Soviet expansionism
The USSR profited from the settlement of the Vietnam conflict in 1975 to gain a foothold
in Africa, particularly in Guinea, Mozambique and Angola. The fall of the Ethiopian
imperial regime of Haile Selassie in September 1974 and the immediate establishment of a
Communist dictatorship in the oldest African state only emphasised the Soviet hold over
Africa, at China’s expense. Initially, the United States’ response to the Soviet advance in a
series of Socialist oriented States was restrained and sporadic. For example, the United
States supported the anti-Communist guerrillas in Angola.
However, the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet army on 24 December 1979 provoked
a much more vigorous reaction from the Western world. The USSR was seeking to support
the ruling Communists against increasingly threatening counter-revolutionary guerrillas.
President Carter ordered a boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow and an embargo
on grain exports to the USSR. The UN adopted a resolution condemning this military
invasion. The United States’ response did not stop at diplomatic condemnation. During the
ten years of the conflict, the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) offered
assistance and financial support to the Afghan resistance, or Mujahideen.

Towards the end of the Cold War (1985–1989)

The arms race and ‘Star Wars’
In 1980, the Americans voted in a man who was determined to restore the image of the
United States in the world. New President Ronald Reagan used the term ‘evil empire’ to
describe the USSR and relaunched the arms race. Reagan’s Presidency was particularly
marked by a rise in military spending and a significant increase in the budget for the
armed forces. The arms race reached such a scale that the term ‘balance of terror’ was
coined to describe the global situation. Détente was forgotten and the number of direct and
indirect interventions increased.
This period of tension between East and West fuelled the arms race, the focus of which was
the ‘Star Wars’ programme devised by US President Reagan. On 23 March 1983, Ronald
Reagan announced the launch of a vast technological programme known as the ‘Strategic
Defense Initiative’ (SDI), or ‘Star Wars’: the United States would be protected from enemy
nuclear weapons by a space-based shield that would detect and destroy enemy ballistic
missiles as soon as they were launched. This forced the USSR to match US spending,
furthering their economic difficulties.
The US project (which would never come to fruition) drew the USSR into a frenzied
arms race which led the country to the brink of financial and economic collapse. It
was only in 1985, with the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev in power in the USSR and his
domestic reforms to democratise the Soviet regime, that Moscow decided to put an end to
this reckless arms race that was ruining the country. Gorbachev openly displayed his wish
to develop closer relations with the West and to resume talks with the United States.
The USSR burden due to Arms Race. The USSR spent enormous resources on its military
and defense industries to compete with the United States. This arms race strained the budget
and took away resources from other crucial sectors of the economy.
USSR was facing an economic stagnation. Centralized Planning was ineffective. The
Soviet economy was heavily centralized, which led to bureaucratic hurdles, production
inefficiencies, and a lack of innovation. The focus was on meeting quotas rather than
producing consumer goods, leaving the populace with limited choices and hindering
economic development. The Soviet Union's centrally planned economy struggled to keep
pace with the dynamic and innovative economies of the Western world, particularly the
United States. Years of heavy military spending and inefficiencies in resource allocation
drained the Soviet economy, leading to stagnation and shortages.
The late 20th century was a time of major geopolitical upheaval in Eastern Europe. The
fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 put an end to the Cold War and its divisions,
which dated back to the Second World War. The fall of the Communist bloc brought about
the end of a bipolar world built around the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet
Union. Economic and military structures such as Comecon (the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance) and the Warsaw Pact were dissolved in 1991. The events of the late
1980s marked the beginning of improved relations between two parts of the continent that
had long been divided.
The Eastern bloc in the throes of change. The political events and economic changes in
Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s radically altered the geopolitical situation in Europe
and transformed existing institutions and structures. Aspirations to freedom, democracy and
the defence of human rights, which had long been stifled by the authoritarian regimes of
the Soviet bloc, were expressed more and more openly, thanks in particular to the reforms
introduced in the Soviet Union by Mikhail Gorbachev and his policy of gradually opening
up to the West.
Communist governments, already weakened, quickly collapsed, encouraging the
reawakening of national identities and minorities in the USSR’s satellite states and
then in the Soviet Union itself. Demonstrations and strikes in support of political and
economic reform became increasingly frequent. The fall of the Berlin Wall in November
1989 further accelerated the removal of the Communist regimes. After Poland and Hungary,
authoritarian governments gave way to elected multi-party coalitions in Czechoslovakia,
the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Romania and Bulgaria. The democratic
revolutions also put an end to the Warsaw Pact and the Comecon planned economy system.
The Soviet Union imploded and was unable to prevent the wave of national independence
in the Baltic states and in most of the republics making up the USSR. In 1991, a group of
conservative Communists, fiercely opposed to the turn of events, mounted an unsuccessful
coup to overthrow President Gorbachev. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),
incorporating some of the former republics, replaced the old Soviet Union. The former
satellite states of the Soviet Union, keen to defend human rights and adopt the principles
of the market economy, immediately turned to Western structures.
The Fall of the Berlin Wall and Eastern Bloc. The symbolic fall of the Berlin Wall in
1989 and the collapse of communist governments across Eastern Europe eroded the image
of Soviet power and influence.

Gorbachev’s ‘perestroika’ and ‘glasnost’. On 11 March 1985, at the age of 54, Mikhail
Gorbachev, an apparatchik of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), was
appointed General Secretary of the CPSU by the Central Committee. He aimed to carry out
a root-and-branch reform of the Soviet system, the bureaucratic inertia of which constituted
an obstacle to economic reconstruction (‘perestroika’), and, at the same time, to liberalise
the regime and introduce transparency (‘glasnost’), i.e. a certain freedom of expression and
information.
Mikhail Gorbachev’s reformist policies in the Soviet Union fuelled opposition movements
to the Communist regimes in the Soviet bloc countries. Demonstrations became more
frequent. Governments were forced to accept measures — recommended, moreover, by
Gorbachev — towards liberalisation. However, these measures were not deemed to be
sufficient.
Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms like glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring)
came too late. The Soviet government became rigid and resistant to change, which led to
mounting internal pressures and a loss of legitimacy as people yearned for greater
freedoms.
Hopes of freedom, long suppressed by the Communist regimes in the countries of the Soviet
bloc and in the USSR itself, were inevitably fuelled by Mikhail Gorbachev’s attempted
reforms in the Soviet Union and his conciliatory policy towards the West. It proved
impossible to maintain reformed Communist regimes. They were entirely swept away by
the desire for political democracy and economic liberty. Within three years, the Communist
regimes collapsed and individual nations gained freedom, initially in the USSR’s satellite
countries and then within the Soviet Union itself. The structures of the Eastern bloc
disintegrated with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon. The Soviet Union
broke up into independent republics.
Although popular with the West, Gorbachev was far less so in his own country, where his
reforms resulted in the disruption of the centralised planning system without the
implementation of any real market mechanisms. This resulted in reduced production,
shortages and social discontent, which led to strikes. This discontent could be all the more
strongly expressed within the system of ‘transparency’; all previously withheld information
concerning the activities of the state and its administrative bodies might henceforth be
disclosed and publicly debated. The lifting of the taboos imposed by the Communist
regime, of which intellectuals and liberated dissidents took full advantage, allowed critical
judgment to be passed on the history of the Soviet Union and on its political, economic and
social structure.
Nationalist Movements started within USSR. Various republics within the USSR sought
more autonomy or even full independence. This led to unrest, weakening the power of the
central government in Moscow. Within the Soviet Union, nationalist movements gained
momentum, fueled by long-standing ethnic tensions and resentment toward Moscow's
centralized authority. These movements, particularly in the Baltic states and Eastern
Europe, challenged the Soviet government's legitimacy and ultimately contributed to its
dissolution.
Social Issues in USSR rosed. Corruption increased and simultaneously there was a
decline in living standards of citizens of USSR. Corruption became widespread,
undermining trust in the system. Coupled with economic problems, this led to a decline in
living standards for many.
Disillusionment and Dissatisfaction in USSR increased. The Soviet populace became
increasingly weary of restrictions, economic shortages, and the lack of political freedom,
leading to widespread dissent.
All this resulted into ideological decline of communism. By the late 20th century, the
appeal of communism as an ideological alternative to capitalism had waned significantly,
both domestically and internationally. The lack of political freedoms, combined with
economic stagnation, led to widespread disillusionment among the Soviet populace.
Technological factors played a significant role in the disintegration of the USSR. The
advent of information technology, particularly the spread of personal computers and later
the internet, facilitated the flow of information both within and outside the Soviet Union.
This enabled dissidents to disseminate alternative viewpoints, bypass government
censorship, and organize opposition movements more effectively. Improved
communication technologies, such as satellite television and fax machines, allowed
people in the Soviet Union to access news and information from the West more readily.
This exposed them to contrasting narratives about political and economic systems, fostering
skepticism toward the Soviet regime's propaganda and ideological orthodoxy.
The collapse of Soviet Communism led to dislocation of the Soviet Union, sapped by an
ideological, political and economic crisis. This in turn precipitated the break-up of the
empire, both cause and effect of the end of Communism. The organisations specific to
‘Soviet federalism’ hastened the implosion of the Soviet Union despite being primarily
intended to consolidate it. One after another the Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs)
proclaimed their sovereignty in the summer of 1991. In December of the same year, some
of these republics, which had become independent in the meantime, redefined their
respective links by creating the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
The Collapse. Ultimately, the combined weight of economic problems, political paralysis,
internal unrest, and dwindling global leverage proved unsustainable, leading to the
dissolution of the USSR in 1991

US Hegemony in the 1990s: A Moment of Unipolarity

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 effectively ended the decades-long Cold War
rivalry between the United States and the Soviet bloc. With the demise of its primary
geopolitical competitor, the United States emerged as the sole superpower, wielding
unparalleled influence in international affairs. The 1990s marked a period of unipolarity in
the international system, with the United States emerging as the sole superpower following
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. This period saw US hegemony manifest in several
key areas:
Unmatched Military Power. The US possessed the world's most powerful military, both
in terms of conventional forces and nuclear capabilities. This dominance allowed them to
project power globally and deter potential adversaries. The arms race with the United States
spurred technological advancements in military technology. However, the Soviet Union
struggled to keep pace with Western innovations, leading to a widening technological gap.
The inability to maintain technological parity weakened the Soviet Union's military
capabilities and contributed to its perceived vulnerability.
Expansion of NATO. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expanded eastward,
incorporating former Soviet satellite states, solidifying US influence in Europe. The United
States played a leading role in shaping international institutions and promoting liberal
democratic values, advocating for free trade, human rights, and democratic governance.
American presidents such as George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton exercised considerable
diplomatic influence, mediating conflicts and promoting peace initiatives around the world.
Military Intervention. The US engaged in several military interventions during this
period, including the Gulf War (1991) and the Kosovo War (1999), demonstrating its
willingness to use force to uphold its interests. The United States engaged in a series of
 military interventions and peacekeeping missions in various regions, including the Balkans,
the Middle East, and Africa, asserting US military leadership and reinforcing its role as the
world's policeman.
Economic and Technological Leadership. The US possessed the world's largest and most
diversified economy, giving it significant leverage in international trade and financial
markets. The US economy experienced remarkable growth and prosperity throughout much
of the 1990s, fueled by technological innovation, globalization, and the dot-com boom.
American companies such as Microsoft, Apple, and Google became global leaders in
technology and innovation, while Wall Street emerged as the epicenter of global finance.
Technological Powerhouse. The US continued to be a leader in technological innovation,
driving advancements in fields like computers, the internet, and telecommunications. This
technological edge further strengthened its economic and political influence.
Cultural Influence. American culture, with its emphasis on individualism, democracy, and
consumerism, spread globally through various channels such as music, movies, and
television. This cultural influence served to promote US values and interests. American
cultural products, including films, music, television shows, and consumer brands,
permeated markets worldwide, shaping global popular culture and lifestyle trends.
Hollywood became synonymous with cinematic excellence, while American fashion, fast
food, and consumer goods attained iconic status across continents
The 1990s witnessed an unprecedented era of globalization, characterized by increased
interconnectedness and interdependence among nations. The United States, as the world's
largest economy and a proponent of free trade, played a central role in shaping the global
economic order, fostering trade liberalization, and promoting economic integration.

4.3 Theories of International Relation

Realism in IR
Realism is the most well-established theoretical perspective in International Relations. Realists
have traditionally held that the major problem of international relations was one of anarchy.
Anarchy prevailed because, in international relations, there was no sovereign authority that
could enforce the rule of law and ensure that ‘wrongdoers’ were punished. The League of
Nations was a poor substitute for a truly sovereign power possessing a system of law and a
military under the control of a single, sovereign government. However, realists went on to argue
that it was impossible to set up a genuine world government, because states would not give up
their sovereignty to an inter- national body. Accordingly, realists argued that war could not be
avoided completely. It is necessary, therefore, to accept the inevitability of war and pursue the
necessary preparations for conflict. Only in this way can war be properly deterred, or at least
managed.
 Anarchy: a condition in which there exists no centralised sovereign authority that enforces the
rule of law. Realists are concerned with anarchy at the international level where there is no
authority higher than the state.

Realists argued that the long history of world politics demonstrated that it was not an exercise
in writing laws and treaties or in creating international organisations. Instead it was a struggle
for power and security carried out under conditions of ‘every country for itself’. By way of
reference, they called themselves ‘realists’ and labelled the previously dominant approach
‘idealism’. Realists argued that the focus of research in world politics should be on discovering
the important forces that drive the relations between states.
Realists believed that the pursuit of power and national interest were the major forces driving
world politics. Focusing on these important forces, they argued, revealed that leaders had far
less freedom to organise the world, and solve its problems, than proponents of idealism had
originally suggested. Although realists accepted that laws and morality were a part of the
workings of world politics, respect for law would only be achieved if it were backed by the
threat of force. Realists also insisted that a state’s primary obligation was to its own citizens,
not to a rather abstract ‘international community’.
Realists argued that, rather than concentrating on disarmament as a root to peace and security
(a central objective of the League of Nations), states must, paradoxically, prepare for war.
Realists believed that conflict was inevitable and so the best chance of avoiding war was to be
strong in the face of real or potential aggression. Realists claimed that relying on reason to
resolve the problem of war was utopian and ignored certain objective truths about world
politics. Although still in its infancy, even at this stage, International Relations theory was
showing signs of what was to become a central characteristic; it ‘evolved’ through a series of
debates. The Second World War effectively settled the first great debate of International
Relations in favour of the realists. The Cold War simply reinforced this view and allowed
realism to continue to dominate International Relations scholarship throughout the 1950s and
1960s.
Neo-realism shares many core assumptions of traditional realism regarding the state, the
problem of power and the pursuit of interests. However, neo-realists place more emphasis on
the anarchic structure of the international system and the impact that the structure has on the
behaviour of states as well as acknowledging, to a certain extent, the importance of non-state
actors.
Key Assumptions of Realism
The assumptions of realism are that:
• States are the key actors in international relations.
• Sovereignty, or independence and self-control, is the defining characteristic of the state.
• States are motivated by a drive for power, security and pursuit of the ‘national interest’.
• States, like men, behave in a self-interested manner.
 • The central problem in international relations is the condition of anarchy, which means
the lack of a central sovereign authority at the global level to regulate relations between
states.
• The aggressive intent of states, combined with the lack of world government, means
that conflict is an unavoidable and ever-present reality of international relations.
• A semblance of order and security can be maintained by shifting alliances among states
so preventing any one state from becoming overwhelmingly powerful and, thus,
constituting a threat to the peace and security of others.
• International institutions and law play a role in international relations, but are only
effective if backed by force or effective sanction.
• Power is the key to understanding international behaviour and state motivation. For
realists the main form of power is military or physical power.
• Human nature can be said to be inherently selfish and constant. As a result, humans will
act to further their own interests even to the detriment of others, which can often lead
to conflict. Because human nature is unchanging, there is little prospect that this kind
of behaviour will change.

Marxism in International Relations

With the emergence of global problems, particularly those related to the vagaries of capitalism
and neo-liberalism, there has been renewed interest in the application of the theory in
international relations discourse. There appears to be highlights of the increased class struggle
in the form of the “new world’ and the “old world”, or, in simple terms, the developed and the
developing societies. In an attempt to illuminate on these class struggles at the international
level and explaining why events happen the way they do, insights have emerged from
contributions by Marx, Lenin, and Neo-Marxists.
Like any other theory of renewed interest in international relations, the Marxist-Leninist theory
seeks to provide a “comprehensive, coherent, and self-correcting body of knowledge capable
of the prediction, the evaluation, and the control of relations among states and of condition of
the world”.
Though some scholars in the field have doubted the existence of the Marxist theory of
international relations, interestingly, in analysing the contributions of classical Marxism and
contemporary Neo-Marxists, one is made aware of the applicability of Marxists ideas,
especially as it regards to imperialism, neo-colonialism, and current globalization trends, social
conflict war, and the revolution (Evans & Newnham). Marxists view the international system
as an integrated capitalist system in pursuit of capital accumulation.

CLASS STRUGGLE AND MARXISM

According to Marx, all history is the history of class struggle between the ruling group/class
and the dominated class. As it relates to states [the key actors in international relations], Lenin
divided them into two groups: the oppressed and the oppressor. In relation to international
politics, the classes are not classes in the strict sense as they are understood in the national
analysis, but they are classes amongst states. In this sense, states, themselves, assumed class-
consciousness on the world scale. Thus the oppressed (the workers or the developing countries)
continue to create value and the value is not returned to them, but appropriated by the
capitalists. Thus, it is not the capitalist ruling class that creates wealth, but the workers (which
are the developing countries). The capitalists at the centre appropriate this wealth to
themselves.
Like any other theory, the Marxist theory is of course not perfect in its entirety. However, in
relation to international relations, much of the criticism has been unwarranted especially with
some authorities going to the extent of dismissing the existence of the Marxist-Leninist’s theory
of international relations. Martin Wright, for example, has asserted that neither Marx nor Lenin
nor Stalin made any systematic contribution to the international relations theory, adding,
“Lenin’s imperialism comes to such a thing, and this has little to say about international
politics” (Wright, 1966)
All societies serve to develop the productive forces, but there comes a time when these forces
rebel against the constraints imposed upon them by the outdated super structure of society. A
new class emerges from the womb of the old society, whose task is to overthrow the older and
lay the basis for a new organization of society. Under capitalism, a world market has been
created, which world has laid the material basis for socialism. Consequently, the working class
is born, not only as a source of exploitation, but as a revolutionary class. Experience, through
mighty battles, teaches the working class to become conscious of its role, by firstly developing
class-consciousness and then a socialist consciousness. In other words, it is the task of the
working class to overthrow capitalism and bring about socialism. In essence the “emancipation
of the working class is the task of the working class itself” (Marx & Engels, 1848).
The gap between the rich and the poor is getting wider and wider. According to David Mitchell,
if current trends continue, then it will be the year 2147 before areas, such as Sub-Saharan
Africa, can hope to half the number of people in poverty (David Mitchell, 2003). Regular
statistics from the World Bank and the United Nations, paint an alarming catalogue of human
misery, degradation, and death. That is the reality of capitalism in the developing world.
Ironically, it is the very policies of institutions, such as the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund, that are forcing whole countries to adopt the bankrupt and corrupt policies of
privatization and the opening up of markets to the plunder of the multi-national companies that
is making the situation worse. For the developing world, the 1990s indicates the lost decade of
development as the policies that were adopted by some developing countries on the advice of
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund exacerbated poverty. the working class, and
by extension the masses internationally, have lost the entire 20th Century and the beginning of
the 21st because of the absolute failure of capitalism to advance the mass of humanity by
refusing outright to entertain predominantly home grown policies that are sustainably, and,
deliberately pro-poor.

The struggle against the neo-liberal policies being peddled championed and internationalized
by the West or developed world represents a situation that confirms third world fears, that
“globalization is a combination of colonization and corporatization” (Hellyer, 1999). This fits
well with McPherson’s observation that “possessive market society necessarily puts in a
dependent position not only wage-earners but also those without a substantial (and by the
natural operation of the market, an increasing) amount of capital”. (C. B McPherson, 1968).
Adopting the sentiments of Vekris and McGarry (1999), arguing along Marxist thought, the
bane of the world today is:
Neo-liberalism and its crafty scheme to continue exploiting the unprotected people of the world
through high sounding concepts such as globalization, “free” trade, “free” investment, “free”
enterprise, and the democracy of the US dollar.
Capitalism, according to the Marxist-Leninist theory, creates all the problems being faced
globally. It gives a rise to war to further its own ends. The conflict in Afghanistan, Iraq and the
former Yugoslavia, just to mention a few examples, bears witness to the hidden agenda to use
ideological justification in “disciplining” the so-called rogue state that oppose the neoliberal
agenda, and thereby ultimately ensure access to oil in the Gulf and the Middle Eastern states.
The move to control the oppressed state is imperialism and this is done through the creation of
monopolies and financial capital spread across the world in search of new markets and
resources (Kubalkova and Cruikshank). This task is being well served by the Bretton Woods
Institutions and the World Trade Organisation.
Capitalism promotes the primacy of markets as the drivers of the economy, further detesting
government intervention in the running of the economy save for a very narrowly limited,
regulatory role. Competition is touted as a minimum requirement but without necessarily
appreciating that the poor and dispossessed masses have no decent chance of competing with
big capital. Indeed, at first sight some of the features of capitalism might seem to indicate
progress, with supporters of capitalism led globalisation adamant that it will eventually lead to
better conditions for poorer countries. Resultantly, misleading adages like ‘Only winners, no
losers’ continue to gain currency. Yet, in fact, the real object is to promote freedom for
international (mainly US) big business – via the World Trade Organization (WTO), the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) – to do as it likes around the
world.
With the avocation for free enterprise in the globalization drive, capitalism does lose its free
competitive element and is being rapidly replaced by a directly opposite capitalist monopoly.
This creates large scale industries, replacing the small industries with the expansion of MNCs,
serving the interests of their mother countries. The West, themselves the chief architects and
also beneficiaries of a world capitalist organised society (especially with the end of the Cold
War in 1989), will always predictably advocate for ‘free markets’ so as to perpetuate their
control over the oppressed, and more importantly, to continue exploiting them. This leads us to
conclude that the gospel according to capitalism is neither a panacea to poor societies’
development, nor is it proffered as a forward-looking model to ensure sustainable development,
but is first and foremost a ploy to maintain the West’s privileged position.
Nothing other than the debilitating debt trap afflicting Third World societies helps unpack the
unsustainable nature of capitalist structures. One can turn to Rob Lyon, who says millions of
people can see clearly that the debt in the Third World countries is imperialist robbery, in most
cases these countries have paid back their principle loans and are simply paying interest, which
amounts to billions of dollars over and above what they originally owed. In this way, the
countries of the colonial world are creditors, as much as debtors.
 Liberalism in International Relations

Liberal thought about the nature of international relations has a long tradition dating back to
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. During these centuries liberal philosophers and
political thinkers debated the difficulties of establishing just, orderly and peaceful relations
between peoples.
One of the most systematic and thoughtful accounts of the problems of world peace was
produced by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant in 1795 in an essay entitled Perpetual
Peace. Kantian thought has been profoundly influential in the development of liberalism in IR
In the wake of the destruction of the First World War, there was a sense of greater urgency to
discover the means of preventing conflict. The senseless waste of life which characterised this
conflict brought about a new determination that reason and cooperation must prevail.
While the conflict itself was horrific, International Relations scholars were initially quite
optimistic about the possibilities of ending the misery of war. A new generation of scholars was
deeply interested in schemes which would promote cooperative relations among states and
allow the realisation of a just and peaceful international order, such as the fledgling League of
Nations
This liberal or idealist enterprise rested on the beliefs that people in general are inherently good
and have no interest in prosecuting wars with one another. Furthermore, people suffer greatly
as a consequence of war and thus desire dialogue over belligerence. Therefore, for idealists all
that was needed to end war was respect for the rule of law and stable institutions which could
provide some form of international order conducive to peace and security. The widespread anti-
war sentiment within Europe and North America which existed in the 1920s seemed to provide
the necessary widespread public support for such an enterprise to succeed.
During the late 1930s and following the Second World War, idealism fell out of favour for a
long period of time, as realism seemed to provide a better account of the power politics
characteristic of the post-war era. The decline in the popularity of idealism was partly
encouraged by the failure of The League of Nations to act as a forum for resolving differences
peacefully and as a mechanism to prevent inter-state conflict. With the outbreak of a number
of major conflicts in the inter-war period, the onset of economic nationalism as a result of the
Great Depression and World War Two, it is not entirely surprising that a much more pessimistic
view of world politics prevailed from the 1940s onwards. However, idealism dominated the
academic study of International Relations between the First and Second World Wars with its
basic faith in the potential for good in human beings and in the promise of the rule of law,
democracy and human rights and continues to be influential within liberal IR theory today.
There have been many innovations in liberal theory since the 1970s which are reflected in a
number of distinctive strands of thought within liberalism. For example, idealism, pluralism,
interdependence theory, transnationalism, liberal internationalism, liberal peace theory, neo-
liberal institutionalism and world society approaches. In the 1970s a liberal literature on
transnational relations and world society developed. So called ‘liberal pluralists’ pointed to the
growing importance of multinational corporations (MNCs), non-governmental organisations
(NGOs), pressure groups, and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), as evidence that states
were no longer the only significant actors in international relations. Liberal pluralists believed
that power, influence and agency in world politics were now exercised by a range of different
types of actors.
Key Assumptions
The main points of the liberal world view or perspective can then be summarised thus:
1. Rationality and inherent good nature are the defining characteristics of human kind.
Rationality can be used in two distinctive ways:
• in instrumental terms, as the ability to articulate and pursue one’s ‘interests’;
• The ability to understand moral principles and live according to the rule of law.
2. While people rationally pursue their own interests, there is a potential harmony of interests
between people.
3. Cooperation is possible and is in fact a central feature of all human relations, including
international relations.
4. Liberalism challenges the distinction between the domestic and the international realm,
claiming that multiple sets of relationships between people transcend national borders.
• Government is necessary, but the centralisation of power is inherently bad.
• Individual liberty is of supreme political importance.
From these basic propositions we can deduce or infer a number of other propositions which
continue to inform liberal approaches to international relations. For example:
• If humans are inherently good and there is a harmony of interests between people, we
might deduce that left to their own devices, people have no interest in prosecuting wars.
• If the centralisation of power is bad, political pluralism and democracy must be a
superior form of political organisation.
• Because cooperation is possible, liberals believe it is thus possible to achieve positive
changes in international relations.
• Similarly, liberals tend to emphasise the distribution of different forms of power
(including military, economic, socio-cultural and intellectual forms) and influence
among a range of actors, rather than focusing solely on the state.
• Furthermore, humans are important actors and possess agency to effect change.
• If reason is the defining characteristic of the human race, all people must have
inalienable human rights.
• Liberalism is a Universalist doctrine and so is committed to some notion of a universal
com- munity of humankind which transcends identification with, and membership of,
the nation-state community.
• The liberal concepts of interdependence and world society suggest that in the
contemporary world the boundaries between states are becoming increasingly
permeable.
BALANCE OF POWER
Used objectively or descriptively, the term indicates the relative distribution of power among
states into equal or unequal shares. Traditionally, it refers to a state of affairs in which no one
state predominates over others. Prescriptively, it refers to a policy of promoting a power
equilibrium on the assumption that unbalanced power is dangerous. Prudent states that are at a
disadvantage in the balance of power will (or at least should) form an alliance against a
potentially hegemonic state or take other measures to enhance their ability to restrain a possible
aggressor. Also, one state may opt for a self-conscious balancing role, changing sides as
necessary to preserve the equilibrium. A balance of power policy requires that a state moderate
its independent quest for power, since too much power for one state may bring about self-
defeating reactions of fear and hostility from other states.
All balance of power systems have certain conditions in common:

• a multiplicity of sovereign states unconstrained by any legitimate central authority;

• continuous but controlled competition over scarce resources or conflicting values;
• An unequal distribution of status, wealth, and power potential among the political actors
that make up the system.

Inequality and the ever-present threat of violence combine to give the dominant and the
subordinate states a shared but unequal interest in preserving the order of the system, whose
equilibrium protects their sovereignty. The balance of power is a kind of compromise among
states that find its order preferable to absolute chaos, even though it is a system that favours
the stronger and more prosperous states at the expense of sovereign equality for all of them.
Great powers play the leading roles in balance of power systems because of their preponderant
military force and their control of key technologies. A dominant or hegemonic state will often
try to justify its position either by providing certain public goods for other states (such as a
beneficial economic order or international security), or because it embraces values that are
common to a set of states. Great powers reap a disproportionate share of the benefits of the
system, but they also bear a greater responsibility as its regulators. It is common to make some
key distinctions about the balance of power. First is the distinction between unipolarity,
bipolarity, and multipolarity.

• Unipolarity is a situation in which one state or superpower dominates the international

system. [Many would argue that the United States is in this position today.

• Bipolarity exists when two states or blocs of states are roughly equal in power. The term is
often applied to the period of the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union,
although it is misleading. Simply because the two superpowers were both more powerful than
all other states, they were not equally as powerful as each other. The Soviet pole was far weaker
than its rival in economic terms, although its ability to engage in a sustained nuclear arms race
with its rival and project its conventional military power abroad concealed its underlying
weakness.
• Multipolarity refers to a situation in which there are at least three great powers. The classic
example is nineteenth-century Europe. In this case, one state’s greater military and economic
strength does not necessarily give it preponderance because weaker states can combine against
it.
A second important distinction is between regional or local balances and the balance of power
in the international system as a whole. Although historians have often spoken of the European
balance of power in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as if it were the whole of
international relations, this was effectively true only for the brief period when European states
dominated the rest of the world. Today, we have a number of regional balances overlaid by a
unipolar pattern.
A third distinction is between a subjective and an objective balance of power. One of the great
difficulties of evaluating the balance of power in the twenty-first century is that power
resources are unevenly distributed among the great powers and there is no simple
correspondence between possession of a resource and the ability to control outcomes as a
consequence. For example, whilst the United States is overwhelmingly dominant in terms of
military power, economic power is much more evenly distributed between the United States,
Western Europe, Japan, China and India.

One of the most contested issues in the study of international relations is the relationship
between the balance of power and the stability of the international system. One should note
that the term ‘stability’ is itself contested! For example, it can mean peace but it can also refer
to the endurance of a particular distribution of power regardless of how peaceful it is. Some
scholars argue that multipolarity is less stable than unipolarity or bipolarity. Under
multipolarity, threats are allegedly more difficult to evaluate, and there is a tendency for states
to ‘pass the buck’ and rely on others to balance against an emerging state. On the other hand,
when power is concentrated among one or two superpowers that compete at a global level, they
are likely to export their rivalry abroad. For example, although the United States and the former
Soviet Union never fought a war directly with each other, over 20 million people died in the
Third World as the superpowers intervened in a series of so-called ‘proxy wars’ in the second
half of the twentieth century.

The debate between supporters and opponents of particular balance of power systems is
inconclusive for two main reasons.
First, the distribution of power among states is a variable located at a structural level of
analysis. Its relationship to outcomes at the level of relations among states has to be determined
in light of the character of the great powers and their particular relationships.
Second, since the origins of the modern state system in the seventeenth century, there are too
few cases of different systems across which one can make meaningful comparisons.
The balance of power is a dynamic concept which, in practice, has to be understood in context.
For example, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the allegedly bipolar balance of the cold
war when so much of the competition between the United States and the former Soviet Union
revolved around the novel challenges of the nuclear era.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

The basic principle behind this concept can be summed up in the phrase ‘one for all and all for
one’. As a means of maintaining peace between states, the legal and diplomatic organisation of
collective security can be located midway between the two extremes of an unregulated balance
of power and a world government. Although the idea of a single world government is
sometimes entertained as a
solution to the problem of war, it is extremely unlikely to be brought about by conscious design.
The idea of collective security is attractive because it seeks to bring about some of the alleged
benefits of a world government without altering the essential features of an anarchical states
system.

In formal terms, collective security refers to a set of legally established mechanisms designed
to prevent or suppress aggression by any state against any other state. This is achieved by
presenting to potential/ actual aggressors the credible threat, and to potential/actual victims the
reliable promise, of effective collective measures to maintain and if necessary enforce the
peace. Such measures can range from diplomatic boycotts to the imposition of sanctions and
even military action. The essence of the idea is the collective punishment of aggressors through
the use of overwhelming power. States belonging to such a system renounce the use of force
to settle disputes among themselves but at the same time promise to use collective force against
any aggressor. In
all other respects states remain sovereign entities.
The purpose of a collective security system is to maintain peace among the members of the
system, not between the system and outsiders. For example, NATO is not a collective security
system. It is an alliance, or perhaps it could be called a collective defence system. Ideally, in a
global collective security system alliances are unnecessary. Collective security allows states to
renounce the unilateral use of force because they are assured of assistance if a state illegally
uses force against them. Simultaneously, it requires that all states participate in enforcing
sanctions against an aggressor.

There are three reasons why many commentators (and sometimes states) have found the idea
of collective security attractive. First, it promises security to all states, not just some of the most
powerful. Ideally, all states have an incentive to join such a system, since they are all subject
to the threat of war. Second, in principle collective security provides much greater certainty in
international relations, at least in promoting a concerted response to war. Third, collective
security is focused on an apparently clear problem – that of aggression, which is typically
defined as the military violation of the territorial integrity and political independence of
member states.
The first major attempt to implement a system of collective security took place at the end of
the First World War, with the signing of the League of Nations Covenant. With Article 10 of
the Covenant, peace was guaranteed and together with Article 16, which provided the threat of
counteraction, they formed the core of collective security. Every member state was asked in
Article 10 to guarantee the territorial and political integrity of all other member states. To secure
this promise, each member state was (according to Article 16) automatically at war with an
aggressor. The sorry history of the League of Nations in failing to maintain international peace
and security (its successor, the United Nations, does not even mention the term ‘collective
security’ in its Charter) reflects some fundamental problems with this concept as a means to
maintain peace. First, unless collective security really is universal, and in particular includes
the most powerful states in the system, it is unlikely to be effective. If the latter are outside the
system, then other states cannot rely on collective security to protect themselves from the great
powers. This was particularly the case in the interwar period. The United States never joined
the system, and other great powers (including the Soviet Union, China, Germany, and Japan)
were never permanent members of the system. Second, the effectiveness of collective security
depends on states sharing the view that peace is ‘indivisible’. Aggression against any states
meant to trigger the same behaviour amongst members, regardless of where it takes place or
the identity of aggressor and victim. This view was shared by many states at the end of the First
World War in light of the manner in which that war had spread so rapidly and the degree of
destruction it had caused. None the less, it remains somewhat idealistic to believe that
collective security can totally replace the balance of power and the calculations of national
interest. For example, the refusal of some states to impose sanctions against Italy after its
invasion of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in December 1934 was due to their belief that Italy could still
be a useful ally against Germany. Third, despite its apparent simplicity, the term ‘aggression’
is notoriously difficult to define in practice. For example, Japanese treaties with China allowed
Japan to keep troops stationed on Japanese railways in Manchuria and those troops had the
right of self-defence. When a-bomb exploded on a railway near the city of Mukden in
September 1931, the Japanese took over the city and soon had control over the whole province
of Manchuria. China claimed that Japan had committed aggression. Japan claimed that it was
acting in self-defence. It took the League a whole year to determine who was right, by which
time the Japanese had succeeded in setting up their own puppet state in the area. Finally, the
concept of collective security is deeply conservative. It is dedicated to the maintenance of the
territorial status quo, identifying ‘aggression’ as the worst crime in international relations, and
it assumes that peaceful mechanisms of territorial change exist which make war unnecessary.
In the twenty-first century, when war within states rather than between them is likely to be the
norm, collective security is unlikely to provide a solution even if the great powers share its
basic assumptions.
The concept of "collective security" forwarded by men such as Michael Joseph Savage, Martin
Wight, Immanuel Kant, and Woodrow Wilson, are deemed to apply interest’s insecurity in a
broad manner, to "avoid grouping powers into opposing camps, and refusing to draw dividing
lines that would leave anyone out."
Collective security selectively incorporates the concept of both balance of power and global
government. Thus it is important to know and distinguish these two concepts. Balance of power
between states opts for decentralization of power. States are separate actors who do not
subordinate their autonomy or sovereignty to a central. Thus, "singly or in combinations
reflecting the coincidence of interests, States seek to influence the pattern of power distribution
and to determine their own places within that pattern. “The expectation of order and peace
comes from the belief that competing powers will somehow balance and thereby cancel each
other out to produce “deterrence through equilibration. “On the flip side, the concept of global
government is about centralization. Global government is a centralized institutional system that
possesses the power use of force like a well-established sovereign nation state. This concept
strips states of their "standing as centres of power and policy, where issues of war and peace
are concerned, “and superimposing on them "an institution possessed of the authority and
capability to maintain, by unchallengeable force so far as may be necessary, the order and
stability of a global community." Collective security selectively incorporates both of this
concepts which can broil down to a phrase: "order without government."
Basic assumptions
Organski (1960) lists five basic assumptions underlying the theory of collective security: [21]
• In an armed conflict, member nation-states will be able to agree on which nation the
aggressor is.

• All member nation-states are equally committed to contain and constrain the
aggression, irrespective of its source or origin.

• All member nation-states have identical freedom of action and ability to join in
proceedings against the aggressor.

• The cumulative power of the cooperating members of the alliance for collective security
will be adequate and sufficient to overpower the might of the aggressor.

• In the light of the threat posed by the collective might of the nations of a collective
security coalition, the aggressor nation will modify its policies, or if unwilling to do so,
will be defeated.

Prerequisites
Morgenthau (1948) states that three prerequisites must be met for collective security to
successfully prevent war:
• The collective security system must be able to assemble military force in strength
greatly in excess to that assembled by the aggressor(s) thereby deterring the
aggressor(s) from attempting to change the world order defended by the collective
security system.

• Those nations, whose combined strength would be used for deterrence as mentioned in
the first prerequisite, should have identical beliefs about the security of the world order
that the collective is defending.
 • Nations must be willing to subordinate their conflicting interests to the common good
defined in terms of the common defence of all member-states.

International Terrorism

The Oxford Advanced Dictionary defines terrorism as the use of violent action in order to
achieve political aims or to force a government to act. The Encyclopedia Britannica describes
terrorism as the systematic use of terror or unpredictable violence against governments, public or
individuals, to attain a political objective It can be broadly defined as violent behaviour designed
to generate fear in the community or a substantial segment of it for political purpose. It is the use
of violence on the part of non-governmental groups to achieve political ends. According to the
Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, terrorism is a method whereby an organized group or party
seeks to achieve its vowed aims chiefly through the systematic use of violence.
The terrorists use various methods to cause panic and fear among people. Some of these methods
include hostage taking, hijacking, political assassination, kidnapping, bombing, and explosions.
Terrorism has several objectives, such as, to advertise the movement or to give publicity to the
ideology and strength of the movement; to mobilize mass support and urge sympathizers to
greater militancy; to eliminate opponents and informers and thus remove obstacles to the growth
of the movement; to demonstrate the inability of the government to support the people and
maintain order; to destroy internal stability and create a feeling of fear and insecurity among the
public; and to ensure the allegiance and obedience of the followers.
CAUSES OF TERRORISM

Terrorism has several causes which can be related to social, historical, cultural, religious,
economic, and psychological aspects. The following could be seen as some of the causes of
terrorism:
The Reality of Persistent Disputes: Terrorism has its breeding ground in conflicts. Reasons for
conflicts, however, can vary widely. Basically, it is the differences in objectives and ideologies
that show the way to conflict. Some of the historical examples to this effect are: dominance of
territory or resources by various ethnic, linguistic, religious or cultural groups; aspiration for
freedom from foreign regimes; imposition of a particular form of govemment, such as
democracy, theocracy, oligarchy, or dictatorship; economic deprivation of a population; and real
or perceived instances of injustices.
Dearth of Reasonable Redressal Procedure: The absence of a systematic and proper redressal
system can cause continued terrorist activities. If such a system were to exist, people will have
recourse to it and thus solve conflicting situations. When such systems are not available due to
their nonexistence, sloth, corruption; or unaffordable cost, the socially and culturally wounded
people will get tempted to seek solution by themselves. Terrorist activities thus can arise from a
sense of denial of lawful right of a certain group of people, for which they have been demanding
determinedly.
Weakness of the Distressed People: When there are violent discords coupled with the absence of
a genuine redressal system, there could be attempts to find solutions to the problems by force.
This could result in various kinds of organized violence like communal riots and war. However,
violence takes an ugly form through terrorism when the distressed people realize their inability to
influence the dominator, due to their weakness. In such a situation, they are unable to face the
oppressive forces face to face or in a direct manner. Therefore, they go underground and fight for
their cause.

Misguidance: When children and youth are not brought up responsibly by their parents or
guardians, there is a high risk for them to get involved with violent groups or militancy. There
are vested interested groups who indoctrinate young minds to take up arms to right for their
causes which are sometimes fabricated. Often, an ideology of hatred in the name of religion,
ethnic loyalty or nationalism are injected into the minds of people. These youngsters are trained
to cause destruction and are armed with deadly weapons. Their misguidance becomes complete
when they are taught to regard the death and destruction of their enemies as a glorious
achievement and their own possible death in the process as heroic martyrdom.

Influence of the Mass Media: Mass media are showing keen interest in terrorism and in the
issues related to it. We find radio stations, television channels, newspapers, and Web pages often
discussing this subject. These broadcasts reach a large portico of people in the world, especially
those in the West and intensify the fear that the threat of terrorism generates. The terrorists make
use of this effect of the media, thus turning them into an unwilling al1y. The wide coverage
given in the media motivates a terrorist organization to go ahead with their plans, since they
know for sure that they action will be made known to the whole world and thus draw greater
attention to the cause. Often, the live coverage of the terrorist activity helps the perpetrators of
violence to get away from the site of the violence in an easy manner. In such cases, the mass
media can become an unwilling ally of terrorism.

Democratic State: Though it is opined by researchers that democratic nations are generally less
vulnerable to terrorism, however, they too are not free from terrorist activities. There is a
complex relationship between terrorism and democracy. Though in one sense democracy
diminishes the risk of terrorism by undercutting some of its reasons, in another sense it often
contributes to its prevalence. The open nature of democratic societies makes them vulnerable to
terrorism. In such societies, civil liberties are protected, and government control and constant
surveillance of the people and their activities are kept to the minimum. Taking advantage of such
restraints by the government, terrorists have stepped up their activities. Studies done on the
relationship between liberal societies and terrorism suggest that concessions awarded to terrorists
have increased the frequency of terrorist attacks. By contrast, repressive societies, where the
government closely monitors citizens and restricts their speech and movement, have often
provided more difficult environments for terrorists.
It should also be noted that in democratic societies the risk of terrorism is compounded if the law
enforcement is slow or inefficient. In such democracies the aggrieved people, having lost faith in
the ability of the legal system of the country to deliver justice, are seen to take law into their own
hands, and if they are weak, they do it clandestinely.

Globalization: It can be said that globalization, though not a direct cause of terrorism, it can often
contribute to the menace of terrorism. The situation brought about by the linkage, even fusion,
around the world of communications and financial systems has contributed to the promotion of
global terrorism. Again, new communications such as the Internet and satellite phones have made
it possible for the extremist terrorist and political organizations to build large
organizational networks, exchange information, and combine resources.

Psychological Factors: Many psychologists believe that the key to understand terrorism lies in
understanding people. According to this perspective, terrorism is purely the result of
psychological forces, not a well-thought-out strategy aimed at achieving rational, strategic ends.
Therefore, psychologists emphasize the study of the mind of the terrorists. Accordingly, various
attempts have been made to gain knowledge of the hidden psychic dynamism which incites a
person to perform such acts without any qualm of conscience. There is another psychological
view which says that the terrorists are normal individuals, who due to their deep emotional need
and a high order of motivation on the grounds of nationalism or religious sentiment forces him to
take up the path of violence. Another reason for taking up terrorism could be due to the desire to
overcome loneliness. They claim that many terrorists are people who have been rejected in some
fashion by society and tend to be loners. Since it is in human nature to be part of a group, an
alienated loner is naturally drawn towards any group that will accept him, give him a sense of
mission, and provide him the ways and means of accomplishing it, along with monetary gains
too.
CONSEQUENCES OF TERRORISM

The causes of the growing terrorism in a State are many. Mostly the terrorists are motivated by
religious and political consideration, but there are also economic factors.

Environmental Consequences: Terrorist activities can paralyze the entire cosmos with its
vulnerable activities. It can be said that every terrorist attack is a way of demeaning the entire
universe. The cosmos, which is the habitat of life, is dishonored into a place of death and doom.
The very fact that a human being is a cosmic reality, he/she is automatically dehumanized in the
wake of every terrorist activity. Anything that is done against the cosmic rta is going to affect all
the living and non-living beings of the universe. Sowing the seeds of disorder, disharmony and
discontent has turned to be the work of a number of psychosomatics.

Political Consequences: Terrorism builds up both direct and indirect pressure on the government
to weaken it physically and psychologically. The function of terror can also be to discourage the
people from cooperating with or giving information to the government. The deepest anxiety
amongst ordinary people arises when they fear a collapse of law and order. Terrorism works
towards a collapse of the social order and terrorists exploit this situation by trying to project them
as a better alternative. In this state of fear and anxiety the essential services may not function
properly. Terrorism grew out of political anarchy.

Terror incorporates two facets: first, a state of fear or anxiety within an individual or a group and
second, the tool that induces the state of fear. Thus, terror involves the threat or use of symbolic
violent acts aimed at influencing political behavior. Following World War II, political terrorism
reemerged on the international scene. During the 1960s, political terrorism appeared to have
entered into another phase. Perhaps the two most significant qualitative changes were: first, its
transnational character and second, its emergence as a self-sufficient strategy, namely, operating
independently of the larger political arena.
Political terrorism occurs as the result of a conscious decision by ideologically inspired groups to
strike back at what their members may perceive as unjust within a given society or polity. The
answers to contemporary political terrorism, therefore, would have to be found within this larger
social, economic, political, and psychological context.

Economic Consequences: Terrorism aims at maximizing economic impact in the world at large.
The destruction of the twin-towers on that Tuesday of 11th September, 2001 has caused much
confusion and disarray in the global economic scenario. Since each act of terrorism is designed
in such a way as to have an impact on the larger audience, its reverberations and after effects are
largely seen in the economic area. Nations and government machineries are forced to equip
themselves with latest technologies to combat the network of terrorism. All those involve the
bifurcation of national funds which could be made use of other purposes. Terrorism, in other
words, deteriorates the economy of a nation. The economy of a nation does not include its
financial conditions alone. It deals with all forms of wealth such as human resource, natural
resource, intellectual power, aesthetic power, creative power, money-power and so on.
Therefore, economic consequences of terrorism affect all forms of wealth without which human
life would be impossible.
Mechanism to deal with international terrorism
Dealing with international terrorism is a complex challenge that requires a multifaceted approach
involving cooperation among nations, intelligence agencies, law enforcement, and international
organizations. Here are some key mechanisms and strategies to address international terrorism:

International Cooperation: Strengthen cooperation among nations through bilateral and multilateral
agreements. Share intelligence and information related to terrorism across borders. Collaborate on
joint counter-terrorism operations and investigations.
United Nations (UN) Involvement: Utilize the United Nations to coordinate global efforts against
terrorism. Support and adhere to international conventions and resolutions addressing terrorism.
Enhanced Intelligence Sharing: Establish efficient mechanisms for the timely exchange of intelligence
among intelligence agencies of different countries. Develop international databases to track and
monitor individuals involved in terrorist activities.
Diplomatic Measures: Engage in diplomatic initiatives to address the root causes of terrorism, such as
poverty, political instability, and religious extremism. Encourage dialogue and negotiation to resolve
conflicts that may contribute to the rise of terrorism.
Border Security: Strengthen border security measures to prevent the movement of terrorists and illegal
activities across borders. Implement international standards for secure travel documentation.
Financial Controls: Implement measures to track and freeze the financial assets of terrorist
organizations. Collaborate with international financial institutions to monitor and combat the
financing of terrorism.
Legal Framework: Develop and enforce strong domestic and international legal frameworks to
prosecute individuals involved in terrorism. Facilitate extradition of terrorists between countries.
Capacity Building: Assist countries in developing their capacities for counter-terrorism efforts,
including law enforcement, intelligence, and judicial systems. Provide training and technical
assistance to strengthen the capabilities of at-risk nations.
Counter-radicalization Programs: Develop and implement programs to counter radicalization and
extremism, focusing on education, community engagement, and outreach.
Cybersecurity Measures: Enhance cybersecurity to prevent online recruitment, communication, and
coordination of terrorist activities. Collaborate on international efforts to combat cyber threats
associated with terrorism.
Humanitarian Aid and Development: Provide humanitarian aid to areas affected by terrorism to
address socio-economic issues and promote stability. Support sustainable development to counter the
conditions conducive to terrorism.
Global Awareness and Media Cooperation: Foster global awareness about the dangers of terrorism
and promote a united front against it.Collaborate with media organizations to counter terrorist
propaganda and misinformation. It's crucial to note that a comprehensive approach involving a
combination of these mechanisms is essential, as no single strategy can fully address the complexities
of international terrorism. Additionally, respect for human rights and the rule of law should be
maintained throughout counter-terrorism efforts
 NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
The spread of nuclear weapons has been considered a grave threat to the security of the world at large.
The debate is not so much about the use of nuclear technology, for the uses of nuclear technology in
the development process of any nation has been well accepted. The debate is on the peaceful vs. the
military uses of this technology. This debate has complicated over the years as this technology has
been acknowledged as being ‘dual use’ technology and as such it would be difficult to differentiate
from the end use for which the technology is pursued. Yet, the debate on the proliferation of nuclear
weapons has dominated the writings on international security. The central concerns have been the
horizontal and not vertical proliferation of these weapons.
Policies of nuclear proliferation present interplay of two sets of issues: one is the technical and
political set of issues and the other relates to the capability and intent of the countries concerned. The
technical element in non-proliferation seeks to either deny the critical technical assets to a country that
seeks to embark on a nuclear programme or to make these assets available under a safeguard system.
This places restraint on the possible use of nuclear technology for weapons production and ensures
that the technology that is transferred or acquired remains for civilian (or confines to) use only. The
political component of the system operates at two levels: one that seeks to create an international
pressure on the countries to desist from going nuclear and two, provide various incentives and
disincentives to countries in the form of economic and other ways to dissuade them from going
nuclear. The political component adds on to the technical component in providing a ‘political’
rationale for not going nuclear.
The capability of a state to go nuclear is dependent on the technical component. The development of
nuclear technology and infrastructure that is capable of producing a nuclear weapon is a technical
dimension of the problem of proliferation. A nuclear capable state may be technically ripe for nuclear
proliferation, but it would be the political intention of exercising the choice to go in for a nuclear
weapon that would determine nuclear proliferation. In fact, with the spread of nuclear technology and
availability of nuclear material, the decision on whether or not to acquire nuclear weapons would be a
political one.
The incentives to produce a nuclear weapon may be listed as follows:
a)Increased international status: This is a psychological aspect of perceiving to have crossed the
‘threshold’ and become a ‘great power’. b) Domestic political requirements or political pressures:
These pressures may be visible in both democratic and authoritarian systems of government. c)
Increased strategic autonomy. d) A strategic hedge against military and political uncertainty,
especially about the reliability of allies. e) Possession of a weapon of last resort. f) Bargain or
leverage over the developed nations.
The disincentives that may discourage nations from going in for nuclear weapons include:
a)Resource diversion to nuclear programme may lead to a loss of opportunity to pursue other pressing
economic and social priorities. b) Adverse national and international public opinion that would reflect
on the ‘status’ of the nation. c) Disruption of established or conventional security guarantees provided
by some of the great powers. d) Infeasibility of developing the required technology and consequently
the corresponding nuclear strategy. e) Fear of an adverse international reaction that would have an
impact on the trade and other relations of the country.
Nuclear weapons programmes usually require a long lead time for countries that have no nuclear
infrastructure. Any nation seeking to manufacture nuclear weapons must develop an appropriate
source of fissile material. This is a major technical barrier. The core of a nuclear bomb is made up of
highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Fifteen to twenty-five kilograms of highly enriched uranium or
five to eight kilograms of plutonium are generally considered the necessary minimum for the core of a
multi-kiloton atomic bomb. A nation seeking to manufacture nuclear weapons must have a source of
this fissile material. There are three main approaches that nations take to overcome this barrier: One is
by developing nuclear facilities dedicated for the purpose of weapons development. The second is the
development of a civilian nuclear programme that is free of safeguards and the subsequent acquisition
of sensitive technologies for the development of a nuclear bomb. In case of safeguarded facilities the
option may be of diversion of material from civilian facilities. The third option is theft of the raw
material or the weapon itself.
Nuclear non-proliferation policy has emerged through four main stages:
i) The post-war phase that was characterised by secrecy and efforts to retain
monopolistic control on part of the United States as the sole nuclear weapons
power in the world.
ii) The ‘liberal’ policy ushered in by president Eisenhower through the ‘Atoms for
Peace’ programme announced in the United Nations in 1953.
iii) The policy of controls through safeguards came to be sponsored by the nuclear
weapon powers to contain the spread of nuclear weapons across the world. This
came to be enshrined in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 and
subsequent efforts like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1996.
iv) The reactive phase on part of the nuclear weapon powers in the post Indian
nuclear test of 1974 and subsequent testing by India and Pakistan in 1998. This
phase saw the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Club and such other legislation
like the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act (1978) of the United States. It also saw the
debate shift from technical to political discourse on the utility of nuclear weapons
and the impositions of various sanctions against the new nuclear weapon states.

Safeguards
The impetus of the ‘Atoms for Peace’ programme did not last long. The IAEA came to be established
in 1957. The Agency’s role in inspection and verification was the key to the idea of ‘safeguards’
system. The IAEA’s function is to seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to
peace, health and prosperity throughout the world and to ensure that assistance provided is not used to
further any military purpose. The IAEA safeguards system was based on four main elements: (i)
review of the design of nuclear facilities; (ii) specification of a system of records and accounts; (iii)
specification of a system of reports and (iv) inspection of safeguarded facilities to verify compliance
with the agreements. The IAEA safeguard system is not concerned with the physical protection of
nuclear material, or with organisation to anticipate and prevent attempts at diversion to recover stolen
or diverted material.
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty
The entry of China into the nuclear club transformed the debate on nuclear issues from an EastWest
Cold War issue that was to be considered mainly by the developed world into a global concern. The
earlier focus had mostly been on weapons systems, strategic parity and corresponding geostrategic
considerations. Now the focus shifted to the problem of diversion of material from peaceful uses to
weapons use. While this concern was expressed in the context of the discussions on the NPT, it was
only after the 1974 Indian test that such a direct linkage came to be acknowledged as a reality. The
acute concern for control over proliferation and possible safeguards finally led to the creation of the
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. The chief motivation of its sponsors, the USA, Great Britain and
USSR, was to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The treaty divides the signatories into two categories: those who possess the nuclear bomb (those who
possessed it prior to 1 January 1967) and those who did not. It commits the nonweapon states to
inspection of their holdings of nuclear materials. The NPT commits them to negotiate safeguard
agreements with the IAEA. These safeguards, however, are not binding on the weapon states. In
exchange of the commitment by the non-weapon states to refrain from producing or acquiring nuclear
weapons the weapon states agreed to the following: (i) not to transfer nuclear weapons or other
nuclear weapon devices and not to assist non-weapon states to acquire such weapons or devices; (ii)
to seek discontinuance of all (underground) nuclear tests as a corollary to the 1953 Partial Test Ban
Treaty; (iii) to refrain from the threat or the use of force in compliance of the UN Charter; (iv) to
develop research production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and help the developing
countries in this regard; (v) to make available to all states the potential benefits from and peaceful
uses of nuclear explosions; and (vi) pursue negotiations to end the nuclear arms race and move
towards nuclear disarmament.
Suppliers Group
In 1970, shortly after NPT came into force, a number of countries had entered into consultations
about procedures and standards to be applied to the export of nuclear fuel and materials. This group
chaired by Claude Zangger, were members of the NPT or were suppliers of nuclear materials.
Following the Indian test, several countries informed the IAEA of their intention to enforce the IAEA
safeguards on their nuclear exports. This memorandum included a ‘trigger list’ of materials and items
and was to become the first major agreement on the supply list of nuclear materials. Two major issues
were discussed: Under what conditions, technology and equipment for enrichment and reprocessing
be transferred to non-weapon states; and whether transfers are made to states unwilling to submit to
full scope IAEA safeguards.
The Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines of the so called London Club, that eventually emerged included the
following: One, nuclear export recipients pledge not to use the transferred material for nuclear
explosives of any kind. Two, transfer of sensitive nuclear technology was to come under this
safeguards system. However, such a transfer could take place with extreme restraint in 15 case the
facilities were using only low enriched uranium. In due course, the entire concept of suppliers group
came to have a new meaning with the restrictions being placed on transfer of dual use technologies
under several regimes instituted for that purpose. In 1987 seven missile technology exporters agreed
to establish identical export guidelines to cover the sale of nuclear capable ballistic missiles. This
agreement is known as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). It aims at limiting the risks
of nuclear proliferation by controlling the transfer of technology which could contribute to nuclear
weapons delivery. In 1992, the Nuclear Suppliers Group in a meeting at Warsaw adopted the
Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear Related Dual Use Equipment, Material and Related Technology.
The Third World in general has been critical of the restrictive measures placed by these guidelines.
They have argued that after having accepted the NPT they should have access to nuclear technology
for peaceful uses. The Weapon states however point out that even under the NPT system the transfer
of technology is not unrestricted and as such would have to be placed under safeguards. These
restraints appear to have slowed down the pace of nuclear related developments in the Third World
and have also put a restraint on the missile programmes of some of the countries.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS EXPLOSIONS
The question of nuclear weapons explosions has been on the international agenda ever since the 1954
Indian proposal that called for a stand still on testing. This has been one of the means of implementing
the non-proliferation agenda. The main treaties that have been concluded in the context of nuclear
explosions are:
1. The 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty
2. The 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty
3. The 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty
4. The 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

The role of non-state actors

1. ‘complex interdependence - international cooperation and the growing significance of
international regimes.
2. Loosing relevance of State - No longer possible to treat states as the only significant
actors on the world stage. States are no longer the only, or necessarily the dominant,
actors on the world stage. Transnational corporations (TNCs), non-governmental
organizations host of other non-state bodies have come to exert influence. (NGOs)
3. In framework of global governance, growing importance of organizations such as the
United Nations, the International Monetary Funds.
4. ‘cobweb model’ of world politics -states are drawn into cooperation and integration
by forces such as closer trading and other economic relationships.
5. Power have shifted away from states generally through the growing importance of
non-state actors and the increased role played by international organizations.
6. Terrorism- 9/11, al-Qaeda not only demonstrated the new global reach of
terrorism but also that in the twenty-first century war can be fought by non-state
actors.
7. Transnational corporations (TNCs) wield greater financial power than many states,
and can effectively dictate the policy through their ability to relocate production
and investment at ease in a globalized economy.
8. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as Greenpeace
and Amnesty International exert global influence. And state security is as likely to be
threatened by global terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda as it is by other states.
9. End of traditional foreign policy. globalizing trends
have also been associated with the advent of post-sovereign governance and the
burgeoning importance of non-state actors: TNCs, NGOs, terrorist groups,
international organizations. Foreign policy can no longer be thought of simply as ‘what states
do to, or with, other states’.
10. ‘international society’ and believing that interactions among states and non-state
actors tend to be structured by principles, procedures, norms or rules, often
leading to the formation of international regimes trend towards multipolarity and the
fragmentation of global power, influenced by developments such as the rise of emerging
powers (China, Russia, India, Brazil and so on), the advance of globalization, the increased
influence of non-state actors and the growth of international organizations
11. proliferation of weapons of mass destruction which in the premodern world can easily
get into the hands of ‘rogue’ states or non-state actors such as terrorist organizations.
 12. trends towards globalization and in favour of regional and global governance have
both had the effect of strengthening the role of non-state actors in world affairs. These
non-state actors are many and various, ranging from
transnational corporations (TNCs) and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) to terrorist networks and international criminal groups.
13. the emergence of global civil society is in the process of
bringing a form of cosmopolitan democracy into existence, thereby empowering
previously weak or marginalized groups and movements
14. inter-state war has become less common in recent years, seemingly being displaced
by civil wars and the growing involvement of non-state actors such as guerrilla
groups, resistance movements and terrorist organizations.
15. ‘new’ terrorism, ‘global’ terrorism or ‘catastrophic’ terrorism had
become the principal security threat in the early twenty-first century, reflecting the
fact that, in conditions of globalization, non-state actors actors have become important agents
of international law, in the sense that civil society organizations being to facilitate
international order.