B

B
EDITED BY JEREMY BLACK
 CONTEN TS

Hopliresoldiersled rhe Greeks rovicroryar Mararhon, 490BC. Mughal army ar thefirsr barrieof Panipar, 1526.

Contents Medieval World

Intr od ucti on 46
49
9 Poiti ers (732)
10 Lechfeld (9S5) 51

Contributors 8 11 Hasti ngs (1066) 54

World map 10 12 Manzikert (1071) 58

Int rodu cti on 12 13 Hatti n (1187) 61

14 Liegnitz (1241) 65
15 Hakata Bay (1281) 69
16 Bannockburn (1314) 71
17 Crecy (1346) 74
18 Ankara (1402) 78
19 Agi ncourt (1415) 81
2 0 The Fall of Constantinople (1453) 85
21 Bosworth (1485) 89

Anycopyof thisbookissued by the publisherasa paperbackissoldsubjectto the Ancient World Sixteenth Century
conditionthat it shall not by way of trade or otherwisebe lent. resold. hiredout or
otherwisecirculated without the publisher's priorconsentin anyformof binding
or coverother than that in which it ispublishedand without a similarcondition Introd uct io n 16 Introduction 92
includingthesewords beingimposedon a subsequent purchaser.
1 Marathon (490 BC) 19 22 Flodden (1 513) 95
First published in the United Kingdomin 2005 by
Thames & Hudson ltd. 181A High Holborn,london W(IV lOX 2 Salam is (480 BC) 23 23 Tenochtitlan (1521) 98
www .thamesandhudson.com
3 Gaug amela (331 BC) 27 24 Pavia (1525) 103
0 200 5 Thames &Hudson ltd . london
4 Cannae (216 BC) 32 25 Panipat (1526) 107
Design : Thomas Keenes
5 Gaixia (203 BC) 36 26 Moh acs (1 526) 110
AllRights Reserved. No part of thispublicationmay be reproduced or transmitted
6 Act ium (31 BC) 38 27 Lepanto (1571) 113
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recordingor anyother informattonstorageand retrievalsystem. without prior
7 Teuto burg Fore st (AD 9) 42 28 The Armada (1588) 118
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BritishLibrary Cataloguing-in-Publicabon Data

8 Adrianopl e (378) 44
A cataloguerecordfor thisbook ls avaitable fromthe BritishLibrary

ISBN-l3, 97B-G-500-2S12S-6
ISBN-10: 0-500-25125-8

Printedandbound in China

ArCrecy, 734 6, Englisharchersthen knighrs slaughrered rheFrench.

Half-t itle RedArmy soldiersgo on rheorrock during Operari on

Baqrato», tbeSoviet summer offensive of 7944 .

Title page ThebarrieofWo rerloo, 78June 7875.

 CON TE NTS
CON TENTS

US Sherman tank entering StL6in the Battle for Normandy, 1944.

Prince Eugenedefeats the Turks at the battl e of Belgrade, 1717.

Seventeenth Century Ninet eent h Century

Intr oduction 122 Int roduct io n 180

29 Sekigahara (1600) 125 44 Trafalgar (1805) 183

30 Breitenfeld (1631) 129 45 Leipzig (1813) 188

31 Nor dlinqen (1634) 133 46 Waterloo (1815) 193

32 Shanhaiguan (1644) 136 47 Ayacucho (1824) 198

33 Naseby (1645) 138 48 Mexico City (1847) 200

34 Vienna (1683) 142 49 Inkerm an (1854) 203

50 Antietam (1862) 206
51 Gettysburg (1863) 210
52 Sadowa (1866) 215
53 Omdurman (1898) 218

Eighteenth Century Modern Times

Introduction 222
Introduction 146
54 Tsushima (1905) 225
35 Blenheim (1704) 149
55 Tannenberg (1914) 229
36 Poltava (1709) 153
56 Jutland (19 16) 232
37 Belgrade (1717) 156
57 Verdun (19 16) 236
38 Rossbach (1757) 159
58 The Western Front (19 18) 240
39 Plassey(1757) 163
59 Battle of Britain (1940) 245
40 Quebec (1759) 165
60 Battle for Moscow (1941) 250
41 Saratoga (1777) 169
61 Stalingrad (1942-43) 255
42 Yorktown (1781) 173
62 Midway (1942) 260
43 Jemappes (1792) 177
63 Battle of the Atlantic (1940-43) 264
64 Battle for Normandy (1944) 268
65 Operation Bagration (1944) 273
66 The American Air Attack on Japan (1945) 276
67 Huai-Hai (1948-49) 279

Relief of thesiegeof Vienna, ' 683. Thebattleaf Trafalgar, lB05. 68 Dien Bien Phu (1953-54) 282
69 The Tet Offensive (1968) 284
70 The Iraq War (2003) 287

Further Reading 291

Sources of Illustrations 297
Sources of Quotations 298
Index 298

Contributors
Jeremy Black is Professor of History at the
University of Exeter . Born in London, he
was edu cated in Cambr idge and Oxford
before teaching at the University of
Durham. He received an MBEin 2000 for
services to stamp de sign. Professor Black
has appeared frequent ly on television and
rad io, and has lectured in th e USA,
Canada, Australia, New Zealand , Japan,
Denmark, Germany, Italy, Spain and
France. His many bo o ks include War:
Past, Presenr and Furure (2000), World War
Twa (2003) and RerhinkingMilirary Hisrory
(2004). 33, 35, 39, 40, 41,42
Gabor Agoston is Associate Professor in
t he Department of History , Georgetown
University, Washin gton, DC, w here he
teaches cour ses on th e Ottoman Empire
and the Mi ddle East. His research interests
include Ottoman history , early mod ern
Islami c and Euro pean w arfare and the
comparative study of t he Ottoman,
Habsburg and Russian empires. His mo st
recent publication is Guns forrhe Sultan:
Milirary Pawer and tne WeaponsIndusrry in
the Orroman Empire (2005). 18, 20, 26, 27,
34,37
Charles R. Bowlus is Profes sor Emerit us of
Histo ry at t he University of Arkansas at
Little Rock and has published more t han
forty art icles in Eng lish and German on
Medieva l Central European Histo ry. His
mo st im portant boo k is Franks, Moravians
and Magyars. TheSrruggle far rheMiddle
Danube (1995). His mo st recent study is
Augusr 955. The BarrieofLechfeld and rhe
EndofrheAgeofM igrarionsin the Wesr (in
press 2005). 10
John Buckley is Senior Lect urer in War
Stud ies at t he University of
Wolverhampton, UK.He has published
8 9
widely on many aspects of military history
but specialize s in air power, the interwar
era and World War II. His publications
include Air Pawer in the AgeofToral War
(1999) and BririshArmour in tbe Normandy
Campaign 1944 (2004). 59 , 63 , 66
Bruce Coleman is a member of th e
Department of Histo ry at the Univer sity of
Exeter. His w ork on 19th-eentury Briti sh
history incl ude s TheIdea ofrhe City (1973)
and Conservatism and the Conservarive
Party (1988). 49, 53
Philip de Souza is Lecturer in Classicsat
University College Dublin, specializing in
Greek and Roman history. He is th e aut hor
of Piracyin theGraeco-Roman World
(1999), Seafaring and Civilizarion: Maririme
Perspecrives on World Hisrory (200 1), The
Peloponnesian War 43 1-404 BC(2002) and
TheGreek and Persian Wars 499-386 BC
(2003). 2, 6
Michael Duffy is a Reader in British
History and Director of th e Centre for
Maritime Histor ical Studie s atthe
University of Exeter. He is also Vice
President of the Navy Records Society . His
recent pub licat ions include TheGlorious
FirsrofJune:A Naval Battleand irs
Aftermarh (2002), TheNaval Miscellany vol.
6 (2003) and articles on t he battl e of
Trafalg ar in Mariner'sMirror and Journal for
Maririme Research (2005). 44
Bruce A. Elleman is an Associat e
Professor in th e Maritime History
Department oft he USNaval War Coll eg e,
focu sing o n Chin ese naval, milita ry and
diplo mat ic hist ory. Recent boo ks include
Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989
(2001). Wilsonand China: A RevisedHisrory
ofrhe 1919 ShandongQuesrion (2002), and
Naval Muriniesoftne TwentiethCenrury: An
Inrernarionol Perspective, edited with
Christopher Bell (2003). He is currently
wo rking o n both a China history t extbook
and an edited book on naval blockades
wi t h S.C.M. Paine, as well as a naval
hi story of China. 67
Charles J. Esdaile has a Personal Chair at
the School of History in the University of
Liverpool. A leading expert on t he
Napoleonic Wars and , in particular,
Napoleonic Spain, he is the author of
many books and art icleso n t he period
including The Wars of Napoleon (1995), The
Peninsular War: A New Hisrory (2002) and
Fighring Napoleon: Guerrillas, Bandits and
Advenrurersin Spain, 1808-1814 (2004) . 46
John France is Professor of Med ieval
History at the Univ ersity of Swan sea,
w hose special fiel ds of interes t are
crusad ing histo ry and medieval warfare .
His Vieroryin tbe Easr (1994) is a st udy of
the m ilitary history ofthe First Crusade,
while Wes rern Warfarein the Ageof the
Crusades 1000- 1300 (1999) analyzes the
develo pm ent of Europ ean wa r asa w hole.
His lat est book, TheExpansion ofCarholic
Christendom , 1000-1714 (2005) brings
together the themes of warfare and
crusadi ng . 9, 11, 12, 13, 14
Jan Glete is Professor of History at
Stockholm Unive rsity . Among his recent
publicat ionsare Navies and Nations:
Warships, Naviesand SrareBuilding in
Europeand America, 1500-1860 (1993),
Warfareor Sea 1500-1 650: Maririme
Con fliersand the Transformation ofEurope
(2000) and Warand the Statein Early
Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic
and Sweden asFiscal-Military States,
1500-1650 (2002). 28
Dav id A. Graff is Associate Professor of
History at Kansas State Unive rsity. He is
the aut ho r of Medieval ChineseWarfare,
300-900 (2002) and co-editor of A Mili tary
HistoryofChina (2002). 4
Ross Hassig isan historica l
ant hropo logist specializing in
Precolumbian and colonial Mexico. His
pub licat io ns include Trade, Tribute, and
Transportation: TheSixteenth-Cenrury
Political Economy ofthe Valley of Mexico
(1985), Aztec Warfare:Imperial Expansion
and Political Control (1988), War and
Society in Ancienr Mesoamerica (1992),
Mexico and theSpanish Conquest (1994)
and Time, History, and Belief in Aztecand
Colonial Mexico (2001). 23
Harald Kleinschmidt is Professor of the
Hist ory of Int ernational Relat ions at the
Uni versity ofTsukuba, and Profe ssor of
European St ud ies at the University of
Tokyo. Among his many publicat ions are
Geschichteder intemati onolen
Beziehungen (1998), TheNemesis ofPower
(2000), Unders randing theMiddleAges
(2000, reissue 2003), Menschen in
Bewegung (2002), Fernweh und
Grossmachtsuchr.Ostasienim
europaischen Weltbild der Renaissance
(2003), People on theMove (2003) and
Charles V. TheWorld Emperor (2004). 15, 29
Peter Lo rg e teaches Chin ese histo ry and
film at Vander bil t University. He
specializes in t he military and political
histo ry of 10t h- and 11th- cent ury China,
and is the author of Warand Politicsin
EarlyModernChino, 900-1 795 (2005). His
next project is a hi sto ry of th e effects of
g un pow der o n Asian wa rfare and society.
32
Philip Ma tyszak studied ancien t history
at Oxford Unive rsity wh ere he received his
doct orat e on the senate of the Lat e
Roman Republ ic. He currently works as a
computer systems administrator in
Camb ridg e and as an aut hor. His
publicat ions incl ude Chronicleofthe
RomanRepublic (2003), TheEnemiesof
Rome(2004) and TheSonsofCaesar
(fort hcoming). 1,3,5,7,8
Charles Messenger served in the Royal
Tank Regiment for 20 years before
becoming a full-time military historian
and defence analyst. He has wr itten
numerous books , mainly on 20th -century
warfare, and among his recent
publications are The D-Day Arias (2004)
and Call ro Arms (2005), an in-de pt h stud y
oft he Brit ish Arm y 19 14- 18. 60 ,61 , 64,
65
Michael Neiberg is Professor of History at
the United States Air Force Academy. His
recent books include Warfareand Society
in Europe, 1898 to the Presenr (2003) and
Fighting the Great War:A Global History
(2005). 4 7, 52, 55, 57
Gervase Phillips is Princ ipa l Lectu rer in
History at Manchester Met ropol it an
University. He is th e author of TheAnglo-
Scots Wars 1513-1 550 (1999) and has
contributed art icles to academic j ournals
including TheJournal ofMilitary History,
War and Society, Warin History, The
Scottish Historical Review and Technology
and Culture. 21 , 22 , 24, 25
Michael Prestwich is Professor of History
at t he Unive rsity of Durham . His research
int erestscentre on 13th - and 14th -cent ury
England . His books include TheThree
Edwards (1980), Edward I (1988), Armies
and Warfarein theMiddle Ages: TheEnglish
Experience (1996) and Planragenet England
1225- 1360(2005). 16, 17, 19
Brian Holden Reid is Professor of
Am erican Hist ory and Mi litary Institutions
and Head of th e Depart ment of War
Stud ies at King 's College, London. He has
written extensively on American history in
the mid-19th century, and his books
CONTRIBUTORS
incl ude TheOriginsofrheAmericanCivil
War (1996), TheAmerican Civil Warand the
WarsoftheIndustrial Revolution (1999) and
Robert E. Lee:Icon for a Nation (2005). He is
an elected Trustee of the US Society for
Military History. 48 ,50
Lawrence Sondhaus is Professor of
History at the University of Indianapolis,
where he also serves as Director of the
Institute for the Study of War and
Diplomacy. His latest books are Naviesof
Europe, 1815-2002 (2002) and Naviesin
Modern World History (2004). 54 , 56, 62
Tim Travers is Professor Emeritus at th e
University of Calgary . He is the author of
three books on World War I: The Killing
Ground (1987), How the War Was Won
(1992) and Gallipoli 1915(2001);a nd is co-
author of World History of Warfore (2002).
Currently he is w rit ing a history of piracy .
58
Spencer T. Tucker retired in 2003 aft er 36
years of university teaching , t he last six as
holde r of t he John Bigg s Chair in Mi litary
History at th e Virginia Military Inst it ute. He
is curr ently Senior Fellow in Milita ry
History for ABC-CLIO Publi shing , and is the
author or editor of two dozen books of
military and naval hi story , most recently
th e fiv e-volum e Encyclopedia ofWorld War
II (2004) and Stephen Decatur: A LifeMost
Bold and Daring (2004). 51 , 68, 69 , 70
Peter Wilson is Professo r of Early Modern
Hist ory at th e Univ ersity of Sunderland.
His recent bo oks include Absolutism in
Central Europe (2000) and From Reich to
Revolution: German History 1558-1806
(2004). He is curr ently w riti ng a history of
th e Thirt y Years War. 30, 31, 36, 38 , 43, 45
 ,. 60 Battle for Mo s ow
...
:; .
61 Stalmgrad

y
63 Battl e of the At lantic
41 Saratoga /

54 Tsushima .\
" 62 Mid way

I
•'.
)

47 Ayacucho 65 Operat .ion Bagration

\.

33 Naseby y) 7 Teutoburg Forest

30 Breitenfe ld
1
55 Tannenberg

V 59 Battl e of Britain / 14 Liegnitz

I A1
28 The Armada 1/ 1 Hastmgs
46
W~terlOo . •• •
/
36 Poltava

19A9i n CO~ ~?/. i 3~Bl5

enh:~m \.
17 Crecy I
64 Battle for Normandy
/57 Verdun
43 Jemappes 10
58 The Western Front I· 31 r li~j1

9 Poit iers

/-
t
,
..
•
.,
 INTRODUCTION

Introduction

I
n th is collect ion, distingu ished scholarsseek to
give shape to th e chaos of war at its climactic
moments. The boo k covers land and sea
battles, aswell as sieges and campaigns in the air.
Our range isglobal. We include not only the major
and familiar battles such as Waterloo (1815) and
5talingrad (1942), but also less well-known but
still very important battles. These include Hakata
Bay (128!), in which a Mongol invasion force
based in China was defeated when it sought to
invade Japan. This ensured that Japan, unlike
Armoured
horsemen, such
as this Turkish
example of th e
15th century, were
prominent in late
medieval warfare
inwestern and
centralAsia.
Korea, would remain outs ide the orbit of the
Chinese (then ruled by t he Mongols), and thu s
that it would follo w a different course. 5ekigahara
(1600), anoth er batt le included in this collection,
was crucial in the consolidat ion of Japan at the
close of the protracted civil warfare of the 16th
century. This helped ensure in the long term that
a united Japan would be in a position to retain its
independence from Western control, whereas
more divided areas found it difficult to do so.
Another neglected battle, Panipat (1526) in India,
led to the Mughal ascendancy of Hindustan , and
thus created th e basic political unit in South Asia
for two centuries.
In discussing the nature of battle from ancient
times to the present - itscauses, cour ses and con -
sequences - the contributors are reminding us
not only that fighting is the crucial element of mil -
itary history, but also that battle hasbeen far fro m
constant in character. Fighting is not some result
of the corruption of human kind by society: it is
integral to human society. From the outset,
hum ans comp eted wi th other animals, and fed
and protected themselves as a result of th ese
strugg les. Yet, even the facts of death and mutila- Choice of battles sider key batt les that dete rmined the fate of The defeat of the
Any select ion of batt les of course involves peop le and affected the distribution of power, fo r Spanish Arm ada
tion have meant very different th ings to people in
in 1588wos
contrast ing cultures . From the physical immedi- debate, and part of th e interest of reading t his example Quebec (1759), which ensured t hat one of the most
acy of the hand -to-hand warfare between Greeks boo k is decidi ng how you would have cho sen dif- French power and culture would not dominate crucial naval
and Persiansat Marathon (490 Be) to the distanc- ferently. We have been gu ided by a number of North America. The drama of these clashesvaried bottles in hista ry,
leadi ng ul timately
ing of death in much (but by no means all) factors,among which reliable sources is very sig- great ly, but all of them were crucial events in
to English
modern warfare, we are also reminded of the very nifi cant: for certain important battles, there are history. ascendancy at sea.
different waysfighting hasoccurred. no such sources. We have also sought to use the It is more difficult to assess what happened on
Difference extends to the frequency of battle. selection to indicate changes in the nature of war a battlefield than is generally appreciated. When
- some of these changes can be presented as several sources exist, the need to reconcile them
In terms of large-scale engagements for which
reliab le sources exist, battle has not been spread developments in the art of war. Certainly, the suggests the problems (of omission ) facing schol-
evenly across the world. Instead, part icular areas greater complexity that stemmed in t he 19th ars when they have on ly one source upon which
and cultures have engaged in battle, while for cent ury from needing to respond to rail-borne to rely. When it is possible to move from a single
others, such as the Aborig ines of Australia, con- tro ops and, in the 20th century from mechanized, source to consider several, there is a welcome
flict was on a smaller sca le and is difficult to aerial and submarine warfare, created problems deepening of understanding. This underlines the
recover from the available sources. for commanders. We have also sought to con- drawback of work that seeks to rely on a lim ited

12 13
 I NTRODUCTION
The so-called range of material, a point made by Hans DelbrOck
'Bottl e of the (1848-1929), a key figu re in th e develo pme nt of
Nations' at Leipzig,
14-19 Octo ber German mili tary history, w ho em phasized th e
IBI3, marked value of the critical examinat ion of sources. This is
the beginning of also true for more recent battles , A paper on t he
the collap se of the
tank strength of German armoured divisions in
Napoleonic empire
since it fed to the 1942-43 produced for the official British histories
expulsion of of World War II argued that casualties and fluctu-
Frenchforcesfrom
ating replenishment priorities were important
Germa ny.
factors in variations and commented:
'It shows how misleading formal establish-
ments can be compared with the actual - and
fluctuati ng - establish ment of a divis ion, and
illu stratesth e importa nce of keepi ng thi sfactor in
min d. It doubtless applies to all armies at one
time or another in their war careers:
Brigadier C. 1. C. Molony added, 'I am apt to
turn a rather jaundiced eye on strength returns -
perhaps because of vague memories of conjuring
14
rabbits out of hat s, as an adj utant a long time
ago!' Tank strength was a particular issue
because,asCaptain BasilLiddell Hart pointed out,
'To deduce correct lessons it is necessary, above
all, to determine the tank strengths on either side
in any important operations: Reconciling sources
involved addressing issues such as how best to
distinguish those tanks that were fit for action ,
and also the treatment of light tanks that were
on ly appropriate for reconnaissance duties. This
serves to underline some of the problems wi t h
explaini ng what happened . To state that the con -
tributors have do ne their best is th erefore high
praise. These scholarly contr ib utions hig hlight
what can be done in throwi ng ligh t on crucial
episodes in world history,
Organization ofthe book
The book is divided into seven part s, each of
INTRODUCTION
set. As a result, Weste rn forces were deplo yed at
great distances, for example by the British (suc-
cessfully) to Plassey in Indi a in 1757, and by the
Russian fleet (unsuccessfully) to Tsushima in
1905.Thiswas clearly warfare acrossthe world .
This fo rce projection, the n, did not necessarily
entail success. Instead, t he abili ty to force a path
along particular routesand to gain control of indi-
vidual sites did not mean t he subjugation of a
society. What was crucial was t he willingness to
accommodate (even acculturate to ) conquerors.
This has varied greatly, and will continue to do so,
ensuring that battle has to be understoo d as an
aspect of a wider process. For example, the
Spanish conquest of the Aztec and Inca em pires
in 1519-21 (see Tenocht itlan p. 98) and 1S31
respectively was follo wed by the arrival of
colonists and th eir livestock, by Christian pro sely-
tization and th e destruction of rival religious Aerialcombat was
rit uals,by th e int roducti on of Spanish admi nist ra- a key innovation
tion st ruct ures, and yet, also, by a degree of of20th-ce ntury
war. During the
Spanish acceptance of local elites as well as of
Battle ofBritain,
local adaptation to the Spaniards. summer 1940, the
As will be made clear in this book, each batt le, Spitfire figh ter
planeproved more
however small, has contributed to the state of
than a match for
today 's world and will continue to influence our the German
ever-changing reactions to conflict. Messerschmitts.
wh ich conta ins discussion of battles that were
im portant to the period and also indi cated key
aspects of warfare. The organizat ion of th e
volume - Ancient World, Medieval World , and
the n a section each for 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th cen-
turies and Modern Times, the last extend ing to
includ e th e Iraq War of 2003 - reflects both the
greater frequency of key battles over the last half-
millen nium and the availability of sources. This
greater frequency was in part due to the expan-
sion in power projection stemming not only from
the development of oceangoing ships, but also
from the will ingness to use such vessels in order
to create transoceanic maritime empires - a
met hod particularly seen with the weste rn Euro-
pean powers, whose ships first circumnavigated
the globe. Philip II of Spain (reigned 1556-98),
after wh om th e Philippines were named, was th e
ruler of th e first emp ire on which the sun never
15
 ..
-
. '.

Ancient
World
erman nationalists in the 19th century

G raised a great statue in 187Sof Arminius, a

German tribal leader, wielding the sword
of vengeance to celebrate his victory in AD 9 over
the Romans at Teutoburg Forest. This captured
the continued resonance of the great battles of
antiquity in the modern world. In 1914, German
strategists planned to repeat, at the expense of
the French, Hannibal 's victory over the Romansat
Cannae (216 BC). Greek triumphs over the invad-
ing Persians, especially at Marathon and Salamis
(490 and 480 BC respectively), are still used to indi-
cate that larger forces could be defeated by those
who were more 'civilized', although the depiction
of the Persiansis often unduly harsh. We also con-
sider other major battles in this open ing chapter.
Gaixia (203 BCl. a key event in the rise of the long-
standing Han emp ire in China, is a reminder that
crucial clashesdid not occur onl y in Europe; while
Octavian's victory over Mark Antony and Cleo-
patra at Actium (31 Be) draws attention alongside
"
Salamis to the key role of naval power. It led to
Rome's dominance of the eastern Mediterranean.
The batt les of antiqu ity present considerable
difficu lties forthe historian, but new insightshave
come from a variety of sources. For example , an
increase in archaeological evidence makes it pos-
sible to cast fresh light on batt les such as that
between Sparta and th e Persian invaders of
Greece at Thermopylae, the prelude to the more
major engagement at Sa lamis later in the year.
Other insights come from study ing weapons and
martial equipment. Thus, an assessment of the
properties of galleys has proved very important

Theheavily armed Greek hoplite infantrymen - seen here in

a Corinthian black-figure vase ofc. 625 Be- became the
standard by which other soldiers were m easured in antiquity.

Full-scale fo r unde rstanding options and choicesat Salamis
reconstructionof and Actium. Similarly, understanding of eques-
a trireme. the
Olympias. The
trian factors has helped lead to questions about
necessity for whether chariots charged en masse and were
ma npo wer to t herefore really deadly in battle.The net impact of
propel the ship
research has been to offer greater depth to
greatly limited the
cruisingrangeof knowledge currentl y stemming fro m a simple
such ships, as rhey reliance on literary sources. For examp le, in con-
had ro srop to rake
sidering Cannae, it is important to amplify the
on morewaterand
food.Across the Classical historian Polybius's account in order to
world, thiswasa move beyond a schematic depiction of the battle.
majorlimitation to The battles of antiquity are frequently dis-
oared warships,
cussed in terms of the 'great man' approach of
whethertriremes
orthe warcanoes history, wi th commanders such as Alexander th e
of, in particular, Great at Gaugamela in 331 BC, Hannibal at
thePacilic.
Cannae, and Armini us at Teutobu rg Forest. This
approach frequen tly overlap ped with the literary
genre of the epic and with the style of the
romance, thus treating battle as theatre. A focus
on great men is fascinating and - in each of the
cases above - their generalship made a key differ-
ence to the battle, but it can ensure that
second-rank commanders, or simply those over-
shadowe d by th e more flamboyant or apparently
noteworthy, are generally neglected. This makes
it harder to evaluate command skills, let alone
other factors in success. For example, the
Romans, like the Han in China, believed in a mass
18
L
army based on th e adu lt males of the farmi ng
popu lation, and this provided huge reserves of
manpower. The Romans used these against
Carthage and also in the conquest of Greece.
Alongside warfare with similar regular forces,
the armies of th e more settled states fo und t hem-
selves in confl ict wit h nomadic forces.Thus, aft er
the Han gained po wer in China in th e civil war,
they were challenged by the Xiongn u confede ra-
tion of nomadic tribes, while the Romans were
put under increasing pressure in the late
4th century, with the emperor Valens defeated
and killed by the Visigoths at Adrianople in 378.
The major series of attacks between AD 250 and
500 known as th e 'barbarian' invasions th at
destr oyed or weakened the empires in Eurasia
and brought down the western Roman empire
was, in fact, another stage in a longstanding
series of struggles and complex diplomacy
between such empires and tribes. These inva-
sions were also aspects of major migrations.
Some of the invasions were mounted by cavalry,
which is oft en held to have become more effec-
tive as a result of the stirrup in Central Asia, the
region where the horse had first been domesti-
cated. Not all 'barbarians' employed cavalry, but
many of the most effective raiders and con -
querors we re horsemen .
Marathon
Date: August 490 BC Location: Attica , Greece
At M ara thon we stood alone against Persia. And our courage in that mighty
endeavour defeated the men of46 nations.
(THEATHENIANSCLAIM THEPLACE OFHONOURAT PLATAEA) HERODOTUS9.27
arat hon was a batt le of opposites.
M A tiny democ~atic city-state op~osed. a
despotic empire hundreds of times ItS
size. One army was almo st entirely composed of
armo ured infantrymen, the other of horsemen
and archers.Thisclash of cult ures was profound ly
to affect the subsequent developm ent of
Western civilizatio n.
For the city-state was Athens, where a func-
tioni ng democracy had been created just two
decades previously. The previous ruler of Athens,
Hippi as, had fled to the court of Darius I (521-486
BC), king of Persia, whose empire stretched from
the Aegean Sea to th e banks of th e Indus. Until
they were conqu ered by Persia, the Greek
colo nies in Asia Minor had been independent.
Unsurprisingly, they felt a greater affinity with
their former homeland of Greece than with their
ruler thousan ds of miles away in Persia. The
Greeks of Asia Minor rebelled against the Per-
sians,and were assisted by Athenian soldiers w ho
captured and burn ed Sa rdi s, the capital of Lydia,
in 498. Herodo tus the histo rian te lls us:
'Darius enquired who these Athenians were, and
on being to ld ... he prayed "Grant to me, God, that I
might p unish them ", ond he set a slave to tell him
three times as he sat do wn to dinne r "Master,
remem ber the Athenians".'
Preparations for battle
Accordingly, aft er crushing the rebellion in Asia
Min or, in 490 BC a Persian invasion force landed at
Right Persian infan trymen shown an a polychrome brick-
faced wall in the royal polaceorSusa(fran). Theirprincipol
weapon was the bow, which they used with deadly effect.
19
•
A NC I EN T WO RLD MARATHON

Marathon, some 32 km (20 miles) east of Athens.
Modern research has moved the date of this
landing to Aug ust from the trad itional date in
early September. The size of the invading force is
uncertain, with some estimates as high as
100,000 men. Probably there were about 20,000
men, including oarsmen and cavalry. Marathon
Right Mosrof rhe was chosen because it was sufficiently far
Greek soldiersor from Athens for an orderly disembarka -
Marathonwere
tio n, and because the flat gro und suited
bophtes, tbeir large
circularshields the Persian cavalry, which outma tched
offeringprotection t he Greek horse.
and support ro Hippias, the former tyrant of Athens, accompa-
soldiers on their
left. Bronzesrarue.
nied the invaders. It was hoped that his presence
might inspire a coup by the conservat ive aristo-
Belo w In tbe initio! crats of Athens and bring about a bloodless
srageof rhebarrIe
surrender.
on tneplain of
Mararhan the The rest of Greece was cowed into neut rality.
Atheniancentre Even th e Spartans,th e foremost mi lit ary power in
movedforward
Greece, discovered a number of pressing reli-
firsr, carching tbe
Persians by gious rituals which would keep them occupied
surprise. for the duration of the crisis. Only Plataea, a tiny
depen dency of Athens, sent reinforc ements to
the Athenian force which mustered before the
plain of Marathon, in an area called Vrana
betwee n the hills and the sea.
The Athenians had about 7,200 men. They
were mostly hop lites, a term which comes from
the hop/on, the large circular shield which they
carried. Each shield also offered support to the
soldier on the shield bearer's left, allowing this
man to use his protected right arm to stab at the
enemy with his principal weapo n - t he long
spear.
The Persian infantry preferred the bow, and
were fearsomely adept with it. They fired from
behin d large wicker shields which protected
them from enemy bowfire, but were of doubtful
value against attacking infantry.
Miltiades, th e At henian leader, knew his
enemy, for he had once served in the Persian
army. Now he had to convince a board of ten
fellow generals that his plan of atta ck would
succeed. Eachgeneral commanded for one day in
turn and, though they ceded that command to
Milt iades, he still waited until his allotted day
before ordering the attack.
This delay was probably for military rather
than political reasons. To neutralize the superior
Persiancavalry the Athen ians might have needed
to bring up abatis, spiky wooden defences, to
guard the ir flanks. Or they might have waited for
the Persian cavalry to consume their available
supplies and be forced to go foraging. Or Datis,
t he Persian commander, might have broken the
deadlock by ordering a march on Athens.
The Athenians deployed most of their strength
Below ln rhe
on the wings , perhaps to buffer a cavalry thrust, barrIe'sfinal
or so that they could extend their line to counter a srages, alrhough
Persianenvelo pment. This left the centre danger- tne Persians had
broken rhraugh in
ously weak, especially as the toughest of the
the centre. on the
Persian troops were deploye d against it. wingsthe
Arhenianswheeled
inwards, crushing
The engagement
theenemyand
To min imize their exposure to enemy bowfire, the forcing the
Athenians did someth ing unprecedented for a Persians to flee.

marsh marsh

:~,

G)~~~~:~=~~~~
ttlrowsthe Persiansoff balanceby advancing at a run.

20 21
•
ANCI ENT WORLD

Salamis
hop lit e army: the y charged down th e slight
downhill slope at a run. The start led Persians mis-
j udged the speed of th e Athenian advance, and
many of the ir arrows sped over the hopli tes'
headsand landed harmlessly behind them . Date: Sept ember 480 Be Location: between Attica and the Peloponnese, Greece
Though caught off balance, the Persians were
tough and resilient fighters. They bro ke th e At first the Persian lin e withstoad the attack; bu t quick ly
Athenian cent re and drov e through to wards The channel was cro wded with our ship s, and they
Athen s. But the hoplite force destroyed th e Could not aid each o ther. Soon th eir armou red pro ws
wing s, and rolled them up in disorder before Were crashing inta friendly hulls and sheari ng off the
turning on th e Persian regula rs w ho had broken Ban ks of oars, while the Greek ships skilfully circled
their centre . The fight boiled through th e Persian Round th em and attacked from all sides.
camp as the Persians struggled to regain their A ESCHYLUS, THEPERSIANS, LINES 412-1 8
ships, with those who failed being driven into th e
marshes behind the camp.
The Athenians captured only six ships -
perhaps because the Persian cavalry belatedly n 480 BC the Persians again invaded Greece,

I
Fifth -century BC
reappeared. Nevertheless, it was a stunning King Xerxes leading a hug e army across from lapis lazuli head of
a young Persian
victory. Over 6,000 Persians lay dead for the loss Anatolia, shadowed by a fleet of about 1,200 prince, possibly
of 192 on the Athenian side. warships. Many of the sout hern Greek city -states representing
But there was no time for self-congratulation. banded togeth er under Spartan leadership to XerxesI. son of
DariusI.
The Persian fleet then started heading down the might never have known Euclid, Pericles or resist him by land and sea. Coordinated attempts
coast to where Athen s lay undefended. In th e Demosthenes - in short, the cultural heritage of to block the advance of his army in th e narrow
subsequent race between the army on land and Western civilization would have been profoundly pass of Thermopylae and hold up his fleet at
Above right Attic
red-figure pelike the army at sea the Athenians were again victori- altered. Artemision failed w hen the Greek land forces
showing fight ing ous. On seeing the Athenian army mustered to Nor would a young runner called Phaedippi- were outflanked and forced to withdraw. A small
between Greek oppose the ir landing, the Persians hesitated Spartan and Thespiaean rearguard resisted hero-
des have brought news of the victory to Athens.
infantry and
briefly, then sailed away_ Phaedippides had earlier gone to Sparta asking ically, but wasoverwhelmed.
o Perslan
cavatryman. for help, and now his heart gave way under The combined Greek fleet moved to the island
Outcome th e strain of his exerti on s. But a run of 41 km of Sa lamis, abandoning th e citie s of Thebes and
Below Ancient
Without a Greek victory at Marathon, Athen s (26 mi les) is still named aft er the battl e from At hens to the enemy. A prophecy urging the
Greekfunerary
tumuJusat might never have produced Sophocles, w hich he came - a marathon. Athenians to put their faith in a wooden wall
Marathon today. Herodot us, Socrates, Plato or Aristotle. The world caused some of them to fortify th eir Acropo lis
wit h ti mber, but the major ity agreed wit h th e next morn ing. Herodot us claims th at Themisto-
..------J"'fOM BATANTS'----.. elected general Them istocles that the ir best hope c1es sent a secret message to warn Xerxesthat the
lay in th e city's 200 wooden, trireme warships, the Greeks were about to w it hdraw, causing him to
Greeks largest contingent in th e Greek fleet. After the send ships around Salamis to cut off the Greeks'
• 10,000 men, of w hich 7,200 were Ath enian evacuation of the Atheni ans to Salami s had been retreat and forcing Eurybiadesto risk a battle.
hop lite infant rymen completed, the Greek fleet assembled in th e bay This story is a highly dubiou s one, assuming as
• Commanded by M ilti ades and Callimachu s on the easte rn side of the island. it does th at King Xerxes and his commanders
• 192 dead When th e news came that t he Acropol is of would tru st such a message, and that Them isto-
Athens had been occupied , the Spartan com- c1es would have thought it advantageous to
Persians mander Eurybiades ordered his captains to provoke a Persian attack. It is more likely that th e
• 25,000 men wi thdraw under cover of darkness to a more Persians planned to surround the Greeks, as they
• Commanded by Datis defensible position on th e Isthmu sof Corinth, but had att emp ted once before at Artem ision. Their
• 6,400 dead (accordinq to the Greeks) he changed his mind later that night and the aim would have been to drive th e Greek ships
Greeks sailed out to conf ront the Persians the northward s and westward s out of th e narrow

22 23
•
2 AN CIE NT WO RLD 2

channel between Salamisand th e mainland , into

the open water s of th e Bay of Eleusis, and attack
I. th em from two sides. For th is purpose Xerxes
despatched 200 Egyptian ships in the early
evening to sail right round Salamis and come at
the Greeks from the direction of Eleusis. He also
sent a flotilla to cruise th e waters around the
sout hern end of th e island, w hile his main fleet
(around 600 ships) moved into posit ion at the
eastern approaches to the narrow straits, ready to
advance at dawn .
The Greekswere made aware of these manoeu-
vres by Aristeides, an exiled Athenian politician
who had returned to join in the fight against the
Persians and had probably been sent on a scout-
ing mission to determine whether the escape
route to the west was clear. His news was greeted
with dismay in the Greek camp, but the com-
manders resolved to sail out at dawn and take the
Persians on in the narrows between Salamis and
the mainland, hoping that the superior numbers
of the enemy would count for less in such con-
fined spaces.

Th e ba ttle
A Roman copyofa
In eager anticipati on of a magn ificent victory,
portrait bust of King Xerxes posit ioned himself opposite Salamis
Themistocles from wit h a good view of the small island of Psyttaleia,
Ostia, possibly
where a detachment of Persian troops had been
basedon a 5th·
centuryBeoriginal landed during th e night. But instead of wi t ness-
from Athens. ing his fleet 's fina l triumph over the Greeks,
Xerxes saw a naval di saster unfo ld before his
very eyes. The various ethnic cont ingents of
the Persian fleet were lined up several rows
deep across the narrow channel w it h the
Phoenicians on the right w ing, nearest to
Xerxes's position, and the lon ians on the left,
nearest to Salamis. As they moved further
into the channel their ships became so com-
pacted and confused that they found it
impossible to keep in formation. The
crews were tired and to make matters
worse a strong swell developed,
making it even harder for the ships
to make headway. Themistocles
had anticipated th is and seemsto
have persuaded the other Greek
commandersto delay engag ing t he Persians unt il
they were clearly in disorder. With the Athen ian
ships leadi ng, the Greeks rowed out from th e
shore and turn ed to wards the enemy. On a given
signal their fresh crews surged forward and broke
through the Persian lines to ram individual ships
asthey struggled to manoeuvre.
The Persians would have been expecti ng the
Greeks to flee before their superior force, accord-
ing to the plan worked out the previous day. But,
like all ancient battles, once the action had
started it was impossible to keep to a specific
plan, and the captains of the individual ships
were forced to make decisions on the spot. The
main decision made by many of Xerxes's captains
was to turn away from the attacking Greeks,
causing confusion as they encountered more of
the ir own ships try ing to advance. In the resulting
chaos th e Greek captains urged on thei r much
fresher crews and pressed the attack w it h great
success.
It is impossible to describe th e full course of
the battle in detai l. Our main source, the writer
Herodotus, offe rs on ly a series of anecdotes
about various groups of combatants. It was
claimed that 70 Corinthian ships under Adeiman-
tos turned and fled towards th e Bayof Eleusis.lt is
likely that this supposed cowardly northward
retreat, which Herodotus presents asan Athenian
slander against the Corinthians, may have been a
deliberate move to engage the Egypti an
squadron and prevent it from attacking the Greek
rear. The Corinthians maintained that the ir ships
did not encounter the Egyptians but returned
to th e battle and acquitted themselves as well as
any of the Greeks. One of the most colourful
anecdotes concerns Artemisia, the ruler of A watetcolour ot
Herodotus's home city Halicarnassus, which was thesea bailie of
Salamis. This
subject to the Persians. She was in command of imaginative
her own shi p and in the front line of the Persian reconstruction
fleet. When an Athenian tr ireme bore down on vividly conveysthe
chaotic natu re of
her she tr ied to escape, but found her path
thebailiein the
blocked by other Persian ships. In desperation straits.
she ordered her helmsman to ram on e of them ,
wh ich sank with the lossof all its crew. The pursu-
ing Athen ian captain assumed that Artemisia 's
ship was on his side and changed course towards
another Persian vessel. Xerxes and his advisors
saw the incident and recognized Artemisia's ship
by its ensign, but their belief that she had sunk a
Greek trireme then earned her the king 's admira -
tion . Xerxes is also said to have remarked at this
point, 'My men have acted like women and my
women like men:

24 25
••
Z ANC IENT WORLD

Gaugamela
Yetanother victory
for the Greeksas to Corinth N 0 5km
thePersian tteet is
rouredand
defea ted by GREEC E
(A It ic a )
Adeiman to s then hea dsjjorth with
70 CorinthianShips (whether a
scouring mission or through pure
cowardice is debatable), but shortly
Bayof Eleusis
,J
t 1 - - - - - - - 11
1-
0 3 miles

nigh tfall. GREE C E Date : 1 October 331 BC Location : Mesopotamia (modern Iraq)
- Megara ;turnS baCk ta r~~
h e ma," fleet 4 ( / ~a (A ttica)

Alexandersaidthat Darius had relievedany anxietyhe might have had by

- ~ '< toA thens -~
~ ,.J ~ bringinghismassed forces together so that in one day everythingcouldbe decided,
,..........., '----, \ - - " - , L.., ® The Persian fleet and they would be spareda lang periodof difficulty and danger.
~~ r' posmon of sets off from the
c:::, (e. 200 Athenia n ~nd Spa rta n~ "~es ~ _ Bayof Phaleron D IODORUS Sicuius, BIBlIOTHECAH ISTORIA, 17.56.1
V shlpsl ed by Themost ociesand --,.a..: 11 ~ -? the night before
Saronic '--..............- r' Eurybiades) ~ - /1. thebartle
Gulf Sa~a
-r>f1llS ~ r,P
l.....,.. Peiraieus

At dawn the two 3 0 v- Psyttaleia •

fleetsmeet in the__..., ~O _ ... ~ n 1 October 331 BC two armies met in Persian guards of

Island of
Salamis
narrowchanneljust
north of Psyttaleia
c;- ~
PersIan Shl S

O Mesopotamia to decide the fate of an

Another story concerns the Persian sold iers on
the island of Psyttaleia. They were placed there in
anticipation of the bulk of the Greek fleet being
driven north and westwards away from the
island . Instead they were isolated from their own
ships and left vulnerable to attack from the
nearby shores of Salamis. Right before Xerxes's
eyes his elite troops, includi ng three of his own
neph ew s, were slaughtered by th e Ath enians.
COMBATANTS
Gree ks
• Over 300 ships
• Commanded by Euryb iades (Spa rta n).
Themistocles (At he nia n). Ade ima nt os
(Corinthian)
· 40 ships lost
Persians
•c. 800 ships
• Commanded by King Xerxes
• Over 200 ships lost
Along the coast of Salamis, other Persians who
managed to get ashore from their foundering
ships w ere killed or captured. Towards the end of
the day the Persian fleet retreated in confusion to
the Bay of Phaleron, having lost more than 200
ships and having failed in its ob jec tive of forcing
the Greeks away from Salamis. The Greeks had
lost only about 40 ships and sent the enemy back
to t heir anchorage in disarray.
Afte rmath
Xerxes took the rema ins of his fleet and much of
his army back to Anatolia, leaving his general
Mard onius wi t h a substantial army in central
Greece. The following year a Greek army led by
the Spartan king Pausanias defeated them at
Plataea, north of Athens , effectively free ing main-
land Greece from the threat
domination . Themistocles was hon oured by the
Spartans fo r his part in t he victory, but his own
cou ntrymen seem to have t urned against him,
eventually fo rcing him to t ake refuge with the
Persians. Xerxes's son Arta xerxes I made him gov-
ernor of Magnes ia on the Maeander River, where
he died around 4S9 Be,
empire. The larger by fat of these armies
was comma nded by Darius III, king of kings,
the king in flu ted
hots . They hel d the
centre of the
Persian infantry
line at Gaugamela.
and master of all between the Euph rates and
The elite Persian
Afgha nist an. Once, his domains had reached infantrywere
t he Med ite rranean, but these lands had been known as th e
conq uered by the invading Macedonians of 'tmm ort als'. The
ceremonial dress
Alexander the Great. Darius had offered Alexan- here was probably
der a huge bribe in a desperate effort to secure replaced wi th
peace. Parmenio , one of Alexander's generals , morepractical
clothing on the
had comment ed, 'I wo uld take it if I were you :
battlefield. As well
and Alexander had replied sharply , 'Yes, I would, if as spears with a
I w ere you: 'pomegranate'
counter-weight,
His offer rejected , Darius collected a massive
likemost Persian
army of about a quarter of a mil lion men, includ- infantry men th ey
ing Scythians from th e shores of the Black Sea and also carried bows.
Bactrians from the foo thi lls of the Him alayas. He
also recruited 6,000 Greek mercenaries as a per-
so nal bodyguard.
Darius chose his battlefield carefully. At Issusin
333 BC the terrain had not allowed him to use his
superior numbers.This time, he chose the plain of
Gaugamela, near Irbil in modern Iraq. (The Greek
histo rian Plutarch says that Gaugamela meant
'camel's home', being named after the beast that
of Persian had once taken a refugee king to safety th ere.)
Darius's cavalry ranged from horse arche rs to
armoured catap hract s, and was hi s main striking helmets , but probably fo ught shieldless, needing
bo th hands to control their long corn el-wo od
force. The wide plain gave his cavalry a good
chance of overwhelming Alexander 's ho rse. spears (called sarissae). The cavalry who fought
Tho ugh the latter were superior in quality, they alongsi de Alexandet we re called the 'Compan-
numbered 7,000 against Darius's 40,000. The ions'.
Macedo nian cavalry wore body armour and The hist orian Arrian put s the Macedonian

26 27
•
3 ANCIENT WORLD GAUGAM ELA 3

infantry at some 40,000 men, a fraction of Darius's
•
I.
host. But the Persian foot were mostly poorly
armed and almost untra ined, whereas Alexander
was leading hardened veterans accustomed to
victory. Some Macedon ians were conventionally
armed hypaspist: (shield-bearers), but the back-
bone of the infantry were phalangites. These
fought in ranks up to eight deep, yet every man
could bring his immensely long pike to bear.
When lowered, these pikes presented the enemy
with a hedge of spearpoints . This 'phalanx' was
Below Darius
chose a battlefield formidable only if it retained its formation. If dis-
in which he hoped ordered , it could be overwhelmed and, to do this,
hischariots would
Darius had scythed chariots.
disrupt th e
Mocedonian These chariots had two weaknesses. They
infantry, all owin g were vulnerable to cavalry and they required the
his huge
smoothest of terrain, since the ir huge scythes
superiorityin
numbers to swamp made any loss of forma tio n catastrop hic. Darius
th e invaders befor e relied on his cavalry to protect hischariots, and on
they could rally.
the battlefield he carefully prepared a number of
Alexander
obstacle-free runs to take the chariots into the
counte red by
refusing to attock heart of Alexander's infantry. There may have
his enemy head- been a few elephants to follow up the chariots,
on, and moving his
and after the cavalry had broken up the phalanx
force everfunher
to the flank asthe yet further, the Persian infantry would fin ish the
two sides closedin. job with sheer weight of numbers.
.......-.......I' COM BATANTS ........_ _
Macedon ians Left Porr of o
Macedonian
• 7,000 cavalry, 40,000 in fan try
phalanx in battle
• Commanded by Alexa nder t he Great array. Themain
funetionof
' 300 dead
Alexander's
ph alanx w as to pin
Persians the enemy forces
un til the cavalry
• 120,ooof250,ooo me n, including 40,000 cavalry
could exploit any
• Commanded by King Darius III Artashata
weaknessesin the
• 35,000 dead enemy's tine.
Belo w The angled
Macedonian
advancemade
On the battlefield army, since Alexander then took the time to scout advanced, but obliquely and towards the Per- Da rius launc h his
Alexander was soon on his way, He had taken an and discovered the chariot runs of Darius's trap, sians' left. This crabwise att ack to ok them away chario ts early, and
eclipse of th e moon earlier in the month as a sign But Alexander refused to countenance Parme- from Darius's chariot runs and fo rced the Persian his cav alry force
had to gallop from
presaging victory. Establi shing his main camp by nio's idea of fight ing at night, whe n darkness king to extend t he left wi ng of his army. th edistant right
the River Bou lemus, he pushed on with his men would mitigate t he Persian advantage of Darius had to launch his chariot s earlier tha n flan k befor e th ey
carrying only battle gear and a few days' supplies. num bers.'I will not steal victory', declared Alexan- planned. As they closed in, t he chariots were met coul d engage. By
this time,
The Macedonians reached Gaugamela in the der haughtily, This forced Darius to keep his by javelins and arrows, When the remnants
Alexander ha d
early afternoon of 30 September and discovered troops standing to all night j ust in case, while the reached the phalanx, the files opened smoothly already hi t the
the king 's army drawn up, with its batt le front Macedonians gained a night's rest. and they passedharmlessly through. opposite flank. and
extending kilometres across the plain . Alexander At dawn , Alexander's army formed up with As Darius had planned, the phalanx was now wascutting
through towards
wanted to rush immediately into battle, but Par- parade-ground precision , slightly to the left of the vulnerable, But his chariots had attacked too the centre and
Persian centre where Darius was stationed . They
menio urged restraint. This probably saved the soon, and the cavalry intended to exploit the Darius himself.

Alexander's discovery of the chariot Alexander strikes the charioteer

runsfoilsthe surpriseattackof the behindDarius. triggeringa rout as
Persians'main weapon:their scythed the Persiansmistakenlybelieve
Right flank guard, chariotsare stopped by Macedonian their king hasbeen killed.
Macedonianarchers cavalry, javelin archersand spearmen.
and javelinthrowers throwersand archers
Persian cavalry

DARIUS'S ARMY

The Macedonianflank
guardsmove to engage
advancingPersian cavalry.

l
Left flank guard
ALEXANDER'S ARMY

andcavalry

The Persian cavalryon the far

sid e of the plainadvanceto
join the action.

28 29
 3 A NCI ENT WORLD G A U G A M EL A 3

open ing of the phalanx was blocked by a Alexander, as

counter-attack from Alexander's lancers. Hastily depicted an a
sarcophagus now
Darius ordered the cavalry on the right wi ng to
in Istanbul. The
join the battle, but these had considerable sarcophagus WQS
ground to cover before the y reached the Mace- probably of the
Persiannoble
don ian left, commanded by Parmenio.
Mazaeus, whom
Alexander jo ined th e battle personally, Alexa nd er
leading his Compan ions against the left w ing of appoin ted ta
the Persian infantry. According to Plutarch, 'The govern Babylon
afterhisvictoryo t
barbarians were starting to scatter. Alexander fol- Gau gam ela.
lowed up strongly, driving the enemy into the
midst of the battle, and to where Darius was com-
mand ing at the centre of his line.'
The batt le was finely balanced. Darius's chari-
ots had failed, but his cavalry was pressing back
the lancers.On the right flank, the Persiancavalry
had struck the Macedonian left, which was
fraying fast. If the cavalry could get among the
phalangites and disorder them, Darius coul d
smother the remnants with his infantry.
What had been a generals' battle broke into a
confused melee. The cavalry had created huge
clouds of dust, blinding everyone from all but
their own corner of the field. Alexander was too
busy with his style of hands-on leadership to see
the whole picture, wh ile Darius was hampered by
the bulk and inexperience of his army.

Darius aga inst Alexande r

Consequently, when the Persian cavalry broke
through the Macedon ian left, they believed that
victory was imm inent and charged on to take
Alexander's camp. Meanwhile the Macedon ian
right hit the left flank of the Persian army, follow-
ing Alexander who wasintent on reaching Darius.
As w it h chess, if the king was taken the game
was won. The Sicilian historian Diodorus Siculus
believed that Darius fought well :
The Persianking me t the Macedon ian attack on
his chariot. raining javelins on his enemies, with his
bodyguard at his back. As the two kings closed the
range between them, a javelin hurled by Alexander
missed Darius, but im paled the chariot driverstand-
ing behind him, knocking him off the chariot. A
shout went up at this from the Persians around
Darius, and those further away from the scene
thought their king had been brought do wn. These
people were the first to flee, and then those beside
them, and so on until the ent ire Persian army disin-
tegrated. With the enemy no w on both flanks, the
king became worried. He drew back, and this was
the signal fora general rout.'
Alexander's biographers - Arrian, Curtius
Rufus and Plutarch - have Darius fleeing at the
mere sight of Alexander, but these accounts are
not contemporary. A laconic account from a
Babylonian astronomical calendar supports
Diodorus's suggestion that Darius's army
deserted him rather than vice versa.
Aft ermath
News of Alexander's success was slow to reach
the Macedonian left, where Parmenio was having
a torrid ti me. He had swung his reserves about to
cover the rear of the army, and was almost
surrounded on th ree sides. Receiving Parmenio's
call for help, Alexander promptly rushed to the
rescue. But by the time he reached Parmenio's
side, a spirited charge by the Thessalian cavalry,
combined w ith bad news from the rest of the
battlefield, had already caused the Persians to
ret reat.
Alexander led a brutal chase towards the city
of Arbela, slaying tens of thousands of fleeing
Persians. He was haunted by the thought that
Darius would raise another army with the se men
and that he would have to fight again. But in fact
Darius was later assassinated by Bessus, the
general who had commanded the left wing of the
Persian army here at Gaugamela.
With the death of his rival, Alexander became
und isputed lord of the Persian empire, and Greek
influence stretched from its ancient homeland
almost to th e Himalayas.

30 31
 CAN N A E 4

Cannae chain mail and carried sligh tly oval shields. Their
main weapons were a heavy th rowing spear,
th e pi/um, and a deadly short sword called th e
gladius. The legionaries foug ht in close form ati on,
Date: 2 August 2 16 Be Location: modern Cannosa, southeast Ita ly almost shoulder-to-shou lder, stabbing und erarm
wi th their gladii. Most of th eir opponents fought
On the next day, w hen he had command, Varro did as expected an d, with longer swords and needed a greater
witho ut consulting his colleague in any way at all, ordered the men to p repare for battle. frontage so as to slash effective ly. This almo st
He th en dr ew up th e legions and marched them acrossthe river. Paullus fo llo wed, despite guaranteed th e legionaries local superiority on
his deep disqu iet a t what was being done . t he battlefield, no matter w hat the overall odds,
(THE ROMAN COMMANDERS BEFORE CANNAE, 216 BC) LIVY 22.45 since the Romans could put th ree men against
their enemies' tw o.
Hannibal commanded a rag-bag of nationali -
ties. He had Lusitan ians and Celtiberians from
Right TheCapua

T
he Second Punic War (218-202 BC) is some-
bust. p resumed ta
times, quite just ifiably, called 'Hannibal's
be of Hannibal.
The Romans War'. Hannibal 's desire to avenge the
imagined defeat of Carthage in the First Punic War
Hann ibal to be
(264- 24 1 BC) inspired him to gather an army in
vindictive and
inhumanlyaue/, Spain and, in one of the most famous marches in
qualities which this history, take that army over the Alps into Italy.
artist ha scaptured This invasion had a political aswell asa military
well.
objective. Hannibal hoped that once his army
was on Italian soil the peoples of Italy would rise
against Rome. This was realistic, for the Samnites
of cent ral Italy had only recently been conquered.
Many Greekcities in the south, such asNaplesand
Taranto , chafed under Roman rule, and the Gauls
of northern Italy were both unconquered and
hostile .
Though the Gauls floc ked enthusiastically to
Hannibal's bann er, the rest of Italy remained
unconvinced . Hannibal defeated the Romans at
Trebb ia in 2 18, and again crushingly at Lake
Trasimene in 217, but there was no general upr is-
ing against Rome.
In 216 Hannibal tried again, capturing Roman
stores at Cannae (modern Cannosa) and position-
ing his army across the Roman supply lines, from
where he dared them to dislodge him . Hannibal
felt it necessary to resort to this because Fabius
Maximus ('the Delayer') had adopted the tactic of
stalking Hannibal 's army - never offering battle,
but never drawing off to allow the Carthaginians
to forage unhindered.
However, unknown to Hannibal, Roman policy
had changed . Rome had resolved to destroy him
once and for all and had mustered 16 legions,
together with support ing auxiliaries and cavalry.
This represent ed 80,000 infantry and a furth er
6,000 cavalry. To pu t this into perspect ive, 300
years later when Rome's power st retched from
Britain to Mesopotamia, the empire had in total
about 25 legions.
The antagon ists
To add to Hannibal 's problems, the Roman legion
was beyond doubt the finest fighting force in
antiquity. At this time the legionaries fought in
Spain, Gauls from the Alpine passes, recruits from
Italy itself, a hard core of Libyan infantrymen,
and cavalry from Numidia in north Africa. It is a
testament to Hannibal's quality as a leader that in
all the years he was in Italy the different compo-
nents of his army remained well disciplined and
completely under control. Only soldiers with
complete faith in their commander could have
carried ou t Hannibal's plan at Cannae.
Hannibal could guess that Rome's formidable
infantry would drive straight at his line, confi -
dent ly expecti ng to break it. Livy's reports of
disagreements bet ween the Roman consuls
about thi s tactic are probably to shift blame from
th e patri cian consul Aemiliu s Paullus. The other
consul was the plebeian Terentius Varro. Nor-
mally each Roman consul commanded his own
army, fo r the consulship was the top political and
mi litary posit ion in Rome. But so huge was th is
Rom an army that both con suls were present, and
commanding on alternate days.
The day of battle
At Cannae on the morning of 2 August 216 BC,
Aemilius Paullus led the cavalry on the Roman
right, facing the Spanish and Gallic heavy cavalry
between the River Aufidius (the modern Ofanto)
and the left flank of Hannibal 's infantry. On Hanni-
bal's other flank was t he Numidian cavalry unde r
Maharbal, a dashing commander with a string of
successful engagements to his name.
Hannibal and his brother Mago commanded
the centre where the main blow would fall, and
where total precision was required . Perhaps the Part of tne reliei
ofDomitius
most reliable of Hannibal 's troops were the
Ahenobarbus
Libyans, who wore mostly Roman armour won in shawing soldiers
earlier victories , and were an obvious choice to wearingchain
take th e first shock of the Roman charge. But moil and with
shields.Note thar
instead Hannibal placed his Gallic and Spanish theseshields were
troops in th e centre , with the Libyans in t wo solid longer and more
blocks on right and left behind the front line. avalrhan
legionary shields in
The battle began wit h Hannibal's heavy
the empire. In the
cavalry breaking the Roman horse of Paullus wi t h
legions the arm our
a savage charge. This would not have surprised Oorica hamata)
the Romans. Hannibal's superior ity in cavalry had was eventually
replaced by the
been known ever since an action at the River better-known
Ticinus near Pavia in 218, w hen the Roman com- 'Iabster plate'
mander Publius Scipio (fat her of the great general armour (1orica
segmentata),
Scipio Africanus) had been wounded. butir continued
Sowhile Terentius Varro led his cavalry against ;nuseamongthe
Maharbal's Num idian horse, Paullus abandoned auxiliaries.
his routed troops and rejoined the main body of
the army as it crashed into the Carthaginian line.
This bowed under the impact, starting slowly to
give way. Polybi us tells us:
'Paul/us threw himselfinto where the fighting was
fiercest in the centre of the line, smiting the enemy
and urging on his men. Hannibal, who had been in
that place since the start of the battle, was doing
exactly the same.'

32 33
 4 A NCIE N T WO RLD
CA N N A E 4

For Hannibal it was crucial that was close. The Carthaginian centre fought with the stubbornness that was the hall, Hannibal remained in Italy for another 14 years,
his centre gave ground wi thout was buckling . Roman reserves mark of their republic. The slaughter, 'butchery he never achieved another victory like Cannae or
breaking . In ancient warfare, poured into the breach, bending rather than batt le' as Livy called it, lasted t he l akeTrasimene. Eventually, Hannibal was recalled
most casualties we re suffered the ir batt le line into a blunted entir e afternoon. to Africa and was defeated at the battle of Zama
Right Helmer
worn by a Roman when a battle line broke and V.At the point of the V the When the victory waswo n, the plain of Cannae in 201 BC. Fifty years later, Roman vengeance saw
cavalryman. This th e routers were cut down. Gauls and Spaniards was a charnel house of some 60,000 corpses Carthage demo lished and salt sown on the foun -
typeofhelmer was dations to prevent the city ever rising again.
When a line did break, those were at the ir last gasp. (including t hat of Aemilius Paullus, though Teren-
called Boeotian',
presumablyafter with the best chance of sur- But on each side were t he ti us Varro escaped). Hannibal's advisors urged Belo w After
rhecavalrymenof driving off tne
vival were t hose who ran Libyan infant ry, and before the him to march immediately on Rome. But Hanni-
Thebes in Greece Romancavalry,
fir st, so morale and discip line were Rom ans cou ld reorg anize, these bal's army was exhausted. The Carthaginians had rheCarthaginian
who developedit.
essenti al in holdi ng a lin e under pressure and Libyans turn ed and fell on th e Roman flanks. At no siege equipment to use against Rome's walls horseswept into
Carthaginian. rhebock of tbe
Belo w TheRoman goi ng backwards. The Gauls and Spaniards, t hat mom ent , th e Carthagin ian cavalry atta cked and, in any case, Hannibal expect ed th at such
weakness in Romanlines.
despite their reputati on for indiscipline, did th e rear of the Roman batt le line. massive defeat would finally force Rome to terms. • 50,000 men
This complered
cavalrywasmore
than compensated exactly as Hann ibal required. Or if not, her allies and subjects in Italy would • Commanded by Hannibal the encirclement
for by tne superior Behind th e Romans, developments became Massacre surely now abandon Rom e?To Hannibal's objec- begun when tne
• 8,000 dead
strengrh and Libyan infanrry
ominous. The Carthaginian heavy cavalry rallied It was a classic envelopment manoeuvre. The t ions, t he exasperated Maharb al replied, 'No closed like a
numbersof
from its pursuit of th e Roman horse, and rod e Romans were surrounded , disordered and ham- general is completely talented . You, Hannibal , Romans viceon the
legionariesin the
Romancentre./r across the back of the battle line to fall on Varro's pered by the ir own numbers. Experienced can wi n batt les, but you do not know how to use • 86,000 men
disorganized
was rhisvery Romans as rhey
cavalry. Attacked from two sides, the Roman infantry mig ht conceivably have fought the ir way your victory: • Commanded by Terenti us Varro, Aemilius
superiority thar pushedrhrough
cavalry bolted, leaving thou sandsof Carthaginian out of the trap , but many of.the Roman legionar- He was rig ht. Rome neither sued for peace nor Paulius rhemiddleof rhe
Hannibal planned
to useagainst the cavalry unchecked behind the Roman infant ry. ies were new recruits, fighting their very first lost many of th e alliances which she had built as ·50,000 dead Carthaginian
Romans. barrieline.
The Roman comm anders still felt that victory battl e. Though in a hopeless situation, th ey durably as her roads. Rome rallied, and though

-'
Spanish and Gallic
cavalry (Hasdrubal)

"
"

. , ..
CA1Qtm o:NNA't
.. ..· .--, _
-,.
.. f.. •.-,-,
,
- ....
' Numidian cavalry
, .,
.' (Maharbal or Hanna)
.'

11111\11
CD
INNI mill
1Ill1l1 1l1li m 1If11111l
Spanish and Gallic
heavy cavalry
Infantry is fronted by
Celtiberiansand Gauls
....
Numidian cavalry
(Maharbal or Hanna)
® ®
(Hasdrubal) (Hannibal and Mago)
Libyan s
Libyans Q) Roman infant ry,joined now by Paullu s. burstthrough
centr e o f Carthag inian infantry. which retreat in
organizedfashion without routing.

CD Hannibal opens·i hea etion ~Y sending ~is famously ,.

,.'

@
... .
strong cavalryto charge'theRemans.
.....
Gallic and Spanish
infantry..
•
. @
•
Carthaginian heavy cavalry rout Vano'shorse a n~ are
noJ-'in a strong position behindthe Roman soldiers.
.,
The weakerGallicand-Spanish. nfant;Ygive qrc end under the
. .. . . ~ -.. ® P owerfu l lib yan infantJ'ton both fla~ks anack -" • ..
,
" "
. ..
"
Roman legionaries. forming.the first part of Hannibal's plan.
- '. the Romans, "9Wenveloped on all Sides. .. '.

34 35
 Gaixia Th e Chu- Han struggle
After securing th e hig hland region around
Xianyang, Liu Bang moved east to contest Xiang
Yu's rule over th e Nort h China Plain. For two and a
Date: 203 BC Lo cat io n: near modern Guzhen, Anhui p rov ince, China half years, t he two sides battled for contr ol of a
series of forti fied posit ions at Xingyang, Cheng-
Hecalled hisenterprisethat ofa Hegemon King. intending to manage the world by meansof gao and Gongxian, just south of the Yellow River
mighty compaigns. Afterfiveyears, hefinally lost hisstate and died himselfat Tung-ch'eng in today's Henan province. While Xiang Yu
l Dongcheng),yet even then hedid not come to hissensesand blamehimself. What error! focused on atta cking th ese Han posit ions
(A BOUT X IANG Yu) SIMA Q IAN, THEG RANOSCRIBE'SRECOROS, C. 100 BC fro ntally wi th his superior forc es, Liu Bang sent his
best general, Han Xin, to defeat th e Hegemon
King's allies nort h of the Yellow River, suborned
another key Chu ally in the Yangzi valley, and set

T
Right Thispainted he batt le of Gaixia was th e valley kingdom of Chu, commanded t he his ow n ally Peng v ue to work harassing the
pottery figurine of fin al engagement of the pro - most powerfu l mili tary fo rce and supply linesthat stretched eastward to Xiang Yu's
a cavalryman, Q
Western Han burial
tracted str uggl e between th e allegiance of most of the home base in the modern prov inces of Jiangsu
abject. reflectsthe the rival generals Liu Bang and Xiang other leaders. But it was the wi ly and Anhui. By th e autu mn of 203 BC, th e success
transition fromthe Yu for dom inance over China, follow- Liu Bang, a former Qin functionary of this mult i-pronged st rategy had left Xiang Yu's
useofchariots to
ing the collapse of the short-lived Qin of humble birth, whose troops had main army weakened, dispirited and short of pro-
the useofcavalry
and infantryasthe dynasty . This encounter marked one of captu red the Qin capital Xianyang visions. At t his point Xiang Yu reached an
main force in t he most significant turning points in (near toda y's Xian). Xiang Yu assigned agreement to divide the empire with his rival, and
batt le.
Chinese history, w hen disun ity and inter- kingdoms to eighteen of th e rebel wit hdrew eastward to wards his capital at
nal strife gave way to a lasting imperial leaders, reserving fo r him self a posi- Pengcheng.
Belo w Liu Bang order. tion as first among equals with the title
pursuedXiong Yu Hegemon King of Western Chu. He compelled Liu The final battle
eastwardsacross The contenders Bang to evacuate the capital region and move his Liu Bang's advisors now persuaded him to break
the North China
Soon after the death of the First Emperor in 210 forces southward into t he Han River valley where the agreement and set out in pursuit of th e Chu
Plain to Goixia,
where theChu BC, the harsh rule of the Qin dynasty was chal- he would assume the title of King of Han. A few army. Overtaken at Guling, Xiang Yu struck at his
army was lenged by a series of rebellions . Two men months later, in th e summer of 206 BC, Liu Bang pursuers and thre w them on t he defensive. As
trapped by the
eventually emerged as preeminent among th e took advantage of Xiang Yu's distract ion else- armies led by Han Xin, Peng v ue and ot her Han
convergenceof
threeother Han rebel leaders. The fierce and impetuous Xiang Yu, where to reoccup y t he territory around Xianyang, allies converged on the area, however, the odd s
forces. scion of a line of hereditary generals in the Yangzi precip itating the war betw een Chu and Han. against Xiang Yu became overw helming and his
army was encircled at th e to wn of Gaixia, about
32 km (20 mil es) east of today's Guzhen, Anhui. 800 horsemen and fled southwa rds, but was soon Painted pott ery
...---1 COMBATANTS '------. There he gave battl e wi t h 100,000 men against a brought to bay near th e north bank of the Yangzi figurinesoffight ly
armoured Wes tern
combined Han force of 300,000. River. There he slit his own throat. Han infantrymen -
Han forces The Han army deployed in three echelons, burial objectsfrom
• c. 300,000 soldie rs Consequences a 2nd-<entury Be
with Han Xin commanding from the cent re of the
lomb near Xian.
• Commanded by Liu Bang first echelon. The Han general's opening t hrust The elimi nati on of Xiang Yu cleared the way fo r Theseare
N Liu Bang to take the imperial throne and establish

• • Unknown casualt ies was repulsed, but the Chu counter-att ack was representative of
stalled by the divisions on his left and right flan ks, th e Han dynasty. Where Xiang Yu had favoured the mossinfantry
I armiesof Han
Chu forces giving him the opportunity to return to the offen - a loose confe derat ion of autonomous regional
China.
- . Hanphase 1
o l 00 km
sive and defeat the Chu army. Surround ed in his kingdoms, Liu Bang and his heirs laboured to con-
I I •c. 100,000 soldiers
- - . - Hanphase2 o SO~iles camp at Gaixia and hearing th e sound of Chu struct a more central ized imperial state. The
- -> Hanphase3 HuaiRiver"...,
~~
• Co m mand ed by Xiang Yu
- . Chuphase t -r-e-, ==-- songs from th e Han lines, Xiang Yu believed that dynasty t hey created did not fall unti l AD 220, and
- - . - Chu phase2 Yangzi River •c. 80,000 dead
- -> Chu phase3 his entire kingdom had been overrun. In despair, the imperial system of government in China sur-
he broke out of th e encirclement with an escort of vived until AD 1912.

36 37

Actium
Date: 2 September 3 1 Be Location : nea r the island of Levkas,western Greece
On one side Augustus Caesar, high up on the poop, is leading
The Italians into battle, the Senate and People with him...
On the other side with barbaric wealth and motley equipment,
Is Antony, fresh from his trium phs in th e East, by the shores of the Indi an
Ocean; Egypt, the power s of the Orient and uttermost Baetra
Sail with him; also - a shameful thing - his Egyptian wi fe.
VIRGIL, THEA ENEID, VIII,678-88
I
n 44 BC the assassination of the dictator Julius
Caesar sparked off a lengthy seriesof civil wars
that engulfed the whole of the Roman world.
By 32 BC it had boiled down to a contest between
two powerful Roman aristocrats and the ir follow-
ers. Caesar's heir, Gaius Julius Caesar Octavianus,
(known to modern historians as Octavian) faced
Caesar's former right-hand man, Marcus Antonius
(or Antony ashe is usually called). Octavian, based
in Italy, dom inat ed th e western half of the Roman
empire. Antony controlled most of th e eastern
half of the empi re, wi th the aid of his ally and wi fe
Cleopatra VII, ruler of th e Hellenistic kingdom of
Egypt. The decisive confrontation between them
came in 31 BC on the western coast of Greece.
Achieving naval superiority was essential for
both sides in this campaig n; wi thout it Octavian
could not hop e to bring supplies and reinforce-
ments from Italy, or stage a potentially decisive
invasion of Egypt. Antony for his part needed to
be able to sever Octavian's lines of commun ica-
tion and cross the Adriatic to invade Italy, w hilst
maintaining his own link s with Egypt and the
eastern provinces.
The bulk of Antony's army was at Patrai in the
Gulf of Corinth, with garrisons at strategic points
around the Peloponnese, and naval squadrons
Marble portrait head from a statue ofOctovian, e. 30-25 Be.
He was the sonofJulius Caesar'snieceand wasadopted by
Caesarin his will.
38
...
AC TIUM 6
dispersed throughout th e nearby
islands. His fleet was laid up at
Actium, at the entra nce to the
mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, a
large bay that was closed by a very
narrow channel lessthan half a mile
in width. Early in the sprin g of 31 BC
Octavian managed to establi sh his
army on the northern headland of
thi s channel w hile his fleet, ably com-
manded by Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa ,
defeated Antony's squadrons on the
islands and gradually cut off the supply
routesto Acti um. Antony and Cleopatra
brought their army up to the
northern headland in an
attempt to forc e Octavian into
a decisive battle, while their
fleet remained at Actium.
There the unhealthy, marshy
conditions, poor supplies and
dw indling morale encouraged
widespread disaffection among their
commanders and w holesale deser- he did manage to lead his Abo ve left
tions by the rower sof the ir warships. army away intact, by giving Greenbosalr
busrprobably
By midsummer th e posit ion had up his fleet he would cut representing Mark
become desperate. Antony 's principal admiral , himself off from the legions that were still loyal to Antanye. 40-30 Be.
Gaius Sosius, attempted to break out by sea, him in Syria and Cyrenaica. He marr ied
Octavian'ssister,
while Ant ony led half his army inland, hop ing to but divorcedher in
draw Octavian away from th e area in pursu it; he Preparations for battle 32sc.
probably inte nded to link up with Sosius on the On 2 September Antony burnt his spare ships,
Above ri ght
eastern coast of Greece. Sosius defeated th e mo stly tr oop transports, to deny Octavian thei r
Marble portrait of
squadron of ships that was bloc kading the use. He th en embarked his best soldiers on th e Cleopatra VII,
entrance to th e gulf, but Agr ippa brought the rest remaining warships,which were fully crewed.The e. 50-30 Be. She
of the fleet up in pursuit and routed Sosius, exact strength of each fleet is impossible to estab- had a son byJulius
Caesarand three
forcing him to turn back. lish, but Antony was heavily outnumbered. children by
News of th is defeat caused Antony to return to Octavian had over 400 warships available, while An rony.
his camp, where a debate raged over whether to Antony's effective battle fleet , depr ived of the
abandon th e fleet altogether and head north for ships stationed around the coast and islands, and
Macedo nia,where allies might still be found, or to further reduced by sicknessand desertion among
man as many of the warships as possible with his his crews, numbered around 230.
best soldiers and attempt another break-out by Ancient warships were powered by oarsmen
sea. If the latter was successfu l, Antony could head seated on up to three levels. The rati ngs applied
fo r Egypt and perhaps assemble another army. to such ships vary from 'twos' to 'sixteens'. They
Anto ny was not an experienced naval com - refer not to the number of men pulling each oar,
mander, but the arguments for a sea-fight , but to the total number of men in each vertical
advocated also by Cleopatra, were sound. Even if group of oarsmen. Hence a 'five' would have oars
39
 6 ANC IENT WORLD
ACTI UM 6

at onl y three levels, but on th e batt les, but Antony's plan was to
top two levels the oars were head out to sea and, as soon as ••••• Octavian'sfleet
(400 warships)
each pulled by two men, his ships had a favourable
w hile the lowest level had
Oet a v ia n (Ga iu s J u liu s Caesar Oetavianus) ••••• Antony's fleet
(230 warships)
wi nd, to set sails and head '406 sh ips
Right Romon one man to each oar. south, round the Pelopon- directionof wind
silver coin minted
• Com ma nded by Marcu s Vipsan ius Agrippa and
The ships in Octavian's nese and on to Egypt. In Lucius Arruntius
in 168C, showing
th e go d Apollo
fleet ranged from the addi tion to the warships • Unknown casua lt ies
ofAcrium moking triremes, rated as 't hrees', there were numerous mer-
a sacrifice ona that carried about 200 soldiers Octavian's
chant vessels which carried Ant o ny (Ma rcu s Anton ius) and Cleopatra VII
plotform decorated Ionian camp
with the prows ond
and oarsmen, to 'sixes', that few troops and had no rams or • 230s hip s Sea o
anchors of
captured warships.
could take in excess of 500 men. catapults , but bore the treasure • Comma nd ed by Pub lius Can idius Crassus, ..
"T"'
They were equipped with rams on the ir chests conta ining Antony and Cleopa- Gaius Sosius. Lucius Gellius Publicola and Ambrac ian
Octavian adopted r-;» later city of
pro ws, but the ir princ ipal tactic was to come tra's war funds. It was vital that these ships got Ma rcu s Octavius Gulf
this version of Nikopolis
Apollo as his divine alongside an enemy vessel, attack it with missile away. The squadron of warships detailed to •c. 150 ships destroyed
patron. weapons, including small catapults , then grapple escort them included Cleopatra's own flagship.
and attempt to board.
"9. Marcus ~
Belo w Ma rble
relieitrom Antony had similar vessels, plus a few larger The engagement fast 'liburnian' ship. In order to increase the \~ Agnp~
~~~I~~OJ£
F~"Y.
Praenesteshowing ships rated up to 'n ines' and 'tens', which were Octavian's aim was simply to block the exit from chances of breaking th rough the enemy lines,
warship, c. 40-30 floating fortresses with towers at bow and ste rn '50- \1 0 ACTIUM
\~
~\' \\%...,'v Antony's camp
the Ambr acian Gulf wi th a do uble line of war- Antony ordered the ships on his ext reme rig ht
sc. The ship ha s
for archers and hundreds of soldiers on t heir ships. Marcus Agri ppa comma nded the left wing and left w ings - under the command of Lucius
two ban ks of oa rs lucus Arruntius '- _
broad decks. His ships were carrying their sails, .~a l u /:
ond is p ro bobly of his fleet , Lucius Arruntius the centre, while Gellius Publicola and Gaius Sosius respectively - o~ Q-'
Q 'four'. whi ch was not normal practice in an ancient sea Octavian himself was on the right wing in a small, to try to move away from the centre, forcing the
enemy to move with them and away from the ~;;1 r N

centre of the ir own lines. This caused a gap to

develop through which it was possible for Ionian
Sea
Octavian

o
t
Skm
Cleopatr a's squadron to sail with the heavily I I
o 3 miles
laden merchant ships.
On the left wi ng of Octavian's fleet Agrippa 's
ships defeated Publicola and drove on towards hailed t he battl e of Actium as the beg inning of a Publicola and
Antony and the t hird, central squadro n under golden era for Rome. It was not so much the naval Sosiustriedto
dra w Ag ripp a 's
Marcus Octavius. Antony's own flagship had defeat as the abando nment of th eir army th at and Octavian's
become inextricably bound up with several other spelled the end for Antony and Cleopatra, and ships away from
vessels in the fierce fighting on the rig ht wing , so t heir chances of ever defeating Octavian. Antony'scentre.
thus creatingan
he had to transfer to another, smaller ship and Although the army began a nort hward wi th-
opening for
follow after Cleopatra's squadron . He was chased drawal from Actium towards Macedon ia, under Cleopatra.
by some of Octavian's lightest and fastest vessels. the command of Publius Canidius Crassus, as Sosius retreated
from Octavian,
By the time they caught up with him he had trans- soon as Octavian's forces caught up with th em
while Publicola's
ferred again to Cleopat ra's flagship and the th e veteran legions stopped and negotiated a squadron was
pursuers were driven off. In all he managed to change of sides. Their sense of loyalty to Ant ony deieatedby
save about seventy warships. was not po werfu l enough to make th em ignore Agrip p a. who th en
engage d th e
the realit ies of th e sit uation. centre.Antony
After mat h The doomed couple were pur sued to Alexan- stru gg led to break
Octavian created a hug e victory monument on dria by Octavian. Both comm itted suicide rather clear of Arruntius's
ships, but
t he site of his own camp, deco rated with rams t han submit to t he new ruler of th e Roman world.
Cleopatra sailed
fro m captured enemy ships. He also fou nded a Octavian returned to Rome, renamed him self thro ug h, followed
city there which he called Nikopolis (Victory City). Aug ustu s Caesar and inaugurated t he line of eventually by
An tony.
Contemporary poets such as Virgil and Horace Rom an emp erors that lasted for 500 years.

40
41

•
 TE UT OB UR G F OREST 7

Teutoburg Forest
on the edge of th e Wiehen hills north of
OsnabrOck, Armin ius had prepared an
ambush. Here, t he forest extended almost to
the edge of an imp enetrabl e marsh. The
Date: autum n AD 9 Locat ion: Kalkriese, Germany Roman army was caught on th e narrow
stretch of land betw een th e tw o w hen th e
In the tield, th e bones of the sotdierslay scattered about, each w here he ha d fallen either Germansatt acked.
standing his gro und or trying to flee. There w ere bits ofw eapons, and the bones ofhors es The Romans were penned in by a wall at the
amongst them, and human heads had been na iled to the trun ks ofth e surroundi ng trees. forest edge. This was part -rampart, but mostly a
TACITUS, ANNALS, 1.61 fence woven with branches between the trees, of
a type that the Germans used to stop th eir catt le
from straying. The Romans were probably split
into pockets by the first attac k and unable to co-
n the early years of the 1 st century AD the the Roman legions for military experience ordi nate th eir efforts. In confused skirmishes and
Right Derailofthe
iron point of a
lance.Some
German warriors
merely used fire-
I emperor Augustus tried to bring Germany
under his control. An unconquered
Germany was uncomfortably close to Italy,
was Arminius, son of a chieftain of the Cher-
usci tribe.
Varus was unaware t hat the despoiling
a running batt le lasting several days, the trapped
Romanswere steadily worn down.

Ab ove Raman
and Augu stus may have felt th at a defensive of his nat ive land had made Armi nius a Outcom e facehelmet from
hardened wooden
speartips. line along the Elbe was easier to maintain bitter enemy of Rome. From the moment Varus was eit her killed or fell on his sword. Others the Teutaburg
than the current one along the Rhine. Varus arrived in Germany, Arminius followed his example, for the Germans had a grisly discovered very recently by Major Tony Clunn, an Forest barriesite.
Belo w By AD 9 Germany seemed sufficiently con- plotted to unite the tribes and bring about way with prisoners. In the end, not one single amateur archaeolog ist. He found Roman metal
Reconstruction of Belo w Theyellow
quered fo r Augustus to send a governor whose the Roman leader'sdo wnfa ll. Roman survived. What we know of the battle is artifacts wh ich suggested a batt le, and profes- patines ofricher
polisade. The
building ofthis main concern was the Romanization of the These tr ibes sent to Varus and asked for from reconst ruct ions, the first by the Romans sional archaeolog ists confirmed that th is was the archaeological
poiisade is site of the Varussch/ocht - where Varus's legions finds suggestthat
province. This was Quintilius Varus, former garrisons to be stationed with them . Varus the mselves, w ho returned to the scene a few years
indicative of the Romans twice
governor of Syria and husband of August us's agreed readily and sent detachme nts, thus later.They foun d places w here senior Roman offi - had been destr oyed. attempted to
Arminius'scareful
planning, aswas great- niece. weakening his main force. Finally, in AD 9 cers had been messily sacrificed, and t he bones of Arminius's victory ensured th at north west break through the
hisuseof terrain to Europe had a Germanic rather th an a Latin palisadesbefore
Varus comma nded three legion s - th e XVII, Armi nius arranged for reports of t rouble in a the dead scattered whe re th ey had fallen.
nullify thesuperior their forcewas
XVIII and XIX. Also, some of the many tribes of distant part of the prov ince to reach Varus. It was Gradually th e sit e of the disaster was forgot- culture. This in turn profound ly affected subse-
equipment and brokenand the
training ofthe Germany were allied with the Romans. Among no w autumn, and Varus seemsto have decided to ten. A massive monument to the batt le was quent European history, and thus the history of survivorshacked
Romans. the young German aristocrats who served wi th move his whole camp and deal wi t h the problem eventually erected at Hiddesen, south of the wo rld. down .

on his way to winter quarters . Another German Detmold. This was some SO km (31 miles) from
leader, Segestes, pleaded passionate ly w it h Varus t he actual site of Teutoburg Forest, w hich was
not to trust Armin ius, but he was ignored. modern
Kalkriese

Action
_ _ .I" COMBATANTS
Armin ius's guides led the Romans astray. Then
the Germans attac ked. Init ially these attack swere Germ ans
pinpricks - ambuscades which melt ed at t he first •c. 35,000 men
sign of seriou s resistance, and th e thr eat seemed • Commanded by Armi ni us
mino r. The Romans had armour, equ ipment and • Unknown casualt ies
training, while many Germans fought naked.
Though some warriors had swords, ot hers had Romans
merely a crude spear (t he frameo ), someti mes Wiehenhills
• 20,000 men
with only a fire-hardened wooden point.
• Commanded by Publius Qu intilius Varus
But the Romans were uncomfortable in the legions XVI I, XVIII, XIX . . . - hills
• 20,000 dead, plus c. 3,000 civilians Osnabruck German advance ....-
dense forest, and we re made more miserable by a archaeo logical finds
" palisade -
series of thunderstorms. Near modern Kalkriese,

42 43
 ADRIA NOPl E 8

Adrianople
Dat e: 9 August AD 378 Locati on: modern Edirne, Turkey

Then the two li nes ofba ttle threw them sel ves against the other. Like the p ro ws
of ships dri ving into each other, they w ere tossed back and forth li ke waves ofthe sea.
Our left wing had advan ced right up to the wagons, and w ould ha ve p ushed on still
further ifproperly supp orted. But the rest of the cavalry abandoned the m to it.
They were hard p ressed by th e sup erior numbers ofthe enem y, overwhelmed,
an d beaten do wn li ke the ruin s of a great rampart.
A MMIANu s M ARCELLINUS 3 1.12
Confident of victory, Valens spurned
Fritigern's offer. Though Valens's advisors
urged him to wait for further reinforce -

I
Despite tbe n AD 376, the eastern Roman emperor Valens resettlement instead provoked the Goths into ments, t he emperor was determined to
stubbo rn Gothic gave permission for the Goths to cross the war wit h the empire. engage the enemy as soon as possible.
defence of their
Danube and settle within the Roman emp ire. Two years later, wit h the Goths st ill unsub- On 9 August 378 Valens marched from
hillrop wogon ton,
the Romans were The Goths were seeking refuge from the Huns dued, Valens set out to fini sh the war personally. Adrianople to where the Gothic encamp-
confidem of sweeping westward from Central Asia, while the He took w it h him about 40,000 veteran infantry, ment of wagons, or laager, lay on a hilltop
victory untttthe Romans hop ed that abandon ed areas would be several hour s' march away. The Goths
and a mixtu re of heavy cavalry, hor se archers and
unexpected arrival
ofa massive
repopulated with taxpaying peasant s who could Arab scouts, making about 20,000 in tot al. att empted further negotiations, and set
Gothk: cova lry supply the ir army wi th recruits. The greed and In early Augu st, Valens found th e Goth s in fire to the fields around the hill to further
force. extortion of t he Roman offi cials in charge of th e delay the Romans. Finally, the Roman infantry, quent impacts, so that they resorted to using their Above The
Thrace, near the city of Adrianop le. Valen s was
frustrated by th e delay, seem to have taken swo rds. These they thrust in to the massed ranks of iudovisi
encouraged by reports of victories against th e Sarcophagus
barbarians from Gratian, em peror in th e West, matters into their own hands and attacked. the enem y. They w ere suicidally brave, since they
showing battle
Gothicencampment _ and his general Sebastian. Furthermo re, his This first uncoordinated assault was a failure, now ha d no hope of saving themselves. They were between Germans
and Romans.
Gothic wagons c=J scouts reporte d far fewer enemy t han expected - but th e veteran Romans briskly re-organ ized and sli thering on ground saturated with rivu lets of
TheRoman on
Gothiccavalry ~ about 10,000 in all, and th ese mostly infantry. As if pressed forward again, still confident of victory. blood, as they tr ied to sell the ir li ves as dearly as pos-
horseback in tne
Roman infantry _ to confirm their weakness, t he Goth ic leader Frit- At thi s point in the battle, the reason for the sib le....At the last w herever one looked there w as too righr corner
Roman cavalry ~ igern sent to Valens, asking fo r peace. Gothic att empts at delay became suddenly no thing but heaps ofthe sla in and li felesscorpse s.' wi rhme ourflung
arm hasbeen
apparent. The Goth ic heavy cavalry had been The general Sebastian was killed try ing to rally
identihed wi rh
away, w het her raiding or forag ing is unclear. But his men. Legend has it that Valens was pursued Hasrilian. son of
....---- COMBATANTS now, in a devastating blo w to Roman morale, by Goth ic cavalry into a farmhouse and the Goths, rheemperor

CD Roman cavalrytries t hey returned - aIlSO,OOO of them . not knowing whom they had at the ir mercy, Decius who died in
AD251.
to prot ect th e line
while the legions Goths The totally outclassed Roman cavalry were secured the cottage and burned it and all within.
de ploy
• 60,000 men, compri sing 50,000 cavalry swept away in the first charge. The infantry were We cannot tell if this is indeed the truth, but cer- Above left Sil ver
caught off-balance by the new threat. Their tainly Valens perished either in the battle or medallion from
• Commanded by Fritig ern Trier, showing
retreat down the hill turned into rout as the immediately afterwards .
• Estimate of 2,000 dead portraitof Volens
Gothic infantry attacked from the wagons even as It was 'the end of all human ity, the end of the from AD 367- 75.
N Romans
the cavalry closed in. Amm ianus Marcellinus tells wo rld', lamented St Ambrose. Ammian us says Volens was the
yo unger brother of

t
o , km
® Goths encirclethe
outclassed Romans,
who are routed and
' 60,000 men
• Commanded by Emperor Valens
us:
'Am idst all the uproar and confusion our infantry
were exhausted by exertion and danger, until at last
that only a third of the army escaped, so Roman
casualties were in the order of 40,000 men. It was
the greatest Roman military disaster since
the emperor
vateminionI, and
a berter finan cial
oI ' slaug htered • 40,000 dead, including Valens managerthan he
O.S;"iles to Adrianople \ th ey had neither strength left to fight, nor the will to Cannae (see p. 32), and one from wh ich the
was a soldier.
plan anything; the ir sp ears were broken by the fre- empire was never to recover.

44 4S

..
 Medieval
World
he most dynamic military forces of this

T period, in terms of territory and people

conquered, were not the feudal cavalry of
western Europe - who won in wars within Europe
at Hastings (1066), losing at Bannockburn (1314),
Crecy (1346) and Agincourt (1415) - but the
newly Islamic Arab armies of the 7th century, as
well as the 13th-century Mongols. The Arabs con-
quered Egypt, Syria, Mesopotamia, Persia, North
Africa and most of Spain, only to be stopped at
Poitiers (732) in western France; the Muslims
never again raided as far north. The impact of
these Muslim advances can still be felt today.
The Mongols conquered not on ly China, but
also Persia, Mesopotamia and southern Russia.
Advancing into eastern Europe, they were victori-
ous at Liegnitz (1241) at the expense of a
German-Polish army. The horns of the more
numerous Mongol deployment outflan ked the ir
opponents, who were hit hard by archers from
the flank. The following year, the Mongols turned
back in Europe when news arrived that the Great
Khan had died. In 1260, another Mongol force
captured Aleppo and Damascus in Syria, but was
defeated by the more numerous Egyptian-based
Mamluks at Ain Jalut, southeast of Nazareth. In
Japan, the Mongols were defeated in Hakata Bay
(1281). Modelling himself on the Mongols, Timur
the Lame (1336- 1405, later called Tamerlaine),
overran Central Asia, sacked Delhi, captured
Damascus and Baghdad and, in 1402, with
rumours circulating of his plans for global con-
quest, smashed the Ottomans at Ankara.
In comparison, the attempts by western Euro-
peans to expand their power were restricted to

In thisfamousscenefrom the 8ayeux Tapestry,KingHarald of

Englandstands mortally wounded. and the bailie ofHastings
( ' 066) is last to the Norman invaders.
 M EDIE VAL W ORLD

Poitiers
Date: c. 732 Locat ion: midwestern France

With Christ's help he [Charles Martel] overran their tents, foll ow in g hard after them in the
battle to gr ind them small in th eir overthro w, and w hen 'Abd ar-Rahnan perished in the
battle he utterly destroyed th eir armies, sca tteri ng th em li ke stu bble before the fury of his
onslaught; and in the po wer of Christ he utterly destroyed them.
THECHRONICLEOF FREDEGAR, e. 732

n this battle Charles Mart el, Mayor of the Muslims began raiding across the Pyrenees. In

I Palace (e. 688-741 ) of t he Frankish king dom ,

defeated a Muslim army and killed its leader,
'Abd ar-Ra hnan al Ghafiqi, governor of Muslim
720/2 1 Eudo defeated a major Muslim army at the
batt le of Toulouse, but was unable to prevent
Muslim raids on Aut un in 72S, and the fall of Car-
cassonne and Nim es th e follo wing year. Eudo
Spain or al-Anda lus. The Franks we re a Germanic
Page from the Trier eastern Europe and the Mediterranean and, in the siegecraft and th e defence of castles, and also an people who, under th e kings of t heir Merovingi an t ried to exploi t differences between th e Berber
Apocalypse, latt er, the Crusaderswere beaten at Hattin (1187) important part in battle. The significance of royal house, had settled between th e Rhine and and Arab conq uerors of Spain, marrying his
8th-9th century,
by another of the Muslim emp ires: th e Kurdish infantry wasdemonstrated at Hastings (1066). Far the Loire since the Sth centu ry and dominated daugh ter to Mun nuza, a Berber chief who led a
showi ng early
medieval soldiers. general Saladin (1138- 93) too k over Egypt, Syria from being a walkover victory by an advanced the surrounding lands. Warfare amon gst the major but unsuccessful rebell ion. In retaliati on
Alongside the and most of Pa lestine, while his generals mil itary system - Norman cavalry easily defeating Merovingian rulers had weakened the ir power, the Arab leader 'Abd ar-Rahnan led a major raid
Raman legacy, Light cavalry,like
advanced to Yemen and into modern Sudan and English infantry - t he batt le was a hard-fought which was then usurped by great nob les calling into Aquitaine, probably in 733, which forced
rulerswere thismounted
dependent on the Tunisia. If Palestine could not be preserved by struggle bet ween two effectiv e systems, and its themselves Mayors of the Palace. The Muslims Eudo to seek help from Charles. bowman,werean
retinuesof their the Crusaders, Byzantium - the eastern Roman outcome was far from certain. Harold cho se a had seized Spain in 711 in t he greattide of Islamic element in Islamic
most prominent The battle armies, but most of
emp ire - was also unable to hold its positi ons. strong defensiv e posit ion on the slopes of a hill, conquest that swept around the Mediterranean
vassols (sworn those at Poitiers
Manzikert (1071) was a spectacular defeat at the thus offer ing protection against th e Norman aft er the death of the Proph et in AO 632. Our Charles gath ered a large army, most of wh ich probably fought
follo wers).
Compared to the hand s of the Seljuk Turks, and t he process culmi- cavalry. Eventually, the shield-wall of th e English sourcesfor thi s period are poor and even th e year was Frankish, but included Burgund ians, and on foot like their
Romans, military confronted 'Abd ar-Rahnan as he marched north Frankish enemies.
nated with the fall of Con stanti nople in 14S3. housecarls was disrupted by advances designed of t he battle is uncertain . Spanish Muslim sources
forcesweresmall,
Ottomans had already overrun Greece, Bulgaria to exploit real or feigned retreats by the Normans written cent uries later indicate 732, but the con- from Poit iers to wards Tours.
less well trained
and frequently and much of Serbia, wit h crucial victories at and, at last, the English position was bro ken. temporary Spanish Christ ian Chron icle of 754 Both sides estab-
'privotized' Nicopolis (1396) and Varna (1444). Infantry too k a more prom inen t part wi th the suggests late 733 or 734, prob ably in October.
expressionsof
The western Europeans were more successful develop ment of pikemen, victorious at Bannoc k-
social pow er,
rather than public in hold ing onto their core areas: th e Magyars burn (131 4), and archers, victorious at Crecy and The cam pai g n and context ofthe battle
expressions of were defeat ed at Lechfeld, Germany, in 955, the Agincourt. These confl icts we re at once civil wars Charles Martel was the latest in a sequence of
state power.
heavy cavalry of the Germans playing a key role. and battles between prot o-nati ons: Scots fo ught Arnulfing clan mem bers who had managed to
Furtberm ore. as
troops were not As was characteristic of western European for and against Edward II of England and French- seize the position of Mayor of the Palace and
paid cash, warfare, th is cavalry relied not on archers but on men for and against Henry Vof England, w ho also impose himself as de fact o ruler of the Frankish
campaigning only weapons for close combat, principally swords. claimed the French throne. In such civil wars, heart lands, relegat ing th e Merovingi an Theud-
really 'worked' if it
produced land to
With in Europe, the Frankish development of pol itica l factors played a major role, as seen with eric IV (721-37) to an honorific role. The bitter
distribu te or knights, castles and siege techniques enabled the defeat of Richard III at Bosworth (148S). power st ruggles dur ing th e Arnulfing family 's
. plunder. those rulers w ho were able to employ them in
some quantity to extend the ir power, both
Command skills were also important in battle. At
Bannockburn , th e Engl ish handled the ir archers
accession had weakened Frankish dom inion over
peripheral areas wh ich th ey had tr aditi onally
against domestic opponents and on their fron - very badl y while Scottish pikemen on well- ruled. Duke Eudo held wealth y Aquitaine and was
tiers. Infantry also played a major role in chosen ground routed the English cavalry. able to defy Charles until 720, when t he Spa ~ i s h

48
 9 MEDIEVAL WORLD
Th e Mu slim
a tt ackers certai nly
raided the
Christian
co unt ryside, but if
they had ach ieved
Q majorvictory
over the Franks it
cou ld have op ened
the way to
conquest.
• Atlantic
Ocean
~ '-!4. N·Ir::S
• Tou lo use
Marseille e
anne - •
Narb onn e {
Muslims ...-
o 5 Charles'Mart el -
I to subdue Aq uitaine or t he sons of Eudo, and o nly
o Barcelona . ,./
lished fortified camps, but fru strat ingl y we know
not hing of how the y fought in th is first clash
betw een a Mu slim forc e and a major north Euro-
.. pean po wer. The quotation from Fredeg ar's
continuation shows th e west ern vi ew, w hile the
Chro nicle of 754 adds little except that th e Franks
. sto od firm against the invade rs. Franki sh armi es
in th is period seem to have centred on w ell-
armed and usually mo unted retinues of th e Lord s
figh ting on horseback or foot with spear, swo rd
and bow, supporte d by larger forc es of poorl y
equipped infantry. The late 19th -century German
w rite r Brunn er suggested that th e Arabs wer e a
largely cavalry army and that Charles owe d his
victory to the development of heavy cavalry,
knights and 'shock' tactics, but mod ern histor ians
do not believe that the se emerged befor e th e
early 10th century. While it is certa inly tru e tha t
Arab light cavalry was impo rtant in th e armie s of
at-Andalus, infantry w asalso a key element, so the
two armies w ere not radically different.
The significance ofthe battle
Fredegar suggests that Charles enjoyed a deci -
sive victory but, although 'Abd ar-Rahnan was
killed, the Mu slim army ravaged systemat ically on
50
Franks
• Comm anded by Charles Mart el
Arabs
• Commanded by 'Abd ar-Rahnan (Muslims and
Berber army from Spain)
Numbers un know n. Both sides probably fought
mainly on foot wi t h substan tial numb ers of
horsem en in t he ranks but prob ably not used in
any system ati c way. The Franks are said to have
stood as if frozen again st t he enemy assault , but
nothing is know n ofthe battle at all forcertain.
Even the place and year of the battle are
contested.
their ret reat t o Spain. Mo reover , Charles still failed
und er Charlemagn e (768-81 4) was Arnulfi ng rule
fin ally secure in th is area. The Muslims never
again raided this far north. However, th ey contin-
ued to establish th em selves in Provence w here
their rule w as firmly fo unded upon cont rol of Nar-
bonn e and th e coastal cit ies. Charlesattacked t he
area in 737 and again in 739 with little success.
Earlier generat ion s saw the battle of Poit iersas
th e turning po int w hen Islam was halted and
west ern Christendom saved, a point reinforced
by the failure of the last Arab att ack on Constan -
t inople in 718. Mor e recently the Arab exped it ion
of732/ 733 has been seen asa me re raid that w ith-
drew at th e first sign of seriou s opposition, and
the decisive str ugg le w as th en fought out in pro -
tr acted and o bscure wars fo r control of Provence.
But th e tid e of Islamic invasion had alway s prof-
ited from th e di visions and we aknesses of th eir
enemies as much as from th eir own st rengt h. In
Provence th e Arab s enj oyed the support of Mau-
rontus, Duke of Marseille and an enemy of the
Arnulfing hou se, and an Arab vict ory at Poiti ers
could have continued thi s pattern. It should be
remembered th at th is was a strong Mu slim army
led by the Muslim governor in person . Charles
was mer ely a struggli ng wa r-lo rd, but in 732 he
defeat ed a Mu slim attack w hose vict ory could
have had th e most serio uscon sequenc es.
Lechfeld
Date: August 955 Location: near Augsburg, southern Germany
Those who came to the river crossings were p itched into th e wa ter by ou r m en manning
th e ferries, the rest were cut down. Those who did manage to reach the oppos ite ban k
were slaugh tered by th e m en who w atched th e shores.
GERHARDOF AUGSBURG, THELiFEOFSAINT U LRICH. c. 985
n mid- Aug ust 955 the forces of th e Germ an
I
king. Otto I. annihilat ed a huge army of Hun-
garians (also know n as Magyars), w ho w ere
predat ory mo unted archers. Their semi-no madic
way of life and mili tary tactics resem bled th ose of
Huns, Avars and (later) Mong ols.They had settled
on the plains of the Carpathia n Basin (c. AD 900),
whe nce they launched pill agin g exped it ions into
west ern Euro pe. Although German y and north-
ern Italy suffered most from these depredation s.
the Magyars' highl y mobile forces occasionally
reached France, sout hern Italy and once even
Spain, but their catastr ophic defeat in 955 ended
the se incursions. The leaders of th e expedition,
Bulksu and Lei, w ere captu red and hang ed, and
most of th eir men w ere killed in the fighting .
Date and place of the ba ttle
Left Otto I in a
contemporary
Because of a reference t o St Lawr ence Day in th e
sculp tu re in
conte mpo rary Annals ofS t Gall, th e battle of l.ech-
Magdeburg.
feld is dated 10 Aug ust. But tw o reliable
Below Hunga rian
contem pora ries, th e mon k Widu kind of Corvey
warrior equipped
and cleric Gerhard of Augsburg . concur wi th a
with composite
anoth er reference in th e Annals in recording th at bow fully strung in
th e annihilatio n of th e Magyars occurr ed after a waterproof case.
numerou s skirmishes o n the days that foll owed.
This catastroph ic defeat therefore could not just
have taken place on St Lawrenc e Day o n the
Lechfeld, th e broad pl ain of th e Lech River, but
rat her th e decisive action must have occurred
as the Magyars fled eastwards through
Bavaria in the dir ection of th eir homeland.
Build-up to the battle
The Hun garians invaded in mid-
summe r. Taking advantage of insur-
rect io ns in Germany, they hoped to
engage Otto's fo rces in a deci sive battle.
The invaders sw ept through Bavaria south
of th e Danub e, crossed the Lech and
pressed on to th e Iller River in the neigh -
bouring duchy of Swabia. Then, falling
back. the y devastated a strip of terri-
to ry 100 km (60 miles) w ide and laid
siege to Aug sburg. an ep iscopal
centre presided over by Bishop
Ulrich . Gerhard . the bi shop 's hagiog-
rapher, describes his heroic defence
of the city. a factor in Ulrich 's later
canonization . Meanwhi le. Otto con -
centrated his forces in Ulm and
51
 10 MEDIEVAL WORLD LECHF E LD 10

Widukind describes chaotic hand -to-hand

N combat in which Magyar forces were cut to
o 10km

t I----.--'
o Smiles Rauherforst
pieces. Since heavily armed Ottonian cavalry had
an advantage fighting in close quarters against
light mounted archers, many historians believe
Magyar leaders made the fatal mistake of stand-
ing their ground against the charge. Gerhard,
however, relates the events from a different
perspect ive. Although he stood on the ramparts
I
00/
~~(;'/ Lech/eld
of Augsburg , he could not see the encounter 8 km
(5 miles) west of the city. He heard the clash of
f arms and then witnessed the Hungar ians riding
" back towards Augsburg in good order. Their

o movements conveyed the impression that the

-
Ulm~
Hungarian camp Magyars were returning to resume the siege.
r ' \ Augsb<;ry
main Hungarian army I I ( • Thus, Gerhard heaved a sigh of relief when these

~ Hungarian envelopment
I) ~MuniCh riders bypassed the city, crossed the Lech and
GERMA NY ..•, entered the broad 8avarian Lechfeld.
:--'-':. . ~:.;!,.. ..-,-..---....'
/
~ Ottonianarmy
Gerhard's description of their flight is consis-
tent with a well -planned feigned retreat to lure
Otto's men onto a treeless landscape east of the
After their marched through the wasted landscape west of Lech where their tactics would be most effective.
envelopment Augsburg . But the German king did not fall for the ruse.
fa iled, th e Magyars
feigned retreat,
After learning of the king 's advance, the He pursued them cautiously for a short distance
Magyar leaders lifted the siege and deployed and returned to Augsburg before dusk. On the
. trying to lure Otto 's
forcesonto the forces to meet the relief column. A wooded following morn ing (11 August ), he dispatched
Lechfeld, an
region west of Augsburg (Rauherforstl protected couriers on swift mounts to the men who
optimal landscape
for mo unted the Germans from Magyar archers, whose guarded the fords and ferries at river crossings in
• archery. The king primary tactic was to rain arrows down on their eastern Bavaria. It was at these crossings, not on

I
did nat rake the
enemies from a distance, but the wood may also
bait.
have hindered the German's visibility, for a Hun-
garian detachment slipped unnoticed behind
Otto's troops . After slaughtering a Bohemian con-
tingent guarding the baggage, they attacked two
Swabian legions at the end of th e column. Disas-
ter was averted , however, when Conrad, the
king's son-in-law, launched a vigorou s counter-
attack that drove off the encircl ing force.
The main battle
Freed from this threat to his rear, Otto deployed
his men and launched a fro ntal assault of heavy
cavalry on the primary Hungarian force between
him and Augsburg . Two sources describe the
ensuing encounter (generally called 't he main
battle'). Writing from the standpoint of inform-
ants who had participated in the charge,
.....- - - COMBATANTS
Germans
• 8,000 well-armed men including at least 1,000
heavy cavalry; c. 1,500 defenders of Augsburg; at
least 3,000 Bohemian and 8avarian heavy cavalry
in fortressesat river crossings
• Commanded by King Otto I
• 3,000 men (3 legions) killed by surprise rea r
attac k; unspecified number in the main batt le
Hungarians (Magyars)
• Max. 20,000 mou nted archers; 5,000 foot sold iers
• Commanded by 'Horka' 8u lksu and Lei
• Few survivors
the Lechfeld, where other forces occupying forts
in eastern Bavaria destroyed the Hungarians on
the daysth at followed.
Conclusion
It is difficult to explain th e annih ilation of this
Magyar army of mor e th an 10,000 mounted
archers since Otto's relief fo rce numbered only
8,000. Even if the German ruler had defeated th e
Hungarians on the Lechfeld, under normal cir-
cumstances these elusive steppe warriors surely
could have fled back to the Carpathian Basin to
lick their wounds, rebuilt their strength and
raided once again. Centuries later Simon de Keza,
a Hungarian chronicler, w rote that Otto had
defeated his ancestors 'because it rained '. Indeed,
heavy rains on the days follo wing St Lawrence
Day 955 must explain the decisive nature of Unable to hold
their ground in the
Otto's victory. Mounted archers do not function
face ofa successful
well in inclement weather, for thei r delicate com- charge of heavy
posite-recurve bows come unglued. Moreover, cavalry, light ly
th e Danub e and it s principal tributary, the Inn, armouredMagyar
steppe warriors
rapidly funnel run off from torrential rains (w hich releaseParthian
frequently occur in August ) into the narrow land-
shots from their
composite bows to
scape bet ween Passau and Vienna. The result is a
covet th eir flight
clogged watershed wit h murky waters backing
from the field of
up throughout the system, in which the invaders
com bat.
were trapped . It is no wonder that both Gerhard
and Widukind stressthe difficulties that the Hun-
garians experienced at river crossings.
Following Lechfeld, Otto restored order in
Germany, paving the way for his coronation as
Holy Roman Emperor in 962. Thereafter in the
West, a German ruler generally held th is title.

52 53
 HASTINGS 11

Hastings
banner. Harald of Norway and Tosti g and th eir
fleet of 300 ships landed close to York, defeat ing
the nort hern earls on 20 Sept ember at Fulford
Gate. Harold's army had disband ed on 8 Septe m-
Date: 14 October 1066 Location: Sussex,England ber for lack of supplies, but he had kept some
forces with him and marched north at great
So a combat ofan unusual kind began, w ith one side attacking in different ways speed, abo ut 40 km (25 miles) per day. He sur-
and th e ather standing firm as if fixed to the ground. prised the Norse army at Stamford Bridge on 24
W ILLIAM OF POITIERS, D EEDSOF W ILlIAM, C. 1071 September, killing Harald and Tostig.
•
f
On the nig ht of 28 September William 's army
crossed the Channel and created bases, first at
Pevensey, then at Hastings. Willi am sought battle
sources suggest tha t the tu rnout was not as great
as he had expected. Disloyalty has been one
explanati on, but it may simply be that Harold
hoped to catch William by sur prise and t he levies
were slow to gath er. Travelling down th e Lond on
road, Harold 's army dep loyed on th e ridge of
what is now called Battle Hill. William 's spies
spott ed his advance and the Norman army gath -
ered at the foot of the hill. The English army
rested it s flanks on the woods to eithe r side, so
William 's men faced an uphi ll charge which
slowed both cavalry and infantry. The Norman

T
his battle bet ween Harold, king of England, gov ernment. Edward feared the po wer of because he needed a rapid decision, and pro - leader needed a quick victory, but if th e English
and William the Bastard, Duke of Nor- Godwin of Wessex, a leading English magnate, voked Harold by ravaging Sussex. Harold was held him off the ir forces would in time increase
Martial skill was mandy, was the result of a succession crisis whom he expelled in 105 1, and prom ised the suc- back in London by early Octobe r and, perhap s - a circum stance which must put in questi on
rheessenceof in the English realm: Edward the Confessor, king inspired by his earlier victory, was eager to attack. Harold's haste to fight.
cession to Duke William, a relative w hom he had
politicolleadership
in th e t ttt: century,
of England 1042-66, had no heir. Edward was the known as a boy. In the event Godwin organized Altho ugh he could have waited for further rein- Both sides depended on their elite troops .
which is why son of Aethelred the Unready, king of England attacks on England and enjoyed some sympathy forcements, Harold raced toward s Hastings. William's knights and Harold's thegns wore
William has here 978- 1016 , and Emma of the Norman ducal house, much the same kind of mai l armour and
amongst the other leaders of English society, so
hod him self
and had been raised in exile at the Norman court within a year he was restored to power. After his The battle used spears and swords, though many of
portrayed in the
panoplyofwaron before his recall to England in 1042. He had death in 1053 power passed to his eldest son, Harold ordered the local levies to join him at the the English preferred battle-a xes. There
thisseat. brought Normans to England to assist him in its Harold, who was not onl y the most powerful man 'hoary apple tree' north of Hastings, and the were significant differences between th e armies.

I
in England but his sister, Edith, was married to
King Edward. Another claimant was Harald Above Thestirrup

Hardrada, king of Norway 1047- 66, who A to londo:::n:== = ==- -5" seems to have

descended from King Cnut 1016-35, w ho had ~Banle AbbeY spread to Europe
from the steppe
ruled England and Scandinavia.
~
\!J William'sinfantryretreats-
Norman sources claim 'fetgned 2J Senlac (Bartle') Hill
~.•
~ landsofAsia.
A claimant needed acceptance from th e pow- flight' tactics - afteritsadvance I I : perhaps vio the
fails to lureHarold'ssoldiers : French Arab world. Its
erful English aristocracy and, though it is possible awayfrom their defensive- fine. .. importancewas
that some were opposed to his succession, / English lightly armed infantry ..... .:
that it improved
~l / either side of ho usecarls \ t?\ .......... ..- ....

,J, 9£ ..,.---. . .;-:;::;- the stability of the

,~ 1 ~'-
r : ,..,
lJ'...9£•..••••••••
Harold was probably the most acceptable candi- I
date. Moreover, before his death on 5 January
N ~. •CD
-. ~
../t 0~
.
rider in the saddle
and made him a
1066, Edward designated Harold ashis successor.
t ••••••••• • •••••••• to Hastings much more
He was crowned the following day. Both William ~ Normans I formidable
Bretons warrior.
and Harald Hardrada, who allied w it h Harold 's
exiled brother, Tostig, prepared for war. o 100 m o Ha rold ', , h;eld-wall stand, firm agai nst the ~L
advancing enemy. but the English soldierswho Left Perhaps
I had beenlured forward are cut down by the
o 2oo'Yds
better-equipped Norman cavalryand archers.
thwarted in his
The campaigns of 1066 attempt to surprise
theNormans,
Harold mob ilized an English fleet and army on the Harold'sposition
Harold formed his
south coast to meet the threat from Normandy 'shield-wall' a t the
--- - - . Englishmovement from high ground
where William gathered an army of 7,000 carried top of the steep
Norman cavalryand infantry, deployed at 9 am slope ofSenlae Hill
by 776 ships, drawing on the resources of all
wi th hisflonks
northern France. William was fortunate that a Normanarchers guarded by woods.
minor on the throne in France and conflict in Norman infantryadvanceand retreat so tha t William
had no alternative
Anjou had neutralized potentia l cont inental
Normancavalryand archer attacks toa frontalassault.
enemies. Moreo ver, skilful diplomacy persuaded
the pop e to bless his expedition wi th a papal

54 5S
 11 M EDIE V AL WO RLO HASTI NGS 11

Normans
•6.000-7,000 men . including 2,000 cavalry;
archers; crossbowmen; heavily armed foot
soldiers; and mobilized (unused) fleet
• Commanded by William the Bastard, Duke of
Normandy (renamed William the Conqueror)
• Unknown casualtie s

Anglo-Saxons
•6,000-7,000 foot soldiers; a few archers; and
mobilized (unused) fleet
• Commanded by King Harold Godwinsson
• Unknown casualties

English faltered and the final Norman assault

gave Will iam victory.
In an age when battles rarely lasted over an
hour, both armies at Hastings had persisted all
day. Both commanders had imposed a remark-
able discipl ine on their troops and William had
shown tactical skill in exploiting his mobility, if we
can believe the Norman accounts of 'feigned
flights'. But in the end, as so often in battle,
chance was decisive: the death of Harold left the
English with nothing to fight for .

The sign ificance of the battle

Victory at Hastings did not guarantee command
over England, but with no obvious candidate for
the kingship the English notables reluctantly
Scenefrom the The English thegns travelled on horseback, but William threw forward archers to harass them advanced were cut off and destroyed . accepted William, who was crowned on Christ-
Bayeux Tapestry. mas Day 1066. He then faced rebellions and it was
their tradition to fight on foot was reinforced in but, firing uphill, they did little damage. His It is possible that Harold had intended a
TheAnglo-Saxons'
shield-wall this instance by Harold 's defensive position; by cavalry and knights on foot were organized in general advance which was aborted by the death not until the early 1170sthat his reign was secure.
canfronted the contrast the Normans had 2,000 cavalry which three divisions: Bretons on the left, Normans in of his brothers who led it. The Norman sources Because the battle decided the fate of the English
Normans who hod provided them with mobility. The English elite say that this crisis suggested a useful stratagem : realm it attracted a great deal of attention from
the centre, and French on the right. Battle began
lost impetus on the
were supported by lightly-armed local levies of at about 9 am. A first assault by the Norman feigning flight to draw the English from their contemporary writers and was also the subject of
steep slope. Elite
warriorson both questionable military value, while Duke William infantry was thrown back and William then had to defensive line so that they could be killed in the a great embroidery, the Bayeux Tapestry, whose
sides woremuch had recruited a mass of well-equipped knights commit his cavalry in support, lest their retreat open. This may have been used twice in the vivid images have impressed themselves onto
thesame armour
and mercenaries. In addition, the English had precipitate a rout. The English right began to course of the day. However, the battle developed the public mind. Moreover, unusually, the field of
and used similar
weapons;but the few archers, perhaps a chance consequence of pursue the opposing Bretons on the left wing into a slogging match in which the shield-wall battle has not been built upon since, and we
unprote cted Harold's rush to battle, while the Normans had who seem to have fallen into disorder, then a stood, albeit battered. A random event decided know where the fighting took place because
archer a t far right gathered many. William founded Battle Abbey to commemorate
rumour spread that William was dead, but he the outcome. As evening gathered and the
wields a bow, the
poor man's Harold created a densely packed 'shield -wall' rallied his men by raising his helmet and gallop- Normans prepared a final attack, Harold was his victory, ordering that its high altar be placed
weapon. along the ridge with his thegns to the fore . ing along the line of battle. The English who had fatally struck in the eye by a chance arrow , the on the very spot where Harold was killed .

56 57
 eort:t.: f: , t,; tl ll t r -J l.l.r ~ .. n lW \ · ' ....0 " - - J -'I...-

~I~';r~ Wy;1 lJ"?;J~~GI lJ"' iPE ~-r:u"TC~'TOlJT MANZ IKERT 12

,,,,-"
Byzantineand

Manzikert Arab cavalry. The

close-poc ked ran ks
of both armies
reflects the tactics
of close-order
Date: 19 August 1071 Location : modern Malazgirt, eastern Turkey
II The Emperor of the Romans w as led a wa y, a prisoner, to th e enem y camp and
battle, in which
each man
suppo rted h is
his army was sca ttered. Those w ho escaped were but a tiny fraction of th e w hole. fe/lows in the fray.

Of th e majority, some w ere taken captive, the rest massacred.

M ICHAEL P SELLUS, CHRONOGRAPH/A, 1018-79
. I ./
•
01.6 V(o),\rc l.G' J: : lijaL".,l,;, __ "ZIJE I/. J '

A
t Manzikert the Seljuk sultan of Baghdad,
Alp Arslan (1063-72), decisively defeated
iI the Byzantine emperor Romanus IV Dio-
• I genes (1067- 71), opened the way for the Turkish
I domination of Anatolia and ultimately tr iggered
I the Byzantine appeal for aid which gave rise to
the First Crusade in 1095 .
I The Turks were a pagan Steppe people who
attacked Islam on it s northern frontier. As brilliant
hor se-archers, many were taken into the service
of the Caliph of Baghdad and other Muslim
potentates. Long contact converted the Turks to
Islam. Under the command of the Seljuk family
they moved into the Arab world and seized
control of the Caliph at Baghdad in 1055. The
leading member of the Seljuk family ruled as
Shah. Many of the tribes resented Seljuk domina-
tion and attacked Byzantium, where their Muslim
zeal as new converts provided a religious cloak
for their natural raiding ways.In 1057 they sacked
Melitene (Malatya), in 1059 Sebasteia (Sivas) and
by early 1060 were savaging eastern Anatol ia.
A 10th-century This came at a difficult time for the Byzantine
Armeniancarving empire. Its hold on south Italy was threatened by
of a Byzantine
rebellious Norman mercenarie s,while Patzinacks
heavy
infant rym an. Such from the Steppe attacked th e Balkans. The Mace-
men w ould ha ve donian dynasty had died out shortl y afte r the
been a m ajor
death of Basil II (976-1025) and no dominant
element in the
Byzantine army. emperor emerged who could impose his dynasty .
Hisarmouris As a result there was bitter rivalry between the
lam ellar, great nobl e families. There were no fewer than
consisting of strips
or scales of metal
th irty rebellions in the period 1028-57, and the
sewn onto Q fabric frontiers were stripped of troops to put them
or leather bose. down. In eastern Anatolia weak central govern -
ment gave rise to turbulence as the numerous
Armenian and Syrian Christians feared that Con-
stantinople aimed to impose religious unity upon
them. The imperial army was a mercenary force
and extremely expensive, so military expenditure
was cut or expanded at the whim of emperors .
Constantine X Doukas (1059- 67) was the head of
a great noble family and on his deathbed he
vested power in his wife to rule on behalf of his
son. But t he rule of a woman in such difficult
tim es was not acceptable and she married a suc-
cessful general, Romanus IV Diogenes. The
Doukas family regarded him as merely guardian
of thei r succession, but when he produced two
sonsthey began to fear for their position.
The cam paign and context ofthe battle
Romanus's prestige depended on him success-
fully dealing with the Turks.It was suggested that
he reduce to a desert the eastern provinces across
which they raided, but he was reluctant to do thi s.
He preferred to force the Shah to curb the raiders
by att acking Syria in great military expeditions,
as in 1068 and 1069 . Alp Arslan was preoccupied
in att acking Egypt where a dissident Caliphate
had form ed a rival centre of power, and had
no wish for war with Byzantium . However, when
Romanus mounted a great expedition in 1071 he
could not ignore the threat. On this occasion a
huge Byzantine army, perhaps 40,000-60,000
men, was raised - a mixed force of native levies
and mercenaries. Amongst the native units the
emperor' s Varangian Guard and a few others
were of high quality, but the Armenians and
Syrians were unwilling soldiers. Amongst the
mercenaries there were Frankish, German and
Norman heavy cavalry and Turkish light cavalry.
During the march the Germans had attacked the
emperor in pursuit of claims to wage s,while ther e
had been frequent clashesw it h local Armenians .
The batt le
Before Romanus attacked Manzikert , where
resistance was weak, he sent his best troops on to
Chliat under General Joseph Tarchaniotes. He
divided his army in the belief that Alp Arslan was
in retreat . In fact the sultan gathered a small but
efficient force of Turkish cavalry and surprised
Romanus's troops , whose anxieties were
_ _- J COMBATANTS \.------.
Turks
o Almost entirely cavalry, especially mounted
archers
o Commanded by Seljuk sultan of Baghdad,
AlpArslan
Unknown casualties
o
Byzantines
040,000-60,000 men: natives - Varangia n Guard,
Armenians, Syrians; mercenaries - Frankish,
German, Norman heavy cavalry, Turkish light
cavalry; elite units mounted; so me heavy cavalry
o Commanded by Byzantine emperor Romanus IV
Diogenes
• Unknown casualties

58 59
 12 ME D IE V A L WORLD
Thelarge
Byzantine army
intended to
strengthen the
torti tications of the
eastern fronti er
and to invade
TurkishSyria. The
wild Turkishtribes
who wereraiding
theempirecould
probably not have
I opposed this
assault, but Alp
J Arslan wasdrawn
into the fray by the
Medir erranean Sea
threat to theSeljuk
lands.
N (Franks, Normans, German)
t o
I
o
200km
200;"iles
increased by th e desertion of many of t heir own
Turkish troops . But Alp Arslan was aware of his
weakness and offere d to negotiate. Romanus,
however, needed a victory to shore up his pres-
tige and knew th e Turks were few. Accordingly,
he deployed his army with Nicephorus Bryennius
on the left, himself in the centre and a leader
called Alyattes on the right. Andronicus Doukas
commanded the reserve. The army advanced
with the cavalry to the fore and the heavily out-
numbe red Turks retreated .
As eveni ng approa ched, Romanus gave t he
order to t urn back to the camp, and his division
did so in good order. Those more distant from
Romanus were uncertain of what was expected of
them , and so they believed the story spread by
the fleeing Andronicus that the emperor had
been defeated. These confusions augmented the
tension s w it hin the army and a general flight
began, led, we are told , by the Armenians. The
astonished Turks slaughtered the fleeing troops
while Romanus and his division fought bravely,
but ultimately had to surrender. The main force of
the Byzant ine army at Chllat , including t he
Franks, Normans and Germans, had simp ly fled
when they heard that Alp Arslan was nearby. The
Byzantine defeat illustrates the difficulties of con -
trolling a large army, in th is case made worse by
its diverse nature and the forces of treachery .
60
Black Sea
Route of Byzantine army 1---
large force to Chliat und er Tarchaniotes 1---
1---
Alp Arslan and the Turks ......
Significance
Although Manzikert was a heavy defeat , it need
not have had serious consequences. Alp Arslan
freed Romanus in return for tribute and the
dismantling of Byzantine fortresses. But the
empero r's enemies then blinded him and
renounced the treaty , recogniz ing Michael VII
Doukas as emperor. But he was not a strong ruler.
The empire divided between feuding families
who frequently called in the Turks.
Anatolia was effectively given away to a series
of Turkish war lords. Dissident Seljuks ruled the
greatest of these principalities, based on Nicaea
and Iconium, the Danishmends controlled the
area around Erzincan, the Menguchekids around
Erzurum, while a Turkish prince held Smyrna
and Ephesus. Alexius Comnenus (1081- 1118)
manag ed to hold the empi re together by an
alliance wi th the other great families. The emp ire
remained rich, but Alexius lacked tr oops and was
thus frustrated in his attempts to reconqu er Ana-
tolia. When the great Selj uk sultanate of Baghdad
began to break up after 1092 he asked Pope
Urban II (1088-99) to help him raise mercenaries,
influencing westerners with terrible tales of th e
sufferings of Christians under t he Islamic yoke.
This inspired Urban II to launch the First Crusade
which would have such consequenc es for the
Byzantine emp ire.
Hattin
Date: 3-4 July 1187 Location: nea r Lake Galilee, Damascus
NowIshalltellyou about King Guyand his hast....Some people in the hast said that if the
Christians had pressed on to meet the Saracens, Saladin would have been defeated.
T HE OLD F RENCH C O NTINUATION OF THE H ISroRYOF W ILlIAM OF TYRE, 1184-97
n 1099 the First Crusade captured Jerusalem
I
and established in the Holy Land the Christian
principalities of Edessa and Ant ioch, and the
kingdom of Jerusalem. The county ofTripoli was
established a little later. Muslim disunity made
this possible, but a series of Muslim leaders
sought to unify Islam against these intruders,
culm inating in the rise of Saladin, who by 1176
ruled both Syria and Egypt, threa tening the exis-
tence of the Christian enclaves. Their position
wo rsened because the Christian king Amalric I
(1162- 76) was succeeded by a leper son, Baldwin
IV (1174- 85), whose reign was punctuated by
regencies. The succession now rested with his
sister Sibyl, whose husband died in 1177 leaving
a child, Baldwi n V. Sibyl increased tensions
amongst the nobility by marrying a newco mer to
the east, Guy of Lusignan. When the child -king
died in 1186, Guy and Sibyl seized power, alienat-
ing many of the great lords, notably Raymond III
ofTripoli who aspired to the throne. Some nobles
fled to Antioch, while Raymond was so angry that
he agreed a truce wi t h Saladin perm itting the
Muslimsto raid royal territory acrosshis lands.
between Egypt and Syria. In late 1186 Reynald Saladin ravaging
The cam p ai g n and context of the battle seized a rich caravan and refused to make restit u- theHoly Land,
from a manuscript
Sa ladin posed as the champ ion of Islam, but his tion to Saladin for this breach of the truce . With ofWilliamof Tyre's
att ackson the Franks (Guy and the Christians) had his prestige at stake, Saladin prepared a great history ofthe
not brou ght much success. Preoccupied with army, perhaps some 30,000 strong . This forced crusades.Once
Saladin had
inter-Muslim po litics,he made no effort to breach Guy and Raymond ofTripol i to consider reconcili-
defeatedGuyot
the tr uce t hen in force wi th Jerusalem, though it is ation, and th e king sent an emb assy of imp ortan t Hatt in, thewhole
likely that he was preparing to attack when it men to Raymo nd. As th ey moved north, kingdom, which
expired in 1187. Reynald of Chat illon was one of Raymo nd agreed to permit a major Muslim force had beenstripped
to providetroops
Guy's key supporters, holding the castles of Kerak to cross his lands, and on 30 April at the Springs of for theking, was a t
and Montreal which dominated the route Cresson they annihi lated 1SO Hospitallers and hismercy.
61
 13 MEDIEVAL WORLD HATTIN 13

Templars (Monk knights ) who had unwisely chal- Guy had raised the largest army the kingdom had there was a dramatic and angry council to decide
lenged them. This shock brought Raymond to ever fielded . Its core was 1,200 heavily armed what to do. The accounts given of this by those
submissio n, but tensions amon gst the barons knights, supported by numerous light cavalry we thi nk may have known what happened are
remained high . and nearly 12,000 infantry. To achieve this all city coloured by the desire of the various Christian
On 1 July Saladin and his great army crossed and castle garrison s had been stri pped and large factio ns to dist ribute blame for the defeat that
th e Jordan and besieged Raymond 's city of numbersof tr oop s raised for cash. followed. Two courses of acti on we re suggested:
Tiberias on Lake Galilee w here his wi fe was that batt le should be giv en, or that batt le should
trapped. On 2 July Guy and his army were The battle be declined and Tibetias left to its fate. It is not
camp ed at Saffuriyah, 26 km (16 miles) to th e Saladin's army advanced to wards Saffuriyah on 2 clear who urged what, tho ugh many sources
west, a stron g posit ion wi t h ampl e water. King July, but Guy refused to accept batt le. That night suggest that Raymond ofTripoli was in favou r of
declining battle while his enemies, Reynald of
Chatillon and Gerard of Ridefort, Grand Master of
the Temple, took the opposite view .
There was a goo d case fo r either course of
actio n. The kingdom was anchored by its fort ifi ed
cities and castles and no atta cker could undertake
a serious siege as long as a field army existed.
Accordingly, as in 1183 w hen Guy had been in
command, th e crusaders usually preferred to
shadow their enem y so that he could achieve
little befo re the campaign ing season ended and
his army di ssolved, avoiding the risks of batt le.
Tiberias was a minor city and its fall wo uld
achieve little. If Saladin's army did not then dis-
perse it could be lured into challenging th e
crusaderson ground sof the ir choosing.
On th e other hand, Guy had a huge army and
an op port unity to defeat Saladin, and revenge
th e destruct ion he had wrou ght on the kingdom .
Moreover, Guy needed the prestige of victory to
Above The army unite the king do m. He wou ld have rememb ered
ofJerusalem
customarily that many who urged avoidance of battle had
carriedthe True att acked him for doi ng ju st tha t in 1183 and he
Cross'into battle, would have been fearful of crit icism for abandon-
and bath sides saw
themomentof its
ing t he lady of Tiber ias. Therefore he decided to
capturearHartin lead the army out to battle on 3 July. That he
as decisive inGuy's intended to give battle isobvious, but we have no
defeat.
idea where and how he hoped to do this.
Right Saladin The core of Guy's army were the knights , and of Tur'an then resumed its eastward march. Saladin 's ghulams
drew Guy into a Sa ladin 's cavalry surroun ded and cut the m off (M uslim slave
th ey were drawn up in three divisio ns for th e
longmarch across
open territory,
Springs of
Cresso n * march, a vang uard under Raymond of Tripoli, a
rearguard commanded by Balian of Ibelin and a
from Tur'an, and attacked the reargu ard fero-
ciously asth ey str ugg led uphill to Maskana.There
warriors) were
heavy cav alry, and
theirarms and

=-
whic h fa voured h is
• Nazareth
hig hly mobile centre where Guy marched. They we re prot ected the army halt ed fo r th e night, desperately short of equipment were
tactks and
enabled him to cut
~ Units
Ch~i5tian move ments ,
and camp
* spring N
o
from enemy missile attack by a screen of foot - wate r and surrounded by th eir enemies.
similarto, but
lighter than, those
the Franks offfrom
crucialwarer
sources.
--.. r
_ .&
Muslim movements,
unit s and camp
road

moun tain s t o
I
6
1miles
soldiers marching about them. Sa ladin 's army
had its own heavy cavalry and clouds of mounted
archers.The crusader army paused on the springs
The next morning the Muslims held back until
the heat of day sapped the crusaders. We have no
dependable account of the fighting on 4 July, but
of the Fra nkish
settlers.

62 63
 13 ME DIEVA L WORLD

COMBATANTS

Liegnitz
it seems that th e infantry. the ir will sapped by t he
Themail hauberk
af this 13th-
lack of wate r. deserted the cavalry and took
Latins
centurycrusader refuge on the hills known as the 'Horns of Hatt in',
has an integral •c. 20,000 , including 1.300 knights. at least 13.000 William ofTyre tells us:
hood and aventail, light cavalry and a large infantry force
mailsleeves with
7hey left th e Spring s of Saffur iya to go to the Date: g Apr il 1241 Location: modern Legnica, Poland
• Command ed by Guy of Lusignan. king of
mi ttens, m ail relief of Tiberias. As soon as they had left the water
Jeru salem
chaussesand be i: behind. Saladin came before them and ordered his For touching upon the cruelty and cunning of thesepeople. there can be no infamy great
being handed a •All infantry & majority of knights killed or capt ured
skirmishers to haras s them from morning to enough... . The Tartar chief, with his dinner guests and other cannibals. fed upon their
heavy 'closed'
helmer.The m idda y. The heat was so great tha t they could not carcasses (of the ir enemies) as if they were bread and left nothing but the bone s for the
M uslims
westernwarriors in go on so as to reach water. The king and all his men vultu res.. .. tho sewho were beautiful were not eaten but were suffocated by mobs of
theHoly Landused •c. 30.000 . including infant ry occupied at Tiberias
and not a major element
were tao spread out and did not know what to do. rovi shersin spite ofall their criesand lamentatlons. Virgins were roped until they died of
similarequipment,
but thearmour
He sent to the Count of Tripoli, who led the van- exhaustion; then their breasts were cut off to be kept as dainties fortheir chiefs. and their
• Commanded by Salad in. ru ler of Syria and Egypt
wasprobably less guard. to ask his advice. The message came back bodies furnished an entertaining banquet for the savages.
• Un kno wn casua lties
full and lessheavy that he should pitch his tent and make camp . The MATIHEWPARISONTHE MONGOLS. THEENGLISH HISTORY. 1200-1259
due to the climate.
king gladly accepted th is bad ad vice. though wh en
he ga ve him good advice he would never take it.'
The cavalry. exposed to attack by enemy
horse-archers. tried to break the encirclement. iegnitz (Leqnica, modern Poland) was excellent soldiers and ferocious raiders of t heir
but on ly Raymond of Tripoli and Balian of Ibeli n
and a few others escaped. After a last desperate
attempt to establish a camp on Hartin, Guy sur-
L witness to a clash of natio ns in 1241. w hen
the ferocious Mongols forced their way
into Europe from the East to wreak revenge on
settled neighb ou rs on the edges of the great
plains. From time to time federations arose which
made a much greater impression. such as those
rendered . Saladin's superior numbers had Hungary. They were met by a strong coalition of which threatened China and forced the build ing
enabled him to hold off the increasingly desper- Polish-German armies. of the Great Wall. Europe felt the impact of the
The terror inspired
ate Christian charges. It seems inconceivable that Huns in t he 5th century. th e Avars in t he 6th
by theMongol
Guy expected to march 26 km (l 6 mi les) to The co nte sta nt s century and th e Hungarians in t he 10th cent ury. arrack is clearly
Tiberias in one day. exposing his army to terrible The ste ppe of Central Asia had always been Amongs t the tribes to t he north of China there revealed by
th irst in an arid countrys ide. Whatever his plan. it Matthew Paris in
do minated by nomad tribes whose way of life was born about 1162 a leader of genius. TemOjin
thissketch of
evidently went wrong. depended on pastoral farming and hunting. This (died 1227). who welded the peoples of the Mongols eating
lifestyle in a harsh environment made them steppe into a great political power. By 1206. as Christians.
The significance of the battle
Sa ladin treated Guy with courtesy and most of
n1::1'lO :cftti....r. ,..fil.lk1l17':·lpli·C l~ttg1~lf( ~~t ,
the noble survivors were ransomed. but he per-
tytUl(lu( epul.11'lttMII' 11~mtl1j mzrm l \';".u
sonally decapitated Reynald and ordered a
fr~CllLln'~lb;f' 2Mm !,!"~OI~lllt'UItlIr"An-:~ue_
massacre of the Templars and Hospitallers. The
remaining survivors were enslaved. Because of
the effort Guy had made to raise troops. the cities
of Palestine were virtually helpless before
Saladin's army. Acre surrendered on 8 July. Sidon
on 29 July. Beirut on 6 August and Ascalon on 4
September. Balian of Ibelin held out in Jerusalem.
but surrendered on terms on 2 October. This dis-
aster created a wave of crusading fervour in
Europe which endured until the Seventh Crusade.
1248-54. led by St Louis of France (l 226-70). The
kingdom never recovered from the defeat of
Hartin, after wh ich it was always dependent on
external forcesfor its very survival.

64
65

14 M EDIEVAL WORLD
structure, notably the Turks who were often a
d
f major element in their cavalry, and Chinese and
others who provided infantry and eng ineers.
,
,i
.!
Mongol cavalry were poorly armed and mounted
• on ponies, but each soldier had a w ho le string of
animals so that they could move quickly across
the steppe, or sustain concentrated combat over
long periods by changing mounts. Individually,
Mongol horsemen were inferio r to almost all their
enemies in th e settled lands. To compensate,
Mongol generals tried to marshal superior
numbers whose discipline enabled t hem to
ope rate in a concerted manne r and to accept
heavy casualties. They also recognized the value
of terror and del iberately unleashed destruction
on enemy lands to frighten their foes. So d readful
was their reputation that Europeans called them
Tartars, denizens of Tartarus or Hell.
In addition, these steppe horsemen were well
aware of the value of careful reconnaissance . The
primary weapon of attack was the bow, and
special arrows were devised inco rporating whis -
,~
i~
( - tles, fired by the best archer in the group as a
guide to the rest. Waves of mounted archers
would break up the formations of their enemies
before engaging at close quarters. A favourite
tactic was to lure the enemy into ambushes by
European heavy Ching is (or Gengh is) Khan - 'Universal Ruler' - he feigned retreat in the certain knowledge that
cavalryman. The dominated all of Mongolia, establishing his encircling them would undermine morale: this
heavily arm ed
capital at Karakoram. He unleashed an astonish - was directly derived from the great encircling
knights w ere th e
most important ing expansion, attacking China where a Mongol movements by which Mongol tribes rounded up
element inany dynasty would establ ish itself by the 1260s. By game over vast areas to slaughter them for the
westernarmy_Man
1220 Persia was devastated, Kievan Russia was winter. Horse archers were very poorly armoured,
forman they were
destroyed in 1240 and Baghdad w as sacked in but increasingly Mongol armies incorporated
muchberrer
equipped than the 125B. better protected elements of heavy cavalry,
Mongols, but th ey
The Khans imposed upon their lands a sophis- sometimes raised from subject peoples , for the
werealso relatively
few, ond the po or ticated governmental system, derived from the close-quarter battle.
discipline of the Chinese and the other peoples whom they con - By contrast European battle tact ics depended
allied army quered. This sustained the army w hose on elite groups of heavy cavalry. Relati vely few in
brought about
organ ization skilfully disciplined the natura l number, the ir shock effect as they closed for
their defeat.
martial skills of the Mongols. The major fighting close-quarter battle could be very effective, pro -
unit of a Mongol army was the rumen, of 10,000 vided that they maintained close formation.
mounted men, subdivided into elements of However, they tended to lack cohesion, partly
1,000, 100 and 10. Iron d iscipl ine reinforced th e because western armies came together onl y for
natura l hab its of cooperative hunting and short periods and part ly because the knights
herding. This was the secret of their success. The were imbued with a spirit of aristoc ratic indi vidu -
Khans incorporated conquered peoples into th is alism. Infantry were also raised for short periods,
66
L1EGNITZ 14
lacked cohesion and were often treated with con -
tempt by aristocratic commanders.
The cam paig n an d co ntext of t he battle
The Mo ngo lian leader SObedei commanded th e
assault on Russia which brought Europe into the
Mongol view . It may be that the primary purpose
of the att ack in 1241 was to punish Bela IV
(1 235- 70) of Hungary, w ho had given shelt er to
Cuman tr ibes fleeing before the Mongols, and
certainly Hungary was their main focus . Good
intelligence would have told the Mongols that no
great power would fight them because European
aff airs were dominated by the bitter conflict
betw een Emperor Frederick II (1212-50) and the
papacy. However, the intention of the Mongols to
move west was well known by 1240 and this
brought together Bela IV, Wenceslas of Bohemia
(1230- 53), the warring rulers of the four principal-
iti es into w hi ch Poland had dissolved, and other
minor po wers. Such a coalit ion could have suc-
cessfully resisted the Mongols.
SObedei had an army of about 150,000, but he
sent 30,000 under Baidar and Kadan into Poland
w hile the main force assaulted Hungary. Henry II
of Silesia, the most important of the Polish
princes, rallied an army 20,000 strong, consisting
other peasants; the forces of Greater Poland ; the Mongol norseman .
of t he levies on foot and horse of the other Polish
The Mongols rode
princes, volunteers like the Bavarian gold-miners forces of another Polish principality, Oppeln, with
small horsesand
the Teutonic Knights; and his own Silesian troops
of Silesia, some Templars and Hospitallers, and a theirarmour,
and mercenaries perhaps numbering 10,000. p robab ly lam ellar
formidable force provided by the Order of the
Istrips of metal or
Teutonic Knights who saw the Mongols as a grave The Mongols seem to have attacked by sur-
bomboo sewn
prise, disordering the Silesians and drawing the
thr eat to the ir position in the Baltic lands. They onro fabricor
gathered near Liegnitz in modern Poland and allied troops into an ambush. Duke Henry, seeing leather) wa s
corresponding ly
await ed support from Wenceslas. what he thought was a small enemy army, sent
lig hte r. However,
his cavalry forward against their centre, but t he asmounred
w ings of the Mongol army now revealed them- bowmen th ey
Th e battle
selves and swept around the attacking knights, could weaken their
Baidar thrust into Poland, burning as he went,
enemiesata
lured out and massacred the garr ison of Cracow, separating them from the rest of their army .
distan ce and then
Accounts refer to the Mongols using smoke to
w hich was sacked, then advanced to wards were suffici ent ly
confuse the westerners and this may be true, prot ected to close
Breslau where he joined Kadan. Henry of Silesia
wi th th em in th e
was awaiting the army of 50,000 Bohemians, but since gunpowder was known to the Mongols
final fight.
as the Mongols approached he chose to give from China. Duke Henry was killed in the rout of
battle, not realizing that Wenceslas was only a his army and most of his troops were slaughtered.
day's march away. Accounts of the battle are con - The Mongols cut off ears to count enemy dead
fu sed. It seems that Henry divided his army int o and after Liegnitz are said to have sent home nine
four divis ions: the Bavarian gold-miners and bags full of this gory evidence.
67
 14 MEDIEVAL WORLD

Significance of the battle
The thrust into Poland had been a diversion
which worked beyond all expectation. On 11Apr il
1241 50bede i's main army destroyed the Hungar-
ian army at Mohi. Europe feared further disasters,
but to their surprise the Mongols went home .
Ultimately this was due to the death of the Khan
Oqodei (1227- 41) which precipitated a struggle
for succession at Karakoram. However, they did
not then give up control of Russia. It is likely,
therefore, that their retreat was due to heavy
casualties in the two battles, difficulties in feeding
their vast numbers of horses and to a sense that
as well as terr ors and, while nothing came of sug-
gested alliances against Islam, the peace which
the Great Khans imposed upon Central Asia
attracted trader s like Marco Polo, who extended
Hakata Bay
European knowledge of the world. Date: 14-15 August 1281 Location : northern Kyushu,Japan
When tidings of its riches w ere brought to the Great Khan [Kubil aiJ...
he declared his resolve to conquer the island.
MARCO POLO, IL M IL/ONE, c. 1295
Europeans
• 20,000 mostly Polish and German forces , with a
few French ; heavy cavalry, knights and
numerousinfantry

M
ongol warriors reached Beijing in 1215. surrender voluntarily to Mongol authority,
they had achieved their real purpose , the punish- o Com m and ed by Duke Henry II, Count of Silesia
thereafter establishing themselves as sending five missions between 1268 and 1273.
ment of Bela. o Casualties in the thousands
rulers over China under the name of the But once the diplomatic efforts proved fruitless
The Mongols never really returned, becoming Yuan dynasty. Kubilai Khan, the head of the and some of Kubilai's emissaries were killed in
more and more preoccupied with the conquest Mongols
dynasty, occupied the Chinese imperial throne Japan, he showed determination to use force.
of China and the assa ult on the Muslim Middle 030,000 light horsemen, mostly archers
from 1260 until his death in 1294.Mongol expan-
East. To assist this latter enterprise they ope ned • SGbed ei in overall com mand, and the for ces led sion was not restricted to the Eurasian mainland, Invasion
diplomatic negotiations with Christian Europe, by Baidar and Kadan
as Kubilai Khan and his warriors pushed into the Kubilai dispatched some 25,000 Mongol warriors
a situation that may well have dissuaded them o Unknown casualt ies
Pacific Ocean to include Japan in their realm. The to Korea (K6ryu) and pressurized its subservient
from renewing their attack. Gradually Europe rec- Japanese archipelago was known to Chinese as a emperor to recruit an army of some 15,000 men
ognized that the Mongols offered opportunities Below An example
gro up of eastern islands in the area 'w here th e from among Korean farmers and to supp ly a fleet
oftetsuhau, rhe
Liegnitz was sun rises'. This name denoted remoteness from of about 900 vessels capable of transporting the world's elde st
essenrialfya the poin t of view of Chinese central ism, and ind i- men, horses and artillery to Kyushu, the western- anti-personnel
The Mongol lnvasio~S 1 223- 1 242 ,/ explosive,
sideshow. Teutonic Knights (1241 ) ~o("'-- cated the tributary status of th e archipelago's most of the large Japanese islands. In November
/ /
excavatedfroma
Siibede;'s main ,- inhabitants. Kubilai did not allow his warriors to 1274 the fleet set sail for Japan. After the core of
purpose was to Duke Henry,Count of Silesia (1241) ship wrecked
invade Hungary, be discouraged by the perception that the Japan- the troops had landed on Kyushu, however, not during tne barrIe.
King Belaof Hungary (1241) "'o(f---
and the rask of ese islands were difficult to approach . He used only did the fleet encounter resistance from the
Baidar and Kadan
diplomacy at first to urge the Japanese rulers to warriors of northern Kyushu, but a storm
was to ravage
Poland, rhus
drawing off
substantial forces Riga-
fromreinforcing ••~r' BalticSea
J
theHungarians.
The presence of
'>
Henry ofSilesia or Breslau ~
lieqnitz and th e - POLAND
liegni};,e
movement ofthe
Bohemians to
suppo rt him resrify

,
to thesuccessof
thisfeint, even
before barrie was l eft The Japa nese
N
joined, because warrior Takezaki
only two day s after Suenagaattacks
Liegnirz, on 11 Mongol bowmen,
April, Subedei rhough his horse is
400km
destroyed the CRIMEA wounded. A bomb
f'------j/ . ~ ----' CaspianSea
Hungarians at 250miles BULGARIA explodesinthe air
Black Sea atcentre.
Mohi. - Sofia

68
69
 15 MEDIEVAL WORLD
In eottempted
invasionsofJapan. KO R EA
1274 and 1281. cBun'ei Campaign (1274) - -
,., Northern fleet (1281) - -
Southernfleet (1281) - -
"
Tsushima
N ~g-.
t f\: ;.,::::;;~B~
X
• Hakata
Buze..
. Oazaifu
Kyushu
o nificance, and built coastguard flotillas .
I -'>. J A P A N
o ~ I • Chiku
then wrought havoc among the ships. many of
which sank. The expedition lost approximately
13,200 men, but Kubilai was determined to try
again. By 1281, after the failure of subsequent
Mongol diplomatic missions, he assembled even
larger fleets ready for a further expedition.
This time, Kubilai Khan could not merely rely
on Korean auxiliaries, but had to recruit a large
contingent of men from southern China (Fukien).
The so-called Northern Fleet, composed of about
70,000 Mongol and Korean warriors on about
1,000 vessels, set sail in the spring of 1281 while
the Southern Fleet, comprising 3,SOO ships and
100,000 men, was not yet ready. The Northern
Fleet began landing, again in northern Kyushu,
on 23 June 1281, and details of their movements
between then and August of the same year
remain obscure. But it does seem that the inva-
sion was aimed at rolling up Japanese coastal
defences from inland rather than attacking
directly from the sea, as Japanese warriors in
Kyushu had stepped up their defence efforts after
1274. The archipelago was then under the rule of
elite warriors whose leaders had established their
headquarters in the provincial town of Kamakura,
near modern Tokyo, over 1,000 km (621 miles)
away from the war zone. The Kamakura rulers
were aware of the strategic vulnerability of north-
70
Japanese
o Details unknown
Mongols
c. 170.000 men (including Korean and Chinese
o
auxiliaries) on 4.500 ships
o Commanded by Kubilai Khan
-c, 140,000 dead
ern Kyushu, the traditional hub of Japan's rela-
tions with the continent, so dispatched men to
guard and fortify ports of perceived military sig-
The centrepiece of a long line of defence was
the port town in Hakata Bayon the northern coast
of Kyushu.The line proved strong enough to hold
the invaders in check until mid-August, allowing
Japanese small vessels to penetrate the ranks of
the now-combined Northern and Southern Fleets
and destroy some vessels. While neither side
appears to have made any leeway, another storm
arrived from the north during the night of 14/15
August 1281, pushing the Mongol fleet,jammed
and disorderly, into Hakata Bay. Apparently, some
12,000 Korean and probably 30,000 Mongol war-
riors were killed , while the Southern Fleet lost
most of its 100,000 men.
Outcome
Disastrous as this second expedition had been,
Kubilai Khan gave orders for the construction of
another fleet, but a rebellion in 1286 forced him
to postpone building. Kubilai's successor TImur
eventually abandoned the plan. Even though the
Kamakura warriors soon afterwards plunged into
domestic warfare - to last intermittently into the
early 17th century - no further invasion of Japan
was attempted until the 19th century. As the
Yuan dynasty was replaced by t he Ming dynasty
in 1344, the new imperial government reverted to
a less war-prone foreign policy towards its
eastern neighbours. In the 14th century, friendly
diplomatic relations between Japan and China
prevailed and the bilateral trade grew .
Bannockburn
Date: 23-24 June 131 4 Location : near Stirling, Scotland
o famous race unconquered through the age s, w hy do you,
w ho used to conquer knigh ts, flee from mere footmen?
VITAEDWARDI SECUNDI, 1326
T
he Wars of Independence between
England and Scotland began in 1296. Ini-
tially the English were successful, with the
sack of Berwick, the defeat of the Scotsat Dunbar,
and the removal from the throne of John Ballio!.
English defeat at Stirling Bridge in 1297 was coun -
tered by Edward l's triumph at Falkirk in the
following year. By 1304, Scotland was conquered.
Then, in 1306, Robert Bruce seized the Scottish
throne, and the war reopened .
Edward II, who came to the throne in 1307, was
incapable of providing the determined leader-
ship that his father had exercised. The English
position became increasingly difficult. One of the
most important of the castles in English hands
was Stirling, w hich commanded the route north-
wards into the Highlands . In the spring of 1314 it
was besieged by King Robert's brother Edward.
An agreement was reached that if no relieving
force had arrived by midsummer, then the castle
would be surrendered to the Scots (it was long
th ought that this agreement was made in 1313,
but th is is now acknowledged to have been a
mistake by Bruce's biographer, John Barbour).
The English could not ignore this challenge .
Military preparations were already underway;
th e news from Stirling galvanized Edward II into
action . His force was substantial . A feudal
summons had been issued, a signal t hat this was
to be a major campaign , on a similar scale to
those conducted by Edward I in Scotland. The
army probably numbered some 2,000cavalry and
15,000 infantry, many of whom would have been
longbowmen. Edward and his advisers were well
aware of the terrain where the Scotswere likely to
challenge them , and orders went out that the
troops should prepare for an enemy established
in the boggy ground near the River Forth.
A sratue of Robert
Bruce was added
to tbe Edinburgh
castleentrance in
There is little evidence about the composition 1929. lr shows how
of the Scottish army. Probably it numbered hewasenvisaged
by a m uch later
between 7,000 and 10,000 men, of whom no
generation.
more than about 500 wou ld have been mounted.
The Scottish cavalry were not equipped in the
same way as the heavily armoured English
knights; they would have been light horsemen ,
good for skirmishing and reconnaissance, but not
suitable for charging enemy lines. The infantry
would have had axes, swords and pikes, wi th few
bowmen among them .
The battle
The account of the batt le by John Barbour, Robert
Bruce's biographer, written much later in the 14th
century, suggests that the English advanced on
Stirling in ten divisions, or battles, but this is
unlikely. The precedents of other English armies,
such as those of 1298 and BOO, suggest that
there would have been no more than four battles
at the most.The Scotswere probably in three divi -
sions, prepared to fight in 'schiltroms', strong
defensive circles of men, bristling with pikes.
The battle was unusual in that it was fought
over two days; most medieval conflicts were
short -lived, lasti ng only a few hou rs. On 23 June
two English cavalry forma tions advanced. The
vanguard under the earls of Gloucester and Here-
ford encountered a body of Scots. Among them
was none other than Bruce him self, and the cele-
brated single combat took place between him
and Henry de Bohun, Hereford 's neph ew. Bohun
71
 16 MEDIE VAL WORLD BANNOCKBURN 16

attempted to charge Bruce, and when the two
passed side-by-side, the Scott ish king split
Bohun 's head w ith his axe. Fighting between the
two sides followed . This relatively minor engage-
ment showed that the English cavalry were far
from invulnerable. The other English cavalry
force , under Robert Clifford, advanced on the
opposite flank . They came up against a schiltrom
commanded by Thomas Randolf, Earl of Moray.
Clifford and his men withdrew in confusion,
unable to break the Scottish formation.
In the night, English force s crossed the stream
known as the Bannock Burn and established th eir
position in a plain beyond it. Alexander Seton, a
Scottish knight in Edward II's service, deserted the
English camp and went to tell Bruce of th e low
morale of the English and to encourage him to
attack. The Scots duly advanced out of the woods
of the New Park early the next morning, encour-
aged by inspirational words from their king. The
English archers should have been able to counter
the Scots advance, but they were neutralized by a
Scot scavalry charge led by Sir Robert Keit h.
COMBATANTS
The English response to the Scotsadvance was
a charge by th e Earl of Gloucester. The earl w as a Scot s
young man, w hose career up to this po int had o Unknown numbers, perhaps 7,000--10,000,
been marke d by sense and moderation, but w ho including c. SOO light horsemen; infant ry with
axes, swords and bowmen
now squabbled wi th the Earl of Hereford over
o Commanded by Robert Bruce
whi ch one had the right to lead the vanguard into
batt le. He had also argued with the king that • Unknown casualt ies
battle sho uld be postponed; Edward accused him Bannockburn was
Eng lis h fough t in boggy
of cow ard ice. This, perhaps , goaded Gloucester
Perhaps 15,000-20,000, including 2,000 cavalry terrainclose to the
int o his fat al charge. Few accompanied him , and o

and 15,000 infantry River Fonh over

once he reached the Scottish lines he was soon two days. The
o Commanded by King Edward 11; Earl of exact siteis
surrounded and killed . Gloucester; Earl of Hereford; Earl of Pemb roke im passible to
The fight soon became general, and gradually determine; that
• Unknow n casualties
the English were pushed back and ground down shown;sthe most
by the Scots in their schiltroms. The cavalry was probable.

hemmed in and surrounded, and as the English

pu lled back, so t hey found it increasingly impossi-
ble to manoeuvre. The fighting was horrific. As
Barbour put it, 'There was such a din of blows as Cambuskenneth
Abbey
weapons struck on armour, and a great breaking
of spears, and such pushing and thrusting, such
N
snarling and groaning.' The English were unable
to ho ld the ir formations, and broke ranks.
As it became clear that the English had lost,
t G) Gloucester and Hereford's
RiverForth

those wi th Edward II decided that he must be led o attackon 23 June

I
away from the disaster. When Edward wa s safe, a ® Clifford 's attackon 23 June
Abov e An early
o ne kni ght, Giles de Argentine, hero ically ® English position on 24 June~
14th -cenrury before generalfighting ~
memorialbrass declared that he w as not accustomed to flee, and
laf Roger de turned round to make one final charge into the
Trumpingtan), ranksof th e Scot s, only to die on their spears.
showing armour
largely ofmail,

o ~
typical ofwhat Conclusion
English kn ights Although the accounts of the battle are not all
wore at New

o
con sist ent one wi th another, the reasons for the Park Bannock Burn
Bannockburn.
Scottis h tr iumph are plain. The Scots had been ~ fArea
O f 0·lqhtlnq
.
(24 June 1314 )
Right Thispage able to est ablish a strong position on ground
from the early
14th -cenrury
Halkham Picture
w hich favoured them. They had a charismatic
leader, and a w ell-thought-out plan of action. The
~ I
r:
Bible Book shows English lacked any coherence in command .
knightly wa rfa re in Chivalro us actions such as those by the Earl of
th e upp er pan el,
while com mo n
Gloucester and Giles de Argentine proved to be
/
soldiers fig ht
below.
suicidal. The defeat opened the north of England
to vicio us Scotti sh raids. It was not until 1332 and
1333, with English victories at Dupplin Moor and
o Scottish 'schilt roms '
(defensive circles)
Gloucester and
c:::J Englishforces Hereford
Halidon Hill, that th e course of the war w as once c=J arrangedin divisions Snabhead •
again reversed.

72 73
 CRECY 17

vided an ideal site for the English to establish a

Crecy strong defensive position. The valley below was

defined by a steep bank on the opposite side,
making it hard for the French to manoeuvre . The
Date: 25 -26 August 1346 Location: Picardie, northwestern France bank partially enclosed what would become a
savage killing ground.
The archers shot so marvellously that when the harses felt the barbed arraws some Did Edward deliberately seek out battle with
would not go forwards. Some would leap into the air as if maddened, some bucked the French. or was he placed in a position by them
horribly, and others turned their rumps towards the enemy, regardless of in wh ich he had no option other than to fight,
their masters, because ofthe arrows they felt. caught in a trap ? This has been much debated.
(ABOUT THE FRENCHCAVALRY) J EAN LE BEL, TRUE C HRONICLES, C. 1352 English royal propaganda was clear; Edward
wanted to fight his rival Philip in battle. However,
he could have faced Philip at an earlier stage in
the campaign, and surely he need not have
he Hundred Years War between England prising ease to the English, who relished the avoided the French by crossing the Seine at

T and France began in 1337. The initial phase

saw the English construct a grand alliance
of princes in the Low Countries. When in 1339
they and their allies confronted t he French,
neither side had sufficient stomach for battle and
none took place. The conflict appeared indecisive
and inconclusive until 1346, when the course of
the Hundred Years War was transformed by an
extraordinary campaign led by Edward III, wh ich
culminated in the first great battle of the war -
Crecy.
The English had landed, quite unexpectedly, in
western Normandy on July 12 1346. This was
probably deliberate, but it may be that contrary
winds meant that the fleet could not make its
intended voyage south to Gascony. Resistance
was ineffective; even the city of Caenfell with sur-
Thelongbow. with
itsropid rate of
shooting, was a
decisive weapo n at
Crecy. Volleys of
arrowswould
terrify menand
horsesalike.These
English archersare
shown with their
quivers, each of
which would hold
two dozenarrows.
plunderthey took there .The plan was to continue
to march northwards, but the River Seine pre-
sented a major obstacle. The French destroyed
the bridges, and Edward's army was forced to
march upstream , until it approached Paris. Chal-
lenges to fight Philip VI of France came to
nothing. At Poissy, the English were able to repair
the bridge, and marched rapid ly northwards. The
next obstacle was the Samme, which the army
forded at Blanquetaque, aided by local knowl-
edge. At Crecy, Edward III halted and prepared to
fight. Crecy lay in the county of Ponthieu, an
English possession since 1279 but current ly occu-
pied by the French. There was a moral advantage
in fighting on what might be regarded as home
ground. More importantly, the ridge that lay
between the villages of Crecy and Wadicourt pro-
Poissy, then making his way northwards at some
speed? Certainty is not possible, but it is hard to
dismiss the contemporary evidence that Edward
wanted to fight the French. There was no better
way to prove his casethat he was the rightful king
of France, by inheritance through his mother
Isabella of France.
The batt le
The sizeof the English army is not known for sure,
but it probably numbered about 15,000, of whom
almost 3,000 were knights and men-at-arms. This
was a paid force, in whic h many served th eir lo rds
in accordance with formal indentures, or con-
tracts, previously agreed upon. Chroniclers'
descriptions of the way in which the English drew
up this army for battle are not consistent one with
another. There was a circu lar formation of carts at
th e rear, defending the baggage. It was probably
here that they had a small number of guns, inef-
fective but noisy. There were three main divisions
bly meaning triangular formations. They flanked An imaginary
in the army, but whether they were draw n up one scene, in which the
behind the other, or along a long front, is not so the main English force, and were ideally posi- young Edward 11/
tioned to cause havoc as the French advanced on receiveshisshield,
clear. The Prince of Wales, with the earls of
showing three
Nort hampton and Warwick, commanded the first 25 August.
leopards, from
division, the king himself the second, and proba- The French forces were undoubtedly far more
St George. Both
bly the earls of Arun del and Hunting don, with nume rous than those of the English, but they figures bear
were infinitely lesswell led. There was much con- aillettes,
others, the third. The English knights and men-at -
fusion among the French, and argument as to rectangular
arms dismounted to fight, as they had learned to shoulder-pieces
do in the Scottish wars. There has been much whether to wait to fight on the following day. displaying their
Finally rashness overcame wisdom. The French arms.
argument about the archers, described by the
chronicler Froissart as drawn up en berse, pro ba- flew their celebrated war banner, the Oriflamme.

75
74
 17 MED IE VAL W OR L D
C RE CY 17

and ord ers were issued on both to have consisted of repeated TheEnglish, on
sides that no quarte r was to be French attacks on the English lines th e tett, in bottle
Righ tThe
given. against the
Pembridge helm, of dismounted men-at-arms.
an English helmet Genoese crossbowm en were French on the
Perhaps at one point th e French right. The French
of the later 14th sent fo rward; they did not even
century. This type even forced Edward Ill's men back king is shown
wasincreasingly have all the ir equipment since to the defensive encampment in prominently, with
used for there had not been t ime to his insignia of the
the rear. The div ision of Edward , I/eur-de -Iys, as is
tournamentmore unpack it. In particular, they
than ba ttle, where
Prince of Wales, bore the brunt of the English royal
lacked their large shields, or the fighting, and twice the prince ba nner beari ng the
helme ts with
movable visors pavises. According to later accounts, their was broug ht to his knees as th e
three leopa rds.
werepreferred. bowstring s became damp in a rainstorm, render- French attacked . Froissart famously
ing their weapons less effective. The English told th e story of how the king refused to send
Below At Crecy
the English ha d a longbows, on the other hand, could not have assistance, saying that the boy should be allowed
cleartactical been more potent. The Genoese were savaged, to win his spurs. The othe r celebrated incident
advantage, for
and forced back, only to be cut down by French came in the closing stages of the battle, when the
their position
wasona slope cavalry as they advanced. blind king of Bohemia, John of Luxembourg,
overlookin g a Accounts of th e battle as it proceeded are demanded that he be led into the figh ti ng so
wi de valley. inevitably confused and cont radictory. It appears that he could strike one blow wit h his sword. His
men t ied their horses together in a ring, and th e
following morning John was found dying, and his
English archers men dead. French casualties in the battle were
very heavy. Many were killed in the sheer crush of
men on the battlefield, suffocated in th eir armour
as men piled up over them . It was claimed that
Genoesecrossbowmen a total of nine princ es, 1,200 knights , and
15,000-16,000 others were lost. Few were taken
French mounted prisoner; German troops figh ting for Edward III
men-at-arms
compla ined at the lossof potential ransoms.
The battle had begun late in the afternoon, ther efore, no exten sive rout and pu rsuit, th ough tive. Int angi ble facto rs, such as th e quality of th e
and by the time it wasover, it wasdark.There was, fig hti ng did reach as far as Watteglise, some way king's leadership, undoubtedly had their part
to the northwest of Wadi court. On the next day to play. As fo r the French, th eir Genoese cross-
ther e was some alarm at the possib ility of further bowm en were no match fo r th e English archers.
Creer COMBATANTS French troops renewing th e fight, but th ey French tactics had not been developed to take
Wadicourt
turne d out to be peasant militiamen, belatedly account of the way in which the English fought.
Engl ish makin g th eir way to th e battl efield. The English Philip VI may have fought bravely, but he did
I I I I
V Prince of
Wales
V V Arundel V • Co 15,000 men

• Commanded by King Edward III; Edward , Prince

massacred them in a final cruel blow.
of Wales; Thoma s Hatfi eld , Bishop of Durham Sum m ary
• estimated at few er t han 100 The reasons fo r the English t rium ph were several.
The English chose th eir posit ion well. The
Fren ch
N
longbow was important: a skilled archer could
• At least 30,000 men shoot thr ee or four times as quickly as a cross-
t • Commanded by Philip VI;John, king of Bohemia ;
Charles, Count of Alencon
bowman, and horses were soon maddened by
the arrows that came on them in massive storms.
• 1,542 men -at-arms (by one estimate) and an The tacticsw hereby th e knightsand men-at-arms
o unknown number of infantry
fought on foot had been develop ed in Edward
Ill's Scottish wars, and again proved highly effec-
76
not have the charisma as a leader that Edward III
possessed. Uncertainty among the French com -
mand ers at th e start of the battle wasfollow ed by
confu sion during the course of it.
The battle of Crecy did not win th e war for the
English, but had Edward been defeated , it would
surely have marked the end of his ambitions in
France. As it was, it enabled th e English army to
mov e on to Calais, w hich wascaptur ed in the next
year. The victory led to th e foundation of th e
Order of the Garter. In many ways it was the foun-
dat ion of Edward Ill's fame.
77
 ANK ARA 18

Ankara
sacked Aleppo, Damascus and Baghdad in 1400
and 1401, he spent the winter of 1401 in
Karabag h in the Caucasus. In early summer 1402
he left his winter head quarters and marched int o
Date : 28 July 1402 Location: capital of modern Turkey Asia Minor via Erzurum and Erzincan to recapture
Bayezid
the disp uted fo rtre ss of Kemah, w hich controlled
He [Tim ur] reached Angara [Ankara] early in July, and an the 20th [i n fact, an th e 28 th] of the upper Euphrates and had recent ly been
that month the fateful battle was fought. At Angora the Ottoman Turks were totally seized by Bayezid from Taharten, lord of Erzincan .
<; ubuk Pla in
defeated by Timur's Tatars, and [ th e Ottoman sultan] Bayazid, a cap tive, is said to ha ve The fo rtress fell wi t hin t en days and was restored
been carried eastward wi th his canqueror in an iro n cage. Bayaz id died misera bly in March to it s fo rme r lord . From here Timur continu ed to
1403, and Constantinople for the next halfcentury w as th us spar ed to Christendom. Sivas, w here he met the Ottoman envoys.
Ru y GONZALES DECLAVlJO, EMBASSYTO TAMERLANE, 1403-06 Timur demanded the surrender of Ahm ed
Jalair, th e fug it ive sulta n of Baghdad , and of Kara
Yusuf, the ruler of the Karakoyunl u (Black Sheep)
Turkmens of Azerbaijan , w ho had both found

T
he early 1400s were especially event ful in
the history of Eurasia and the Middle East
due largely to the rise and conquests of
Timur the Lame (floruit 1370-1405), known in
western literature as Tamerlane. By 1370, Timur, a
A war elephant
from Rashid skilful and cruel military leader of Mongol descent
at-Din's History, from Transoxan ia (modern Uzbek istan), who was
early 14th·century Turkish in speech and Mu slim by relig ion , had
Iran. Tlmur's army
is said to have had
establ ished himself as the und isputed ruler of th is
some 30 war area. From his capital in 5amarkand his arm y,
elephants. dominated by expert Chaghatay nomad cavalry
archers, ov erran th e territories of the Golden
Horde, northern India, Persia, Syria and east ern
Anatolia. When , in the late 1390s, the Ottoman
sultan Bayezid I (1389- 1402) extended his rule
over eastern Anatolia, th e clash between the two
rulers became unavoidable. Smaller local lord s in
eastern Anatolia tried to manoeuvre between the
two gr eat rulers . They sought and found refuge
wi th either Bayezid or Tirnur, g iving ample
pretext to both conquerors to attack th e other.
After Timur had invaded Syria and Iraq and
refuge w it h the Ottomans. But the sultan's
envoys informed Timur that Bayezid would not
accept the se demands and , since diplomacy
failed, Timur continued his march into Anatolia.
From Sivas Timu r's arm y advanced to Ankara
fo llow ing the River Krzrhrma k. Having refreshed
his tired army w it h the products and fruits of th e
well-t illed country, Timur laid siege to An kara.
The siege w as lifte d w hen scouts brought news of
the approach ing Ottom an army, w hich arrived
'perishing wi th d istress and mu rd ered by th irst ',
aft er a long march.
Timur had also d iverted the C;:ubuk Creek that Although Timur
reached Ankara
Th e battle flowed on the C;:ubuk Plain by con structing a
from the south an d
The act ion took place at Cubukovasi (Cubuk diversion dam and an off-stream reservo ir south Bayezid camefrom
Plain). northeast of Ankara, on Friday 28 July of the town of C;:ubuk, denying drinking water to the no rth, they
1402. Figur es regarding th e size of the opposing the Ottoman fighting forces and their horses on changed positions
the nigh t before
armies vary greatly from several hundred thou - 28July. the battle. This
sand to th e imagina ry 1.6 mill ion . Reliable Batt le started in the morning at around 9 am plan shows an
modern estimates put the num ber of Timur's and and lasted until lat e even ing. The vanguard s of older, m ore
traditional
Bayezid's armi es at 140,000 and 85,000 men Timur's army we re co mmanded by Timur's
reconstruction of
respectively. Ottoman sources underline that g randsons : princes Abu Bakr and Sultan Husayn the battle based on
Bayezid 's arm y had been exhausted by the long on the right and left wi ngs respectively. Behind Alexandrescu·
Dresca's 1977
fo rced march from Bursa to Sivas and Tokat and th em stood th e main arm y w hose right and left
map, whichisnow
back to Ankara in the pursuit of th e enemy. w ings were under the orders of Timur's sons, generally agree d
Apart from their numerical inferio rity and princes Miran Shah and Shah Rukh. Timur, the to show an
exhaustion, another factor that significantly Lord of the Fortunate Conj unction, led the centre, unrealistically
large force led by
weakened the Ottomans was their lack of fresh supported by reserves under the command of
Timur.
water resourc es, a major drawback in the hot Prince Muhammad Sultan, another of Timur's
Anatolian summer. Most accounts agree tha t grandsons.
Timu r destro yed the w ell s sit uated around The pro vin cial cavalry from Rumelia on the left
Ankara. Mode rn scholarshi p has sugg ested that wi ng of the opposing Ottoman army was under

78 79

Thecapture of the orders of Prince SOIeyman, Bayezid's eldest
Beyazid I by Timur, son. The Anatolian troops along w ith some
Mughal mi niatu re.
20,000 Serbian cavalry stood on the right, com-
Sultan Bayezid
died in Timu t's manded by Stephen Lazarevich of Serbia, the
captivity en B sultan's brother-in-law and vassal. Some S,OOO
March 7403 near
janissaries, the sultan's professiona l foot soldiers,
Akiehir.
stood in the centre along with t he infantry azabs
and were under the command of Bayezid and
three of his sons, princes Musa, Mustafa and Isa.
The mounted forces of the sultan 's standing army
formed the centre of the second row, flanked by
Tartar and Serbian vassals on the left and right
wings, respectively. The Ottoman reserve con-
sisted of cavalry from Sivas, Tokat and Amasya.
Despite all their disadvantages, the Ottomans
fought successfully for a while. When, however,
the Kara (Black) Tartars on the Ottoman left wing ,
in treacherous agreement with Timur, attacked
the Ottomans' back, and when the cavalrymen
from the recently subjugated emirates deserted,
80
COMBATANTS
Turco-Mongols (Tart ars)
• 140,000 men
• Commanded by Timur the Lame (or Tamerlane),
ruler ofTransoxania and found er ofthe Tirnurid
empire
• 15,000-40,000 kill ed and wo unded
Otto mans
• 85,000 men
• Commanded by 8ayezid I, Ottoman sultan
(1389- 1402)
• 15,000-40,000 killed and wounded
the sultan 's fate was sealed. Abandoned by his
sons, SOIeyman and Mehmed , he fought bravely
with his janissaries and Serbian vassals, until he
was defeated and captured . Bayezid I, known as
Thunderbolt for his swift conquests, died in
Timur 's captivity in March 1403.
Significance
As in Syria and Iraq, plundering Tartar hordes
brought devastat ion and horror to Asia Minor.
Territories in eastern Anatolia , recently seized by
Bayezid, were restored to their former lords by
the victor. Over the remaining Ottoman realms a
bitter fight started among the sultan 's sons. A
decade of interregnum and fratricide almost led
to the downfall of the sultanate. Fortunately for
the Ottomans, however, basic institutions of state
had already taken root and large segments of
Ottoman society had vested interests in restoring
the power of the House of Osman. In 1453, the
Ottoman troops were again at the gates of
Constantinople (see p. 8S). The Aragone se
ambassador, Ruy Gonzales de C1avijo, travelled
through Byzantium and Asia Minor a year after
the battle on his way to Timur 's capital,
Samarkand (see opening quote). Although he got
the date of the battle wrong, and was one of
those contemporaries to spread the legend of the
'iron cage' (as in the picture above), his summary
as to the significance of the battle is perfect : it
gave Byzantium a half-century reprieve.
Aqincourt
Date: 25 October 1415 Locat ion : near Arras, Nord-Pas-de-Calais, France
The cloud of arrows flew again from all directions, and iron so unded
on iron , while volleys of arrows struck helmets, plates and cuiras ses.
Many of the French fell, pierced with arrows, here fifty, there sixty.
T HOMAS OF ELMH AM, LIBERM ErRICUSDEH ENRICIQ UINTO, c. 1418
enry V's famous victory at Agincourt was
the last great English triumph of the
Hundred Years War. It was a battle won
against all the odds, by a small tired army, and
it paved the way for the English conquest of
Normandy.The success of 'We few, we happy few ,
we band of brothers' on St Crispin's Day inspired
Shakespeare's great patr iotic play about Henry.
Backg ro und
The failure of a diplomatic mission to Franceearly
in 141 5 provided Henry V with reason for resort-
ing to arms. Preparations began as early as
February; the fleet sailed in August, transporting
an army which was some 12,000 strong . The
objective was Harfleur, a port whose capture
would open up Normandy to the English. Once it
was in his hands, Henry could then engage in a
war not of raids, like Edward Ill's campaigns, but
of conquest. The army was well equipped with
guns and more traditional siege engines, but
despite thi s, the defences delayed the English for
over a month. In addition, the army was severely
affected by dysentery in the course of the siege.
A major campaign to follow up the success at
Harfleur would have been impossible, but instead
of sailing home directly, it was decided that it
would be better to march to Calais, and take the
shortest sea-crossing. This had the added advan-
tage of enabling the king to make a show afforce,
though it seems unlikely that he was aiming at a
major confrontation wi th the French.
A port rait o f Henry V,from th e Royal Coffectio n.
81
 19 MEDIE VAL W O R LD
AGI NCOU R T 19

RightThe COMBATANTS ' - - - -

barrlefield ar
Agincourt was
definedby the
_ English men-at-arms

. . . . . . . Englisharchers
Q) Frenchcavalrycharge
® Main French advance
. Ag~c~nX
-
atlIis
,-.~,..-- /'
En gli sh
woods on either
side,which limited '-_._ French cavalry ® French anackon
f'!a - -A
Amiens
Paris •c. 8,000 men
baggagetrain
the Frenchscope • Com mand ed by King Henry V; Edward Duke of
formanoeuvre French dismountedmen-at-arms York led the vanguard, and Thomas lord
Ar/anric
;:( FRA N CE
verycansiderably, OCean Camoys the rearguard
sa rhar rheywere
• Fewer than 1,000 casualt ies, including the dukes
unable ra rake
of Yor k and Suffolk
advantaqe of their
superior numbers.
Fre n ch
Belo w The English •c. 20,000 me n
archerswith their
longbowsplayeda • Com mand ed by Marshal8oucicaut , the
decisiveroleat Constab le Charles d 'Albret , th e dukes of Orleans ,
Agincourr. This 8ourbon and Alencon
isa modern • 5,000- 10,000 casualties
reconstruction of
the way they were
dressedand
equipped. ~~ Camoys HenryV York English, most of them were di smou nted, w ith th e In the closing stages of th e fight, th ere was a Afilmed
reconstruction of
cavalry forces in the rear. sudden fear t hat th e French rearguard was abou t
Englishcavalry
N As so ofte n in medieval batt les, th ere was a to attack. Henry decided that th e many prisoners charging ar

,---, o
t
SOOm
long period of a face-off, with neit her side pre-
pared to advance. It was not until evening th at
Henry V took the bold step of orderin g his men to
taken duri ng th e fighting should be killed, for to
leave them alive was to o risky. It is not clear how
many were in fact executed by th e archers
Agincaurr, the
work aftbeRoyal
Armouries.

,
" _..
,
) baggage
train
Henry and his army crossed the Somme with
some difficulty, for the ford that had been used by
Edward III in 1346 (see Crecy p. 74) was now held
by French forces, and they had to move further
upstream. The army was exhausted, with many
men still ill with dysentery. Near the village of
Agincourt the French blocked Henry's route
northwards. The two armies manoeuvred within
sight of each other on 24 October, the English
taking care not to be surrounded.
Walter Hungerford told the king
that he would be glad of
..... 10,000 add itional archers.
Henry rebuked him: 'Do you not believe that
the Almig hty, w it h t hese His hum ble few, is able
to overcome the opposing arrogance of the
French?' Henry's forces spent the night in silence,
whi le the French caroused, confident in victory.
The next morning the French drew up the ir forces
in battle array.
I
o advance. This was contrary to all past Engl ish
The battle
The English army was perhaps some 8,000 strong ;
the French was very much larger, though th e
sources do not allow a defin itive figure to be
given : 20,000 is a conservat ive estimate. The bat-
tlefield was level; the only advantage that th e
English possessed was that it was hemmed in on
either side by woods. English men-at-arms, dis-
mounted, formed a line across the field . The
vanguard was placed on the right, the rearguard
to the left. How the English archers were arrayed
is not quite clear. One account says th at th ey
formed wedges between the three 'batt les' or
divisions, another th at groups of archers were
intermi ngled with the men-at-arms. It is likely
that the majority were placed on th e wings. As
well as their bows, they were equipp ed w ith
stakes (prepared in advance) to bloc k French
cavalry attack s. The French were arranged in
three 'batt les', one behind th e other. Like th e
experience, which taught that they shoul d main -
tain a strong defensive line. The English did not
advance far, but it was sufficient to spur the
French into attacking. The French tried but failed
to break the formations of English archers w it h
cavalry charges on the flanks. The French knights
were forced back against their own lines of dis-
mounted men. The hail of arrows did a great deal
of damage and the melee then developed. The
English were pushed back some way.
Henry himself was in the thick of things ; one
Frenchman came so close to him that he wasable
to make a hole in the king 's helmet, and knock the
crow n off it. When his brother, Humphrey of
Gloucester, was wounded, Henry stood over him
to protect him . Ast he battle progressed, the press
from behind forced the French forward, onto the
bod ies of th ose killed in t he initial fighting. More
and more piled up one on anot her and horrific
heaps of dead men marked t he batt lefield.
English archers, their bows abandoned, slaugh-
tered the French with knives, daggers, and
anything else that came to hand,
appoi nted to undertake t his grim task. This may
appear unchival rous, but alt hough there were
certainly those on the batt lefield who opposed
Henry's decision , he was not crit icized for it, even
by French chroniclers . In the event , the renewed
attack did not mater ialize and the English were
left victorious.
The battle was bloody. Casualties, among the
French, were extremely high , with most contem-
porary estimates putting th e number killed at
between S,OOO and 10,000. Among the English,
there were two nota ble deaths, those of the
dukes of York and Suffolk. Many of those who
died were suffocated, as huge piles of dead and
dyi ng men built up and men pressed fo rward in
the fight.
An interesti ng feature of Agin court is th at the
plan of batt le which th e French had drawn up in
advance survives, There was to be a large van-
guard, and a second substant ial cavalry batt le.
Two wings of infantry would be on th e flanks,
with archers in front. A furt her cavalry battle was
to be kept in reserve, and used against the English
archers.A final, smaller cavalry force was depu ted

82
83

-
 19 ME D IE VA L WOR LD

The Fall of Constantinople-

Date : April-May 1453 Location: Istanbul, modern Turkey

Either I shall take this city, ar the city will take me, dead or alive. . ..If you will admit defeat and
withdraw in peace .. .we shall be friends. If yo u persist in denying me peaceful entry into the
city, / shall force my way in and I shall slay yau and all yo ur nobles; and t sha l! slaughter all the
survivors and allow my troops to plunder at will. The city is all / want, even ifit is empty.
S ULTAN M EHM ED II TO EM PEROR C ONSTANTINE XI

n 1451, at the time of 19-year-old Mehmed II's the straits, Mehmed had a fortress built at the

I second accession to the Ottoman throne, the

Ottomans controlled most of the Balkans,
except for Serbia, Bosnia and the Morea, while in
narrowest point of the Bosporus. Rumeli Hisan or
t he 'European castle' stood opposite the old or
Anatolian castle that had been erected by
Asia Mi nor the Antalya-Aksehir-Kayseri-Trabzon Bayezid I (1389-1402) during the first Ottoman
line marked the ir eastern borders (fo r the princi- siege of Constantinople. With the ir cannons
palit y of Karaman had not been conquered). The deployed o n the walls of the two castles, the
conciliato ry pol icy of previous decades was over Ottomans effectively sealed off Byzantium,
and the new sultan revived the old Ottoman depriving it of reinforcements and supplies.
wa rrior tradition . His first target w as Constantino - As part of the military preparation s, some 16
ple, seat of the thousand-year-old empire of the large and 60 light galleys, 20 horse-ships and
Romans, known as the Byzantine empire. Con- several smaller vessels were constructed in the
stantinople not only separated the sult an' s Ottoman arsenal of Gallipoli. The sultan 's army
European and Asian provinces, but its emperor of 80,000 to 100,000 men w as assembled in
A 75th-century to attack the English baggage train . In the event. mentally unstable French king, Charles VI, was also pl ayed a crucial role in incit ing ant i-Ottoman Edirne, the Ottoman capita l, In the Edirne foundry Heavily repainted
manuscript
the plan could not be fully carried out, with the not capable of leading the army. There was no crusades and rebellions in the Balkans and Anato- some 60 new guns of various calibres were cast. in the 19th century,
illustrationof
exception of the final element. The terrain was th is portrait of
the ba ttle of one ind ivid ual who had the prest ige to take Iia. Emperor Constantine Palaiologos (1448- 53) Some of them threw shot s of 240, 300 and 360 kg Sultan Mehmed II
Agin court. not suitable for it, and it did not provide for the command, and the collective leadership of the unnecessarily provoked the sultan by asking him (530-793 lb), The largest bombard that th e Hun - has been
showing the
way in which the English archers were able to Marshal, the Constable and the young royal to double the amount paid annually by the garian master Orban made for the sultan fired, attributed to
English forces an
hold off cavalry attacks, partly by means of the Gentile Bellini and
the righ t. Alth ou gh princes was ineffective. Ottomans for Orhan, a pretender to the Ottoman accord ing to the somewhat contradictory testi-
is dated to 7480.
Shakespeare omits stakes they planted. Agincourt, like so many battles, did not w in the throne who had been kept in Byzantine custody mon ies of contemporaries, stone balls of 400 Mehmed II. a true
the longba wmen
war. Victory for the French, however, would have in Co nstant inople. to 600 kg (800-1,322 lb), It was transported to renaissance ruler,
completely from
Summary meant that the English lost the war much sooner Constantinople by 60 oxen. wan ted to make
hisaccount of the
Constan tinople the
battle in Henry V. There are many reasons for the English victory. than they did. Not only that, but Henry V's king - Preparationsfor the siege and the defence The emperor did all that he could to prepare mast powerful and
here theircrucial The relatively narrow battlefield countered the ship would have been thoroughly discredited. As To fore stall potential attac ks by the Ottomans' for the siege. Envoys were sent to Venice, Genoa, magnificent city in
part in the English
French advantage in numbers. Heavy rain the it was, the English victory paved the way for him t radi ti onal enemi es during the planned siege, the the Pope, the Western emperor, the kings of the Eastern world.
victoryis
acknowledged by night before the figh t meant tha t the ground was to invade and conquer Normandy. The du chy's sultan renewed the peace treaty with Hungary, Hungary and Aragon , with the message that,
theirprominence. soon churned to mud, making it very hard for the capital , Rouen, fell early in 1419, and peace nego- led a military campaign against the po werful unless immediate military help was provided, the
French cavalry. English archery was a very signifi- tiat ions led to the marriage of Henry to Katherine, Turkic em irate of Karaman in Asia Mi no r, and sent days of Constantinople we re numbered. The
cant factor; the longbow was a decisive weapon. daughter of Charles VI of France. The war contin- an exped iti onary arm y int o the Peloponnese response was un impress ive. Some Italians,
Henry V's po wers of leadership contraste d with ued until t he final expulsion of the Eng lish from against the emperor's two brothers, despots embarrassed at their government's impotence,
the incoherent French command structure. The France in 1453. Thomas and Demetrios. To assume control over came as volunteers. The most famous of them

84
85

=
 20 M ED IE VAL W ORLD

was Giovanni Giustiniani Longo, a celebrated The siege

Genoese expert in siege warfare, who arrived On 5 April Sultan Mehmed arrived with the rest of
with 700 soldiers. The Venetian colony in Con- his troops and erected his tent opposite the Gate
Op posite The stant inople and many cit izens in Pera, oppos it e of Saint Romanos. On th e sultan's left , all the way
Siege of Constantinople, also stayed, as did Orhan, th e to th e Golden Horn, were the European troops,
Constanti no ple
Ottoman pretender with his Turks. All in all, the commanded by Karaca Pasha. The Anatolia n
(romBerrrandon
de 10 Broquiere's emperor had some 8,000 Greeks and 2,000 forces, under the command of Ishak Pasha,
manuscript fore igners at his disposal along with some 30,000 camped to the sultan's right all the way to the
LeVoyage
to 40,000 civilians who rendered valuable service shore of the Sea of Marmara.
d'Outremer
(c: 1455). Ottoman by repair ing the 18-mile-long walls of the city In the first weeks, 'onslaughts, attacks, bom-
militarysuperiority before and during the siege. bardment and general warfare were continuous',
and Mehmed II's From the south and east, Constantinople was but the city stood firm. Ottoman shipboar d
careful plannin g
an d inge nu ity
protected by the Sea of Marmara, whereas the artillery was ineffective against the tall Christian
proved crucialin Golden Horn guarded the city 's northern side. galleys in the harbour. Sultan Mehmed, a keen
the conquest of the On 2 April, in order to deny the Ottoman fleet student of contemporaneous mil itary technol-
city .
access into the Golden Horn, the Byzantines ogy, urged his cannon-makers to make a different
Right Mehmed Irs stretched a boom across the entrance to the type of cannon which could fire its shot 'to a great
cannonsbreached harbour. That very same day, the advance forces height, so that when it came down it wo uld hit
the city'»
of the sultan appeared near t he city's western t he ship'. Designed by the sultan, this new
thou sand -year -ald
walls. Here. the landward walls. weapon - soon to be known as mortar - sank a
land walls of Christian ship in the harbour.
Istanbul as they
On the morning of 23 April, the Byzantines
appear today.
noticed with terror that some 70 to 80 smaller
Below By 23 Apri l Ottoman ships had been lowere d into the Golden
the Ottomans had Horn. Using sheep and ox tallow aslubricants, the
tra nspo rted 70
Ottomans transported the ir smaller ships from
ships overland
fro m the Bosporus the Bosporus on rollers either along the longer
to the Golden (12 to 13-km or 8-mile) land route that connected
Ham. Then on 29
the Double Columns (Bestktas-Kabatas) with
May Mehm ed's
final assault Eyiib, or along the usually accepted shorter (2 to
began. 3-km or l.8-mile ) Tophane-Takstrn-Kasrmpasa
route . Sultan Mehmed 's ingenious manoeuvre
bridge of boats Turkish fleet
was a serious blow for the Byzantines, who were
N
now forced to allocate men and resources to

t portage route \
(or ships
~-~
defend the walls along the Golden Horn.
Ottoman assaults and bomba rdme nt cont in-
Turkisharmies
ued. Food supplies and ammu nition in t he city
~~- ';.
~ ~:- were running short. When it was learned that
boom r " ,. neither relief forces nor the promised Venetian
\ Bosporus
armada would arrive, the defenders lost hope and
felt abandoned. The sultan 's messengers urged
the citizens to surrender or face slaughte r and
slavery. Peculiar nat ural phen omena preceding
Seaof Marmara the fall of the city had major psychological effects
Wall of
o 2km on both sides. Modern historians explain the
Theodosius
I lunar eclipse, the unseasonably chilly weather,
o 1 mile
the violent thunderstorm and th ick fog, and the

86
 20 MEDI EVAL WORLD
infernal lights upon the roof of th e church of th e
Holy Wisdom with the massivevolcanic explo sion
that wiped out the South Pacific island of Kuwae
and spread enormous clouds of volcanic ash
throughout the upper atmosphere worldwide.
Unaware of such explanation s, Constantinople's
desperate defenders took these natural occur-
rences as signs of divine displeasure and omens
that foretold the loom ing fall of their city. To the
besiegers, though, these were signs of hope and
of imminent victory.
On 29 May, shortly after midnight, the last
assault began. While the Ottoman shipboard
artillery bombarded the walls along the Sea of
Marmara and the Golden Horn, the army attacked
the city 's landward walls. The sultan first sent his
irregulars and volunteers against the walls, but
the defenders, commanded by Giustiniani and
the emperor, drove them back. These were fol -
lowed by more experienced and disciplined
Ottoman troops , w ho attacked 'like lions', but
they too were forced to withdraw. At the break of
Ianissaties of the
Ottoma n ormyon dawn, Mehmed order ed his elite jan issaries
parade. These were against the walls. In the midst of this fight, Gius-
the elite warriorsof
tiniani was badly wounded by an arrow or musket
Mehmed'sarmy
and took part in
thefinal assault
Thesymbols on
their hatsdenoted
theirpositions and
taskswithin the
army.
88
shot, and was taken to a Genoe se ship in the
harbour. Not seeing th eir general, Giustini ani's
men lost their spirit. The janissaries took advan-
tage of th e defend ers' confusion and several of
th em forced thei r way through th e breaches, now
opened by the constant bombardment. Last seen
near the Gate of Saint Romanos, Constantine
Palaiologos, the last emperor of the Romans, died
as a common soldier, fighting the enem y. Sultan
Mehmed entered the city on horseback through
the very same gate, known to the Ottomans as
Topkapr, The sultan granted a three-day plunder
to his troops. After the plunder, however,
Mehmed entru sted the newly appointed
Ottoman governor of Constantinople with the
reconstruction and repopu lation of th e city .
Significance
The Ottoman conquest of Constantinople
brought military, geopolitical and economic
rewards, as well as political and psycholog ical
prestige in both the Muslim and Christian worlds .
It eliminated a hostile wedge that had separated
the sultan's provinces, and gave the Ottomans an
ideal logist ical centre for further campaigns and a
commanding posit ion over the trade routes
bet ween Asia and Europe, the 81ack Sea and the
Mediterranean . Possession of the city enabled the
Ottomans to cement their rule in southeastern
Europe and Asia Minor and to create th e
strongest contiguou sempire in the area.
COMBATANTS
Ottomans
• 80,000-1 00,000 men
• Command ed by Sultan Mehmed II
• No credible est ima te s of casualt ies
Byzantines
• 10,000 soldiers and 40,000 civil ians
• Command ed by Emperor Con stantine
Palaiologos XI and Giovanni Giu stiniani Longo of
Genoa
• No credible estimates of casualties
Bosworth
Date: 22 August 1485 Location: Leicestersh ire, England
Hesaid, 'Give me my battle -axe in my hand,
Set the crown of England on my head so high!
Far by him that shaped both sea and land,
King of England thisday will I die!'
ANONYMOUS, THEBALLAD OF BOSWORTH FIELD, c. 1490
ichard III had seized the English throne on
th e death of his brother, Edward IV, in 1483.
He had fended off one rebellion, led by the
Duke of Buckingham, before th e emerg ence of
the next challenge - Henry Tudor , Earl of Rich-
mond. Tudor was an exile in Brittany .Through his
mother, Margaret Beaufort, he claimed a tenuou s
Lancast rian lineage. His betrothal to Edward IV's
eldest daughter, Elizabeth , also won over disaf-
fected Yorkists to his cause.
On 7 August 1485, Henry landed in Pem-
brokeshire ready to make his bid for the crow n. A
Welshman by birth , he was able to att ract much
local support as he marched through mid -Wales.
On crossing th e border into England, he was
jo ined by about 500 men unde r Sir Gilbert Talbo t. Bosworth , even regarding its precise location. Above leh
A 16th-century
Whilst Henry's stepfather, Lord Thom as Stanley, The topography of th e battle and th e disposit ions
Florentine bust
refused to comm it himself to either side, his of th e tr oop s thu s also remain th e subject of of the victor of
more impulsive brother, Sir William Stanley, may deb ate. The rival armies probably deployed on Bosworth,
have encouraged th e pretender. Together, th e th e plain south west of Amb ion Hill, near to Henry VII.
Stanleys controll ed th e military manpower of Market Bosworth, in Leicestershire. Henry's army
Above Richard //I
Lancashire, Cheshire and much of north Wales. appears to have been formed around a core of portrayed in a
Their forces shadowe d the rival armies, a di scon- French mercenaries, armed predominantly with Tudor portrait
(c. 1533-43) asa
certing presence for king and would-be king pikes and halberds. Henry's Welsh and English
defeated usurper
alike. Richard had called upo n his own support- troops would have been armed with bows, bills with shivered
ers, mainly from northern England, to muster and spears. He also had some cannon, probably sword. His
th eir retinu esin all haste , and hisarmy assembled taken from th e garrison of Lichfield . The 28-year- reputation
remains contested,
in th e Midlands in a matter of days. On th e eve of old Henry was not an experienced soldier, bu t but, usurperornot,
batt le he comm anded some 8,000- 10,000 men, could count on wise coun sel from John de Vere, he lived his last few
perhapstwice t he number fielded by Henry. Earl of Oxford, and the French captain Philibert de mome nts likean
English king and
Chand ee, In cont rast, Richard III was a proven
died refusing to
The battle comma nder, a veteran of fighting in England and yield hiscrown.
There is much mystery surroundi ng the battl e of Scotland, and famili ar wit h conti nental meth od s,
89
 Zl MEDIEVAL WORLD

having served along side the Burgundian army
during th e abortive 1475 campaign in France. He
led a large and we ll-balanced army. His infant ry,
for the most part longbowmen and bill men, were
supported by some artillery and a strong force of
mou nted men-at-arms.
On the mo rning of the batt le, 22 August, all the
odds seemed in Richard's favour. For him, the day
would be a chance to establish the legiti macy of
his kingsh ip thr ough victory . For this reason he
fo ught most conspicuous ly as a king : a gold
crow n was fixed to his helmet and he wore a
loose-fitti ng rob e displaying the royal coat of
arms over his armo ur. Acti ng in accordance wi th
established military wisdom, he divided his army
into th ree 'battles'. The vanguard, perhaps 1,200
stro ng, was led by the Duke of Norfo lk; t he main
battle , of 2,000-3,000 men, by Richard himself;
and th e rearguard, of a similar size, by t he Earl of
Nort humberland. Henry seems to have concen-
t rated his smaller army into a sing le main battle.
He had met, once again, with th e 5tanleys on 21
August but had not secured a firm pledge of th eir
inte nt ions. They now took up a position on
Richard's left flank.
Faced with a numerically superior enemy,
Henry needed to gain some tactical advanta ge.
As the engagement opened, Oxford led Henry's
main battle in a sweeping flank march, onto th e
right of Norfolk's vanguard .With t hesetwo bodies
of men locked in a savage combat, Richard might
have moved his mai n batt le in support of Norfo lk.
Instead, he seized upon a momentary opportu-
nity to deliver a decisive stroke elsewhere on t he
field . Henry and his bodyg uard had become sepa-
rated from the mass of the ir troops and Richard
had seen th em. Striking his horse w it h his spurs,
Richard and his men-at-arms charged. Thund er-
ing over th e gro und, they seemed an irresist ible
force. Henry's standard bearer, William Brando n,
was t ransfixed on Richard's lance. A ferocious
strugg le arou nd the toppled banner ensued. Sir
Joh n Cheney courageo usly th rew him self in
Richard's path, but was knocked to t he ground. Richard can only have been yards fro m his rival 'killed fig ht ing manfull y in th e press of his Bill, sword ond
when a fresh onslaught convul sed th e melee. enemies'. Many in his vanguard suffe red a simil ar poleaxe clash
as modern
Sir William Stanley had joined th e battl e, fate. As Oxfo rd pressed forward, Norfolk was
J. to Market Bosworth re-enactorsstrive
charging Richard and his isolat ed bod y of men-at- killed and his com mand scatte red. Nort humb er- to capture the
I Yorkist rearguard arms. Unhorsed, th e king was urged to flee as his land's rearguard, though, either through treason terocityot tstt»

~~e) - /
.[@ dwindling band of foll owers was hacked down or in th e confusion of battl e, neith er st ruck nor
cenrury infanrry
combar.Richard,
(! ~<5'/ around him . Screamin g his defiance and cursing received a single blow before wi thdrawing from
C!) Battle of thevanguards:Oxford leads J....~-
alth ough smoll in
Henry'stroops to attack Norfolk ~ ;. """ t raitors and rebels, he refused to run and was th e fray. Henry was victorious. stature, was a
srrong and skilful
,,,\\1111// ...... /

= ® ~ AmHillbjon
-;:c
~

:::
Sutton Tudo r England
warriorand fought
hisway rhrough
o lkm ""
........// ,,\\' ---J CO M B ATA N T S~--~ Alth ough tr aditi onall y seen as marking the end of such Q melee to
I Yorkist main 'battle' th e medieval period , Bosworth had little impact with in yords of
o 0.5 rrii les
Henry Tudor.
Yorkists on th e lives of most peopl e in England and Wales.
N ® Main battle:Richard attacks Henry, who • 8,000- 10,000 men Even th e new dynasty was not wh oll y secure.
Although the
preciselocation of
t has been isolated w ith his bodyguard s

John de Vere, Earl of Oxford @

• Commanded by King Richard III; Thoma s
Howard, Duke of Norfol k; Henry Percy, Earl of
Henry VII, as he was crowned , would defeat one
Vorkist pret ender at Stoke-by-Newark in 1487,
Bosworth Field, Northumberland anoth er claimant accompanying a brief Scottish
and the Thomas Howard, Duke of Norfolk ® • gOO casualties foray into northern England in 1496. Vet in retro-
dispositions oi the
King Richard III ®
rivalarmies, spect, Bosworth assumed an immens e historica l
remainmuch Henry Percy, ® Tud ors
significance. The establishment of the Tudor
Earlof Northumberland
contested, it seems
most likely thor the
HenryTudor ® • Tudor army: 5,000; th e Stanley contingent : 3,000 dynasty seemed to mark a new beginning after
action took place Lord Thomas Stanley ® • Commanded by Henry Tudor, Earl of Richmond; 30 years of strife and instab ility. So, as Henry
Jo h n de Vere, Earl of Oxford; Philibert de
in the rolling
Leicestershire
Sir William Stanley ® Chandee : Sir William Stanley
visited imprisonment, execut ion or exile upon
Dadlington
potential rivals for the throne, he fostered, too ,
countryside, south- m arshy area J. : "" • 100 casua lties
Crow n Hill the legend of Bosworth: of anarchy conqu ered by
west of Ambion
Stoke
Hill. ord er, of a usurper overcom e by nemesis.

90 91
 Sixteenth
Century
ajor drives for expansion led to, and were

M secured by, key battles . Tenochtitlan

(1521) ensured the Spanish conquest of
Aztec-ruled Mexico, Panipat (1526) the Mughal
conquest of Hindustan , and Mohacs (l526) the
Ottoman overrunning of Hungary . In contrast,
defeat at Lepanto (1571) helped stop the impetus
of Ottoman advance in the Mediterranean. Other
battles, such as Flodden (1513), Pavia (1525) and
the defeat of the Armada (1588), were more
clearly within military systems and cultural areas,
in these cases the western European military
system. Pavia was an important step in the use
of firearms, against both pikemen and cavalry,
although it is also necessary to make due
allowance for Spanish effectiveness in the small-
unit engagements they sought, and to
emphasize the role of generalship. At Flodden,
cannon played a role, but the key elements in the
English army were archers and bill men, not
arquebusiers and pikemen . The more mobile
billmen proved more effective than the Scottish
pikemen . Mobility was also important in the
Armada's defeat. The Spanish warships relied on
a tight formation and lacked the flexib ility to take
advantage of more fluid fighting conditions.
In all these battles, firepower played a role.
Gunpowder weaponry had developed first in
China, where the correct formula for manufactur-
ing gunpowder was discovered in the 9th
century, and where effective metal-barrelled
weapons were produced in the 12th century. By
the beginning of the 16th century, restrict ions on
the use of gunpowder weaponry had been over-
come in a number of important areas, especially

Massacre ofthe Azrec nobility, 23 May 1520. Thedestruction

ofthe leadershipwasvital to Sponishsuccess in Mexico, and
accomplishedby war, massacre and the effectofsmallpox.
 A tapestry showing
the munitions
stare exp lod ing in
the French cam p at
Pavia. The battle
was decided by the
combination of
pikem enand
arquebusiers
fighting in the
open, rath er than
depending an field
toniticatiom.
thanks to the development of the arquebus, and
it was to spread d uring t he century. The
Ottomans, victors at Mohacs , for exam ple, had
made the trans ition from the traditional Central
Asian nomadic force of archers on horseback, to a
more mi xed force including elite infantry
equipped with firearms and cannon.
In many cases, decisive victories in this period
reflected a technological gap in weaponry, specif-
ically the role of cannon at sea, and the advantage
on land that firearms offered over cutting and
thrusting weapons. Firearms could also help rela-
tively small forces defeat far more numerous
op ponents. But other factors also played a role,
such as the ability to bene fit from divisions
among opponents, a tactic which greatly helped
the Spaniards against the Aztecs and Incas. It is
also clear that not all battles were decided by fire -
po wer. In India, for example, Babur's use of
mounted archers at First Panipat w as im portant,
and the Mughals also emp loyed w ar elephants, as
well as troops armed with firearms and heavy
cavalry w ith swords and lances.
The limited role of firearms w as not restricted
to India - where, indeed, there was no major
change until the spread of the flintlock musket in
the 18th century - but could also be seen in
Africa, China and Persia. This was also the case at
sea. Ottoman defeat at Lepanto did not indi cat e
any marked deficiencies in the ir naval technol-
og y. Their opponents battered th eir way to
94
victory thanks to superior (or at least mo re
numerous) gunnery, t he fig hting qua lities and
firepower of the Spanish infantry, and the exhaus-
tion of Ottoman gunpowder. The normal caution
of the Christian galley commanders w as overrid-
den by the charismatic leadership of Don Juan de
Austria . The Ottomans, however, rapidly rebuilt
their fleet , and th e Christ ian powers soon
accepted a de facto establi shment of Spanish and
Ottoman spheres of influence in thei r respect ive
halves of the Mediterranean.
It is also appropriate to draw attention to the
deficiencies of firearms in this period. The accu-
racy of smoothbore guns was limited wh ile
spherical bullets were lessaerodynamically effec -
ti ve than their 19th -century replacem ents.
Recharging and reloading from the muzzle (end)
of the gun (rather than , as lat er, th e breech )
increased th e time taken to fire, and the lo ng
reloading cycle led to acute vulnerabili ty for the
musket eers, especially from cavalry. Troops w ere
deployed near th eir opponents because the
ability of spherical shot to inflict leth al wound s at
other than short range w as lim ited , and was
furth er decreased by the impact on muzzl e veloc -
ity of the large windage (gap between projecti le
and inside of barrel ) made necessary by the diffi -
culty of casting accurate shot . This limited ability
helped account for the continued popu larity of
body armou r, as it could pro vide protect ion
against most gu nshot woun ds.
Flodden
Date: 9 September 1513 Location: Nort humberland, England
tt is not to be douted, but th e Scotts faught m anly, and wer det ermyn ed o uthir to wy nne the
ffie/de or ro dye, th ey wer a/so as well appointed as was pos sible at all points with armes
and harness, soe th at few af thaim wer s/aine wi th arrows, ho w be it th e bille s did beat and
hew thaim do wn e w ith same pa ine and daunger to Englisshmen.
A NONYMOUS, THETREWEENCOUNTRE, C. 1 S13
or James IV of Scot land and Henry VIII of di vided int o two 'battles', or groups, each flanked
F England , war was a means of achieving
status on an international stage. In 1513,
Henry led an English inv asion force across the
by smaller un its on the ir wi ngs. The vang uard,
comma nded by his son Sir Thomas Howard , Lord
Admiral of England, was abou t 9,000 strong. Its
A 16th-century
colour engraving
ofJames IV o f
Scotla nd
accoutredforwar.
channel. James, tied to France by an ancient flanki ng uni ts were commanded by Surrey 's
The English
alliance and mindful of previous successes in the youngest son, Edmund Howard, with 3,000 men, chronicler Ed ward
border country, responded by open ing a second and Marmaduke Constable , with 1,000 men . The Hall po id th is
front in th e no rt h. Henry received the Scott ish main battle w as Surrey's own command , 5,000 tribute to his
recklessbra very:
declarat ion of w ar in his camp outs id e Therounne str ong and flan ked by 3,000 Bordere rs under Lord
'0 What 0 noble
on 11 Augus t, 1S13. He had not ignored the Thomas Dacre on the right, and 3,000 Lancashire a nd triumphan t
pot ential threat fro m Scotland and had left the and Cheshire levies under Sir Edward Stanley on courage was thy s
for a kynge to
defence of Eng land in th e hands of Thoma s th e left . Surrey now wait ed for the Scots to attac k
fygh te in a battayl
Howard, Ea rl of Surrey. This do ughty old w arrio r but, to his dismay, James wo uld not leave the as a meane
had fought at Boswort h fo r Richard III. As a natura l fortres s he had found . Making a skilful use souldier.'
servant of the Tudor dyna sty he had marched in
pursuit of invad ing Scottish armies in 1496 and
1497. Now in his seventieth year and plagued by
go ut, Surrey had trouble w alking.James un w isely
mocked him as'a croo ked old earl in a cart'.
The manoeuvre for position
James had set off for the bord er from Edinbu rgh
on 18 Augu st 1513, picking up levies as he moved
south . When he crossed th e Twe ed int o Eng land
at Norham he may have had as many as 40,000
men w it h him. His first act was to destroy several
local stron ghold s. He then took up a naturally
st rong defensive position on Flodden so ut h-
east of Branxton . Here he mad e his camp,
diggi ng entre nchments for his cannon,
and awai ted Surrey.
The Eng lish earl arrived w it h his army at nearby
Bolt on-in-Glendale on 5 Sept em ber. His army was
9S
 ----..=-

rLoDDEN 22
22 S I XTE ENTH CEN TU RY

of terrain to conceal his movements, Surrey
t herefore executed a daring flank march, placing
his army to the rear of James's po siti on and
cutt ing him off from Scotl and.
Fatal field
Early in the afternoon of 9 September, James
finally realized Surrey's intentions. He abandon ed
his camp and moved his own army onto Branxton
Hill, whilst the English were still struggling into
position through some difficult , bogg y ground
near Branxton village. Desertion had reduced
James's army to about 34,000 men. These he
divid ed into five batt les. On the extreme left were
a mixed cont ingent of Borderers and High landers
under Lord Alexander Home and the Earl of
Huntl ey. On their right was a column of pikemen
under the comman d of the earls of Errol, Craw-
ford and Montrose. In the cent re was the king
himself, with th e main batt le. To his right was a
pike column commanded by the Earl of Bothwell.
On the extreme right was th e largest Highland
cont ingent, led by the earls of Lenno x and Argyll.
Each Scottish battle numbered about 4,000 to
S,OOO except for th e king 's, wh o had 9,000 men. Left This
conremporary
The English were still t roop ing into position woodcu t shaws
led by Edmund Howard's small detachment, fol- James lyi ng dead.
lowed by the Admiral's vanguard. Jamesappears while th e Scottish
nob iliry is hacked
to have been eager to catch them as they arrived
down around him.
piecemeal onto the field before him . He took his
own place in the front rank of his mighty batt le. A .!l elow Madern
reconstru ction o f a
brief exchange of artillery fire foll owed . Few Eng-
com man English
lishmen were struck, but several of their cannon foorsoldier at
balls ploughed into the Scottish ranks, causing Fladden , wear ing a
the pike columns to hasten the ir advance and metal-ptated 'iack'
andasallet
thus disrupting th eir formations. Nevert heless, helmet. The
Home and Huntl ey's column scattered Edmund English bill, derived
Howard's outnumbered command. Only a well- from a simple
agr icultural too l.
timed charge by Dacre's Borderers saved the
wasone of the
English right flank from disaster. Next, Montrose deadliest melee
and Crawford 's pike column smashed into the wea pons of
medieval warfare.
Admiral 's vanguard. In the close confines of t he
melee the English bi ll proved a handi er weapo n
than the Scottish pike, and the Adm iral's men combat wi th Surrey's main battl e. The Scottish Once these had been put to flig ht, th ey swept
hacked the ir way fo rward. king led his men to w it hin yards of th e bann ers th rough t he Scottish camp and fell on th e
Volleys of arrows had failed to stop the that marked th e earl's positi on, but a tenaciou s rear of James's doo med column. Home,
advance of th e tw o centre pike columns under defence held firm. Ra nk aft er rank we re hacked sensing defeat, withdrew his men from the
James and Bothwell. These were now locked in down by the English bill men, knight and nobl e, fight asnigh t fell. Vet for th e rest of t he Scott ish
laird and commoner. On th e eastern edge of the army, the re was no avenue of retreat ; they fell
batt lefield, the levies of Lancashire and Cheshire whe re they stood . Only in th e morning did the
had taken th e offensive, scramb ling up a muddy English realize t he mag nitude of their victory.
slope to att ack Lennox and Argyll's High land ers. They took possession of t he magnifi cent artillery
train abandoned on Branxton Hill and found the
body of the Scottish king himself, wounded by

.
Riverli'll
Sandyford
COMBATANTS arrows, killed by bill strokes.
Following a risky .-:::::
flanking m arch,
the English ar my English The ra ids of 151 3- 14
thread ed its way
Marmaduke - - ---S:--,;:r; Although thei r victory had neutra lized th e th reat
• 26,000 men
thraug h sam e of Scottish invasion for a generation, the Eng lish
• Co m manded by Thomas Howard, Earl of Surrey;
difficult, boggy
Sir Thomas Howard, the Lord Admiral; Sir Edwa rd were unab le to do min ate the bo rder cou nt ry as a
ground to confront
Stanley; Lord Thomas Dacre; Marmaduke wh ole. All Scotland feared an English incursion in
the invader's army.
Co nstable; Edmund Howard
TheScots, having th e wake of th e catastrophe . Vet Lord Home,
abandoned th eir • l ,Soo casualties alt hough much criti cized for aband oning the
originalfonifi ed
N field , had saved enough men to defend his home -
position, were
deployed an the
high gro und of
Bronxton Edge, o 1 km
t Scotti sh
' 34,000 men
• Command ed by James IV; Lord Alexand er Ho me;
land. In a vicious series of raids and counter-raids
in the year fo llowing Flod den, neit her nat ion
I gained a marked ascendancy . Indeed, for nearly a
well pa sit ion ed to
o l~j le William Graham, Earl of Montro se; Ad am
overrun the 1 Earl of Hunt ley A Earl of Crawford
century, the Anglo -Scots 'marches' (or frontier
Hepburn , Earl of Bothwell; Matthew Stuart, Earl
Eng lish as they 2 Earl of Errol B King JamesIV Eng lish forces _ of Lenn o x; Arch ibald Campbell , Earl of Argyll zones) remained th e scene of sudden conflagra-
arrived piecemeal 3 Earl of Bothwell C Count d 'Aussi
• 7,000-8,000 casualt ies tion, foray and raid. Even the death of a king could
an th e field before 4 Eart of lennox o Earlof Argyle Scottishforces _
them. not bring peace to the wild borde r coun try.

96 97
 TE soc H TI TL AN 23

Tenochtitlan
Sixteentb-century
mapaf
Tenocbtitlan.lakes
and shoreiine. The
top points west
Date: 13 August 1521 Location : modern Me xico City, Mexico and Tenoctuittan is
in the centre, with
Xachimilca an the
Cortes was beginning to feel that th e siege was too long dra wn ou t, since he had left, T1acapan at
not been able to take Mexico in fifty days ofit; and he w ondered at th e endurance of th e the top and
Tepeyacac an the
enemy, in skirm ish and combat, and at their determination not to accept peace, for he
right. The body of
knew ho w many thousands of them had died at th e hands of their adversaries, water to the left of
and h ow many from hunger and disease. the Tenochtitlan
FROM CORTt S: THELiFEOF THE CONQUERORBY HISSECRETARY FRANCISCO LOPEZ DE G OMARRA, 1540 map is the Gulfof
Mexico.

he final assault on Tenochtitlan that began

T in May 1521 was the pivotal event giving

Spain domination over Mexico. This was
not a surprise attack, but the culmination of 18
months of Aztec/Spanish contacts . The Spanish
general Hernan Cortes had reached coastal
Mexico in April 151 9 and struck alliances wi th dis-
affected Aztec tr ibutaries and enemies, notably
the state of Tlaxcallan. Cortes's goal was con-
quest, yet his str ategy had been to coopt Indian
rulers rather th an confront th em wit h his few
men. On reaching the Aztec capital on 8 Novem-
ber 151 9 he was welcomed by King Mote uczoma
Xocoyotl (popularly but incorrectly known as
Montezuma), but a week later seized th e unresist-
ing king and ruled Mexico through him for over
seven month s before being forced to flee.
The events initiati ng that flight began w it h th e
arrival of Panfilo de Narvaez, a conquistador who
was sent by Governor Diego Velasquez to return
Cort es to Cuba for violat ing his orders. Cortes
marched to th e coast, triumphed over Narvaez,
and was joined by Narvaez's men. Meanw hile, in
Tenocht it lan and suspecting a plot, Cortes's com-
panion Pedro de Alvarado massacred thousands
of Aztecs participating in a festival. whereupon
the pop ulace rose up and besieged the Spaniards
in t heir quarters. On learni ng of th is, Cortes
return ed with Narvaez's men and 2,000 Indian
Hernan Cortes W QS credited withconquering Mexico. Born in
Casrile, Spain, c. 1485, Cortes accepted the surrender af
Cuauhtemacon 13August 152 1. Hedied in 5eviffein 1547.
~
Q.lIMa JHlft('ba
____..;-::::-
..
_ .. ~ .~
;:;=...~a-~
;:::~
=.:-
Imno . . .
...pI,-'tI-
="'::: .._ _
allies, and entered Tenochtitlan unopposed on
24 June. But they were immediately trapped .
Spanish forays and entreaties by Moteuczoma
failed and, with supplies dwindling, the Spaniards
slipped out at midn ight on 30 June du ring a
heavy rainstorm . Discovered in mid-fl ight, Cortes
and 500 Spaniards escaped, but he lost 800
Spaniards, his Indian allies and captive nobles,
including Moteuczoma. Aft er eleven days of
fight ing withdrawal, the Spaniards reached Tlax-
callan and recuperated for three weeks befor e
resuming the ir conque sts. The Aztecs reinforced
their tributaries near Tlaxcallan but were unable
to stop t he Spaniards, w hose success secured
their rear and th e road to t he coast. This road was
then used to t ransport enough men to double
their numbersdu ring th e following year.
Moteuczo ma's brot her, Cuitl ahua, became
king, but soon died of th e smallpox brought by
Narvaez th at killed 40 per cent of th e Indians in
cent ral Mexico wi thi n a year. He was succeeded
by his nephew, Cuauhtemoc, in a climate of
general political di sruption. Many contenders to
the t hron e drove bargains for Spanish help,
notably Ixt lilxochitl, wo uld-be king whose
brother ruled Tetzcoco, th e empire's second city .
...
~ _
Unable to consolidate immediate control over
their eastern tributaries in the face of the
SpanishlTla xcaltec forces, the Aztecs adopted a
defensive strategy. Tenochtitlan was connected
to the shore by three major causeways which
could be severed without impeding either the
canoes that supp lied the city or the canoe-borne
Aztec troops in their attacks on the Spaniards
throughout the Valley of Mexico. So when Cortes
re-entered the valley on 30 December 1520, the
Aztecs did not oppose him.
Preparations fo r the siege
Pol iticall y, Cortes wooed disaffected cities in and
around th e valley to dep rive the Aztecs of sup-
porters and supplies. And on the Spaniards'
arrival, Tetzcoco's king fled to Tenocht itl an,
leaving Ixt lilxochitl in control of the city, its food
supplies and men, and an ideal beachhead for a
Spanish att ack.
Militarily, Cortes's first priority was to isolate
Tenocht itlan . His major assault drove straigh t into
th e centre of the valley along a peninsula to
Ixtlapalapan, which wo uld cut Tenochtit lan
off from th e agricult ural breadbasket in th e
southern lakes. But marching along the lakeshore

98 99
 23 SIXTEENTH CENTURY

subjected Cortes to Aztec canoe assaults, the
attack failed and he narrowly escaped.
Cautious but undeterred, Cortes launched two
encircli ng campaigns, each lasting over two
weeks.The first, begun on 3 February, struck anti -
clockwise north through the least pop ulo us areas
around to Tlacopan before Aztec reinforceme nts
forced him to withdraw. Then, on S April, Cortes
began his southern encirclement. Dense popula-
N o
tions and pro ximity to the lakes prevented a repe-
tition of the northern assa ult , so he marched
clockw ise south of t he valley. He conquered citie s
en route, t hen re-entered t he valley from th e
southwest and attacked Xochimilco before being
repulsed. These t wo t hrusts covered only three-
quarters of the valley's circumference, but t hey
blocked every major pass in or out, cutting t he
Aztecs off from outside suppo rt. And t hey lay th e
groundwork for th e siege itself.
Cortes's advantage lay lessin his ow n men and
Gu lf o f arms, th an in what th ey added to his Indian allies'

t o
I M e xi co
men and arms. Aztec and Tlaxcaltec armies we re
comparably armed, wh ich ofte n resulted in stale-
mates, and Cortes's men were to o few to alter

,I ~ o ~ .,J~ that balance. But unli ke Indian arms, Spanish

- Teotl uac ~ cannon s, arquebuses, crossbows and mou nted
Tepey c~~ t- Tetzcoco I
enochtitlan I ~ .,. _ ,
lancers could all penetrate th e op posing lines. So

I l•.:...\lxtlapalapan ~xcallan Cortes's primary contri buti on wo uld be in pu nch-

Xochimilco ........ . J ing throu gh and di srupti ng opposing lines, w hile
....6 ......)
I Pop ocat ep etl volcano 6. Orizaba volcano
his Indian allies exploi ted breaches th ey could
not create alone.
(
~
~ute of Hernan Cortesto Tenochtitlan After cutti ng off the valley from exte rnal
II (August-Novembe r lS 19) -
route of Cortes 's fligh from Tenochtitlan to Tlaxcallan-
- -
- suppo rt, tightening t he noose further requ ired
I I control of the lakes. Through out the campaig n,
the Spaniards had been subjected to canoe
Above Route of assau lts and, regard less of the effect iveness of Coyohuacan and Sandoval at Ixtlapalap an, the defence s. Eventually, Cortes ordered camps to be Alatet,
I i, Cortesandhismen
from the Gulfcoast
o
o
I Spanish arms, an unsupported attack along th e latter two (southern) causeways joining before established wherever the advance stopped for romanticized
painting afThe
to Tenochtitlan in narrow exposed causeways was hopeless. reaching the capital. the day, and the slow Spanish progress resumed. Taking of
I : 1519 and th eir Accordingly, Cortes ordered 13 brigant ines to be Cortesthen launched hisarmada, convincing ly Some canoes slipped through the brigan tines ' Tenochtitlan by

I flight from
Tenochtitlan to
built, each over 13 m (40 ft) long, w ith 12
oarsmen, 12 crossbowm en and arque busiers, 1
defeated the first Aztec fleet he encountered,
breached th e Ixtlapalapan causeway and sailed
blockade , but too few, and famine soon gripped
Tenochtitlan. Asthe fortunes of war shifted to the
Cortes, 1521, by an
artist of the
T/axco//an in July Spanish schoo l.
1520. artilleryman and 1 captai n. When th ey we re to Coyohuacan, where he scattered the canoes Spanish side, so too did towns in the valley, but
Tlacopan e launched atTe tzcoco on 28 Apr il, the siege began opposing Olid 's forces. With brigantine support, their progress was precarious. On 30 June, 68
Righ tThe forces of
in earnest. Olid and Sandoval both reached the causeways' Spaniards were captured during one assault. Ten
Pedro de Alvarado
advanced from j uncture on 31 May, which freed Sandoval to were slain immediately and t heir heads thrown
T/acopan, Ganzalo The siege block the last major (northern) causeway, to back into Spanish lines; t he rest we re sacrificed
deSandoval from t hat night on the Great Temple, in full view of the
The remaining land forces were divided into Tepeyacac.
Ixtlapalapan and
Pedro de Alvarado thr ee armies of around 200 Spaniards and With food and water slowed to a trick le, Spanish camp. Their faces were skinned, tanned
from Coyohuacon. 20,000 -30,000 Indians each. Alvarado and Tenocht it lan's great populace now became a lia- and sent to waver ing allies as a warning. Encou r-
Once the latter two Cristob al de Olid left Tetzcoco on 22 May, fol- bility and its larger forces could not be brought to aged, the Aztecs attacked wit h renewed vigour
armies linked up
low ed by Gonzalo de Sandoval on 30 May, to bear on the causeways' limited fro nts, where the for fou r days and most of Cortes's allies left . But
on thecauseway,
Sandoval and his coordinate the ir arrivals at th e th ree major cause- effectiveness of Spanish arms was concentrated. the assault eventually waned , t he Spanish camps
forces withdrew to ways. Destroying en route the aqueduct at The Aztecs adopted counter-measures t hat were not overrun, Cortes began his offe nsive

2
Tepeyacacand aqueduct ~ lxtla pa la pan
causeway C~YohUacan Mexicaltzinco Chapolte pec t hat brought freshwater to slowed the assa ult , but were ultimately futile. once more and hisIndian allies returned.
advanced onto
thatcauseway. dike Lake Tenochtitlan, Alvarado encamped at th e Tlaco- Spanish advances during t he day were lost at Once t he figh t ing entered t he city, the Aztecs
Xochimilco • Culhuacan
pan (western) causeway, wh ile Olid encamped at night as the Aztecs widened breaches and rebuilt attacked from flanking buildings and rooftops,

100 101
 23 S IX TE E N T H C E N TU RY

COMBATANTS

and the Spaniards razed everyth ing in response.
Burning and levelling the build ings before them ,
the Spaniards fought toward the centre, until
Cuauhtemoc finally agreed to negotiate. The
fighting slackened but, w hen negotiations failed
to mater ialize, Cortes resumed his attack. And on
13 August , the Spaniards broke through the last
defences. Cuauhtemoc fled with a canoe fleet but
was overtaken by a brigantine and surrendered ,
Drawing from
ending the siege.
Diego Durd n's
Historia de las
Ind ias de Nueva Aftermath
Espaii a e Islas de
The conquest ofTenochtitlan was effectively the
la TIerra Firme
dep ieting Cortes conquest of Mexico. Some cities resisted unsuc-
besieg ed in cessfully, but most capitulated without a
Tenochtitla n
struggle, consolidating the Spanish victory and
I,
Pavia
Span iards and Indian allies
• Spaniard s: c. 2,000 men involved throughout
two years, armed w ith falconets, arquebu ses, Date: 24 February 1525 Location: Lombardy region, northern Italy
crossbows, swords, fewer than 20 horses and 13
brigantines; Indi an allies: c. 100,000 men ,
comprising soldi ers fro m TIaxcallan, I have taken all necessary m easures; my supplies are ready and my tro ops
Huexotzinco, Tetzcoco , Chalco and Cholollan, all are paid . I am expecting 1,400,000 francs next month and I ha ve summ oned fresh tro op s.
armed wi th simil ar we aponry to t he Azt ecs I ha ve no t crossed the Alpsin person or invaded Ita ly wi th 30,000 good infantry and the
• Spanish com mand ers: Hernan Cortes, Pedro de supp ort ofa fleet with 6,000 or 7,000 troops on board to stop no w. I w ant nothing less
Alvarado, Crist6b ai de Olid, Gonzalo de
than the entire state of Milan and the kingdom of Naples.
Sandova l; Indi an allies commande rs: Ixt lilxoch it l
(Tetzcocans ). Chichim ecateuetli (TIaxcaltecs) FRANCIS I, S TATEPAPERS OFHENRY VIII, VOl. 6, 359, N OVEM BER 1524
•c. 1,000 Spaniard s d ied (100 in t he final
assault);
casualty n um bers of India n allies unknown
Aztecs
hen FrancisI succeeded to the throne of enced commanders, such as Louis de la

I
before his fli ght.
The Span iards
were besieged in
th e Palace o f
Axayaca tl, and th e
opening up Mexico to Spanish colonization and
exploitation. That victory encouraged the con-
quest of Peru ten years later and also opene d Asia
• Likely to be c. 100,000 men; armed w it h
obsidian-bladed oak broad -swords, thrusting
spears. slings , bo ws and arrows; protected by
shields and quilted colton armour
W France in 151 S, the Great Italian Wars
had already raged for over a quarter of a
cent ury. Francis himselffaced a partic ularly acute
Tremouille and Jacques de Chabannes, Seigneur
de la Palice, to strike directly at t he main Imperial-
ist force at Lodi. However, his young friend
to trade, which ran from Manila to Seville through st rategic crisis: in 1516 his Habsburg rival, Charles Guillaume Gouffier, Seigneur de Bonnivet, per-
attackin g Azrec • Commanded by Moteuczoma Xocoyotl until 30

I wa rriors are
in dica ted by the
Mexico City. And the silver and gold of the New
World overwhelmed Spain, fuelling development
June 1S20, Cuitlahua until early December 1520,
then the Aztec king Cuauhtemoc until his
V, became both King of Spain and Holy Roman
Emperor. France could now expect invasion from
suaded him to besiege Pavia instead, w hich was
closer to Milan . The commander of the Lodi garri-
glyph ofa stone surrender on 13 August 1521

II andcacrus
denoting
throughout much of Europe, stimulating colonial
expansion by other powers and irreversibly • Unknown casualties
Germany, the Netherlands or Spain. Charles's
English ally, Henry VIII, threatened France from
son, Fernando Francesco d'Avolos, Marqu is de
Pesca ra, exclaim ed in relief, 'We were defeated ;
I Tenoch titlan. changing the world. across the Channel. In 1523 -24 a rebellion at soon we wil l be victorious.'
home, led by Charles Duke of Bourbon , had to be
quashed. Yet th e audacious Francis resolved to
I! carry the war to the Habsburgs, by leadin g French
armies back into the Italian pen insula.

The capture of Milan

Francis's main objective was t he wealthy Duchy
of Milan, against which his fort unes ebbed and
flowed. At Marignano, 1515, he was victorious; at
Bicocca, 1522, he was defeated. Possession of
Milan eluded him. In Octob er 1524, Francis FrancisI ofFrance
launched anot her invasion across th e Alp s, and as depicted by
with around 33,000 men, his army was twic e th e Jean Cloue t. This
port rait was
size of Imperialist forces defend ing Milan. The pro ba bly pa inted
French army was of a high quality too ; Swiss, in the same year
Landsknecht (formidable German infantry) and thor catastrop he
overtook th e
Italian mercenary infantry supported by French
king or Pavia .
heavy cavalry and an impres sive artillery train . Chivalro us an d
Charles de Lannoy, th e Imperialist commander, brave, bu r a poor
general, he was
wi thdrew his forces into Lod i and Pavia, and
lucky to escape the
abandone d Milan to th e French on 26 Octob er. battlefield with h is
Francis was urged by his older, more experi- life.

102 103
 Z4 SIX TE ENTH C ENTU RY

The siege of Pav ia enter into a secret treaty supporting Francis's

Pavia was a difficult propos it ion for a besieger; cause. Even as Imperialist forces gathered under
to the south , the River Ticino (called Ticinus in Lannoy and Charles Duke of Bourbon, the French
Roman times, see Cannae p. 33) formed a strong king remained confident and insisted that Pavia
natural defence, while all other approaches were would soon fall.
defended by t he city walls. The 6,000-strong
German and Spanish garrison was commanded The Imper ialist gamble
by the capable and determined Antonio de Leya. By February 1S25, the Imperialists knew they
Premature assaults on the city on 21 November were running out of time . Their troops ' pay was in
were repulsed, and an ingenious attempt to arrears and a mutiny threatened. Yet an attack on
divert the Ticino was thwarted by heavy rainfal l. the strong French positions around Paviaseemed
Thefighting at
The siege settled down into a wearying contest of a desperate gamble. The French army still num-
Pavia ebbed and
flowed th rough th e artillery duels, sorties and skirmishes. bered around 30,000, marginally more than the
wooded expanses Francis detached 6,000 of his own troops , Imper ialists had assembled. Their gun batteries
ofMirobello Park under John Stuart Duke of Albany , to threaten the
and around the
were well -entrenched and much of the army was
kingdom of Naples.This expedition failed to draw
I!
I
siege-lines
surroundingthe
city.
significant Imperialist troops away from Lom-
bardy, but it did persuade Pope Clement VII to
stationed in a walled park to the north of the city,
containing the fortified hunting lodge , Castello
Mirabello.
I Attempts to draw the French from these posi-
tions by feinting at Milan had failed. Little option
I Imperialist landsknechts
Spanish/ltalian cavalry
Spanish/Ita lian infantryand arquebusiers
~
0
0
,
was left but to try to assault the French posit ions
around Pavia. This would combine a surprise

II French gendarmes
Frenchlandsknechts
Swissinfantry
•
~

[;;jjjjI
attack on the park with a strong sortie from within
the besieged town itself. During the night of 23
II French counter-attacks - - . . February, sappers breached the wall of the park in
Frenchwithdrawals ,..

I~
Imperialist trenches ~ three places. The work was done quietly and
Frenchtrenches ...............
slowly. It was already dawn on 24 February when
Imperialist troops began to move into the park.
lmpedalist night
maf'ch& deployment
The b attle in the pa rk Fresh Imper ialist troops continued to march Rupert Hell er, The
(18.000 men led by
-
Pescaral
COMBATANTS The first objective of the attack was Castello through the breaches into the park, marshalled Battle of Pavia,
1525 (c. 1529). The
Mirabello, which was seized by 3,000 arque - by Bourbon . They were screened by a force of impo rtance of
Imperialists busters led by Avolos d'Aquino, Marquis de Vasto. about 1,600 Spanish cavalry under Lannoy. To his gunpowder
• 28,000 m en Yet Imperialist troops now came under a heavy dismay, he could now seeover 3,000 French men- weapo ns, bot n
cannon an d hand-
to Lodi • Main commanders: Charles de lannoy; Fernando fire from French cannon that seemed to have at-arms forming up before him. Franciswas at the
~ held arquebuses,

?~-
Francesco d 'Avol o s, Marquis d e Pescara; Charles
~ Duke of 8ourbon ; Avolo s d 'Aquino, Marquis de
been expecting the attack. Gaps were torn head of his heavy cavalry and was determined to at Paviais weI/-
th rough the ranks of some Imperialist units as drive the Imperialists from the field personally. illustrated in this
~~ Imperialist Vasto; Georg vo n Fru nsberg
spi rited depicti on
~~ camp t hey attempted to form up. The Imperialist Land- The Spanish horse wheeled to meet t he threat
• 1,500 casualt ies of rhe fighting.
sknechts, under their famous captain Georg von but the thundering French charge easily smashed
French Frunsberg, fared better, pushing deeper into the through them , scattering the survivors. A stream
• 30,000 men
park where they soon encountered a large body of enemy horsemen fled the field, carrying
of Swiss pikemen . The French defence seemed Lannoy with them . The French king exclaimed in
• Main commanders: King Francis I; Loui s de la
Tremouille; Jacques de Chabannes, Seigneur de uncoordinated, with bodies of troops arriving triumph, 'Now is the time to call me Duke of
la Palice; Guillaume Gouffier, Seigneur de piecemeal into the battle. But the Swisswere well Milan!' Yet it swiftly became apparent that he had
Bonn ivet; Charles de Valois, Due d 'Alencon known for their courage and discipline and held ridden to catastrophe, not victory.
• 10,000 casualties the Landsknechts for over an hour before finally The massof French horsemen had masked the
withdrawing from t he field in some disorder. cannon that had been do ing so much damage to

104
105
 Z4 S I X TE E NT H C E N T U R Y
German
Landsknecht
mercenariesare
lackedin cambat
in this detail fram a
contemporary
tapestry. At Pavia,
Imperialist
Landsknechts
clashedwith the
Landsknechtsaf
the 'Black Band;
wha fought for
France, ina bitter
melee with no
quorterqiven.
the Imperialist infantry, and the gunners had
ceased firing. The Marquis de Pescara seized this
respite to reorganize his infantry. Unsupported
and isolated, the king and his men-at-arms were
soon hedged in by an impenetrable wall of pikes.
Unable to manoeuvre, they were an easy target
for the thousands of arquebusiers lurking out of
reach in the copses and broken ground of the
park. As they fell, halberdiers and swordsmen
moved in to fin ish them off. Some French infant ry
hurr ied to the ir king 's aid but simply met the ir
own destruction. German Landsknechts in
French service, th e renow ned 'Black Band',
clashed wi th th eir Imperialist counterparts. It was
a particularly bitter encounter and Frunsberg 's
men gave no quarter asthey hacked their compa-
triots down.
Fouqht in a thic k mist, in bro ken, wooded
terrain, the fight ing at Pavia was ofte n a bewilder-
ing series of scattered skirmi shes and sudden
encou nters between bod ies of enemy tro ops.
106
-
The French king himself was caught in one of
these desperate melees. Unhorsed, he fought
valiantly in his own defence as the nobility of
France was cut down around him . Lannoy would
claim to have saved Francis's life, intervening to
protect him from an ingloriousdeath at the hands
of an arquebus ier. Mor e likely, an ugly scuffl e took
place around Francis, as a number of men com-
peted to make him a prisoner and claim a king 's
ransom. To be captured was a miserable fate for a
king, but Franciswas more fortunate than most of
his friends and counsellors. The dead included
both Bonnivet and Tremouille. Richard de la Pole,
Duke of Suffolk, the exiled Yorkist claimant to the
English throne, fought and died amongst the
men of the BlackBand.
The sortie by the garrison of Pavia proved as
successfulas the Imperialist advance through the
park. Swiss troops had been driven from their
posit ions around the Five Abbeys district and the
earthworks at Torre del Gallo. The last-formed
bod y of French troops on the field was the 5,000-
strong command of Charles de Valois, Duc
d'Alenc;on, which had been based outside the
park, west of Pavia. Alerted to the disaster by the
routers fleeing past his camp, Alenc;on accepted
that the battle was lost and retreated towards
Milan . By mid-morning the fighting was over.
The Treaty of Madrid
Remarkably, the victors failed to capitalize on
France's misfortune. In January 1526, th e capti ve
Francis signed the Treaty of Madrid by w hich he
renounced his claims to Italy and surrendered the
French province of Burgundy to the Holy Roman
Emperor. On his release from captivity, however,
he declared the treat y 'contrary to all reason and
equity'. Skilful diplomacy forged a new alliance
with the Papacy, Venice, Florence and Francesco
Sforza of Milan. Whilst, in t ime, th is league wo uld
itself prov e fragile, it allowed Francis to pursue
once mor e his ambitions in Italy. The mighty
struggle between th e Valois and Habsburg
dynasties woul d drag on until the Treaty of
Cateau-Carnbresls, of 1559. And yet there was to
be no peace, for Europe was by then entering the
dark era of the Warsof Religion.
Panipat 1526
Date: 21 April 1526 Location: Haryana district, northern India
By the grace and mercy of Alm igh ty God thisdifficult affair was m ade easy to me,
and that mighty army, in the space of halfa day, was laid in the dust.
Z AHIR- UD- DIN M UHAMMAD BABUR, A PRIL 1526
imur the Lame (1336- 1405), ruler of migrated to the plains under the Lodi dynasty. He
T Samarkand, had carved out a rich Asian
empire, from his base in Islamic Transoxi-
ana (see Ankara p. 78). Yet his successors had
was able to establish a brief alliance wit h the
unrel iable Daulat Khan Lodi, viceroy of the
Punjab, and his uncle Alam Khan, who together
Babur's
dispositionsat
Panipar allowed
Iorapotent
mixture of stalwart
struggled to retain his legacy. By 1494, it was left sought to overthrow the sultan of Delhi, Ibrahim
defencebased an
to an 11-year-old boy, Zahir-ud -din Muhammad Lodi. Yet Daulat Khan's intriguing, which eventu - field fortifica tions
Babur, to attempt to recover the fortunes of the ally destroyed the alliance, and Usbek pressureon and gunpowder
Babur's homeland, delayed a serious invasion weapons, and a
dynasty. Babur's language and paternal ancestry
devastating
were Turkish. His mother wasa Mongol, a descen- attempt. Only in 1525 was Babur able to resume mobile offence:
dant of Ching his (Genghis) Khan. The empire he his march into India. An enemy army und er thetulughma
would found wou ld derive its name from this line Daulat Khan melted away before his advance. manoeuvre of the
horsearchers.
of descent: Mughal. Babur was a lover of literature Sultan Ibrahim himself now took the field. Unableto fight its
and an accomplished poet , but his early life was way farward and
do minated by a harsh military education. Panipat: triumph of horse and gun envelopedby the
Sultan Ibrahim 's army reputedly numbered
swarmsofenemy
Three times Babur won, and then lost, Timur 's cavalry,lbrahim's
100,000 men, ten times the size of Babur's inva-
capital of Samarkand, before being driven back to armywassoon
sion force, and was accompan ied by 1,000 war 'laid in thedusr'.
Ka bul by the Usbeks in 1511. In 1514, his Persian
allies were defeat ed at Chaldiran by the Ottoman
sultan, Selim the Grim. Accept ing that he could reserve cava lry Mughals
left flank
-
not recover the fo rmer Timurid doma ins, Babur right flank advance guard cavalry
cavalry cavalry
centre left
t urned his attention to India. His small army
infantry
already displayed the best qualities of its Turkish
and Mongol heritag e, being predom inantly a
commanded
well-discipli ned and mobi le fo rce of skilled hor se by Prince
archers. Babu r also learned from the Ottoman use
Hum~ _
of gu npowder weapons. He armed much of his
infan try with matchlock handguns and estab-
Afg hans - _
lished an impressive artill ery train.
The invasion of India N
L_
Babur began his campaign in 1519 by subduing
th e hill tr ibes who blocked his invasion route into
th e Punjab. Thereafte r, he launched a num ber of
t
o lkm
incursions into northern India itself. Babur's I
o
adversaries were principally Afghans, wh o had
107
 Z5 5 I X TE E N T H C E NTU RY PANIP AT 1526 Z5

eleph ants. Yet Babur was undaunted; he thought
the sultan a you ng and inexperienced com-
mand er 'who marched without order, reti red or
halted without plan and engaged in battle
without foresigh t'. He intended to USE.- a close
combination of firepower (his enemy possessed
support the th reatened portion of the line, but
COMBATANTS
Ibrahim' s men were quickly stalled at the field for -
tific ations. The rear ranks pressed forward, Mughals
without comprehendi ng that they drove their • 10,000 men
comrades onto the abatis or into the ditches . • Main commanders: Zahir -ud-din Muhammad
From behind Babur's defences, bow, matchlock Babur; Prince Hum ayan

no gunpowder weapons ) and the mobility of his and cannon po ured a mercilessfire into th e di sor- • Few casualties
cavalry to negate Ibrahim's numerical advantage . dered masses. Cavalry moved t hrough th e gaps
Afghans Mug hal armo ured
On 12 April 1526, Babur took up a position with that had been left for them and drove off the ele-
elephan t , c. 1600.
his right flank anchor ed on Panipat, north of phants with flights of arrows. The men of Babur's • 100,000 men Babur'smen
Delhi. In the centr e of his battle line, he stat ioned left wing now advanced. For a brief time t hey • Main commanders: Sultan Ibrahim Lodi ; faught with a
Vikramajit Singh of Gwalior potent mix of
his cannon and matchlock men. Imitat ing the were held, until fresh troops filtered forward from
Mangoland
Ottomans at Chaldiran, he fortified the ir posit ion the centre in support of the counter-a tt ack. The • 1S,OOO casualties
Turkish rocrics.
wi t h 700 wagons chained together and a line of Afghans made a number of desperate charges, As the M ughals
breastworks. Sim ilarly, he strengthened the posi- but each was repulsed in turn and the survivors established
themselvesin India
tion of both his left and right flanks w it h driven back onto th eir own ranks. they integrated
defensive ditches , and an abatis (wall of felled Whilst the battle raged in the cent re, th e indigenousforces
trees). Gaps a bowshot wide were left between tulughma was skilfully executed . The flanking into theirarmies
roo, including
fortified positions , in order to allow the cavalry to detachments were soo n behind the Afghan s,
th e formidable,
advance when opportunity arose. Remarkably, cutt ing off any avenue of ret reat and firing arrow if natwholly
Babur was able to work on his field fortifications after arrow into th e packed ranks of trapped men. dependable, war
elepha nt.
for eight days in th e presence of Ibrahim 's army, As Babur recalled, his enemies 'could neither
whic h was singularly inactive after it s arrival at move forward against us nor force a way for
Panipat. During th is time, Babur's hor semen rode flight'. Ibrahim himself was cut down,
up to the enem y lines and fired arrows into his fighting bravely to the last alongside
camp with out pro voking a response. th ousands of his men. By midday the
On 20 April, Babur att empted a night attack on battle was over.
Ibrahim which miscarried badly in the darkness.
This little victory emboldened Ibrahim and his Birth of an empire
men and, during th e cour se of the fo llowing day In the immedi ate after mat h of victory,
they finally deployed for battle. Babur had Delhi and Agra were seized. From this
divided his army into six main div isions: right and base, Babur consolidated his hol d
left centre , right and left wings , advanced guard on northern India, defeat ing th e
and a reserve. He had also, true to Mongol trad i- Rajpu ts at Kanua in 1527, and
tion s, detached two flan king part ies of light storming the fortress at Chandiri
cavalry, one on the extreme left, the ot her, com- in 1528. On his death in 1530,
manded by his son Prince Humayan on the Babur ruled an emp ire tha t
extr eme right. These bodies of horsemen would incl uded Kabul, the Punjab
execute the tulughma , a wid e enveloping and Delhi. It stretched
manoeuvre that would attack the enemy from eastward as far as
the rear once they were fixed in battle. Bihar and south to
On 21 April the po ndero us Afghan army finally Gwalior. He bequeathed to his
moved to attack, with a concentrated assa ult on successors, too, an army that proved to
Babur's right wing . Babur's reserve moved to be a fo rmidabl e inst rument of conqu est.
Thus were th e foundations of th e Mughal
Akbar the Great. Babur 's grands an, besieges Ranthambhar in
1568. It was Akbar wha frnally con salidated Mughal ru le in emp ire, that would come to do minate the
India. but the process began wi th victory at Panipat. Indian sub-contin ent, laid at Pa nipat .

108 109
 MOHAcs 26

Mohacs 8-28 Augu, t

• Tol na
'-~I"!"0'
~ ~

Szekszard . "'" Hungarian main army advance ~

Kingtouj, II & Tomori
Hungarian main army
_
l"" 1
° artillery~
Turkish infant ry
Turkish cavalry

~/ ?/
- "'-'I pIL '" advanceof Tomori......- - light cavalry ""
Date: 29 August 1526 Location: southern Hungary "'" >Ir< reco nnaissance un it s .. ..-- ja nissaries
",.--fJ!-'
' SUleyman & Ibrahim 1": ~ Hungarian infantry
Hungarian cavalry
_
l;jI
The division of th eJan issaries attacked the contemp ti ble infidels (gavurs) Ujfalu)oi Bata.. surrender of Ujlak I,)
* ~dvance of th eTurkish army. -
light cavalry ..:..
three ar fou r tim es wi th m usket fire and tried to force them ba ck. f"': SUleyman l""
It Mohiics Turkish flotilla -+-
FROMTHE CAMPAIGNDIARYOF SULTANSOLEYMAN, 1S26 0 '-. ~_ em bankmen t - King Louis II l""
J~ ~ "'" swamp
(
1
\....0:
[
'G~"'=tfu-
*---'" swampy when
high water
* Tomori ~

Bara~
· r 1~
~ ~ ~
"'" \ \ level
N

B
y the early 16th centu ry the Ottoman
emp ire had emerged as a signifi cant mili-
tary power tha t controlled the Balkans,
important castles of t heir south ern bo rder
defence system.
The causesof the 1526 Ottoman campa ign are
* •
"':'-ESZ~k:l~~ ~ I
~ ""J- * \
>Ii

. Belly
_,

* ~
_ ,

I t N

Eszek-Moh~cs road --_.JJ o

Asia Mino r, th e Black Sea litt oral, the eastern
Med iterranean and most of the Midd le East.
Compared to this vast empire of SOleyman I
(1520- 66),LouisII of Jagiello's(1516-26) Hungar y,
th e only regional po wer in cent ral Europe that in
the 15th centur y had been capable of halting the
Ottoman advance, was now a small and weak
country. Resources of the Ott oman empire and
Hungary respectively in the early 1520s give a
clear picture of th eir differences. Territory:
1,500,000 sq km (580,000 sq miles) v 300,000 sq
km (116,000 sq miles); popu lations: 12-13 million
v 3.1 -3.5 million; Central Treasury revenues:4.5-5
million gold ducats v 0.3 million gold du cats;and
potentia l mobi lizable forces: 110,000-130,000
men v 40,000-50,000.
Recog nizing th at his father's wars against the
Safavids in eastern Anatolia could not be contin-
ued due to economic,military and religio-political
reasons, SOleyman turned against the empire's
Christian enemies in Europe, where his major
opponents were the Habsburgs and their Hun-
garian neighbours. By occupy ing Belgrade and
Zimony (1521),Orsova (1522) and Szoreny(1524),
the Ottomans had assumed control over the
low er Danube as far as Belgrade by the mid-
1520s, w hile the Hungarians lost the mo st
Above left After hi, accession to the throne,SO/eyman the
Magnificent turned against the Ottomans'Chrisrian enemies.
Left Loui, II, who failed to mobilize the coun try~ farce, in
time, wa, thrown from hi, horseand killed whileescaping.
I
o
2km
,
1 rrii le t
hotly debated.Some historians claim that it was a l""~ (r=' - I -
Borova - \
response to King Louis's'provocat ions: the king's lit • Bacs th e much larger Ottoman army in increment sasit Far left Between B
refusal of SO/eyman's peace offe rs and th e Hun-
vu kovar • '"' ~ "" >Ir<
descended from th e steep and, given th e heavy and 2BAugu' t, the
garians' interference in the sultan'stwo Rumanian
-X
• Budap;;'!
[v1Qh'c1cl··~"
> ~~
.~
=......:.:Dcm: b'e
--..-~
Sati n
rainfall in the weeks befo re the battle, slippery
70,000-, rrong
Ottoman army
vassal principalities, especially in Wallachia,
whose 'voevode' or lord repeatedly rebelled
Belgrade rr: plateau.
Facing sout hwest, th e army lined up in tw o
made nswoy
along the western
o 20km side of the Danube,
against the Ottomans wi t h Hung arian backing. I I echelo ns. On th e righ t and left wings of the fir st
o 12 m iles finally reaching a
Others mainta in tha t all these were mere prete xt s echelon stood the Hungarian heavy cavalry, plateau, where
- that t he conq uest of Hungary had been SOley- facing the Rumelian and t he Anato lian timario t they turned to face
the Hungarian
man's main objective from the beginning of his intelligence he received, put the whole fighting cavalry of the sultan respectively. The 10,000-
troop' below.
reign and that he carried it out according to his force of the sultan's army at about 70,000 men, strong Hungarian infantry stood ten ranks deep
plan of 'gradual conqu est: Given SOleyman's seems more realistic than th e exaggerated in the midd le facing the ja nissaries. Louis II stood Above Thank, to
in t he second echelon behind the Hungarian their position, the
pragm atic and ofte n reactive policy, the empire 's fig ures of 150,000 to 300,000 men suggested by
outnumb ered
mu lti ple comm it ments and const raints, th e insuf- later historians. However, even this more modest infant ry, w hereas SO leyman , guard ed by his Hungarians
ficiently unde rstood nature of Ottoman ideo logy, esti mate suggests a con siderable Ott oman central cavalry, stoo d behind th e janissaries. , uccessfully routed
propag anda and decision- making, it iswise not to nume rical superio rity. Since t he Croatian and Ottoman cannon s were placed in front of the theRumelian
cavalry,which wa,
overstate th e importance of religio-political Transylvanian forces, numbering some 10,000 to jan issaries.
the first to arriveon
imperatives wi th regard to Ott oman imperial 15,000 men each, could not join the king in 1526, However, this battle ord er evolved only gradu - theplain.Failing to
planning. the Hunga rian army that met the Ottomans south ally. The Hungar ians initi ated the combat w hen capitalize on this
only the Rumelian army was on the plain. SO ley- eartyadvantaqe.
of Mohacs - near the intersection of mod ern
however, the
The opposing forces Hungary,Croatia and Yugoslavia - wason ly about man and his cavalry were still descending from Hungarianswere
In the 1526 campaign the Ottoman army may 25,000 to 30,000 strong . A similar Ottoman supe- the plateau and t he Anato lian troops of the right then ea,y prey for
have numbered some 60,000 provincial cavalry riority can be seen wi t h regard to firepower: flank were fur th er behind. The skirm ishes of the the Ottoman"
who,e highly
(t he Rumelian and Anatolian troop s) and stand- w hereas th e Ottomans dep loyed some 200 light cavalry fo rces were already underway w hen skittedjonlssarie:
ing forces (janissaries [the sultan's elite infantry cannons, mainly small-calib re ones, the Hungar i- th e Hungarian artillery opened fire at the fini,h ed off the
troops], cavalry and art illery ) and perhaps ans had only abou t 80 cannon s. Rumelian army about to camp on the plain.It was batt le.
anot her 40,000-50,000 irregulars and auxiliar ies. followe d by the cavalry charge of t he Hungarian
Due to the long ,four-month march,rainy weather The battl e right flank th at broke the resistance of th e
Rumelian cavalry. But instead of chasing the
and sieges,a good portion of th is army must have The battlefield was borde red by th e marshes of
been lost by the tim e it reached Hungary.Thus t he the Danub e from t he east and by a plateau 25 to fleeing enemy, th e Hung arians set out to loot. By
estim ate of Archbishop Pal Tornori, commander- 30 m (82-98 ft ) high from th e west and south.The then , the janissarieshad arrived at th e bottom of
in-chief of the Hungarian army, who, based on Hung arian com mand planned to charge against the terrace and inflicted major destruct ion on the

110
111
 26

'8arrle af Mahdcs'
from the
Suley rnannarne
of Arifi tronscribed
in 1558. Ta the
Lepanto
right, the sultan
is backed by a Date: 7 Octobe r 1571 Location: near Naupactus, Gulf of Patras, Greece
phalanx oitalt-
hatte djanissaries. .. .In five months they [the Ottomans] have built 150 vesselswi th all the artillery and
This was the
equip ment needed ....Already their general isprepared to set out to sea a t th e end ofthis
human barrier
against which the month wi th two hundred ga lleys and on e hu ndred ga ll iots, ofco rsairs and others. .. / should
Hungarian cavalry never ha ve believed th e gr eatn essof th is monarchy, had I not seen it with my own eyes.
dashed itself to
DENOAILLES, FRENCHAMBASSAOORIN CONSTANTINOPLE, TO CHARLESIXON 8 MAY1572,
pieces.The
ja nissaries' SEVEN MONTHSAFTERTHEBAmE OFLEPANTO
firepower proved
decisive.

n 7 Octobe r 1571, the allied fleet of the richness in land and taxes as well as for its close-

O Holy League destroyed th e Ottoman

Hungarians with their volley s.Alt hough the Hun-
garian infa ntry and the left wi ng fought bravely,
th ey were unab le to break the obstacles erected
in front of the cannon s and janissaries and were
slaughtered by jan issary volley s. Contrary to
general belief, it was not the Ottoman cannons
(which shot beyond th e Hungarians) but the
insurmountable wall and firepo wer of the ja nis-
saries th at figu red decisively in t he Ottoman
victory.
The consequences and historical significance
ofthe battle
Such a grave defeat had not been inflicted on the
Hungarian armed forces since the battle of Muhi
in 1241 against the Mongols. The king, most of
the magnates and prelate s, about 500 noblemen,
4,000 cavalry and 10,000 infantrymen perished.
Hungary also lost its centu ry-and -a-half-old
struggle to contain the Ottoman advance into
central Europe, More importantly for Europe,
the batt le led to the direct confrontation of the
Habsburg and Ottoman empires, for a group of
Hungarian aristocrats elected Archduke Ferdi-
nand of Habsburg, younger brother of Charles V,
as their king (1526- 64). However, Ferd inand was
able to control only the northwestern parts of
Hungar y, for the midd le and eastern part s were
under t he rule of Janos Szapolyai, also elected
king of Hungary (1526- 40), whose pro-Ott oman
polic y tempora rily postponed t he clash.
Szapol yai's death in 1540 and Ferdinand 's unsuc-
cessful siege of Buda in th e spring and summer of
1541tr igg ered the sultan'scampaign w hich led to
the Ottoman occupation of cent ral Hungary, and
turned the country into t he maj or cont inental
battleground between t he Habsburgs and
Ott omans.
COMBATANTS
Ottomans
• 60 ,000 -70,000 men
• Comrnander-in-Chisf Sultan SUleyman the
Magn ificent (1520-66)
• Unknown casualt ies
Hungarians
• 25,000-30,000 men
• (ommander-in-(hief Archbishop PalTomori;
King louis II of Jagiello (1516-26)
• 14,000-15,000 casualties
navy. Contemporaries celebrated the
victory of united Christendom over the 'infidel'
Turks.Historians have claimed that the battle sig-
nalled th e 'decline of the Ottoman empire' and
the 'rise of the West'. But did Lepanto yield major
strategic advantage for th e West ?
Otto man challenge: the conquest of Cyprus
1570- 7 1
By the second half of the 16th century the
Ottoman emp ire had become a major power that
controlled the Balkans, the Middle East, the Black
Sea and the eastern Mediterranean. For Grand
Vizier Sokullu Mehm ed Pasha (1556-781. whose
pol it ical grand designs included th e unsuccessful
Don-Volga and Suez Canal projects (1569) to
encircle Istanbul 's Safavid rivals and to counter
Portuguese imperialism in the RedSea and Indian
Ocean respectively, the conquest of Cyprus
seemed a long -overdu e task. This Venetian-h eld
island was a nuisance in the Ottoman-controlled
eastern Mediterranean, for it offe red a safe haven
for Christian corsairs who endangered Ottoman
lines of maritime communication between the
capital and Egypt, the richest province of th e
empire, and preyed on Muslim merchant and
pilgrim ships. Failure to elim inate Christian pr iva-
teering would cause severe econom ic lossesand
weaken Istanbul 's legiti macy in the Islamic world.
Cyprus was a tempting target too for its known
ness to Ottoman logistical bases, an important
consideration given th e war galley fleets' limited
radius of operation .
During the 1570 campaign t he Ottoman s
mobilized some 208 to 360 vessels and at least
60,000 land forces. Despite its up-to -date, 't race
italienne' fortificati ons, Nicosia, the capital of
Cyprus, fell on 9 Sept emb er after a 46-day siege.
Shorter Ottoman lines of suppl y and reinforce-
ment that enabled the besiegers to outnumber
the defenders at a ratio of 6 to 1, Ottoman skills in
siege warfare, the dismal performance of th e
Venetian relief fleet plagued by typhus and deser-
tions, the incompetence of Nicosia's Venetian
commander, as well as local support the Cyprio ts
afforded th e Ottomans against their detested
Venetian overlords, all played a role in th e
conquest. The ferocity of the thr ee-day sack of
Nicosia persuaded the other Venetian forts to
surrender, except for the eastern port garrison of
Famagusta, w hich was finally captured on 1
August 1571 after w ithstanding seven general
assaults and 74 days of heavy bombardment.
Although the Ottomans agreed to generous
terms of capitulation, the massacreof Muslim pil -
grims, kept in the garrison, provoked Ottoman
retaliation. On 5 August, the Venetian officer s
were beheaded and governor Bragadino, who
had ordered the kill ing of the Muslims, was
skinned alive, his hide stuffed with straw and
paraded along the Anatolian coast and Istanbu l.

112
113
 27 SIXTE ENTH CENTURY
L E PA N TO 27

Right Naval Battle

of Lepanto by
Andrea Micheli
Vicentino '
(7539-1614).
Displayed in tbe
Doge 's Palace,
Venice, this picture
celebrates the
grear Ctuistian
Belo w Alrhaugh
victory, in which
rhe 24'year-old
Venicehada
Caproin Genera l of
leading rale.
tb e Haly League
fleer, Don Juan de
Below Ad mi ra l Ali
Austria, was an
Pasha, a land
inexperienced
commander with
commander, he
noexperience in
praved an able
naval warfare, was
diplomar and
largely responsible
managed ra keep
for tne Orroman
rag erher rhe fragile
defea r.
alliance.

Western response: the Holy League and the
battle of Lepanto
On 25 May 1571 the Holy League of the Papacy,
Spain, Venice, Genoa, Tuscany, Savoy, Urbino,
Parma and the Knights of Malta was proclaimed
in Rome.The League's purpose was to fight a per-
petual war against the Ottomans and the Muslims
of North Africa, and to recapture Cyprus and the
Holy Land. The signatories agreed to provide 200
galleys, 100 ships, 50,000 infantry and 4,500 light
cavalry along wi th the necessary weapon ry and
suppl y.
The fleet of 1571, led by Don Juan de Austria,
23-year-old half-brother of Philip II, assemb led in
Messina in early September and reached Corfu on
26 September. Here the alliance was informed
that the Ottoman navy, which had raided Crete
and Venice's Adriatic possession s during the
summer, had returned to Lepant o (a harbou r
town on the north side of t he Gulf of Patras). On 4
October the Christians learned of th e fall of Fama-
gusta and Bragadino's torture. The news sparked
desire for vengean ce, giving the fragile alliance
unusual unity of pu rpose.
Meanw hile, Ottoman scouts informed th eir
commanders about the arrival of a Christia n fleet
off Cephalonia. At a war council held on 4 October,
Pertev Pasha, commander-in-chief (serdar) of the
1571 campaign and Uluc Ali Pasha, governor
(beylerbeyl) of Algiers, were of the op inion that
th e Ott omans should take a defensive posit ion in
th e Gulf of Lepanto , cit ing the unde rmanned
natu re and exhaustion of the navy. However, it
was MOezzinzade Ali Pasha, admiral (kapudan) of
the navy, a land commander w it h no experience
in naval warfare, who prevailed. He ordered his
fleet to attack t he Christians.
The opposing navies clashed on 7 October in
the Gulf of Patras.The numbers of vessels given in
the factfil e are somewhat misleading, for they do
not contain the galiots in the Christian fleet and
exclude all iustas, smaller t ransport ships, from

114
115
 27 SIXTEENTH CENTURV
L E P A N TO 27

both navies. Estimated fig ures of soldiers and
weaponry indicate that the Holy League sligh tl y
outnu mb ered th e Ottomans in terms of combat-
ants and auxiliaries - 62,100 to 57,700 - and had a
substant ial advant age regarding firepower -
1,334 to 741 guns . Ottoman accounts also under-
This reconstruction line that their fleet was undermanned due to
ofLe panto shows losses during the 1571 campaign and to the fact
the crucial ph ases that many of th e soldiers aboard the coastal beys'
of th e battle and
ships had already left for the wi nte r.
the deploym ent of
galfeysa n eith er The battle started before 11 am w it h the
side. engagement of the insho re squadrons . Ottoman
Holy Leagueforces
GREECE
Ottoman forces
Oxia
commander Mehmed Suluk almost outflanked
Agost ino Barbarigo's gall eys manoeuvri ng
between th e shoals and the Venetians. The Vene-
tians lost several galleys and Barbarigo was
mortall y wounded. However, un engaged gall eys
of th e Christian left wi ng and vessels from the
rearguard sent in by another Holy League com -
mand er, Don Alvaro de Bazan, turned the defeat
into victo ry, destroying the ent ire Ottoman right
wing in t wo hours.
Meanwhile, a fierce melee dev elop ed betw een
the Christian and Ottoman centre, following a
head-on clash of the two flagsh ips, Don Juan's
Real and Ali Pasha's Sultana. Ali Pasha planned
to counter Christi an firepower superior ity by
using his reinforcements from the reserve until
Mehmed Suiuk and Uluc Ali outflanked the
Christian wings .
Despite losses from the cannons of the galle-
asses (warships with auxiliary oars), Ottoman
galleys penetrated the Christian ranks and Ali

CapeOxia
CD.- Pasha's men even boarded the Real. Soon,
however, the Ottoman cent re was overwhelmed.

t~
Barbar igo When Ali Pasha was killed and his Sultana taken
(S2galleys) by th e Real in to w, th e Ottoman centre collapsed.
All the Ottoman ships here were sunk or taken,

\,
galleasses AliPasha

~~
\1 .-
,,,,,",,,
\\
rearguard
(Sgalleys)
COMBATANTS

The Holy League

• (Venice, Habsburg Spain. the Papacy, Malta,
Genoa. Savoy): 62,100 combatants; 2.300 rowers;
Gulf of 202-21 9 galleys ; 6 galleasses; 1.334 guns
Parras
• Commander-ln-Chief Don Juan de Austria;
Agostino Barbarigo; Gian Andrea Doria ; Don
Alvaro de Bazan
N • 33 galleys lost/disabled; 23,000 dead /wounded
and almost the ent ire population of their crews
mercilessly massacred.
The clash between the seaward squadrons
started later, for Uluc Ali and Gian Andrea Doria,
the most skilled sea capta ins on eit her side, both
tried to out manoeuvre th e other. While th e bulk
Sign ificance
When in 1572 an entirely rebuilt Ottoman navy
emerged from Istanbul under the new kapudan ,
Uluc Ali, it seemed as if Lepanto had altered the
balance of power little. It is true th at Cypru s was
never regained and that the Holy League col-
Battl e of Lepanto
by Hendr ick Vroo m
the Younger
(c. 159 1- 166 1).
The ba ttle. w hich
halted further
Ottoman
expansion in the
of his galley s engaged Doria 's right and cent re, lapsed asVenice concluded a tr eaty with Istanbu l Mediterranean.
Uluc Ali managed to infl ict serious damage upon in 1573, and as Spanish resourceswere redirected also marked the
apogee of galley
some 15 of Dor ia'sgalley s that had broken forma - to meet new challenges in the Netherlands. It is
warfare.
tion at the left flank. also true t hat in 1574 the Ottomans retoo k Tunis,

0 4km
t Ottomans
I I
0 2 m iles
G) Sulukalmost defeatsChristian left before Bazan
comesto the rescue, destroyingthe Ottomans
® Meanwhile. the opposingflagships clash, ending
in the collapse of AliPasha'scentre
® Despitean initial success. the Ottomansareoverwhelmed
by Doria. who ishelped by Bazan; UlucAli flees
• 57,700 combatants; 19,OOO rowers; 205 galleys ;
35-68 galiats; 741 guns
• Commander-in -Chief Muezzinzade Ali Pasha;
Salih Pashazade; Mehmed Bey; SuluklSirocco
Mehmed; Uluc Ali Pasha
• 25.000 dead ; over 3,486 captured; 84 galleys &
galiots destroyed; 127 captured
Uluc Ali proceeded to attac k the Christian
cent re's right flank in order to help the over-
w helmed Ottoman centre . It was too late. Ali
Pasha was already dead and Bazan sent his
remaining reserve against Uluc Ali. Rea lizing that
he could not save the day, Uluc Ali escaped into
the open sea with some 30 galleys. The Christian
victory was complete. The Holy League fleet
destroyed almost the ent ire Ottoman navy with
its crew and ordnance.
capturing also the Spanish garr ison of La Golena .
But Lepanto did save Venice and it s remaining
Mediterranean possessions (most notably Crete)
and the western Mediterranean from further
Ottoman conquests. While the galleys were
rebuilt by 1572, it took decades for Istanbul to
replace the crews, especially the skilled Muslim
marines, sailor-arquebusiers and naval archers.
And Uluc Ali was too good a seaman to challenge
the Christians with his green navy.

116
117

The Armada
Date: 31 July-8 August 1588 Location: English Channel
I don't know who had the idea that weshouldjoin forces
{with the ArmyofFlanders Jin a place with such powerful currents, with a
shoresa open and liable to cross-winds, and with somany sandbanks....
DONFRANCISCODEBOBADILLA, COMMANDER OF THE ARMADA'SARMYFORCES,
TO DoNJUANDEIDIAQUEZ, PHILIPII'sSECRETARY, 20 AUGUST1588
n 1585, the successes of Philip II of Spain's
I Army of Flanders caused Queen Elizabeth to
send English forces to help the Dutch. A
Spanish victory over the Dutch rebels might
endanger her regime . Indeed the aim of Philip 's
lS88 campaign was to overthrow England, the
main threat to his power. If England were
defeated , the Dutch revolt would collapse and
raids against Spanish and Portuguese colon ies
and trade would end. Philip believed that most
Englishmen and Dutchmen were still Catholics at
heart and willing to accept new regimes. Success
here might also lead to a rapid victory for the
Catholic and pro -Spanish side in the French Civil
War. Philip hoped to win these three wars with
one major offensive and establish a firm Spanish
hegemony over western Europe.
Preparations
During 1586 two plans to invade England
King Philip II evolved . The Duke of Parma, commander of
(1527- 98) was Philip's army in the Netherlands , suggested that
themast powerful
rulerin
30,000 of his men should be sent in barges across
Christendam the English Channel in a surprise assau lt. The
and the first wha Marquis of Santa Cruz, commander of Philip 's
controlled
Atlantic fleet , planned to send 5S,000 soldier s
territoriesaround
theglobe. The from Spain on a drastically enlarged fleet. By Sep-
Armada operation tember 1587 Philip had merged this into one
showed that there
plan, to be executed with available resources:the
werelimitseven to
hispower. Atlantic fleet was to sail to the Channel with part
of the invasion army to protect the transportation
of Parma's army to the Thames estuary.
The deployment of a large force from southern
118
to northern Europe was a huge admin istrat ive
undertaking and the departure of th e fleet was
repeatedly delayed . In February 1588 Santa Cruz
died and Philip appointed the Duke of Medina
Sidonia as his successor. The duke was an experi-
enced administrator and his social position gave
him the authority to command . When the
'Armada' (Spanish fleet) left Lisbon in late May it
had 29,000 men on 24 major warships,47 armed
merchantmen, 21 transports and 3Ssmall vessels.
Contrary w inds and gales made its prog ress slow
and it spent over a month in LaCoruna for repair.
The element of surprise was lost and England
had plenty of time to mobilize. 34 royal warships
and 192 private vessels with around 16,000 men
served during 1588. However, most of the private
vessels were small and many were auxiliaries. In
termsof tonnage, possibly half of the English fleet
were purpose -built warships, including private
warships. The comparable Spanish figure was
about one th ird of th e fleet.
Combat
In mid-July the English intended to make a pre-
emptive attack on the Armada in Spanish ports,
but southerly winds kept them back. When the
Spanish sailed into the Channel on 30 July, most
of the English fleet was in Plymouth. The Armada
formed its combatants and transports into a w ide
crescent, with additional groups of ships as tacti -
cal reserve. The intention was to fight in line
abreast, and the heavy guns were probably con -
centr ated fore and aft rather than in the
broadsides. The Spanish knew that they were
inferior in gunfire, while the English knew that
they must avoid boarding as th e Armada had a
much superior infant ry. Philip had no illusio ns
that his fleet, with a high percent age of slow and
unw ieldy merchantmen, could bring the nimble
English warships to close combat, but he was
confident that it could fight off an English attack.
If t he Armada reached Parma's army and pro-
tected its crossing, it had achieved its purpos e.
The English fleet easily gained th e w indwa rd
position. As westerly winds prevailed in th e
Channel th ey took a position aft of the Spanish
fo rmation, which they attac ked from the rear. In
the first battle, off Plymouth on 31 July, th e
English fleet was divided in two parts, com -
manded by Lord Howard of Effingham and Sir
Fra ncis Drake. The ships attacked individually or
in small groups , firing their bow guns, broadsides
and stern gun s in succession, after wh ich they
hauled off to wind ward for reloading and to give
place to t he ship next astern. The rate of fire was
slow and th e effect of gunfire at long distance
was limi ted.
THE ARMADA 28
Two Spanish ships were seriously damaged
but only by accidents, and both were abandoned
to the English - a sign that Medi na Sidonia had no
intention of fightin g a decisive battle. He
reform ed th e fleet into a vanguard and a larger
rearguard, both saili ng in line abreast and he
form ed groups of fast warships, w hich could be
sent to any part of th e fo rmation. On th e morning
of 2 August , off Portland Bill, th e wind for some
hou rs gave th e Armada the weather gauge.
Medina Sidon ia tried to bring abo ut a close-range
battle but th e English avoi ded it. Long -distance
gunfire cont inued unt il late afternoo n but wi t h
litt le effect on both sides.
Next day the English fleet wasdivided into four
squadrons, apparently for better control. On 4
August, the Armada passed the Isle of Wight and
a new battle developed . The duke may have let a
few ships trail asbait to lure the English into close
combat. He may even have tried to use the Solent
as a sheltered harbour. If these were his inten-
tions, they both failed. Again, damage was
lim ited , but both sides now lacked ammun it ion
and refrained from further combat.
Queen Elizabeth
(1533- 1603) ruled
a medium-sized
power and she
normally fallowed
a cautiousforeign
policy. Long-term
investm ent s in a
navy madeher
able ro keep
control of the
EnglishChannel
evenwhen
atrockedbya
farmida ble enemy.
119
 28 SIXTE ENTH CENTURY
THE A R M AD A 28

The Armada anchor ed off Calais in the evening Parma's invasion would have had to be launched
Sailing fleets were of 7 Augu st. The English main fleet was strength-
dependent on
im mediately, befo re th e Armada's provisions ran
winds an d the
ened wi th the squadron which had been out. But w ithou t contro l of th e shallow waters,
performanceof guardi ng th e narrow straits. The fir st phase of the Parma's fleet could no t even set sail - a proble m
theirworst sailors. Spanish operation had been successful, but now wh ich ought to have been solved at planni ng
TheArmada WQ S
geography and the comp lexities of a comb ined stage. Parma and Medina Sidon ia had believed
delayed by
unfavourable operati on conspired to cause disaster. Since for too long that t he other had the soluti on, w hile
winds. and 1S74, the Dutch rebels had contr olled the deep- Philip had underestimated the Dutch w illingness
westerlywinds
wate r port s on the ir coasts. They now blockaded to fight.
ma de it difficult to
return through the the ports in Flanders, preventing Parma's vessels During the night of 7 August , the English sent
Cha nnel. In th e there from reaching open wat er. Furthermore, eight fire-ships to drift into th e Armada. The
Atlantic it suffered the sea outside the se ports was shallow and did
from heavy gales
Spanish ships cut th eir anchor cables and
and the slower
not allow the deep -draft ed Armada ships to sail escaped, but the formation lost its cohesion.
shipsranout of closeenoug h to break the blockade. During 8 August, in the batt le off Gravelin es, the
food. Wit h no deep -wat er base for the Armada, English fleet attac ked aggressively at close range

COMBATANTS

English & Dutch

• Engli sh naval for ces during 1588: 23 major

and 11 minor royal warships and 192 private
vessels, of which around 30 may be counted
as major combatants; total app roximate
displacement (calculated): 20,000 tonnes of
royal warships and 30,000 tonnes of private
Atlantic
Ocean
ships; arou nd 16,000 men, of w hom 1,500 we re
sol diers; Dutch : over 100 coastal warships
,-'
'.,
• English commanded by the Admiral of
England, Charles Lord Howard of Effingham;
Dutch commanded by Justin of Nassau
• Eng li sh: small losses in combat, but several
th ousand died from disease and insuffi cient
provisions; Dutch losses un known
FRANCE
Spanish
• Forces in late May 1588: 20 warshi ps (galleons),
47 armed merchantmen, four galleasses
(warships with auxiliary oars), four galleys,
21 transport s and 31 small vessels; total
,-
SPAIN ,,
,
approximat e displacement (calculated):
i-/'
- 50,000 tonnes; 8,000 seamen, 2,000 oarsmen
and 19,000 soldiers
and the effect of their gunnery markedly I
w ho sailed did not ret urn, mainly due to ship- In thispainting, the
artist has brought
increased. Med ina Sidonia could grad ually re- w recksand disease.The victors did not fare much
together th e two
form his fleet , but four ships were lost and several better in fact, as epidemic di sease and logi stical maineventsof 8
damaged. Early on 9 August it loo ked as if th e breakdo wn s caused th e deaths of thousands of August. In the
Armada would be st randed on th e sandbanks off seamen, despite minimal losses in acti on. background the
English fireships
Flanders, but it was saved by a shift in the wi nd.
Ofe making their
Unbeknown to th e Spanish, if Parma's army had Outcome night atta ck off
been able to passthe sandbanks, the battle-worn The Armada campaign did nothing to change th e Calais, while the
English and
but unbroken Armada mig ht have been able to poli tical and st rateg ic situation. Philip's attempt
Spanish ships in
protect itscrossing.The English fleet had spent its to win all his wars wi th one offe nsive strike failed, the foreground are
amm unitio n and cou ld not resume fighting for and th e English sti ll retained control of the figh ting off
weeks. Without a port, the Armada had no alter- Channel and the freedom to make raids on Gravelines, a battle
that lasted from
native but to retu rn to Spain. Spanish trade. The rise of England to marit ime the morning to the
With the prevailing winds and a seemin gly and naval pre-eminenc e came later and only after
superio r British fleet at sea it was j udged best to a long period of Dutch marit ime supremacy.
evening.

l- ..
<?
• Commanded by Don Alon so Perez de Guzman sail around the British Isles. The fleet was gradu - Philip diverted Parma's army to the civil war in
Mediterranean { N el Bueno , Duke of Medina Sidonia ally scattered by gales and a total of 28 ships sank France. The Dutc h gained much ter ritory and
y~
"'--,
- . . route of the ~nish Armada
Sea

o
~

300km
t • c. 9,000 soldi ers and possibly 5,000 seamen
and oarsmen kill ed, taken pri soner, lost in
ship wrec ks, mi ssing ; at least 35 ships lost, two
at sea or were w recked on the Scottish and Irish
coasts when seeking shelter to repair and get
water. The first ships arrived in Spain on 21 Sep-
time to develop their army and navy, while the
French gradually rallied round their new king ,
Henry IV, against Spanish interventi on. Spain did,
, I captured by the English, two by the Dutc h
c==J European trritories controlled by Philip II o
I
200 miles tember, but stragglers cont inued to arrive for however, remain the most powerful European
about a month. Probably around half of the men state until the mid-17th century.

120
121
Seventeenth
century
s before, key battles were waged between

A and w it hin mi litary systems. A leading

examp le of t he former was Shanhaiguan
(1644), the battle that led both to the capture
of Beijing by the Manchu, and the first conquest
of the country by non-Chinese forces since the
Mongol invasion in the 13th century: Beijing
had been sacked by the Mongols in 121S. The
Ottoman defeat outside Vienna in 16B3, in con-
trast, marked a crucial end to the attempt to exert
force on Christian Europe, and was followed by
the Austrian conquest of much of Hungary.
Within systems,there were battles that played
a major role in leading to the unification of states
and ending civil conflict, such as Sekigahara in
Japan (1600), and Naseby in England (1 64S).The
17th century also saw important batt les between
states, with Breitenfel d in 1631 and Nord llnqen
in 1634. Breitenfeld established Gustavus Adol-
phus of Sweden as the leading general of the
Thirty Years War. The defeat of the Imperial army
led many German Protestant princes to rally to
Gustavus, whereas - had he been defeated - the
Catholic Habsburg Holy Roman Emperor Ferdi-
nand II would have established a degree of
practical control in the empire that would have
been unassailable. The fluidity of war was indi-
cated three years later, when the Swedes were
defeated outside Nordlinqen, although, as at Bre-
itenfeld, size played a key role. In each case the
outnumbered army was defeated.
The net effect of these battles was to ensure
that no single power dominated Christian
Europe. The competitive military emulation that
this 'multipolar ity ' caused resulted in an increase

The Relief of Vienna, 1683. Christian furopecelebratedthe

safety ofits most prominent bulwark with considerable relief.
TheOnoman commander was pun ished with strangulatian.
 SEV EN TE ENTH CENTURY
EngraYing by in the aggregate effect iveness of Christian Euro-
Marrhaeus Merion pean powers, and also kept the ir forces
the Younger
showing the battle
combat-worthy. Victories reflected the combina-
of Nordlingen. tion of numbers, command skills and fighting
Battlesin the Thirty quality. For example , at Naseby, the well -disci-
Years Warwere
plined cavalry on the Parliamentary right under
usually won by
Oliver Cromwell defeated the Royalist cavalry
experienced and
mo tivated troop s opposite and then turn ed on th e veteran, but
whosedispositions
heavily outnumbered, Royalist infantry in th e
had been well
centre , who succumbed to an overwhelm ing
arranged.
Numerical attack.
superiority could Nothing in the European world compared to
alsobe crucial.
the scaleand drama of the overthrow that accom-
panied Ming China. Shanhaiguan was a victory
for Manchu cavalry over the static military system
and warfare of China, but the lack of unity on the
Chinese side was also important. This weakened
resistance and, in some cases, directly abetted the
Manchu advance. From 1S82 China had suffered
weak emperors, increasingly arbitrary central
government, oppressive taxation and growing
financial problems.
Having conquered China, the Manchu drove
on to overcome rebellion and, in th e 1690s, to
conquer Mongolia and defeat th e Dzhungars of
124
Xinkiang. The Manchu system had delivered a
decisive verdict , despite the difficulty of t he
terrain , the distance from Chinese sources of
supply and the long months of campaigning. The
combination of effective forces and successful
logistical and org anizational systems made the
Manchu army th e best in the world.
The Mughals, th e leading land power after
China, encountered serious setbacks both wi thin
India and in neighbou ring regions, especially in
frontier zones where the terrain was not suited to
their forc es, such as Afghan istan. In comparison,
the European military impact on India was of
minor importance, and the same was also the
case elsewher e in South and East Asia and in
Africa. Where native peop les were fewer,
however, not ably in eastern North America and
Siber ia, Europeans made important inroads: the
English and French infiltrated North America,
while the Russians advanced acrossSiberia to the
Pacific Ocean. The Europeans also competed
wit hin the ir expand ing world, th e Anglo -Dutch
wars of the 16S0s, 1660s and 1670s being waged
in west Africa, North America and northern South
America, aswell as in European waters.
Sekigahara
Date: 2 1 October 1600 Location: Gifu Prefecture, Japan
The arts ofpeace and th e arts of wa r are like to w heels of a cart w hich,
lacking on e, w ill ha ve difficulty in standi ng.
KURODA NAGAMASA(ASAMURAI WHO FOUGHT FOR IEYASUATSEKIGAHARA), N OTESON REGULATIONS, 1568-1 623
Tosei gu soku
p until the end of the 16t h century, the
armour from the
Japanese archipelago had wi t nessed Momoyama
about 250 years of rivalry and domestic period (Iare 16th to
conflict, of which over a century consisted of early 17th century)
andmadeofiron,
mor e or less intens ive warfare. A warr ior elite leather, lacquer,
held power. Successful warriors were endowed silk,woad and
wi th landed property comprising rights to rule silver leaf. Thissuit
wasowned by
over smaller or larger groups of dependent
Kuroda Nagamasa
farmers. The granting of rights to rule over land (1588- 16Z3),
and peopl e in exchange for military service daimyo - ar feudal
lord - of a doma in
resulted in a social hierarchy that reminded early
in Chikuzen
European visitors to Japan of the Midd le Ages, province, and was
and induced them to apply the terminology of worn by him at
feudalism in their descriptions of this warrior the bartle of
Sekigahara.
aristocracy.
Indeed, the hierarchy of Japanese military
land-holders displayed some strik ing sim ilarities
wi th th e social order of medi eval Occidental
knight s, but differed in at least one crucial
respect . Whereas in the med ieval Occident,
knights occupied th e top echelon of rulership
manifest in the offices of the emperor and the
several kings, the Japanese warrior elite estab-
lished and maintained its position as a social
sub-system within the comprehensive political
framework headed by the emperor, or Tenno ,
The Tenno contin ued to be regarded as th e
supreme legiti mizer of secular power and was
t hus not him self part of the warrior elite. Conse-
quently, the rivalries and military campaig ns that
the warriors fought among themselves were
never contests about the 'unity ' of Japan, even in
th e 13th century when there were two rival
branches of the imperial dynasty backed by
oppos ing warrior factions.
125
 29 S EV EN TE ENTH C ENTU RY

The rival pow ers

Nevertheless, there was an incremental process
through which, in the course of the 16th century,
a few warriors elevated themselves to more pow -
erful positions and higher social status than their
rivals and, in consequence of their superior power
and authority, positioned themselves as over-
lords over large parts of the archipelago.
At the end of the 16th century, the most
powerful of these warrior aristocrats were Oda
Nobunaga , Takeda 5hingen, Uesugi Kenshin,
Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Tokugawa leyasu. From
1573, Oda was in actual control of most of the
archipelago, only to be murdered in 1583 by a
group of retainers wary of excessive power in the
hands of one man. However, Toyotomi Hideyoshi
succeeded in taking over Oda's position and
became the virtual ruler of Japan (except the
northern island of Hokkaido), established his
headquarters in the old imperial capital of Kyoto
and erected Osaka Castle as his military strong-
hold. When he died in 1598 he left behind an
infant son under the regency of his five most
powerful vassals, namely Tokugawa leyasu,
Maeda Toshiie, Uesugi Kagekatsu,Mori Terumoto
and Ukita Hideie. The regents soon resumed their
rivalries and tried to knock each other out. Hideyoshi's sole successorand moved into Osaka their commander's knowledge that Kobayakawa needed protection by other forces or linear A detail ofThe
Within these campaigns, leyasu - whose Castle. But as soon as the following year, he Hideaki, one of Mitsunari 's men, was determined defence works. Portable firearms were therefore Battle of
A gun manual
stronghold was in the Nagoya area and whom Sekiga hara,
praduced by the relocated the core part of his forces to the Kanto to betray his lord during the battle. Sixteenth - insignificant, and tactics remained dominated by attribu ted to Tosa
Inata mi Schaal. Hideyoshi had dispatched to the Kanto plain area to fend off a possible rising of Uesugi's men. centu ry Japanesearmies were composed of small weapons like longbows, useful during rapid and Mits uyoshi (Edo
Firearms were around modern Tokyo - managed to attract the leyasu's departure from Osaka allowed his warrior bands wit h kin affiliation, local connec- autonomous battle action. As a consequence, the period, no later
introduced to
largest number of retainers and was lucky to than 16" -12i.
Japa n by enemies to gather forces of about 128,000 men, ti ons or dependence on a lord. Although these battle of 5ekigahara evolved as a sequence of
Thispa ir of
Portuguese sailors survive his rivals. After Maeda Toshiie's prema- mainly from western Japan (t he Western Army '), small bands were integrated into tactical forma - combats between small warrior bands. eigh t-fold screens
in 1543. ture death in 1599, leyasu attempted to become in an effort to check leyasu's rising power. tions under an overarching command structure, wasmadeusing
ink, calau r and
In October 1600 these forces, led by Ishida they strove to fight autonomously as much as The battle itself
gold leaf on pap er.
Mitsunari, gathered around the passage at 5eki- possible. Bands were often separated from their leyasu's forces launched an attack in the early
gahara through a mountainous area east of Kyoto comrades by the terrain - intervening hills, rivers hours of 21 October 1600 and a melee began that
that blocked the westward road from Nagoya. or build ings that complicated the coordination of lasted until noon with no real advantage falling to
Mitsunari's forces were determined to launch a battle acti on. Moreover, the deployment of either side. Hideaki's units did not part icipate
surprise attack against leyasu to prevent him mounted archers allowed for rapid movement unt il leyasu employed rifles and, almost as if th is
from return ing to Kyoto and Osaka. But leyasu across the battlefield, not always by strict execu- was a signal, Hideaki gave orders to attack Mit-
obtained intelligence about his rivals' plans and tion of given commands. Portable firearms used sunari's forces. This treacherous move proved
appeared well prepared. by infantrymen added a static element to the decisive and forced Mitsunari to flee from the bat-
battle as, under the constraints of 16th-century tlefield while his remaining troops surrendered.
Prelude to battle muzzle-loading technology , firearms could only leyasu lost approximately 6,000 men while about
leyasu's 'Eastern Army' of about 75,000 men be reload ed through a lengthy process dur ing 9,000 men from the Western Army were killed in
encountered the ir foes in good order and with w hich the ir bearers were essentially unarmed and action.Ten days later,leyasu entered Osakaasthe

126
127
 29 SE V ENTEENTH C E N T U RY

dominant regent for Hideyoshi's son and actual name for a location w here several rivers meet at
ruler of Japan, while Mitsunari was captured and
decapit ated.
the ocean. Yet it is unclear whe ther th e name had
th is meaning before the Chinese characters we re
chosen to represent it in writing. leyasu chose
Breitenfeld
Aftermath
Edo asth e seat of hisgovernment once t he Tenn6 Date: 17 September 163 1 Locat ion: north of Leipzig, Germany
leyasu did not stay in Osaka but returned to th e in Kyoto had, in 1603, agreed to make leyasu the
Kanto plain , where he established himself at a Shogun, the highest-ranking military ruler. As Breitenfeld was not what we calla 'decisive' victory, in that it did not decidethe war.
seaport conveniently located at the end of a hold er of th is office, leyasu could act as the effec- Butit wasa majorvictory, a turning point.
Pacific Ocean bay that stretched deep into th e tive ruler of th e country by the Tenn6's authority, W ILLIAM P. G UTHRIE, BATTLESOF THE THIRTYYEARS WAR, 2002
main island of the archipelago. This place had a even ifToyotomi Hideyosh i's family cont inu ed to
small fortress and was used as a fishing port articulate claims that Hideyoshi's son was the
under the name Edo (modern Tokyo). The rightful ruler of Japan. The conflict between
Chinese characters used to write Edo can be leyasu and the Toyotomi clan continued for more he Thirty Years War (1618- 48) was
translated as 'water gate ', perhaps an appropriate than ten years untilleyasu provoked the battle of
Osaka in 161S, where he defeated the Toyotom i
and their follo wers. leyasu di ed in the following
T essent ially a struggle ov~r the correct.i ~ te r­
pretation of the pol itical and reliqious
constitution of the Holy Roman Empire. The Aus-
year. He had already passed the Shogun 's office trian Habsburg dynasty ruled both the empire
to his son Hidetada in 160S, and it remained with and a monarchy that stretch ed into Hungary .
their descendants until 1867. Infighting at the end of the 16th century encour -
Tokugawa leyasu had completed Hideyoshi 's aged parts of both th e empire and the monarchy
design for the establishment of a central military to seek greater political and religious autonomy.
government under the Tenn6's nominal Faced with late 16th-centu ry rebellion s in both
suzerainty, but sought to create his own centre of areas, Emperor Ferdinand II tr ied to reassert his
government at a distance from the court in Kyoto. authority, prompting a backlash th at began in
leyasu's deputies in the provinces were obl iged Bohemi a and spread to Germany after 161 8.
- Nagatsuka
to spend some time and more money at the

,
Mount Mount
Matsuo Hideaki Nangu - Ankokuji cent re in Edo, where they had to leave hostages Background to the conflict
Mo'i ;!
,-,"v behind . Throug h th is system the Tokugawa clan Ferdi nand was determ ined to impose his inte r-
~ S Chosokabe retained control even in remote parts of the archi-
'" 0
I
l.Skm
I
I %.f,/;ORiver EasternArmy _ pelago and maintained domestic peace for about
pretation of the imperial constitution that gave
limited tol eration for Lutherans, but not Calvin-
0 1 mile
Western Army - 200 yearsfrom the mid -17th century. ists. He had no desire to become embroiled in the
leyasu also followed Hideyo shi's exampl e in prolonged strugg le of his Spanish cou sinsagainst
try ing to dem ilitarize the warrior elit e and disarm th e Protestant Dutch rebels and was reluctant to
Tokugowo teyasu,
the lower-ranking warr iors. While the high - accept Spanish military assistance, leaving him armies remained separate, but command of both Jean-Jacques
commander of the r--~-.I COMBATANTS '"__--. Walter'spaint ing
Eastern Army, ranking warriors continued to be able to carry depend ent on Lutheran Saxony and Catholic was given to th e League general , Jean Tzerclaes
of Gustav-Adolph
advanced west- their swords, the centrally enforced 'sword hunt' CountTilly (1559-1632).
Bavaria. The latter was permitted in 1619 to at the Battle of
wardsthrough Eastern Army
the valley at
decrees promulgated by Hideyoshi were reconstitute the Catholic League, an organization Tilly was an experienced and respected Breitenfeld,
•c. 75,000 men extended to include firearms, wh ich remain ed in soldier, but also war-wounded and past his prim e, c. 1632. In the
Sekigahara. At the Habsburgs had previou sly suppressed as too
background can
around noon on • Commanded by Tokugawa leyasu, and helped use solely for hunting purposes. The Tokugawa sectarian, but w hich now pro vided powerfu l w hile his forces were demorali zed by Wallen- beseen the
thedoy af battle, by Kobayakawa Hideaki
also exercised strict control over fortresses. The assistance in crushing Ferdinand's origina l oppo- stein's dismissal and major reduct ion s in Swedish cavalry
Hideaki, Wakizaka
•c.6,000 dead only major fortress that they allowed to be newly strength. At this point, King Gustavus Adolphus attock.
and Kikkawa led nents. Danish intervention widened th e war in
the turncoats wh o built was Himej i Castle, the centre of Tokugawa 1625, encouraging Ferdinand to raise his own of Sweden intervened in order to sustain his ow n
betrayed Mitsunari Western Army
government for areas west of Osaka. And in a army under Albrecht Wenzel von Wallenstein Baltic empire. He deftly evaded Tilly's superior
to ensuredefeat •c. 128,000 men
forthe Western decree issued in 1615, leyasu requested that elite (1583- 1634), an enigmatic Bohemian noble . forces wh ile rallying the support of Protestant
Army and victory • Commanded by Ishida Mitsuna,i warriors should devote the ir skills to non-military German princes; it was not until Elector John
Fearing that the emperor was becom ing too
farley asu. •c. 9,000 dead activit ies while continu ing to pract ise the martial George of Saxony arrived that he felt strong
powerful, the League combined with othe r
arts with or w ithout weapon s. princes to force Wallenstein's dismissal. The two enough to give battle just north of Leipzig.

128
129
 BREITENFElD 30
30 SE VE NTE EN T H C E NTU R Y

COMBATANTS '--- ---.

The t wo arm ies th e Saxons were raw levies and gambled on Two cavalry wings stood either side of thi s
Controversy surroundsTilly 's decision to fight th e his veterans being able to defeat the enemy's infantry centre, each wit h its fir st line interlac ed
much larger Swed ish-Saxon force. Many blam e superior numbers. with musketeer detachment s to add fire support Swedes a nd Sa xon s

the im petu ous cavalry general Count Pappen- Tilly dep loyed north of Breit enbach village
heirn, who con sidered Tilly senile. Allegedly, he facing open fields sloping gently down to the
led the impe rial advance guard so close to th e Loderbach stream. The centre comprised 18,700
Swedish army that Tilly was forced to come and imperial and League foot soldiers grouped into
rescue him . In fact, Tilly was keen to fight, having four brigades of three 'tercios' or large infantry
sought battle all summer. He knew that most of regiments with two batteriesin front. The brigade
on the right occupied the Galgenberg Hill, the
on ly significant high point on the battlefield. The
• ToDuben right wing was commanded by Count Fursten-
I finesuit as this.
berg who had the best cavalry regiments,
totalling 3,1SO troopers, supported by Count
Podelwitz
Isolano w ith 9S0 Croatian light cavalry, as we ll as
to th e cavalrymen's pistols. The enti re line was • 22,800 Swedes with S4 guns, and 17,300 Saxons
with 12guns
supposed to fir e simultaneously once the enemy
cavalry came within pistol range. The Swedish • Swedes: Commander-in·Chief KingGustavus
Adol ph us, Count Gustav Horn, GeneralJohan n
horse would then charge home. Many commen- Baner;Saxons: Lieuten ant -General Georg von
tato rs held this tactic to be superior to the Arnim, under the overall co mm a nd of Elector Cuirassier's
caracole of the im perial cavalry, w hereby a unit Johann Georg I armour, Dutch,
from about 1630.
wo uld ride wi thin range of the enemy and then • 3,000 Swedish and 2,100 Saxon casualties
Only the best-clad
each rank would fire its pistols and return to the troopers would
rear to reload. Though copied by other armies Imperialists have worn such a
into the 1650s, t he Swedish system was not an • 31,300 men with 26 guns
unqualified success, asBreitenfeld was to show. • Commander-in-ehief Jean Tzerelaes Count TIlly;
Count Gustav Horn commanded the left w it h Count Pappenheim; Count Furstenberg; Count

l:
Isolano; Colonel Erwin e
Bindauf the 1,200-st rong Wangler infantry regiment. 1,250 cavalry and 940 musketeers in the first line
• 7,600 killed, 6,000 captured. 3,000 more taken
~ The left, under Pappenheim, comprised 3,800 and l,OSOmore cavalry in the second. A detach -
ToHalle .
I ~
e.a1\e
f _ '::..

.
_ c:
Dragoon
Eleet~ sax~j~
Horn ~1 '
heavy cavalry, backed by the I ,SOO-strong Hol- ment of 460 dragoo ns stood to the rear in
in the pursuit from the field; all guns captured

~ 'I'13I'I'c;;a.,. . . . ~q.gl
stein infantry regiment. Five unenthusiastic support. The right was nomi nally under General

Gustavus r::;;;6JI,,,,,'''''''''' - -r;t~ Arnim~tt (~) cavalry regiments, totalling 2,000 dispirited Johann Baner, but in pract ice Gustavus Adolphus
Furstenberg had greater
r;;(O
, (:;;;10
C"'-.. \ , \wedes Galgenberg ,;
;> troopers, were left in reserve under Colonel was in charge directly throughout much of the
~ '\
I
Pappenheim
! __ - • .
Galiasl U

Alt -Tilly Goess

Hili U
c:;;;:;;.
\ Wangler \
=-
ISOla no
Erwitte. Tilly's exact intentions are unknown, but
the massing of his best troops on the right sug-
gests he intended to crush the Saxons first and
day. The king clearly intended to make his main
att ack here and massed his best men - 2,450
Swedish and Finnish horse - in the first line,
success.The Saxon cavalry put up
little resistance, particularly the
1,500 levies making up most of
. ~ Pappenheim
Holstein l Erwitte Furstenberg then turn on the Swedes, backed by 860 musketeers. Another 9S0 cavalry the right-hand group w ho
~ ~eehausen The Saxons deployed separately under the made up the second line. fled before conta ct. This
nom inal command of the ir elector, but in practice exposed the flank of the
ToBreitenfeld Y Y Toleipzig infant ry that were rolled up
led by General Arnim. Their ten batt alions The battle

- infantry
~ cavalry
... musketeer detachment
U heavyartillery
_ infant ry
~ cavalry
U heavyartillery
Gustavus 6aRet
J- totalling 12,100 infantry deployed much like the The Swedes and Saxons advanced from Duben by the imperial cuirassiers
imperial foot in relatively deep formations. They early on 17 September, forcing a crossing over who the n hit the other
'L Situation after 4.30 pm group of Sa xon horse on
1'----..... were flanked by two groups of six squadrons, the Loderbach after a stiff fight with the Croat
Swedes & Saxon~ . . the left . Most of the Saxons
totalling S,200 cavalry, and had a batt ery of 12 cavalry who set fire to Podelwitz village as th ey
fled , but around 1,000 cavalry
guns to their front. retreated to join Tilly. Tilly 's artille ry open ed fire
Saxons under Arnim stayed to joi n the
} The Swedes were in t hinner format ions to around midday as the allies came wit hin range,
Imperialists l~ maxim ize firepower. Their seven infantry but t he Swedes and Saxon s closed to wit hin 600 Swedes, wh ile some infant ry con -
r' " brigades totalled 11 ,930 men, each subdivided m (1,970 ft l before ret urning fire; the cannonade tinued to resist for a while around the
j I.J.~, gun line.
5 -
...-t-,,:..I3
wedes
'1'- ~
....If01
into thr ee battalions and deployed wi th one bat- conti nued for two hours wit h the imperialists
Furstenberg was unable to exploit
talion in front and two behind in support. Four of losing twice as many men. Some claim th is stung

E
~

his success. Some of his men went off in

r::;;;6JI
(:;;;10''''' \
'~~ ttttt .
Alt-Tolly
0~
, ~~e ..~ et
the brigades formed the first line wi th another the im perial horse into action , while others
r;;(O' \. _ fo..• 1,010 musket eers and SOO cavalry in immediate suggest Tilly ordered an att ack. Either way, both pursuit of the Saxons, while the others got

I~ ~ t:iI
'Il -
• t 'll~"
support behind. The other three brigades we re in Furstenberg and Pappenheim went forward lost in the great clouds of du st thrown up

I 7
Gallas IU U Gobschelwitz

/~'\' •• , ctstel" . j the second line with on ly 700 cavalry in support. short ly after 2 pm .The latter was met by a massed
volley from the Swedish left wing and recoiled to
by every movement across the bone-dry
plain. The attack had also outpaced th e
Above left Theimperial right routed the Saxons but the join the Holstein infantry that were coming up in imperial foot that set off around 2.30 pm in

»>: o
o
I
1 ~ile
3km
Swedes remained firm.

left The imperial army crumbled asthe Swedish counter-

sup port. However, the Swedish 'charge' failed to
break th e imperial horse that launched another
an arc to the right, intending to strike
Swedes in the flank. The Goess and
attack started. six att acksover the next two hours. Pappenheim brigades, along with

130
 30 SEVE NTE ENTH C ENTUR Y

Nordlinqen
Date: 6 September 163 4 Location: Bavaria, southern Germany

The grea test victory ofour time s.

GASPARDE GUZMAN,COUNT-DUKEOFOLIVARES, 1634

ordlinqen stands in stark contrast to Breit- crossing directly, the allies set off at sunrise on

N enfeld (see p. 129) as a crushing imperial

victory that destroyed Sweden's hop e of
ending t he Thirty Years War on its terms. Aft er
5 Septembe r westwards along the Bopfinq en
road to cross further upstream .They then moved
south to pick up some of the ir reinforcements
Gustavus Adolphu s's death, Chancellor Oxen- at Neresheim around 11.30 am. leaving th eir
stierna sought a safe way to extricate Sweden baggage guarded by 2,700 militia from Wurttem-
from the war whilst retaining its territorial gains berg, they marched eastwards back towards
on the north German coast. He reorganized Nordlinqen , By seizing the Arnsberg hill behind
Sweden's Protestant German allies into the Heil- the imperial army, they hoped King Ferdinand
bronn l eague wi th an army und er Duke Bernhard would be forced to abandon the siege.
of Weimar (1604- 39) to assist the Swedes under Unfortunately,they had little know ledge of the
Count Gustav Horn (1592- 1657). Saxony refused terrain. They arrived on the Arnsberg plateau in
.H T£R. to cooperate,weakening the league, while Oxen- mid-afternoon, but found that there was still the
Sl:RL"SS:SuECOR:
RLOEH ETS\xON~ stierna switched most of the Swed ish veterans to Rezen valley and a fu rther line of hills between The Victory of
ELECTORE>lN£CNON
hold the Baltic shore. The personal animosity them and the imperial f1ank.These hills ran nort h- Ntirdlingen by
C'LTHOLICA.. LJO~ G
RAUJI Co" : it.TiLl VII . Cornelius Schut,
bet ween Weimar and Horn reflected the growing west to southeast in two groups (Himmelreich,
J UT• •B&1Il, ""'"' JIID C:bur1 1635.This typical
rift betwe en Sweden and her allies. In contrast , l.andle and lachberg divided from the Heselberg early Ba roq ue
Spain diverted her Dutch war reinforcements to and Allbuch ), then met a second line of hills pa inting shows
the youthful
southern Germany for that year's campaign to running northwards to Nordl inqen and the impe-
Ferdina nd
help the main imperial-l eague army under the rial camp (Schonfeld, Adlerberg, Staffelberg and triumphing with
A copper Erw itte'scavalry reserve, marched round to att ack cavalry from his w ing to cover the retreat. emperor's son, Ferdinand, king of Hungary, the Galgenberg ). The t wo hill lines intersected divineassistance.
engravingof
from th e east, while th e Alt-Tilly brigade assisted by the general Count Matteo Gallas. with the Eger to make a triangle enclosing a rela-
Breitenfeld by
MotthaeU5Merion approached from the south. Aftermath tively open plai n called the Herkheimerfeld.
from hisTheatrum Horn had time to improvise a new line along The l eague's army was ruined and its political Swedi sh plans
Europaeum
t he Leipzlq-Duben road by bringing up t he organ ization wo und up fo ur years later. Tilly died Heartened by news of the Spanish approach , the Action on S September
(1637). Note th e
fugitives scattering second line of infantry from th e centre. The im pe- a broken man shortly after, w hile Wallenstein was imperialist s besieged Nordlinqen in Swabia.lf the The 12,000 imperialists were encamped east of
from th e tight rial units arrived at different times, making a recalled to rebuild the im perial army. Breitenfeld town was not saved,the Heilbronn league would Nordl inqen , together with the 6,000 Bavarians
formationsand the series of uncoordi nated att acks th at were all
clo uds of
establi shed Gustavus Ado lphus's military reputa- probably collapse. Weimar wanted to att ack th e under Duke Charles IV of lorraine.They had been
gunsmoke and beaten off wi th heavy loss. Meanwhile, th e impe- tion ; ye t luck had played a considerable part in besiegers, but the mor e cautiou s Horn preferred joined the day before by 15,000 Spaniards under
du st. rialists had becom e over-stretch ed, opening his victo ry. Swedish tactics prov ed superior, but to wait for expected reinforcements.Accusing his Prince Fernando, the younger brother of King
seriou s gaps in their centre . Both Horn and the margin was only slight and has often been colleague of cowardice, Weimar persuaded the Philip IV of Spain. like his cousin King Ferdinand,
Gustavus counter-attacked shortly after 4 prn, exaggerated. Gustavus went on to defeat Wallen- other senior officers to endorse his plan. he had been given an experienced advisor : the
routing both Pappenheim 's cavalry and Erwitte's stei n at l.utzen in November 1632, but at the cost Weimar and Horn were northwest of Nordl in- Marquis of leganes.
horse. The imp erial foot st ruggled to leave t he of his own life, marking the high point of Swedish gen, wh ile the imperialists were encamped Weimar had raced ahead and left his artillery to
field, but many units were cut off and either killed influence in th e emp ire. Sweden retained terri- sout heast of the to wn on the oth er side of th e clog the on ly road over the Arnsberg, impedi ng
or forced to surrender. Pappenheim rallied 10400 to ry in northern Germany unti11815. River Eger. As it was too dangerous to force a Horn's advance. Around 3 pm Weimar's men

132
133
 NORDLINGEN 31
31

COMBATANTS ' - - - - .... /

Situat ion afte r 5 am

Swedesand the Heilbronn League

• 13,300infantry,la,150cavalry,68guns
;_//
• Swedes:commanded byCountGustavHorn;
HeilbronnLeague:commandedby Duke
BernhardvonWeimar
•B,oookilled.4,OOO capturedalong with all guns \)- .....;;;;;;d~~~~'-.J==~~:
N o:
· rdlingen
and baggage ~ imperialcavalry 'i
_ imperialinfantry r
~ imperial artillery ~ )'
Imperiali st s ~ Swedish/Heilbronn cavalry . . . / · J
• 20,000infantry, 13,000 cavalry,64 guns _ Swedish/Hei lbronn infantry Kfein-Erdlingen GAlGfNBfRG

• Imperialist army:commanded byCountMatteo J..., 5wedish/Heilbr~n arti1le~ ~ Croats

Gallas (under overall command of King ~~~ma~ ~ ,/ • •Bavaria~5TAFFEl"RG
Ferdinand ofHungary);Spanish:commanded by
DiegoFelipe de Avila de Guzman,Marquis of / : ~~ {]~ A" ADlER.ERG
Leganes (under overall commandof Prince "*",1Crl'~ . ~ ~u \
ft Unter-Reimlingen
/~
Fernando, Cardinal-Archbishop ofTaledo) 't'.fy
Taupadel
nrHothetm .....
Herkh eim e -+ .. Lorraine
'"
Ober.
'.11U Reimlingen
• 1,500 killed,2,000 wounded
/LA NOlE Herkheimerfeld · •
°
, " .... SCHONFELD
""" Legane • •
lAcHBERG • •

'''I, 5panish ~ ~
Thiscontemporary encountered Spanish dragoons and Croat light Main battle assault s and headed back up the Rezen valley
painting by Pieter int ending to ford at Ederheim, covered by
Hornl l ,/ O b .
cavalry posted from the Himmelreich to the Things went wrong for the Swedes from the start.
Meulenerconveys A
Allbuch. Having cleared the ground as far as the Horn 's cavalry attacked ahead of his infantry by Weim ar's remaining men on the Heselberg and

~6. . "
"

a goodimpression
of the oh en Lachberg, they were halted by the arrival of
confus ed fighting another 500 Spanish musketeers. Horn finally
of m ost 17th-
arrived around 10 pm, fought another two hours
century battles.
to clear the Heselberg, and decided to leave the
Allbuch till the following morning
During the night, Horn deployed in four lines
between the Heselberg and the Rezen, with two
infantry brigades and three squadrons in the first
line. Seven squadrons stood behind these, with
three infantry brigades in the third line and
another eight squadrons in the fourth. Horn
intended to seize the Allbuch at dawn and use his
cavalry to exploit his success. Weimar deployed
on the hill line from the Uindle to the Heselberg
to cover him. He put his three infantry brigades on
the Heselberg and a battery of 20 heavy guns on
the Lachberg. His 21 squadrons were divided into
three groups, one behind the infantry and two
behind the guns.ColonelTaupadel and 1,000 dra-
goons covered the left flank. The imperialists
guessed their opponents'intentions and posted a
strong force to hold the Allbuch, whilst placing
the rest o n the ridge running nort h to Nord lingen
in case Weimar made a dash to relieve the town.
mistake, becoming embroiled in a skirmish in the
Rezen valley, leaving the foot to storm the hill
alone. The first assault captured one of the
entrenchments, but was disorientated by an
exploding powder wagon and driven back by the
crack Idiaquez regiment.
Horn sent in three more attacks,but by 7.30 am
it was clear he was not going to take the hill alone.
Weimar had been cannonading the main imperial
position since 5 am, whilst Taupadel 's dragoons
skirmished with the Croats on the plain. He
decided to attack, hoping to relieve the pressure
on Horn by distracting the imperialist s' attention.
He launched 2,000 cavalry onto the plain, while
General Thurn attacked the Allbuch with two of
his infantry brigades.
This fatally split Weimar's army. Thurn was
harassed by the Spanish cavalry, and cavalry sent
by Ho rn to help were in t urn hit by Lorra ine 's
Bavarians and routed. Less than half of Thurn's
infantry escaped back to the Heselberg and , by
this time,Weimarwas losing the fight on the plain.
By 10 am he had no cavalry left, whereas Gallas
had a reserve . Horn abandoned his fruitless
-c'!J/~""'
Lachberg. However, Gallas's fresh troops tipped
the balance, routing the Swedish horse and
'-4 _ _ "
o •
Hirnheim
joining the Bavarians and Spanish in sweeping
Weimar's rema in ing infantry off the hills . Only f-- --,r'
Horn's lead ing brigade managed to cross before 05~iles
the Bavarians seized Ederhe im . His rearguard
managed to escape downstream, but the centre
was cut off and captured. The Croats had mean-
w hi le turned Weimar's left and reached
Neresheim, where they massacred the Wurttem-
bergers guarding the baggage. . Unter·Reimlingen
-:>
°
Consequences
Along with White Mountain (1620l , Nordlinqen
was the greatest im perial victory of the war. The
emperor imposed the Peace of Prague (1635) as
his solution to the conflict, but French interven-
t ion and Swedish resistance ultimately frustrated
this and forced his successor to accept a less
favourable settlement at Westphalia in 1648.
Above right The first Swedish o rracks got un derwa y in th e
earlymorning.
Right The imperial-Spanish arm y delivere d its death blow.

135
134
 , • 1.

l.,~ oro:\" .
-,
'. SHAN HAIGU AN 32

I
Nurhaci, the first

Shanhaiguan Manchu leader,

leads the Ma nchus
in storminga
Chinese city.
Illustration from
Date : 27 May 1644 Location: Hebei province, northeast China the 'Manj u i
yargiyan kao/i'
(M anchu Veritable
My court wanted to reinforce the eastern frontier's defencesand buttress
Records), by Men
the copita l and ordered me to relinqui sh Ningyuan and defend Shanhaiguan. Yingzhao , Beijing ,
Bandits suddenly rebelled against Heaven and toppled the emperor. Unfortunately ( . . ..,. 17BI.
~• • I,

for the late emperor, the people ofthe capital were not loyal, and a group of r,
traitors opened the gates and welcomed the bandits.
Wu 5ANGUl'SLmER TO THEQING(MANCHU) EMPEROR, 20 MAY1644 . I

around t he rebel's left flank in a blinding sand-

n the middle of the 17th century, the Ming decide on anyth ing, so when Li Zicheng seized

I
dynasty was suffering internal rebellions as
well asincursions by the increasingly powerful
Manchu people to its northeast. Although Ming
China was a vast, wealthy emp ire, its corrupt and
ossified government was no longer able to main -
tain an effect ive army or react to crises. When
rebels seized the capital Beijing, the central gov -
ernment collapsed and the emperor committed
suicide. Caught between the rebels and the
Manchus, Wu 5angui - the general commanding
the Ming army defending Beijing from the north-
east - allied himself with the latter and crushed
the rebels at 5hanhaiguan. This avenged the
Ming emperor, but opened the door for the
Manchu conquest of China.
Context
Frequent famines in the 1630s-1640s fomen ted
widespread peasant rebellions , exacerbated by
the government's weak response. By 1641 a rebel
army led by Li Zicheng had grown large enough
that he was able to capture Luoyang, an impor-
tant walled city, and then Kaifeng the following
year.Many of the Ming army's best generals could
not , however, be reassigned from the northern
steppe frontier, where they faced the growing
Manchu threat. The inept Chongzhen emperor
and his hopelessly factionalized court failed to
Beijing on 25 April 1644 and the abandoned
emperor hung himself, generals like Wu 5angui
were left militarily and politically stranded on the
border. Rather than join the Manchus, Wu initially
resolved to accept Li's offer of terms.
On his way to surrender to Li, however, Wu
heard that the rebels had butchered his ent ire
family. He returned to 5hanhaiguan, defeating
two rebel attacks on his position on 5 May and 10
May. Wu tried to open negotiations with Li over
the disposition of the Ming heir apparent, but Li
had already left Beijing and was heading for
5hanhaiguan with his 60,000 veterans.
Wu 5angui's posit ion was critica l. He was
about to face a force equal or superior to his own ,
wi th no hope of Ming aid, and without a route of
retreat or escape. He had no choice but to turn to
the Manchus, whom his uncle and several cousins
already served. The Manchus themselve s had just
completed a major poli cy review, concluding that
it was tim e to shift from episodic raid ing of Ming
territory into long-term conquest. According ly,
they resolved to use the excuse of crushing the
rebels who had overthrown the Ming emperor to
launch a major invasion. The Manchu army began
its march south on 14 March, almost a week
before Wu 5angui's envoys arrived . Wu's request
for aid, and the news that the Chongzhen
emperor was dead, reinforced the Manchus'
Battl e
Leaving a strong force to garrison 5hanhaiguan ,
Wu 5angui deployed his main army near the 5ha
River, a few kilometres west of the city. Li
Zicheng' s tr oops faced him in a broad and deep
line. When the battle opened early on 27 May, th e
Manchu army had just arrived before 5han-
haiguan. Wu 5angui formall y surrendered to
Dorgon, the Manchu regent , while his forces
made repeated charges into the rebel lines. Wu's
fo rces sustained heavy casualties without break-
ing th e rebel lines, and would have been bad ly
defeated had the Manchu cavalry not then ridden
Manchu & Ming
• Manchu: c. 100,000 men ; Ming: army numbered
c. 50,000, and Ming local militia c. 50,000
• Manchu: command ed by Dorgon; Mi ng army led
byWu 5angu i
• Exact casualti es unknow n, but Wu 5angu i's main
t roo ps suff ered heavy casualt ies
Rebels
•c. 60,000 men
• Commanded by Li Zicheng
• Exact casualties unknown, but Li Zicheng's army
is recorded as having lost many 'tens of
storm . As the rebels realized who their new
attacker s were, their army collapsed.
Aftermath
Li Zicheng fled back through Beijing, pausing
long eno ugh only to have him self enthroned as
emperor and to set fir e to the city and it s imperial
palaces. The Manchu army follo wed soon aft er,
occupying Beijing without resistance on 5 June.
Wu 5angui was sent in pursuit of Li, while the rest
of the Manchu army used the excuse of putting
down rebellion and stabilizing the situation to
conquer north China.
The battle of 5hanhaiguan was crucial not in
allowing the Manchus through the Great Wall -
someth ing they had accomplished by forc e
repeatedly before - but in giving them the
chance to smash Li Zicheng's army and spread
acrossChina's Central Plain asa rescuing force.
Northeastern border of Ming China in 1644
Shanhaiguan •
•Fengrun
N
A map showi ng the
•
Tianjin

o SOkm
t Great Wall defence
line and th e route
betw een
thousands of corpses on the fie ld ' • Gaoyang Bohai
claim to a righteous pu rpose and shifted their Sea o1------1 .
30m,Ie, Shanha igu an and
Beijing.
A Chinese swo rd (dao), possibly doting from 1572 ro 1620. route of march through 5hanhaiguan .

137
136
 NASEBY 33

Naseby the Parliament ary side, and a joi nt fo rce heavily

defeated the major Royalist army in the north at
Matsto n Moo r (2 July 1644). Like many battles,
althoug h not Naseby, Marston Moor arose from
Date: 14 June 1645 Locatio n: nea r Northampto n, cent ral England an attem pt to relieve a siege, in th is case besieged
York, by Patliamentary and Scottish forces.
King and kingdom w ere lost. This clash pr efig ured the battle at Naseby th e
EARL OF C LARENDON, C HARLES I's AOVISERAND THEROYALIST HISTORIAN OF THE WAR,
followin g year. After th e 27,000-strong Parlia-
HISTORYOFTHEREBElliON, 1702-04 menta rian/Scot s army launched a surprise attack
on the l 8,000-st rong Royalists at abou t 7 pm, th e
Royalist cavalry was successful on the allied rig ht, left Military
but on the allied left the ir cavalry, under Oliver success took Oliver
Crom well fro m the

N
aseby ensured the defeat of the Royalist Cromw ell and Alexander Leslie, drove the oppos-
Huntingdonshire
cause in the English Civil War of 1642-46, ing Royalist cavalry from the field . The infantry gentry to become
a defeat that was to help determine the struggle in the centre ended when Cromwell's LordProtectorin
direction of British history, and the character of 1653, the most
cavalry j oined the assault on the Royalist infantry.
dramatic example
the state and society of what became the key The allies lost about 1,500 men , the Royalists ofup ward social
imperial power in the world . 3,000 and their cannon , but, mo re seriously, their m obili ty in Brit ish
War broke out as a result of widespread suspi- cohesion was broken and the Royalist cause in histo ry. Hisportrait
here was pa inted
cion of the autocratic and Catholicizing policies of the nort h fatally defeated. York surren dered on by Robert Walker ,
Charles I (reigned 1625-49). This suspicion was 16 July and this was followed by the overrunning c. 1650-53.
focused by the Long Parliament that met from of mo st of northern England. Nevertheless,
late 1640. Charles's inabili ty to retain political Below Like other
further south, Charles's forces continued to hold
battlesofth e
control of th e situation led him to attempt a coup, most of Wales, western England and the southern period, Naseby
forcibly entering Parliament on 4 January 1642 to Mid lands. Charles felt able to reject advice that he wasonethat
seize his most virulent opponents, only to fi nd flowed more on
negotiat e with Parliament, advice that he again
th e cavalry fla nk s
that they had already fled . As both sides prepared rejected in January 1645. than in the infantry
for w ar, Charles left London to rally support, a centre.
foolish move as the history of civil conflict in The 164 5 campai gn
England demonstrated th e importance of seizing In response to the continued resilience of the
the capital's resources and instit utions.
As determined minorit ies polarized the nation,
Royalists and the defeat of the Earl of Essex, the / 1-
lead ing Parliamentary commander, at Lostwithiel
/ ' II reserve long Hold
fighting began at Manchester in July 1642. (2 Sept ember 1644), and t he incompetence of ~ Dust HI co.~ Spin ey
Boyahst Infantry; - , [3~ _ C3 1:
Charles, whose support was strongest in th e t heir commanders at th e incon clu sive Second succumbs to W-WlCiit [3[31[3

no rth, Wales and Cornwall, advanced on London,
narrowly winning the battle of Edgehill (23
October 1642), but w as checked at Turnham
Green to the w est of London (13 November
Battle of New bury (27 October 1644), the Parlia- Cromwell's attack R~pert Astley,,-", ( Langdale
® .r-: - -----.:
mentary forces were reorga nized as the New / ~® Cromwell defeat s
-:
•
Model Army, led by SirThomas Fairfax, with Oliver
Cromwell as commander of the cavalry. An
...

/" i
I Ireto n . t:~~-
Naseby
Covert

rom~ell
Raijallstcavalry

1642). He retr eated to establish his headquarters opport unity to destroy the main Royalist field CD ~~-
at Oxford, his best chance of winning the war lost. army w as provided by the developing contest for Royalist cavalry sweep Sklppon
~rtiamentarycavalry
In 1643 the Royalists made major gains, espe-
cially in weste rn England, where Brist ol w as
control of the Midlands in the late spring of 1645.
Prince Rupert of th e Rhine, Charles l's neph ew,
f~ f1eld
Rossiter
Mill Hill »:
@ Royalist troops
sto rmed , but their sieges of Gloucest er and Hull st ormed Leicester o n 30 May with 10,000 Royal- attack parliamentary
baggagetrain
both failed . In 1644 a Scottish army intervened on ist s. This threat ened Parliamentary control of
nearby Northamp ton and the two armies clashed '"" cavalry ] -Royalist Parliamen tary NASEBY
Charles I on Horseback with Monsieur de 5t Antoine by - infantry baggagetram o lkm
[3 cavalry
Anthony Von Oyck; 1633. His Roya l Majesty, on im age of out side the village of Naseby, 17 km (11 miles) - infantry ] -Parliamentary I
po wer p rior to defeat. ... musketeeers o O.Sri,iles
nort hwest of Northampton, on 14 June.

138
139
 33 SE V E N TE E NT H C E N T U R Y
The battle
The Royalists, deployed like the Parliamentarians
wi th infantry in t he centre and cavalry on the
wings, were heavily outnumbered, but the battle,
which began at about 10 am, was decided by the
superior discipline of the Parliamentary cavalry.
The cavalry on the Royalist right, under Rupert,
swept the cavalry of Henry Ireton 's Parliamentary
left from the field, but th en dispersed to attack
th e Parliament ary baggage tr ain, which offered
easy looting.
In con trast, on th e Parliam ent ary rig ht, t he
cavalry und er Cromwell defeated the Royalist
cavalry opposite under Sir Marmaduke Langdale,
but t hen retained suffi cient control to turn on the
veteran, but heavily outnum bered, Royalist
infant ry in the centr e. These were already heavily
engaged, with the inaccuracy of individual
muskets countered by th e pro xim ity of th e
opposing lines and th eir close-packed natu re.
The Royalist infantry had advanced and driven
back t he fro nt line of the New Model's infan try ,
but Fairfax had deployed the most experienced
troops in the second line. They had held fast,
Musketeerof the
English Civil War.
Muskets were
heavyweapons,
slow ta fire and af
limitedaccuracy
and reliability. As a
result. lirewa s
deliveredin volleys
andat closerange.
140
NASEBY 33
COMBATANTS ........_ _
Parliamentary forces
•c.6,500 cavalry and 7,500 in fantry
• Com manded by 5ir Thomas Fairfax
• Few er than 1,000 de ad
Royalist fo rces
•c. 3,600 cavalry and 4,000 infantry
• Comm and ed by Charles I
• At least 1.000 d ead; nearly 5.000 captured
advancing and stopping the Royalist infantry. It
was this struggle that Cromwell swayed by
attacki ng the flank and rear of th e Royalist
infantry. Att acked by both infantry and cavalry.
the Royalist cent re succumb ed. w it h about 5,000
men taken pri sone r. The Royalists also lost all of
their artillery. Charles I had proved a poor com-
mander, not least for failing to use his reserve
effectively. He fled the battlefield.
Reasons for victory
The New Model Army's equipment and tactic s victory. Also like Marston Moor, and the French alt hough, hop efu l of success in Scotl and and Thenatu re of
were essentially similar to th ose of t heir oppo- victory over the Spaniards at Rocroi in 1643. naturally stubborn, Charles st ill refused to negoti- Naseby aso
nent s; th e major difference was that they were combined afms
Naseby indicated the continued decisive battle- ate. Thanks to superior Parliamentary firepower, engagement
bette r disciplined and supported by a more effec- field role of cavalry. Command skills were also the pri ncipal Royalist army in the west was emerges clearly
tive infrastructure and supply system. Promotion crucial. The ability to grasp and explo it the initia- defeated at Langport on 10 July, while Bristol was fromthispicture.
was by merit and Cromwell. in particular, Pikemenand
ti ve and to make good use of the terrain were successfully stormed on 10-11 September. The
musketeers were
favoured officers and men imbued with equal bot h important. Cromwell's victories over the Parliamentarians were also victorious at Rowton interdependent.
religio us fervou r to his own . This contributed to Scots at Preston (1648) and Dunbar (1650) were Heath near Chester on 24 Sept ember. By the end
the ir disciplined response to th e uncertainty of to be parti cularly goo d examples of the form er. of 1645. t he Royalists had been pushed back int o
battl e. and interacted positively with Cromwell's Command skills were also seen in the degree of Wales, southwest England and isolated strong -
com mand skills. The contrast between Prince success whe n retaining control over cavalry, the holds in the Midlands. The pace of Parliamentary
Rupert and Oliver Cromwell was one of different decisive factor at Naseby, and one that was far attack cont inued in early 1646 with the capture of
attitudes towards responsibility. position, quality from easy. Chester on 3 February and the overrunning of
and merit. The New Model Army prefigured the much of Devon. On 5 May 1646. Charles gave
Continental Army of the American War of Inde- Co n seq uen ces himself up to the Scott ish army in England . The
pend ence. the republi can army of th e French Naseby was a decisive victory wi t h decisive remaining Royalist strong holds th en surrend ered
Revolution. and the Red Army in th e Russian Civil result s. It led mo st Royaliststo appreciate th at t he or we re capt ured: Worcester on 23 June, Oxford
War. In each case, th e army served as th e expres-
war was over. Carlisle had successfully resisted a next day, and Harlech Castle in February 1647.
sion of the poli ti cal thrust of the revolu tion , as Scotti sh siege once t he previous October, but it The social and ideo logic al politics of th e New
well asproviding its force. asked for terms when news of Naseby arrived . Model, however. made it im possible to demobi-
The Parliamentary victory took three hours With the main field army heavily defeated , the lize, and it was to serve as the basis for the
and. like Marston Moor, was very much an attack Royalist situation was one of inexorable collapse, dictatorship th at Cromwell imposed.
14 1

Vienna
Date: 15 July-12 September 1683 Location: eastern Austria
I canno t believe that the Vezir proposes to go
be based on such mediocre forces. It is po ssible that brutal resolution ofth is kind may be
inspired by sheer pride; but the judgment ofGod will fall upon them.
EMPERORLEOPOLD'SAMBASSADOR, ALBERTCAPRARA, AFTER HELEFT THEOn oMANARMY AT EsztxON 12 JUNE 1683
n 1683, about a century and a half after the first
I unsuccessful siege of Vienna in 1529, the
Ottomans were again in front of the walls of
the Habsburg capital. This was a major change
in recent Ot toman-Habsburg relations, which
were relatively peaceful in the first half of the 17th
century due largely to Habsburg commitments
in the Thirty Years War (1618-48) and the
protracted Ottoman-Venetian war over Crete
(1645- 69). The host ilities broke out in the 1660s,
in a decade that saw a series of Ottoman con -
quests in Hungary (1660 and 1663), Crete (1669)
and Poland-Lith uania (1672) under t he able lead-
ership of Grand Viziers Kopru lu Mehmed Pasha
(1656- 61) and his son, Kopruluzade Fazil Ahmed
Pasha(166 1-76).
Increased Ottoman m ilitary activity and capa-
bility were linked to the refo rms int roduced by
the KoprUlu Grand Viziers, w hich strengthened
Istanbul's authority and improved its administra-
t ive-fi nancial capabilities. Recent reviva l of
Ottoman military fortunes and Vienna's concilia -
tory policy towards the Ottomans, exemplified by
the Treaty of Vasvar (10 August 1664), w hich
acknowledged the lat est Ottoman conquests
in Hungary (Varad and Ersekujvar/Neuhasel)
despite a decisive Habsburg victory at Szentgot-
thard (1 August 1664), were interpreted in
Istanbul as signs of Habsbu rg weakness.
Above left The Grand Vizier's failure a t Vienna forged an
anti-Ottoman coalitionthat eventuallyrecapturedHungary.
Left Jan 11/ Sabieski's triumph at Kahlenberg is celebrated as
one of the major victoriesin Polish history.
142
to Vienna, and that so am bitious a design can
Emperor Leopold's ineptness against the Hun-
garian insurgents in the 1670s and , especially,
Imre Thoko ly's successful insurrect io n (1681-83)
that resulted in the estab lishment of yet another
pro -Ottoman clie nt state, Thokoly's 'Middle Hun-
garia n Principa lity' in Upper Hungary (betw een
the Habsburg -controlled Royal Hungary and the
Ottoman-vassal Principality of Transylvania), all
reinforced the Ottomans' perception s of Habs-
burg vu lnerabilit y. Louis XIV's polic y of 'reunio ns'
- capturing terr itories in his northeast frontier
merely because they w ere granted to him in past
treat ies - and perceived Habsburg mi litary weak-
ness persuaded Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pasha
th at the tim e had come to challenge Vienna . As it
turned out, his assessment of int ernational poli-
t ics and of Ottoman and Habsburg capab ilities
proved t o be w rong.
The road to Vienna
Rumou rs of a possib le Ottoman attack against
th e Habsburgs circulated from th e 1670s
onwards, but Kara Must afa managed to secure
t he sultan 's suppo rt for hi s planned campaign
only in August 1682. Sultan Mehmed IV (1648-87)
and his arm y left Edirn e, the old capit al, on 1 April
1683. They reached Belgrad e in early May, w here
the j anissaries, cannoneers and th e bulk of th e
provincia l cavalry from Asia Minor and the Arab
provi nces joined the army. Sultan Mehmed
decided to stay in Belgrade and appointed th e
Grand Vizier commander-in -chief.The decision to
lay siege t o the Habsburg capita l, instead of
Ko rnarom (Komorn) and Gyor (Raab) that had
VIENNA 34
been the official targets of the campaign, was cent rated their atta cks again st th e walls bet w een
taken either in Szekesfeh erva r o n 25 June or in
the military camp
between 1and 7 July.
nearby Gyor, sometime
th e Burg Bastion and the Lobi Bastion , However,
as in 1529, the Ottomans lacked heavy siege
artillery, and moreover, th eir 130 field guns and
On 7 July the Grand Vizier left the camp at Gy6r 19 medium-calibre cannons we re inferio r in
for Vienna wi th th e main army, leavi ng Ibrahim number to the defenders' 260 cannons and
Pasha - the beylerbeyi or go vernor of Buda - wi th mortars. The defenders did lack suffi cient ammu-
25,000 Ottoman and 10,000 Tartar soldiers to nition, howe ver, w hich explains w hy only on e to
besiege Gyo r. The Grand Vizier reached Vienna on tw o shot s per weapon were fired dail y during th e
14 July w it h an army of about 90,000 men . Of th e
Ottoman vassals only th e Tartars took part in th e
actual fig hting.
Ottoman cavalry
The si eg e
Emperor Leopo ld and hi s court left Vien na on
7 July fo r Linz and Passau. The defenders of
Vienna under Count Ernst Rudiger von
forces werethe
backbane of the
Ottoman army,
wi th a mobilizable
force of more than
Starhemberg numbered some 16,000 men :
100,000 men . The
10,000 infantry and 6,000 cuira ssiers. They sipahi (Turkish
were st rengt hened by 8,000 cit izens and 700 cavalryman)
un iversity students fit for military service. The usuallywore mail
shirt and helmet,
city's fo rti ficatio ns had been mod ernized in and hisweapons
the 1670s and reinforced before the siege. included sabre,
Due to th e indefati gable dipl omac y of Pope recurved
bowanda
Innocent XI (1676-89), eff ective military small
assistance was also on it s way. round
Aft er a failed preven tive siege against shield.
Ersekujvar, the Habsbu rg forc es - com-
manded by the talent ed Duke Charles of
Lorraine (1643-90) - tried to secure the left
bank of th e Danube w hil e w aiting for the
Polish alli ed tr oops. The latter we re to j oin the
relief army accord ing to an 'everlasting offensive
and defen sive allia nce', signed in Krakow by the
representatives of the emperor and Jan III
Sobieski, king of Poland (1674- 96), on 31 March,
a day befor e the sult an had left Edirne.The Habs-
burg and papal dipl omac y also secured the
participati on of some 10,000 Bavarian troops
and a like num ber of Saxon soldiers, led by the
elect o rs of Bavaria and Saxony , Maxim ilian II
Emanuel and Johann Georg III respectively.
By 15 July Vienna had been encircled
and cut off. The very same day the siege
began in earn est wi th heavy bombard-
ment that lasted for the next two months.
Throu ghout the siege, th e Ottomans con-
I
143
 34 S EVENTE ENTH CENTURY

siege. Ottoman trench and mine attack s, of which

the sultan's soldier s were expert s, proved more
effecti ve than Ottoman bombardment . But th e
defenders stood firm , made frequent sort ies,
repaired the walls and stopped the besiegers by
hastily erected fortifications behind the breaches.
It was not until 2 September that the Ottomans
could take the Burg Ravelin. On 6 September
another mine exploded under the Burg Bastion
and the defenders, who had by this time lost
about half of the ir strength and were weakened
by dysentery and food shortage, expected a deci-
sive final assault. Instead, Kara Mustafa paraded
his army in front of the walls to force the city to
surrender. Had the Grand Vizier launched th is
Christians
o (Austrian Habsburgs, Germans and Poles>
Defenders of Vienna : 16,000 sold iers and 9,000
citizens ; relief army at th e battle of Kahlenberg:
75,000-80,000
o Commander-in-Chief of the defence forces of
Vienna : Count Ernst Rud iger Yon Starhemberg;
commander-in-ehief o f th e relief army: Jan III
Sobieski, king of Poland
02,000 casualt ies
Ottomans
090,000 men during the siege; c. 50,000 at the
battle of Kahlenberg

final assault instead, he might have been able to o Commanded by Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pasha
take it before the arrival of the relief army. o 10,000 casualties

The crucial battle at Kahlenberg

The decisive battle took place on 12 September
near Kahlenberg, at the edge of the Vienna
Woods.The relief army of 75,000-80,000 men and
160 cannons was gathering northwest of Vienna.
The troops from Bavaria, Saxony, Franconia and
Swabia numbered about 35,000-40,000 men and
--.... European advance
joined the imperial forces of 20,000 men under
Lorraine. Arriving last, King Jan Sobieski's Polish
troops could have numbered some 20,000 men.
Underestimating the st rength of the relief
army, Kara Mustafa left most of his janissaries in
the trenche s and planned to destroy the allied
12 September 168 3
Christ ian troops wi t h a decisive cavalry charge. west. By 6 pm the Ottomans were defeated. Thispic ture by
Franz Geffels
Although Ottoman chron iclers put the number of Those who had not been slaught ered fled the
cap tu res both the
th e Ottoman forc es at Kahlenberg at 28,400 men, batt lefield, leaving amp le booty, the whole
siege a nd the
wi th Tartar and other auxiliary troops it must have Ottoman camp, for the Christians. battle, with King
Sob ieski - th e hera
reached some 50,000 men, despite carrying only
of th e battle - in
60 field guns. Due to bad intelligence, Kara Significance
the fore ground
Mustafa expected the Christian attack on 11 Sep- Vienna was saved by a coalit ion of central Euro- (right). No tice the
tember and ordered his soldiers to stay awake pean countries, whose army proved tact ically elaborate

- th roughout that nigh t. Ottoman siege

----.. Ottoman advance superior and, for the first time in the history of
works (trenches,
The battle actually started at dawn on 12 Sep- Ottoman-European land confrontations, matched mines) in the
-. Ottoman trenches tember, between the Ottoman advance forces the Ottomans in term s of deployed manpower ba ckgr ound.
under Kara Mehmed Pasha and the Christian left and weaponry, aswell asin logist ical support.
wing under Lorraine near Nussberg. Lorraine's The Grand Vizier's defeat led to his downfa ll
o 1 km
I forces, strengthened by the Saxons, soon reached and execution, soon follo wed by the dethrone-
o 0.5 :niles
the Ottoman right wing , commanded by Ibrahim ment of his master, Sultan Mehmed IV. More
N Pasha. The Bavarians and Franconians also importantly, Kara Mustafa's 1683 campaign pro -

t descended from the slopes further inland and

joined the fight against the Ottoman right wing
voked the creation of an anti-Ottoman coalition,
also called the Holy League. In the ensuing Long
J.blonowsk~ and the middle. Sobieski's Poles on the Christian War of 1684-99 the Ottomans lost Hungary,
t ~ right wi ng advanced slowly because of difficult Sultan Suleyrnan 's most prestigious conquest
terrain , but by 1 pm the Polish vanguard had (see Mohacs p. 110). Although the Ottomans
The battle at t ~
reached Dombach . Although the Ottomans were far from defeated ; the early 18th century
Koh lenberg, 12 fought bravely, an overall Christian attack that saw Ottoman military resurgence and success as
Sep tem ber '683. .....
Thisreconstruction ~ ~ ~ started after 3 prn, in the fiercest heat, decided well asthe limits of Habsburg military capabilities .
t the fate of the battle. The Ottoman left wing and The peace treaty of Karlowitz that ended the Long
shows the
~ f
~CA M P /
distribution of
~ the Tartars were unable to withstand the charge War signalled a new era in the history of Ottoman-
forcesand their
mo veme nts.
Breitensee •
~~ t of the Polish cavalry and dragoons , who were the Habsburg, and more generally in Ottoman-
first to reach the Ottoman encampment from the European, relat ions.
144
145
 Eighteenth
century
n the 18th century there were two important

I developments. First. European forces were

increasingly successful against non-Western
opponents - Belgrade in 1717 was a key victory:
the Austrians under Prince Eugene defeated the
Ottoman army seeking to relieve the besieged
city. In a difficult position, Eugene resolved on a
surprise attack and won. It was a confused
engagement that was not a matter of clear-cut
formations exchanging fire. and was followed
by the surrender of Belgrade. There was also a
major victory outside Europe, at Plassey in north-
ern India in 17S7. Until this poin t, despite the
European impact in the Americas and Siberia,
there had been little success on land to report
from the rest of Asia or indeed Africa. But the
Brit ish victories in India were the first to change
th is situation.
Secondly, the majo r battles fought by Euro-
pean forces wit hin the Western world outside
Europe continued to be against other European
forces, as wi th the battle bet ween Brit ish and
French troop s outside Quebec in 17S9. But from
177S. rebellion by colonists became an added
factor: Brit ish rule was challenged in the Thirteen
Colonies that were to become the core of the
independent Unit ed States of America. and led to
key American victories at Saratoga in 1777 and
Yorktown in 1781. These battl es showed that
American success involved not only avoiding
defeat but also forcing British armies to surren-
der. although at Yorktown they had the vital
assistance of the French navy, which prevented
the relief of the besieged British position. The
American achievement was particularly marked
given Brit ish experience in power projection and.

Thebattle of Pottova in 1709, saw theemergence ofRussia as

a greot power. In this conflict Peter the Greardefeatedthe
Swedish king, CharlesXII(see p. 153).
 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
A moredistant
view of the ba ttte
afPo/tava, pa inted
c. 1750by an artis t
of the Russian
School.
specifically, in operations in Nort h America
against th e French and the Native Americans.
Rebellio n against European rule was subse-
quently to spread, first against the French in the
1790s and 1800s,leadi ng to the creation of Haiti,
and the n against Spanish and Portuguese rule in
Latin America.
Within Europ e, th e key battles di d not arise asa
consequence of civil wars, but instead reflected
t he strugg le for dominance between states. The
1700s saw the fail ure of the French effort to seize
hegemony in western Europe, especially with
defeat at Blenheim in 1704. Again, command
skills proved crucial. The Anglo -Dutch -Austrian
vict ory over the Franco-Bavarianarmy was largely
due to the tactical flexibility of John Churchill , 1st
Duke of Marlborough - in particular his ability to
retain contr ol and manoeuvrabili ty. The decisive
facto rs we re mastery of t he te rrain, the rete ntion
and management of reserves, and t iming of t he
heavy strike in the centre where t he opp osing line
was bro ken. Victo ry was followed by th e con-
quest of Bavaria. Russia's victory at Poltava (1709)
led to the fall of the Swedish empire in northern
Europe, while Rossbach (1757) confirmed the
148
new-found reputation of Prussia und er Frederick
the Great. Frederick's ability to grasp and retain
the initi ati ve, and the disciplined nature of his
outnumbered army, were decisive. The rise of
Prussian power owed everyt hing to success in
battle. Rossbach was also a very serious blow to
French mili tary prestige , and led to pressure in
Francefor widespread military reform.
A very different force was victor ious at
Jemappes in 1792, the columns of Revolutionary
French soldiers bringing to an end Habsburg rule
of the Austrian Netherlands (modern Belgium ),
and adding a strong ideological factor to conflict
in Europe. The levee en masse, a general conscrip-
tion ordered in 1793, raised large forces, such that
French armies were able to operate effectively on
several fronts at once, match ing the opposing
forces of much of Europe.
Casualty rates in t he battles of this period were
fo rmidable. At Poltava th e Swedes suffered terri-
ble casualties, as their attack on well-defended
Russian posit ions exposed them to superio r
forces and artillery. Only 14 of the 700-strong
Uppland regiment, and 40 of the 500 in the
Skaraborg batt alion, survived.
Blenheim
Date: 13 August 1704 Location: near Donauworth, Bavaria, modern Germany
From a church toweryou wouldhaveseenthe enemy repulsed on one flank
and we on the other, the battlerippling to and Iro likethe waves of the sea,
with the entire lineengagedin hand-to-handcombat.
FROMTHE MEMOIRSOFTHE COMTEDEMERODE-WESTERl OO, 1702-12
estern Europe in the late 17th century
W had been dominated by the power of
Louis XIVof France (I. 1643-1715 ), and it
wasth is power that was decisively checked at the
batt le of Blenheim. In 1701, France and Austria
had taken up arms in th e War of th e Spanish
Succession. In 1702, concerned abo ut the conse-
que nces of the inheritance of the Spanish
dominions by Louis's grandson , Philip, Britain and
the Dutch entered the war on the Austrian side.
Britain comm itted the bul k of her military
pow er in th e traditional nearby region of military
activity, th e Low Countries, but in 1704the Brit ish
had to strike further afield. In alliance wi th Elector
Max Emanuel of Bavaria, French forces had
invaded southern Germany. In 1703-4, a comb i-
nati on of the two wi th Hungarian rebels seemed
about to extingu ish Habsbur g power , and thu s
to destroy the basis of Britain's alliance strategy :
t he use of Austrian strength to resist French
expansion.
The Brit ish response was organ ized by one of
the greatest of British generals, John Churchill
(1650- 1722), then 1st Earl of Marlborough . He
thwarted Louis XIV's plans by a bol d advance, at
t he head of an Anglo -German army, fro m the
Rhineland to th e Danube Valley. This was th e
most decisive Briti sh military mov e on the conti-
nent until t he 20th centu ry and, unlike th e
Waterloo campaign in 1815 (see p. 193), was a
combination of the st rategi c and th e tactical
John Churchill, ' st Duke ofMarlboro ug h, a m aster of
coalition warfareand ot toaicatsurprise. Portrait attributed
to MichaelDahl, c. 1702.
 35 EI GH TEEN T H C E N TU RY

offensive . The advance was a formidable logis- with Tallard covered by the Nebel stream, but it
tical challenge : depots of supplies were was soundl y beaten. Allied victory was largely
established along the route , prov iding the troops du e to Marlborough's flexibility: in particular to
wi th fresh boots as well as food . Such depots his ability to retain control and manoeu vrability,
enabled the army to maintain cohesion and disci- an ability that contrasted with the failure of the
pline, instead of having to disperse for supplies. opposing generals both to coordinate opera-
The campaign was a great triumph for mobility tions, and to respond to particular crises. The
and planning, both in strategy and on the battle- decisive factors were mastery of the terrain, the
field . The French had been kept unsure of retent ion and management of reserves, and the
Marlborough's destination by feints . Having timing of the heavy strike. Having pinned down
arrived in Bavaria, Marlborough stormed the much of the French infantry in defensive engage-
Schellenberg Heights north of Oonauworth, but ments in and around the villages of Blenheim and
Max Emanuel had been joined by the French Oberglau, into which the French fed their
under Marshal Camille de Tallard. Although the reserves, Marlborough launched the substantial
Thebattleaf Franco-Bavarian army was larger, Marlborough, force he had kept unengaged at th e centre of
Blenheim was jo ined on 12 August by the Austrians under Tallard's army. He was able to achieve a local
moreof a
Prince Eugene, forced a battle at Blenheim on the superiority in what he made a crucial part of the
successfully
planned encounter north bank of the Danube. battlefield. The initial British cavalry attack there
than m any battles was checked by the French, who had assumed
af the period, bu t The battle that they would be able to drive back any British
figh ting quality
Blenheim was hard fought, with about 31,000 advance in the centre, but British infantry and
wasnecessary
alongs ide adro it dead or wounded in just one day. The Franco- artillery support block ed th e advance of the
planning. Bavarian army had a strong defensive position, French cavalry, and it was then unable to resist
the second British cavalry att ack.
20km Allies Franco-Bavarians This led to th e rout of the French cavalry, fol - Marlborough had been more successful than vital role in training the officers and in accustom - The Batt le of
, ~ cavalry ~ cavalry Blenheim by John
10miles - infant~ infantry lowed by the retreat of th e Franco-Bavarian left his opp onents in integrating cavalry and infantry, ing the troops to immediate mano euvre and
Wootton, c. 1743, a
under Max Emanuel and th e surrend er of 10,000 his cavalry we re better trained fo r charging and executi on. This was the most battle-experienced major painter of
French infant ry on the righ t in th e villag e of the artill ery, unde r Colonel Holcroft Blood, Brit ish army since those of th e civil wars of th e batttes.tn 1743,
Blenheim, th eir retreat cut off by British infant ry manoeuvred rapidly on the battlefield , brought 1640s, and th e latter did not take place in battles rhe memory of
•••; . N
~~~,hrince.
Blenheim was a
• • • ,
who had exploited the victory in th e centre . forward to help support the breakthrough in the that were asexte nsive - or siegesof position sthat
painful one, asits
• • .• _ - :; ne Schwennenbac • centre. Cool and composed und er fir e, Marlbor- were as well fortified - as those that faced Marl- brilliant success

~/ , _
Lutzmgen ~~ "'''~/' Wolperstettin ough had proved a master of th e shape and borough 's fo rces. was not to be
repeated in the

. -- ~ __-'''9irC:~ ~~~. . . ~ ~o~o(,

details of t he batt le. He kept control of his own The cavalry com posed about a quarter of th e
Warofthe
,/ ,/ ,
, ..-- - ' ,; I' ,' -
,~ "'~
~
: '$ fo rces and dictated th e tempo of the conflict , army. Like Gustavus Adolp hus of Sweden in th e Austrian
...' ~ .. ' '-- .. ,- -- I, I Dber):t"qu
nl .. Unterglau
... General Allies moving and committing his troop s decisively at Thirty Years War, Marlborough made his cavalry Succession. George
...- ,: ,/ / ( ¥',.",.;;.; , / ' L. .d Cutts the most appropriate moment. act like a shock force, charging fast, rath er than as II's victoryoverthe
• Brit ish, Austrians and allies: 52,000 men
. >: ,': .: ~'i(,,';1f': k"C~ J ..
• Commanded by John Church ill, 1st Earl (t hen mounted infantry relying on pistol firepower. He
French at
Dettingen did nor
MarshalMarsin &-""'..... ,k"' .......... ~ '/ ;1(-,' .~ '" Duke) of Marlboroug h, and Prince Eugene of The British army used a massed cavalry charge at th e climax of have thesame
Elector of Bavaria ~... ~ ,,'~ ... / ~ ......
5avoy consequences as
Talla'd,,/ ' ¥-- ~~ Under Marlbo roug h, t he Briti sh army reached a Blenheim, Ramillies (1706) and Malplaquet
Blenheim.
---=" I ~ ,' 'C~ ~ • c. 13.000 men dead and wounded peak of successth at it wasnot to repeat in Europ e (1709). The infantry, drawn up in three ranks,
- ~
Sonderhelm ~~~~ for another century. The combat effect ivenessof were organi zed int o th ree firings, ensuring th at

===~' ~ __ ~
=' ~ (~~ ..~).
~. Blenheim
Franco -Bava rian alliance
Briti sh units was superb, especially the fire disci- continuou s fire was mainta ined. Brit ish infantry
Hochstadt r • 56,000 men pline and bayonet skill of th e infantry , and th e fire was mor e effective th an French fire, so th at
:?
\S\~
• Commanded by Marshal Camille de Tallard and cavalry's abil ity to mo unt successful charges the pressure of battlefield conflict wit h the Brit ish
\'le~ "=-- Max Emanuel. Elector of Bavaria
relying on cold steel. Extensive experience of was high. The artillery was handled in a capable
· c. 18.000 dead/woun ded and c. 13.000 priso ners campaigning and batt le in the 1690shad been an fashion : the cannon were bot h well posit ioned on
important factor in th is success, and also played a the field, and re-sited and moved forward to

I SO
1S1
 3S E I GH TEENT H C E N T UR Y
The Blenheim affect th e tempo of the battle. As Marlborough
Tapestry , 1175. was Master-General of the Ordnance as well as
The memory of
Captain-General of the Army, he was able to over-
Blenheim waskept
alive a t the new come institutional constraints on coopera tion.
pala ce built for the Marlborough's battles were fought on a more
Spencer·Churchill
extended front than those of the 1690s, let alone
Dukes of
Marlborough in the 1650s, and thus placed a premium on mob il-
theOxfordshire ity, plann ing and th e ability of comm anders to
countryside.
respond rapidl y to developments over a wi de
front and to integrate and influence what might
otherwise have been a number of separate con -
flicts. Marlborough anticipated Napoleon 's skilful
and det ermined generalship in th is respect, and
was also successful in coord inat ing th e deploy-
ment and use of infant ry, cavalry and cannon on
the battlefield.
Casualty rates, however, were very high . The
exchange of fire bet ween nearby lines of c1osely-
packed troops, the battlefield use of artillery
against such formations, and cavalry engage-
ments relying on cold steel all produced high
casualties. Some 1,500 of the 4,000 British troops
who stormed the Schellenberg Heights in 1704
were killed or wounded .
152
Consequences
Blenheim was followed by the conqu est of south-
ern Germany asBavariawas'taken out' of the war.
After both th e battle and the subsequent retreat
to the Rhine, most of th e Franco-Bavarian army
was no longer effective. The Allies were able to
take th e major fortresses of Ulm, Ingolstadt and
Landau before the close of the year. French forces
were not to campaign so far east again unt il 1741.
Marlborough won oth er battles, but non e had
the dram atic impact of Blenheim, in part because
that victory had ended the danger of the ant i-
French alliance collapsing.
Marlborough also found t hat victory did not
end th e difficulty of obtain ing co-operation
among the Allied forces, and th is, comb ined with
differences in military and diplomatic strategy
among the political leaders, especially Dutch
caution, made his task very difficu lt. Nevert heless,
he benefited personally, becoming a duke, wh ile
Parliament provided the funds with which in
Oxfordshire he built a majo r palace named after
his great victory, an unp recedented reward for a
British general.
Poltava
Date: 8 July 1709 Location: eastern Ukraine
God today in his great mercy has granted usa matchless vic tory over the enemy.
In short, their entire force has been defea ted.
PETERTHE GREAT, 1709
he battl e of Poltava marked the turn ing
T point in th e epic str uggle of the Great
Nort hern War (1700- 21) that decided the
balance of power in nort hern Europ e and marked
the emergence of Russia as a great power. The
war began with a combined attack by Russia,
Denmark and Saxony-Poland.The Allies hoped to
part it ion Sweden 's Baltic empire between th em,
but seriously underestimated th e young king
Charles XII. Having knocked out Denmark wi thin
a few mo nth s, Charles defeated Tsar Peter the
Great at Narva in November 1700. Russia
remained at war, but could do little to prevent
Charles overrunn ing both Poland and Saxony
by 1706. The Swedes rested in Saxony, creating
considerable app rehension asto th eir next mov e.
Aware t hat Russia was rebu ilding it s fo rces,
Charles t urned eastwa rds through Poland and
into the Ukraine in 1707.
The main army of 38,000 crossed th e Berezina
and defeated a Russian force at Holowczyn in July
170B. But it was clear that Peter's forces were
much improved. The Russian army was already
being transformed before he became Tsar in
1696. Peter stepped up the prog ramme of inte-
grati ng western European ideas and techn ology
wit h native experience and numbe rs. Though
unsuccessful at Narva, the Russians were gaining
confidence and already displaced most of the
hired forei gners in the senior ranks by 1708. Mil i-
tary doctr ine was revised after Holowczyn to give
greater emphasis on firepower to counter the
Swedish shock (go po) tactics. However, Peter was
Victory symbolically crowns Peter theGreat on th e field of
battle in thispaint ing attribut ed to Gottfried Danhouer.
153
 POLTA V A 36
36 E I GH TE EN THe E N T U R Y

.. attacked , but was beaten off by the Swedish

~camp cavalry that also cleared the Cossacks from the
Budyschenski woo d. Most of th e Russian cavalry
}Jl.: Russians
fled northwards to a gu lly called t he Great
• 30,000 infantry; 9,000 cavalry; about 3,000
Cossacks; 102 guns , plus the Poltava garrison Ouvrage , pursued by the Swedish horse, but
• Com manded by Prince Alexander Danilovitch some rallied under Men shikov south of the camp.
Menshikov (under the overall command ofTsar Rehnskold regrou ped t he Swedish infantry in a
Peter the Great) depression about 1 km (0.6 miles) west of the
• 1,345 killed and 3,200 wou nded enemy camp, but was unable to make th e main
att ack because Roos' grou p wasst ill on the wr ong
Swed es side of t he redoubt s. Roos had lo st over 1,000
Ribtsi
• 9,500 in fan try ; 12,800 cavalry; 32 guns and up to men t rying to take th e redoubts. He now had no
5,000 Cossacks
idea whe re the main army was and retreated into
• Com mand ed by Field Marshal Coun t Carl
the Yakovetski wo od wi th 1,600 survivors. Realiz-
Gu nt her Rehnskold (u nd er the overall com mand
CD 3.45 am Swedish advance of King Charles XII) ing his predicament, Menshikov sent a strong
• 6,900 killed and wo unded, p lus 2,800 (m ostl y
force of infantry and dragoons to catch him. Roos
w ou nd ed) pr isoners. Another 13,558 soldi ers was fin ally forced to surrender near Poltava at
and 5,000 civilians were captured at 9.30 am afte r heroic resistance.
Perevoloch na
Pet er had learnt his lesson at Narva, and now
advanced smart ly out of his camp to atta ck the
main Swedi sh force. Leaving a small for ce to hold
N King Charl esXII af
Swedish Ru ssian
•
Ci
• infantry - - retreat of Swedes (see;"'ap'rlghtl"
~ cavalry a earth redoubts ...
t I -
:f- -----r--'
I

Above lett The not yet ready fo r a major batt le and conti nued to
Swed ish infa ntry retreat , destroying t he countryside as he went.
assaultoverran the
firs, redoub ts.
The Swedes suffered grievously in the harsh
winter of 1708 after their supply convoy was cap-
Above ri ght The tured at Lesnaia in October. Intending to open
Russian counter-
the route northeast to Moscow, Charles besieged
attack tra pped
a nd destroyed the small town of Poltava on the Vorskla, a tribu -
most ot tne tary of the Dnieper. The place was poorly fortified,
Swedish army.
but th e Swedes lacked proper equipment and the
siege dragged on. Charles needed a decisive
victory to win fresh ground and convince the
Turks and Tartars to join him . Peter also sought
battle and moved across the Vorskla to an
entrenched camp north of Poltava. Charles was
wounded in the foot during a small skirmish and
had to be carried about in a litter. Nonetheless, he
resolved to attack, entrusting tact ical comma nd
to Field Marshal Rehnskold (16S1-1722).
The Russian position
The Swedes had a form idable task. The main
Russian army was entrenched in a rough rectan -
1 rriile
gle backing onto th e bluffs above t he Vorskla.
There were only th ree exits and the approac h was
strewn with obstacles. There were 51 infantry
battalions totalling 25,000 men inside wi th 73
guns, many of which were on platforms to fire
over the parapet. Any approach from the west
was blocked by the Ivanchinsti stream and
8udyschenski wood, both watched by Cossack
cavalry. The Yakovetski wood exte nded from t he
southern side as far as Poltava and was guarded
by another 1,000 infantry and a similar number of
Cossacks. Poltava was held by a further 4,000
foot and 28 guns. This left only a narrow route
between the two woods. A line of earth redoubts
was built to block this w ith another line extend -
ing at right angles towards the Swedish camp so
asto enfi lade any attack ing force . Eight battal ions
totalli ng 4,000 men held these redoubts together
with 16 guns, while 9,000 cavalry in 85 squadrons
drew up behind unde r Prince Menshikov
(1673-1729). The latt er had another 13 light
cannon attached.
Aware that other Russian forces were in the
vicinity, Charles was fo rced to detach 1,800
cavalry (off the map) south of Poltava. Another
1,100 infan try , 200 cavalry and 2 gu ns held th e
siege lines aro und th e town , w it h 1,000 Polish
lig ht cavalry in the Yakovetski woo d. Most of th e
arti llery was left behind wi th the baggage that
was guarded by 2,000 horse and Charles's
Cossack allies. This left only 18 battalions (8,200
men), 109 squadrons (7,800 men) and a mere 4
gunsfor the assault.Charles intended to rush past
the redoubts before dawn and attack the
entrenched camp . By concentra ting his ent ire
force at one point, he hop ed to break in and roll
up the Russians who would be crowded together
inside.This had worked at Narva, but now Charles
was facing a very different Russian army.
Th e Swedish attack
The Swedes were delayed by the late arrival of
their cavalry and did not advance until 3.45 am on
8 July, by which time it was already lig ht. Worse
still, the battalion commanders were not told
w hether they should move past or storm the
redoubts. As a result, six battalions got left behind
under Major General Roos. Menshikov counter-
the camp, he massed 22,000 infantry in two lines,
flanked by his dragoons who had now rallied. The
Swedes coul d muster barely more tha n a single
Sweden wearing
the sameaustere
blue and yellaw
li ne of foot, w hile most of t heir cavalry were still uniformastherest
afhisarmy.
refor ming after th eir earlier efforts. Nonetheless,
they st uck to th eir offe nsive tacti cs and charged
the Russians. Some battalions managed to close,
despite heavy musket and artillery fire, but the
Swedes were overwhelmed by superior numbers
and dissolved in rout.
Swedish surrender
Charles and t he survivors fled south to
Perevolochna where their path was blocked by
t he Dnieper River. The king and his escort
managed to get across, but the rest were too
demoralized to resist once the Russians arrived
and surrendered on 13July. Having been st ripped,
the Swedes were forced to watch the execution
of the Cossacks who had joi ned them and were
t hen marched off into capt ivity. Charles escaped
to exile in Turkey, before returning to Sweden
and dying in action in 1718. Sweden relinquished
most of its Baltic empire in the 1721 peace settle -
ment, that confirmed Russia's new status as a
great power.

1SS
154
 BEL GR A D E 37

Belgrade defenders resisted th e siege for 43 days, but Danub e at Pancsova (Parceva), east of Belgrade.
eventually gave up t he fo rtress on 16 Octobe r. By 18 June Belgrade was surrounded and th e
Rejecred by Louis
During the win ter, Eugene made preparat ions for Imperialists were busy building their protective XIV, Prince Eugene
next year'scampaign, the mai n objective being to ent renchme nts against the fortress (counter- ofSavoy entered
Date: 15 June-22 August 1717 Location: modern Yugoslavia recapt ure Belgrade, t he strongest Ottoman valati on) and the approach ing relief army (cir- the serviceof the
Austrian
military base that controlled th e main invasion cumv allat ion ). Eugene's army had a paper Habsburgs, scoring
There isno doubt that the blood which isgo ing to flo w on both sides will fa ll like a curse route against Habsburg Hunga ry. strength of 100,000 men, over 100 field guns and many victoriesfor
upon you, your children and your children 's children until the last j udgmen t. a st rong siege artillery train. Defended by the them in the War af
the Spanish
GRANDVIZIERSILAHDARAu PASHATO EUGENEOFSAVOY, APRIL 1716 The battl e of Belgrade Danube from th e north and the Sava from the
Succession and
On 15 June 171 7, using pontoon bridges, the west, Belgrade was guarded by 30,000 men and against the
Imperial army under Prince Eugene crossed the 600 cannons under SanMustafa Pasha. When the Ottomans .

H
absburg-Ottoman relations remained rel-
I, atively calm following the peace treaty of
Karlowitz (1699). Both empires waged
wars on other fronts . The War of the Spanish
Succession and the Hungarian insurrection of
Ferenc Rakoczi II tied up Vienna's resources. The
Ottomans were fighting successful wars against
the Russiansand the Venetians. Prince Eugene of
Savoy, Imperial Field Marshal and President of the
Viennese Aulic War Council, watched Sultan
Ahmed Ill's recent conquests in the Morea (Pelo-
ponnese) and Crete with great suspicion. On
Eugene's suggestion, the Habsburgs formed a
defensive alliance with Venice in 1716, leading to
Istanbu l's declaration of war against Vienna.

The war of 1716-17

The 1716 campaign resulted in major Habsburg
victories . The Imper ial army, 70,000 strong and
commanded by Eugene, met the Ottoman army
under Grand Vizier Damad Ali Pasha, the victor
of the Morea campaign, at Petervarad (Peter-
wardein ), northwest of Belgrade on the right
bank of the Danube. Without Tartar and Wal-
lachian auxiliaries, even the paper strength of the
regu lar Ottoman forces was hardly more than
70,000: 41,000 janissaries and 30,000 sipahis
(Turkish cavalry). The battle of Peterva rad (5
Augu st 1716) ended with the defeat of the
Ottoman troops with some 6,000 dead, including
t he Grand Vizier. Despite severe Imperia l lossesof
4,SOO dead and wounded, Eugene decided to
besiege Ternesvar, the centre of an Ottoman
provin ce since 1S52 and a stro ng Ottoman
fortress guarded by 12,000 men. Ternesvar's

lS6
 37 E IG H TE E N TH C E N T U R Y

----'~OM BATANTS ' - - -_

~
~~
-;=< .
~
Panc sova

Austrian Habsburgs
Rossbach
• 100,000 men(paper strength)
•Commanded by Prince Eugene of Savoy, Date: 5 November 1757 Locat io n: w est of Leipzig, Germany
Imperial Field Marshal (1663- 1736)
• S,OOO casualties When our great Frederick arrives
and just claps his knee
Ottomans then the entire imperial army
•Ottoman d efend e rs of Belgrade: 30,000; pandours and French flee
o 2k m Ottomanrelief army: over 100,000 (paper C ONTEM PORARY SONG
I ' strength)
o 1 :ni le

- - Austrian Habsburg fortificat ions •Commanded by Grand Vizier HaC! Halil Pasha
- - Onoman fortifi cations • 10,000 casualties
& Ott om an camps
ossbach was the most com plete victory

Above This
reconstruction
sho ws th e
Ottoman relief army under Grand Vizier HaC! Halil
Pasha arrived on 27 July, Belgrade had been seri-
field army'sartillery fire. Eugene had to act quickly
if he wasto save hisarmy, w hich was suffering not
R won by Frederick the Great of Prussia.
Frederick began his reign in 1740 wi th a
surprise attack on Austria, grabbing t he valuab le
deployment of ously destroyed by the Habsburg bombardment. only from enemy fire but also from dysent ery. province of Silesia. Austria was forced to acknowl-
fo rces and the The pap er strength of the Ottoman fo rces was Hopi ng that th e besieged wo uld not be able edge this loss five years later, but planned
coun tervalJation
well above 100,000 men. However, contem po- to fight for some days after th e large explosion revenge. A radical shift in European alliances
and
circumvoltation raries noticed th at regu lar troops composed only on 14 August , Eugene decided to attack th e bro ught France, Russia and Sweden on Austria's
built by Eugene. 'a small pro portion of t heir whole body. The Ottoman army on 16 August. While he left 10,000 side by 1757 . They resolved to dismember Prussia
rest... are a mob... ignorant of all discipl ine, and men in t he trenches facing the fortress, Eugene and destroy its formidable military potentia l.
BelowEugene
are neith er armed no r trained sufficien tly well to unleashed his remai ning forces in the early
crownedhis career
with the battle of make a stand against a regula r for ce.' Knowi ng morning when the thick fog cleared that had con- Prep arat i on s fo r conflict
Belgrade, otter the weakness of his forces, the Grand Vizier chose cealed the Imperialists' movements. Thanks to Fearing attack, Frederick struck first in August
which he retiredas
not to eng age Eugene's army in an open battle. the courageous Bavarians and at the expense of 1756 by invading Saxony (now northwest
the most successful
general of the Instead, he kept up a deadly artillery fire on the over 5,000 dead, the Imperialists destroyed t he Germany), hoping to seize this as a forward
Austrian Imperialists from his elevated position to the east Ottoman army, capturing all 150 pieces of the base in the com ing war. This move played into
Hab sburgs .
of the city, against which the circumvallation Ottoman artillery and the Grand Vizier's camp. Aust rian hands, enabl ing it to legitimize it s own
gave little protection. The Imperialists were The Ottomans, who lost perhaps as many as war of revenge as defence of the Holy Roman
caught between the defenders' and the Ottoman 10,000 men, retreated towards Ni~. A day after the Empire. In keeping with its defens ive character,
battle the defenders of Belgrade, who - blinded th e empire relied on its constituent territories
by Windy weather conditions - had remained to second their own troops to form the Reich-
passive during the battle, surrendered. On 22 sarrnee, or imperial army. Limited coordination
August, Eugene and his men moved into the city . was provided by the ten 'circles', or regional
organizati ons, of the German terr itories.
Significan ce However, the mote ambitious princes ruling
The Habsburg -Ottoman war of 1716-17 was the larger territories frequently refused to subordi-
briefest of the military conflicts between the two nate their forces to the circle organization and
empires . With the conquest of Belgrade and the made the ir own arrangements, while their
Ternesvar region, Prince Eugene of Savoy smaller neighbours often had to raise their con-
crowned his career asthe most successful military tingents from scratch.
leader of his time. The following peace treaty of
Frederick the Great shortly after the barrie of Rossbach. The
Passarowitz (17 18) restored the 'natural' Danub e action iscelebratedfor the Prussian tacticsofdisciplined
borderline between the two empires . movement, cavalry shock and infantry firepower.

158 159
 38 E I GH TE E NTH C E N TUR Y
These shortcomings were to have a major
impact on the outcome of Ross bach, but the
wider political circumstances were probably
more significant. Most German territories were
reluctant to follow Austria's lead. The members of
the three northern circles were largely allied to
Prussia and Britain and formed their ow n army
to oppose the French. Austria was supposed to
provide 36,200 men from the Austr ian and Bur-
gun dian circles. Yet it needed its own army to
invade Silesia and sent only 8,200 men, most ly
hussars and 'pandours', or light infantry from the
Habsburg Balkan pro vinces.The oth er five circles
fielded 33,000 men, only 10,000 below th eir
officia l quot as. Mi litarily it wo uld have made
sense to use th ese forces as garrison troop s, but
po litically th e imperial army had to be at th e
forefront of t he campaig n to liberate Saxony.
Comma nd was entrusted to th e Prince of
Sachsen-Hildburghausen, an experienced adm in-
This rather stylized
contemporary
picture shows the
Franco-Imperial
army an the paint
ofcollapse.
160
R OSSB ACH 38
istrator, but a singularly unsuccessful general. He
had to collaborate with a French army under the
Prince de Soubise, a man who owed his
heavy guns. Most of the im perial army was
detached covering the flank and rear, leaving just
10,900 in t he camp . These we re divided into 12
• Mucheln
Imperialand . -
Prussian Franco-Imperials
_
~
IIIC::i!l
infant ry
cavalry
artillery
~
command largely to his connections at court. It batt alions and 39 squadrons, 13 heavy guns, and / FrenCh camp ~~~~an
was agreed that the jo int force would invade
7:~~t~uer
incl uded 3,860 Austrian cavalry and light t roops. \ Janus Hill
Saxony from Thuringia , while the main Austrian • Bed
y ra Frederick" / Seydlitz
army captured Silesia. Frederick would have to The Franco-Imperial adva nce ........ StGerma in
;
divide his forces to meet these two threats. Hildbu rghausen persuaded a reluctant Soubise • leiha . }tll
Branderoda • .. ......
However, they had not reckoned on the speed to agree to att ack Frederick on 5 November 1757. ~ Gallows Hill Rossbach lundsta dt
--I
of the Prussian response. Frederick left his main Five French brigad es under th e Comte de St l ou d on , • Reichardtswerben
t
\
army to hold Silesia while he dashed with 27 bat-
talions and 45 squad rons to confront the
Germain were to pin do wn th e Prussians by \'-+-__ Peltstadt . _ _
h?" ~agewerben
N
advancing onto the Schort auer Heights, wh ile the Zeuchfeld · ~
Franco-Imperial army. He gambled on defeating o 3 km
main army swu ng sout h and th en east to turn th e
G) TheFranco-Imperialsbelievethat their I !
this first and then hurrying back before th e Aus- enemy flan k. The Austrian lig ht troops under advancehasforcedthe Prussiansto retreat o 2 ~iles
tri an operations were fully und erway. The Loudon would occupy th e Gallows Hill and act as
Prussians crossed the Saale River in western a link bet ween St Germain and th e main fo rce.
Saxony to camp between the villages of Bedra Soubise merely hop ed th at Frederick would go ® The Franco-Imperial cavalry retreats ® Prussia" infantry and cavalrycombine
and Rossbach, opposite th e enemy position 4 km after a surprise Prusstan attack from forcesto surround and overwhelm
hom e, but Hildburghausen wanted to fall on him
behind JanusHill the Franco-Imperials
(2.5 mi les) away. The French muste red 30,200 and destroy hisarmy.
men in 49 batta lion s and 40 squadrons wi th 32 The plan was basically sound, but let down by
Janu s Hill JanusHill
poo r coordi nat ion and th e demoralized state of
t he allied army that had run out of food. Soubise
set off at 9 am witho ut having recalled foragi ng ~
Rosi bach- :
\ J"/I
~IlO
Rossbach
\ lund~dt ' )
"
~c~ardtswerben
parties or t he horses set out to graze, leaving the Lundstedt
} R~chardtswerben • : .....
~,
gunners to manhandle the ir pieces. Communica-
tion bet ween br igade commanders was almo st "
non-existent and the cavalry were soon 2 km
(1.25 miles) ahead of the infant ry, whil e the impe-
~'1
tlfii'" • Tagewe rben
~J
PI\ \ .) • Tagewerben
rial foot were squeezed out by the ir French
colleagues and dropped even further beh ind.
Short ly after 1.30 pm the allies ob served the
Prussian te nts suddenl y collapse and wi t hin
Thinking that Frederick was merely covering Top Allied forces
minu tes the Prussian army disappeared beh ind
try ro turn the
the long ridge of Janus Hill. Bot h generals were his retreat, t he allies cont inued th eir advance,
Prussiar: flank.
convi nced Frederick was retreatin g and Soubise bringing t heir infantry to with in 750 m (820 yd s)
w rote j ubila ntl y to Paris repo rt ing victory. of t heir now-station ary cavalry and moving eight Above left The
guns forward to reply. Seydlitz's cavalry suddenly initial Prussian
Frederick app eared to be unconcerned all attack.
morning, bu t General Friedrich Wilhelm von Sey- swept over th e hill and bore down on the Franco-
dlitz had ordered th e cavalry to saddle up and so Imperial horse that had yet to deploy from Above right
column of march. Only two regiments were out in The final Prussian
was ready to mov e w hen his king finally decided
a rrack prompts the
to act. A few troops we re left at th e camp site to front , but the se managed to delay the Prussians rival a rmy to flee.
watch St Germain, while t he infantry formed up long enough for some others to fo rm into line.
behind the Janus Hill and the cavalry assembled The Prussian first line recoiled, but th e second
further to th e east . A batt ery of 18 heavy guns was swept forward and broke th e leading Austrian
placed on the summit and opened up at 3.15 pm and French regiments. Most of the imperial
at the Franco-Imperial cavalry who had now cavalry, unused to manoeuvring, was swept
arrived north of Reichardtswerben . away, but one south German contingent fought
161
 38 EIGH TE ENT H CENT U RV
TheSzechenyi on until attacked in the confusion by the Austrian
Hussar regiment hussars. Soon, the entire allied cavalry was in
of the Austrian
contingent with retreat to Reichardtswerben where they panicked
theimperial and fled. Seydlitz halted southwest of here to
army, from a regroup. The melee had lasted just half an hour.
contempo rary
The leading allied infantry brigades halted
illustration.
once t he cavalry engagement started, but their
com manders neglected to tell those leading the
rearward units, who continued to press forward,
increasing the confusion. The Prussian infantry
now raced over the hill and swung into a single
line to maximize firepower. The French regiments
at the head of the allied columns had dep loyed in
columns for a bayonet attack, but wilted under
the hail of shot that was increased by the fire of
the Prussianbattalion guns.They gave way, disor-
dering the units behind them just as Seydlitz
launched a second cavalry attack . The French
infantry collapsed, and fled through the imperial
regiments beh ind them. Most of the latter now
ran off, though the Hessen-Darmstadt regiment
stayed to help cover the retreat along with St
Germain and Loudon 's men.
In a mere two hours, the Prussians had killed or
captured a quarter of the enemy for scarcely any
I f
loss themselves. The French suffered further
during their hasty retreat over the next two
weeks, while the imperial army virtually disinte-
grated.
162
r - - - - - r COMBATANTS ' - - -_
Prussians
Plassey
' 16.600 infantry; 5,400 cavalry ; 79 guns including
23 heavy guns Date: 23 June 1757 Locat ion: Bengal, northeast India
• Commanded by King Frederick t he Great
• 548 killed and wounded Gentlem en, this m orning at one 0 ' clock we arrived at Pla ssey gr ove and early in the
morn ing the Nabob 's whole army appeared in sight and cannonaded us for several hours
Franco-Imperi als an d about noon returned to a very strong camp.. . upon w hich we advanced and stormed
• 34,000 infantry; 7,500 cavalry; 114 gun s the Nabob's camp ....Our loss is trifling, not above 20 Europeans killed and wounded.
I ROBERTCLIVE TO THESELECT COMMITIEE OFTHE EASTINDIACOMPANY, 1757
• Commanders: French led by Prince Charles de
Soubise; Im perials led by Prince Josef Maria
Friedrich von Sachsen-Hildburghau sen
• French : 600 killed. 2.000 wounded. 5,000
captured; Imperial: 2,535 mostly captured. Both
lassey was a relatively minor engagement, June 1756 the newly acceded Nawab of Bengal.
forces also had 72 guns captured
bu t one w it h important consequences. Siraj-ud-dowla, stormed the poorly defended
Britain was the dominant European mili- British position in Calcutta, Fort William , confin-
tary power in India in 1756, but the local states ing his captives in the 'Black Hole'. Robert Clive,
Rossbach and German history were becomin g stronger as the Mughal emp ire Lieutenant Governor of Fort St David, the major
This ten -to-one ratio of lossesis extremely rare in declined. The French and the British East India British position in southeast India, was instructed
to retake Calcutta. In command of 850 British
18th-century battles, magnifying the scale of the Companies were part of a more general process
As with many
Prussian triumph. Frederick's military reputation of state-building in India, but also linked to inter- soldiers and 2,100 Indian sepoys (trained to fight bort/es. thesmall
wasrestored after defeats earlier th at year, and he national power systems in the shape of French like Brit ish regulars), Clive regained Fort William sco/eofthis
in late December, largely thanks to the guns of conflict bore no
went on to win another striking victory over the and Briti sh interests. European influence in India
relation to the vast
Austrians at Leuthen in Silesia that December. saw the spread of flintlock rifles, bayonets , pre- Rear-Admiral Charles Watson's supporti ng naval
consequences that
The two successes convinced Britain to continue pared cartridges and cast-iron cannon . Not unti l squadron . The Nawab's advance on Calcutta was wereto stem
its backing for Prussia, greatly contributing to the 18t h century in India did cavalry progress to then checked by Clive, Siraj-ud-dowla made Iromit.
Frederick's survival during the subsequent five infantry bearing firearms, while superior firearms
years of war. Austria abandoned its plans to and effecti ve tactics greatly improved artillery. _British _Indian infantry
Calcutta
recover Silesia and made peace on the basis of The initi al crisis in Bengal arose as a result of Plassey";<: ~ ~ cavalry
the pre-war status quo in February 1763. th e Brit ish needing to defend their position. In Mangora artillery
;../.~. ,...../
INDIA/
....
The immediate mil itary consequences were far
less dramatic. Hildburghausen resigned, but the \ ] Boya'
Bengal
imperial army reassembled and fought on with -_....I' COMBATANTS '---__. ()
some success until the end of 1762. Later writers ~
largely ignored the divisive impact of the Seven Anglo-Indian force Balchera ... ~
Years War on German politics, using Rossbach as • 850 British troops; 50 naval gunners; 2,100 Indian
~ ~
-.l7;~.. ~
,~
a symbol of Prussia's allegedly superior politica l sepoys
and military organization. In fact, over-confi- • Commanded by Robert Clive
dence and inept leadership turned simple defeat •c. 60 casualties Lodg~ \ .... ~ -:. II' /
« <:«:
l. ' R - ..
Ramnagar
into disaster. While Rossbach iscelebrated for the ~
Prussians' disciplined movement, cavalry shock Indians
attacks and infantry firepower, it was the French •c. 50,000 men
1.1. ~~
who pointed to the future w it h their mixture of • Commanded by Siraj-ud-dowla. Nawab of o 1 km'
I
linear and column formations. All these elements Bengal I
a 05 h,i1es
were to be refined by Napoleon and contribute to •c. 500 casualties Plassey
Prussia's own disaster at Jena in 1806. jl ' ---
163
 39 EI GH TE E NTH C E NTUR Y

the flanks and his ten field guns and howitzers. An

artillery duel began and Clive wi thdrew his men
into th e grove. The Indian s mad e no real effort to
Quebec
atta ck, with th e exception of a cavalry advance
that was dri ven back by grapeshot, and Mir Jaffir's Date : 13 Septembe r 1759 Location: eastern Canada
men were deliberat ely inacti ve. Rain th en sabo-
tag ed mo st of th e Nawab's guns, but th e British We stood to receive them; they began their fireat a distance, we reserved ours, and as they
gunn ers kept th eir powd er dry. As th e Indian came nearerfired on them by divisions, this did execution and seemed to checkthem a
artillery (manned by Frenchmen ) retreated, Clive little, however they still advancedpretty quick, we increasedour fire without altering our
advanced to man th e embankment surround ing position, and, when they werewithin less than an hundred yards, gave them a full fire, fixed
a large pond to th e front of his position. An Indian our bayonets, and under coverof the smokethe whole line charged.
infantry attac k wasrepelled by Clive'sart illery and ANONYMOUSBRmsHPARnCiPANT, 1759
infantry fi re and, as th e Ind ians retreated, Clive's
men advanced rapidly, storming the Ind ian
encampment. The Nawab had already fled.

T
he clash that ensured that North Ameri ca success. The Brit ish were able to move forces
Consequences woul d draw on Brit ish rather th an French wi t hin their imperial syste m, and to stop the
Casualties were slight, but the political conse- cult ure, t he battl e outside Quebec, was th e French fro m doin g th e same. The blo ckade of
quences were important. The subsequent result of th e Briti sh det ermin ation to capture th e Brest (th e leading French naval base) made it diffi-
defection of Mir Jaffir, whose son had the Nawab French bases in Canada. Conflic t between the cult for France to send sub stant ial reinforcements
killed, was a dramatic example of how th e British two powers had broken out anew in North to , or to maintain important tr ade links wi th, their
benefited from th eir ability to wi n local allies. America in 1754, but the French largely held their colonies. French insurance premiums for ships to
Abov e Francis peace and, on 9 February 1757, recogn ized Cal- Mi r Jaffir was installe d as the Nawab's successor, own until the 1758 campaign. On 9 July 1755, Quebec rose from about 5 per cent in 1755 to
Hayman. one of they and their Native American allies ambushed over 50 per cent in 1758, and were seldom ob tain -
cutta as British. enabli ng Clive to establish himself as a poli ti cian
rheleading
painter: afrheage, Concerned about the French presence in wi th a gift of over £250,000. The Brit ish victory and routed a force of British regulars advancing able in 1759, a year in which many of the
dep icts Robert Bengal, Clive next attacked th eir fort at Chander- at Buxar in October 1764 led to th e Treaty of on Fort Duquesne (modern Pittsburgh, Pennsyl- merchantmen sent to Canada were captured.
Clive and Mir Jaffir nagore, an advance made possible by excellent vania). In 1756, the French drove the British from In 1759, benefiting from reliable pilots and
Allahabad (1765) which recognized the Brit ish
afte r th e Battle of
navigation in the waters of the Hooghly River. position in Bengal and Bihar: the Mughal emperor the southern shores of Lake Onta rio, capturing nearby harbour facilities at Halifax, both of whi ch
Plassey, c. 1760.
Close-range fire from Watson's warships was conferred th e right to collect revenue and Fort s Ontario, George and Oswego, and in 1757 had been lacking du ring previou s atte mp ts in
Belo w A ma rch- instrumental in its fall on 23 March. Suspicious, they bom barded Fort William Henry at the head 1690 and 1711, the Briti sh navy convoye d a force
conduct civil justice, the diwan, on the East India
lock mu sker or
however, of intrigues between the Nawab and Company. Bengal and Bihar were to prov ide a of LakeGeorge into surrender. of 8,640 men, includi ng 6,560 Briti sh regulars and
toradorfrom
Lahore, India (late the French, Clive determined to replace the solid source of revenue and manpower, and to be In 1758, however, t he balance of advantage 1,190 American mi litia, under James Wolfe to ju st
lBrh century), Nawab and reached an agreement with one of his th e basis of British imperial power in Asia. shifted. William Pitt the Elder, the most dynamic outsi de Quebec. Alth ough young , Wolfe was
Brirish-rrained
generals, Mir Jaffir. Clive then marched towards The number of troops at Plassey was far fewer Brit ish minister, had written of the need for 'an experienced and had a well- deserved reputation
troops usingmore
efficienr Ilintkxks th e Nawab 's capital at Murshidabad, taking the than those w ho fought at the Third Battle of offensive war....The King is of op inion, t hat the for energy and determination. The relatively A skilled
benetued from fort at Cutwa en route . taking of Louisbourg and Quebec can alone small forces involved in trans-oceanic operations, commander,
Panipat on 14 January 1761, wh en Afghan
rheir fire quality. Louis-Joseph,
invaders of India defeated the Marathas in proba- prove decisive'. In 1758, Pitt planned a three - and the close similarity of their weapons and Ma rquis de
Battle bly the largest land batt le of the century; but, in pronged offensive on Canada. A British frontal methods of fighti ng, put a great premiu m on Mon rcalm had
The Nawab stationed his army to block Clive's attack on Fort Carillon at the southern end of Lake leadership (especially the abil ity to understand been pa rti cul arly
term s of the long-term history of South Asia and
effectivein the
• advance near the village of Plassey, where the consolidation of an Indian state, the British Champlain on 8 July was repulsed wi th heavy and explo it terrain). as well as on mo rale, and unit
early srages of
two forces met on 23 June 1757. Clive victory at Plasseywas more important. losses - nearly 2,000 killed or wo unded ; bu t the cohesion and firepowe r. the war.
deployed his men in fro nt of a mango French lost th eir majo r North American naval Wolfe arrived near Quebec on 26 June, but the
grove with an acute angle of the base, Louisbourg on Cape Breton Island on 26 natural strengt h of th e posit ion, French fortifica -
river behind him , the sepoys on July. This op ened th e way to a Brit ish amphibious tions, and th e skilful character of th e Marquis de
advance up the 5t Lawrence River. The t hird Mo ntcalm's disposit ions thwa rted him fo r over
prong captured Fort Duquesne. two mon ths. Wolfe's initia l operations along the
Naval power played a key role in British Beauport Sho re were unsuccessful : on 31 July

164 165
 40 EIG H TE ENT H C EN T U R Y

....--....J COMBATANTS
Prep a rations for battle

British
•c. 4,500 men
• Commanded by Major-Genera l James Wolfe
•c. 658 killed or wounded

Fren ch
•c. 4,500 men
• Comm anded by Major-General Marqu is Lou is-
Joseph de Mon tcalm
· 644 killed or wounded

an attack on French posit ions was repelled by

Montcalm's large army, w it h the Brit ish suffering
British attack .....-
Brit ish ret reat .....:-- 440 casualties to the French 60. As winter
French attack " ' - approached, it seemed increasingly likely that the
Fren ch ret reat ......- -
British reg im ent _ British would fail, although, at least, they avoided
French regimen t •
British d ispersed regiment • the heavy losses to disease suffered by British
Brit ish/French garr isoned po sit ion • • exped it ions in the West Indies.
Canadi an mi litia & Ind ians •
Wolfe risked a bold move. James Cook, later
famous as the explo rer of the Pacific, had thor-
oughly surveyed the St Lawrence, while British S,140 men, then landed and advanced to the of the French force persuaded the British not to A View of th e
o

f
The battle
warships had passed beyond Quebec from 18 Plainsof Abraham to t he southwest of the city. pursue the French into the city , The French were Taking of Ouebec.
I
o / --® July onwards and made upriver raids on 8 Aug ust. still in control of the major fo rt ified posit ion and
Thispainting
/ vaudreuil and 1;S~t he Montreal underestimated
N '" I rnilitia are en route to th e battle at The army was to follow. On 1-3 September, Th e b attle 2,000 more French troops arrived immediately the difficulty and
'I the time o f the charge; after delays

t K
\
// ----anareversedcrecrsroOs.Quebec

\'_~
surrendered on 18 september

&1
British troops left the Montmorency camp and
moved along the sout hern bank of the river
opposite Quebec. On 10 September Wolfe,
Montcalm was in a strong posit ion, with a total of
13,000 men in th e area and fresh troops
approaching Wolfe's rear, but, instead of waiti ng
after the battle in the British rear, leading the
British to send the 48th and 35th regiments and
two field piecesto meet them . At a council of war,
hazard ofscaling
theeliffs.

\A- - - -.::;;-,. 0 '

I,® "\ ~/ having reconnoitred th e river, decid ed to land at on the defensive and uniting his forces, he chose the French offic ers decided not to risk battle

dislodge the BritiSh {

II
" 8 '
Montcalm is
I I fatallywOUndedaS ~ ~
\
.:; /
l Anse-au-Foulon to the west of the city, a move to attack with the men immediately available.The again, but to retreat upriver. The decision to
I
requiring a secret redeployment that was skilfully French advanced in columns, but their centre retreat was reversed on 17 Septe mber but, even
fromen occupled \ ) ~ ..,._ J,he f rench retreat ':.,._-.
house.but_are~ ~f'I ~~ handled .
drive~ba(kbythe j
'9hTinfa.ntryand l ,t• ~
~ .
I

~~
I <:
7"' ~ ""'--'; I
After delays due to th e weather , th e British
veered to the right, and their formations became
disorg anized. The British waited until the French
as a French relief force approached Quebec, it
surrendered on 18 September, far earlier than

--'" ---,.--0/'
members of th e ~ \ QUEBEC ~ landed in the early hou rs of 13 Septemb er. Some were about 30 m (100 ft ) away, then opened was necessary. The relief force was lessthan 5 km
.~ .-
15th regiment) .
k - ",
-.lit'
".--
#
'' ~
~--~
\
\~= 200 light infantry scaled th e cliffs and successfully regular voll ey fire. This close-range onslaught (3 miles) from Quebec when Commandant de
.'/ - T."...~
~/ =¥f \ att acked a French camp of 100 men from the rear. caused the French columns to disintegrate and Ramezaysurrendered the city .

.>:~-)ft£J
/A
® ~se(orethecharge.WOlfe
Another 38S men landed and overran the Samos
battery. The remainder of the British force, about
retreat before the British began the ir bayonet
charge. Wolfe had already been fatally wounded Consequences

r ~ded - f. ~ Above left Early an 13September 1759, British regiments

ston ed to land southwest ofQuebec. Preparation wascrucial
® The French colum.".scharge befo re help arrives to the correctpositioning of troops.
• from the north; Bntl sh troops begin to fire by
platoons. disrupting the French forma tion and
• fOf'Cing rt to veer to the right
Belo w left The batt le wasspeedily over, the French calumns
proving unable to prevail over the firepower ofthe British
lines.
before t he French advance, and Mo ntcalm was
mo rtally wounded ashis troops retreate d.
French and British casualties were compara -
ble, but French morale was shattered . Quebec
had not been captur ed, in part because the pres-
ence of 1,500 Canadian militia on the right flank
The captu re of Quebec was t he key blow to
French rule in Canada, but its impact was
enhanced by successfuladvances on other fronts ,
with th e British capturing Fort Niagara on 26 July
and Carillon (renamed TIconderoga ) on 27 July.
In early 1760, the French army still in Canada

166
167

b
 40 EIGH TE ENTH C ENT U R Y

Saratoga
Dat e: 19 September-17 October 1777 Location: New York state, eastern USA

...rashprojects, visionaryenterprises, and disastrous events.

BRITISH PAMPHLET DESCRI BING THE SARATOGA EXPEDITION

The battle

T
he defeat of an ent ire Brit ish army in 1777
was a key event in the winning of inde- On 19 September, Burgoyne approached the
pendence by the Americans. It was also American commander Horatio Gates's posit ion,
th e total failure of a bold strategy comprising which was fortified by breastworks and redoubts,
cutt ing th e rebellious Thirteen Colonies in half on Bemis Heights , a heavily wooded area
along the Hudson corridor. The British army in north of Stillwater on the western side
Canada advanced south, easily captur ing Fort of the Hudson . The advance was a
Ticonderoga on Lake Champlain on 6 July and disaster. Americans under Benedict
then advancing to the Hudson through difficult Arnold and Daniel Morgan
wooded terrain, made harder by the American s advanced to meet the British
felling trees in order to block the creeks. All war centre at Freeman's Farm, about
involves risk and not to have pressed on, having 2 km (1 mile) north of Bemis
taken Ticonderoga so easily, would have been to Heights, and Morgan 's riflemen
make no cont ribution to w hat appeared likely to inflicted serious casualties. Every
be the decisive campaign . If the British were tired, time the Brit ish advanced, th e
their opponents were also in a poor state, Americans withdrew, snip ing from
affected by low morale and desertion , and uncer- 180 m (200 yds) and killing officers in
tain how best to respond to the British particular. The British fought bravely but
commander John Burgoyne 's advance. Major- they did not reach Gates's entrenchments.
General Philip Schuyler had written about Burgoyne was at fault for failing to coordinate
Edward Penny, advanced to try to recapture Quebec: the British fell back on Montreal. That summer, British troops Ticonderoga on SJuly: his three advancing units, and for exposing his Charles Willson
The Death of
position there was weakened by the closure of advanced from Quebec, Ticonderoga and Lake 'Should an accident befallus in that quarterand troops in an engagement in which they lost the Peale'sportrait of
General James Horatio Gates,
Wolfe, 1763.A the St Lawrence by ice, which deprived the troops Ontario, and the greatly outnumbered French - the troops be lost we shallbe in a disagreeablesitua- initiative without possessing a strong defensive 1782. Successful
totemicsceneof of naval support and supplies. On the very same 3,S20to 17,000 men - unde r the Marqu is de Vau- tion, with little elsebesides militia; with not a single position to fall back on . Fortunately for Burgoyne , at Saratoga and
sacrificefor the battleground, the British were defeated in the an effective
dreu il (Governor-General of New France), piece of heavy or light artillery, and not one artillery Gates, an overrated general, refused to leave his
causeofempire administrator,
that prefigured battle of Sainte-Fay (28 April 1760), which was in surrendered at Montrea l on 8 September. Three man... we have no cartridge paper: entrenchments in order to support Morgan and
Gateswas to be
thatofNe/san many respects a replay of the 17S9 battle: the days later the fort at Tro is-Rivieres , bet ween Instead of resisting , they fell back. Arnold, while the British were assisted by an heavily defeated
at Trafalgar. French had 4,200 men, the British 3,870. The Quebec and Montreal, surrendered. A detached part of the British force, however, advance of German auxiliaries under General by the Britishat
The audience Camden in 1780
French carried the day with a bayonet charge that The 1760 campaign was an impressive was defeated near Bennington on 16 August , Frederick Riedesel, which eventually turned the
ata thearrein and wassoon
Birmingham, benefited from a lack of order in the British force, tr iumph of resources and planning, but it is while, having crossed the Hudson on a bridge of American right flank. Burgoyne was left in after rep/aced by
Eng/and, on 17 and the British retreated with heavier casualties appropriate that the fall of Quebec should receive raft s on 13 and 14 September, Burgoyne foolishly command of the battlefield, but he had lost about Nathanael Greene.
August 1791
into Quebec: 1,088 dead and wounded, com- most attention. At that stage, the fate of the war pressed on towards an American army that was 600 men, compared to 300 Americans, while
was promised Q
'grand serious pared to 833 French casualties. was more in the balance. Moreover, Wolfe in his grow ing in numbers and moving north from Gates still blocked the route south. The British
pantomime' The melting ice, however, enabled a British death provided a powerful icon of self-sacrifice Albany. He underrated the risks, not least advance had failed to fulfil its operat ional goals
culminating in fleet to arrive with reinforcements on 16 May. Yet and success, an image of imperial warfare that because he was well aware of his lack of accurate and had revealed serious weaknesses in British
Wolfe'sdeath.
again, naval power proved decisive. The French wasto possess gr eat potency. information. tact ics.

168 169
 SARATO GA 41
41 E I GHTE EN TH C E N TU RY

Burgoyne decided to try again, but he th en Gates, whose army had increased to 11,469 ---- CO M B ATA N T S ~--~
postponed his attack in order to see what impact
a British advance up the Hudson from New York
effecti ves, compared to 6,617 in Burgoyne's force.
When it was pointed out that the thick woods America ns
•••
under General Sir Henry Clinton would have. On made it impossible to obtain accurate informa- • Eventually 21,000 me n
Benedict Arnold, 28 September Burgoyne wrote to Clinton inform- tion , Burg oyne prop osed a reconna issance in • Commander-in-ehief General Horat io Gates;
the hero of General Benedict Arnold, General Daniel Morgan
ing him that he was outnumbered and cut off force th at could be broad ened into a fu ll att ack to
Saratoga, is
unhorsedastbe from Canada and had pro visions only until 20 turn the American flanks. Attempted on 7 • c. 430 casualties
Americans October. Clinton had only a small forc e, but on October, th is was repelled by th e Americans,
encounrer a group 6-7 October he advanced, seizing Forts Mont- although Gates's refusal to commit all his troops British
ofRiedese!'s
Hessians. Arnold
gomery, Clinton and Constitution. These, limited the extent of the disaster. The British lost • 7,000 men
wasseriously however, were still far from Burgoyne 's position. 600 troops , including several important officers, • Com mande r-in-Chie f Gener al John Burgoyne;
wounded at Bemis Since the engagement of 19 September, while there were about 130 American casualties. General Sim on Fraser; German auxilia ries led by
Heights. In 17BO he General Fred erick Riedesel
Burgoyne 's increasingly exposed army had been The battle destroyed the morale of Burgoyne 's
entered into
• Entire Briti sh for ce t aken as pr ison ers of war
treasonous affected by falling morale, decreasing supplies army, and on 8 October the British began to
correspondence and desertions . At a Council of War on 5 October, retreat, leaving the ir wounded, a measure that
with the British,
his officers pressed Burgoyne to retreat while further hit morale. The Americans, however, had
butwasthen
discovered and there remained a chance, but he obdurately already fortified the opposite bank of the Hudson "'="' Saratoga

farced raflee. responded by calling for a full-scale attack on to prevent a crossing. Burgoyne was persuaded
to abandon the gu ns and baggage, and retreat by
forced marches in order to cross the Hudson
above Fort Edward, but, when he discovered
that the route was also blocked , he counter-
manded th e march. Encamped at Saratoga,
Burgoyne 's army was reduced to
waiting for Clinton, while exposed
to constant fire.
Clinton 's men were pushing forward, but on NEW YORK X
14 October Burgoyne began negotiating with
Alban~ r-
t
l---
Gates, and on 17 October the army surrendered . ,,
Keen to settle because he was concerned about NEW'<" N.J
JERSEY " ,Y
Clinton's advance, Gates agreed to terms under
w hich Burgoyne 's troops were to return to Britain
on condition that they did not serve again in
America. This type of parole was natural to Euro-
pean combatants and Gates, an ex-major in the
British army, believed that he was acting accord-
ing to normal conventions. Worried that those
who surrendered and were returned to Britain
would simply replace other soldiers w ho could be
sent to fight, however, Congress disavowed the
conventi on and kept the soldiers as prisoners of
war. The British troops ended up in Virgin ia,
marching all around the back country till late in
the war.
Burgoyne 's approach to forest operations had
been insuffi ciently flexible . The British general,
Simo n Fraser, was shot down by Morgan 's marks-
men on 19 September, or his German counterpart
Riedesel might have succeeded in defeating the --...... American units
~ and movem ent
Americans. But with Burgoyne in command, the
. . . . British units
and movement
Ab ove right The firstarrack. TheBrit ishforce waschecked, o Britishposition
afterthe battle
but Riedesel led a counter-attack on the American right,
enabling Burgoyneraachievea drawn battle by nightfall. <> red oubt

Below ri ght Burgoyne'sfinal atrack. After being checked,

.........
••
fortifications
qua rter of
com man de rs
Burgoyneand hisarmy left the British waunded an the battle-
field and retreated to Saratoga where termswereagreed.

171
 41 EIGHTE ENTH CENTU RY
British suffered seriously from poor leadership.
To be 'Burgoyned' - surrounded and captured -
became a common term .
Consequences
The loss of the troops was serious, but so also
were the strategic consequences. Thereafter the
British did not attack south from Canada. As a
result, they adopted a marit ime strategy that
centred on control of ports and coastal areas
without the additional dimens ion of overland
capability provided by an offensive force based in
Canada. This reduced the strategic options open
to the Briti sh. Saratoga marked the end of any
serious prospect of cutting off New England from
the rest of America. Had Burgoyne retreated , he
would have been in a position to advance and
threaten the upper Hudson again. The campaign
also served as a warning to those th inking that
the Americans had really only one important field
army and, consequently, that its defeat would
signal the end of the war. When Burgoyn e's
advance had first been considered , it had been
assumed that the sole significant risk would be
if Washington moved against him . Instead,
The surrender of
Genero l Burgoyne
wastherewardfor
rashness. a failure
to unders tand the
geographical and
strategicsituation,
anda lack of
support fro m other
Brit ish generols.
Paroled, Burgoyne
was appoint ed
commander-in-
chiefinIrelandin
17B2.
172
Burgoyne had been defeated w hile Washington
campaigned near Philadelph ia.
The not ion th at the mi litia or Morgan's sharp-
shooting riflemen wo n Saratoga is a hoary old
tradition no long er accepted by mod ern scholars;
but one that again reflects the empha sis on vol-
unteeri sm and th e strength of sturdy amateurism
in the American mil ita ry myth. Saratoga power-
full y contributed to th is myth over the following
century. It was seen as a victory for a distinctly
American way of fighting. It was indeed the case
that, in August 1776, militia forces defeated a
British detachment at Bennington, which was a
major blow to the campaign. Furthermore,
Gates'sforce of Continenta ls at Saratoga wasonly
enabled to stand and fight because of the large
numbers of militia who had rallied to their
support. Most of the fighting on th e American
side, however, was done by Continentals
detached from Washington'sarmy under Arnold .
Saratoga had a major impact in America and
Europe, raising th e mo rale and prestige of the
Revolution. By help ing to demonstrate American
resilience, the campaign led France closer to
intervention.
Yorktown
Date : 29 September-19 October 1781 Location: Virginia, eastern USA
There was nothing to be seenbut bombs and cannonballs raining down on ourentire line.
FROMTHEDIARYOFJOHANNDOHLA, WHO FOUGHT FOR CORNWALLISATYORKTOWN, 17B1
he surrender of the British force at York- however destructive, was not going to secure it.
T town led to the end of the American War of
Independence, as it caused a crisis of confi -
dence in the continuation of the war and resulted
Moreover, Cornwallis was reduced to establish-
ing a position on Chesapeake Bay in response to
orders to cover an anchorage for British warships.
This represented a dangerous loss of flexibility
A watercotout ot
American soldiers
at Yorktown,
paintedbya
in t he fall of the British government. It was a deci- French oiiicet,
sive battle, won with few casualties. The defeat and the initiative, because the Americans and lea n-Baptiste-
more particularly marked the failure of both their French allies were preparing to act. Ant oin e de Verger,
incl udes a blac k
British land-sea coordination and of the strategy Nevertheless, at this stage, the war had not
infantryma n of the
for 17B1 which had led Cornwallis to march north been lost. It was apparent that neither the British First Rhode Island
across North Carolina and into Virginia. A lack of southern strategy nor the advance into Virginia Regime nt. This is
had brought the anticipated gains, but - asearlier th e only known
Loyalist support made hopes of conquering Vir-
contemporary
ginia idle, and Cornwallis 's operations there around New York City - the British had shown in renderi ng o f a
lacked a clear strateg ic purpose. If pacification the south tha t they coul d gain and hold im por- bla ck soldier in the
tant points and defeat American forces. Conti nental Army.
was the British objective, wandering into Virginia,
173

Furthermore, the economic bur den of the strug-
gle was becoming more pun ishing for the
Americans. Hyperinflation had wrecked the
Ameri can economy, and units mutinied in early
1781. Nathanael Greene, the commander of the
American forces in th e south, compl ained on 13
August 1782, 'The supply is so tri flin g com pared
to our wants that it has served little ot her purpose
than to mock our distress....Murmuring and dis-
content prevailed among the soldiers to a great
degree:
Furthermore, had the British successfully pre-
served their positi ons in America and pursued
their maritime war against France and Spain, they
Top A small and could have hoped to divid e th eir rivals. This was
shan siegeby
not to be, however, as the British provi ded their
European
opponents wi th an opportunity that they appre-
standards, but a
crucial one. This ciated and grasped. Cornwallis settled on
view ispainted by
Yorktown, a defensive posit ion that had little to
LouisNicolasvan
commend it, being unfortified, low-lying and
8larenberghe.
commanding no ground, although it did have an
Above George anchorage suitable for ships of the line. George
Washington by
Washington had hop ed to attack the British base
JamesPeale(after
Charles Willson of New York City, but rapidly took advanta ge of
Pealec. 1787-90). the possibilities created by Cornwallis 's moves.
Yorktown was the
American and French troops, including the
pinnae/eal
Washingtan's crucial French siege train , were moved south into
militarycareer. Virginia.
174
The British naval response was inadequ ate, in
large part because Admiral Rodney refused to
send suffi cient ships from the West Indies. and
the French were able to build up a crucial local
superiority in naval strength. As a result, on 5 Sep-
tember at the batt le of the Virgi nia Capes, the
Briti sh Admiral Thomas Gravesfound himsel f out-
num bered 24 to 19 in ships of the line. In t he
battle, neither side had any ships sunk. but the
clash was decisive in that it prevented Graves
from relieving Cornwallis's army.
Meanwh ile the net closed. French troops had
landed near the entrance to the James River on 1
September. while on 14 September Washingt on
reached t he Williamsburg peni nsula. Two days
later, reassured by a promise of naval support,
Cornwallis wrote, 'If I had no hopes of relief I
would rather risk an action , than defend my half-
finished works. but as you say [Admiral] Digby is
hourly expected , and promise every exertion to
assistme. I do not th ink myself justified in putting
the fate of the war on so desperate an attempt:
He soon had no opt ion. The Franco-American
force took up positions rou nd Yorktown on the
night of 28 September and the next day.
The battle
Encouraged by the promise of relief. Cornwallis
•
abandoned his outer works on the night of 29
September in order to tighten his position and
increase the density of his defence in the face of
the mor e numerous besiegers. Washington's
men occupied the outer wor ks on 30 September.
although they had to cope wit h heavy fire from
Cornwallis's cannon until, on 6 October, their own
artillery arrived. The besiegers were the n able to
begin convent ional siege-works against w hat
was,by the standards of the age. a vulnerable and
weakly fortified position.
On the night of 6 October, the besiegers began
to dig the first 'parallel', a trench parallel to the
fortifications and a crucial part of normal siege-
works. They com pleted it on 9 October and. t hat
afternoon, began the bombardment wi th a larger
and heavier artillery force than that of Cornwallis,
causing many casualties and damage. and badly
affect ing the mo rale of the defenders.
On 11 Octobe r. Cornwallis wrote,
•. ..nothing but a direct move to York River. which
includes a successfulnaval action. can saveme. The
enemy made their first parallel on the night of the
6th at the distance of {550 m] 600 yards. and have
perfected it, and constructed places of arms and
batteries with great regularity and caution . On the
evening af the 9th their batteries opened and have
since cont inued firing. without intermission wi th
about 40 pieces of cannon, mostly heavy, and 16
mortars... many of our works are considerably
damaged; wi th such works on disadvantageous
ground, aga inst so po werfu l an attack we cannot
hope to make a very long resistance.'
On 12 Octo ber a postscript reads:
'Last night the enemy made their second parallel at
the distance of {270 m] 300 yards. We continue to
losemen very fast.'
Many of Cornwallis's cannon had been
silenced by the bombardment, w hile a lot of his
troops were wounded or ill. On the night of 14
October. the besiegers bravely stormed the two
redoubts th at obstructed t he path of the second
parallel to th e river, and th us further curtai led th e Above Charles
Brit ish perime ter. Cornwallis wrote the next day. Cornwallis, 1st
Marquess
'Experience has shown that our fresh earthen works Cornwallis, by
do not resist their po werful artillery... .The safety of Thomas
the place is therefore so precarious that I cannot Gainsboraugh.
1783. Defeated at
recommend that the fleet and army should run
Yarktawn.
great risk in endeavouring to save us.' Cornwa//is rescued
hisreputation with
Theend successin India
(I 79 1-9}) and
On 16 Octob er. a sortie desig ned to spike the Ireland (1798).
besiegers' guns had only a limited and temporary
effect . Cornwallis therefore decided to try to cross
the York River to the Brit ish outpost at Gloucester
by night and then to atta ck the French force
175
 42 EI G H TE ENTH C EN T U R Y

blockading that position. The first detachment

Jemappes
On 17 October Johann Conrad Dohla, a
Fighting wit h crossed the river successfully late that day, but a member of the Ansbach-Bayreuth forc es in Corn-
backs to the river violent storm prevented the boats from crossing wallis's army, recorded , 'At daybreak the enemy
was never
recom mend ed, a second time , and, by the time the weather bombardment resumed, more terr ibly stron g
and weak improved, it was too late to mo unt an attack and than ever before . They fired from all positions Date: 6 November 1792 Location: near Mons, southwest Belgium
fartificat iansdid Cornwallis had to recall th e fir st wave. Under a w it hout let-up. Our comma nd, w hich was in t he
nat greatly
ferociou s bombardment th at could not be coun- Horn work, could hardly tolerate the enemy There was nat a unit in the French army that was not [at first) beaten,
impro ve the
situa tion for the tered, Cornwa llis decided to abando n the bombs , howitzers and cannonballs any longer: and that did not [then) close with the enemy with coldsteel.
British . position. That day, th e fourth anniversary of Burgoyne 's FROM THE MEMOIRS OF G ENERAL C HARLES F RAN~OI S D UMOURIEZ
surrender at Saratoga , Cornwallis proposed an
armistice in order to settle terms for his surrender.
\' ... British units and movements .
(
/
-
.......New York
American units and movements .
After negotiations on 18 October, the British
troops marched out of their ruined positions the emappes was the first major defeat of a reform s of more enlightened monarchies else-

PENNSYLVANI A \
French units and movements .
Franco-American ships
quarter of commanders. "
British redoub t s/outwor ks' 0
French/American parallelsof siege works-
following day to surrender to the t une of 'The
II World Turned Upside Down '.
Although the British still held Charleston, New
York City and Sava nnah, Yorktown was effective ly
J
professional army in Europ e by a force where. Prussia, Russia and Austria were far more
imbued with the revolut ionary principle of interested in the problems of eastern Europe.
France remai ned a monarchy, but the new liberal
motivated 'citizens-in-arms'. This form of organi-
government of t he Nationa l Convention failed to
zatio n stemm ed from th e French Revolution of

..
~ Briti sh fort fficat ions - t he end of Briti sh efforts in Nort h America. It led to 1789 and was expected to sweep the supposedly resolve its underlying prob lems. As radical, mod -
Choisy. batt eries ~I lil
<" . the fall of Lord Nort h's cabinet in March 1782, and uninterested mercenaries from th e field. erate and conservative fact ion sj ost led for power,
""~ '/ its replacement by a government under th e However, th e Revoluti onary Wars (1792-1802) war increasingly seemed a welcome way out of
GI~~~ Marquis of Rockingham pledged to negotiations were far more t han a simp le clash of opposing the domestic impa sse. The regio n of th e Austr ian
with the Americans. On the world scale, however, ideologies and thei r respective military institu - Netherla nds - modern Belgium and Luxembo urg
_~ __ !W.
...Tarleton r-~
~ ....
Britain did less badly . The temporary and local- tions. Few outsi de France believed that war was - had been in upheava l since 1787 and it was
~ D u nda 5 -.

--
ized superiority the French fleet had enjoyed off inevitable and thought the Bourbon king only widely predi cted in Paris that the inhabitan ts
the Chesapeake was not the consequence, nor had himself to blame for failing to im plement t he would we lcome t he French as liberators. The
cause, of a climatic battle in which one fleet

- destroyed the other and there was no decisive

shift in naval advantage against Britain. Instead,
on 12 April 1782, Rodney inflicted a serious defeat
on the French fleet off th e lies des Sa intes. Had it
come earlier th ere might have been a very differ-
ent result at Yorktown.

~---J CO M B ATA N TS~--~

Franco-American army
• 16,000 men

• Commanded by General George Washin gto n

• 600 casualt ies

.
.. -
Washington
America n
art ille ry park

•
light infantry
•
Washingt on U6 ,700) l

l
l

r
l
Br itish
• 6,000 men

• Commanded by General Lord Corn wallis

• Entire force taken pri soner
A contempo rary
etchi ng oi tne
battle of Iemappes
shawing the
French heroic ally
storming the
t
Austrianpositions.

176 177
 43 EI GH TEEN THe E N TU R Y
J E M APP ES 43

Convention decla red war on the Habsburg assem bled French fo rce at Valm y, 160 km (100 ~_...J' COMBATANTS .......----, Austrian French
emperor and directed the 34,000-strong Arrnee 2 km - infantry .... infantry
miles ) east of Paris on 20 September 1792. After I
~ cavalry ca cavalry
l
d u Nord to invade Belgium on 29 Apri l 1792. a cannonade, the Prussians withdrew having 1 mile V entrenchments ~ initialattacks
Fren ch
--,. follow-up assaults
lost only 184 men . This otherw ise insig nificant • Armee du Nord (38,000 men ; 100 9uns )
Th e campaign of 1792 engagement had major politica l repercussions. Jemappes
• Commanded by General Charles Francois
Though the French greatly outnumbered th e The next day the Nat ional Convention abo lished Dumouriez
Mon s

Austrians on the frontier, they fled south at the

first encounter. France appeared on the po int of
complete collapse, creating an opportunity for
the monarchy and procla imed a republic. Short of
supp lies, the allies retreated in disarray, allo w ing
the French to invade the Rhineland and send
• 4,000 killed and wou nd ed

Aust rians
",....;.'
\\
Cuesmes

Austr ia and Prussia to sett le their own differences Ferrand

more troop s to th e Belg ian fro nt ier.
at its expense. In retu rn for acknowledgment of Co mmand of the northern sector was
it s greatly enhan ced position in eastern Europe , entrusted to General Charles Francois Dumouriez
Prussia backed Austr ia's bid to seize Alsace and (1759- 1823), a minor aristocrat w ith 34 years
Lorraine from France under cover of an invasion
'Depart ure of the experience in the roya l army. Dumouriez's rein-
volunteers.' The intended to restore Lou is XVI's authority. forced Arrne e du Nord now numbered 90,000
wi ne bottle may be
The overconfident allies made poorly coordi- men , giving him a clear advantage over the
a reference to the
nate d attacks on northeastern France late that
I Frenchpracticeof
liv ing off rhe land. summer. The main Prussian army met a hasti ly
50,000 Austrians, most of w hom were dispersed
on interna l security and garrison du ty . Sending
smaller columns to d istract the Austr ians along
the frontier, Dumouriez pushed his main force
towards Mons , aim ing for Brussels. His troops
were a mi x of the old roy al army and new vol un-
tee r forces. There were 32 line battalions and
38 more battalions of volunteers, giving 35,000
infantry, plus 3,000 cavalry in 10 line regiments
and fou r free companies. The 100 guns were
served by experienced profess io nal artillerymen.
The Austr ians were commanded by Field
Marshal Albert Duke of Sachsen-Teschen
(1738- 1802) w ho cou ld muster only 13,200 men
in 14 battalions, 16 squadrons and 54 heavy guns
to confront th e invaders. He deployed on a ridge
south of the small town of Jemappes, w it h his
front prot ect ed by a stream, entrenchments and
the village of Quaregnon.
Battle is join ed
After three days of skirm ishing, Dumo ur iez fin ally
approached early on 6 Novem ber. He deployed
in three groups, each in two lines. The left under
General Ferrand was d irected to seize Quareg -
non, while the rig ht under Dampierre swung past
Frameries to outflank the Austrians and cut them
off from Mons . The centre wo uld th en make the
main attack. Things d id not go qu it e to plan.
After th ree hours of pre lim inary bomba rd -
ment the Aust rians were clearly outnumbered
• 13,200 men; 54 quns
• Commanded by Field Marshal Albert Duke of
5achsen- Teschen
• 305 killed, 513 wounded and 423 taken prisoner
and outgunned. Dumouriez ordered Ferrand to
start his assault at 10 am. The French infantry
for med bat ta lion col umn s and adva nced rapid ly
toward s Quaregnon, redepl oyi ng into lin e to fire
at the defenders. Supported by their main
battery, the Austrians th rew them back. The first
lin e of the French centre then advanced in battal-
ion columns to make the main attack around
noon. Twice beaten back by heavy fire, the French
made some prog ress o nce Ferrand finally took
Quaregnon . However, th e rig ht wi ng had made
little headway in the face of fierce resista nce and
was unable to prevent the Austr ians breaking off
at 2 pm and escaping past Mons .
The Austr ians lost 1,241 men , and though the
Frenc h claimed a huge vict o ry, the ir frontal
assault s had proved cost ly and they suffered
4,000 casualties.
A revoluti onary victory?
Later generations proclaimed Jemappes as 'a true
revolutionary victory', typified by th e verdict of
Georges Lefeb vre, the great historian of the
French Revolution , w ho w rote that 'it had been
wo n in an open attack without astute manoeu-
vres and by t he sans-culottes who rushed the
enemy to t he martial strains of the Marseillaise
and the Carmagnole, swamping the adversary
with sheer force of numbers'. While numerical
super ior ity clearly played a major part , it was not a
clear-cut victory of a modern, revolutionary army
over an outmoded opponent. Regulars from the
Faubourg
de Bertaimont
(Iply
Wasmes
Frameries
royal army formed over half of Dumouriez's This map shows
troops, still resplendent in their white Bourbon the disparity
berween rhe
un iforms. When the attack wavered, the men
oppasing forces,
were rallied by the 19-year-old Due de Chartres, wirhrhe
the futu re King Louis Philip pe who rule d France ou tnumbered
Austrians stretched
1830-48. The Austrians ret reated on Colog ne,
ro defend their
abandoning t he Net herlands to th e French. positionagainst
How ever, they we re back wi t hi n a year and retoo k three rim es th e
number of French.
most of the province before a more co nvincing
defeat at Fleurus in June 1794.
The political significance of Jemappes far out-
weig hed it s military importance. Embol dened by
the success, the National Convention declared it s
determination two weeks later 't o give fraternal
support to all people w ho wish to regain the ir
libert y', effectively committi ng France to a pro-
tracted offensive war tha t w oul d even tually lead
to the Napoleonic empire. Domestic po litics took
a radical turn, first with the execution of Louis XVI
on 21 January 1793 and then the Jacobin Terror of
Apr il 1793 to July the following year. The regulars
were merged with the vo lun teers t o create a
sing le revo lutionary army, backed by universal
conscription decreed in August 1793. Acco m-
pan ied by accelerating anti -clericalism , such
measures proved deeply divisive and Dumouriez
was one of the many officers w ho subsequently
defected to the Austrians.

178
179
 Nineteenth
Century
he Western conquest of much of the world,

T especially in Africa, Oceania and Southeast

and Central Asia, was a major theme of
warfare during this century, leading to a series of
battles such as Omdurman (1898),in which larger
non-Western forces were defeated. In the West,
there were also battles arising from conflict within
states, as with Antietam (1862) and Gettysburg
(1863) in the American Civil War (1861-65), or
between states, as with Trafalgar (1805), Leipzig
(1813),Waterloo (181 5), Mexico City (l847),lnker-
man (1854) and Sadowa (1866). This internal
struggle for control sometimes arose from sepa-
ratist conflicts, and there is not much to choose
between those in which the separatism failed,
such as the American Civil War, and those where
they were successful,such as Ayacucho in 1824,a
crucial battle in the Latin American Wars of Inde-
pendence against Spanish rule.
During the century, there were important
technical developments in battlefield capability
and operations. Land warfare was transformed by
the cont inual incremental developments in
firearms, such as the introduction of the percus-
sion rifle and the Minie bullet, both in the 1840s,
and, subsequently, of breech-loading cartridge
rifles. The net effect , for both handheld firearms
and artillery, was substant ial changes in preci-
sion, mobility and speed of use. Commanders,
however, faced the problem of how best to
respond to developments. Due to defensive fire-
power, massed frontal attacks on prepared
positions became more costly. The firepower
shown by the British in Napoleon's final defeat at

Ptussiat: efficiency, technological superiority and tactical

saphisticarion were established at the batrle of Sadowa (see
p. 21S) in lB66, when Moltke'sforcesdefeated theAustrians
under Benedek.
 NINETEENTH CENTURY
Waterloo was surpassed by the time of the Ameri-
can Civil War, in which both sides learned the
necessity of throwing up entrenchments asa con-
sequence of fighting each other to a costly draw
at the battle of Antietam (1862). Already at Inker-
man, attacking Russian columns, seeking to close
to bayonet point, took heavy casualties from the
Enfield rifles of the British and were defeated .
Bayonets and rifle d muskets were increasingly
supplemented by, or even downplayed in favour
of, field fortifications and artillery: looking
towards the situation in the two World Wars,
infantry tactics responded . In the Sadowa cam-
paign, the Prussian tactic of concentrating
stre ngth on the skirmishing line, and adopting
more extended formations that were less dense
than col umns or lines, and thus less exposed to
fire, commanded attention. However, Prussian
Charge ofthe skill at the operational and tactical levels and
21st Lancers at
poor Austrian leadership, had not prevented
Omdurman,
2 September many difficulties from arising, not least at the
1898, painted the hands of Austrian artillery.
following year.
More generally, in the century after Waterloo
Briti sh infantry
and artillery were in 1815,greater and more predictable production
moreeffective
of munitions flowed from a more streamlined and
than those of th eir
systematized manufacturing process. The overall
enemy,
result was a degree of change far greater in pace
devastating the
Mahdists. and scope than that over the previous century.
1B2
This was even mor e th e case w it h logistics,
command and cont rol, and naval warfare, as the
railway, the tel egraph and steam po wer affected
both nearby campaign sand tho sewaged at a dis-
tance. The comb ination of all three made it
possible to apply and direct greater resources,
and in a more sustained fashion, than hitherto.
This supported imperial expansion , although, as
before, it was valuable to be able to elicit support
within those subject to pressure. Indeed, much of
th e fighting for imperial ism in South Asia and
West Africa was done by local troops recruited
and trained by the British and French respec-
tively.ln EastAsia, Japan successfully modernized
its military under Western pressure, but China
was less able to do so. Japan joined in the naval
revolution stemming from major advances in
naval armour, gunnery and propulsion.
Command of the sea through battle was
emphasized by late-19th -century theorists , par-
ticularly the influential American, Alfred Thayer
Mahan, and from the 1890sthe leading po wers all
developed battleship navies. The potency of
naval gunnery increased as breech-loaders
replaced muzzle-loaders, as quicker-firing guns
and high -explosive armour-piercing shells were
introduced, and as ships were redesigned to
allow for guns mounted in centrel ine turrets .
Trafalgar
Date: 21 October 1805 Locat ion : off southern Spain
Th is battle must be considered as an exception to the actionshitherto engaged
on accountof the mannerin whichthe enemy attacked;it was a concourseof
individualengagements overa smallarea.
VILLENEUVE'SCHIEFOFSTAFF, COMMANDERJ-BPRIGNY, 1805
his famous naval battle was fought off the off Ferrol on 22 July 1805 - and put back to Vigo
T
Below left Vice
southwest corner of Spain between a and then to Cadiz. Napoleon decided instead to Admiral Horatio,
Viscount Nelson.
British fleet of 27 ships of the line com- march eastward against the more accessible
manded by Vice Admiral Horatio , Viscount target of the Austrian and Russian armies. Below right The
Nelson, and a combined fleet of 18 French and The combined fleet at Cadiz was now to be newlydiscovered
(2000) sketch by
15 Spanish ships of t he line under the command used in the Med iterranean to protect the
Nelson ofhis
of the French Vice Admiral Pierre, Comte de emperor's exposed Italian flank against British battle plan: after
Villeneuve. and Russian amphibious attack. Deciding that Vil- considering (in rap
leneuve's indecisiveness would prevent him half) a manoeuvre
Trafalgar was a consequence of the collapse of
to 'double' the
the Emperor Napoleon 's impracticable dream s of forcing his way past the blockading British fleet , enemy li ne, he
invading Britain in 1805. These failed at the first Napoleon sent a new commander, Adm iral Rosily, develop s (botto m
serious hurdle when Villeneuve 's combined to take the fleet to Italy. ha lf) his idea of
breaking thei r line
Toulon and Cadiz fleet was repulsed from its News of Rosily's impending arrival, and of the
in twoplaces,
intended junction with the Brest fleet by a withdrawal of part of the watching British fleet for shawn by hi s
waiti ng British squadron - under Admiral Calder resupply at Gibraltar, encouraged Villeneuve to vigorousscratches.
... ...
. "
183
 44 NINETEENTH C E N T U RY TR A F A L G A R 44

12.4Spm 4.30 pm
»> ",_
.
Neptuno Raya . /
Scipion Conqueror . ~ , 5anF~anCl~o
\ \
N ----..' ~ , deAsIs \

- - - --I. \ I. '\
Britannia O :'
Intrepide\ • . Heros
Formidable ~
Mont-Blonc\
Africa RayoI \
Duguay-Trouin t Ajax
Agamemnon'
N ept une-
. '
A~onaute U
, , -l ~.
fAontai'N!s ~ :
,
i,
Santissima LevIathan, : :
N '\ " San Francisco
\- de Asis Trinidad Africa: ' Son I' . Indomptablei

t Neptune Bucentaure
Leviathan
San Agustin
t eros Scipion '"_, Nt
. t
5portia e ,
ep uno "
, " . Mars ~
Intrepide ,

~ Victory
Revenge ' .
Agus , In
Orion
:
Neptune
'
Son ,''
I . Leandro,'
:
:

(onqueror > -
Britannia~d~ T"!' '' '~'e
' Sanrissima
Trinidad ,/
• 0
:
Minotaur
Bucentaure
rl ' ~ ' II
I

,
• Euryalus , \ lut~n I , /l "
.
Ajax Temeraire • Neptune : ' Fougueu. 'C ~ uMerer So'lJusto
, ~ J _ San Justo I , Mont·Blonc ... RoyalSovereign ' ''. -'
Agamemnon , Victory . - / ' -:San : : ,
Te"!eraire -"Redoubtable \ /-.:
: Dupuay-Troum Dreadnougbt ~ ~ "' - ~
Minotaur Redoubtable ' Leandro
\, C .. SontaAna 't' .., \ j OIOSSUfS • Prince Principe de
.........., ~ "brion SontaAna Indomptable
FOfrpicja6le AlgeClras~hama Swihsure , Wihsure Asturias
(paniate RoyalSovereign~ BelleIsle )
Tonnant ,"~ Sonldelfons Polyphemus
Marsf1 I~~k-j Son Juan de Nepomuceno t II Defence

~ .,ronnanr-Fougueux
M~ 0t
Bellerophan" Defianc\Aigle
Monarca' , BelleIsle t
.,
Prince Algeciras Achille/. Argonauta
., Berwick
--- Bahama ........
Belleropho~~ Colossus
Aigle
" Achille
~" Argonaute
MontaMs I I AchIlle
Son Idelfo~ I Argonauta
I I Englishship
Reven(e I Achille
• I Spanishship

, I

-
French ship
CPrincipedeAsturias

---
: ~ O flagship
Defence,
, Swihsure

Polyphemus. .
I
I Berwick
I tt masts lost
SanJuan de Nepomuceno ~--~ ..
': ~' F renc h and Spanish ships that escaped capture

Nicholas Pocock's set aside his misgivings. He took his fleet to seaon unique in their time in always seeking battles of as quic kly as possible, ordering his ships to carry needed, and inst ructed all his captains to joi n the Ab ov e left 12.45
pointing ofthe pm: Colling wood's
19-20 October. hop ing to rescue his reputation annih ilat ion. A result of th is sort would be im pos- full sail and extra studding sails unt il the y reached action as soon as possib le. He also urg ed board -
closing stages of column had
the action at the by implementi ng the emperor's orders himself. sible to achieve by t radit ional line-ahead th e enemy line. instead of th e normal fighting rig ing tactics to viti ate the superior Brit ish gunnery. already engaged
ba ttle ofTrofalgar As the combined fleet left harbour, a chain of manoeuvres in the short daylight hours of late of topsa ils only (which avoided the mainsails In the event. however. he was let down by his an d Nelson brok e
(see second map frigates and battlesh ips reported its movements the line in Victory
October. Nelson's victorious encounters w ith the being set alight by gun flashes). His largest first- subordinates. Gravina tame ly attached his ships
on the oppo site at the he ad ofhis
paqe). In the
back to Nelson. whose fleet was hovering beyond Spanish at Cape St Vincent in 1797. and with the and second-rate battleships headed his columns to the rear of the line (w here he saw that Colling - column.
distance the the horizon. Anticipating that it would be bound French at the Nile in 1798. had revealed thei r poor since they were best able to absorb damage. had wood was aim ing ). rather than using his freedom
French van for the Mediterranean. he moved his fleet south- of action to manoeuvre against Collingwood 's Above ri g ht
gunnery. He decided to risk a head-on attack by the weight to break up the enemy line. and
escapes south- 4.30 pm:pan of
east to intercept it. two columns . carried most guns to take on the concentrated flank and disrupt his attack. Admiral Dumanoir
southwest and to the allied van
the left the French His own (12 of th e line on the day) would cut fire power until the ships beh ind arrived to help. (Form ida ble). commanding the allied van, escaped south-
Achill e catches fire Preparations for battle the enemy centre, capture their admiral and hold Villeneuve. who had been at the Nile. correctly allowed himself to be mesmerized by Nelson's southwes t after
and explode s. failing to rescue
Nelson. the foremost admiral of the age, had back the enemy van from interfering in the deci- foresaw that Nelson would not fig ht an orthodox init ial feint towards the van before attacking the
Bucen ta ure and
taken command only three weeks before, but he sive action, which would be achieved by focusing line-against -line battle. but instead concentrate centre. and was consequently late in ordering his Sant issima
had a clear idea of how he would fight. This was superior numbers (1S of the line under Colling - against part of his fleet. To counter this he formed ships to turn back and support the centre. a Trinid ad; the rest
communicated to his captains over dinners at wood ) on overwhelming the enemy rear. To a fast squadron of observation under the Spanish movement further delayed by the very light w ind ofthe van and
survivors from the
which he raised morale amongst his newly restrict the damag e from a head-on att ack Admiral Gravina (Pri ncipe de Asturias) to act sepa- which necessitated launching his ships' boats to rear escaped to
formed blockad ing fleet. He and Napoleon were against the enemy broadsides he looked to get in rately from the line of batt le wherever it was tow them around . Cadiz.

184 18S
 T RAF ALG A R 44
44 NINETEENTH CENTURY

Action carronade s (short guns). Two adm irals were

Collingwood - in his newly refitted, fi rst-rate
Royal Sovereign - was first to break through t he
allied line at about midday. Nelson headed his
column through the centre in Victory at 12.45 pm
and the battle then continued until about 43 0
pm.The fir st British ships into action too k the bu lk
of casualties as they found themselves sur-
rounded by enemy ships. Nelson himself was
killed by a French sharpshooter, as were two cap-
tai ns in Collingwood's division.
However, as more British ships entered the
newly opened gaps in the enemy line, so thei r
Admiral Pierre superior gun drill and mutual fire support in a
Charl esJean- melee action proved their worth. French
Baptiste Silvestre,
Comr ede
attempts to use boarding tactics were blasted to
Villeneuve, pieces by the Brit ish upper-deck heavy-calibre
comm ander-in-
chi efofthe
co mbined French
r - - ---' COMBATANTS '-----.
and Spa nish fleet.
British
• Tota l crews 21,456men : 18,134 seamen, 3,322
marines: 3-decker 'fi rst rates': 3 x 100 guns ;
3-decker 'second rates ': 4 x 98 guns ; 2-decker
't h ird rates': 1 x 80 guns , 16 x 74 guns , 3 x 64
gu ns; 4 frigates, 1 schooner, 1 cutter
• Commander-in-ChiefVice Admiral Horatio,
Viscoun t Nelson; second in command Rear
Admira l Sir Cuthbert Collingwood
• 449 killed , 1,214 wounded
killed, as well as a commodore and six captains .
Nine Spanish and eight French ships were cap-
tured (including Villeneuve and his flagship
Bucentaure) and another French ship caught fire
and exp loded. Eleven lim ped back to Cadiz with
t he mo rtally wo unded Gravina, and Dumanoir
escaped northward with four of the van.
A savage storm followed the battle, lasting
several days, while the British struggled to keep
their own damaged ships and their captures
afloat . In the end Collingwood saved all his own
ships and four of his captures. During the storm,
on 23 October, five of the allied survivors made a
daring sortie from Cadiz and managed to rescue
two captured vessels, but one of these was subse-
quently wrecked , as were three of the rescuers.
All the remaining captures fo undered or were
wrecked on the adjacent coast, or destroyed by
the British to avoid their recapture.
Total casualties on the British side were 449
killed and 1,214 wounded, and in the Franco-
Spanish combined fleet 4,408 were killed or
drowned and 2,545 wounded, many of these
included among 7,000 prisoners. On 3 November
Dumanoir's fou r fugitives were intercepted in the
Bayof Biscayby Sir Richard Strachan as they tried
to reach Rochefort, and all were captured, bring-
ing the total loss of the combined fleet to 24 out
of the 33 battleships engaged .

Franco-Span ish co m b i ned fleet (Allies) Significance of the battle

• French : total crews c. 15,000; 2-decker 't hi rd
rates ': 4 x 80 guns, 14 x 74 gu ns; 5 fri gat es,
2 corvettes. Span ish: to tal crews 11,817; 4-decker
'fi rstrate': 1 x 130 guns ; 3-decker 'fi rst rates': 2 x
112 gun s, 1 x 100 guns; 2-decker 'third rates ': 2 x
80 guns, 8 x 74 guns , 1 x 64 guns
• Comman der-in-Chief: French fleet and
combined fleet: Vice Admiral Pierre, Comte de
Villeneuve; Spanish fleet : Adm iral Don Federico
Grav ina
• French : c. 3,370 kill ed or drown ed, 1,160
wo und ed , 5,000 t aken priso ner, 2,500 taken
p riso ner b ut escaped in th e storm after the
battle; Spanish: 1,038 killed or drowned and
1,385 wounded, 3,000-4,000 prisoners, some of
whom escaped in the storm after the battle, and
all t he wounded were returned by Collingwood
The annihilation battle that Nelson had sought
was largely achieved - more ships of the line were
taken than in any previous battle of the sailing
era. But the immediate effects of Trafalgar were
small. It prevented the combined fleet from inter-
fering in Med iterranean operations, but those
operations - the Russo-Brit ish invasion of Naples
- were themselves invalidated by French victories
at Ulm and Austerlitz. Trafalgar did not stop
Napo leon's path into Europe, but it greatly set
back any attempt to resume his westward ambi -
tions . It gave the British breathing space to
rebuild their deteriorating fleet and encourage-
ment to continue the fight despite the defeat of
their allies.
Napoleon sought to hide the British victory
from the French people (his coldness to Vil-
leneuve drove the latter to suicide when he
returned on parole in 1806) and he was to rebuild
his fleets, but he never rebuilt the confidence
among the ir commanders and crews to take on
the British navy successfully. Spain was the great -
est loser. She never replaced her fleet, and the
loss of her sea power contributed to the loss of
her vulnerable American empire. Yet even Spain
drew consolation from the valiant and prolonged
resistance of their scratch, untrained crews to the
murderous British onslaught. The stigma of sub-
servience to the French was cast off and later
gene rat ions saw this asthe heroic, bloody birth of The Fall of Nelson.
Mort ally wo unded
a new Spain - the start of the restoration of
earlyin the action
national honour that would lead to the Peninsular by a shorps hoorer
War and the ultimate rejection of French rule. in the tops of
the French
Trafalgar was the last great naval battle of the
Redou bt able,
age of sail, and the benchmark by which all future
Hora tio Nelson
naval battles were to be compared. The dead lived long eno ugh
victor and his victory became immortalized in to hear of th e
extent of h is
centra l London by Nelson's column in Trafalgar victory.
Square. Nelson left the British nation with a naval
triumph that was a cornerstone to the prestige of
the British navy and symbol of British naval
mastery for another century, up to the battle of
Jutland (see p_232).

187
186
 lEI PZ IG 45

sector northwest of the city, w it h Bernadotte trail - 16 October (morn ing)

Leipzig
,
ing some way behind. Napoleon deployed the

~
"% French
~. reinforcements ._
bulk of his troops on the main battlefield south- BlUcher <t"-!I CONFED. !-eiyztg
east of the city wit h his outer line of 41,000 men (Army of Silesi~ ~ oG(>.'{>';.r...J' Of '!:'~' ro-.
Date: 14- 19 October 181 3 Location: ea stern Germany under King Joachim Murat of Naples. ~ r\~« '~- ? RHI.. ", 0. ....

Schwarzenberg' s advance guard clashed with (P'VSSia~ :rmont 'I / /

Never had any field of battle, in modern history, been so inundated with human gore. Murat' s post at the village of Liebertwolkwitz -, ~ Mockern / ~I
~ \ French
But thus, and only thus, could the inordinate vainglory of Napoleon be for ever eclipsed, early on 14 October. Murat launched a series of ~ ~ reinforcements

offering a memento appalling to nature, but truly beneficial to mankind. counter-attacks wi th his cavalry throughout the
..6
r-/ / ~ -
L~
d ~I~'"
GENERALCOUNT GNEISENAU, THELiFEAND CAMPAIGNSOFFIELD M ARSHAL PRINCEBLOCHER, 181S morning, his claims of success persuading
Napoleon to stand and fight, rather than escape
to the west while the road was still ope n. In fact,
bot h sides had lost around 2,000 men, but the
/ /; In en' ·V '
r ~t~ \;'.(? '. ' ~·'··'~I H Ih
0 z ausen

allied casualties were quickly made good by the Gyula i _ " "'~P~ol,:">s thel da "
F
Im peri al Gua rd, ought over six days in October 1813, essary to preserve allied harmony and was later (Austrians) "'" • C'!Qnew1tz ". , , (Cossacks)
Foo t Grenadier.
Nopoteonic
Leipzig was the largest battle of the toasted by the Prussian Marshal BlUcher as 'the arrival of the rest of Schwarzenberg's army.
...J ( \ " \ Murat ~ol:iergt!. Seifertshain
infantryman in
Napoleonic Wars, both in terms of its battle- commander-in-chief who had three monarchs at Napoleon completed his deployment on 1S
~ " ~ li:be~~I~ustrians) -,
f •Wachau. r ~ wolkwitl II
1
summer full dress field and the numbers engaged. Napoleon 's his headquarters and still managed to beat the October, increasing his forces southeast of
;f / (Allied
J, ./ j :arklee be rg 1 ~ /,~rei~entS)
= -
(indicated by white hete rogeneo us Grande Armee faced forces from enemy '. Bluc her commanded t he Army of Silesia, Leipzig to around 120,000 men, giving him
gaiters).
the entire European coalition, giving rise to its composed of Prussians and Russians, while a simi- a decided advantage over Schwarzenberg's Q:'Mervelot - ' . ~ ., ~
other name: the 'Batt le of the Nations '. Thanks to larly mixed force, backed by a Swedish corps and 100,000. However, the latter could expect the (Aust rians) ",1-- 1:"' = : -

~. "---
the presence of Francis of Austria and Tsar a tiny British contingent, made up the Army of the Russian and Prussian reserves to join him, wh ilst
~~ Schwarzenberg
Alexander, along with Napoleon and the kings of North under Bernadotte. Blucher was fast approach ing the city from the ~', (Army of Bohemia)
~

Prussia, Saxony, Sweden and Naples, it is also
known asthe 'Battle of the Three Emperors'.
Background
Napoleon's empire had begun to unravel follow-
Napoleon hoped to defeat his three enemies
in detail, but they deftly avoided contact. When
he finally caught Schwarzenberg at Dresden he
was unable to achieve the decisive victory he
sought and he had to retreat into northwestern
northwest. Napoleon had only 40,000 men north
of Leipzig, with another small force at Lindena u
protecting the vital escape route to the west. 18 October (midday) - 19 October (morning)
Bemadotte
16 0 ct ob er (Army of the North)

ing his disastrous invasion of Russia from which Saxony. After the defection of Bavaria on 8 The main battle on 16 October fell into two (>.'{><
, <~G
only a tenth of his army returned at the begin - October, it became im perative to saveSaxony,his distinct parts as Schwarzenberg assaulted (PrusSlans~ BlUcher ~\'IIe: ~ ~

ning of 1813. Prussia defected at the end of chief remaining central European ally. Two corps Napoleon's forces southeast of the city, while q ---:;.rmy of SileSi;,) /~~
December 1812,joining Russia in declaring were left in Dresden while the main army concen- Blucher attacked around the village of Mockern UA.L " ~(RU~anS) ~ (S~)I (Prussians)
NWU'ern ~ ~
to the north. Schwarzenberg 's first wave went in
a War of Liberation' on 16 March that was trated at Leipzig, Saxony 's second city.
;( (~ ~/ ' \ (,RUSSianS)=="
backed by Britain and soon by Jean- at 8 am against the French-held line of villages ~ ~ t;:y
?'.),ft\ Q.. ~ ,.-
Linden~>~~~1 ' ~\
(RUSSianS)
Baptiste Bernadotte, one of Napoleon's 14 October from Markleeberg through Wachau to Kolmberg .
marshals, who was now Crown Prince of The French replied with a fur ious artillery barrage
~/' ~v, s: ~b Holzhausen
Victory remained within Napoleon 's grasp if he

/
Sweden. Napoleon improvised a new army to could defeat Schwarzenberg before the others that intensi fied once the fog lifted at lOam and
meet this threat to the east but, despite a arrived, and his chances were improved by the expended over 80,000 shots. Schwarzenberg ;/ ~urat~ ?'~n
7I(}
series of minor victories , he was unable to nature of the terrain. Leipzig lay at the confluence realized he was too weak to carry the entire posi- Gyulai ~ ' , P\ljsth~a
connewitZ ...., .
defeat the allies in eastern Germany and of the Elster and Pleisse rivers. The ground tion and fell back to his start line around 11 am. 1 1~ ~ ~ • • Seifertshain
agreed an armistice on 4 June. Austria took the between the rivers south of the city was marshy The Austrians west of the Pleissealso retired after 1 "" ""~ . Liebertwolkwitz
opportunity to declare its hand for the allies. and wooded, aswas much of the area generally to some initial successes, having failed to hold onto
~N
Politi cal rivalries simme red under the surface,
but the allies at least agreed to operate in three
the west.
Since Tsar Alexander refused to deploy any
Lindenau or force a crossing at Connewitz. -
-+
attack
• .... co unter-attack
retreat
~ cavalry
...
}
Ma'kleebe

French x:
rg
\ .
• Wachau

S''',,~,
f1.et''oet
>
",-:.",;.
,.. 1
1
t
separate armies. The Army of Bohemia was the Russians west of the Pleisse , Schwarzenberg only Above rig ht The French successfully defend ed their pas it ion - infantry 1 ' --- r 1
largest and was led by Prince Schwarzenberg, the posted 32,000 Austrians in these sectors, keeping as th e allies slowly converged on Leipzig . _ attack } 0 1 Skm
~ cavalry <t Prussians ssians I I
nominal allied commander-in-chief. Though the rest of his army east of the river. Blucher and Right Superior n um bers to ld as th e allies crushe d the
- infantry A 1 0 1 3 miles
unimaginative, Schwarzenberg had the tact nee- the Army of Silesia were advancing across the surro un ded French.
1

189
188
 French School, The Sensing weakness, Napole on counter-
Battle of Leipzig.
atta cked, hopin g to t urn th e allied right around
This' 9th-century
picturegives Q Seifertsha in. Initially, local successesencou raged
good impression of him to feed in ever mo re tro ops until the atta ck
the scole of the
became general by 2 pm . Mu rat led a massed
battle.
charge of 10,000 cavalry to pun ch through the
thinning allied ranks, but was repulsed by the
allied reserves. Reinforced, Schwarzenberg held
out against three further infantry assaults.
Napoleon refused to commit his reserves for a
final blow, and instead left th is sector around 2.30
pm to concent rate north of Leipzig.
Marshals Marmont and Ney had only two corps
to hold the Mockern position against Blucher's
entire Army of Silesia. They ignored Napoleon 's
orders to join him south of the city, but the Aus-
190
trian atta ck on Lindenau compelled them to
detach troops later in the morning. Fortunately,
Blucher's army was strun g out along its approa ch
road and only 20,000 Prussians were in place to
attack at 3 pm . The French retook Mockern three
times before finally being driven out with 10,000
casualties. The Prussians lost 8,000 and were
unable to advance further because of nightfall.
Overall, Napoleon had held his ground, but he
had been unable to capitalize on his local superi-
ority south of t he cit y. He had lost 25,000
irreplaceable troops to the allies' 30,000. It rained
throughout 17 October and both sides spent the
day repositioning their forces for the final battle.
Schwarzenberg's army now numbered around
170,000, while Bernadotte at last arrived with his
60,000 to reinforce Blucher's remaining 40,000.
The allies were conv inced Napoleon would try
and escape north east and so directed Bernadotte
to march in a wide arc across the Parthe to attack
Leipzig from this direction. Blucher wou ld have to
continue his assault alone until Bernadotte's men
could reach their new posit ion. In fact, Napoleon
was considering escaping westward and rein-
forced his outpost at Lindenau, whilst pulling his
remaining 150,000 troopscloser to the city.
18 October
It took until 2 pm before Schwarzenberg was fully
in place to attack the new French position from
Connewitz through Probstheida to Holzhausen.
The allies took most of the villages after bitter
fig hting. Around 5,000 Saxons and Wurttem-
bergers defected to the allies around 4.30 pm.
Afte rwards, Napoleon blamed t hem for his
defeat, but the final arrival of Bernadott e south of
the Parthe proved far mo re significant. Blucher
also made progress and the French were forced
back to wards the city.
The French were now nearly out of ammun i-
tion . The baggage had already left at 11 am and
the wi thdrawal conti nued throughout t he day
and night th rou gh Leipzig and along t he 2-km
(1.24-miJe) causeway acrosst he swamps to Linde-
nau. The allies started shelling this route the next
morning while they renewed their attack on the
city itself. The situation was critical , but not yet
desperate until the French engineer in charge of
191
 45 N I N ETE EN T H C E N TU R V
FrancisI ofAustria, the vita l bridge over the Elster panicked and blew
Frederick-Wilhelm
III and Tsar
Alexa nder af
Russia meetonthe
battlefield after
it up, cutting off the rearguard of 20,000 French
and Poles still in Leipzig.
Aftermath
Napoleon 's great
defeat at Leipzig
Napoleon escaped with only 80,000 men, but
(19th-<:entury defeated another Austro-8avarian army that tried
paint ing). to block his route at Hanau. He held out in France
until overwhelming allied forces compelled him
to abdicate on 11 April 1814. Leipzig encapsulates
the characteristics of a major Napoleonic battle. It
was a hard-fought action extending over several
days as fresh unitsconverged on the field. Cavalry
still played a major tactical role, along with
massed artillery and infa ntry assaults. The experi-
ence was open to very different interpretations
by Jomini and C1ausewitz (the two leading mi li-
tary theorists of the 19th century) , both of whom
were present as staff officers in the allied armies.
192
Allies
• Armies of Silesia, Bohemia and the North,
totalling 342,000 men with 1,500 guns
• Commanded by Prince Karl Philipp von
Schw arzen berg
• 22,600 Russians, 16,000 Prussians, 14,900
Austrians, 200 Swede s killed and wounded
Fre nch
• Gran de Armee totalled 195,000 men wi th 900
guns (by 140ctoberonlyc. 1ll,OOOment
700 gu ns)
• Command ed by Emperor Napol eon
• 13,000 dead; 23,000 wo un d ed (mos tly also
captured ); 15,000 captured ; 5,000 d eserted ;
325 gun s and 900 wagon s lost
Waterloo
Date : 18 June 181 5 Location: south of Brussels, Belgium
I never saw such a battle. ..and n ever before did I ga in such a vi ctory.
I tr ust i t is all o ver wi th Napoleon Bonaparte.
D UKEOF W ELLINGTON
ought on 18 June 1815, the battle of Water-
F loo const ituted the climactic moment in
the 23-year conflict known as the Revolu-
tionary and Napoleonic Wars. In brief, three years
after the French Revolution of 1789, war had
broken out between France and Austria and
Prussia (see Jemappes p. 177), who were quickly
joined by most of the rest of Europe. Fighting
continued on and off unt il 1802, but in that year
France's last remaining opponent - Britain - was
forced to make peace.Though France had experi -
enced some failures, she can on the whole be said
to have got the better of the struggle. However,
t he triumph of 1802 was squandered. Under the
leadership of Napoleon Bonaparte, the successful
general who had seized power in 1799, France
continued to disturb the peace, and in May 1803
Britain was provoked into renewing the conflict.
After a long, complicated struggle, Napoleon ,
Far left Francisco
Goya'sPort rait of
the Duke of
Welling ton , 1812.
Centre Napo leon
in his Study,
painted by
Jacqu es-Louis
Davidin 1812.
l eft An 1828
portr ait ofField
Marshal Gebhard
8lOcher.
who had become emperor of France in 1804,
overreached himself. Thus, after defeat at Leipzig
in 1813(see p. 188),in 1814 he was overthrown by
overwhel ming odds and forced to abd icate.
With France in the hands of Louis XVIII,
Napoleon was sent to the minuscule Med ite r-
ranean island of Elba, where he was expected to
live out his days as a minor princeling dependent
on a subsidy paid by the French government.This
subsidy, however, was only paid sporadically, and
the erstwhile emperor may also have feared that
Louis intended to have him murdered. With news
coming in that France was in a state of growing
unrest, Napoleon sailed from Elba at t he head of
his tiny army. Landing on t he French coast on 1
March 1815, he marched on Paris. Finding that his
army would not fight Napoleon, Louis fled into
exile. By 20 March, then, Napoleon was back in
the capital . Views on his return were mixed -
193
 46 NIN ETE ENTH CENTURY

to Wat erloo 11.30 am

til Merbraine

( N

Napoleon f-- 1,,0<)0

. m
t
1,ooOyds

to Waterloo ..
i there was, in fact, considerable disaffection - but
wellington . the soldiers of the old imperial army were willing
enough to fight for him, and he soon had a force
A Merbraine of some 280,000 men at his disposal. This, mean-
while, was just as well : currently assembled to
discuss a definitive peace settlement at Vienna,
the powers of Europe unanimously declared war
on Napoleon and declared him an outla w who
was to be overthrown at all costs.
The campa ign
If he was to win the com ing conflict, Napoleon
knew that he had to strike hard and fast so as to
inflict such a blo w on the allies that some or all of
his opponents would decide that they would do
better to make peace. The allied forc es garrison-
ing Belgium being the most accessibl e target, by
early June 120,000 men were heading for Brus-
• infantry Above left By I U Dam, Wellington'smain line wason the
c;:;. cavalry ridge nearMont Saint Jean, Napoleon down the slopebelow.
I • • • skirmishers
sels. Opposing them were two armies: 93,000
British, Dutch , Belgians, Hanoverians, Nassauers
and Brunswickers under the Duke of Wellington,
and 117,000 Prussians under Field Marshal
Blucher. To deal with these opponents Napoleon
had, again, but one hope, except th is time the
trick was to get his army between the two oppos -
ing forces and defeat first one and then the other.
Rather than marching on Brussels by the direct
road (a plan t hat would only have driven Welling -
ton straight into the arms of the Prussians), he led
his army to a position due south of the Belgian
capital and crossed th e frontier at Charleroi, th e
road that led from that town to Brussels marking
the exact spot w here the responsibilities of one
army ended and the other began. It was a good
plan - Wellington, in particular, was taken com -
pletely by surprise and caught with his army
spread out far to the west watching the main
Paris-Brussels high way - and the allied armies
were not in good shape: of Wellington's 30,000
(Prussians and non -Prussians alike) were main ly An artist's
unwill ing conscripts with littl e ent husiasm for th e impression of
Waterloo.
strugg le.Yet the French were also lesswell placed Wellington.at for
than they might have been: few of Napoleon 's left and holding a
best commanders were available, whilst the army telescope. gives
orders to an officer
was badly equ ipped and much affected by
during theheight
rumours of treason and disaffection . And it was of the batt le.
not long before the plan broke down very badly .
Having crossed the fron tier on 15June, the fol -
lowing day t he French came up against Blucher at
Ligny, whilst they at the same time contacted the
leading elements of Wellington's forces at Quatre
Bras. Vigorous offensives at both places might
have won the day for Napoleon , but although th e
emperor carried the day at Ligny, he failed to rout
the Prussian army, which was able to draw off in
reasonable order.
Still worse, meanwhile, at Quatre Bras the
French forces commanded by Marshal Ney failed
to inflict any significant damage at all. Nor were
Wellington and Blucher even driven apart : w hilst

l -----.. . .: : . : :~---.L-_-----'------'-_______.J
• , , guns Left Afinal assault by the French Imperial Guard had been
repulsed, and BlUcher wasclosing in for thekill from theeast.
British soldi ers, many were little more than raw
recruits, and the Dutch, Belgians and Germans
the former retreated north towards Brussels, the
latter headed not east for the German frontier but

194
195
 46 N I N E TE E NT H C E N T U R Y WATERLOO 46

rather north to ward s Wavre. The German com -
mander thereby kept open the possib ility that
he might join up with Wellington, despite feeling
rightly let down by his British counterpart
('humbugged', ashe put it, by Napoleon , Welling -
ton had got BlUcherto fight at Ligny by promis ing
that he would come to his aid when he knew full
well that this was a physical impossib ility). And,
last but not least, the French forces were no
longer even united. While Napoleon followed
Wellington with 73,000 men, 33,000 men went
after Blucher under Grouchy.
The ba ttle
With rain falling in torrents, on the evening of 17
June Wellington's troops reached a ridge called
Mont SaintJean, 3 km (2 miles) south of Waterloo .
It was here the next day they turned to fight. The
ridge provided excellent 'reverse slope' positions
for the allied army whilst several roads led from
the battlefield to the Prussian position at Wavre.
Forward of the main line, meanwhile, three iso-
lated farms - Hougoumont, La Haye Sainte and
Papelotte - offer ed excellent defensive bastions.
Even now, however, Napoleon might have won,
but th e gro und was deep in mud and so the
emperor delayed a while to allow th e sun to dry
out th e battlefield a little. And when th e French
did attack, the ir efforts were clumsy and uncoor-
dinated. First, large numbers of infantry became
bogged down in fighting round Hougoumont on
Napoleon 's left flank; second, a clumsy attack on
Wellington's left-centre was mauled by British
cavalry; and third, the bulk of Napoleon 's own
cavalry was thrown away in a series of unsup -
ported charges on th e allied right-centre.
Only late in the day did more careful planning
payoff by delivering La Haye Sa inte to the French
and open ing up Wellington's over-stretched and
exhausted forces to destruction. But the Prus-
sians saved the day. Having heard the sound of
the guns, Blucher had immediately got all the
men he could on the road (a develop ment that
Grouchy singu larly failed to prevent ), Since early
afternoon, the n, large numbers of Prussians had
been arriving on Napoleon's righ t flank. By din t of
great courage, the French were hold ing their own
against them, but there were now too few
reserves to make the capture of La Haye Sainte
count for anything. Thus, with evening drawing
on, Napoleon made one last effort to break
Wellington's line, sending forward what little was
left of th e infantry of th e Imperial Guard, But the
men involved were hopelessly outnumbered,
and they had no sooner reached the ridge than
they were overwhelmed . Seeing the Guard break,
the rest of the army was affected by panic in its
turn, and within a few minutes
most of Napoleon 's army
was in flight,
Impa ct and consequences
At the simp lest level, Waterloo ended th e career
of Napoleon Bonaparte, the erstwhile emperor
soon finding himself on board a ship bound fo r St
Helena, wh ere he died in 1821.Byth e same token ,
of course, it also enshrined Wellington as British
hero of heroes, Beyond that it effectively put an
end to 150 years of French dreams of dominance
in western Europe. Yet even had Napoleon won at
Waterloo , he wou ld sooner or later have met his
end somewhere else, the consequence being
th at the real significance of the battle is not politi-
calor diplomatic but rather military. Waterloo
provided Europe's generals with the concept of At theconclusion
the titanic clash of arms that could settle entire ofthe battle
french soldiers
wars at a single stroke. Assuch, it was to become a
flee, pursued by the
fatal mi rage - t he fount, indeed, Prussians under
of the tragedy of 1914. BlOcher,

-_-I COMBATANTS '-_--.

Army of the lower Rhine
• 75,000 men (effect ively engaged: 28,000);
264guns

• Commanded by Gebh ard Blucher von Wahlstadt

• Casualties: 7,000

Army of the Net h erl ands

• 68,000 me n (30,000 Briti sh; 20,000 German;
18,000 Dutc h-Belgian); 155 guns
• Commanded by the Duke of Wellington
• Casualt ies: 8,600 Briti sh; 4,000 Dutch-Belg ian;
3,000 Germ an

Army of the North

• 73,000 men ; 252 guns
• Commanded by Napoleon Bonaparte
• Casualties: 25,000 killed and wounded;
17,000 captured or lost to desertion

196 197
 A YA CUCH O 47

Quinua t hat was well pro tected by ravines.

Ayacucho During th e night, Sucre and his offi cers wor ked
out a plan to allow La Serna to attack first, th en
respond w it h reserves. They divid ed th eir forces
Date : 9 December 1824 Location: southern Peru into fo ur divisions, wit h two regiments of heavy
cavalry in th e centre and four batt alion s of
Opinion in Peru, General, is that of the entire world, in that everyone wants infantry on eit her flank. Three battalion s of
to be kin g of his own home; as to th e decisio n to take up arms, certa inly you ha ve infantry und er General Lara formed a reserve
m ore troops and a better po sition than we have, but your soldiers are not capable of responding to LaSerna'sattac k.
the eq ual of ou rs, asyou w ill see in th e hour of combat.
G ENERAL JOSE M ARIA C ORDOBA TO G ENERAL A NTONIO M ONET, 9 D ECEMBER 1824 The 'Batt le of th e Generals'
At dawn on 9 December the Royalists attacked
Sucre's right, which was commanded by General
Jose Maria Cordoba . This attack failed, as did an
n June 1824 Revolutionar ies responded to th e of Peru, he was confid ent that he could defeat attack on the centre by forces led by t he Royalist

I Royalist recapture of Lima by voting new

powers for the charismatic Peruvian leader
Simon Bolivar and General Antonio Josede Sucre.
Sucre's army. La Serna moved his 9,300 soldiers
north of Sucre'sforces near the town of Ayacucho
(t he name means the 'Corner of the Dead' in
general Antonio Mo net. The Colombians under
Cordoba responded with a bayonet attack that
drove back t he left of the Royalist line, breaking
Bolivar and Sucre inflicted a minor mil itary Quechua), located appro ximately 300 km (186 the ir ranks and allowing t he Revolutionaries
reverse on Royalist forces at Junin in July. Bolivar mile s) sout heast of Lima. By do ing so he hoped to to introduce thei r cavalry and infant ry reserves .
Foughr on a plain then too k a force towards Lima, leaving Sucre to cut the Revolutionaries off from t he sea and any Royalist reserves unwi sely advanced, leaving
in rhe Andes handle an expected Royalist counter-offensive. possible reinforcement by the new army Bolivar them selves in a position to be encircled by Revo-
Mountains, lutionary fo rces.
That offensive was led by Viceroy Jose de La was trying to raise near Lima. The altitude of the
Ayacucho's open
spaces allowed a Serna, who believed that the Royalist cause in Ayacucho region, as high as 2,800 m (9,000 ft), Despite having been outnum bered, Sucre
smaller Peruvian Peru was doomed. He hoped to establish a pro vi- promised to further limit Sucre's ability to won a fast and relatively blood less batt le. The
force to entire action had taken less than 80 minutes.
sional government and invite a Bourbon pr ince to manoeuvre.
outmanoeuvre Q
come to Peru and assume the throne. Despite his La Serna'sforces outnumbered those of Sucre, Total Revolutionary casualties were just over 300
larger Spanish
force. pessimism about Spain's future political control who had j ust 5,780 men, most of them from Gran dead and 600 wounded.
Colombia and Peru. LaSernatried to use his supe- Royalist casualties, on the ot her hand, were
rior numbers to encircle Sucre, who responded by astonishingly high.They suffered 10400 dead, 700
- Infantrytroopsof AntonioJose de Sucre adroitly moving his men out of harm's way and wounded and 2,500 capt ured. Amo ng the cap-
c:;;jjjjI Revolutionaryheavycavalry
BRAZ I L establishing a defen sive posit ion on th e plain of t ured were the majority of the Royalists' most
- Troops of Viceroy Jose d e La Serna important officers. Viceroy La Serna himself
became a prisoner of war, as did 15 generals, 16
. . - ---' COMBATANTS - -- ---. colonels and 68 lieutena nt colone ls. The hig h
number of senior officers lost gave this batt le the
Peruvians (Revoluti onaries) nickname 'Battle of the Generals'. The Royalists
could not afford the lossof so much of their senior Peru 'Bolivia' in hono ur of Simon Bolivar. AntonioJose de
• 5,780 soldiers
Sucre (1793-1830)
military and administrat ive leadership. The victory at Ayacucho effecti vely ended
• Commanded by Anton io Jose d e Sucre on horseback at
Spanish control in South America. The im pacts of Ayocuc ho, 1824,
• 309 d ead, 607 w o unde d
Quinuaplain Aft ermath the Napoleonic Wars meant t hat Royalist fo rces during rhe War of
could not expect reinforcements from Europe. Indepe ndence
Royalists
Sucre gave t he Royalistshonourable terms of sur-

II
against Spain.
Reserve infantry render. La Serna agreed to w it hdraw all Royalist The last sizeable Spanish force surren dered at
~ 09,300 sold iers

II~/'-----
under Lara
Condurcunca forces from Peru,making it indepen dent of Spain. Callao in January 1826. Sucre became Bolivia's
Hill • Com manded by Vicero y Jo se d e La Serna
Sucre t hen moved into Upper Peru, and at first consti tutio nal leader, but soon resigned in
I • 1,400 d ead, 700 w oun de d, 2,500 captured
Chuquisaca he proclaimed t he independence of the face of an insurrection. Chuquisaca was later
Cordoba
that prov ince in Aug ust 1825. He renamed Upper renamed Sucre in his honour.

198 199
 Mexico City
Date: April-September 1847 Locat ion: ce ntral Mexico

.. .one of the most unjust [bottles] everwaged by a strongeragainst a weakernatian.

TH E vesoicr OF THEPERSONAL MEMOIRS OF ULYSSES S. G RANT, 1885-86

T
he military operations conducted by the planning the operation. On 9 March 1847 he
U~ited St~tes in the early stages of its war landed with 10,000 men near the port of Vera
with Mexico {1846-48l, south of the Rio Cruz, and took it 20 days later after a short siege.
Grande, had failed to bring decisive results. In Scott's strategy for the Mexico City campaign
October 1846 President James K. Polk decided reflected methods prev iously used further north.
to strike directly at Mexico City, the capital; but, American forces would advance rapidly into the
as a Democrat, he nursed severe reservations hinterland, utilizing the full available space, and
about the officer best equipped to undertake this seize their objectives rapidly before the Mexicans
hazardous mission, Major General Win- could concentrate overwhelming force. The civil
field Scott. Polk suspected that Scott population would be treated relative ly gently to
would use a successful campaign as prevent any guerrilla uprising that could jeopard-
a springboard for a Whig presiden - ize vulnerable supply lines.
tial candidacy in 1848. Scott faced enormous logistical problems
Nevertheless, on 23 November becausehis army had to surmount the sierrasthat
1846 Scott received orders to begin stretched before him . The further he advanced,
the longer his lines of communication back to
Above Portrai t of
Vera Cruz became. Scott, for all his self-absorbed
General Antonio
Lop ez de Santa pomposity that earned him the nickname 'Old
Anna, President of Fuss and Feathers', had an astute milita ry brain
Mexico.
and was a keen student of military history. To
Righ t Mojor offer detailed advice on the planning process,
Generol Winfield Scott created his 'litt le cabinet', the first properly
Scott, c. 1849. functioning general's field staff in American mili-
Although
querulous, vain tary history. Its members included some of the
andpompous, most talented young officers in the US Army,
Scot t was th e including Robert E. Lee, P. G. T. Beauregard and
centraltiqure in
George B. McClellan (see Antietam p. 206).
th e USa rmy's
ad op tion of
professional March across Mexico
m ethod s during
On 10 Apr il 1847 Scott began his march on
theMexican War.
Mexico City. The long American columns toiled
up the narrow mountain paths, conscious that
they were about to take part in an epic military
adventure. The Mexican caudillo (military strong -
men-turned-leader) General Antonio Lopez de
Santa Anna, who combined the presidency wi t h
command of the army, rushed down from north-
ern Mexico to block Scott's path .
In a brill iant seriesof out-flanking manoeuvres,
Scott successively turned Santa Anna out of
strong defensive positions at Cerro Gordo (18
April) and Contreras (18- 20 August ). Scott had
been forced to wait for nearly three months at
Puebla asthe enlistments of 7,000 volunteers had
expired, and he could not advance further
wi thout reinforcements.
ByAugust 1847 Scott could field 10,738 men in
four div isions. This was hardly a huge force and
Mexico City could boast strong fortifications. The
city had to be approached along causeways
through extensive marshes in the beds of dried-
up lakes (see Tenochtitlan, ancient Mexico City,
p. 98). The poi nts of entry were covered by defen-
sive lines and forts, the strongest being EI Penon.
Santa Anna had 25,000 men to hold the city,
divided into three field armies.
Scott's success at Contreras had allowed him
to advance on th e city from the south and avoid EI
Penon. As Scott approached Mexico City he
received a request from Santa Anna for an
armistice to which he acceded. But Scott was con-
vinced of Santa Anna's knavery and suspected
that the Mexicans were defyi ng its terms by
melting down church bells to make new cannon Theseizureof
Chopultepec wos
at an improvised foundry at Mol ino del Rey. Scott
the key moment in
determined to attack it the following day. He suc- the storm ing of
ceeded in taking it, but at heavy cost; he lost 700 Mexico City.
Superior attiilety
lives, while the Mexicans sustained 2,000 casual-
ties and 700 prisoners. Nor could Scott's officers
and gunpowder
prepared the way
find any evidence of cheating . for the American
assa ult.
Storming the city
Although an error, the seizure of Molino del Rey
brought American forces right up to the walls of
the fortress at Chapultepec. Scott decided to
storm it without delay. On 12 September he
announced impulsively that he would attack that
day; but he was persuaded by brevet Lieutenant
Colonel Robert E. Lee to wait until the following
morning, th us allowing t he artillery bombard-
ment to have more effect. So at 8 am on 13
September three of Scott's divisions moved
forward to the assault: John A. Quitman from the
south, Gideon J. Pillow from the southwest, and
William J. Worth from the west. The infantry bran-
dished scaling ladders, clambered up the walls,
surged over them , and by 9.30 am Chapultepec
had fallen into American hands. Thereafter the
divisions of Quitma n and Worth pushed on to the
Belem and San Cosme gates respectively. Both

200
201
48 NINETEENTH CENTU RY

Thedefence of
MexicoCiry
dependedon its
outerramparts.
Molino del Rey
Defencesstormed by US
marines 8 September •
Santa Anna
Inkerman
Once rhese
surrendered, Santa Date: 5 November 1854 Location: southwest Crimea. Ukraine
Anno decided to
abandon theciry
Quel abbatoir!
rather than fight
for every street. y GENERALP. F. J. BOSQUET, ONSEEINGTHE PILESOF BODIES AROUND THE SANDBAGBATIERY, 5 NOVEMBER18S4
American moves"""-
Mexican moves"""-
Chapultepec
lines breachedby US
~] Mexican fortifications ~
fo rces 13 September American fortifications 'IJ.........J
o 2km American batteries '" "-
he Crim ean War of 1854-56 arose from and the next day a Russian sortie probed the right

T
!
I
o 1 ~ile Mex ican batteries ~.J.
Russia's attem pts to expand sout hwards at extension of th e Brit ish-held part of the siege line.
the expense of the Ottoman empire and Though recognizing the vulnera bility of this
from the determination of Britain and France to flank, the allied commanders, Canrobert and

gates had been taken by nightfall. But Scott
entertained real doubts as to whe ther he could
seize th e city and hold it - he had suffered 900
casualties and was running low on ammu nitio n.
The Mexicans, however, solved Scott's
dilemma for him. Santa Anna commanded a
demoralized army that had fought bravely but
ultima tely failed to hold Mexico City's strong-
points. He decided to abando n th e capital and
withdraw nort h to Guadalup e Hidalgo. On 14 Sep-
tember Mexico City surrendered and Quitman 's
tro ops marched into the Grand Plaza and raised
the American flag. With in the hour Scott and his
staff arrived to take the salute.
Hosti litie s still rumbled on fo r several weeks
wi th Santa Anna refusing to give up. He "tried to
retake Puebla and force Scott's wi th drawal by
harrying US supply lines. But he failed in these
small operations as he had in the greater and,
resigni ng t he Mexican presidency, on 11 Octo ber
he was relieved of mi lit ary command.
Scott 's campaign against Mexico City repre-
sents a masterly achievement tha t displays high
qua litie s of planning and generalship. Given the
leng th of his sup ply lines, a single error might
have led to catastr oph e; but he did not take
counsel of his fears. Scot t' s tim ing and logistical
judgment could not have been bette red.
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
The Mexican War did not formally end until the
signin g on 2 February 1848 of the Treaty of
..._---I'COMBATANTS '------.
United States forces
• 10,738 men
o Command ed by Major General Winfield
• 900 casualties
Mexican f orces
• 25,000 men
o Commanded by General Anton io l opez de Santa
Anna
04,000 casualties
Guadalupe Hidalgo. Mexico ceded more than half
it s national territo ry, California, pl us the New
Mexico territories, and the USgained the frontier
of the Rio Grande (over 1 million sq. km [half a
million sq. miles]). In return Mexico received $15
million, plus a further $3,250,000 to pay outstand-
ing claims against it by U5 citize ns.
The Mexican War served notice of the US
determination to be the paramount power in
North America. It facilitated the establishment of
a cont inenta l republic stretching from the
Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans. Alas, by acquiring
so much new territ ory from Mexico, Scott's
victory revived sectional debate as to its fut ure
character. Slave or free? Such questions affected
the North -South balance; ultimately, the political
crisis of the 1850swould end in the catastrophe of
secession and civil war.
prevent that. Russia occupie d Turkey's Danub ian Raglan, chose to concentrate their limi ted
provinces in July 1853; Turkey declared war in resources on a decisive assault on the town
October and Britain and France the following befo re winter closed in. Menshikov, the Russian
March. When the Russians, th reatened by Aus- comma nder-in-chief, was und er pressure from
tri an intervention, withdrew from the Danubian the Tsar to strike early to break the siege and
Scott
theatre, the allied armies focused on the Crimean expel the invaders from the Crimea; the arrival of
peninsula and the destruction of the naval baseat reinforcements from the Danube theat re now
TheCrimeawas
Sevastopol from which Russia controlled the gave him marked superiority in manpower and thefirst campaign
BlackSea and th reaten ed Constanti nople . artillery. He desig ned a decisive blow of his ow n to berecordedby
th rough a pincer movement aim ed at th e weak photography,
though actual
British right. Two converging forces wou ld scale
The campaign battle remained
The Anglo-French forces landed on 14 Septem- and seize the thinly defended lnkerman Ridge beyond thelimi ted
and occupy the Chersonese plateau behind the technology.Here
ber and, moving south towards Sevastopol.
RogerFenton's
fought a major battle at the Alma River. Though besieging forces, while diversionary att acksoccu-
exposureofthe
Sevastopol was soon under siege, most of th e pied th e French. Menshiko v entr usted field Light Division's
Russian army remained at large in th e peninsula's com mand to General Dannenb erg w ho had encampment
shows theopen
interior and could communicate wi th the incom- arrived with t he Danub ian troo ps.
and vulnerable
plete ly invested town and threaten the besiegers. natureofBritish
The Russians sought to break through to the The battle dispositionsabove
The Russian atta ck began in th e dark early hours Balaklava.
British supply harbou r at Balaklava on 25 October,

202
49 N I N E TEEN T H C E N T UR Y

Anglo-French forces

• z.soo Briti sh and B,2oo Fren ch o n Inkerman

Ridge

• Command ers-in-Chief: Gen eral Lord Raglan

(British); Gen eral F. C. Canro bert (French)

• British: 63S kill ed, 1,938 woun d ed;

French : 17S killed, 1,625 wounded

Russian forces
~ ,-"" • 3S,ooOmen on Inkerman Ridge
,~<t rz,~flI"
West o • Commanders: General-Adjutant and Adm iral
Jut ,,'" Prince A. S.Menshikov (co m mander-i n-chief)

Lancaster r -!1,luiak0v
~ ~~ Ca t art
and General P. A. Dannenberg

G(,1< Top Ridge

.
)
•c. S,OOO killed, c. 7,000 wounded
batteryr •
o- 6\ - Sandba
The Barrier • battery
Co~ . • 07) Fore Gap. Even this
',> •
Ridge 2nd Division commander, Brigadier General Pen- The much larger French fo rces had faced two The impact
~f0'J b'l.\'\e-
romanticized

~
"''C'<s'''''' ~ ~Home
• ~ •Ridge
~ •• nefather, decided to throw men forward as they dive rsionary attacks, the first a fierce sally from The initial outcome of the battle was negative for
depiction of the
2nd111 became availabl e to reinforce his pickets rather t he to wn on the left of the siege line, the second a both sides. The British were shaken, only the death of
Division ~ ill Lieutenant General
heroism of the infantry having prevented a disas-
• camp •
Guards' It,. Raglan
picket
~1<
than wi thdraw to the plateau to await larger rein-
forcement. This tactic prevented the superiority
feint attack south of th e plateau from a force of
22,000 commanded by General Gorchakov, The ter, and casualties were high (50 per cent in some Sir George
Cathcart, who had
units). One general suffered a nervous break-
"'~ of Russian numbers and guns (art illery had been weakness of the pressurefrom Gorchakov left the
down and another advised the abandonment of
rashly led his men
French General Bosquet confident enough to dis- intoa ravine
installed on Shell Hill, supplemented by two gun -
the w hole campaign. The planned assault on Sev- exposed to Russian
N
boats in the bay below) from having full effect. patch several of his regiments northwards to fire, conveys
astopol was now impossible and the siege had to

t
troops from Neither side was fully aware of t he other's assist the British. In this second phase, as arriving something of the
3rd Division
continue over the winter. A great storm which battleground
~ UU numbers and dispositions, even when the mist detachm ents were thrown in desperately, the
destroyed the Brit ish supply ships and depot at confusionat
"::::::oUght Division part ially cleared and a series of fierce and discon- batte red Brit ish line develop ed a gap, wit h confu -
1h1.4t h Divi
Guards Inkerman.
camp Balaklava on 14 November increased th e priva-
tvrsron Guards'camp 11111 nected encounters developed along the ridges sion and indi scipline among commanders
1 camp
o tion s and losses through the winter of 1854- 55.
and scrub-lined ravines of the plateau 's edge. cont ributing to the problem. Only th e impact of
I
o Though the Minie rifle used by some of the British the 18-pounders in clearing the enemy artillery Major reinforcements were po ured into the
was markedly superior to the Russian muskets, and the arrival of Bosquet's regim ents (mainly Crimea to give the allies military superiority .
Theabovemap of Sunday 5 November. Infantry 19,OOO-strong the detrimental effect of overnight rain on these Zouaves) turned the day and, after taking heavy The impact on the Russian side was even
illustratesthe with supporting arti llery, commanded by lieu- rifles, ammunition shortages and the close casualties, Dannenberg ordered wi thdrawal. greater . A third major battle had failed to dis-
narrow front ofthe lodge the invaders and, as the allied build-up
tenant General Soimonov, advanced from engagement meant that there was unusually The clear superiority of Russian resources,
engagement along
Sevastopol to wards th e right end of th e Brit ish heavy reliance on the bayonet in hand -to-hand aided by the advantage of surprise, had not proceeded , it was clear Sevastopol was doomed.
tber idqes,
interspersed by lines on Inkerman Ridge. A second force of 16,000 fighting. The Coldstream Guards made eleven achieved victory. Failures of co-ordination among After a last break-out attempt, the town fell in
ravines, above September 1855 and the war ended as an Anglo -
men under Lieutenant General Pavlov, accompa- bayonet charges. The frenzied and improvised Russia n commanders and the forward engage-
Sevastopoi. This
nied by Dannenberg, was to make a simultaneou s resistance of Pennefather's division of 3,000 men ment by British troops - restricting the enemy to a French victory. The Treaty of Paris (1856)
concentration
served the British advance across the Tchernaya River to join Sol- broke Soimonov's advance, killing the Russian narrow front and difficult terrain where his full demilitarized the Black Sea and stalled Russia's
defenderswell and
monov's troops in breaching the British lines. But general himself, so that the British line on Home resources could not be deployed - had permitted expansion at Turkey's expense for 20 years.
reduced the effect Russia's loss of t he aura of mi litary invincibility
ofsuperior Russian repairs to Inkerman bridge and Dannenberg's Ridge was still intact whe n Pavlov's division the line to be held until t he French arrived. Inker-
numbers. changes to Menshikov's timetable prevented the arrived. Raglan, present on the field , left local man, a wholly defensive and reactive battle as retained since 1815 would have profound
conjunction of the two forces which attacked responses to sector commanders, but made two fought by the allies, would stand as 'a soldier's domestic and international consequences. But
consecutively instead of simultaneously. Aided crucial decisions: to request French assistance battle', aswell asa notably bloody one.One junior the international standing of Palmerston's Britain
by darkness, drizzle, mist and the terrain , Soi- (earlier declined) and to order up two 18-pounder officer concluded, 'We owe our existence as an was confirmed and that of the Emp eror Louis
monov achieved total surprise, but the British siege guns to counter the enemy 's artillery. army to the pluck of the private soldiers: Napoleon's Franceenhanced .

205
204
 ANT IETAM 50

Antietam
Date: 17 September 1862 Location : Sharpsburg, northwest Maryland, USA

The present posture ofaffairs, in my op in io n, p laces i t in the power ofthe Government of

the Confederate States to propose with propriety to that of the United States the
recognition ofou r independence.
ROBERT E. LEE TO JEFFERSONDAVIS, 8 SEPTEMBER1862

T
he Maryland Campaign of September 1862 Preparations for battle
President
Abraham Lincoln in t~e American Civil Wat, culm inating at President Abraham Lincoln reacted to this crisis
visited McClellan's Antietam, resulted from the strategic decisively. He called for another 300,000 volun-
troopsa tAntietam
reverses inflicted on Union arms by Confederate tee rs, recalled Union forces from the South
on 1October 1862.
Frustrated with his General Robert E. Lee. The Seven Days' Batt les Atla ntic and Kanawha Valley and , most contro-
commander,he (25 Jun e- 1 July) had saved the Confederate versially, appointed Major Genera l George B.
sarcastically capi tal, Richmond, and the second battle of Man - McClellan as commander of all Union forces in the
described theArmy
of the Potomac as
assas had re-established the Confederate frontier Washington area. As a Democrat, McClellan w as
'McClellan's along the Potomac River. On 5 September Lee's regarded by some of Lincoln's cabinet as a po liti -
bodyguard '. Army of Northern Virginia entered Maryland. cal enem y and, desp it e demonstrating astute
organizatio nal qualit ies, the Seven Days' Battles
had shown him to be more concerned with avoid -
ing defeat than defeating the enem y. He now
redeemed himself by instituting an int ensive
training programme and bringing new recru its
into the Army of the Potomac. By 7 September
McClellan had got his t roo ps into the field , but
almost one quarter of them (some 20,000 men)
had not seen act io n befo re.
Lee's self-confidence led him to underrate
Union resilience, and the speed of McClellan's
reaction took him by surprise. He had counted on
at least three weeks to allow his tro ops to rest,
refit, and move through the western (Unio nist)
counties of Maryland towa rd s Pennsylvania. Lee
int ended to stay on northern soil until November,
erod ing support for th e continuation of the war
and forcing Lincoln to ackno wledge Confederate
independence. He to ld Colonel William Allan in
1866, 'I went int o Maryland to give battle', hoping
to out-manoeuvre Union fo rces and st rike a lethal
blow that would w in th e war fo r the South .
The Arm y of Northern Virg in ia had to spr ead
out to forag e off the country. On 9/ 10 September
Lee's staff issued Special Ord er No. 191 detailing
his dispersal. Most sig nificantly, Major General
Tho mas 'St onewall' Jackson and 38,000 men had
bee n sent back to 'i ntercept ' th e Federal garrison
at Harp er's Ferry. A .co py of th is order - the
famous Lost Order - was fou nd by Union troops
and handed to McClella n. He waved it exuber-
antly in the air, an act noticed by a Confederate
spy. It wo uld appear doubtful that Lee knew the
precise cause of McClellan 's elation for so me
time, alt ho ugh he did recog nize that hi s plan s
had been co m promi sed .
Lee had, in any case, already lost the in it iati ve.
On 12 Septem ber Union troops entere d Freder-
ick, Mary land, and Lee had on ly one div ision
availabl e to pr otect his rear, that of D. H. Hill. On
14 September McClellan attacked Hill at the
battle of South Mountain, but unfortunately did
not exploit hi s success. In an effort to shield
Jackson's forc e Lee orde red a retreat via
Keedysville, from w here on 15 Sep tember he
spotted the Sharp sburg Heights and d iscerned
th eir stre ng th as a defensive position for his army.
Shortly afterwards he received a despatch from Union and
Jackson predicting the fall of Harper 's Ferry (an Confederate
uniformsin 1861,
unanticipated siegel. Lee thus ordered a concen- the War of theBlue
tration of the army at Sharpsburg . and theGray'. The
At th is point Lee had yet to make up his m ind choiceof gray was
chosenby the
w hether to offer McClellan battle on th is ground
Confederate
or withdraw . But a return to Maryland at a lat er president,
date wo uld have ruin ed the strategic momentum Jefferson Davis,
who had beena
of the campa ign . The Sharpsburg Heights offe red
cadet at WestPoint
a confusing series of interlocking hills tha t might and always
deceive McClellan as to Lee's numerical weak - admired thegray
ness, giving Lee valuable time. With the meander ofthecadets'
uniforms.
of the Potomac beh ind him , the Confederat e
flan ks co uld safely rest there, but he had no
aven ue of escape should McClellan break his
front. By midday on 15 September, Lee had onl y
15,000 men and 100 guns with him , accepting an
enormous risk by making a stand at Sharpsburg.
Jackson arrived on the morning of 16 Septem -
ber (m inus A. P. Hill 's dl vision ), considerably
add ing to Lee's strengt h. That aft ernoon the
cavalry commander, Maj or General J. E. B. Stuart,
reported the arrival of Union troops, first Majo r

207
 50 N I N E TE E NT H C E N T U R Y
General Joseph Hooke r's I Corps, followed shortl y concentrated his guns on hi s right at Poffen-
afterwards by XII Corps under Major General berger Hill behind the North Woods. McClellan
Joseph Mansfield. At 4 pm both corps started to
foo lishly believed that the Confederates outnum-
cross the Antietam Creek and approach the Con- bered him, when Lee barely had 50,000 men
McClella n's
federate left, but McClellan took no further action ready for battle. His plan to weaken both Confed -
onslaug ht
that day. He forfeited surprise by advertising his
degenerated into a erate flanks with attacks then smash Lee's centre
series ofpiecemeal strength and then granted Lee another day to demanded tight tactical control and neat timing.
arracks. Leecou ld make his preparations. Alas, McClellan made his headquarters far in the
thus concentrate
his reserves a t key
McClellan commanded 75,000 men and 275 rear and did not appear on the field once . Conse-
points to repulse guns. The Union arti llery was superior in both q uently, his plan br oke dow n into a series of
them. range and wei ght of ord nance, and McClellan piecemeal fro nta l at tacks, none of which was
strong enough to defeat Lee's army on its own.
Action
N On 17 September the Union assault opened on
t the right at 5 am. Hooker intended to seize the
high ground around the Dunker Church . Once
taken, Lee's army could be driven into t he
Potomac. Confederate artillery placed on Nicode -
mus Hill enfiladed the Union infantry as they
marched forward. Jackson commanded this
sector and resisted Hooker's onslaught stub-
bornly. XII Corps received the order to advance at
7.30 am, but Mansfield fell mortally wounded and
his divisions attacked piecemeal. Lee sent
Jackson one d ivision from t he centre and another
) from the right. Jackson's streng thened line held .
The second phase of the operation began at
about 9 am, when Major General Edwin V.
Sumner 's II Corps thrust towards the Confederate
~---J C O M B ATA N T S~ __
Union
• 75,3 16 men
• Command ed by Major General George B.
McClellan
PENNSYLvAN IA • 2,108 d ead, 9,549 wounded, 753 missi ng
~~
(includi ng pr isoners)
PotornacR:
-- ''''e,.
Confederat e
- Confederate positions • 51,844 m en
...- Confederate movements
....--. Confederate retreat Atlantic • Commanded by General Robert E. Lee
- Union positions Ocean
..-. Union movements
• 2,700 dead , 9,024 w ound ed, 2,000 mis sing
(including pr isoners )
208
cent re. This was the weakest part of Lee's position
because a dale ran through it to the Potomac. D.
H. Hill's division covered the vital hinge, a sunken
lane, linking it to the Confederate left flank .
McClellan let this attack go forw ard as an
unsupported front al assault - contributin g to the
wea ring-o ut process tha t it should have been
held back to exploit. Sumner 's three divisions
became confused by the ground, diverged, and
then made three separate assaults. Lee struggled
to resist them and committed R. H. Anderson's
division to support D, H, Hill, but at 1.30 pm the
Confederates were driven out of the sunken lane,
The battle seemed to be going against Lee,
One of Sumner's divisions renewed the assault on
the Dunker Church and for a couple of hours this
fell into Federal hands , Lee worked feverishly to
patch up his line, but by 2.30 pm he had no more
reserves to commit. One weak division of 2,400
men covered his entire right flank , Then another
disaster occurred , At long last Burnside 's IX Corps
drove back Confederate skirmis hers and crossed
the Rohrbach (now Burnside 's) Bridge, climbed
the bluffs over Antietam Creek, and belatedly
advanced on Sharpsburg to cut off Lee's retreat.
Lee failed to rally the fleeing Confederates and,
in a dramatic flourish, A. P. Hill's division from
Harper's Ferry arrived . 'General Hill', said a
delighted Lee,'I was never so g lad to see yo u. You
are bad ly needed: In the nick of t im e, Hill' s Ligh t
Divi sion charged Burnsid e's exposed left flank
and drove it back over the creek.
On 18 September Lee stood his ground, claim -
ing the field and thus the victory, which McClellan
made no effort to challenge. The following day
ANT IETAM 50
Very high
casualties resulted
from th e close
proximity of th e
two armies, the
power of their
artilleryond the
desperate nature
of the fighting.
Lee withdrew back to Virginia, his troops
exhausted . The Army of the Potomac had also
been drained by the experience and remained
largely in the locality for another six weeks.
Although technically a draw, Antietam remains
one of the most decisive and bloody battles of t he
American Civi l War, each side sustaining losses of
about 12,000 men.
Consequences
Antietam frustrated Lee's efforts to gain a deci -
sion in the Confederacy's favour that year. It also
dashed the very slight chance that Great Britain
and France might intervene on t he Sout h's side.
The withd rawal of Confederate troops offered
Lincoln enough of a strategic victory to justify
the issue on 22 September of the preliminary
Emancipation Proclamation. It freed no slaves,
except those on Confederate territory, but sig-
nalled Lincoln's harsher approach to the South .
He sought nothing less tha n a Confederate sur-
render or th e destruct ion of th e So ut hern social
system based on slavery. Although a persuasive
case has been made that Antietam made foreign
intervent io n more likely because of humanitarian
fears of a servile war, Britain only had 'med iation'
in mind , not military intervention. Lincoln could
have bru shed this aside.
In sum, Antiet am provid ed the all-im portant
fou ndatio n for th e event ual Union victory. It
cou ld also lay claim to be one of the most decisive
battles of the Americas. Wit hout it t he United
States cou ld not have establi shed an imperium in
the western hemisphere by the 1880s as a
prelude to w orld power,
209
 GETTYS BU RG 51

Gettysburg
Date: 1-3 July 1863 Locati on: southern Pennsylvania, USA
Thedead dying and the wounded begersall decription. They lay in Pilesabout the
BrestWorksand for miles they lay Iyke Wheat Bundells in a good hearvestfield - Men,
botsis, Mules, Broken Canan,Canan Caridges, Bugles, Drummes, Swords, and
Muskettes law stewd all over the fields- grain feelds all Stompt in the Earth.
Themost horabel Sight man eversaw.
L m ER FROM A W ISCONSIN SOLDIERAFTER THE BATTLE
posit ion to thr eaten a number of eastern cit ies,
including Baltimore and Washington, and hoped
thereby to force Hooker to attac k him .
By the end of June Lee's th ree corps, unde r
Lieutenant Generals Richard Ewell, A. P. Hill and
James Longstreet , were all in Pennsylvania but
wi dely scattered. Because there had been no
word from hiscavalry commander, Major General
J. E. B.('l eb') Stuart who wasto secure the Confed -
erate right flank in the march north, Lee assumed
t hat the Federal Army was not a threat. But Stuart
had become separated from the main Confeder-
ate Army and forced to circle behi nd the
northward moving Union troops . On the evening
of 28 June, wi th his own forces dangerous ly dis-
persed, Lee learned that Hooker's army was
massed near Frederick, Maryland, closer to por -
tions of Lee's army than these were to each other.
Lee had to concentrate at once. If he did not do
so, hisarmy would be destroyed piecemeal.
The Confederates assembled at Gettysburg , a
littl e town of 2,400 people and major road hub .
The Army of Northern Virginia came in from the
northwest, the Army of the Potomac from the
south . Union fo rces also had a new commander,
Major General George Gordo n Meade. Hooker
had been quarrelling wi th his superiors in Wash-
ington, and on the 28 June Presid ent Abraham

G
ettysburg was probably the most impor-
tant battle of the 1861- 65 American Civil
War. Following his bril liant victory at
Chancellorsville in May 1863, General Robert E.
Lee, commander of the Confederate Army of
Northern Virginia , conv inced Confederate Presi-
dent Jefferson Davis to allow him to carry out an
invasion of Pennsylvania. Lee intended this as a
spoiling attack to delay an anticipated invasion
by Major General Joseph Hooker's Federal Army
of the Potomac (see Ant ietam p. 206 ). It would
allow Virginia a chance to recover from the
ravages of war and th e Confederacy could draw
resources from the rich Pennsylvania country-
side. Bringing the war home to the North might
also aid the peace movement there, and if the
South could wi n a great military victory, it would
certainly aid Southern chances of securing diplo-
mat ic recognition abroad. Although the Union
had a slight edge in manpower (about
85,000- 90,000 to som e 70,000 Confederates) the
numbers were closer than the y had been recently
or would be in the future. Artistic rendering
offigh ting
On 3 June Lee's army began moving west. between Union
Hooker took a parallel route north of the Rappa- tro ops (left ) and
hannock , keeping his own forces between Lee Confederate
soldiers (righ t)
and the Federal capital . Lee slipped across the
during the second
Blue Ridge, moved north through the Shenan- day of the ba ttle.
doah Valley and crossed the Potomac north 2J uly 1863.
Hand -coloured
through Maryland and into Pennsylvania. Secur-
lithograph
ing Harrisonburg wo uld allow Lee to cut Union published by
commun ications to th e west. He would also be in Currier & Ives.

210 211
 51 N INETE E N T H CE NTU RY GETTYS BU RG 51

Lincoln replaced him . Hooker had been a capable
corps commander, but he had dithered and
allowed Lee (wit h half his numbers >to win a bril -
liant victory at Chancellorsville in May. Lincoln
and his advisors doubted Hooker could stand up
to Lee; while it often took Meade some time to
make decisions, he was nevertheless a reliab le
and unflappable commander.
Preliminary contact between the two forces
occurred near Gettysburg on 30 June. Union
cavalry under Brigadier General John Buford
entered Gettysburg and sighted A. P. Hill's Con-
federate infant ry scavangers west of the town.
Buford sent back word to Major General Joseph
Union and Reynolds, commander of the Union I Corps and of
Confederate
Meade's left wing. Buford decided to try to hold
positionsat
Gettysburg, 3 July Gettysburg as both
7863. forwa rd.
PENNSYLVANIA
The battle Far left Mojor
The batt le of Gettysburg lasted three days. The GenerolGeorge
Gordon Meade,
first day, 1 July, was a Confede rate victory. commander of the
Reynold s reached th e to wn in mid -morn ing and UnionArmyofthe
moved his infantry forward to replace Buford 's Potomac.
cavalry. Reynolds was killed wh ile directing the Left General
placement of units . In early afternoon, Major RobertE. Lee,
General Oliver Howard 's Union XI Corps reached commanderofrhe
ConfederateArmy
the field, taking up posit ions north of Gettysburg.
of Northern
In fierce fighting that followed, the Confeder - Virginia.
ates dro ve the Union troops back through
Gettysburg into strong posit ions on Cemetery Hill
and Culp's Hill. Reynolds and Buford had pur -
chasedjust sufficient tim e, for the resultant Union
defensiv e line - which came to be known for its
shape as the Fishhook - was Meade's greatest
sides rushed resources single advantage . The Fishhook was anchored on
the right by Culp's Hill. It ran westward to Ceme-
tery Hill, the n south along Cemetery Ridge to the
3 Jul y 1863 two Round Tops. Union cavalry screened the secure the Round Tops at the south of the Union The fig hting then shifted to the Union centre .
I d flanks. The Confederate s, meanwhile, occupied defensive line and then swing around behind the Although Hill attacked with insufficient numbers ,

-- A-- "'" Seminary Ridge, a long , partially wood ed rise

running north and south parallel to Cemetery
Ridge. The first day's battle had been costly for
the Union; two-thirds of the 18,000 Federals who
fought on 1July were casualties.
~-;:;?' Sem i na Benner's Hill The second day revealed the advantage of the
/'
Union forces threatening Baltimore and Wash-
ington, to draw Meade fro m his defensive
positions. Lee, however, planned a two -pronged
att ack on th e Union flanks.
These att acks occurred on e after the other,
enabling Meade to conta in both. Longstreet's
one Confederate brigade briefly secured a lodge-
ment on Cemetery Ridge.To the north, at twil igh t
two Confederate brigades were driven back from
Cemetery Hill, and Ewell's attack on Culp's Hill
wasalso rebuffed. The second day ended a draw .
On the third day Lee planned a massive Con- Belo w

y
.
!idge
~-S!1
..Q
.[;0 -,
I::
~~
~a,{
;;:.
!i/ __
,
fl)

v .. ~
Culp's HIli /
~
Fishhook, asMeade, operating from interior lines,
could more easily shift about troops and supp lies
march beyond the Union left and its observation
posts took much of the afternoon. Nonetheless,
federate attack from Seminary Ridge against the
center of the Union line, held by Major General
Participants in
a modem
reconstruction

-
XU Corps than could Lee. Longstreet urged an effort to the Confederate attack by two divisions against Winfield Scott Hancock's II Corps. The Confeder - of thebarrie of
1 ! Pltzer - c#.;: Q, _ etf f Cemetery Hill
r I 10 ;:'1 the Union left under Major General Daniel Sickles, ate cavalry under St uart, which had arrived only Gettysburg.
Bliss X ~ Widow Leister
commander of III Corps, was successful. Sickles
I ~ :.

1/
\ e (Meado's HQ)
I §, -.: Cod on. 0 ,g had foolishly left Cemetery Ridge and moved in
~ .a
• - i3 advance of the rest of the Union line, form ing a
Spangler . ~ ;:,; • Rogers \ ~ Powers Hill
Union salient that wascomp letely unsupported.
~ 'i~ ::~ingl e 0- I ~ }>-~-->- >- •c. 8S,ooOmen of the Arm y of the Potomac Fight ing here raged through locat ions that
~ ~... 'P h
. " . ~ QjE
WelCken
and 372 art ill ery pieces became famous: the Peach Orchard, the Wheat-
~ ~ ~c ~
en Orchard' U 1. • Commanded by Majo r Gen eral George field , Devil's Den and Little Round Top. Meade
; I Gordon Meade
now shifted forces south and, although Sickles's
..... • Rose Wheatfield' 1. l' I
• 23,000 casualt ies men were driven back to Cemetery Ridge, they
oeyiI's 'Uttle RO~~:'

I ~
Den '
'Big Round
Confederate

•c. 70,000 men of th e Army of Northern Virginia

held that position. The Confederate s also failed
to take Littl e Round Top, thanks to Colonel
Joshua Chamberlain's badly outnumbered 20th
_ Confederate Top' and 274 artillery piece s
infantry \ Maine Regiment, rushed there just in time. Had
- Union.nfantry • Commanded by General Robert E. Lee
the Confederates been successful here, it would
artillery • Up to 28,000 casualties have enabled Longstreet to enfilade the ent ire
Union line.

212 213
51 NINETE ENTH CENTURY

the day before , was to sweep around the Union

line from t he north, but was defeated 8 km
(5 miles) east of the battlefield by Union cavalry.
At about 1 pm, the Confederates began a
massive artillery barrage with some 160 guns
from Seminary Ridge. More than 100 Union guns
on Cemetery Ridge replied in a two-hour cannon-
ade. Then t he guns all fell silent and the
Confederate s began their assau lt over 1.5 km (1
mile) of open gro und in ranks the same di stance
wi de, battle flags flying as if on parade. There
were three divisions in th e charge, with Major
General George Pickett' s in the cent re. The two
oth ers faded away and streamed back tow ards
commander refused to take the bait. Finally, on
the night of 4 July Lee decamped, taking advan-
tage of darkness and heavy rain to withdraw
Sadowa
down the Cumber land Valley and into Virgin ia,
wit h captu red booty and even 6,000 prisoners. Date: 3 July 1866 Location : modern sadova, Czech Republ ic
Aftermath The path w ascrammed with men fleeing from the right wing. Cavalry, infantry, artille ry,
In the battle itself, Meade lost some 23,000 men . tra ins, everything; we couldn 't clear them out or restore any kind oforder. Our columns
Lee's losses were as great as those of the Union were broken up . The enem y directed his fire into this o verfilled ra vine and every ball
and possibly as hig h as 28,000 men. Although the hit home. We retreated, lea ving thousands dead.
South trum peted a vict ory, coo ler heads could ANAUSTRIANOFFICER AT SADOWA, 1866
see that this was a Confederate defeat. The Army
of t he Pot omac had at last lived up to its promise.
The Union vict ory at Gettysburg, coupl ed wi t h
russia's victory over Denmark in 1864 led Not expecting so rapid a movement and con-

t he Confederate lines, leaving Pickett 's division
alone and exposed to enfilading Union fire. Only a
few hund red Confederates reached the Union
line, w here they were halt ed. Out of about
12,000-13,500 men, Pickett lost between 8,000
A dead and 10,000 that day.
Contederate
Lee then shorten ed his line. He remained in
soldier in the
place along Seminary Ridge t he next day, hoping
Devil'sDen,
Gertysburg . that Meade wou ld attack him, but the Union
th e simultaneous success at Vicksburg, Missis-
sippi, decisively tipped the mil itary/ diplomatic
balance in favour of th e North . From this
point, th e Confederacy was on an
unrelenting slide to defeat.
P
to t he Prussian acquisition of th e provinces
of Schleswig and Holstein. Austria soon
led a coalit ion th at included Bavaria, Saxony and
Hanover to resist furt her Prussian gains and to
balance an ltalian-Prussian alliance. With war
loo mi ng, Prussian forces, und er the command
of General Helm uth von Moltke, mobil ized and
prepared fo r deployment in June 1866. The
superiority of Prussian staff wo rk soon yielded
important advantages. Moltke used six different
railway lines to concentrate three armies across a
SOO-km (312-mile) arc in Bohemia, catching the
much slower Austriansoff guar d.
centratio n of his opponent 's forc es, Austrian
General Ludwig von Benedek had suffe red a
series of local defeats before placing his fo rces
betwee n th e town s of Sadowa and Koniqqratz,
His deplo yment was bett er suited to th e 18th
tha n the 19th centu ry. The Austrians deployed
with th eir backs to the Elbe River, th eir right flank
sitting on low ground, t heir left flank virtually
unprotected. This position was ill-suited to thei r
lines of retreat and the ir reserves were to o close
to the main forces. The Aust rians thus placed
them selves in a position to be encircled if the
Prussians could locate them and strike quickly.

Farleft One af th e
desig ners of the
modemgeneral
sraffsystem and
an earlyconvert to
railways, General
Helm ut h van
Maltkegrasped the
importance of
pl anning and
preparation.

Left General
Lud wig von
Benedek 's heroic
status at So/ferino
(1B59) was
destroyed after
Sadowa, w hen
Austriamade
him a na tiona l
scapegoo r for th e
loss.

215
 52 NI NETE ENTH CE NTURY SADOWA 52

Prussians
· 225,000men
• Commandedby General HelmuthvonMoltke
• 9,000 deadand wounded

Austrians and Saxo ns

• 230,000 men
• Commanded byGeneral Ludwig von Benedek
• 20,000 dead andwounded; 20,000prisoners

Neverthele ss, asMol tke himself once observed,

Austrian battery
o Austrianarmy
- - . Austrian counter-offensive
- . Austrian retreat /
o Prussian army -#
-..... Prussian advan,~
--==
The Austrian Benedek had gained fame by saving the Aus-
positionleft
tr ian army in the wake of the defeat at Solferino in
exposed flanks
rha r tb e berrer- 1859. Now he commanded a demoralized and
armed Pruss;ans polyglot force that was almost 60 per cent Slav.
wereablero These soldiers cared little for a war to decide who
exploit.
would become master of Germany. Austrian staff
work was clearly inferior to that of the Prussians,
leading Benedek to become pessimistic about
Austria's ultimate chances of winning the war. He
had already asked his emperor to sue for peace
and been refused. Now he was poorly positioned,
poor ly informed and poor ly armed .
Moltke needed to win a quick war to keep
France neutral and avoid lon g supply lines from
Prussia. His scouts located th e Austrians on 2 July
amid a dr iving rain sto rm. Molt ke planned to
advance th e next mo rning wi th all three of his
armies and cut th e Austrians off from retreat wi th
his cavalry. If all went to plan he could destroy
Benedek's army, despite both for ces being
rough ly equivalent sizes, c. 250,000 men each.
no plan survives first contact w ith the enemy . Due
to a failu re of his telegraphic comm unicat ions, the
Second Army did not receive its orders and th us
did not atta ck. By mid-morn ing Austrian arti llery
had held the ot her tw o Prussian armies at bay,
leaving them few gains except in a wooded area in
the cent re known ast he Swiepwald .The Austrians
unwisely decided to counter-attack to reclaim the
woods , advancing directly into the path of solid
Prussian infantry using breech-loading rifles
known as needle guns. These weapons allowed
the Prussians to disperse, fire lying down, and
remain concealed .
The Second Arm y arr iva l
By midday the Austrians had been bloodied, but
showed few signs of breaking . They did not ,
however, kno w of the approach of the Second
Army. Upon hearing the sounds of the battle in
the morning the Second Army began advancing,
reaching the right flank of the Austrian army at
around 2 pm. The Prussians advanced in dis-
persed formations, hitting the same exhausted
units that had been attacked in t he Swiepwald.
The subsequent advance of the Prussian First
Army in th e centre held the Aust rian centre in
place, leaving th e right flank to face th e wit hering
fire of th e Second Army by it self. It soon col-
lapsed, taking wi th it any ho pe of Austr ian victory.
Poor weather slowed th e Prussians eno ugh to
allow Benedek to order coun ter-attacks to cover a
ret reat. He was t hus ab le to extri cate his army as
he had done at Solferino seven years earlier.
The Austr ian army survived, but it had been
badly hit. More than 40,000 Austr ians were killed
or w ounded and a further 20,000 had become
prisoners of war. Prussia lost j ust 9,000 men in all.
Mili tarily, Sadowa helped to establish the reputa -
tion of the Prussian army, particularly that of its
General Staff. Prussian efficiency, technological
superiority and tactical sophist ication clearly out-
classedthose of the ir opponents. Prussiaused the
same system, with a few refinements, to defeat
France in the 1870-71 Franco-Prussian War .
The Treaty of Prague
The po lit ical ramificati ons of the battle were just
as impressive. In th e Treaty of Prague, signed on
23 Augu st, Austria agreed to exclude it self from
German affairs and recog nize Prussian dom i-
nance of t he Nort h German Confederation .
Having lost t heir influence in Germany, Austria
decided to move its powe r east and south. Conse-
quently, it negotiated with Hungary to form the Thispain rin g
Dual Monarchy in 1867. Thereaft er, Austrian infl u- captures someof
theconfusion in
ence would be directed in to central Europe and the midsr o ibattte.
the Balkans. The defeat at Sadowa also fo rced Moreorgan;zed
Austr ia to abandon its campa ign in the Veneto , Prussian staff
work made tbe
allow ing Italian forces to retake Venice and Prussians better
embark on the final stages of unification. suited rodeal wirh
The terms that German Chancellor Otto von this uncertainty,
providing an
Bismarck presented to the Austrians at Prague
impo rtant
were in fact more generous than they need have advanroge on the
been. With Austria thorough ly beaten on t he bat- botttetietd.
tl efield and its leaders fearfu l of revoluti on,
Bismarck could have demand ed much harsher
terms. Although th e Prussians did demand an
indemn ity, Austria lost none of its territory. The
tw o German powers remained on relativ ely good
terms in th e years immediatel y foll owing th e war.
By 1879 relations between the two states were
cordial enough to lead to th e conclu sion of the
Dual Alliance, the first step in th e inte rlocki ng
alliance system th at led Europe to war in 1914.

216 217

Omdurman
Date: 2 September 1898 Location : nea r Khartou m, centr al Sudan
It was not a battle, but an execution.
G. W. STEEVENS, W ITH KITCHENER TOKHARTUM, 1898
mdurman was the highpoint
O
C. M. Horsfoll' s
post-Omdurman of the success of Brit ish mil-
po rtrait of
itary imperialism against
Kitchener, now
ennobled ond 0 native resistance and ended the
celebrity, conveys Mahdiyya, t he dervish state in
the imo ge of
the nom inally Egypt ian Sudan.
forbiddi ng
sternnessand Though Britain had occupied
ruthlessnessits Egypt in 1882, cont rol of the
subject cultiva ted.
Sudan was lost to the Mahdi's
mili tantly revivalist Islamic
movement. Defeats for Brit ish-
led forces had culminated in the
death of General CharlesGordon at
Khartoum in 1885.
Britain and Egypt, the latter effectively
ruled by the British Consul-General Lord Cromer,
left t he Sudan to the Khalifa, the Mahd i's succes-
sor, for a decade. Avengi ng Gordon 'sdeat h was a
popu lar cause in Britain, but it was not the moti ve
for th e reconquest of 1896- 98. Lord Salisbury,
Conservative Prime Mini ster, ordered a diversion
to aid th e Italians, defeated by Abyssinia at
Adowa early in 1896, and to head off any alliance
between Abyssinia, the Khalifa and France. But
the successful Egyptian advance south along the
Nile to wards Dongola showed the w illi ngness of
native troops to fight fellow-Muslims, and
Londo n learned of a French military expedition
heading for the Upper Nile Valley.
Salisbury and Cromer decided that the fo rces
com manded by Major-General Herbert Kitch-
ener, th e Sirdar (commander) of the Egypt ian
Army, should take Omdurman, the dervish
capital. and secure cont rol of the whole Nile
Valley. British resources and reinforcements were
committed to the expedition, though it remained
2 18
OMOURMAN 53
gunboats lay, wi th a zariba (thorn-wall) erected The Egyptian battal ions had the Marti ni-Henry
on the desert side. A night attac k would have
reduced the advantage of allied firepower and
given the dervishes the ir best chance of breach-
rifle, the Brit ish the new Lee-Metford smokeless
magazine rifle. Few dervishes survived to within
270 m (300 yds) of the perimeter and none
Belo w The
campoign left
valuoble
photogrophic
records. Here
ing the zatiba, but instead battle commenced in reached it. Churchill , an eye-witness, thought the Kitchener is shown
the light of early morning. slaughte r 'a mere matter of machinery'. The only directing
allied set back was th at cavalry and Camel Corps operations. His
There were two phasesto t he batt le. In the first
refusal to employ a
phase, Kitchener's main fo rces foug ht an essen- squadrons, stat ioned outside the zariba towards chief-of-staff
tially defensive engagement from within the the Kerreri Hills, were driven fu rther northwar ds handicapped him
zariba; in the second, they moved out to advance by dervish cavalry; only t he intervention of gun- asafield
commander, but
on Omdurman and cut off the dervish retreat boat s saved them from a mauling.
his preparations
nominally Egyptian and around two- (Kitchener was nervous of street-fighting in a The annihilation of t he dervish charges per-
before the battle
thirds of both manpower and hostile city ). suaded Kitchener to leave the perimeter and werestilldecisive.
money were prov ided by Egypt. The first phase was dom inated by t he weight
of Anglo-Egyptian firepower as the enemy
The expedition infan try charged t he perimeter en masse across
The essence of Kitchener's the plain. The num erically superior dervishes had
campaign lay in t ransport litt le artillery, no machine-gun s and onl y muskets
and supply. He overcame th e and ob solescent rifles wi th poor quality ammun i-
tio n, in cont rast to th eir oppone nts' modern
pro blems of distance and
desert by constructing the weaponry. Kitche ner's artillery, 80 pieces includ-
Sudan Military Railway across ing those on the gunboats , opened up with
the great bend of the Nile, 616 shrapnel at 2,750 m (3,000 yds), the 44 Maxim
km (383 miles) in all, inspir ing guns at 1,650 m (1,800 yds) and the infantry's
Winston Churchill to declare 'The rifles at 1,370 m (1,500 yds).
Khalifa was conquered on th e railway'.
The line ensured the rapid flow of supplies, rein- Left The
development of
forceme nts and prefabricated sections of the the barr Ie in irs two
armed river steamers w hich gave Kitchener effec- pha ses, before and
tive control of t he Nile and its banks, as the rising after themain
allied forces left th e
waters of th e river's seasonal flood made t he
zariba. Bot h.
cataracts crossable. At the Atbara in April 1898 though, were
a Mahd ist force 12,000 -16,000 strong was contestsbetween
defeated , but thereafter the dervishes offered no dervish numbers
and Anglo-
sign ificant resistance as the Anglo-Egyptian army Egyp tian
advanced along the river. The Khalifa staked all on firepower.
a great battle befo re his capital.
The batt le
The invade rs reached the plains before Orndur -
man on t he west bank of the Nile on 1 September.
Native 'friendlies' secured th e east bank, and ~
toOmdurman
artillery and th e gun boats shelled th e city and its
defences. A great dervish army was already taking village
--- --
the field and Kitchen er decided to protect his _ N
o 2km
ammuni tion
~ old fort 0 _______
forces overn ight within a large, semi-circular I
I
gunboats barges
o 1 rriile gunboats River Nile
encampment backing onto the river, wher e the
219
 53 N IN ETEENT H C E N T U RY OMDU RMAN 53

advance on Omdurman to cut off the remaining Th e im p act m ight now appeared as irresistible in Africa. and concede the Nile Valley to British control. The RobertKelly's
enemy . The deci sion was premature. In this This overwhelm ing victory empha sized the gulf St rategically th e outcome was decisive for British dream of a British-dominated East Africa was depiction of the
Kholifa'sflight
second phase his forces suffered heavier losses bet ween Western and native weaponry, and their control of th e whole Nile Vall ey , the Sudan being closer to reality . The victory was received raptur- was wholly
and came closeto serious reverses,and were now respectiv e tactics. The dervish mass charges only declared an Anglo -Egypt ian condominium. ously in Britain and Kitchener became a popular imaginative, but
beyond the support of the gunboats. Kitchen er inte nsified th e effect of superior allied firepo wer. Marchand's French expeditiona ry force which hero, despite some press criticism of the killing of still suggeststhe
had underestimated the Khalifa's reserves, held impact which the
Churchill dignified it as 'the mo st signal triumph had earlier reached Fashoda was soon con- derv ish wounded. Any illusions about the invinci-
exotic image of
back behind hills. A cavalry charge by the 21st ever gained by the arms of science over barbar- fronted by Kitchener 's force s. After some days of bility of British force s in colonial fields wou ld dervishpower had
Lancers (in which Churchill participated) won ians'. The impact of Adowa effaced, European international ten sion, Paris agreed to wit hdraw soon, however, be punctured by the Boer War. on British opi nion .
three VC s but was both unnece ssary and expen -
sive, severe casualties among men and horses
leaving the squadron unfit for pursuit duties.
The abandonment of standard echelon forma-
tion in the rush for the city left the Egyptian
infantry divi sion, commanded by Lieutenant
Colonel Hector Macdonald, exposed on the
advance's northwest flank and it was attacked by
the Khalifa's forces from the west and then by
dervishes return ing from the north. 'Fighting
Mac' re-aligned his division to face west and then
north while under attack and fought off the
assaults until relieved .
Again the weight of western firepower had
told against mass charges of natives, mostly
spearmen, despite their courage. Now the
Khalifa's remaining force s retreated from the field
and the allied march on Omdurman resumed .
The city was occupied with little resistance and
the harrying of the escaping dervishe scontinued,
though t he Khalifa was not finally hunted down
until the following year.

Anglo-Egyptian forces

• 8,200 8ritish and 17,600 Egyptian and Sudanese

soldiers

• Commanded by Major-Gene ral Sir Herbert

Kitchener
'48 killed ; 434 wounded

Dervish forces

•c. 52,000 warriors

• Commanded by the Khalifa Abdullahi
• 9,700 killed ; 10,000-16,000 wounded; R.jalt.."t .I'ellu
5,000 captured

220 221
 Modern
Times

T
he 20th century brought a dramatic change
in the range and nature of battle. Aerial
combat was added, as in the defensive
British victory over the Germans in the Battle of
Britain (1940) and the successful American air
attack on Japan (1945), and its combination of
land and sea combat greatly changed both. At
sea, the major exchanges between capital ships-
a crushing Japanese victory over the Russians at
Tsushima in 1905 and the Anglo-German battle-
fleet draw at Jutland in 1916 - were replaced by
conflicts dominated by air power. America's
victory at Midway in 1942, for example, turned
the tide in the war in the Pacific. The sinking of
four heavy Japanese aircraft carriers and the loss
of many aircraft and pilots shifted the naval
balance, as the initiative and arithmetic of carrier
power moved rapidly against the Japanese.
Air power was also brought in to influence the
struggle with a new force in naval conflict: sub-
marines, as with the Anglo -American victory over
the German submarines in the battle of the
Atlantic in 1943. Other factors also played a role,
not least the effect iveness of convoy escorts, the
Allied abil ity to intercept and decipher German
naval codes, and the building of far more mer-
chant shipping from 1942, particularly by the
Americans. Air power had only played an ancillary
role in the land battles of World War I, such asTan-
nenberg (1914), Verdun (1916) and the Allied
offensive on the Western Front (191B), and they
continued to be largely artillery and infantry affairs,
although tanks played a supporting role in 1918.
During World War II, in cont rast, air power was
more important, as seen in th e battle for
Massed American tanks in training for the GulfWar 0 99 /1,
a canflict that led to 2003 'sIraq War. The introd uct ion of
armouredvehicleswas a keydevelopment inmodernwar.
 MOOERN TIME S
dominance in the western half of Eurasia. This
took the Germans as far east as Stalingrad on the
Volga, but they were fought to a standstill there
despite a massive comm itment of resources.
When, in turn , the Soviets counter-attacked, Hitler
failed to respond with the necessary flexibility
and forbade a retreat from Stalingrad before it
was encircled . Thereafter, the Soviets advanced,
driv ing the Germans back to the Elbe by 1945, a
distance greater than that achieved by any Euro-
pean force for over a century. A key campaign
was Operation Bagration in 1944, which overran
Belarus (White Russia or Belorussia) and took the
Soviets close to Warsaw, in the process destroy-
ing much of the German Army Group Centre and
causing over half a million casualties as the
Germans were outgeneralled and outfought.
There was also a web of wars for hegemony in
t he eastern half of Eurasia. Most significant were
the Russo-Japanese War, in which Tsushima was
the decisive battle at sea; the war in the Pacific
between the USA and Japan from 1941 to 1945,
in which Midway stopped the Japanese, and the
American air attack on Japan ended the war;
the Chinese Civil War, one of its key battles being
Huai-Hai (1948-49), which led to Communist
dominance; and the attempts to define the
Communist position in East Asia, which led to the
Korean and Vietnam Wars. The French defeat at
Dien Bien Phu in 19S41ed them to wi t hdraw from
Vietnam , and although the Americans - who
eventually replaced them - thwarted the Com-
munist assault in 1968 (the Tet Offensive), their
inability to secure victory led to withdrawal in
1973, which was followed by the Communist
overrunning of South Vietnam in 1975.
AGerman Normandy, when British and American forces There were bloody conflicts elsewhere in the
propaganda
defeated the Germans in the key struggle for world, most particularly in Africa, but they did not
pic ture, fal sely
building up
control of France in 1944. Subsequent attempts focus on large-scale battles. The Iraq War of 2003
confidence during to use air power as a war-winning tool were not indicated clearly that victory in battle was not the
Sraling rad. The always successful. for example in the Vietnam same as success in war. American technological
difficult urban
War, but could be very important, as wi t h th e superiority, resources and training were impor-
terrain greatly
hindered the American-led attacks on Iraq in 1991 and 2003. tant in leading to the rapid overthrow of Iraqi
Germans, who Many of t he key battles of the first half of the forces, but the effectiveness of guerrilla warfare
were then
century - Tannenberg (1914), Moscow (1941), and terrorist attacks challenged the sense of
surra unded by an
effective counter- Stalingrad (1942) and Bagration (1944) - focused political control. This contrast is unlikely to dimin-
Qttack. on the struggle between Germany and Russia for ish over the next century.
224
Tsushima
Date: 27 May 1905 Locat ion: Island in the Korea Strait
The fa te ofthe empire rests upon this one battle; let every man do his utmost.
(SIGNAL FLOWN FROM FLAGSHIP M fKASA) AOMIRALHEIHACHIROTOGO, I .5SPM, 27 MAY1905
ensions between Russia and Japan over
T spheres of influence in Korea and
Manchuria led to a ruptu re of diplomatic
relations on 6 February 1904; t wo days later,
wit hout declaring war, the Japanese launched a
surprise attack against the Russian Pacific
squadron, sending ten destroyers into Port
Arthur where they torpedoed two battleships
and a cruiser, all of which were subsequently
repaired . In the first high -seas action of the
Russo-Japanese War, the Battle of the Yellow Sea
(10 August 1904), Admiral Heihachiro Togo 's
Combined Fleet turned back an attempt by the
Russian Pacific squadron to break out of Port
Arth ur and run for Vladivostok. Neit her side lost a
ship in the engagement, but the unprecedented
range at which th e batt le was fought (between
8,000 and 9,000 m / 8,700-9,800 yds) drew world-
wide atte nti on.
Over the followi ng months, Japanese siege
guns sank fou r battlesh ip s and two cruisers at
Port Arthu r; th e Russians ulti mately scutt led a
fifth battlesh ip there to keep it out of enemy
hands w hen the base surrendered (2 January
1905). Meanwhile, after the loss of an armoured
cruiser in the Battle of the Sea of Japan on 14
August 1904,a Russian cruiser squadron based at
Vladivosto k did not venture out for the rest of the
war. Japanese lossesin 1904 were limited to two
battleships, a small armoured cruiser and two
protected cruisers (all of wh ich struck mines) and
a third protected cruiser, sunk accidentally in a
collision with another Japanesewarship .
After the defeats of August 1904 the Russians
resolved to relieve Port Arthur with reinforce -
ments sent from the Baltic. Admiral Zinovy
Rozhestvensky's Second Pacific squadron, includ- Above left
Portrait afAdmiral
ing most of the Russian Baltic Fleet, departed for
Razhesrvensky
th e Far East on 15 Octobe r. Mishaps along th e (1848-19091, who
way included the Dogge r Bank Incident (21- 22 commanded the
October 1904), in which ji tt ery Russian gunners RussianSecond
and Third
mistook a gro up of Brit ish Nort h Sea fishing squadrons a t
trawlers for 'Japanese torpedo boats', sinking one Tsushima.
and damaging six. Afterwards only the mo st
Above right His
strenuous diplomatic efforts by France (which
enemy counterpart
considered Britain and Russia natural future allies Heiha ch ir a Tago
against Germany ) kept Britain from declaring war. (1848-19341
commanded tne
Rozhestvensky divided his fleet off the coast of
Japanese
Spain, sending the smaller units to the Indian Com bi ned Fleer at
Ocean via the Mediterranean and the SuezCanal. Tsushima.
while the battleships proceeded around the Cape
of Good Hope. In January 1905 he reunited his
forces off Madagascar, where he received new sof
the surrender of Port Arthur. In an attempt to
make up for the ships lost there, Rozhestvensky
received as reinforcement the Third Pacific
squadron under Rear Admiral N. I. Nebogatov, a
225
 S4 M O DER N TI M ES
TSUSHIMA S4

for ce consisting of older or smaller battleships
and cruisers no t included in Rozhestvensky's
squadron owing to t heir lack of speed and fire-
powe r. Cruising via the Suez Canal, the Third
squadron joined th e Second in Apr il 1905, at
Camranh Bay in French Indo-China. The com -
bin ed force th en steamed northward to meet th e
surviving unit s of the Russian cruiser squadron at
Vladivo stok.
The battle
As Rozhestvensky's lon g column neared th e war
zone, Admiral Togo planned to intercept it in th e
Korea Strait as it passed the island of Tsushima.
The Japanese had 12 armo ured warships (4 bat -
tleship sand 8 armoured cruisers), th e Russians 14
(1 1 battleships and 3 armou red cruisers), but
Togo enjoyed a clear qualit ative superiority. None
of his armoured ships was more than eight years
old and three of his battlesh ips were larger than
any ship in the Russian fleet. In contrast , Rozh-
estvensky's fleet included the three 4,970-tonne
Admiral Ushakov-c1ass coast defend ers, and his
three armour ed cruisers were actually armo ured
frig ates mor e th an two decades old. Aside from
fou r 13,520-tonn e battl eship s of the Borodino
class and th e 12,680-to nne batt leship Osiiabia,
his larger warships were obsolete.
Togo opened the battle at 1.40 pm on 27 May
1905, when he initiated a crossing of the Russian
T from east to west at a point roughly 40 km (25
miles) east of Tsushima. When he repeated the
manoe uvre from west to east, Rozhestvensky
respon ded by attem pting to steam past the
Japanese to th e nort heast, forci ng Togo to give
chase. At 2.08 pm Russian gun s registered th e first

Borodino sinks
7.20 pm
hits of the battle, against Togo's flagship, the
<~ 7.20 pm
15,140-tonne Mikasa, at a range of 7,000 m (7,600
....-
7.30 pm -- _
yds). Though the two fleets fought at shorter
ranges th an in the Battl e of the Yellow Sea (at
Tsushima th e Japaneseheld th eir fire until closing
to 6,400 m/7,OOO yds), mediu m-calibre art illery
again played little part. Once again, the Japanese
advantage in speed doomed the Russian quest to
reach Vladivostok but, unlike t he encounter of
the previous August, which had ended in a
Russian retreat to Port Arthur, Rozhestvensky's
4.51 pm fleet had nowhere else to go.
The Osliabia was the first casualty, sinking at
N 3.10 pm. As the Japanese line pulled ahead of the
S pm
Japaneseclosed to sink them. At the climax of the Japaneseprint
action Rozhestvensky lost three of t he Borodinos depieting the n ight
aetion of27/2 8
within 30 minu tes, including th e flagship Suvo rov
(7.20 pm). The last fighting Russian units
May, during which
Togo 's torp edo
exchanged fire wi th th eir attackersat j ust 2,500 m flotilla sank several
ofthe surviving
(8,200 ft ) and at such close range, medium-calibre
Russianwarships.
artillery finally came into play. During the night of
27/28 May the Japanesesank or capt ured most of
the remaining Russian warship s. Rozhestvensky,
severely wou nded, was rescued from the Suvorov
before it sank, only to be captured aboard a
Russian destroyer. On the morning of the 28t h,
some 240 km (150 miles) north-northeast of
Tsushima, his second-in-comma nd Nebogatov

S.10 pm
o
t Russian line, Rozhestvensky doubled back and
attempted to steam due north acrossthe wake of
surrendered the last of the Borodinos (the 13,520-
tonne Ore/) along with three smaller battl eships.
Aplan of th e barrie I Togo's column , but the Japanese admiral quickly
o 10,000 yds
afTsushima. do ubled back to the west to cut him off. Rozh- Consequences
Action from 2.30 Japanese warships - - estvensky then turned away to the south , and his The decisive clash of battle fleetsat Tsushima vin-
pm 10 7.30 pm,
following the first Russian warships - - column began to disperse.The large stocksof coal dicated the 'one big battle' approach to naval
crossing of th e
S.27 pm
Russian cruisers, destroyers _ the Russian warships carried only hastened th eir warfare that Alfred Thayer Mahan had promoted
Russian T by the and servicevessels
destruct ion, aswidespread fires left many of them in his influential work The Influence of Sea Power
Japanese.
unable to defend themselves furth er as the upon Histo ry (1890). The Japanese sank six

226
227
 54 M OD E R N TI M ES
Admiral Togo 's
15,140-tonne
flagsh ip, The
Mikasa.
Russian battleships, one armoured cruiser and
one prot ected cruiser, and captured anot her four
battleships.The Russians scuttled one battles hip,
two armo ured cruisers and one protected cruiser
to prevent th eir capture; t he three remai ning
Russian protected cruisers eventually made th eir
way to Manila, to be interned by the United
States. The armed yacht Almaz and two destroy-
ers made it through to Vladivostok ; the other
sixteen smaller units were either sunk, scuttled or
captured .
The Japanese lost three torpedo boats, and
three of t heir armoured warships suffered moder-
ate damages. The prizes they took, along wi th
COMBATANTS ' - - -......
Japanese
• Combined Fleet :4 battleships; 8 armoured
cruisers ; 7 protected cruisers; 65 de stroyers or
smaller vessels
• Commanded by Ad miral Heihach iro Togo
• 116 dead; 538 woun ded; 3 torp edo boats sunk
Russians
• Second and Third Pacifi c squadro ns:
11 batt leship s; 3 armoured crui sers; 5 protected
cru isers; 19 destroyers or smaller vessels
• Commanded by Admiral Zinovy Rozhestvensky
• 4,830 dead; unknown number wounded;
5,9t 7 captured; all but3 small vessels sunk,
scuttled, captured or interned
228
other warships raised at Port Arthur and later
repaired, more than made good the losses suf-
fered by Togo 's fleet during 1904. The disastro us
outcome of th e largest naval engagement since
Trafalgar forced Russiato the peace table. Negoti-
ations mediated by the United States concluded
in t he Treaty of Portsmouth, September 1905.
Russia's loss in territory (the southern half of
Sakhalin Island) was min imal compared to its loss
of influence in northeast Asia. Russia had to agree
to transfer its lease of the Liaotung Peninsula to
Japan, surrender ing the naval base at Port Arthur
and informal title to the former Russian sphere of
influence in Manchuria . Japan also gained a free
hand in Korea,which it annexed in 1910.
Contemporary naval observers had difficulty
drawing lessons from Tsushima and from the
Russo-JapaneseWar as a whole. A torpedo attack
had opened the war, but neither side ever
deployed a submarine . Mines sank two Japanese
battleships and one Russian battlesh ip, and
concern for mines influenced the behaviour of
both navies. Both made effective use of destroy -
ers, deployed extensively in combat for the first
time . At Tsushirna, as at the Battle of the Yellow
Sea, the big guns of the largest warships had reg-
istered hits at ext raordinary ranges, tha nks to
new range-find ers and bett er gun -sightin g. This
develop ment ult imatel y overshadowed th e
othe rs, providi ng j ustification for t he construc -
tion of Britain's Dreadnaught and battle cruiser
designs as well as other 'all big gun ' warships
already on the drawing board at the time.
Tannenberg
Date : 25-30 August 19 14 Locat ion: modern Stebark, Poland
There is no information about the situation of the Corps of the Second Army
on the evening of the 3 1st... .There is no news of the XIII Corps. Isolated men
of the XV Corpsare arriving in batches at Ostrolenka. A portion of the
XXII/ Corps is fighting with the /Corp s, a portion was with the XV Corps.
RUSSIAN NORTHWESTH EADQUARTERS REPORT, 31 A UGUST 1914
he report above indi cates the extreme in a poor position. The commanders of the two
T state of confusion and total ity of the defeat
inflicted by Germany on the Russianarmies
at the battle of Tannenberg. It was one of t he
Russian armies, Pavel Rennenkampf and Alexan-
der Samsonov, had little info rmation about th e
ot her's exact dispositions, The Nort hwest Front
Erich Ludendorff
and Paul von
most complete victories in mi litary history , com mander, Yakov Zhilinski, did little to resolve Hindenburg
destroying four Russian Corps despite a Russian either the comma nders' confusion or their well - assumed
leade rship af tbe
superiority in manpo wer (based on their First an d known enmity for one another. As a result, the German Eighrh
Second Armi es) of nearly two to one. Russians moved cautiously and in a manner that Army shortly
The Germans had long planned to fight on the did not incline them to support one another in before
Tannenberq. Their
defensive in East Prussia, where the railway the event of a German attack. Their communica-
successindirecting
networ k facilitated rapid troop movement. tions, moreover, depended upon radio links and rhe battle ser them
German General Paul von Hindenburg had spent uncoded messages, yielding important clues to ona coursethat
evenrually made
his retir ement planning every detail of defeating German eavesdroppers.
rhem the two mas!
a Russian invasion of East Prussia. Nevertheless, Upon their arrival in t he east, Hindenb urg and powerfulmen in
German war planning for 1914 was based on a Ludendorff reviewed a staff officer 's aggressive Germany.
deployment of seven armies to France, leaving
just one army to face a much larger Russian force.
The defence of East Prussia became an even
more critical issue in t he face of a Russian mo bi-
lization that was faster than t he Germans had
ant icipated . Russia inflicted a defeat on Germany
at the battle of Gumbinnen on 20 August. The
German comma nder, Max von Prittwitz, feared
that the larger Russian forces might encircle him .
When he pro posed a retreat to the Vist ula River,
the German high com mand replaced him wi t h
Hindenburg, recently recalled from ret irement.
They also named Erich Ludendorff, one of th e
heroes of Germany's campaign in Belgium, as
Hindenburg's chief of staff.
'The emperor trusted me'
Despite th eir advance, th e Russians were act ually
229
 SS M ODE RN T IMES TANNENBERG SS

plan to insert the German Eighth Army between Herman von Francois moved east, surrounding Russian soldiers
the Russian First and Second Armies. The plan th e Russians. The main German attack th en came nghtfroman
improvised trench.
was risky, but it fitted in with General Staff teach- from the southwest, thus trapping Samsonov's Poor leadership
ings about interior lines of communications and army. The arrival of additional forces from the andpoortraining
w it h ideas that Hindenburg and Ludendorff had north completed the encirclement. doomed

discussed during their train ride east. thousands of

Russian units soon found themselves attacked
Russiansro death
The German plan involved screening Ren- from several sides and suffering heavy casualties. orimprisonment.
nenkampf with one cavalry division and By 28 August , Samsonov's XIII and XV Corps were
redirecting the remainder of the German forces engaged in fierce combat with German forces.
against Samsonov. While Samsonov moved west- Trapped among swamps and lakes, Samsonov
wards unaware of the danger mounting around could not redeploy his forces, increasing the con -
him, a German corps under the aggressive fusion. His decision to move forward and direct
operations from XV Corps headquarters left him
unable to direct the battle as a whole . The next
day, the XVCorps failed to break out of the encir-
clement and soon found its const ituent units
jumbled with those of the XIII. After telling his right also blocked approaches to the town of The aftermath
chief of staff, 'The emperor trusted me. How can I Allenstein , further impeding any possible move Tannenberg helped the Central Powers to survive
face him again after such a disaster?', Samsonov by Rennenkampf. As it became evident that the the early months of the war. This victory counter-
disappeared, committing suicide later that day. Germans were moving large numbers of forces balanced the German setback at the Marne River
Although Rennenkampf's cavalry was within around him, Rennenkampf reacted by retreating near Parislessthan two weeks later. It also helped
striking distance of the main German attack, he his forces east. That decision undoubtedly gave to relieve the pressure from Austria-Hungary,
remained largely ignorant of the crisis in front of him a temporary respite from German move- whose chaotic mob ilization and war planning
Samsonov. German forces attacking Samsonov's ments, but it left Samsonov with no support. had led to early defeats. Perhaps most impor-
The Russians lost 30,000 dead, more than tantly, Tannenberg greatly reduced any threat of
Above German 130,000 prisoners, and 500 heavy guns. The a Russian invasion of the German heartland.
infantry, with their
Germans had to devote 60 trains to transporting For Russia, this crushing defeat led its main
classicspike Baltic SeO
helmets, advance. the horses and equipment taken from the Rus- allies, Britain and France, to have grave doubts
Theirinitial sians. Hoffman suggested calling the great about the fighting ability of their colossal but
mission W QS to •
defend Easr
I victory Tannenberg after the nearby sight of a clumsy partner. Tannenberg left the Russians off
Grodno
Prussia, but •
Warsaw battle in 1410 in wh ich Polish and Lithuanian war- balance, allowing the Germans to strike again at
Hind enbur g and riors slaughtered the Teutonic Knights. the battle of the Masurian Lakes. Between 7 and
Ludendarff soon 14 September, the same German forces that had
developed p lans to
destroyed Samsonov's First Army routed Ren-
use rhemina
majoroffensive
- _..I COMBATANTS ' - - - - nenkampf's Second Army. The Russians lost
aimed at 140,000 more men. Only German exhaustion pre-
destroying two
German forces vented an even greater disaster.
Russian armies.
German armycorps • Eighth Army: 200,000 men Combined with the end of the Schlieffen Plan
2DAugust
Right The German reserve • Commanded by Paul von Hindenburg, Erich in the west, Tannenberg caused a fundamental
Masurian Lakes division
Germancavalryscreen Ludendorff shift in German grand strategy . Hindenburg and
limitedRussian
.--. German corps. by rail Ludendorff became confirmed 'easterners',
ab ility to • 10,000 dead and wounded
--.. German corps, march

/~r
concentrate their _ . German attacks.
believi ng that victory was more likely against
superiornumbers, 26- 29 August Russian forces Russia than in France. In 1915 they had their
providing the VI Russian army corps
20 August • Second Army: 150,000 men chance, inflicting huge damage on Russia in the
Germans with an - .. Ru ssianadvances.
enticing
opportunity.
" 80km
!
First Army.unopposed
--.. Russian advances.
• Commanded by Alexander Samsonov Gorlice-Tarn6w campaign. Even this defeat failed
to destroy the Russian giant, leaving Germany
4O~iles Second Army • 30,000 dead; 130,000 prisoners
with the two-front war it knew it could not win.

230 231

Jutland
Date: 3 1 May- 1 June 191 6 Locatio n: Skagge rak Strait,
off Denmark'sNo rth Sea coast
There seems to besomething wrong with our bloody ships todoy.
VICEADMIRALDAVIDBEATTY,AFTER THEEXPLOSIONOFTHEQ UEEN M ARY,
THESECONDBRITISHBATTLECRUISER SUNK AT JUTLAND,4.26 PM, 31 MAY1916
he r th e outbreak of World War I, German
A
strategy called for Rear Admiral Franz
Hipper's battle cruiser squadron to be
used as bait to draw a portion of t he Brit ish Grand
Fleet int o batt le in th e Nort h Sea w it h th e rest of
Adm iral Sir t heir High Seas Fleet, reasoning that if t he enti re
John Jefficoe German fleet could be brought to bear to destroy
(1859 - 1935),
a part of t he British fleet, Germany 's numer ical
commanderof
Britain'sGrand inferiori ty in capital ships could be erased in a
Fleet at Iu ttatid. single stroke. In the first such sortie to result in
contact w ith the Brit ish,the battle ofDogger Bank
(24 January 1915), Hipper's squadron of three
battle cruisers and the armoured cruiser BlOcher
lured Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty's five battle
cruisers out of Rosyth, then steamed back
towards Wilhelmshaven. But in the ensuing
action, the British sank the Bliicher while not
losing a ship of their own .
Kaiser Wilhelm II responded to the defeat by
relieving Adm iral Friedrich von Ingenohl, com-
mander of the High Seas Fleet and Hip per's
superior, for keeping the main body of German
dreadnoughts too far from the battle cruisers to
come to th eir aid or to trap the British battle
crui ser squadron.The emperor subsequently kept
Ingenohl's successor, Admi ral Hugo von Pohl, on
such a short leash that th e High Seas Fleet practi-
cally rusted at anchor.
Early in 1916 Vice Admi ral Reinh ard Scheer
succeeded Pohl and persuaded th e emperor to
allow th e High Seas Fleet to resume sorti es,w it h
Hipp er's battl e cruisers again used to lure out th e
Brit ish. Unlike Ingenoh l on th e day of Dogg er
Bank, however, Scheer intended to keep his
dreadnough ts closeenough to rescue Hip per and
232
destroy the British forces that came out to chase
him. Sorties in February, March and April of 1916
brought no contact with British capital ships, but
Scheer's fou rth sort ie resulted in the battle of
Jut land, t he largest naval engagement of th e war.
In t he predawn hours of 31 May, five batt le cruis-
ers under Hipper'scom mand steamed north ward
from Wilhelmshaven, parallel w ith the coast of
Danish Jutland in the direction of the Skaggerak
Strait,with Scheer'ssixteen dreadnoughts,six pre-
dreadnoughts and a host of smaller warships
following some 80 km (50 miles) behind .
Asat Dogger Bank,Beatty'sbattle cruiserscame
out of Rosyth to intercept Hipper, this tim e fol-
lowed by the rest of the Grand Fleet under Admir al
Sir John Jellicoe, from Scapa Flow. On the British
side,as on the German, the main body of the fleet
follo wed roughly 80 km (50 miles) behind the
battle cruiser force. Owing to a recent exchange
of ships between Beatty and Jellicoe, Beatty had 6
battle cruisers and 4 dreadnoughts, and Jellicoe
had 24 dreadnoughts and 3 battle cruisers.
Light cruisers screening for Beatty and Hipper
first engaged at 2.28 prn, just over 160 km (l 00
miles) west of the Jutland coast. The two battle
cruiser forces began t heir exchange at 3.48 pm.
After sighting the Brit ish battle cruisers, Hipper
turn ed away to t he south-so ut heast, running
back towards Scheer so as to draw Beatt y into
batt le wi th t he entire High Seas Fleet.
The first phase of th e battl e, later called th e
'ru n to the south: lasted 50 mi nutes. Steam ing
south-sout heast on parallel courses, the two
colum ns of batt le cruisers du elled at a range of
11,000-14,500 m (12,000- 16,000 yds). Gunfire
JUTLAND 56
from the Von der Tann sank the Indefatigable at German 'T; steaming eastward in an east-west German
dreadnought
4.02 pm, and shells from the Derfflinger sank the line. The old armoured cruisers Defence and
Konig in dack after
Queen Mary at 4.26. Twelve minutes later, w hen Warrior, deployed wi th Beatty's battle cruisers at Jutland, where it
Beatty sighted the main body of the High Seas the head of the column , came under heavy fire sustained ten hits
from th e German capital ships at a range of barely from 8r it ish hea vy
Fleet steaming up from the sout h, he reversed
guns. In the decode
course to the north, hop ing to draw t he entire 7,300 m (8,000 yds).While the Warrior survived to between the
German fleet onto Jellicoe'sadvancing force. be towed from the scene at the end of the day (to launching afHM5
During the second phase of the battle, or 'run founder and sink the next morning), the Defence Oreadnouqht
(1906) and tne
to the nor th; neither side lost a capital ship. But sank at 6.20 prn, followed by a t hird British battle
battie ot Iuttand.
the 38-cm (15-inch) guns of the four Queen cruiser, the Invincible, at 6.32 pm . Hippe r's battle Britain ho d
Elizabeth-class dreadnoughts now bringing up cruisers, still headin g th e German column , suf- completed 42 'all
big gu n'copi tal
Beatty's rear overmatched the 27- and 30-cm (11- fered in the exchange but remained afloat,
sh ip s(dread-
and 12-inchl gu ns of Hipp er's battl e crui sers, now alt hough his flagship Liitzow sustained enough nough rsand batr/e
at th e head of th e German column, inflict ing damage to force th e adm iral to transfer to cruisers) to 22 for
anoth er ship. Germany.Ofrhese,
con siderable damage.The Germans fir st encoun-
31 British and 2 1
tered th e main British force at 5.36 prn, when a By 6.45 prn, th e entire German colum n had German copital
light cruiser Jellicoe had sent on ahead met light turn ed away to th e sout hwest, only to double ships saw actionat
cruisers of Hipper's gro up. back to th e nor th east j ust befo re 7 pm. When Jutland.
By 6.15 prn, Beatty's ships had joined Jellicoe's batt le resumed minutes later, Jellicoe achieved a
line, and the enti re Brit ish force crossed the second crossing of th e T by slowing his line,
233
56 MOD E RN TIM ES JUTLAND 56

leaving the lead ships of Scheer's column bearing German, including t he battle cruiser Liitzow, 6.15-7.35 pm situation at nightfall

directly into his starboard flank. By 7.15 pm th e torp edoed by a German destroyer after finally N N

ent ire Brit ish line was concentrating fire on the

German column from a range of 10,000 to 12,800
m (11,000- 14,000 yds), scoring hits as far back as
being abandoned around 3 am, and th e pre-
dreadnought Pommern, torpedoed by a Brit ish
destroyer at 3.13 am. Remarkably, th e High Seas
®
t
7.1Spm
t ® 8pm ".. /
rerncoe reconsiders;
his Grand Fleet
renew the chase ¥
Grand Fleet again
0 6.19pm crossesGerman 'r: 16km (10miles )
t he eleventh ship. Scheer again t urned away to Fleet made it home despite t he fact t hat, for
Jellicoe'~
Grand firing directly into behind their enemy JI
th e sout hwest, this time in di sarray. Around 7.35 several hours du ring the nigh t of 31 May/1 June, Fleet.joined <!:.. SCheer'sflanks
prn, wit h abo ut 30 minutes of daylight remaini ng, the British fleet was actually closer to Wil- ~;u~s:~~'s
d I ,\I<;.
.7
~ ...
Wamor
\
(
1 ./
/ @8.30pm
British draw
Jellicoe opted not to pursue the Germans. Fear helm shaven. The Germans survived because ep 0'-7' Defence ,. parallel and both
) I'
that enemy torpedoes would claim still more of
his capital ships swayed him from try ing for t he
Scheer steered a course much closer to the
Jutland and Schleswig coasts than Jellicoe antici -
Wiesbaden l
(disabled) / ! ~ '
fleetsheaddue
south

decisive victory then w ithi n his grasp. pated; steaming south-southeast, the main body f2' 7 pm
IV /
;fG
f4\ 73Spm I
./""0
"
Earlyam, 1 June
Scheer veers south-
As darkness fell, Jellicoe reconsidered and of his fleet ultimately crossed the wake of the Having veered
southwest
Jellicoedecides
not to pursue
, JI' southeast.eventually
escaping further
ordered the Grand Fleet to pursue the fleeing Brit ish force heading south -south west. Scheer
losses by crossing Grand
doubles
Germans. The fifth and final phase of the battle back to
British _ Fleet 'swake before
retumingto
began with the High Seas Fleet already enjoy ing a Outcome head German --..
Wilhelmshaven
northeast
16-km (lO- mile ) lead over it s pursuer, but the At Jut land, the Germans clearly inflic ted more
Brit ish closed fast. By 8.30 pm th e two fleets were damage than they suffe red, sinking 3 battle cruis-
The escape of th e
steami ng almo st du e south, th e British betwee n ers, 3 armo ured cruisers, 1 flo ti lla leader and 7 t urned out this way largely because of t he st ur- alter t he strateg ic sit uation,on 4 July 1916 Scheer Above left The
Hig h Seas Fleer.
trad ition of
A German artist's the Germans and the Jut land coast. Around mid - destroyers, wh ile losing 1 battle cruiser, 1 pre- dier construction of the German capital ships, the advised Wilhe lm II that the only hope for victory
Victorian genre-
rendition of the at sea lay in a U-boat war against British com-
night the British lost t he armoured cruiser Black dreadnought batt leship, 4 light cruisers and 5 unsafe handling of unstable powder supp lies pain ting used for
actionon the
Prince after it blundered into Scheer's dread- destroyers of their own .Aside from Scheer's good aboard the larger British warships, and poor fire merce.The High Seas Fleet sortied into the North moral exam ple
morning of 1June
Sea again in August, October and November of and fund-raising.
1916. noughts. But the warship lossesof 1 June were all luck and Jellicoe's moments of caution , Jutland control especially on the Brit ish side.TheGermans
The 16-year-old
claimed 'Skaggerak' (their designat ion for the 1916, then only once more (April 1918) before John Cornwell,
battle) as a great victory, even though after wards, steaming to Scapa Flow to be interned under the c,
V. Boy First Class
Armistice. aboard the light
the British remained in command of the North
cru;serChes ter at
Sea. Realizing that the battle had done nothing to Jutland, earned a
Aftermath posthumous
While th e war in th e North Sea went their way Victoria Cross for
mann ing Q gun
after Jutland, the British were deeply disap-
thr ou gh out th e
pointed by th e battl e, having expected th at th e ba ttle, despite
much-an ticipated encoun ter wi th the High Seas being mo rtally
Fleet wo uld result in a second Trafalgar. Jellicoe wounded early in
• High Seas Fleet: 16 dr eadn ou ght s; S battle cruis- the ac tion.
ers;6 pre-dreadnought battlesh ip s; 11 lig ht cru is- and Beatty (or, more accurately, their suppor ters
ers; 61 destroyers within the officer corps) each blamed the other for Above middle
• Command ed by Vice Admiral Reinhar d Scheer opportunities missed. At the end of 1916 Beatty and r ig htJutland
evening and night
• 2,55 1 dea d; 1 battle cruiser, 1 pre-dreadnought became commander of t he Grand Fleet, when
action respectively.
batt leship,4 1ight cruisers and 5 d estroyers Jellicoe was appointed First Sea Lord. Meanwhile, Afterthe initial
sunk
in Germany, Wilhelm II promoted Scheer to full runs to the sout h
and north, at 5.30
admira l and awarded him t he Iron Cross Pour
British pm Beatty 'srun to
Ie Merite, th e country 's high est mi litary decora- the no rt hwes t
• Grand Fleet: 28 dreadnoughts; 9 battle cruise rs;
8 armo ured crui sers; 26 light cruisers or fl otilla tion. An offic er corps historically fragment ed by drew Scheer
infigh ting rallied around Scheer, excusing his towards th e Grand
leaders; 78 d est royers; 1 m inelayer
Fleer.
• Comm anded by Adm iral Sir John Jellicoe tact ical errors at Jutland. He finally t urned over
• 6,097 dead ; 3 battle cru isers, 3 armo ured cruise rs, comma nd of the High Seas Fleet to Hipper in
1 fl ot illa leade r and 7 dest royers sunk August 1918, then spent t he last months of the
war asChief of the Supreme Navy Command.

235
 VE RDU N 57

Verdun Thisfamaus
photograph from
Verdun shows the
desperation of
Date: 2 1 Febru ary- mid- December 191 6 Locat ion: Lorraine, north east France infantry assaults.
These menare
advancing in the
Whole regiments melted in a few m inutes, but ot hers took th eir places, only to perish in the
face ofGerman
sam e w ay. 'It is a battle of madmen in the m idst of a volcanic eruption' was the description machine gunand
given by a staffcap ta in .. .. West of the Meuse men died in the open air, but at Douaumont in rifle fire.
the horror of darkness, they fought in tun nels, scream ing with the lust ofbutchery,
dea fened by shells and grenades, stifled by smoke.
G EORGE LA H R, NEWYORKTIMES, 19 16

n 16 January 1916, French Commander-

O
in-Chief General Joseph Joffre told a
visitor to his headquarters at the sumptu -
ous Chateau de Chantilly: 'I ask only one thing,
that the Germans should attack and should do so
at Verdun. Tell the government so.' Joffre was
responding to criticisms that he had left Verdun
relatively unguarded by removing men and
German
heavy guns from the garrison . Lieutenant Colonel
infantrymen
preparing to Emile Driant , a member of France's Chamber of
advanceinto the Deputies and a battal ion commander in the Bois
Verdun sector. des Caures on Verdun 's outer defensive line, had
Theircommander,
Erichvon
writt en to his colleagues in Paris warning them
Falkenhayn. hoped of immense German preparat ions opposite his
tha t his methods posit ion. Joffre and his staff, Driant believed , had
would kill French
left Verdun unable to withstand a determined
soldiers at an
acceptable ratio to German attack. Minister of War General Joseph
German losses. Gallien i had told Joffre of Driant 's letter in mid-
December 191 5. Joff re's confident comments advantage and th at the acquisition of territory purpo se. German lines of commu nication to the
one month later were meant to put the issue of mattered for little. Consequently, he created a Verdun sector were sufficien t to support a major
Verdun to rest. battle plan that, he hoped , would force his offens ive, w hile France could only supply the city
Verdun's ring of fortre sses guarded the strate- enemies to send waves of soldiers to attack a th roug h one road. If the Germanscould assemble
gically important Meuse River and the eastern place of trem endou s significance to them , but of a large force without detection and capt ure
approaches to Paris. But Verdun held an impo r- less significance to Germany. He could therefore Verdun quickly, its strateg ic and symbolic im por-
tance out of proportion to its military wort h. It methodically use the tacti cal advantage of the tance to France would compel the French to
was a nati onal symbo l of resistance, having w ith- defensive to destroy enemy counter-attack s. dedicate enormous military resources to it s
stood Prussian and German attacks for cent uries. Verdun was custom -made for Falkenhayn's recapture. Once the battle had begun , Falken-
The mod ern French and German nations (as well
as th e mi ddle ground th at includes Alsace and
Lorraine) owed the ir birth s to th e Treaty of
Verdun in 843.The city's fall would be a spectacu-
lar blow to French mor ale.
Accord ingl y, France reinvested in Verdun 's
FRANCE
fortresses in the years before World War I. By 1912
Verdun was defended by 60 individual forts and
outposts. It was one of the strongest and best
protected places in the world. It had held out
against German attac ks in 1914, leading Joffre to
remove 4,000 of its heavy artillery pieces for use
on other fronts . These removals, with an accom-
panying reduction in personnel, had prompted
Driant's letters. Unlike most ba ttles
in thisvolume,the
German plans German goal at
Verdun was nat the
Germany's Chief of the General Staff, General
cap ture ofterritory.
Erich von Falkenhayn, believed that he had fo und buttheelimination
a way to win the war in th e west in 1916. His _ _ German line, of the enemy 's
21 February
forces ina
observations of the war's first two years in the ____ Germanline,
25 February nightmarish
west had led him to conclu de t hat the defenders __ _ German line, ,
5km
str uggle af
almost everywhere held an immense tactical 6May
A French forts
3~iles attrition.

236 237
 57 MODERN TIMES
hayn believed , he could manage the killing in
such a way that would 'bleed France white: and
attrite French forces faster and more completely
than his ow n forces. With the French army
beaten, England would seek favourable peace
terms, leaving Germany free to focus on the
EasternFront in 1917.
German preparat ions for the attack yielded
enormous advantages in both heavy artillery -
1,400 pieces in all - and man-
power. Four days after Joff re's
defiant statement, mounting
Parliamentary pressure led him
to ask General Eduoard de
Castelnau to go to Verdu n and
assess th e seriousness of t he
sit uat ion for him self. Castelnau
agreed wit h Driant that an
attack was imminent and th at
Verdu n was too weak to defend
itself, but his dispatch of a bat-
talion of engi neers to improve
the forts was utterly insufficient
to defend the city.
Germany attacks
The weakness of French
defences became apparent
when Falkenhayn's artillery
Henri Philippe began its assault on 21 February. German guns
Petainhad been
fired almost 2,000,000 shells. Fort Douaumont,
oneof the lane
advocatesof Verdun 's stronges t, was the target for 120,000
defensivewarfare shells. German infantry then advanced along the
in theyearsbefore east bank of the Meuse River, marching directly at
World WarI. His
careful and
Driant's position in the Bois des Caures. The
methodical French commander and his battalion were woe -
approach to fully outnumbered, but held on long enough to
defensivewarfare
allow those behind them to gain strong defensive
mode him the
obviouschoice to positions. Driant 's death on 22 February made
command the him a great national hero, but could not preven t
Verdunsector. the Germansfrom captu ring the position.
The slow German advance frust rated its army
and corps commanders who , misled by Falken-
hayn, believed t hat their goal was to capture
Verdun. Falkenhayn, however, was pleased with
the campaign 's early stages. He had the 'killing
cauldron' he had sought. On 25 February a small
238
gro up of German advance troops fo und an
unguarded op ening into Fort Douaumont and
captured it without firi ng a shot. Its loss was a
great shock to th e French peop le. Both sides
rushed reinforcements into the Verdun sector to
continue a battle th at had already atta ined
mythic status.
Falkenhayn had hoped to limit his offen sive to
the east bank of the Meuse in order to control the
battle more carefully. Heavy French artillery fire
from the west bank, however, inflicted enormous
casualties. Much of that fire came from the appro-
priately named Mort Homme ('Dead Man') ridge.
The Germans thus decided to extend their offen -
sive to both banks of the river on 6 March.
Falkenhayn's carefully managed battle quickly
began to grow beyond hiscont rol.
France counter-attacks
In April, under new comma nder Henri Philip pe
Petain, the French began counter-attacks. The
back-and-forth fighti ng became as savage as any
in the course of the war. One village changed
hands fifteen times in three weeks. In a bid to
recapture Fort Douaumont, the French fired
1,000 tons of artillery shells per day for four days
on a plot of land measuring just 60 hectares (1 50
acres). In mid-July, in the wake of a Russian att ack
....----- COMBATANTS - - - - .
French
• 500,000 men ; 270 artillery pieces (Army Gro up
Centre)
• Commanded by Henri Philippe Petain (und er
overall command of Gene ral Joseph Joffre )
' 6 1,000 dead ; 101,000 mis sing; 216,000 wounded
Germans
• 1,000,000 m en; 1,200 artillery pieces (Fift h Army)
• Commanded by Crown Prince Wil helm (u nder
ove rall command of Genera l Erich von
Falkenhayn, replaced in late Aug ust by genera ls
Paul von Hinden bu rg and Erich vo n Ludendorff)
• 142,000 dead and mi ssing; 187,000 wou nded
in th e east and a joi nt Anglo-French off ensive on
th e Somme River, t he Germans decided to cease
atta cks in order to conserve manpower. By that
tim e the t wo sides had fired more than
23,000,000 art illery and gas shells.
French counter-att acks conti nued th roughout
the summ er and autumn. French artillery officers
began using a technique called a 'creeping
barrage', wherein a curtain of arti llery shells pre-
ceded by 90 m (100 yds) an infantry advance. This
system suppressed enemy machine-gun fire, but
furt her stressed Verdun 's already tenuou s supply
system. Thousandsof labourers repaired Verdun's
only open and passableroad, wh ich soon became
known asthe Voie Sacree ('Sacred Road').
French offensive s in October and November
almost retu rned the front line to it s originalloca-
tio n in February. On 24 Octo ber t he French retook
Douau mo nt and captur ed th ousands of German
prisoners of war. The onset of wi nter and mutual
exhaustion forced an end to the battle in mid -
December. French losses are estimated at 61 ,000
VERDUN 57
dead, 101,000 mi ssing, and 216,000 wounded;
German losses are th ought to have been 142,000
dead and missing, and 187,000 wounded. The
high numbers of missing reflect th e imme nse
po wer of the arti llery.Today, an ossuary at Verdun
conta ins the remains of 130,000 men that could
not be identified.
Verdun led to the replacement of both Joffre
and Falkenhayn at th e heads of the ir respect ive
armies. It also forced Britain to assume the main
burden for the battle of the Somme in the
summer of 1916. Perhaps most importantly,
Verdun created a national myt h of the heroism of
the French soldier. Belief in the superiority of that
heroism led many Frenchme n in the inter-war
years to overestimate t heir ability to withstand
anot her German offensive.
Reconciliations at Verdun The destruction at
Verdunshows the
Verdun remains a sacred place in French and powerof modem
German history . In 1963 Charles de Gaulle artillery. Many of
(himself a Verdun veteran ) and Conrad Adenauer thevillagesoutside
Verdun were
symbolically shook hands in front of the Verdun
damaged so badly
ossuary. Francois Mitterand and Helmuth Kohl that theFrench
repeated the gesture in 1984, under- government
decided to
scoring th e meaning of Verdun and
abandon them
th e importance of learning its rather than rebuild
haunt ing lessons. them.
 58

The Western Front

Date: Ma rch-Novembe r 191 8 Location: near Amiens, northeast France

We are engaged in a 'wearing-out battle; and are autlasting and beating the enemy.
FIELD MARSHALSIRDOUGLASHAIG, 21 AUGUST 1918

F
our years of destructive warfare had pro - Then in March 1918, heartened by the Russian
duced no conclusion to World War I by the Revolution of 1917, which eliminated Russia from
early summer of 1918. On the Western the Allied side, the German army launched its
Front the stalemate of late 1914 and 1915 was own large-scale offensive on the Western Front.
confirmed by the terrible attrition battles of This attack, using new infantry and artillery
Verdun (see p. 236) and t he Somrne in 1916. The tactics, captured 64 sq. km (40 sq. mi les) of terri-
Brit ishMark V next year, 1917, saw some Allied success but also tory , nearly split the French and British arm ies
tankssupporting
the 29 September
another costly attrition batt le at Passchendaele, apart, and came close to ending the war by itself.
19 18 Faurth Army while the failure of a major French offensive However, the German attack lost momentum and
offensive aimed earlier in 1917 led to the French mutinies of that direction, while a series of further German offen-
at breaking the
year. Only the late 1917 battle of Cambrai, using sives in the spring and early summer of 1918 also
German
Hindenburg Line in tanks and accurate artillery against German failed to bring victory. These German 'peace
the Bellicourt area. artillery, which were carefully located on maps, offensives' were the final throw of the dice for the week French counter-attack was the turning mangled, a gruesome sight. On a slope less than Soldiersof the
The tankscarry showed promise. Second American
tasanes to helpin
German army, since the French-led counter- point on the Western Front, and led to the Allies {lBO m] 200 yards away lay the other actors of the
Division defend
crossing trenches offens ive at the Marne in July 1918 caved in the moving onto the offensive for the rest of the war. scene, two German gun crews done to death beside their positio n
ond the StQuentin German front, and clearly shifted the balance of their guns .. ..' against the final
canal. stagesoithe
the war against Germany. In retrospect this two- Ove rtu re: the battle of Am iens, 8-11 August The Amiens battle continued for a further
German Michael
In early August t he British Fourth Army prepared three days but the troops we re exhausted, there
offensive. The
to launch a surprise attack against t he German were few tanks still running, German reserveshad action takes place
army in the Amiens area. The spearhead of the arrived and the old Sornrne trenches were in a heavily
bombarded wood
attack was composed of Australian and Canadian holding up progress. Nevertheless, General Erich
on 3 April 191Basa
divisions, supported by British and French divi- Ludendorff described the Amiens attack as the 37·mm gun crew
sions on the flanks. One reason for the eventual 'black day of the German army'. fire their weapon.
success of this offensive was the overwhelming
Allied advantage in men and material . There were The late August Allied offensives
75,000 Allied troops versus 37,000 German troops , Now the Allies began their own series of attacks
2,000 Allied artillery pieces, 1,900 French and along the German lines, aimed at crumbling
British planes, and numerous Allied tanks: 342 these defences rather than trying for decisive
heavy Mark V tanks, 72 lighter Medium A tanks, SO breakthroughs. For example, the French Tenth
infantry-carrying tanks and 120 supply tanks. All of and Third Armies fought a seriesof engagemen ts
t his overwhe lmed the German defende rs on 8 from 18 August following, and two days later
August, who suffered 27,000 casualties, while the launched the battle of Noyo n w hich resulted in
Allied line advanced 12.8 km (8 miles). One scene 8,000 prisoners taken. Then on 21 August the
symbolizes the fighting: British Third Army, supported by Fourth Army,
'In the valley lay a crippled tank with a couple of launched a number of attacks over the next eigh t
shell holes in her side, within were the crew, terribly days called the battle of Albert, while the British

24 1
58 M O D E RN T I M E S
First Army followed up with offe nsives between
26 and 31 August in the batt le of the Scarpe.
In fact the major attacks were taking place in
the centre of the British line, where the strongest
forces were available. Thus the Australians in
Fourth Army conducted a lightning dawn attack
on Mont St Quent in on 31 August , preceded by a
half-hour mortar and howitzer barrage, with
troops using rifle grenades and Lewis guns, and
rapidly capt ured this important high grou nd.
Similarly, the Canadians in First Army capt ured
the Droco urt-Queant line on 2 September with a
combined artillery, infan try and tank attack.
Meanw hile, t he French armies cont inued attack -
ing through late August, and suffered 100,000
Chalons e
casualties that month, noteworthy because
French forces have sometimes been criticized for
not contributing strongly enough in 1918.
Reasons for Allied success
So successful were the Allied advances in late
August and early September, t hat on 2 Septem-
ber General Ludendorff ordered the retreat of the
German army to the Hindenburg Line. But what
accounted for these Allied successes? First, it is
clear the Allies possessed overwhelming advan-
tages in men and material. For example, German
losses from 21 March to t he end of the war
amounted to 1.76 mi llion casualties, which could
not be replaced, wh ile in contrast the American
Final armistice line - - -
Frontline an 7 August - - - - -
Front line on 26 September - - - -
Hindenburg line - - -
• BRUSSELS
Luxemburg .
TH E W E STER N FRO NT 58
army was landing 250,000 men per month. And The final Allied offensives: September and
while the number of German divisions on the October Belowleh A
British9.2-inch
Western Front shrank from 200 in March to only It is not surprising then that a series of Allied
gunfires as it
47 'fit' divisions in September, the Allies main- attacks in September drove the German army supports troops
tained 211 divisions in the field . Then, even back in retreat from the Hindenburg Line and defending against
before the March German offensive, the German other defensive systems. Starting with the first the German
GeorgetteApril
army on the Western Front could only deploy major American offensive at St Mihiel from 12 to 191Boffensive.
14,000 artillery pieces against 18,500 Allied guns, 18 September, Marshal Ferdinand Foch then
3,760 planes against 4,500 Allied planes, and by launched a number of wi dely separated offen - Below right An
American soldier
the end of the war a mere 45 tanks against 3,500 sives desig ned to crumbl e t he German line, keep
usesafield
Allied tanks. the German army off balance, and prevent telephone in 191B.
In particu lar, the key weapon of the Western German reservesfrom reinforcing anyone area. Communication
by telephone was
Front, the artillery, dominated the German forces, Hence, on 26 Septembe r th ere was a Franco-
important ostbe
as one officia l historian noted of 1918: 'For every American attack in the Meuse-Argonne area; on warbecame more
shell the enemy sent over, he received ten or 27 September an attack by the British First and mobilein 191B.
twenty back. In the bombardments... of the
summer and autumn of 1918, the Brit ish artillery
dom inated to such an extent that the enemy
retaliation was largely blind : In addition, Allied
counter-battery (the destruction of enemy
artillery) worked very well by 1918, enabling
Allied infantry attacks to succeed with many
fewer losses. Second, the Allied armies had learnt
by 1918 how to properly combine infantry
(armed with Lewis guns, rifle grenade s, trench
mortars, bombs and rifles) with artillery, tank s
and air superiority, to create an almost unstop-
pable attack system.Third , German morale was in
such cont inuous decline through the second half
of 1918 that desertions increased rapidly - in
Augu st, 110,000 German soldiers left the ranks.
243
58 MOD ERN TIMES
Demoralizedand Third Armies tow ard s Cambrai; o n 28 Septe m be r
exha usted German an attack in th e north by th e Belgia n Army and
troops retreatin
Briti sh Second Arm y; and lastly an atta ck on 29
mid-September
191BatVauxaillan, Septe m be r by th e Britis h Fou rth Arm y and French
in theChemin des
First Arm y in t he cent re of th e Alli ed lin e, There
Damesarea ofthe
w as hard fi ghting in all these areas, especia lly
FrenchArmy
sector. This area against German mach in e gun ners, and Alli ed
had seen severe
casualt ies were ofte n heavy (t he Canadia n Corps
fighting in 1917,
suffered it s he aviest casualt ies of th e wa r, 49,152,
which by 191Bhad
turned theearth in 191 8), but t he Hind enburg Lin e and other
into a featureless syste m s were broken and th e Germ an army was
plain. in overall ret reat . In certai n pla ces d efences stiff-
ene d, but normally there w as a German retrea t,
covered by th eir artillery and m achine guns, w it h
All ied forces followi ng up.
The Arm ist ice, 11 November 1918
By earl y Octobe r bot h General Lud end orff and
Field Ma rshal Paul von Hindenburg reali zed t hat
an end to th e wa r was nec essary. After pr otract ed
arg u me nt s among Germ an general s, politician s
and th e Germ an monarch y, th e arm isti ce w as
sig ned in Foch 's railway carriage in the for est of
244
. - - - - COMBATANTS - - - ,
Allie s
Battle of Britain
• Estimated combat strengthsof forces in
November 1918: Date: July-September 1940 Locat io n: Britain and no rthern coa stal France
British Expeditionary Force (BEF)1,202,000;
French Army 1,540,912; Belgian Army 115,000;
The Battle of France is over.. ..The Battle of Britain is about to begin . .. Hitler knows he will
American Expeditionary Force (AEF): 1,078,222
have to break us in this island, or lose the war... .Let us therefore brace ourselves to our
• Overall Commander-in-Chief,Marshal Ferdinand
Foch duties , and so bear ourselves that, if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last
for a thousand years, men will still say, This was their finest hour.'
BEF: FieldMarshalSir DouglasHaig
(Commander-in-Chief) W INSTON CHURCHILL, 18 JUNE 1940
French:MarshalHenri Philippe Petain
(Commander-in-Chief)
Belgian: King Albert I
(Commander-in-Chief of Belgian ArmyGroup) he Battle of Britain rem ain s o ne of the most In essence th e Batt le of Britain was an air supe-
AEF: General JohnPershing (Commander-in-
Chief);Major General Hunter Liggett; Major
General RobertBullard, Major General Joseph
Dickson
T fam ou s cam pai g ns in m il it ary hi sto ry and is
v iewed by man y as t he piv otal moment of
World War II, w he n Germ an y's o p port u nity to wi n
riori ty campaig n fo ug ht pr ed om in an t ly ove r
sout he rn Engl and in the late sum me r of 1940
bet w een RAF Fight er Command an d t he Luft -
t he w ar quickly and decisively w as den ied th em. w affe. It was con sidered cr ucial for t he lau nch ing
• Dead, missing, wounded & captured:
BEF852,861 (throughout 191 8); French 306,000 There is litt le d oubt t hat t he fa il ur e t o knock of Operation Seelowe (Operat ion Sealion), t he
(March-Nov); Belgian 30,068(28 5ep-l1 Nov); Brit ain out of t he w ar in the sum mer and autumn German plan to in vad e Brit ain, t hat t he RAF be
AEF 281 ,627(t hroughout 1918) swept from the skies over th e English Channel.
of 1940 had enormous rep ercu ssion s for Hit ler's
regime. German pl ann ers assume d that if the RAFw as st ill
Germans
• Estimated combat strength in November 1918:
2,911 ,700
• KaiserWilhelm II (Commander-in-Chief);
Field Marshal Paulvon Hindenburg (Chief ofthe
GeneralStaff); General Erich Ludendorff, then
GeneralWilhelm Groener(First Quartermaster
General); ArchdukeAlbrecht of Wurttemberg;
General Hansvon Boehn; General Maxvon
Gallwitz;Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria;
Crown Prince Wilhelm
• Dead, missing, wounded, captured & deserted:
1.76million (21 March-ll November 1918)
Corn pie q ne d uring t he early ho u rs of 11 No vem-
ber 191 8. Ho stilities ceased at 11 am on 11
Nov em be r, th e fi ft h year of th e w ar. In su m m ary,
durin g 191 8, th e Britis h army capt u red 188,700
prisoners and 2,840 guns, th e French 139 ,000
priso ners and 1,880 gun s, th e Am erican s 4 3,300
pri son ers and 1,421 g uns, and th e Bel gian s 14,500
pr isoners and 474 g un s. These stat ist ics reveal
Messerschmitt
accura te ly eno ug h th e relat ive co nt ri b uti o n of 109sin 'finger four'
eac h All ied army to th e d efeat of Germany on th e form ation over
St Margaret'sBay.
Western Front in 19 18.
24 5
 S9 MOOERN TIMES
Lond on a nd the
Thame s lie
vulnerable below a
German Heink el
He 111 bomber,
seen from an
escon plane
dur ing a bom bing
raid on 9 July,
1940.
viable, any attempted invasion woul d be vulnera-
ble to attack by the Royal Navy, protected from
the Luftwaffe by Brit ish fighter cover.
The Luftwaffe
In order to achieve their goal, German command-
ers recognized that they would have to draw the
RAF's Fight er Command into intense and sus-
tained air battle over England in order to destroy
t hem, and to do this they would have to threaten
Britain wi th a major bombing campaign . Precisely
how this wou ld be prosecuted and w hich targets
wo uld be crucial enough to t he Brit ish to force
th em to commi t th eir fighters was a matt er of
some debate in th e Luftwaffe's hig h command.
They knew th at they heavily out numbered the
RAF (2,600 aircraft to the RAF's 640 fighters), but
also noted that they woul d be battling over
England in British skies, and tha t many tactical
advantages would reside wi th the RAF. German
246
I
l
planning staff added to their difficulties by
overestimating the Luftwaffe's operational and
tactical superiority, whilst underestimating the
strength and capabilities of the RAF.
In equipment, the Germans fielded a variety of
twin-engine bombers , such as the Heinkel He 111
and the Dornier Do 17, along wi th the Junkers
Ju 87 Stuka dive -bomber for precision attacks.
To protect them , the Luftwaffe had the Messer-
schmitt Bf 109 single-engi ne fighter, and the
Messerschmitt Bf 110 twin-engine long-range
heavy fighter. The twin-engine bombers were
adequate, but nonetheless vulnerable to high-
perfor mance enemy fig hters, especially when
operat ing with few or no escorts. The Bf 109 was
a top-class fig hter but suffered from limited
endurance, whilst the Bf 110 had the ability to
operate over the UK for longer, but lacked the
aerial combat capability to lock horns with the
British fighters. The Luftwaffe, nevertheless, was
able to deploy three Luftflottes (air fleets) along
the coast of northwest Europ e from Norway to
Brittany to spearhead the attack. Complicating
matters, however, was t he influence of Hermann
Goring , head of the Luftwaffe, who retained
control of some air units and wh ose executive
leadership was to handicap the Luftwaffe
throughout World War II.
RAF Fighter Command
British air defence was centred upon RAF Fighter
Command and its supporti ng network of RDF
('radio direction finding' or radar)' and ob server
corps statio ns, along wi th ant i-aircraft gun batt er-
ies, balloon barrages and an array of civil defence
measures. Command fell to Air Chief Marshal Sir
Hugh Dowding, who had been a pivota l figu re in
the development of RAF Fighter Comm and in th e
late 1930s. In addition, he had stood firm against
pressureto despatch more of his precious fighter
BATTLE OF B R IT AIN S9
strength to France duri ng the desperate battles Paul Nosh's Battle
of May and June, earning some criticism. In hind- of Britain (194 1).
Nashwasan
sight Dowding was proved correct in his Official War Anist
assessment that Fighter Command's pilots and during both Warld
aircraft would be essential to save Britain, and Warf and If.
t hat frittering them away on the continent in a
hopeless battle was not an effective use of scant
resources. Britain was also divided into four
Fighter Com mand Grou ps, with 11 Group - based
in sout heast Eng land under Air Vice Marshal Sir
Keith Park -likely to bear th e brunt .
The Brit ish had invested heavily in air defence
measures in th e late 1930s and th e aircraft of
Fighter Command were generally high-qualit y
types. The Hawker Hurri cane was th e most
num erou s fighter, a rugg ed and dependab le
design, capable of matching anyt hing the Luft -
waffe had, save perhaps th e Bf 109. In addition,
the British deployed the Supermarine Spitfire, a
cutting-edge, high -performance fighter to match
247
 S9 MOD ERN TIMES

the Bf 109. The RAF also had the great advantage southern England. The Luftwaffe's tactics
- Left Supermarine
Spitfire Mark Is of
S9

Theimpo rta nce of
the ba rrie in the
skies over
southeast England
isapparentfrom
the mop below. 11
Group endured the
heaviest losses, but
the bottl e was won
and lost here.
of figh ting over its ow n territory, thus being able included mixed hig h- and low-level attacks to
610Fighter
to recover preciou s num bers of downed pil ot s confuse and surprise RDF and observer stations, Squadron on
much more easily. try ing to catch aerod rome defences unp repared. patrol during the
Eagle Day (or Adlertag) on 13 August saw t he Battle of Britain.
TheSpitfire's
The campaign beginning of this determined effort by the Luft-
speed a nd
The Luftwaffe's campaign began on 10July w it h a waffe and, by early Sept emb er, Fighter Comm and manoeuvrability
series of probing raids against shippi ng, coastal was on the brink of defeat with heavy losses and made it Britain's
premier fighter
convoys and ports. In addition, the Luftwaffe acutely st retched infrast ructural support. Plansto
aircraft of World
attacked the RAF's RDF stations, but was largely wit hdr aw Fighter Command 's assets north to War II.
unsuccessful in its effort to elim inat e th is impor- await the invasion were discussed, but Dowd ing
Left 'Never WQS so
tant element in Brit ish air defences. and Park decided to continue contest ing air supe- Brit ish to retali ate by bombi ng Berlin. As Luft-
much owed by so
The Luftwaffe then switch ed to attacks upon riority over the south. waffe lossesremained heavy and the direct attack many to so few.'
the RAF direct, 11 Group in part icular. Air raids In reality the Luftwaffe was endu ring a chas- on th e RAF did not seem to be worki ng, Hitl er The famo us
quotation from
were now conducted against RAF aerodromes ten ing experience too, with heavy losses of t hrew his weight behind a change of tack: dir ect
Churchill's tribute
and stations in an effort to break Fight er aircraft, pilots and aircrew. The Ju 87 Stuka had attack s upon the Brit ish civilian population in
to thevictors of the
Command , and t hus gain air superior ity over already been w it hdrawn due to grievous casual- order to break their morale and draw the RAF Bot tl e of Britain is
ti es and qu est ions were being raised abou t fighters into direct aerial confrontati on. given visual form
,, tactics. Goring was well aware his force was far In fact, the Luftwaffe had been very close to in thisph oto-

, \
FighterCommand headquarters ~
group headquarters G weaker than Hitl er had been led to believe, and successand the change in tactics actually allowed
m ontage, c. 1940.

FIGHTER
\ group boundaries conscious that continued losses would quickly Fighter Command to recover. Moreover, London
COMMAND '" Newc~Slle
13 G ROUP I fighter bases '" break the Luftwaffe asa major fighting force. was at the edge of the Bf 109's operational range,
ll<
DurhamG,c,
I
I , sectorcommandpost oft en causing German bombers to fly unescorted
~L/ - "" ,
, \
high·level radarstation
LuftwaffeHQ •
The battle decided for part of their missions, increasing casualties still
The campaign was soon to swing Britain's way, further. By mid -September there was now no
\ Luftw affe bomber base •
however. The Germans had begun conducting chance of the Luftwa ffe seizing air superiority to
I ri s h York,c, '" \ l - Smajorr aidsl l 00 tonS+) 'l:<
Se a '> Hull
r: liverpoo,*" ",'l:< Manchester,c,
\
I
6-10 majorr aids
. . .....
*" night -time bo mbi ng raids on RAF stations, but
one such attack hit a civilian area, causing the
allow for Operation See/owe before the wi nter,
so th e battl e was effectively over. The 'blitz' of
IBirkenhead) , > 10mejor raids ,...
"-I Sheffielcf' I Briti sh to wns and citi es continued throughout
Cr-: '" ~ Nottingham - 1- --- - '\ th e winter of 1940-41 , but t he Germans were
~ FIGHTER CO M M AND Norwich.+. , COMBATANTS forced to swi tch to nig ht -time attacks to reduce
(-', ." Birmingham"ll<. 12GRouP I No rr h
bomber losses, and overall effect iveness was
,,~ 'l:< Coventry Cambridge r Se a
I
\ <" - G REA T B R I T A I N
~ "'" I
Colchester
Allies limited. Hit ler's attention had in any case by then
I ..... ,?'J' I • RAF Fighter Command : 900 aircraft, of wh ich 600 turned towards the invasion of the Soviet Union
I ~.
,
Cardiff
r-" "--....,'t;i ~ *" '" Stanm~~ A
Uxbridg.,...- ", *-
'"
Lonilii n I
/
""--"
could be airborne at one time planned for 1941 (see Batt le for Moscow p. 250). the ir force wascloseto collap se, but the ir defence
, .P~stol(Avonmouth) G Bat~ FIGHTER ...~----. \ lUFTFLonk2 HQ • Commander-in-Chief Air Chief Marshal Sir Hug h had been stout and resilient and the toll they had
\ .....- - f~IGHTERC
~ OMMAND '" b . . COMMANO
11 G
'" "" It \ Brussels - - Dowd ing
1 0 GRQUP :(;l ROUP \ . , ' \ ,0.t:
The batt le in retrosp ect exacted from t he Luftwaffe was a crucial factor in
r">; E .II. Southampton...." " --........ {'t C.lliais - l IU • 507 dead, 2,945 wou nd ed, 788 aircraft lost The deg ree to which the result of the battle was prompting the Germans to change tactics.
'I
\.
'
* xeter~
A
,----vJ/;.
I'"s---'«',;
\.... _-,
Portsmouth
\ \ e,~
(.'~.
//
0o
/ I
--
- ', 41

Germans
a product of German failure or British success is Finally , alth ough Germany's surrender in
..- Plymouth I . --~- E l>Q. __" a debate that will cont inue, but it is clear that World War II was brought about by many later
\ " (Oevpnpo rt) I maximumeffective ---- ~
\ , ...... __ ....._ range of low-Ievel ......-- • The Luft waffe: 1,800 out of 2,600 aircraft played no one factor decided the outcome. Conti nually campai gns, Britain's determination to conti nue
\ I radar ~ a key role, including twin-eng ine bombers, div e
,_/ • Cherbourg ,.". shifti ng German prio riti es was a majo r hindrance, the war afte r the fall of France. underpi nned by
bombers, single-engi ne fighters & lo ng- range
but thi s was also governed by heavy and near- thei r success in t he skies over England in th e
" LUFTFLOTTE3 HQ
heavy fighters
• Commanded by Reichsmarschall Hermann unsustainable loss rates, with the Luftwaffe ill Battle of Britain , wasto lay the foundations for the

• Brest
f - - - - - - - - , - -200km
"
Parisll

100:niles
t
N Gor ing
• 1,294 aircraft lost
equ ipped for a sustained air superiority cam-
paign . For the Brit ish, the switch to urban
combine d bom ber offe nsive, success in the
Mediterranean, th e liberation of western Europ e
bombing in Septem ber came as a great relief as and Germany's total defeat in 1945.

248 249
 BATTLE FOR MOSCOW 60

Russian w inter, time was in short supp ly. Indeed,

Battle for Moscow

prime Soviet agricult ural area in Ukraine secured.
This was to take place afte r von Bock had dealt th e rain began th ree days before Typho on was Hitler planned for
wi th anot her large pocket around Smolensk. launched. Fourth and Second
On the Soviet side, Stalin and his high Panzer armies to
The Smolensk pocket wasduly reduced, with a
surroundMoscow,
Date: November-December 1941 Location : western Russia fu rther 310,000 Soviet tro ops falling into German command had always been conv inced that butin the face o f
• hands. Gerd von Rundsted t's Army Grou p South Moscow was the major German target . This was worsening
We only needed anothertwelve kilometres to get the capital within gun range - but wejust advanced to Kiev, t he ancient capital of Ukraine, reinforce d by Luftwaffe air attacks on t he capit al weatherand
Russian
couldnot make it. w hich Stalin ordered to be held to t he last man. whi ch had begun towa rds th e end of July. This
reinforcementsit
GERMANLIEUTENANT IN FRONT OFMoscow, EARLYDECEMBER1941 Once it crossed from th e Baltic states into Russia prompted a redeploym ent of th e Soviet muni- proved overly
prope r, Army Group Nort h's advance became tions indust ry east of the Ural Mountains to place ambitious.

slowed by gro wing exhaust ion and the heavily

wooded terrain. Not until the beginn ing of
Germanmovements ----..

T
he German invasion of the Soviet Union in
June 1941 caught the Red Army ill pre-
pared and unable to cope with the tidal
wave which engu lfed it. Within 24 hours the
Panzer spearheads (German armoured units ) had
penetrated up to 80 km (50 miles). 8y early July
the Germans had overrun Latvia and Lithuania,
reduced a large pocket of Soviet troops in the Bia-
lystok area, which yielded nearly 300,000
prisoners, and were penetrating Ukraine in the
south. Stalin, who had remained strangely silent
for the first two weeks of the fighting, exhorted
the Soviet people to fight to the last, but few
outside observers believed that it would be long
before the Germans were hammering at the
gates of Moscow.
The Soviet capital was initially the prime
German object ive and th e intention was to seize
it before winter fell. To th is end, Fedor von Bock's
Army Group Centre, tasked with advancing to
Moscow, had been allocated the bulk of the
armour with two Panzer groups, while Army
Group North, whose objective was Leningrad
(present-day St Petersburg), and Army Group
South, tasked with overrunning Ukraine, had just
one each. On 19 July Hitler, who had been
increasingly meddl ing in the conduct of opera -
tions, issued a new directive. Moscow, he
declared, was no longer the main target. Instead,
Army Group Centre was to hand over much of its
armour to the other two army groups so that
Leningrad could be qu ickly captured and th e
September was Lening rad put unde r siege.
~ Germanfront line,S December - -
Immedia tely, Hit ler changed his mind once mor e.
Moscow was restored as th e prim ary objective pockets of Russian troops <::::>
and Army Group s North and South were ordered
to return the armour that they had obtained from
industrial areas 1M
Army Group Centre. For Army Group North , now
settling down for a long siege (it would last until
January 1944), the transfer was reasonably
straightforward. In cont rast, Army Group South
was embroiled in the capture of Kiev. This did not
fall until 19 Septemb er, yielding 600,000 prison-
ers, and only th en could von Rundstedt hand
back Heinz Guderian 's Second Panzer Army to
von Bock. The result of thi s was that th e 320-km
(200-mile) advance on Moscow, codenamed
Operation Typho on, could not beg in until 30
September. With the autumn rains due in mid -
October, followed by the beginn ing of the grim

____ COMBATANTS 'L..-_ _

Russians
• Soviet Western, Reserve & Bryansk Fronts:
1,250,000 men (as at30 5ep )

• Commanded by Georgi Zhukov

German • 515,000 killed and captured, 144,000 wounded

reconnaissance and sick (to 5 Dec)
elements
advancinginto Germans
Ukraine, summer

r
N
1941. The Panzer • German Army Group Centre: 910,000 me n (as at
sp ea rheads 305ep)
were often days • Commanded by Field Marshal Fedor von Bock
ah ead of th e ma in 400km
I
• c. 200,000 casualties (to 5 Dec)
body offoot 200~iles
marching in fanrry .

250 251

I
~
 BATT LE ' OR MOSCOW 60

Second. the rains. now becoming mixed with
snow as October drew into November. were
increasingly reducing mobility. This was aggra-
vated by overstretched German supply lines.
Many German troops were still in their summer
uniforms and beginning to suffer from the cold
and. because the reinforcement system could no
longer cope, units were down to half strength.
Matte rs came to a head on 30 October. when
Guderian att empted to seize Orel, 11 0 km (70
mi les) east of Bryansk. Among th e defenders was
the first of th e Siberian division sto arrive and Gud-
erian. with his fuel tanks alm ost dry. was surprised
by the ferocity of the resistance. This and the now
virtually impassable grou nd forced a halt.
The Ger man s are foiled
Wit h th e coming of Novemb er. so th e frost
arrived and th e ground began to harden once
more. The Germans hastily brought up more sup-
plies so that the advance could recommen ce.
Simultaneously, troop trai ns were rumbling west-
wards from Siberia. bring ing a to tal of 40 fresh
divisions to reinforce the Moscow defences.
Some of th ese troops too k part in th e annu al Rev-
olution Day Parade held in Red Square on 7
November in the presence of Stalin and then
dep loyed immediately to the front. The German
advance on Moscow resumed on 15 November.
While the frozen ground had restored mobility.
the increasing cold had a debilitating effect on
the troops. Combined with the ever stiffer Soviet
resistance.progress was slowing considerably.
By th e end of 4 December t he northern thrust
had reached th e Vo lga canal. just 32 km (20 mil es)
nort hwest of Moscow, and some reconn aissance
units claimed that they could see the spi resof the
Kremlin . In t he south, Guderian was approaching
the River Oka, southeast of the city. It seemed
that. with one final heave. Moscow would be in
German hands. That night, however. the temper-
A Germanbarrie
atu re plummeted to -35 degrees Celsius. Tank group preporesfor
engines would not start, weapons became ino p- the final advance
erable and frostb ite was rampant among th e on Moscow,
November 194 7.
ill-clo the d German soldiers. Apart from
On 5 December Zhukov counter-att acked. his improvised white
troops and vehicles bett er equi pped to comba t camouflage. the
troopslacked the
t he cold . Hit ler was fo rced to give permission for
proper clothing to
some local wi thd rawals to take place, but wi thi n capewith the
48 hours had changed his mind . In th e north , th e Russian winter.

A Russian village it out of range of the bombers. Three lines of
burns asGerman defences were also constructed west of Moscow,
troops tighten
theirgripononeof
largely by local labour. Facing Army Group Centre
the pocketsaf were two Soviet fronts : 5emyon Timoshenko's
Russian troops Southwest Front of 55 div isions and Andrei Yere-
tbottbey
menko's Bryansk Front wi t h 26 divisions. Stalin
surroundedin
Oeraber 7941. The had, however, ordered the transfer of div isions
task afthe German from Siberia, who were well inured to the cold, to
infantry was to
the Moscow area.
reducethe pockets
which the Panzers
had formed. Operation Typhoon
The renewed German offensive wasspearheaded
by Erich Hoepner's Fourth PanzerArmy, Hermann
Hoth 's Third Panzer Army and Guderian's Second
Panzer Army. Guderian quickly enveloped the
Bryansk Front. to tally trapping it by 6 October.
and the following day Hoth and Hoepner similarly
encircled Timoshenko. Although it took time to
reduce the pockets, both Soviet fronts were
completely destroyed and it seemed that the
road to Moscow now lay open . But the weather
intervened. On 7 October, the very day that th e
Germansentrapped the Western Front at Vyazma .
th e autumn rains proper began. The eart h qu ickly
became a morass. drastically slowing movemen t.
To compound the German problems. Hit ler now
insisted that th e Panzerarmies surround Moscow
rat her than thrust di rectly at the city. But the
advance continued.
By mid -October the Germans were within 160
km (100 miles) of their goal. Panic now gripped
Moscow. Many of the organs of government and
the fore ign embassies left the city . Even Stalin
himself prepar ed to leave. but changed his mind
as his train stood ready to depart. By 18 October
the Germans had penetrated to with in 130km (80
miles)of Moscow and it seemed asthough it were
merely a matter of days before they reached their
goal. But all was not go ing the German way. First,
Stalin had appointed a tough new commander,
Georgi Zhu kov, whose newly formed West Front
was charged wi t h halting the German offensive.

252 253
 60 MOD ERN T I M E S

stalingrad
German withdrawal was orderly, although much

3ALUMTMM equi pment had to be abandoned. Guderian,

however, had considerably more difficu lty extri-

POI"'IO cating his troops from the narrow salient which

they had occupied. They found t hemselves
repeatedly cut off and fighting their way out of
Date: September 1942-2 February 1943 Location : modern Voigagrad,
southwest Russia
* encirclement. The Soviet pressure was such that
by late December the Germans had been driven Asfar as the eyecan see lie soldierscrushedby tanks, helplesslymoaning wounded,
back up to 1SOkm (95 miles). The Red Army con - frozencorpses, vehiclesabandoned through lack offuel, blown-up guns
tinued its atta cks unti l th e end of February 1942, and miscellaneousequipment.
Righ t ThisSoviet
by which t ime it was exhausted. HANS SCHMEIDER, N INTH FLAK D IVISION, STALINGRAD, J ANUARY 1943
posterreads We
will defend our The repu lse of Army Group Cent re in front of
Moscow'. It was Moscow marked th e end of German hopes of
theappeal to
patriotism father
speedily crushing the Soviet Union . The Germans
than ideology failed because they began the ir invasion of th e
assa ult into t he Donets Basin. Again th e Red Army

T
which galvanized Soviet Union to o late in th e year, and Hitler's he origin s of th e long -drawn -out ago ny
theRussianpeople of Stalingrad dur ing th e winter of 1942-43 w ithdrew, but th e German progre ss was slowe d
failure to adhere to th e orig inally agreed plan of
to resist and turn
back theinvader. Moscow as th e primary objective imposed an lay in Hitl er's decision to renew his Russian by heavy rain and fuel shortages. Hitler qui ckly
Soviet soldiers
additional tim e penalty. Consequently, th e off ensive after th e rebuff in front of Moscow became impatient and ordered the tr ansfer of fighting a
Below A T-34 in 1941 (see previous entry p. 250 ). Rather than Panzer form ation s and air assets from Army rearguard action
Germans found th emselves facing not onl y a
supports Russian during the German
rapidly recovering Red Army, but also th e harsh- make anothe r attem pt on th e capital, he decided Grou p Bto General Siegmund List (comma nder of
infantryin a advanceto the
counter ·attack, ness of the Russian win ter, for wh ich th ey were to seize the oilfields in the Caucasus, a plan that Army Group A), leaving just Friedrich Pa ulus's RiverDon, July
January 1942. singularly ill equip ped. he dreamed would coincide with victory in North Sixth Army, supported by some Panzer elements , 1942.
Africa to force the entire Midd le East under his
sway.
Codenamed Blue, this attack was to be con-
ducted by Fedor von Bock's Army Group South,
w hich was subd ivided into two Army Groups: A
and B.The main assault was to be carried out by
t he former, w hile Army Group B advanced to the
Ii n~ of the River Don, then turn ing southeast to
Stalingrad to secure Army Group A's eastern flank
on the Volga as it plunged into the Caucasus. An
elaborate deception operation was mounted to
make Moscow seem th e principal objective and,
even when plans for th e Caucasus offensive fell
into the ir hand s, th e Russians remained con -
vinced it was merely a subsidiary attack.

Operation Blue is launch ed

On 30 June 1942 Army Group Bbegan its advance
to th e Don and hoped to trap the forces initi ally
opposi ng it in a pocket. Now wise to this previ -
ously successful tactic, the Russians withdrew
before the pocket could be formed, but th is
enabled the Germans to reach the Don within a
week. On 7 July Army Group A launched its

254 255
61 MODERN TIMES

to cont inue the advance towards Stalingrad .
Frustrated by what he saw as his slow progress.
Hitl er then sacked von Bock and dissolved his
headquarters . At the same time . the two army
groups were now on divergent paths - Army
Group B eastwards towards Stalingrad and Army
Group A south wards into the Caucasus. By mid -
August the latter had overrun Maykop oilfields
(despite Russia having destroyed most of t he
machin ery) and reached th e foo th ills of th e Cau-
casus. w hile Paulu s was fight ing on th e outskirts
of Stalingrad and subjecti ng the city to heavy
bombing. Significantly. Hermann Hoth's Fou rt h
Panzer Army was on its way to join him. having
been switched from Army Group A. which had
also handed over one of its air fleets.It meant t hat
th e drive into the Caucasus began to run out of
mom entum as the atte nti on of both sides
Russiansoldiers became fixed on Stalingrad.
armed with On the Russian side. VasilyGordov's Stalingrad
7.62-mm PPSh Front was respo nsible fo r the area. Stalin told him
submachine qu n s
during th e costly
on 24 August that the city mu st be held at all costs
Stalingrad street and sent his chief troubleshoot er, Georgi Zhukov,
fighting. to oversee operations. While Vasily Chuikov's
Sixty- Second Army was made responsible for th e
city itself. Zhukov was aware that Paulus's flanks
were vulnerable and began to organize counter-
attack forces. Meanwhile. the Germans managed
to pressChuikov into a narrow salient on the west
bank of the Volga. but casualties were mounting.
Chuikov 's men, too . were becom ing exhausted
and running low on reinforcements. The only way
that they could reach him was across the Volga.
but the river was being subjected to constan t
arti llery fire and many were lost. By th e end of
September a virt ual stalemate had been reached.
Zhukov plans a counter-offensive
Zhukov had already organized limi ted counter-
atta cks into th e flanks of the German Sixth Army.
which had forced Pa ulus to div ert forces to deal
wi th them. Asearly as 12 September he conceived
an ambi tiou s plan for a double envelopment of
th e German forces in the Staling rad area by
launching attacks on th e shoulders of th e salient
in whi ch they found thems elves. It took t ime to
prepare. largely because Stalin was slow to agree
that th e necessary reinforcements should be

switched from Moscow to th e Stalingrad area,
and it was also decided to await th e wi nter snows,
w hen th e grou nd would have hardened once
more. One advantage which the Russians enjoyed,
however, was that th e Germans had been forced
to deplo y two low- grade Romanian armies to
guard their flanks.
Security for t he Russian plan. entit led Opera-
ti on Uranus, was very tight. Only the Front
commanders concerned - Nikolai Vatutin of th e
Sout hwest Front. Konstant in Rokossovsky of the
Don Front (w hich had taken over from Gord ov's
Stalingrad Front ) and Andr ei Yeremenko of a
newly created Staling rad Front - were to ld of the
out line plan.While Vatut in attac ked th e Romanian
Thi rd Army west of Stalingrad and Rokossovsky
kept Paulu s tied down through att acks into th e
flank of th e German forces, elements of the Stalin-
grad Front would assault the Romanian Fourth
Army to the south of th e city . Uranus would be
mou nted on 9 November, wi th detailed ord ers
issued only on the previous day. The att ack had
to be postpon ed by ten days. however. because A Germa n p latoon
of delays in deployin g tr oop s, and dur ing th is pauses for breath
outside the
time Chuikov 's situat ion within th e city became Stalingrad tractar
increasingly desperate. factory. one of the
On 19 November 1942. Vatutin and most bitterly
contested
Rokossovsky launched the ir attac ks. wi t h Yere-
landmarks in the
menko joining the offensive the following day. city.
The stunned Romanians soon broke and bot h
prong s of the offensive swept sout heast and
northwest. on 23 Novemb er linking up at Ka lach.
some (80 km) SOmiles west of Stalingrad. lt meant
t hat the German Sixth Army, to gether with ele-
ments of Fourth Panzer Army, were now cut off .
Pa ulus's logical action would have been to break
out of th e encirclement before it had time to
congeal, but Hermann Goring declared th at his
Luftwaffe could keep th e surrounded Germans
resupplied . Consequently, Hitler ordered Paulu s
to stay put. He also tasked Erich von Manstein,
one of th e ablest of th e German commanders. at
the head of the newly formed Army Group Don,
to mount a relief op eration.

2S7
61 MOD ERN TIMES STALINGRAD 61

At the begin ning of December th e Russians the latter was under strict orders from Hit ler to regroup and resumed his attacks on 22 January. On the evening of the follow ing day Paulus,
laun ched fu rt her attacks designed to split t he maintain his hold on Stalingrad and was unwill- The following day saw the last German aircraft fly who was in the southern of the two pockets, sur-
Stalingrad pocket in two. They made little ing to make sufficient forces available. out of t he pocket. rendered . The northern pocket cont inued to
Hitler's growing
progress and were called off after a few days. On Paulus was now so desperately short of food resist for another 48 hours but, subjected to a
fixat ion with 12 December, von Manstein mounted his relief The German fate is sealed and ammunition that his 30,000 sickand wo unded final devastating bom bardment, also gave in on
Stalin grad resulted operation . Initially it made good progress, but The Russian offensive in the north had continued were denied rations. Rokossovsky's men had 2 February. Of the 90,000 men made prisoner
in ArmyGroupA 's
Russian resistance stiffened and t hey also and was joined by one launched by the Stalingrad linked up with Chuikov in Stalingrad itself and the during the fighting, only some 5,000 would
advance into th e
Caucasus running launched an attack fu rther north, designed to Front on 24 December. The twi n attacks threat- Germans had been reduced to two small areas. survive to be event ually returned to Germany.
out ofmom entum . t hreaten von Manstein's lines of communication. ened to cut off a signifi cant port ion of von Hitler refused to countenance any form of break- While the Russians rejoiced, Hit ler declared four
Iber eattet the city Manstein 's forces and on 28 Decemb er Hitler
Even so, his men pressed forward, reaching the out and ordered Paulus to defend to the last. On days of mourning . He recognized , as did Stalin,
dr ew in Germ an
forceslikea River Myshkova, ju st SO km (30 mi les) from th e gave permission for him and Maximilian von 30 January, Goring made a radio broadcast on the th at Stal ing rad was a major turning point of th e
magnet, making pocket, on 19 December. But the Russians had Weichs's Army Group A to his north to wi thdraw. anniversary of Hit ler's accession to power, declar- war in the East. From now on it was the Russians
th eir na nks This was to put them over 200 km (125 mi les) who held th e initiative as they began an advance
prepared defenc es along it, preventing the ing that 'a thou sand years hence Germans wi ll
increasingly
Germans from breaking through. Von Manstein away from th e pocket. Not only did th is make speak of thi s battle with reverence and awe: that would eventually take them all the way to
vulnerable to
Russian attack. suggested to Paulus that he now break out, but further attempts to relieve Paulus nigh on impos- Hitler himself promoted Paulusto Field Marshal. Berlin.
sible, but it also aggravated his supply situation.
The Germans at Stalingrad required 750 ton nesof
~ Soviet advances supplieseach day and th e most that the Luftwaffe
~ German counter-attacks had achieved th is far was 250 to nnes. The
front line 19 November
increased distance that the aircraft now had to fly
front line 30 November
meant that the daily supply rate would drop to 90
front line 31 December
tonnes per day at best.
T Germanairfields
With th e threat from von Manstein remov ed,
the Russians could now move in for the kill. On 10
January 1943, Rokossovsky assaulted the pocket
from th e west. With in a week all the airfi eld s bar
one had been overrun by the Russians, and th e
Luftwaffe wasreduced largely to dropping, rat her
than landing, suppl ies, most thu s falling into
Russian hand s. Rokossovky now paused to

_ _- - I COMBATANTS ' - - - -

Russians
• Russian Southwest, Don, and Stalin grad Fronts :
1,143,500 men (as at 19 Nov)
• Overall co mmander Georg i Zhukov
• 486,000 killed and captured, 614,000 wo unded
.-
and sick • The h aggard n ew ly
promoted Field
, ot Ma rshal Paul us
Germans marches into
cap tivity. He n ever
• German Sixth Army : 290,000 men (asat 22 Nov) -, forgave Hitler for
• Overall command er Friedrich Paulus abandoning the

o
o
I
BOkm
,
• 265,000 killed and captured, 23,000 wounded
and evacuated ,...' ~ .. .- Sixth Army and
broadcast an ti-

-
SO miles Nazi propaganda
far the Soviets.

25B 259
.'
 MIDWAY 62

Midway ® 2.30 pm 4 June

Yorktown hit by 4 torpedoesin
~_"r-~
sec_onda ry Hiryubombingattack
10.30 am 4 June-12 am 6 June

Date: 4-6 June 1942 Location : North Pacific Ocean 9 6JUne'j~~

~
Mikumasinks ~
'1- ¥ .
~o.L ~~~~ EnrerpriJ-spruance
f."\
This memorable American victary was of cardinal import ance, not on ly to the United \l; ~:J~ Homer

States, but to the whole Allied cause. The moral effect was tremendous and instantaneous. First of two strilesfr ~r;. l eft By 10.30 am

At one stroke the dominant position ofJapan in the Pacific was reversed.
Hiryu dive bombershit 03 pm 4 June on 4 June the US
the Yorktown ...---1 Yorktown (Fletcher) abandoned Enterprise had
W INSTON C HURCHILL, THEHINGEOF FATE, 1950 ....~ already bombed
® 5pm4June
Enrerprisedive bombers
set fire to Hiryu
t
N Akagi and Kaga,
and the Yorktown
had hir Soryu,
rendering off three
dmiral Isoroku Yamamoto's plan for t he attack, but in the batt le of the Coral Sea (7- 8 May Japanese carriers

A Mid way campaign called fo r Japanese

forces to secure th e island of Mid way, at
th e western end of the Hawaiian chain 1,930 km
1942), the Lexington had been sunk and the York-
town damaged so badly th at Japan believed it
was also destroyed. Coral Sea was th e fir st Japan-
American fleet carrier
Japanese fleet carrier
Japanese cruisers

American movements . . . -
_
_
_
out of action for
the resrof rhe
barrie. Thisplan
showshow tbe
conflict evolved
(1,200 miles) from Pearl Harbor, in ord er to draw
out the US Pacific Fleet for a decisive battle. The
ese setback of th e war, forcing th em to cancel an
amphibiou s invasion of the sout hern coast of
. Japanese movements . . . -
overthenext
couple of days.
Americans had still not recovered from the Japan- New Guinea. Earlier, in th e wake of Pearl Harbor,
ese surprise attack th at had started th e war; of th e th e Japanese had taken Guam and mo st of th e
;.:~ Below Admiral
JAPA' " Chester Nimitz of
eight battlesh ips in Pearl Harbor on 7 Decemb er Philippines from t he Americans, Singapo re and
® 12.30 pm 4 June ~. tbe United Srares
1941, fou r had been sunk and the oth er fo ur Malaya from the British and t he East Indies from Japanesecommander / M idw~y Island Navy. Nimitz
Kondo isordered to , (1885- 1966)
damaged badl y enough to remai n unavailable for the Dutch, t hen empl oyed carriers to great effect withdraw to Japan PacificOcean
commanded tbe
service six months later. None of t he Pacific Fleet's in raids on Darwin, Australia (19 February 1942),
American forces ar
carriers had been in Pearl Harbor during the and deep into the Indian Ocean on Colombo and Midway.
Trincomalee , Ceylon (5- 9 April 1942l.
After its sortie into the Indian Ocean the main Yamamoto remained behind in Japan coordinat-
Japanese carrier force, under direct command of ing the navy's multiple offensives of December
Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, returned home for 1941, on this occasion the entire Combined Fleet
a refit before the Midway campaign. The fleet car- sortied, including Yamamoto in the flagship
riers Shokaku and Zuikaku, which had seen action Yam a to in overall personal command. Nagumo
at Pearl Harbor and Ceylon, were detached with led the way with a force including the fleet carri-
the light carrier Shoho to spearhead the force ers Kaqa, Akag i, Hiryu and Soryu, 2 battleships, 2
intercepted in the Coral Sea. While the battle heavy cruisers, and 1 light cruiser, supplemented
the re cost th e Americans th e much larger Lexing- by the light carriers Hosho and Zuiho, 4 battle-
ton, the Japanese lost the Shoho , their first ships, 8 heavy cruisers, and 3 light cruisers. At the
signi ficant mat erial casualty of th e war. The same time , Vice Admiral Boshiro Hosogawa led a
Shokaku wasdamaged beyond repair for the next diversionary strike against the Aleutia n Islands
campaign; th e Zuik ak u emerged from th e battle wi th the Fifth Fleet - the light carriers Ryujo and
Fleer Admiral unscathed, but lost enough aircraft and pilot s to Junyo,3 heavy cruisersand 41ight cruisers.
Isoraku
be held back too . Meanw hile, thank s to a Her-
Yamamoto
(lBB4-1943) of culean effort in the dockyard at Pearl Harbor, th e The battle
rheImperial Navy Americans would have the York town repaired Nagumo opened the battle at 4.30 am on 4 June
andcommander 1942 by launching 108 of his 234 aircraft against
and back wi th the fleet in time for Mid way.
of tne Japanese
CombinedFleer In contrast to th e strike against Pearl Harbor, Midway. When this first wave made its bombing -
orMidway. conducted by Nagumo 's First Air Fleet while run two hours later, the island's anti -aircraft guns

260
62 MO D ERN TIM E S
shot down or damaged all but 41 planes, seri-
ously reducing th e striking power of Nagumo 's
fou r fleet carriers and givi ng Yamamo to second
thou ght s abo ut the dep loy ment of th e four ligh t
carriers, no ne of which wo uld part icip ate in th e
ensuing batt le. The Am erican fo rce, und er th e
overall command of Ad miral Chester Nim itz,
steamed tow ard s Midwa y from Pearl Harbor.
His ships w ere subdi vided int o Task Force 16
Air Attack on (Rear Ad miral Raymond Spr uance), including th e
Japanese Carriers
carriers Horn et and Enterprise, S heavy cruisers, 1
by Griffith Baily
Coale, c. 1942. light cru iser and 11 destroyers; and Task Force 17
(Rear Admiral Frank Fletcher ), including the
new ly repaired Yorktown, 2 heavy cruisers and 6
dest royers. Toget her th e t hree America n flatt ops
carried 233 aircraft.
Nim itz's carriers laun ched their first planes
between 7 and 8 am .They made their fir st contact
w it h t he Japanese fleet after 9 am,j ust as Nagumo
was hesit at ing over whet her t o arm his planes
for a second attack on Midway or for battle wi t h
t he app roaching American fo rce. Some of t he
Hornet' s to rpedo planes spotted the Kaga after
9 am, bu t failed to damag e it in thei r att ack.Then,
bet ween 10.20 and 10.30 am, dive bombers fro m
th e Enterprise scored hits on the Akag i and Kaga,
w hile di ve bombers from th e Yorktown set the
Soryu ablaze. Inte nse fi res rendered th ese three
Japanese carriers uselessfor th e rest of the battle;
the Kaga and Soryu each remained aflo at for
another nine hours before sinking, while
Yamamot o ordered destroyers to torpedo the
burning hulk of the Akagi at 5 am the following
morning.
The Hiryu , whi ch had taken a cour se to th e
north of the other Japanese carriers, remained
Americans
• Pacific Fleet,Task Force 16andTask Force 17:
3fleetcarriers; 7 heavy cruisers; 1light cruiser;
several smaller andsupporting unitsincluding
17destroyersand19submarines)
•Overall commander Admiral Chester Nimitz;
Rear Admiral Raymond 5pruance (Task Force 16);
Rear AdmiralFrankFletcher(Task Force 17)
• 307 dead; 1carrier and 1destroyer sunk
Japanese
• CombinedFleet:4 fleetcarriers; 2 light carriers;
6 battleships; 10heavy cruisers; 4 light cruisers;
several smaller andsupporting unitsincluding
34destroyers and 15submarines(NB:totalsdo
not includeunitsof FifthFleet deployed against
Aleutian Islands)
• Overall commander Admirallsoroku Yamamoto;
Vice Admiral ChuichiNagumo
•c. 4,800 dead; 4 carriers and 1heavy cruiser sunk
unscathed and launched a str ike against the York-
town around 11 am, and a second strike at 1.20
pm . The fi rst wave t ook an hou r to reach it st arget,
the second around 90 minu tes, bu t each scored
hits, and th e Yorktown had t o be abandoned j ust
before 3 pm . The Hiryu's pilot s, conv inced they
had sunk an American carrier on t he fir st str ike,
believed t hey had sunk a second carrier on t he
second st rike. In any event, short ly afte r th e York-
town's crew abando ned ship, American p lanes
spo tt ed th e Hiryu, and at 3.50 pm the Horn et and
Enterprise launched all of th eir remain ing aircraft
for a strike against it. They found their prey just
aft er 5 pm, catc hing th e crew taking it s evening
meal in no great sense of urgency. Four bombs
to re through th e Hiryu's flight deck, putting it out
of action and igniting fire s below; the ship finally
sank at 8.20 am on 5 June.
Earlier on th e 5th , short ly after Yamamoto
o rdered th e remaining ships to withdraw, th e
heavy cruisers M ikuma and Mogami collided in
th e predawn darkness, leaving both damaged
and capable only of a reduced speed. On 6 June
aircraft from the Hornet and Enterprise attacked
the two ship s as they straggled behind the rest of
the retreating Japanese fleet ; the Mikuma sank
aft er dark that evening, while the Mogami
escaped w it h heavy casualties. The Yorktown,
abandoned two and a half days earlier, remained
afloat until the morning of 7 June, when a Japan-
ese submarine torpedoed and sank it. Meanwhile,
Hosogawa's Fifth Fleet landed troops which
occupied the islands of Attu (5 June) and Kiska (7
June) in the Aleutians, but this costly diversion
failed to dra w significant American forces away
from th e main body of the fleet at Midway.
Int elli g en ce the key
Superior int ell igence was key to the American
victory at Midway. Thanks to the remarkable
eff o rts in the weeks prior to the battle of a team
of codebreakers led by Commander Joseph
Rochefort , Nimitz knew exactly where and when
the Japanese would attack. In contrast,
Yamamot o sent his forces into battle thinking the
Yorktown had been sunk at Coral Sea, and confu-
sio n over th e number of American carriers he wa s
facing pl agued Nagu mo throughout the batt le. US NavySBD
Ultimately, faced with th e dual obj ecti ves of Dauntlessdive
bombers fly over a
attac king Mid way and destroying th e Americ an burningJapanese
fleet , Nagumo lost valuable tim e deliberating ship during the
over w hether and when to arm his plane s with at tack on the
Japanese fleet off
bombs or torpedoes; the fatal strike s against the
Midway, 4-6 June
Akagi, Kaga and Soryu occurred when the trio 1942.
we re especially vulnerable because of such hesi-
tation. Yamamoto's chief of staff, Vice Admiral
Matome Ugaki, blamed the defeat on arrogance,
saying, 'we had become conceited because of
past success'.
Consequences
The battle of Midway, coming just six months
after Pearl Harbor, was the turning point of the
Pacific theatre of World War II. Yamamoto failed
to deliver the knockout blow again st the US
Pacific Fleet, denying Japan the short war it so
desperately needed. The industrial might of the
United States soon turned the tide: during the
years 1942-45 Japanese shipyards completed 1
battleship, 10 carrier s, 5 cruisers, 61 destroyers
and 121 submarines, wh ile Amer ican shipyards
completed 8 battleships, 20 fleet and 82 escort
carriers, 48 cru isers, 354 destroyers and 203 sub-
marines . Against mounti ng odds, the Japanese
navy went down fighting, leaving few larger units
to surrender to the Allies. By the end of the war
Japanese naval deaths alone numbered 300,386,
just a few thousand less than the total figure for
all branches of the United States armed forces on
all fronts. In lives lost as well as in tonnage of
material destroyed, no other defeated navy ever
suffered destruction on such a scale.
263

Battle of the Atlantic
Date: 1940-43 Location: Atlantic Ocean
The only thing tha t ever really fri ghtened m e du ring the war was the U-bo at peri/.
W INSTON C HURCHILL, THE SECOND WORLDWAR, 1950
uring World War II Britain perhap s came
D closest to defeat not in th e skies over
southern England in 1940 (see Battle of
Britain p. 245), but in the oceanic wastes of th e
Atlant ic during 1940-41 . That winter, German U-
boats att empted to enforce a blockade of Britain
by exact ing a cripp ling toll of Allied merchant
shipp ing, wi th the ult imat e aim of forcing th e
Briti sh out of the war wi thout direct invasion.
Trade defence war
The Batt le of the Atlantic was in essence a cam-
paign centr ed around th e Allies' efforts to move
resources predom inant ly into and out of t he
A destroyer (m e Brit ish Islesvia th e Atlanti c shippi ng lanes, relying
smalle r ship a/one in particular on th e 3,000 ocean-go ing vessels
in tn e rear, righ t)
of th e British merchant navy. The Germans
shep herds
attem pted to prevent th is movement byemploy-
freightersacross
the At /an ricin a ing surface naval units, such as the Bismarck , the
convoy duringthe
German air force and, most importantly of all,
Battte oitbe
Atloruk: (June their U-boat (or submarine ) fleet. To combat th is,
1943). the Allies deployed a host of defen sive forc es to
264
J
S A TT L E OF TH E ATL AN TIC 63
maintain Britain's maritime links wit h th e outside
world, ranging from th e Royal Navy, Royal Cana-
dian Navy and US Navy, to air assets like RAF
Coastal Command.
The camp aign wasalso shaped significa ntly by
a sophisticated intelligence war, on th e Allied
side famou sly based at Bletchley Park in England.
In thi s area of the battle th e British held a
considerable advantage, fo r th ey were able to
compromise the security of the Enigma encoding
machines, used extensively by the German mili-
tary comm unicati ons and an essential part of
U-boat operations. Intelligence derived from
such sources was known as Ultra, t hough the
process by which it was gleaned remained a
closely guarded secret thro ughout the war and
for many years afterwards. Indeed, despite some early successes followi ng tactics and operational methods. In order to Sig hting the
The U-boats of the Battle of the Atlantic were the outbreak of war in 1939, the U-boat menace avoid detec tion by asdic, U-boats began attack- Targ et . A 1943
warereo/aur by
still effectively submersible torpedo boats rather did indeed appear to be under control by 1940. ing on the surface and at night, where thei r low Georg es 5ch reibe~
tha n true submarines, only being capable of low silhouettes would be much harder to spot. In
underwater speeds and requiring large amounts The 1940-4 1 campa ign: the first Happy Time addi tion, in an effort to swamp t he stretche d
of ti me on the surface to recharge diesel batte ries However, a number of factors pl unge d Britain escort defences attached to each convoy , the U-
and reple nish air supplies. U-boats subme rged into a severe trade defence crisis by th e autu mn boats attacked in grou ps, know n as 'wolfpacks'.
only to preve nt detect ion for, once forced under- of that year. Firstly, following the fall of France in As soon as a convoy was located by the Germans
water, speed fell away from around 17 knots to June, U-boats began to operate from French - either by aircraft, individual u -boats , or from
less than 10, and the ability to prosecute attacks Atlantic ports, significantly cutting down their intelligence derived from intercepts and code
even on slow merchant shipping greatly receded. travelling time to and from the marit ime breaking - Donitz, fro m his base in Europe, would
With the advent of convoying in 1917, approaches to the British Isles. This allowed them direct wolfpacks towards the target, often result-
whereby the Allies began to group the ir mer- to spend much more time on station , searching ing in drawn-out battles that could last for days.
chant ships together and protect them with naval for merchant shipp ing . Secondly, Allied resources By t~e autumn and w inter of 1940/41, mer-
escorts and aircraft , and th e later development of were stretched to near breaking point by t he chant shipping losses were rocketin g out of
underwater dete ctio n equipment such asasdic or various mili tary disasters t hat befell Britain in control , thoug h debate continues asto how close
sonar, the threat of the u-boat appeared to be at 1940, there being shortages of naval escorts, air- to the brink Britain actually came. The period ,
an end by the late 1930s. This was certainly the craft and techn ical equ ipment such as radar and nevertheless, became known to the U-boat fleet
opinion of the Royal Navy, and was also a view asdic. Finally, the German U-boat fleet , under the as th e Happy Time, such was the ir success.
held by some in the German Kriegsmarine (Navy). direction of Karl Donitz, fully embraced new However, a series of counter-measures was
265
 63 MODERN TIMES

rapidly introduced by th e Allies to meet th e canswould be ill-prepared for the complexit ies of
challenge. The number of escorts was slowly a modern anti -submarine campaign, and com-
increased; the level of radar support allocated to mitted some of his best crews to patrol just off the
convoys improved, thus largely countering the American eastern seaboard in searchof easyprey.
U-boat tact ics of surface night attacks; air cover Their success was staggering, precipitating a
around Britain and out into the Atlantic improved second Happy Time and, until the USNavy even-
conside rably; and intelligence provided to t he tually accepted that they were ready to employ
Admiralty and RAF Coastal Command was convoys and other counter-mea sures, Allied mer -
boosted by the increasing efficiency of Ultra chantmen losses we re prohibitive. Many have
informat ion. Indeed, for phases of the campaign, argued that th e US Navy was far too un willing to
the Allies were able to reroute convoys around listen to Brit ish advice or to adapt its operati ng
congregat ing wolfpacks, tha nks to Ultra. To com- practices to the realit ies of th e campaign unfold-
po und matters for the Germans, U-boats began ing before t hem. Howev er, new measures, tact ics
to be redire cted to the Mediterra nean to aid th e and equipment were eventually int roduced and
Italian war effort. By th e late summer of 194 1, the lossesonce again brought under control.
th ough Briti sh merchant shipping losses contin- in the mid-Atlantic, as far as possib le from th e the mid-At lantic air gap, thus provid ing continu- Above le ft The
ued to be high, the y were at least manageable. The 1942-43 campaign scourge of Allied air power. Donitz also had ous air cover acrossth e ocean. That it too k a crisis American artist
GeorgesSchreiber
By th e summer of 1942 th e Allies believed th at increasing numbers of U-boats available, and his as deep as that of th e previous winter to prompt depicts the action
Operation Drumroll: the second Happy Time they were beginning to win th e battl e, but th ey planner s argued that a period of sustained Allied high command to accept the need to allo- belaw decksan a
The campaign changed yet again w it h the entry were thrown into further crisisand, as wi th Oper- success against th e Brit ish cou ld well drive them cate enough suitable aircraft to close th e air gap is submarinebefore
of the USAinto th e war in Decemb er 1941 . Donitz ation Drum roll, it was again in part self-inflicted. a torpedo is
out of th e war. German effort s were further aided both remarkable and baffling. With this measure,
launched in Stand
and his staff correctly identi fied that the Ameri - Donitz's U-boats were predom inantly op erating by th e failu re of Ultra intelligence for a substanti al however, and th e increasing qual ity and qu antity by to Fire, 1943.
part of 1942, though of course Donitz and hisstaff of surface escort s, u-boat losses soared, mer-
Above right
were unaware of t his. chant ship sinkings fell away, and Donitz was
Coast Guardsmen
Allied losses increased dramaticall y, especially forced to wi thdraw his fo rces. The Battle of th e on the deck ofthe
o in the w inter of 194 2/4 3, but by th e spring of 194 3 Atlantic was over. USCoast Guard
• the battle had finally turned decisively in th eir CUller Spencer
• favou r. They had regained t he initi ativ e in the Consequences
watch the
explosion of Q
intelligence war by breaking into Enigma once With victory in th e Atlant ic, the Allies were free to depth charge that
o again and, more im porta ntly, began dep loying increase t he bui ld-up of tro ops and equipment in blasted a Nazi U-

o eno ugh aircraft with sufficient endurance to close Britain preparatory to the liberation of Europe in
boar's hope of

o jI ' •
1944-45. Wit hout the defeat of the U-boat th reat,
breaking into the
centre ofa large
o
Allied merchant ~ . th is success woul d have been inconceivable.
Allied shipping losses were heavy at various
convoy. Sinking of
U-175, 17 April
shipssunk itt • 1943.
between Azores stag es of t he camp aign, but in tr uth it was only in
December 194 1 ;; A llies the winter of 1940/41 that Germany came close
and May 1943. The O Bermuda - US ZONEOF ;;
RESPONSI81UTY • Brit ish merchant navy (3,000), Royal Navy, Royal to victory. Even in 1942-43 when lossesrose dra-
crucial Qrea of the
campaign was the
itt 8 R1TISH ZONEOF Canadian Navy, United States Navy , RAFCoastal mati cally, at times even exceeding German
RESPONSIBlUTY Command
centralareaofthe targets, th ere was enough slack in the Allied ship-
Nart h Atkm t«: • 11,905,000 shipping tonn es & 2,000 aircraft lost; ping net work to weather the storm and, once the
Losses were 25,000 merchant sailors dead
heaviest here, but USAwas involved in the war, Allied shipping pro -
Atlanti c
onceaircover WQ S
O cean ., : Germans
duction was always likely to swamp any efforts of
applied across the ;; itt the German U-boat fleet. Losses on all sides were
wholeocean in the • German U-boat fleet
spring af 1943, the
heavy during the Battle of the Atlantic, but chill -
;; • Commanded by Karl Donitz
campaign was o 800 km ingly th e death rate of German U-boat crews
jI
I I
;; • 783 U-boats lost ; 28,000 men lost/dead
aver and theAllies o 6OO~iles approached 75 per cent, approximatel y 28,000
had wan.
being killed in some 800 or so U-boats.

266 267

Battle for Normandy
Date: 6 June-20 August 1944 Location : north coast of France
This day undescrible [sic] mortar fire and wood fighting. Many casualties.
Thank God I survived another day.
C PL G.E. H UGHES, 1ST H AMPSHIRES, DIARY ENTRY 12 J UNE 1944
n 6 June 1944 the Allies stormed ashore
O
ration that had gone into Operation Overlord .
on five beaches of Normandy in what is The liberation of France had begun , but some
still the largest amphibious operation hard fighting lay ahead.
ever mounted. With nearly 6,500 ships and over General Bernard Montgomery, commanding
Field Marshal 11,500 aircraft , 150,000 men landed at a cost of the Allied ground forces in Normandy, had an
Erwin Rommel 9,000 casualties. Only Omaha beach experienced overall plan. This was to draw the bulk of the
inspecting coastal
real problems, but these were largely overcome German armour onto the British and Canadians in
defences priorto
theinvasion of by nightfall on D-Day. It was a fitting tribute to the the east to enable the American s to break out in
Normandy. many months, even years, of plann ing and prepa- the west. Meanwhile, the US First Army under
General Omar Bradley was to seize the port of
Cherbourg . The invasion had taken the Germans
by surprise, and they were also well aware of the
Allies' overwhelming air supremacy. Thanks to
the Allied decept ion plans, they were not sure
whether the main landing was yet to come in the
Pas-de-Calais. Consequently, divisions deployed
elsewhere on the English Channel coast were not
immediately moved to Normandy. Those in other
part s of France found their progress to the battle
area impeded by the results of the pre-D-Day
Allied air offens ive against communications and
by th e activities of the French Resistance.
First steps inland
The five individual beachheads were finally linked
up on 13 June, but already the Allies were
pushing inland. Bayeux, a D-Day target, was liber -
ated on 7 June, but efforts to break int o Caen, th e
regional capital and another objective, stalled in
the face of bitter German resistance. Indeed, the
German s were desperately trying to driv e the
British and Canadians back to the beaches wit h
an armo ured counter-attac k, but th e slow arrival
of Panzer divi sions and th e di srupti on caused by
Allied artillery and naval gunfire meant that th ey
268
I
L
could do little more than temporarily halt the
Allied advance. Matters were made worse on 10
June when the headquarters of Panzer Group
West - coordinating armoured offensive opera-
tions - was struck by Allied bombers , killing most
of the staff.
The Germans continued to frustrate Mont-
gomery's efforts to seize Caen, but a significant
part of the problem lay in the nature of the Nor-
mandy terrain. Much of this bocage consisted of
small fields enclosed by hedge -topped banks and
with narrow twisting roads, a claustrophobic
arena unsuitable for both tanks and attack. But
such was the Allied pressure that the Germans
found themselves having to commit their Panzer
divisions to line holding, and were unable to
mount a concerted counter-attack. So concerned
were Gerd von Runstedt, the theatre commander,
and Erwin Rommel. his subordinate and head of
Army Group B, that they persuaded Hitler to come
and see for himself. They pleaded for infantry
BATTLE FOR NORMAND Y 64
reinforcements and to be allowed to withdraw
out of range of Allied naval gunfire. While Hitler
reassured them that reinforcements were being
sent, he refused to countenance any withdrawals.
The day after Hitler 's conference with his
commanders, 18 June, the Americans succeeded
in cutting the Cotentin Peninsula.Turninq north,
they made for Cherbourg , which Hitler had
ordered to be defended to the last. In the event,
the garrison surrendered on 28 June and the
Allies now had a sizeable port, although German
damage to the docks would prevent their use
for several weeks. In the meantime, the Allies had
to continue to rely on the Mulberry artificial har-
bour s constructed off the original landing
beaches. Mulberry A supporting the American
sector was seriously damaged in a storm from 19
to 21 June, which forced Montgomery to delay
another attack to capture Caen. Operation Epsom
was designed to seize the high ground south of
the city through another thrust from the west.
Generals
Eisenhawer (left)
and Montgomery
(right) watching
manoeuvres in
Britain, early 1944.
Despite their
rigoroustraining,
theAllied troops
were iff prepared
for thedifficulties
of fighting in the
Normandy
bocage.
269
64 MO D ERN TIM E5 64

After a promising start, it became bogged down A British Churchill

in the bocage and was halted after facing resolute
German counter-attacks.
Towards the break-out
Undeterred by the failure of Epsom, on 30 June
Mon tgomery announced his strategy for the
break-out. While the British and Canadians con-
ti nued to tie down as much German armour as
possibl e, the Americans woul d advance sout h-
wards and eastwards so as to trap the German
forces as the y wi t hdrew fro m Normandy. In th e
meanti me, th e pressure in the Caen area was
maintained. Aft er a prelimina ry atta ck by the
Canadians to seize Carpiquet airfield west of the
city, the main assault was launch ed on 8 July,
preceded by an attack by RAF Bomber Command
and an intense artillery barrage, reducing much
of Caen to rubble . The British troops entered and
fought their way to the River Odon , but the
Germans had blown the bridges and were thus
able to cling onto th e sout hern part of the city.
The American s, too, began to push sout hwards,
their main objective the commun ications centre
at St La. They found them selves advancing
through some of th e worst of the bocage and
progress was slow and costly in terms of casual-
ties. Confidence among the Allies began to flag .
But th e German swere being pressed to break-
ing point, with Hitler remaining adamantly
opposed to any w it hdrawals.Von Rundstedt was
sacked at the beginning of July and replaced by
Gunther von Kluge, w hose initial confidence was
soon shaken by Rommel's warning that only
10,000 men had arrived to make good th e
120,000 casualti es since D-Day. The prosp ects of
the situation improving we re slim in view of a
major Russianoffensive which wasth reatening to
destroy th e German Army Group Centre (see
Operation Bagration p. 273). Indeed, the Allies
were comfortably winning th e reinforcement race.
Montgomery, how ever, now came under pres-
sure from both Prime Minister Winston Churchil l
and Supreme Allied Commander Dwight D.
Eisenhower. Unfazed by rumours of his imminent
dismissal, Montgomery approved a plan pro-
posed by General Mil es Dempsey, command ing
the Brit ish Second Army, for an armoured assault
in the better tan k country east of Caen. Dempsey
believed that th is cou ld be th e Allied break-out
and so did Eisenhower, w ho saw little pro spect of
an early decisive blow in the bocage confrontin g
ta nk breasts a
typical Norm andy
bank. This exposed
its relatively th inly
armoured belly to
Germananti-tank
guns.
the Americans. Montgomery, however, saw it
mor e as a final effort to waylay the German
armour in the British sector, allowing an American
break-out in St La.
Operation Goodwood was launch ed on 18
July, th e day afte r Rommel had been severely
wounded, preceded by another massive RAF
carpet bombing attack. Three Brit ish armour ed
divisions led th e main attac k and made good
early prog ress against th e benumbed defence.
But the Germans recovered quick ly and deplo yed
tanks to the Bou rquebu s ridge, which dom inated

6-12June 12 June-20 Augus t

Eng l ; ;/- (
Sh C hanne l Cotentin
~~ OPERATION OVERLORD6 June Pasde Calais Peninsula Eng li Sh Ch
annel l '\.Havre
• Cherbourg
Omar
Bradley
Berna rd
Montgomery Miles
•'--- ---,
(US) (British) Dempsey se ine ~.

- -.------
Cotent in USMulberry harbour

Above ri g h t
A British
Peninsula
Vologne se
82 (Airbo rne) " "
J
(Briti sh)
Ba ie de /0 Seine
LeHavre
• "-18 June ~ ..
destroyed 19-21 June

St Laurentsur Mer
•
Trouville
101 (Airbo rne) "- seine R.
infantryman While the
6 June ..,.. 6 (Airbo rne - British) Bayeux . Americans cleared
during the bi tter 6June • ) : - ; : : :TION
/
battles to secure 3 July < Carpiquet EPSOM the Cotenrin
Trouville '> .....-----t.!v/, Peninsula , the
Caen in July 1944. l.essay '(' I /' . ' I 24-30June

'!~!t i j
:>7
, .... -_-,2~-!i'b: ( ~ael)""
~n assault aJuly
British and
Right Once the jJ St Lo..... - __-
." ~ c/" Rommel
Canadiansin the
east fo ught to save
Aflies wereashore
~e~say I 20JUI~
~ GOODWOOD
N
N \ OPERATION
C tl'"/ J) OPERATION Caen, aiming to tie
in Normandy, their
first task was to
linkup the
beachheads and
t
0
)

20km
I
Stlo ·
t
0
I """
COBRA
25 July

20km
OPERATION BLUECOAT
30 July
aumont _ cr

OPERATION
18July
dawn the German
armour to enable
the Americans to
I I
Caumont TOTALIZE breakout
begin the advance 0 15miles 0 to Avranches 15 miles 8 August • Falaise 20 August
inland. southwards.

270 271
64 MOD E RN TIM E S

COMBATANTS

Allies
• Brit ish 21st Arm y Group; US 12th Army Grou p:
c. 900,000 men (as at 25 July)
• Command ed by Field Marshal Bernard
Montg omery
• 45,000 killed, 173,000 wounded or missing
Germans
• German Army Group B: c. 500,000 men (as at 25
July)
• Commanded by Field Marshal Erw in Romm el;
Field Mar shal Guenther von Kluge (fro m 17 July );
Field Marshal Walt er Mod el (fro m 17 Augu st)
• 30,000 kill ed, 210,000 m issing /captured, 80,000
wound ed
US infanrryon the th e axis of advance. The Brit ish were brought to a attack th e American flank and restore the situa-
assault during the halt, with a heavy loss in tanks, and th unde r- tion. Four Pa nzer divisions t herefore caught t he
break -out from 5t
storms th en forced an end to the ope ration . Americans by surp rise in the Mortain area on t he
L6 at th e end of
July 1944. The man night of 6-7 August, but swarms of Allied fighter-
in the foreground The break-out bombers soon stopped the attack in itstracks.
isaboutto firea
Postponed for five days by bad weather , Bradley's On the following night the newly created
riflegrenade.
break-o ut from St L6 - Operat ion Cobra - went Canadian First Army launched an attack, Opera-
Operation Bagration
Date: 22 June 1944 Locati on: Belorussia
Ninth Army stands on the eve ofanother battle,
the scale and duration ofwhich can only be surmised.
GE RMAN N INTH A RMY W AR D IARY ENTRY, 22 J UNE 1944
n 1 May 1944 Stalin informed the senior operati ons. In the far north the Russians were to
O members of his staff, the Stavka, of his
intentions for th e summer. By thi s time
th e Russians had lib erated much of the ir hom e-
mount an attack to force Germany's ally Finland
out of th e war and to prevent th e German Army
Group Nort h fro m go ing to th e aide of its south -
land which had been under German occupati on. ern neighbour once Operation Bagration, as the
In th e north they had closed up to the borde rs Beloru ssian offen sive was codenam ed, was
wit h Estonia and Latvia, while in the south th ey launched. Much effort was also to be put into
had recaptu red Ukraine and were beginning to making th e German s believe that th e main Soviettankson the
rampage. By 1944
t hreaten Hungary and Romania. Only in the assa ult would be in th e far south and directed at
the Russians had
centre di d a significant portion of Russian terri- Romania and Hungary. developed highly
tory remain in German hands. It was Stalin's On th e German side, Field Marshal Ernst Busch, ettective assoult
command ing Army Group Centre, became ever tacticsbasedon
primary object to liberate Belorussia, w hich was
deep penetration
held by t he German Army Group Cent re. The mor e convinced that the Russianswere preparing
o f the enemy's
offensive was to be launched in June to coincide for an offe nsive against him . He was also well fron t.

ahead on 25 July, and within a few days the
German resistance was beginning to crumble.
Matters were not helped by von Kluge's belief
that the main break-out would be in the British
sector and his reluctance to swit ch Panzer
divisions to the west. Furthermore, Operation
Bluecoat, a Brit ish attack launched on 30 July
close to the boundary with the Americans, was
designed to act as a swinging door that would
shut in the face of the German tanks.
On t hat same day, 30 July, the Americans
entered Avranches and von Kluge was forced to
admit that his left flank had collapsed. A new
force, George S. Patton's USThird Army, had been
landed during th e previou stwo weeks and its role
was to explo it the break-out. Patton 's armour-
heavy force passed th rough Avranches and then
swung west into Brittany, south towards Nantes
and Angers, and east to wards Le Mans. Vo n Kluge
realized that the game wasnow up and wanted to
wi t hdraw to the Seine, but Hitler insisted that he
tion Totalize, towards Fala ise, the object being to wi t h the Western Allied landin gs in Normandy.
trap the German Fifth Panzerand Seventh Armies Much em phasis was to be placed on decept ion
in conjunction with Patton's army. While Totalize
did not actually reach Falaise itself, the German
forces in Normandy were becoming progres-
sively bottled up, but pressure from Hitler to
counter-attack continued .
The Canadians resumed the ir advance and
entered Falaise on 17 Aug ust, by which time
Patt on's men had reached Argentan, leaving a
corridor of just 19 km (12 miles) through which
the Germans could escape. On the same day
Walter Model arrived to take over from the sacked
von Kluge, and only now we re the German forces
allowe d to withdra w. Those who were able
st reamed back across the Seine, leaving 10,000
dead and 50,000 prisoners in the pocket, w hich
was fin ally sealed on 20 August. With furth er
Allied forces having landed in the south of France
on 15 Augu st, the liberation of the remai nder of
th e country could now begin .

272
 6S M O DERN T IME S
KAAEUAN ARMY aware that his forces were holding a huge salient
Hein richs
based on Minsk and had been forced to transfer
troop s to Arm y Group North Ukraine to the south
and w here Hitl er and others believed th at th e
main blo w would fall. This had left his defences
KARELIAN
FRONT
very st retched, but his request to sho rten his line
by withdrawing to the River Berezina was
rejected by Hitler. Busch was furth er frustrated by
the fact that the Russians enjoyed air superiority,
which inhibited his air reconna issance, and in the
days before the assault the Russians imposed
3 RO BALIK FRONT
strict radio silence, deny ing him another inte lli-
gence source.
2 ND BALT1C FRONT
Bag ration is la u nch ed
1ST BAlTICFRONT
At dawn on 22 June 1944, the third anniversary of
the German invasion of Russia, and after a short
but intense bombardment, the 1st Baltic Front
attacked north of Vitebsk. It took the Germans by
surprise and by nightfall the Russians had pene-
trated to a depth of over 11 km (7 miles). The
following day th e 3rd Belorussian Front atta cked
south of Vitebs k, putting the city in danger of
being cut off, and the 2nd Belorussian Front also
attac ked in th e Orsha area, but made little
progress. On 24 June the 1st Belorussian Front
j oined in, striking the southern part of th e salient.
Faced with these multiple threats, Busch
pleaded to be allowed to withdraw, but only
grudgingly did Hitler relent and allow Third
Panzer Army in the north to do so, although he
ordered part of it to continue to hold Vitebsk,
which fell within a couple of days.The w it hdrawal
came too late, however. By 28 June Third Panzer
Army had been shatt ered, while Fourth Army
further south was desperatel y try ing to get back
to Minsk befor e being trapped, a fat e which had
already befallen Ninth Army. In short, Arm y
Group Centre was being torn apart, not helped by
........- Russian advance part isan attacks on its communication s.
Hitler, aghast at what was happen ing ,
Russian advanceline 10July replaced Busch with Walter Model, who was com-
Russian front line31 August manding Army Group North Ukraine. He also
sacked Georg Lindemann, who was in charge of
Black Sea Thesummer 1944 offensives drovetheGermans out ofRussia
and placed Germany itselfunder threat.
274
-_....I COMBATANTS "---__.
Russians
• 2,330,000 men: Russian 1st Baltic Front and
1st. 2nd , 3rd Belorussian Fronts
• Commanded by Marshal Georqi Zhukov
• 17B,OOO killed and captured; 587,000 wounded
and sick
Germans
• 500,000 men : German Army Group Centre
• Commanded by Field Marshal Ernst Busch (unt il
3 July), then Field Marshal Walter Model
• 250,000 killed, wounded and missing
Army Group North and wanted to carry out with-
drawals because of the developing threat to the
southern part of his sector. Worse was to come.
The Russians succeeded in surrounding much of
Fourth Army and entered Minsk on 7 July. Only
the wi ngs of Army Group Centre retained any
cohesion . Six days later, the 1st Ukrainian and 1st
Belor ussian Fronts began to attac k the northern
sector of Arm y Group North Ukraine, intending to
separate it from its desperately struggling neigh -
bour. They created a pocket in the Brody area,
which resulted in the loss of another 42,000
German troops.
On into Poland
As Army Group Centre continu ed to disintegrate,
elements of Ivan Chernyakovsky's 3rd Belorussian
Front reached Poland's 1939 eastern bord er on
t he River Bug. This occur red on 20 July, the same
day th at a bomb exploded dur ing a conference
Hitl er was holding at his Rastenburg HQ in East
Prussia.Three days later, th e 1st Belorussian Front
liberated Lublin and the exterminat ion camp at
Maidenek, and the northern Russian fronts
increased the pressure by attacks against Army
Group North. Hitler demanded that bot h Army
Groups hold their ground, despite the liberation
of more cities around them .
Yet, after an advance of 300 km (190 miles), the
Russians were beginning to outstrip the ir sup-
plies and their progress began to slow. This
OP ERATION BAGRATION 6S
enabled Model to restore some order and even Soviet infa ntry
mount local counter-attacks. He could not, stormpasta
knocked-aut
however, stop the 3rd Belorussian Front from PzKw VPanther
swinging northwestwards towards the Latvian during their
Baltic port of Riga and threatening to cut off the advancetowards
theRiver Vistu/a.
whole of Army Group North. As July came to an
end, the peopl e living on the eastern outskirts of
Warsaw, the Polish capital , could hear the sounds
of battle in the distance and began to believe that
liberation from th e Nazi yoke was finally at hand .
Indeed, on 29 July a Russian-sponsored Polish
radio station broadcast a call to arms. But the
fighting the Poles could hear east of the Vistula
was in fact the 1st Belorussian Front facing fierce
counter-attacks by three Panzer divisions . It was
a clear sign that the Russian offensive had run
out of momentum and that the Germans were
recovering. Consequently, on the night of 31July/
1 August the Russians went over to th e defensive,
but did not inform the Poles, who started a rebel-
lion in the capital the following day.
The Warsaw uprising w ould continue until
early October 1944, when the Germans crushed
the last vestig es of resistance. All th e time, the
Russian forces east of the Vistula remained mere
bystanders. Indeed, not until the fo llowing
January wo uld t hey finally liberate Warsaw. Yet
Operat ion Bagration itself represented a majo r
Russian victory and, with the Western Allie s
advancing towards Germany's western borders ,
the days of the Third Reich were no w numbered.
275
 THE AMERICAN AIR ATT AC K ON J AP AN 66

The American Air had nevert heless been rushed int o service and
consequently suffere d from a rang e of sho rtcom-
ings. Difficulties cent red upon th e inadequately
tested engi nes, inappropriate tra ining, th e

Attack on Japan weather and str ong prevailing tail wind s. Ea rly
results were disappo inti ng and, by the end of
1944, pressure had begun to bui ld on the U5AAF
Date: March-August 1945 Locat io n: sk ies above Japan to begin achi eving clear results.
In January 1945, General Curt is LeMay was
We were going after military targets. No point in slaughtering civilians appoi nted to shake up the bombing campaign
for the mere sake of slaughter....We knew we were going to kill a lot ofwomen and he st rove to pull th e flagging elements of his
and kids when we burned that to wn [Tokyo]. Had to be done. command together. His tireless and single-
MAJOR-GENERALCURTISLEMAY, 1965 minded approach improved morale, but results
remained poor.

Th e t orching of Japan
n the fina l year of World War II, U5 strategic air Japanese towns and killed hundredsof th ou sand s

I
fo rces embarked upon a sustai ned bombing of civilians in a series of ferociou s and arguably
campa ign against Japanese cities, one that bruta l firebombing raids. However, despit e th e
ult imatel y reached an int ensit y and level of best efforts of th e American air forces, th is cam-
destruct ion unmatched in warfare before or paign did not in itself force Japan's surrende r and
since, and culm inated in th e atomic bombing s of ultimately had to be supplemented by t he atomic
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In th e space of a few bom bings and a variety of oth er measures.
month s, in part icular March to August 1945, U5
20th Air Force systematically destroyed dozensof Planning and in itial raids
Long-term planning by the Unite d 5tates Army
Air Forces (U5AAF) for a bombing campaign
against Japan dated back to the 1930s when
specifications for a long-range four-engine strate-
gic bomber capable of operations across ocean ic
areas had been drawn up, a programme that
resulted in the B-29 5uperfort ress. American plan -
ners had also id entified that Japanese urban
areas, constructed with a high percentage of
combustible materials, wo uld be particularly sus-
cepti ble to firebom bing or incen diary raids.
An American However, durin g the early stages of the Pacific
im age anticipating War of 1941-45, bombi ng Japan itself seemed a
rheexpected
invasion ofJapan
remot e possibi lity , save the publicity stu nt of
in 1945. The Colon el Doolittle's raid on Tokyo in 1942. The ear-
invasion was liest long-ra nge efforts launched from China and
rende red
Indi a achieved little, and it was only wit h th e
unnecessary by rhe
surrende r ofJap an capture of th e Mariana Islands in June 1944 th at a
in August, shartly suitable base of operatio ns, wi thin range of
ottertheatomic Japan's major cities, fell into Ame rican hands. But
bambingsand tne
Soviet declaration the B-29, although hig hly advanced and clearly
of war. the most sophisticated bomber th en in existence,
From March onwards, however, the campa ign
was transformed. LeMay, determined to demon-
st rate what his forces cou ld achieve if allowed
(and based largely on his ow n judgment),
switched tactics. In essence he abandoned high -
alt itude, precision , daytime bombing and
adopted low -level, night-time, area-bombing
methods. This solved many tact ical and meteoro-
logi cal difficulties, reduced strain on the still -
temperamental engines of the B-29s and, as
Japanese air defences were mainly intended for
daytime operations, th e already limited resist-
ance virt ually di sappeared. Defensive armament
on the B-29s could then be reduced , allowing
even heavier payloads of bombs to be carried.
Initi al results wer e impressive, as was the use
of incendiaries(firebombs)which proved particu-
larly effective against Japan's combustible cities.
For Operat ion Meetinghouse, a raid conducted
against Tokyo in March 1945, LeMay's command
adopted the new tactics and the results were
both appalling and spectacular. The heavy use of
incendiaries helped to fashion a firestorm in
which tempera tures at the centre of the confla -
gration reached levels of great intensi ty, perhaps
approaching 1,000 degrees Celsius. As many as
100,000 peo ple died in th e attack, and over one
mill ion were rendered homeless.The USair crews
themselves were shocked and repu lsed by the
effects of the bombing, and employed oxygen
masks to fi lter out the stench of burning flesh.
Under the tutelage of LeMay a series of similar B-}9Super-
firebombing raids followed, with cities such as fartresses unload
their incendiaries
Nagoya, Kobe, Osaka, Yokohama and Kawasaki over Japan in June
receiving devastating treatment. Despite the 1945.
reservations of some senior commanders,
nothing was don e to control LeMay's pro -
gramme, reflect ing the inc reasing desperation of
the USto end the war.
Th e atomic bombin gs
However, the most controversial aspect of the air
campaign was the deployment of atom bombs
against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The first nuclear
weapons had been developed in the USA in the
Manhattan Project, and the first was dropped by
t he B-29 Enola Gay at 8.15 am on 6 August.
Perhaps 100,000 people died instantly and a new
age in warfare was upon the world. It had taken
doze ns of bomb ers many hours to devastate
Tokyo in March, compared to a few seconds and
one bomb at Hiroshima. A second atomic
bombi ng fo llowed three days later on the city of
Nagasaki, where another 35,000 were killed . In
both cities thousands more would die subse-
quently because of radiation sickness and many

276 277
66 M ODE RN T IM E S

--- ~ I R CAMPAIGN - - -

Huai-Hai
Theblockade of 500km
I
Japan in 1944-45
350 ;"iles
was a/most total
and consequently N XXI Bomber Command Operations
devasraring. The
nearcollapse in
Japaneseair and
t November 1944-August 1945

Sorties Bomb tonnage

Date: 1948-49 Locati on: modern Xuzhou, northeastern China
naval strenqtt:
from late 1944 Nov1944 175 459 You are to complete th e Huai-Hai campaign in two months, November and
aI/owed USforces Decembe r [7 948J. Rest and consolidate your forces next January [7 949J. From March to
Dec 1944 492 1,759
free reign around
1,1 80 July you will be fighting in coordination wi th Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaop ing to drive
theJapanese Jan 1945 454
islands. th e enemy to po ints along the Yangzi River, where he w ill dig in .By autumn your
Feb 1945 732 1,854
main forc e will probably be fi ghti ng to cross the Yangzi.
Mar1945 2,520 13,681
MAOZEDONG, THECONCEPTOFO PERAtees FOR THEH UAI-HAI CAMPAIGN, 11 Oa oBER1948
Apr 1945 3,246 16,383
May 1945 4,226 24,812
June 1945 5,243 32,524
Jul1945 6,168 42,733

~ ......... US carrier task force
(July 1945) AU91945 3,145 20,936
......- - - - US submarines atomic bomb
+ - - - t< USaircrah ... heavily bombed
more would suffer the after-effects for the rest it is the first use of nuclear weapons that trans-
of their lives. The prolonged effects of the air formed our understanding of war. Some
campaign and blockade fused with the atomic historians have argued that the atom bombs
bombings, the Soviet declaration of war on Japan were dropped not for military reasons but pre-
(8 August ) and increasing realism in the Japanese dominantly to wr ing concession out of the
military, to provoke surrender on 15 August . increasingly recalcitrant Soviet Union , and as
such should be seen as the first major act of the
Aftermath Cold War, as much as the last act of World War II.
Below A gruesome Because of the atomic bombings, the conven- But whe ther Japan was ready to surrender on
rem inder of th e tional air campaign against Japan has been rather terms acceptab le to t he Allies prior to the atomic
aitertnatb oitne over looked . Yet it is worth noting that more in i- bombi ngs is by no mean s clear and at best it was
aromic bombing
of Nagasaki, tially died in the Tokyo raid in March 1945 than in a combination of factors that forced Japan to
9 August 1945. either of the August atomic bombings. However, capitulate. In reality the atomic bombings
reflected the growing frustration and despera-
tion of the USA to end the war as qu ickly as
possible by w hatever means. The level of po litical
and diplomatic capital that flo wed from th is final
act of the air campaign against Japan wi ll,
however, continu e to be a matter of intense and
bitter debate.
Ultimately, although the strategic and political
effect iveness of the bombing campa ign remains
a matter of conjecture, there is little doubt that
th e raids - conventional and nuclear - threw up a
whol e host of po litical , moral and ethical con-
cerns over excessive civili an deaths, concerns
w hich still appl y to warfare toda y.
T
he ChineseCommunist Huai-Hai campaign 1927 through to the end of 1936. Follow ing the
in 1948-49 resulted in the Nationa list 9,OOO-km (6,OOO-m ile) 'long March' from south -
retreat to Taiwan and to the fo und ing of th e east China to the northwest base area of Yan'an,
People's Republic of China (PRC) on 1 October Mao Zedo ng (Mao Tse-t un g) took charge of th e
1949. The 'loss' of China proved that Soviet- CCP. In the December 1936 Xi'an Incident. Jiang
backed communism posed a serious danger, and was kidnapped by General Zhang Xueliang and
for many Americans marked the real beginning of forced to form a second united front with the
the Cold War. Soviet intervention, especially in Communists aimed at Japan.
denying the Nationalists access by sea to During the mid -1930s Mao's work On Pro-
Manchuria, proved instrumental in allowing the tracted War divided warfare into three stages.
Communists to move quickly from guerrilla Firstly, the Commun ists would be on the defen-
tactics to conventional warfare. sive using guerrilla tactics; secondly, they could
progress to mobile war; and in a third phase that
Background to the Chinese CivilWar wou ld spell victory for t he CCP, th e People's liber-
The Chinese Comm unist Party (CCP) was founded ation Army (PlA) could ado pt positional warfa re.
in July 1921. Afte r a brief per iod of cooperation At this time, Mao's st rategi c goal was to pu sh
w ith the Nationalist Party, t he CCP openly Japan ou t of China, fighting only as far as the Ya lu
oppos ed Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) from April River (t he border of Manchuria and Korea). In November 1948,
theMilitary
Commis sion of the
CPeCentral
Committee
decided to
establish the Iive-
member General
Front Comm ittee
to exerciseunified
leadership and
command over the
Central Plainsand
East China Field
Armies.Left to
right: 5uYu,Deng
Xiaoping,Liu
Bacheng,Chen Yi
and Tan Zhenlin.

279
 67 MODERN T IMES

COMBATANTS
~~ 22 NOV:
EastChina Field Armysurround
I
CENTRAL PLAINSFIELDA RMY
and defeat Nationalist 7th Army. ! lianyungang Communists
Liu Bocheng then linkwith li u Bocheng V- .
• Oongh ai •600,000 menfromCentralPlains Field Army
EAsT CHI..... F1aO ARMY (laterSecond Field Army)andEast ChinaField
Chen V((and Su Yu) Army(laterThirdField Army)
•Commanded by Secretary of the General
Communists . . - -
Front-line Committee,Deng Xiaoping
Nationalists -+-
•Unknown casualties

Nationalists
•Anestimated 500,000 men,supported bythe 7th
Group Armyof 70,000; 12thGroupArmyof
N
80,000; plus120,000 at Pangpu;and other

t
o
regional troops,totalling almost 800,000
•Commanded byGeneral LiuZhi
I • 550,000 killed, wounded and defected
o

The Comm unist As US forces advanced towards Japan, and of the military situation was the nonobservanc e in the field by the deputy commander Su Yu, thi stim e the Central Plains Field Army had already A mo dern
vietorya t Xuzhou by the Soviet Union of the [August 1945] sino- totalled 600.000 men. Deng Xiaoping was surro unded the Nationalist 12th Army between reconstruction
with the end of the war in sight, the PLA opened
was the decisive pa inr ing ofthe
an anti-Japanese offens ive. Mao's real goal was to sovietTreaty of Friendship and Allian ce: appointed Secretary of the General Front-lin e th e Hui and Guo rivers so ut hwest of su xian.Then. battle, which
batrleaftheCivif
War.With the invade Manchuria in preparation for the final Chinese Commun ist authors und erst ate Soviet Committee.which included Liu Bocheng.Chen Yi, o n 4 Decemb er, Su Yu's East China Field Army spell ed th e defeat
successofthe stage of the Communist-National ist civil w ar. help since it conflicts wi th Mao's claim th at th e Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin. caught up wi th and surrounded Du Yum ing's o f th e Nationalist
Huai -Hai forcesin mainland
Follow ing the Soviet entry into the war in early CCP wo n unaid ed. However. new archival docu - The fi nal concept of th e Huai-Hai campaign thre e arm ies.The 12th Army w as destroyed on 15
campaign, the China . By the artist
roadsouthwards August 1945, Soviet ships helped mov e the Com- ments reveal th e important role played by the w as to use the East China Field Arm y to enci rcle Decemb er and the last remnants of Du Yum ing's Wei Chuyu, this
to th e Yangzi River mun ists by sea and gave them arms from USSR. In 1958, Khrushche v even rem ind ed Mao. the 100.000-strong Nation alist 7th Army east of force fell on 10 January 1949. painting won a
was now open. People's Liberation
Japanese stockpiles.Once in Manchuria. the PLA •.. .it was advantageous for yo u that the Soviet Xuzhou. Meanwh ile. th e Central Plains Field Arm y In a campa ign lasting 63 days th e Communists
After the ArmyArt prizein
Communist forces used the Soviet-con trolled railway s to move Arm y was in Port Arthu r and Manch uria: w as to prevent any rescue attempt by the Nation - had wi ped ou t an estimated 550.000 Nationa list 19B3.
cro ssed the Yangzi quickly into th e metropolitan centres of alist forces west of Xuzhou. The pre-plann ed troop s and opened the road to the Yangzi River
they quickly too k Shenyanq.Chanqchun and Harbin . Th e Huai-Hai battle defection to th e Commu nists of two Nationa list valley. In Apr il 1949 th e Communists crossed the
Nanjingand
After Manchuria, the most im po rtant fi nal cam- divisions northea st of Xuzhou on 8 November Yangzi River and took Nanjing. By May, PLAforces
Shanghai, and
pu shed the Rene wa l ofthe Chinese Civil War paign s of th e civil w ar were cent red around also contributed greatly to the defeat of the 7th had moved into Shanghai and were push ing into
Nationaliseforces Immediat ely after Japan's surrender. the civil war Beiping (later Beijing) and Tianj in, known as the Army at Nianzhuang. some 48 km (30 miles) east southwestern China. Soon,Jiang and his loyal fol-
on to Taiwan.
bet ween Nationalists and Communists resumed. 'Ping-Jin' camp aign , and the 'Huai-Hai' campa ign of Xuzhou.After nearly t wo weeks of fighting, the lowe rs w ould be forced to retreat to th e island of
Amer ican representatives like George C.Marshall near Xuzhou in the northern half of Jiangsu and Nationalist army was destroyed on 22 November Ta iwan.
tried in vain to form a coalition government. but Anhui provinces, named after the Huai River and and its commander. Huang Baitao, killed .
by 1947 both we re fighting over the resource- Haizhou. If the PLA took Xuzhou, th e road to th e While the East China Field Army was fighting Conclusions
rich, industrialized province of Manchuria. Nationalist capital in Nanjing would op en. facili- east of Xuzhou, th e Central Plains Field Army Without assistance from the USSR. the CCP might
Nationalist efforts to consolidate their power tating the invasion of Shanghai and control over struck to th e south and east to seize the Tianjin- have faced a combined land -sea attack from the
in Manchuria were foiled by Soviet control over the vast agricultural resources of South China. Pukou Railway and cut off Xuzhou from the south . Nationalist Army and Navy. With access to
the Manchurian ports of Port Arthur and Dalian The Nationalists assembled five armie s and In late November. the Nationalists tried to Manchuria cut off by Soviet forces,the PLAmoved
(formerly Dairen ). In particular. the Nationalist troops from three pacification zones, totalling reestablish a link with Xuzho u by having their quickly to positiona l warfare. whic h played to its
Navy,which had over 800 vesselsand 40,000 men some 800.000 men. under the command of 2nd, 13th and 16th armies attack southward while strengths.The Huai-Hai victory not only helped to
by October 1948. was denied access. According General Liu Zhi.On the PLAside,the Central Plains their6th,8th and 12th armies moved to the north. establish Mao Zedong's reputation as the PRe's
to the China White Paper. the Nationalists com- Field Army (later Second Field Army) under Liu This plan failed and on 1 December the group unr ivalled leader. but later Deng Xiaoping also
plained bitterly in November 1948 that 'the most Bocheng, and the East China Field Army (lat er army in Xuzhou commanded by Du Yuming aban- came to power, in part due to leader ship qualities
fundamental factor in the general deterioration Third Field Army) under Chen Vi. but commanded doned the city and began moving southwest. By demonstrated at Huai-Hai.
I
280 281

J
 D IEN B IEN PHU 68

COMBATANTS
Dien Bien Phu Viet Minh
•49,500 troops; 20-24 10S-mm howitzers, 15-20
Date: 20 November 1953-7 May 1954 Location : northwestern Vietnam 7S-mm howitzers, 20120-mm mortars, at least
40 82-mm mortars,80Chinese-crewed 37-mm
anti-aircraft guns, 100 anti-aircraftmachine
To occupy Oien Bien Phu and accept battle th ere appeared to me as the unique solution, guns, 12- 16 six-tubeKatyusha rocket launchers
giving me the chance, with the forces that I had, to save Laos. •Commandedby General VA Nguyen Giap
GENERAL HENRI N AVARRE, A GONIEDEL'INOOCHfNE, 1953-54
• 22,900 casualties(7,900 killed, 15,000 wounded)

French
• 16,500 men; 4 l SS-mm howitzers, 2410S-mm

T
he batt le of Dien Bien Phu was one of the peo ple, fo r they failed t o grant gen uine authority
most im portant of t he entire 20th century, to the State of Viet nam.
signalli ng t he end of t he Indo-China War In early 1954 Viet Mi nh comma nder General
and of Western colo nial ism in Asia. Fighting Vo Nguyen Giap prepared to invade Laos. The
began in Decemb er 1946 between t he French French com mander in Indo-China, General Henri
and th e Viet namese nationalist s, the Viet Mi nh, Navarre, responded with Operation Castor: the
led by vet eran Commun ist Ho Chi Minh. Despite establishment of a base in t he village of Dien Bien
massive US aid to the French, the 1949 Commu- Phu in far no rth western Viet nam as a blocking
nist victory in Chin a had provided the Viet Minh position astride th e chief invasion route into
wit h a sanct uary and sup ply base.The French also northern Laos. He hoped to use this as bait to
lost th e battle fo r the 'hearts and m inds' of th e draw Viet Mi nh forces into battl e, then destroy
th em with superior arti llery and air power.
Located in an obscure valley some 321 km (200
miles) by air from Hanoi, Dien Bien Phu had a
small airstr ip. On 20 November 1953, 2,200 para-
t roo ps dropped into the valley, easily defeating
th e Viet Mi nh force t here. Navarre assumed that,
at most, Giap wo uld commit one division, but if
proved wrong he was still confident the garr ison
cou ld be evacuated. But to leave the Viet Min h in
TheFrench relied
almost entire/yon con trol ofthe high gro und surrou ndi ng t he base
airborneaid and wo uld be disastrous.
theirsupplies were
Colonel (promot ed to Brigadier General
severely reduced
by thedestruction during the battle) Christian de Castries com-
of their airstrip and manded French forces at Dien Bien Phu . These
planes. Henri were entirely dependent on air supply by some
Navarre, overall
French
75 C-47 Dakotas. The French could also call on 48
commander, hod B-26 and Privateer bombers, 112 Bearcat and
drastically Hellcat fighter-bombers, and a few helicopters.
underestimated
Around the French centra l command post in t he
the VietMinh
forces, whose village , de Castries ordered construction of a
persistent series of strong points: Beatrice, Gabrielle, Anne -
bombardment led
Marie, Dominique, Huguette, Francoise, Elaine
to the cap ture of
everyFrench and Isabelle.This last po st w as separat ed from the
strongpoint. others , 4.8 km (3 miles) to the south, and could
I
282
howitzers, 4 120-mm mortars
•Commanded by Colonel Christian Marie
Ferdinand de laCroix de Castries
• 20,000 casualties(2,242 killed, 3,71 1missing,
6,463 wounded, 6,500 prisoners, plusforces lost
in reliefoperations)
not only be easily cut off, but it also tied dow n a
th ird of the French forces. By mi d-Marc h 1954 the
French had nearly 11,000 me n in th e valley, a
third of t hem ethn ic Vietn amese. Ulti mate ly th ey
com mitted 16,544 men there. Forti ficati on s were
inadequate, the French assumi ng tha t t heir
art illery cou ld qui ckly knock out any enemy
artillery,
Giap accepted the challenge, but there was
po litical pressure on him to do so. A d iplomatic
conference of th e great powers was set to beg in
in Geneva, and a major Viet Minh mi litary victory
might bring nego t iations to end the war. Giap
committed fo ur div isions to the effort, assem-
bling some 49,500 combat troops and 31,500
support personnel.
The battle
The siege opened on 13 March with a heavy Viet
Mi nh bombardment. Although t he French added
4,000 men during the battle, Giap more than
offset this wi th increases of his own and also
steadily improved his artil lery, Thousands of
porters literally dragged the guns there . Ult i-
mately the Viet Minh deployed more artillery
piecesand fired more rou nds than did the French.
On the very fi rst night of the siege, 13-14
March, th e Viet Minh took Beatr ice. Gabrielle fell Viet Minh soldiers
two days later. The Viet Minh also shelled th e advanceacross
Muong Thanh
airstrip, destroying or dr ivi ng its aircraft away and Bridgetowardsthe
knocking ou t its radio directio n beaco n. C-47s sti ll Frenchcentral
flew in supplies and took o ut wo unded, but at command post.
Muong Thanh was
great risk. The last fligh t in or ou t occurred on 27
thenome of the
March. Duri ng the battl e, t he Viet Minh shot village in tribal
down 48 French planesand destroyed another 16 Ta l. Dien Bien Phu
isVie rnamese for
on the gro und .
theFrench nameof
Heavy casualties fo rced Giap t o shift from 'Seat ofthe Border
costly hu man-wave tactics to classic siege County Prefecture'.
warfa re of t renches inching ever closer to the
French lines. The final assault occurred on 6 May
and t he last French t roops surrendered on the
evening of 7 May. A plan to rescue t he gar rison or
to breakout came too late,The Viet Minh immedi-
ately sent t heir 6,500 prisoners off on foot on an
800-km (500-mile) trek to prison camps, from
which fewer than half returned .
Afte rmath
The outcome of the battle allowed French politi-
cians to shift t he blame t o th e French Army fo r the
defeat in Indo-China and th us extricate France
from the war. The Geneva Conference did subse-
quently hammer out a sett lement for Indo -China,
but it proved to be on ly a truce.
283

J
 The Tet Offensive
Date: 30 January-24 February 1968 Location: Vietnam

With 1968, a new phase isstarting. Wehave reachedan important point when the end beginsto
come into view....the enemy's hopes arebankrupt.Withyoursupport we willgiveyou a success
that willimpact not only on South Viet-Nom but on everyemergingnation in the world.
ADDRESSBY GENERALWILLIAMWESTMORELANDTO THENATIONALPRESSCLUB,
WASHINGTON, D.C., 21 NOVEMBER19B7

he Communist Tet Offensive of January Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) troops were repeat -
BellUH-I 'Huey'
troop-carrying
helicopterslift ing
soldiers to the
combatzone
T 196B was a major turning po int in the
Viet nam War. Since Dien Bien Phu (see pre-
vious entry), fighti ng in Indo-China had resumed
edly battered by local Comm unist forces (Viet
Conq), Washington dispatc hed USgrou nd troops.
An increasingly bloody stalemate developed as
during the Tet in the late 1950s,t he United States defending t he the regular Communist army, the People's Army
Offensive. Each southern Republic of Vietnam (RVN) against a of Vietnam (PAVN), infil trated the south .
Huey could Comm unist insurgency directed by the northern Nonetheless, in November 1967 General
transport 05 many
assixfully-loaded Democra tic Republic of Vietnam (DRV).When the William Westmoreland, commander of the US
soldiers. poorly trained, ineffect ively-led Army of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV),

ret urned to the United States and praised th e
battlefield progress, even telling a reporter, 'I
hope th ey try someth ing , because we are looki ng
fo r a figh t.' In South Vietnam , meanwhile , as US
atte ntion was riveted on a series of border
engagements, PAVN and Viet Cong troops we re
preparing their largest mi litary operation to date .
PAVN Comm ander General Vo Nguyen Giap
plann ed to draw US fo rces away from the popu-
lated areas, then mount a gen eral military
offen sive to bring a popul ar uprising again st the
RVN government and t he Americans.
The DRV leadership selected th e Lunar New
Year celebrations of Tet, w hich had tradit iona lly
been a ceasefire. ARVN units were at low strength,
security was lax and even ARVN-uniformed guer-
rillas managed to trave l undetected.
Contrary to pop ular myth , the offe nsive did
not catch t he Americans complete ly by surprise.
A variety of sources indicated that PAVNN iet
Cong units were concentrating aroun d the cities.
On January 10 the commander of II Field Force,
Lieutenant General Frederick C. Weyand, con-
vinced Westmorela nd to pu ll add it ional US WoundedUS
combat batt alion s back around t he capital. Marines being
transponed to an
making 27 batta lions instead of the planned 14 in aid station on an
th e Saigon area. It was to be one of th e criti cal M-4Btonk during
decisions of th e war. thebattle for the
city of Hue.
Westmoreland 'schief of inte lligence , Brigadier
General Philip B. Davidson, did not believe th at
the Communists would risk alienat ing the peo ple
by attack ing during Tet. But his chief error was in
underestimating both the scale of the offens ive
and th e tenacity of th e Communists, who w ould
risk everything in a fig ht for the cit ies.
With tension mounting, Westmoreland tr ied
to conv ince RVN President Nguyen Van Thieu and
ARVN Chief of th e Joint General Staff General Cao
Van Vien to end the ceasefi re overTet. He secured
only a reducti on to 36 hour sand pledge of at least
50 per cent of ARVN duty troops on full alert .
The Tet Offensive
Early on 30 January 196B, PAVNN iet Cong forces
hit several locat ions in central South Vietnam, but
the bul k of the attacks began the next night.

284 285
69 M O D ERN T I M E S

V ...- " "" army

North '
Vietnamese
US Military Assistance Command Vietnam
(MAVC) & Army of the Republicof Vietnam
The Iraq War
I
) LAOS South China Sea (ARVN)
Date: 19 March - 14 Apr il 2003 Location: Iraq
• B5,000men(2Bl manoeuvre battalions, with
i overwhelming advantagesin tanksandother
',,- \~ t Co n g
armoured vehicles, artillery, fixedwing aircraft
andhelicopters)
Decisive combot in Iraq saw a maturing oijoint force operations in many ways.
Some capabilities reached new performance levels... .Our forces were able to achieve
gueriiTa't rce
•Commanded by General William Westmoreland their operational objectives by integrating ground manoeuvre, special operations,
TH AILAN D ) precision lethal fires, and non -lethal effects.
• MAVC: 1,829 killed, 7,746 dead, I I missing;
~
,
ARVN: 2,788dead, 8,299 wounded, 578 missing;
Vietnamesecivilians: c. 12,600 dead
GE NERAL T OMM Y F RANKS IN TESTIMONYTO THE US C ONGRESS, 9 JULY 2003

-......J'--" ,/
.( People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) & Viet Cong
''"'. ' 197 manoeuvre battalions(99PAVN and

98Viet Cong; afew PT-76tanks; some artillery
and I 22-mmrockets; noaircraft)
CA MB OD IA ~
..,~" • Commanded byGeneralVoNguyen Giap
•45,000 dead, 5,800 captured
munists made a large investment of resources.
Fighting was intense and house-to-house. In the
N 25 days it took USand South Vietnamese forces to
I
n Augus t 1990, d ictator of Iraq President
Saddam Hussein invaded and annexed
Kuwait, prompting US Presid ent George H. W.
Bush t o gat her a wo rldwide coalition against Iraq
and launch Operation Desert Storm on 17
January 1991 - a massive air attack followed by a
ground assault on 24 February th at liberated
Kuwait in o nly 100 hours . Left in power, Saddam
subsequently defied the United Nations by failing
to account for (and allegedly fail ing to destroy) all
Security Counci l resolution threatening force
unless Iraq made full disclosure of it s WMD and
calli ng on UN inspectors regu larly to report th eir
progress to the Security Cou ncil. The Bush ad min-
istratio n also posited a link between th e Iraqi
government and al-Qaeda (late r not proven).
Iraq claimed it had noth in g to hide, but the
inspectors reported only mixed success and the
Bush administration pushed for the use of force.
Following a coalition of France, Germany and

--' lS0km
!
t
I
retake Hue, half of the city was destroyed and
116,000 of 140,000 civ ilians were made homeless.
of his so-called 'weapo ns of mass destruction '
(WMD). Frustrated UN inspectors left Iraq, UN
economic sanctions continued and Britain and
Russia that blocked such a resolution in the UN,

100 miles the United States enforced no -fly zones for Iraqi
Aftermath
North Vietnamese forces _ The Tet Offensive was a major Communist mili - fixed-wing aircraft.
North Vietnamese attacks ---+- tary defeat. Although Allied losses were the
allied forces _ Th e new Bush adm in ist ration
heaviest of the war to date, PAVNNiet Cong
losses amounted to half of the force committed; US President George W. Bush, elected in 2000 ,
furthermore there had been no general rallying of adopted an increasingly tough attitude towards
The unexpected Communist forces struck 36 of 44 provincial the civilian population to the Communists. Iraq, particularly following the 11 September
timing and ferocity capitals, 5 of 6 autonomous cities, 64 of 242 Support for the RVN government grew as news 2001 al-Qaeda terrorist attacks against the World
ofthe Communis t
d istrict capitals and about 50 hamlets. They also arrived from Hue that the Communists had exe- Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in
assault shocke d
tn e Unit ed Stares, hit many military installations. including 23 air- cuted some 5,000 'enemiesof the people'. But t he Washington, D.C. After Afghanistan's Taliban
which barely fields, destroying 58 (and damaging 280) aircraft. RVN government also faced staggering prob- government refused Washing ton's dema nds that
mo noged to
In t he vita l area around Saigon, the Com mu- lems, particularly in caring for 627,000 newly it hand over members of al-Qaeda, especially its
garh er suitice rn
men in time. ni st s com mi tte d th e eq uivale nt of more than tw o hom eless people, and pacification had suffered a leade r Osama bin Laden, US forces invaded
Despite eventualty di vision s. Com munist sappers penet rated th e US serious blow. Afghan istan and overt hrew the Taliban.
defeoting the Presid ent Bush anno unced his int ent ion to A USAir borne
Embassy, blew up part of th e large Long Binh Most im porta nt ly, the American pub lic per-
Northern sold ier porachute s
Vietnameseforces, am munit ion storage d ump and capt ured all of ceived Tet as a defeat. The offensive came as a roo t out terrorism and punish th ose states tha t into northern Iraq .
the American Bien Hoa City. Most of the figh ti ng inside Saigon great shock and many shapers of pub lic opinion suppo rte d it, specifically mention in g an 'Axis of Securi ng cont rol in
public perceived was over in a matt er of days, save in the Chin ese now force fully objected t o the war . Before the Tet Evil' of Iraq, Iran and North Korea. The Unit ed thararea WQ S
Tetosodefeor madeeasier by
dist rict of Cho Lon. Offensive, Washing ton was trying to win the war States, supported by the British government
fath er than victory. wi despread
In t he former imperial capital of Hue, the Co m- mili tarily; afterwards it sought to find a way out. under Prime Min ister Tony Blair, secured a UN Kurdish support .

286 287
70 M O O ER N T IM E S
Bush and Blair decided to proceed virtu ally alone.
Bush secured a congressional mandate and
enjoyed solid US pub lic support. Increasingly,
Bush also d emand ed th at Saddam and his family
be removed from power in order to bring democ-
racy to Iraq. Later, when no WMDs were fo und,
Bush made this a chief j ustification for th e war.
An Allied bu ildup had been und erway for
some time in Kuwait und er US Army Cent ral
Command commander General Tommy Franks,
but, in th is war wit h Iraq, Saudi Arabia refused
the use of its basesand there was no broad coali-
tion of nations behind the United States. Some of
the Gulf states, notably Kuwait and Qatar, cooper -
ated , but Washington experienced a major
setback when th e Turkish government refu sed to
allow US fo rces to use its territory for a northern
front, a key component of t he USm ilitary plan.
Operation Iraqi Freedom
The war, du bbed Operation Iraqi Freedom, began
on t he nightof 19 March,just ho urs after the expi-
ration of Bush's ultimatum to Saddam Hussein.
The second nigh r Thiswas to be a hi-tech war of a new kind wit h the
ot tnetroq Wars aw bare m inimum of troops and a rapier-l ike ground
heavycoalition
approach, rather than th e sledgehammer of the
use of precision
previous Gulf War. Over succeeding nights,
m unition s it: and
ar ound the cicy of Baghdad was repeatedly struc k wi th cruise-
Baghdad, in wha r
missile attacks and air strikes by B-1 , B-2 and B-52
wasknownas the
'Shock and Awe' bombers aimed at key headquarters and
cam pa ign. command-and-control targets . Altogether the
288
T H E I R AO WAR 70
coalition flew some 41,404 sortie s dur ing th e war
r----.I COMBATANTS '------.
(93 per cent US), wh ile no Iraqi fixed-wing aircraft
took to the air. Of aerial m unitions employed, US and Coalition forces
I RA N
some 70 per cent were 'smart' (guided weapons) • Men: 466,985 US personnel deployed in the area
and 30 per cent we re 'dumb' (unguided). In 1991 of operations (actual deployment on the ground
was c. 130,000 in Kuwait); coali tion forces
only 10 per cent had been 'smart' weapons. included 42,987 British, 2,050 Australians and
On th e night of 22/23 March 2003, Allied air- 1BOPoies
craft landed in northern Iraq, ferrying men and Air. 1,663 USand 115 British fixed-wing airc raft;
nearly 400 USand British helicopters
supplies in to the Kurdi sh-controlle d zone and
Land: 1,000 main battle tan ks and 1,000 other
op enin g a nort hern front, not only agai nst th e armoured vehicle s
Iraqi Army but also against Ansar at-Islam, a mili - Sea: c. 150 ship s, including 47 USNavy major
surface combatants (5 US carrier battle g rou ps;
tant Islamic group wit h training facilities at Kalak
2 amphibious ta sk for ces; 12 sub marines; and
on th e Iranian borde r. This base was later many surface support shi ps); in all abo ut one
destroyed by US Special Forces and Kurdi sh third of the USNavy; Brit ish Navy task gro up of
troops. Air strikesalso occurred against th e north - 1 aircraft carrier, 1 helicopter carrier, 1 submarine
and amphibiou s sup po rt ships; 3 Austra lian sh ips
ern cities of Mosul and Kirkuk .
• Commanded by US Arm y General Tom my Franks SA UDI ARA BIA
Meanwh ile, a 100,OOO-man coalition ground
• 119 US and 31 Brit ish kill ed
force moved into Iraq from Kuwa it on th ree axes
o 300k m
to race th e 482 km (300 mi les) to Baghdad. In th e I
mo re sparsely populated west the 3rd Infantry
Iraq is o 150 :"iles
• Men: c. 400,000 troops of varying quality
Division, its 3rd Squadron leading , made the most
Air. some 255 combat aircraft, which were
rapid progress, w hile in the centre th e 1st Marine grounded during the conflict; perhaps 100
Expeditionary Force mo ved north th rough attack helicopters
Nasiriya and on to Najaf and Karbala. And on the Land: 1,000 surface-to-air missi les (SAMs); about western Iraq and, on th e nig ht of 26 March, 1,000
The Allies focused
2,400 major artillery weapons; some 6,000 anti- oncapturing
eastern part of th e front the British had the diffi - mem bers of the 173rd Airb orne Brigade dropped
aircraft guns; about 2,200 tanks (700 T-72s); and speatic areasand
cult task of securing the port of Umm Qasr and 3,700 other armoured vehicles into northern Iraq to work in conju nct ion w ith
key cities in Iraq.
Iraq's second largest city of Basra, wi t h its half Sea: no official navy lightly armed Kurdish forces against the key oil-
havingmustered
million, largely Shiite, population. • Commanded by President Sad dam Hussein produ ction cent re of Mosul. tbe support of a
A fierce sand storm on 25-26 March, logisti cal loo,OOO-srrong
The British 7th Armoured Brigad e covered the • over 2,400 kille d and 7,000 pri soners o f w ar
coalition. But
112 km (70 m iles) from the Iraq-Kuw ait bord er to problem s and the so-called 'Saddam Fedayeen' desp ite the success
the outskirt sof Basra in lit tle more than a day. The all delayed the move north. On 26 March the US of theirmission to
3rd Squadron , 7th Cavalry Regiment and other depose Saddam
Hussein, the
expected uprisi ng of th e Shia po pulation t here 3rd Infant ry Division (lD) eleme nts defeated an conflict provoked
did not occur, however, thanks to memories of Iraqi force near Najaf in t he largest battle of th e hugecontroversy
the abo rt ive and costly 1991 rebellion. So long as war thu sfar, killing about 4S0Iraqis. around rhe world
and sporked
Baath Party activists and 'Iedayeen' (irregulars With some unit s short of ammunition and
widespread unrest
ofte n in civilian clothes who attacked from civil- foo d, and with an advance of 320 km (200 mile s), among the Iraqi
ian vehicles using machine gu ns and rocket- a week into th e cam paign USforces we nt into an population.
propelled grenades) remained ent renched in the 'operational pause'. Saddam, meanwh ile, reposi-
city, th e Shiawo uld not rebel. tioned th e six elite Republican Guard division s
At Basra the Brit ish slow ly began infi ltrating around Baghd ad for a defence of th e capital. As
t heir ow n specialized units in and out of t he city, th e Baghd ad and Medina di visions moved to new
th en mo unting larger swift raids and, by April, th e position s south of the city, heavy coalit ion air
local popul ati on was helping to root out remain - attac k destroyed much of t heir equ ipment.
ing Baath ists. Meanwh ile, th e Allies had seized by On 3 April US forces reached th e outskirt s of
coup d e main the oil field sand key refineries north Baghdad and began securing th e int ernational
of Basra. US Special Forces secured airfie lds in airpo rt. By 5 April Baghdad was in effect und er a
289
70 M O DERN T I M ES
In oneof themost
memorable
images of the war,
a USsoldier
watches as a large
statue of President
Soddom Hussein is
toppled in the
centre of Baghdad
on 9 April 2003.
loose blockade, with the 3rd ID closing from the
southwest, the Marines from the southeast, and a
brigade of the 101 st Airborne Division from the
north. On that day a brigade of the 3rd ID pushed
through downtown Baghdad, inflict ing an esti-
mated 1,000 Iraqi casualt ies. Operating on th e
assumpt ion t hat war is more a test of will s tha n of
hardware, thi s strike showed that USforces could
move at will. On 6 and 7 April th e process was
repeated and, in a fierce firefight on the 6th , US
forces killed an estimated 2,000-3 ,000 Iraqi sol-
diers for only one of their own lost, and moved on
to occupy one of the presidential palaces.
On 7 April a coalition spokesman announced
that Iraq had only 19 tanks and 40 artillery pieces
left. Coalition forces held some 7,000 Iraqi paws.
The ring around the capital was now closed.
By 8 Apr il there was at least one USbrigad e in
Baghdad.The next day resistance collapsed in the
capital as Iraqi civilians, assisted by US Marines,
toppled a large statue of Saddam. There was still
fighting in parts of the city as diehard Saddam
loyalist s sniped at US troops, but Iraqi govern -
ment central command and control had
collapsed . On 10 April a small number of Kurdish
fighters , US Special Forces and the 173rd Air-
borne Brigade liberated Kirkuk. The next day,
Iraq' s third largest city of Mosul fell w hen the Iraqi
V Corps commander surrendered some 30,000
men. Apart from sporadic shoot ing in Baghdad
and massive looti ng there and elsewhere, the one
290
remaining centre of resistance was Saddam
Hussein's ancestral home ofTikrit.
On 12 April the 101 st Airborne relieved the
Marines and 3rd ID in Baghdad, allowing th em to
deploy northwest to Tikrit, wh ile th e 173rd Air-
borne Brigade took control of th e north ern oi l
fields from th e Kurdsso asto prevent any possibil-
ity of Turkish inte rvent ion. The batt le fo r Tikrit
failed to materialize, and on 14 April Allied forces
entered the city. That same day th e Pentagon
announced that major military operati ons in Iraq
were over; all that remained was mopping up .
Aftermath
Allied air power, the rapidity of the Allied ground
advance (t he longest in Marine Corps history ) and
th e ability of coalit ion troops to fight at night
were all important in coalit ion success. And
throughout, coaliti on fo rcesendeavoured to con -
vince the Iraqi peop le that they came asliberator s
rather th an conq uerors. But although th e coali-
tion had won the war, winning th e peace proved
more difficult than anti cipated. Providing security
and reestablishing public services proved major
obstacles, as the Bush adm inistration had given
little thought to, and had clearly underest imated
the difficulty of, post -war operations. Saddam
loyalists who mounted terrorist attacks to di s-
lodge the occup iers, animosit ies bet ween Shiite s
and Sunni Muslims, and radical clerics all thre at-
ened to undermine th e coalition milit ary victory.
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York. 1973)
Erickson, J.. TheRoad to Stalingrad (Lo nd on & New York. 1975)
Glantz , D, M. (ed.), From the Don to the Dnepr: Soviet Offensive
Operations December 1942-A ugust 1943(Londo n, 1990)
Goerlit z, W.. Paulusand Stalingrad (Londo n, 1963)
Kerr, W.. TheSecret of Stalingrad (New York, 1978; Londo n, 1979)
62 Midway
Bicheno, H.. Midwa y (Lond on, 200 1)
Fuchida , M. & Kkumiya , M., Midway: TheJapaneseStory (Lo ndo n,
2002)
Healy, M.. Mid way 1942: Turning Point in the Pacific (Oxfo rd, 1993)
295
..
FURTHER READING
Prange, G., et 0/.. Miracle At Midway (New Yo rk, 1982)
Ugaki, M., Fading Victory: TheDiary of AdmiralMatome Ugaki,
1941-1945, trans. M. Chihaya (Pitts burg h, 1991 )
63 Batt le o fthe Atlantic
Buckley, J.. TheRAF and TradeDefence 1919-1945 (Keele, 1995)
Hinsley, F. H.. Codebreokers: TheInside 5tory ofB letchley Park (Oxford,
1993)
M ilner, M., TheU-boot Hunters: TheRoyal Canadian Navy and the
OffensiveAgainst Germany'sSubmarines (Annapo lis, Maryland,
1994 )
Milner, M., TheBarrieof the Atlantic (Lo nd on, 2003 )
Terraine, J., Business in Great Waters:TheU-boat Wars 1916-1945
(Londo n, 1989 )
van der Vat, D., TheAtlantic Campaign (Lo ndon, 1988)
64 Battle for Normandy
Chandler, D. G. & Collins Jr, J. L.,TheD-Day Encyclopedia (Oxfo rd &
New York, 1994 )
D'Este, C , Decisionin Normandy (Lo ndon & New York , 1983 )
Keegan , J.. SixArmies in Normandy (Lo ndon & New York , 1982 )
Messenger, C , TheD-Day Atlas:Anatomy of the Normandy Campaign
(Lo ndon & New York , 2004 )
Weigley, R. F.. Eisenhower'sLieutenants: TheCampaigns ofFranceand
Germany 1944- 1945 (London & Bloomington, 1981)
Wilmot, C , TheStruggle for Europe (London & New York , 1952)
65 Operation Bag ration
Adair, p.. Hitler'sGreatestDefeat: TheCollapseof Army Group Centre,
June 1944 (Lo ndon, 1994 )
Erickson, J., TheRoad to Berlin (london & Boulder, Colorado, 1983 )
Niepold, G., TheBattle for White Russia: The Destruction of Army Group
Centre, June 1944 (london & Washington DC, 1987)
66 The American Air Attack on Japan
Alperovitz, G., TheDecision to Usethe Atom ic Bomb and the
Architecture of an American Myth (Lo ndo n, 1995 )
Crane, C c.. Bombs, Citiesand Civilians: American Air Strategy in World
War Two (Kansas, 1993)
Hansell, H.. Strategic Air War Against Japan (Maxw ell, Alabama , 1980 )
LeMay , C with Kantor, M., Mission with LeMay (New York, 1965 )
Schaffer, R., WingsofJ udgment, (New York, 1985 )
Sherry. M., TheRiseof American Ai, Power (New Haven . Connecticut.
1987 )
Werrell, K. p.. Blanketsof Fire: USBombersoverJapan during World War
Two, (Washington, 1996)
296
67 Huai-Hai
Bjorge, G.J., Moving the Enemy: Operat ional Art in theChinesePLA 's
Huai Hoi Campaign (Kansas, 2004 )
Chassin, L. M., The Communist Conquest of China: A History of the Civil
War, 194S- 1949(Cam b ridge, M A, 196S)
Dryer, E., China at War, 1901-1 949( Lo ndon, 1995 )
Jowett , P. 5., Chinese Civil War Armies 1911-4 9 (New York, 1997)
Levine. 5.1.. Anv il o(Vietory: The Communist Revolution in Manch uria,
1945-1948 (New Yo rk, 1987)
Morwood, W.. Duel for the Middle Kingdom: TheStruggle Between
Chiang Kai-shekand Mao Tse-rung for Control ofChina (New Yo rk,
1980)
Pepper,S., Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945- 1949
(Berkeley, 1978 )
Westad, O. A.. Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and
the Origins of the ChineseCivil War, 1944-1946 (New Yor k, 1993)
Yick, J. K. 5., Making Urban Revolution in China: TheCCP-GMD Struggle
for Beijing-Tianjin. 1945- 1949 (Arm onk, NY, 1995)
68 Dien Bien Phu
Fall, B. B., Hell in a VerySmall Place: TheSiegeofDienbienphu
(Philadelp hia, 1966)
Jules, R.. TheBattle ofDienbienphu (New York , 1965 )
Simpson, H. R., Dien Bien Phu: TheEpicBarrieAmerica Forgot
(Washing to n, DC, 1994)
69 The Tet Offensive
Oberdorfer, D., Tet! (New York, 1971)
Smith, G. W., TheSiegeat Hue (Bo ulder, CO, 1999 )
Westmoreland , W. C ,A Soldier Reports (Garden City , NY, 1976)
Wirtz, J. J., TheTetOffensive:Intelligence Failure in War (It haca, NY,
1991)
Tucker, S.C (ed.), Encyclopediaof the Vietnam War: A Political, Social,
and Military History, vot. 3 (Sant a Barbara , CA, 1968), 1029 - 30
70 The Iraq War
Boyne, W., Operation Iraqi Freedom: What Went Right, What Went
Wrong and Why (New York, 2003 )
Cordes man, A. H.. TheIraq War:Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons
(New Yo rk, 2003 )
Williamson, M. & Scales Jr, R. H., TheIraq War (Cam b ridge, MA , 2003 )
Purdum, T. S.. & staff of TheNew York Times, A TimeofOur Choosing:
America'sWar in Iraq (New Yor k, 2003 )
West , B. & Smith, R. L.,TheMarch Up: Taking Baghdad with the 1st
Marine Division (New York , 2003 )
Sources of Illustrations
a: above; b: below; c:centre; I: left; r. right
Cl '" Cartographica ltd; Ml: MlOesign
(any tit~ mentioned by author and date alone are detailed in full in Further Reading , p _291 )
I Photo akg-images; 2 V& A Picture library, 41ClPeter Turnley/CORBIS; 4r Photo akg -
imagesiErich Lessing ; 51Bibliotheque Nationale. Paris. MS Fr. 2643 , f. 165v; 5rV & APicture
library; 61Photo akg -imagei; 6r Photo akg-imagei; 71Photo akg -irnages; 7r Peter Newark 's
Military Pktures: 10-11 ML.; 12 Deutsche Hinorisches Museen, Bertin; 13 Q National Maritime
MUie'Um, london; 14-15 Photoakg-images; 15 Getty lmagei; 16-17 louvre, Parii . Photo
RMN- Chuzeville; 18 ClMike Andrews/Anclent Art & Architecture library; 19 Photo Will Pryce
www .willpryce .com;20a5taatlicheMuseen.Berlin;20b&21bCL.;22a MUie'UmNarodowe.
Wariaw; 22b Roger Wilu>n; H Archaeological Mu~m, Tehran; 24 Werner For ma n
Archive/MuiE'OCitia,ltaly; 24 -25 Photo akg-images/Peter Connolly; 26 ML.; 27 Photo akg -
imagei; 28& 29b CL.; 29.1PhotO akg·imageslPeter Connolly; 30-31 Turkish National Museum.
Istanbul; 32 MuiE'ONazionale Archaelogico, Naples ; 33 Roger Wilu>n; 34.1Aihmolean
Museum. Oxford ; 34b &35 CL.; 36a National MUieum of Chinese History, Beijing ; 36b Ml after
Zhongguogudoi zhonzhong zhon Ii suan bi 'on (1981) vot.t. pl. 19; 37 National MUieum of
Chinese History, Beijing; 38 British Museum, london, GRl888.1o-12.1; 391The Bankes
Collection, NationalTrui t; 39r Staa tliche MUieen Antikeniammlung, Bertin. 1976 .10: 40a
Staathche MUnliammlungen, Munic h; 40b Gregoriano Profano Museum, Vatican Museums,
Vatican ; 41 Ml ; 42a Photo akg ·imageslMuseum xannese: 4 2b Roger wnsco: 43a Photo akg '
images/Museum Kalkriese; 43b &44 Ml; 451British Muse u m. l ondo n; 45 r MUieo Nazicnale
in Palazzo Altem pi, Rome ; 46-47 MUiee de la r apu se ne de Bayeux, Fra nce; 48
Sted tbiblicthek, Trie r Cod . 31, f.63; 49 Photo David Nicolle; 50 Ml; 5 11Pho to akg -
images/Schutze/Rodemann ; 51r Magyar Nemzetl Museu m, Budapest. 52 Ml; 53
wu nemberqrsche t and esbibnctb e k.Cod . Bibl2 23; 54 British li brary, london Seal XXXIX .8;
55a The Board of Trus tees of the Armou ries; 55b Ml afte r Collins Arlos of Mili rory Hisrory
(20041 p.4 l ; 56-57 Muse£> de la Tapisser ie d e Bayeux . France ; 58 Photo David Nicolle; 59
Werner Forman Archive /Biblioteca Nacional. Madrid; 60 Ml ;61 British library. london Yates
'thompson 12 f.16 1; 62a The Masters and Fellows of Corpus Christi College. Cam bridge, MS
26279; 62b Ml after TheCambridge lIIusrrared ArIas of Warfare (19961; 63 Musee Naticnale,
Damascus;64 British library, london Roy. 2 A XXII f.22O;65 The Master and Fellows o f Corp us
Christi College, Cambridge M5 16, f.l6&; 66 Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris, MS tat 10136
Annales Geneunses f.14 1; 67 Topkapi Sardy Museum. Istanbul; 68 Ml after TheCamb ridge
l/Ius rra red Aliasof Warfare (19961 p.62; 691Museum of the Imperial Collections tSanno ma ru
Shozokanl Photograph courtesy of the International Society for Ed ucationa l Information. Inc;
69r 0 James P. Delgado; 70 ML.; 71 Photo akg -imagesITorquil Cramer; 721Trumpington.
Cambridgeshire; 72r Photo akg -images; 73 Ml; 74 Bodleidn library. Oxford ; 75 Christ Chur ch
Oxford . MS92 . f. 3; 76a The Board o f Trustees of the Armouries; 76b Ml; 77 British library,
london, MS. COtton Nero E.n. t.152 v; 78 Reproduced with permission of Ed inbu rgh
University library, Spec ial Collections Department. Or Ms 20. f.119R; 79 Ml after
Alexandres.c:u-Oresca t 1977); 80 British library, london, Johnson Album 1, no 2;8 1 Royal
Collection, Windsor; 82a Ml; 82b The Board ofTrustees of the Armouries;83 The Board of
Trustees of the Armouries;84 British library. london. MS. Royal 14 E.N . f.201 V; 85 Nationdl
Gallery. london; 86a Photo Heidi Grassley, 0 Thames & Hudson ltd. l ondon; 86b Ml; 87
Bibliothl'que Nationdle. Paris. MSFr 9087 f. 20 7v; 88 Private Collection; 891V&A Pictu re
library; 89r The Society of Antiquaries ot london; 90 Ml after Foss (1990); 91 Photo courtesy
ot leicestershire County Council; 92 -93 Codell Duran , Chap. LXXV; 94 Photo akg ·
images/Erich Lessing ; 95 Bridgeman Art libfary/Arch ives Charmet; 96 Ml after Hodgk in, T~
'The Battle of Flodden', AIchoeologio Aeliona (1892) vo"16; 97a British library. london; 97b
The Board ofTrustees of the Armouries; 98 0 Archive Iconograhco. S. A/COfbis ; 99 Newberry
library, Chicago; l00a &bMl after Sanders, Parsons & Santley, TheBosinofMexico (1979 );
10 1 British Embassy , MexicoCityfBridgeman Art library; 102 Codex Duran . ChapLXXV1; 103
louvre, Paris; 104 Ml aher Collins Arias of Mi lirary Hisrory (2004) p.47 ; 105 Bridgemdn Art
l ibrary /National MUie'Um, Stockholm; 106 Photo a kg-images/Erich Lessing ; 107 Ml; 108
Pho to akg -images; 109 The Board of Trustees of the Armouries; 11OaTopkapi Saray MUie'Um.
Istanbul; 11Ob Pho to akg -irnagesi Erich Lessing : 1111&r Ml after Perjes (1989) maps 6 &9.1;
112 To pka pi Saray Museum, Istanbul. f.219b-220a; 114-15 Pho to akg-images/Cameraphoto ;
116 Ml after Davis, P. K..l OODe<islve Ban les (200 1) p.197 ; 117 V&A Pictu re library; 118
MuiE'Ode{ Prado. Madrid; 119 Private Collection; 120 Ml after Martin & Parke r (1988) and
Pieru>n (1989 ) p.ll 0; 121 Pho tO akg-imageslErich Lessing ; 122-23 Pho to akg ·images/Erich
Lessing; 124 Theatr um Europaeum ; 125 Fukuo ka Art Musuem, Fukuoka Prefec tu re, Japan:
126-27 Private co llect ion; 126 Spencer Collectio n Japanese M553, New York Pub lic library ;
128 MLafter Sad ler, A. L. TheMa ker of Modern Japan (1979 ) p.l94; 129 Musee Histo rique de
5t rasbourg - Pho to A. Plisu>n; 130a &b Ml; 131 The Board of Trustee s o f the Armo urie s; 132
Photo akg -imag es; 133 Pho to akg-imdges; 134 Nat ional Museu m. Stock hol m; 135a &b Ml ;
136 The Board ofT rustees of the Armo uries; 137a Ming Shilu; 137b Ml aft er Wakem an (1985);
138 Her Majesty theO ueen; 139a The Crom well Museum, Hunt ingdon ; 139bML.; 140 The
Board of Tru stees of th e Armo uries ; 14 1 Anon , Batt le of Naseby Pu rchas ed by Daventry
District Council with assista nce from the Nat ional Art Collect ion Fund and from th e Purch ase
Grant Scheme admi nistered by the Victoria &Albe rt Muse um . l ent by Dave ntry DiWict
Council to Harbor ough Museu m. Photo co urtesy o f l eicest er shire Cou nty Council; 142a
Histor isches Museum der Stad t, Vienna . Inv. number 31 .033 ; 142b Photo akg-imageslErich
Lessing ; 143 Rust kammer, Dresden; 144 Ml after Barker (196 7) p.H l ; 14S Photo akg -
images/Erich Lessing ; 146--47 Pho toa kg-images; 148 Bridgema n Art li brary/Pelerhof Palace ,
Pet rodVOfets,5t Peten.burg, Russia; 149 Courtesy of the Director, Nalional Army MUie'Um,
london; 150 Ml; 15 1 Courtesyot the Director, Nationdl Army Museum. london; 152
Cou rtesy Jeremy Whitaker; 153 BrKtgeman Art librarylTretyakov Gallery, Mos.c:ow; 1541&r
Ml; 15S The Board of Trustees of the Armouries; 156-57 Photoakg-images; 1S8a Mlafter
Braubach (1964 ); 15Bb Private c~'ection; 159 Photo akg -imagesiErich Lessing ; 160 Arch iv
Gen.tenberg; 161a. bI &br Ml; 162 Stadtrtwseum Bautlen, Germany; 163 Ml; 164a Nat ional
POrtra it Gatlery.london; 164b The Board o f Trustees of the Armour ies; 165 National Archives
ot Canada, Toron to, Acc.No. 199 1-209- 1; 1663 &bMl; 167libfaryand Archives of Canada,
rcrcotc. C-146 340; 168 The Ashmolean Museum, Oxford ; 169 Independence National
Historical Park. Philadelphia; 170 Private collection; 17 1a &b Ml after Bradford, J. C. (ed.).
Oxford Arias ofAmerican Military Hislory {20(3 ) p.22; 172 Yale University Art Gallery; 173
Cou rte sy of the Anne S. K.Brown Military Collection. Brown Univer sity library; 174
Independence National Hislor ical Park. Philadelphia; 174-75 Pho to RMN- Philippe Bernard;
175 National Portra it Gallery, london; 176 Ml after Bradford . J. C. (ed .). Oxford Aria s of
American Milirary Hisrory (200 3) p.3O;177 Photo a kg-images; 178 Photo akg -images; 179 Ml;
180-81 Photo akg-images; 182 Courtesy of the Director. National Army Mu~m.london ;
1831ClNational Maritime Museum, l o nd on, Greenwich Hospital Collection; 183r Q National
Marilime MUie'Um.london; 184 Q National Maritime Museum, l on don ; 1851&r Ml after
Taylor, A. H ~ Mariner's Mirror vol.36 , no.4 (Oct 1940); 186 Private collection; 187 0 National
Maritim e Muse um , london; 188 PrivatecoUection; 190-91 Bibliotheque Marmo tton,
Boulogne-8illancourt, Paris, Photo Girau don/Bridgeman Art library; 192 Corbi slArchivo
Iconografica; 1931National Gallery . l ond o n; 193c National Gallery of An, Washington,
Samuel H. Kress Collection; 193r Wellington Museum, Apsley Ho use, londo n; 194a &b Ml
afte r Chandl er, D. G., Waterloo: TheHundred Days (200 1) p .129; 194-95 8ridgema n Art
library; 196-97 Pho to akg -images; 198 Ml ; 199 The Art Archive /Museo Nacional de Histo ria
lime/Mireille va utie r: 200a libra ry of Cong ress . Washington; 200 b libra ry o f Cong ress,
Washington; 201 li br ary o f Congress, Washi ngton; 202 Ml after Bradford, J. C. (ed. ). Oxford
Arias ofAmerican Mili rary Hisrory (200 3) p.59; 203 li brary of Congress, Washington; 204 Ml
aher Royle (1999 ) p.285 ; 205 Courtesy of the Director. National Army Museum, london; 206
Corbis; 207 Ridge Press . New York; 208 Ml after McPhe ru>n, J ~ Crossroads ofFreedom :
Anrieram (200 2); 209 library of Congress . Washington; 210 library o f Congress. Washington;
212 Ml after Hess (200 1) p.8; 213 1library of Congress, Washington, 213r library of Congress ,
Washington; 2 13b Gettysburg Co nve ntion &Visito rs Bureau . Photo Paul Witt; 2 14 library of
Cong res s, Washington; 21 51Private collection; 21 5r Private collection ; 216 Ml; 217 Pho to
akg -imdges; 218 The Tru stees of the Imperial War Museum, london; 219a from Black and
White , I October 1898; 219b MLafter Churchill (18991;220-21 Bridgemdn Art librarylWalker
Art Gallery, li verpool, Merseyside; 222 0 Jacques LangevinlCorbi s 5ygma; 224 The Tru stees
of the Imperial War Museum. london; nSI from The War in the East by Repington. 190 5,
Jo hn Murray . london; 225r from With Togo by H. C. 5eppings Wright. 1905. Hurst and
81ackett limited; 226 Ml after Evans &Peattie (1997) p.123 ; 22 7 Peter Newark 's Military
Pictures; 228 Courtesy ot VKkers ltd; 229 Photo akg -images; 230a Ullstein Bilderdienst.
Berlin, 00487531 ; 230b Ml after CollinsAria sof Milila ry History (20041 p .l1 0; 231 The Art
Archive/Bayer Army Museum Ingoldstadt; 232 The Trustees of the Imperial War Mu~m,
l ondon ; 233 The Trustees of the Imperidl War MUie'Um.london; 234 Photo akg -images; 2351
Collection Imperidl War MUie'Um; 23$(&r Ml; 236 Hutton Archive /Getty Images; 237.1Hulton
Arch ive/Getty Images; 237b Ml; 238 Photo akg -irnage-s; 239 Roger -VlOIlet.Paris; 240 Photo
akg ·images; 241 Q BettmannICorbis; 242 Ml after Edmonds, J. Eo. Mi/ iraryOperarioils. France
and Belg ium. 19 18, voIs ii-v (1937-47) End pa per A; 2431The Trustees of the Imperial War
Mu~m.london; 243r Photo akg -images; 244 The Trustees of the Imperial War Museum,
london; 245 Robert Hunt libfary, london; 246 The Trustees ot the ImperialWar MUie'Um,
london; 247 The Trustees of the Imperial War MUie'Um,london; 248 Ml after CoIJinsArlas of
Military Hisrory (2004 1p.134 ; 249a The Trustees of the Imperidl War Museum,landon; 249b
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stan ford University; 250 The Trustees of
c..
the Impe rial War MUie'Um,london; 251 Ml aher Messenger, WcwfdWar Two:
Chron ologic al Arias (1989) p .6S; 252 0 BettmannlCorbis; 253 Photo akg -images; 2543 Hoover
Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University ; 254b The Trustees of the
Imperidl War Mu~m,london; 255 Photo akg -images; 256 Photo akg -images; 257 Photo
akg -images; 258 Ml aher Newa rk. T.. Turninglhe Tlde ofWar (2ool ) p.117; 259 Photo akg -
images; 260 US Naval Historical Cen tre ; 26 1.1Ml after Brad ford . J. C. (ed.), Oxford Atlas of
American Military Hisrory(2003) p.138 ; 261 b 0 Bettmannl Corbi s; 262 Naval Historical
Foundation , Washingto n 88 -188-AE; 263 library of Congress. Washington; 264 The Mariners '
Muse umlCorbis; 265 Naval Historical Fou nd at ion, Washington 88 -159ji; 266 Ml after
Bradf ord . J. C.(ed .l. Oxford Arias of American Mil itary History (200 3) p .159; 2671Naval Histor ical
Fou ndation. Wash ing ton 88- 159-jj; 267 r 0 Co rbis; 268 0 Bett mannlCorbis; 269 Q
Bett ma nn /Co rbis; 270a The Trustees of the Imper ial War Museum. l o nd on . 86725; 270b &
271b Ml afte r Messenger (2004); 27 1 The Trust ee s of th e Imper ial War Museum. l ondon
86122; 272 Getty Ima ges ; 273 Photo akg -imag es; 274 MLafte r Me sse ng er, C~ Worfd War Two:
Chronological Aria s (19891 p.191 ; 275 Pho to akg -images; 276 Hoo ver Ins titut ion on War,
Revolutio n a nd Peace, Stanf o rd Univer sity ; 277 0 Bett m ann /Corbi s; 278a Ml after Bradf ord . J.
C. (ed .), Oxfo rd Arias ofAm erican Milil ary Hisrory (200 3) p.15S; 278 b Pho lOa kg-images ; 27 9
Private co llectio n; 280 Ml ah er Davis, P. K.. 100 Ckcisive Bartles (200 1) p.418; 28 1 Intern ation al
Instituut voo r Sociale Gesc hiedenis. Amsterdam Collection S. Landsberge r; 282 Ml after
Newa rk. T~ Turning rhe Tide ofWar (200 1) p.171; 283 Re x Features; 284 Ullstein Bilde rd ien sl.
Berlin, 00054437; 285 Phot o by Jo hn OlsonlTi me & l ife Pictu reS/Getty Images; 286 Ml afte r
Newark. T.. Turning rhe Tide ofWar (200 1) p.I77 ; 28 7 Defense Picture library; 288 ClOlivier
Coretlln Visu/Corbis; 289 ML.; 290 0 Reute rs/Co rbis
297
----
I ND E X

Benn ington 169,1 72 Bursa 79 chariots 28, 30 Co rtes, Hernan 98, 98 -1 02, 101

Sources of Quotations
Berezina. River 153, 274 Busch. Ernst 273- 75 Charle m ag ne 50 Cossacks 154.1 55
8erlin 249. 259 Bush. Georg e H. W. 287 Charleroi 195 Cotentin Penin sula 269
Bemadotte.Jean-Bapnste 188- 89, 191 Bush, Geo rge W. 287-88 Charles I 138, 138-41 co untervaue tio n 157, 158
Bernhard of Weimar, Duke 133- 35 Buxar 164 Charle s IV, Duke of lorraine 133,143. Coyo huacan 100. '00, 10 1
Bialystok 250 Byzantine empire 58. 60, 85 144.145 Cracow 67
Bian Hoa City 286 Byzant ium 48,5 8, 59,80.85 Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor 103, Crassus, Publius Canidius 41
Bkocce 103 112 Crawford , Earl of 96
Bold numbers refer to the page showing a quotation ;a : above; b: be low; aut ho r's ow n Angeles & l ond on, 1985)/Kai·fu Tsao (1965 di ssertation); p . 1S6 McKay, Prince Eugene of Bihar 109,164 Cadiz 183,186 Charle s VI of France 84 Crecy. battle 47,48, 74 -77, 82
tran slation s un less spec ified 5avay llondon, 1977, p. 164 after a contempo rary source); p. t es teken from Schuyler's
bills/bill men 89.90,93,96, 97, 97 Caen 74,268- 71,211 Charle s IX 113 Crete 114,142,156
correspo ndence with Washin9ton ; pp . 174 & 17S take n from Cornwallis's personal
Birmingham, England 168 Calais 77, 8 1; 120, 127 Charle s XII of Sweden 147,153-55,155 Crimea 203 -05
p . 19 Herodotus Book 5.105; p . 30a Plutarch Alexander 33.63; p . 30b Diodoru s Siculus correspondence; p. 179 Lefe bvre, The History of the French Revolut ion (Paris. 1924); p. 200
Bismarck 264 Calcutta 163-64 Charles Duke of Bourbon 103--05
BibliorhecaHistorio 17.60.1; p . 33 Polybius 3.116; p. 36 tran s. ed . Nenheuser. Jr (Bloo ming to n Webster, The PersonalMemoirsof UlyssesS. Grant (New York. 1885- 86. vel. I, p. 53); p . 21 a Croatia 111
& Indianapolis, 1994, p. 202l; p. 38 tran s. Day lewis (Oxford. 1996. pp . 373 - 74); p. 4S Woodworth , Benearh 0 North ern Sky;a Short Hisrory of theGerrysburg Campaign (Detroit. Bismarck . Otto vo n 217 Calder . Admiral 183 Charleston 176 Cromer.Lord 218
Am mianus Marcellinus 31.13; pp . 85 & 86 xnt c vcuro s. Hisroryo f Meh m~ the Conaoeror. 2003); p . 21SWawro. The Austro-Prussian Wor: Austr ia 's War wirh Prussiaand Italy in 1866 Black Band 106 California 202 Chemin des Dames 244 Cromwell.Oliver 124. 139, 139-4 1
tran s. Riggs (Connect icut, 1954, p. 5 1): p . 91 Polydore Vergi l. ThreeBooksof Polydore Vergif's ((ambridge. 1996. p. 267); pp . 218, 219 & 220 Churchill, The River War: on Account of the Black Prince 234 Callao 199 Chen Yi 279,280-81 crossbowmen 76,77,100
EnglishHistory, eo. H. Ellis (l o nd on. 1844. pp . 224 -26); p . 98 Cortes: TheLifea f the Conqueror Reconquest of the Sudon (london. 1933editi on. p. 163. p. 273 & p . 300 respe<:tively); p . 236 Black Sea 27,88. 110, 113, 203, 205 Calvinists 129 Chenggao 37 cruisers 225,226,228,232,234.261-63
by his secretary Francisco lopez de Gomara, trans. Byrd Simpson (Berkeley & los Angele s. Whiting Halsey, TheLiterary Digest of the World War (New York. 1919, vot. 3, p. 119); p. 278 Blair, Tony 287-88 Cambrai 244; battle 240 Cherbourg 268.269 Crusades: First 58,60,61 ; Seventh 64
1964 , p. 285); p. 107 lane-Poole, Bdtxl r (Odord, 1999, p. 165); p . 118 Martin & Parker. The (factfi le) Army Air ForcesStatistical Digest: World War Two (1945); p . 282 Navarre, Agoniede Blanquetaque 74 Camden 169 Che myekovsky.tvan 275 Cuauhtemoc 98-102
5panish Armada (l ondon, 1988, p. 268); p . 136 Wakeman, TheGreatEnterprise(Berkeley, l os I'Indochine (Paris,1956. pp . 199-200 ) Blarenberghe, louis Nicola s van ' 74-75 Camel Corp s squadrons 219 Cheruscl tribe 42 Cuba 98
Blenheim: battle 148. 149 -52; Tape st ry Camoys , Thomas lord 83 Chesapeake Bay 173.176 Cubuk Creek 79, 79
152 Campbell, Archibald. Earl of Argyll 96, Cheshire 89,95 ,97 Cubukovasl (C;;:ubuk Plain ) 79
Blet chley Park 264 97 Chester 14 1 cuirassiers 131, 731,143
Bhu 249 Cam ranh Bay 226 Chikuzen province 125 Cuitlahua 99
Blood . Ho lcro ft 151 Canada 165-68 China 12.17,36-37,47,65,66,68,69, Culp ·s HiII212.213
Blii cher 232 Canadian Corp s 244

Index
70,93.94,124.136-37, 182,276,282; Cumberland Valley 214
Blucher, Gebhard vo n 188-91 ,193. Cannae : battle 17,18. 32-3 5,45 Cent ral Plain 137; Great Wall of Cumin t ribes 67
195-96.797 cannons 85,86,88,89,93,94,95,100, 65,137; People 's Republic of 279 Currier&lves 211-12
Blue Ridge 210 lOS, lOS, 109, 111, 112. 116, 139. 143, Chinese Civil War 224.279-80 Curtfus Rufus 30
Bobadilla, Don Francisco de 118 144.151 ,155,163,175.178,201 Chinese Communist Party 279-81 Cyprus 113,114, 117
Bock, Fedor von 250,251 ,25 5 canoe s 101,102 Chinghis (Geng his) Khan 107 Cyrenaica 39
BoerWar 221 Canrobert, General F. C. 203 Chliat 59,60 Czech Republic 215-17
Page numbers in ita lic refer to Alvarado, Pedro de 98 -102 Army of Flanders 118 B-29Superfortress 276,277,177 Bohemia 68.129.215 Ceo Van Vien 285 Cho lon 286
illustrations; page numbers in bold Alyattes 60 Army of Northern Virginia 206,210.211 Baath Party 289 Bohun , Henry de 71-72 Cape Breton Island 165 Chu 36-37 Dacre, Lord Thomas 95,96
refer to the main article AmalriCl61 ArmyofSilesia 188.190 Babur (Zahir-ud -d in Muhammad) 94, Boli var,5imon 198, 199 Cape 5t Vincent, battle of 184 Chuikov, Vasily 256,257,259 Dahl , Mic hael 149
Amasya 80 Army of the North 188 107-09 Bolivia 199 Cap-are. Albert 142 Chuquisaca 199 Dalian 280
Amb racien Gulf 39.40 Army of the Potomac 206.209,211 -14 Baetrians 27 bombs 69,243,276-78 Cap ua bust 32 Chur chill , John , 1st Duke of Damascus 47,61-64,79
abatis 21,108.109 Ambrose.St 45 Army of the Republic of Vietnam 284. Baghdad 47,58,60,66.79,288,289. Bonnivet, GuilfaumeGouffier, Seigneur Carcas sonne 49 Marlborough 148,149,149-52 Dam pierre, Marquis de 178
'Abd ar-Rahnan el Ghatiqi 49.50 American Civil War 181,182,206,209, 285 290.290 de 103,106 Carpathian Basin 51,53 Churchill, Winston 218,219,220,245, Danha uer , Gottfried 153
Abu Bakr 79 210 Arnim, Georg von 130,131 Baidar 67,68 B6ptingen 133 Carpiquet airfield 270 260,264,271 Danishmends 60
Abyssinia 218 American War of Independence 140, Arnold. Benedict 169. , 70,172 Balaklava 203,203 ,205 Borde rers 95,96 carriers 262,263 circumvallation 157,158, 158 Dannenberg, General P. A. 203--05
Acre 64 173 Arnulfing family 49,50 Baldwin IV 61 Barod ino battleships 226,227 carronad es 186 Clarendon, Earl of 138 Danube, River 44.51 ,53,110,111 ,143,
Acnumbartle 17,18. 38-4 1 Amien s, battle of 241 arquebuses/arquebusfers 93.100.705. Baldwin V 6 1 Bosporu s, River 85,86 Carthage 32.35 Clausewitz, Carl von 192 150,156, 157,158,203
Adeimantos 25 Andronicus Do ukas 60 106,117 Balian oflbelin 63,64 Bosquet, General P. F.J . 203 Castello Mirabello. Pavia 104--05 Clavijo, Ruy Gonzales de 78,80 Darius I 19,23
Adenauer, Conrad 239 Anatolia 23,26,58,60,78,79.80.85, Arras 81 Balkans 58,85.110, 113.217 Bosworth: battle 48, 89- 9 1,95 Castelnau , Edouard de 238 Clement VII, Pope 104 Darius III 27-31
Adlertag (Eag le Day) 248 110.111 ,113 Arrian 30 Bathol,King John 71 Bothwell, Adam Hepburn, Earl of 96 Castile 98 Cleopatra VII 17,38-41 ,39 dans 21
Admiral Ushakov 226 Angers 272 arrows 28. 74.96 Baltic empire 129,155 Bou lemus , River 28 Castries, Chris tian de 282 Clifford, Robert 72 Davidson, Philip B. 285
Adowa 218, 220 Anhui pro vince 36,37,280 Arruntius, lucius 40 Baltic Fleet 225 Bourbon, Charles Duke of 103--05 Cathcart,5irGeorge 205 Clinton, General Sir Henry 170-71 Davis, Jefferson 206.207,210
Adrianople:battle 18, 44 -45 Ankara: battle 47, 78-80 Artexerxe s I 26 Baltic Front , 1st 274 bows 19,21 ,17,49, SO, 51, 53, 53, 56, 82, Catholic league 129.130,132 Clive, Robert 163-64,164 D-Day 268,270
Adriatic Sea 19,38 Ansar al-lstam 288 Artemi sia 25 Baltic Sea 129. 133.225 83.89,109, 743; lo ng bo w s 74 Caucasus 79,255.256 Clouet. Jean 703 Decius 45
Aeschylus 23 Ansbach -Bayreuth forces 176 Artemiston 23 Baltimore 211,213 Bradley ,Omar 268.272 Ceures, Bois des 236.238 Clunn ,MajorTony 43 Defence 233
Aethelred the Unready 54 Anse-au-Foulon 166 artillery 90,96, 100, 107,110, 140,143, Baner , General Johann 131 Bragadino, Governor 113. 115 cavalry 12,18,21 ,22.12,27,28,29, Cnut.King 54 Delbrvck, Hans 14
Afghanistan 27.124,287 Antietam: battle 181,182,200. 206-09. 15~152.155 ,15 ~15a1~ ,l64 ,17~ Bannockburn: battle 47.48. 7 1- 7 3 Branxton Hill 95 -97 31-35,36,48,55,59.59,64,66,71 , 72, Coale, Griffith Baily 262 Delhi 47,108,109
Africa 94,124,147,181 ,182,221 ,224 210 178.181 .182.189,204,208,216,219, Barbarigo. Ago stino 116 Brettenteld: battle 123, 129-32 78,80,82-83,83,93,105,108,109, Cold War 278,279 Demetnos 85
Agincourt:battle 47,48, 8 1-84 Antioch 61 223,227,238-43,268,283 Barbour,John 71, 73 Bresleu 67 110,111 ,112,124,131 ,132,134,139, Colds tream Guards 204 Dempsey, Miles 271
Agrippa, Marcus Vipsanius 39,40 Aquino. Avolos d'. Marquis de Vasto 105 Arundel. Earl of 75 Basil I! 58 Brest 165, 183 140,141. 142, 145, 150. 151, 154, 155, Collingwood, Sir Cuthbert 184-86 Deng Xlecpmq 179, 281
Ahmed III, Sultan 156 Aquitaine 49.50 Ascalon 64 Basra 288.289 brigantines 100,101 159,161 ,162,164,178.189,190.192, Cologne 179 Denmark 153. 215
aillettes 75 Aragon 85 Asia 12,102,147, 164. 228,282;Central Battl e Hill 55 Bristol 138,14 1 199,212,213,214,219,230; dervish Colombo 260 Derfflinger 233
AinJalut 47 Arbela 31 12, 18,44,47,65,94, 181;East 124, Battle of Britain 15.223, 24 5- 4 9,264 Britain 32,188,193,209.218. 225,230, 219; heavy 44,48,50,52.53 ,59,63, Combined Fleet (Japanese) 225,225, destroyers 234.262,263,264
aircraft 15,241.243,262 ,268,286.287; archers 44.47.48.53,63,75,77,78,82, 182, 224; South 12, 164, 182 battleships 185.186,225,226,228,234, 231,245-49,264,265,266; Battle of 66.94, 199; light 49, SO, 59.111, 114, 261 Detmold 43
seeal so named aircrah 81,83.93,94. 117 Asia Minor 19,79,80,85,88,110,142 260. 261, 263 245 -49, 264 130. 134;Ottoman 143 Communism 224,279-81 Devil'sDen 213
Akag i 261-63 Argentan 272 Atbara 218 Bavaria 51,5 2,129,134,135,143,144, Brittany 89.247,272 Celttbenans 33 Comnenus, Alexius 60 Devo n 14 1
Akbar the Great 108 Argentine. Giles de 73 Athens 9,22,23,26 145,150.152,158,188,215 Brody 275 Central Plains Field Army (Chinese) Companions 27,30 Dien Bien Phu : bartle 282- 83 , 284
Ak~ehir 80 Argonne 243 Atlantic: Battle of the 223, 264 -67 Bayeux 268;Tapestry 46-47,56-57,57 Broquiere. Bertrandon de la 86 279-81 Cornpteqne. forest of 244 Digby, Admiral 174
Albany, John Stuart , Duke of 104 Argyll, Archibald Campbell, Earl of 96, Atlantic Ocean 202.264-67 Bayezid I 78-80,80,85 Bruce, Robert see Robert I of Scotland Cephalonia 115 Confederacy 209,210.214 Dighton, Dennis 195
Albany. New York state 169-72 97 atomic bombings 276-78 bayonets 162, 163, 182, 204 Brunner 50 Cerro Gordo 201 Confederate Army 206--08, 211-14 Dnieper, River 154,155
Albert, battle of 241 Aristeides 24 Attu 263 Bazan, Don Alvaro de 116,117 Brussels 178.193-97, 194.195 Chabannes. Jacques de, Seigneur de la Connewitz 189,191 Dogger Bank,battle of 232
Alencon. Charles de Valois , Due d' 106 Armada 13,93, 118-2 1 Autidius. River 33 Beatty , David 232,233,23 5 Bryansk Front 252.253 Palice 103 Conrad 52 Dogger Bank Incident 225
Aleppo 47,79 Armee du Nord 178 Augsburg 51, 52 Beaufort, Margaret 89 Bryenn iu s, Nicephorus 60 Chaghatay 78 Constable, Marmaduke 95 Dohla . Johann Conrad 173,176
Aleutian Islands 26 1, 263 Arminius 17,18,42-43 Augustus. Emperor 17,38,38,40,41 ,42 Beauregard.P .G .T .200 Bucentaure 185, 186 chain mail 33,33,54.64.ll,14 3 Constantine X Doukas 59 Don Front 257
Alexander the Great 18,2 7- 31 Armistice 235,242.244 Austerlitz. battle of 186 Bedra 160 Buckingham, Duke of 89 Chiang Kai-shek seeJiang Jieshi Constantine XIPalaiologos 85 Don , River 255
Alexander, Tsar 188, 191 armour 71. 27,42.55.64. ll, 73; Australia 12 Beijing 69.123. 136, 137.280 Buda 112,143 Chaldi ran 107,108 Constantinople 48. SO. 59, BO, 203; fall of Donauworth 149-52
Ali Pasha, Damad 156 cuirassier's 13I; lamellar 58, 67; Austria 142-45, 149, 159, 178,1 88, 193, Beirut 64 Budy schenski w ood 154, 155 Chamberlain, Joshua 213 8 5-88 Donets Basin 255
Ali Pasha, Muezzinzade 115 'Io bster plate' 33; Mughal elephant 217,231 Bela IV 67 Buford, John 212 Cham p lain, lake 165,169 Continental Army 140,172 , '73 Dongola 218
Ali Pasha, Silahdar 156 709; Tose;gus oku /15 Autun 49 Belgian Army 244 Bug. River 275 Chancellorsville 210,212 Contreras 201 DOnitz. Karl 265- 67
Ali Pasha, Uluc "4,115-16 Army Group A 255,256,258 auxiliaries 32.33,110,118.156 Belgium 148,177-79,193-97,229 Bulga ria 48 Chandee, Philibert de 89 Cook, James 166 Don -Volga Canal 113
Allan , William 206 Army Group B 255,256,269 Avars 51,65 Belgrade 110, 142; battle 147, 156-58 Bulk su 51 Chandernagore 164 Coral Sea, battle of the 260, 263 Doolittle, Colonel 276
Alma River, battle of 203 Army Group Centre 250,251 ,252,254. Avranches 272 Bellicourt 240 bullets 94;Minie 181 Chandiri 109 C6rdoba, Jose Mar ia 198, 199 Dorgon 137
Almaz 228 270.273,274,275 axes 71. 72 Beloru ssia 224,273 -75 BurgBastion 143,144 Changchun 280 Corinth: Gulf of 38, 113-17; Isthmus of Doria , Gian Andrea 117
Alp Arslan 58-60 Army Group Don 257 Ayacucho: battle 181. 198- 99 Beloru ssian Front 274.2 75 Burgoyne,John 169.1 71-72. I l l. 176 Channel , Engli sh 55.103,118-21 ,245. 23 Dornier Do 17 246
Alps 32, 103 Army Group North 250. 25 1.273,275 Azerbaijan 79 Bemi s Heights 169, 170 Burg Ravelin 144 268 Corn wall 138 Dowding, Sir Hugh 247,248
al-Qaeda 287 Army Group North Ukra ine 274,2 75 Aztec empire 15 Benedek . ludwig vo n 18 1,2 15. 215- 17 Burgundy 49, 106 Chantilly, ChAteau de 236 Cornwallis, Charles 173-76. , 75 dragoons 131,134,145.155
Al sace 178.236,243 Army Group South 250.2 51,255 Aztecs 92- 93,94.98-10 1 Bengal 163-64 Burn side. Ambrose Everett 209 Chapoltepec 100,201 Corn well , John 235 Drake , Sir Franci s 119

298 299
-
I ND EX INDEX

Oreodnoughr 228.233 Ferrand . General 178.179 Gallipoli 85 Gyor (Raab) 142,143 Hol y leag ue 113, 114- 17, 145 unifica t io n of 2 17 Kcniqqratz 215 l odi, Ibrahi m 107-09
dre adn ought s 233.23 4 Ferrel 183 Gascony 74 Holy Roman Empire 129,132,159 txtlapatapan 99, 100, 101 Korea 12,69.225,228,2 79 loire, River 49
Dresden 188 Fifth Fleet (Japanese) 261.263 Gates.Horatio 169. 169, 170- 71 Habsburgdynasty 103.106.112,129. Hclzheusen 191 btfnxochttl 99 Korea Strait 225-28 lombardy 103-06
Dnam, Emile 236,237 Fifth Panzer Arm y 272 Gaugamela: battle 18, 27- 3 1 142,1 43, 145. 148. 149,156-58 Home Ridge 204 Korean War 224 london 138, 187,246,249
Droco urt- Queant line 242 Fin land 273 Gaull e, Charles d e 239 Habsbu rg-O ttoman war 158 Home. lord Alexander 96-97 Jackson. Thomas 'Sto new all' 207 Krak6w 143 long Binh 286
Dronbach 145 firea rms 94.127.128.163.181 Gauls 32 -3 4 Haig , Douglas 240 Hooghly River 164 Jacobins 179 Kriegsmarine 264 long March 279
Du Yuming 281 fi repower 93, 108, 151. 153. 159, 162. Geffels, Franz 145 Haiti 148 Hooker. Joseph 208.210,212 Jaffir , Mir 164,164 Kubila i Khan 69 - 70 long Parliament 138
Dual Alliance 2 17 181 Generals. Battle of t he see Ayacucho Haizhou 280 hoplite s 4, 16-1 7.20.21 Jeta!r. Ahmed 79 Kurds 287,290 long War 145
Dual Monarchy 217 First Air Fleet (Japanese) 260 Geneva 283 Hakata Bay: battle 12.47, 69- 70 Horace 41 James IV of Scotland 95.95-97.97 Kuwae , island of 88 longbowsllongbowmen 76.82.84. 90,
Dvben 131.132 First Army (British) 241.244 Geneva Con ference 283 Hale, Edward Matthew 182 Horn . Count Gustav 131-34 James. River 174 Kuwait 287,288 127
Oumanoir,Ad miral 185.186 First Army (Callcldian ) 272 Genghis Khan 66 Halicarnassus 25 Hor net 262.263 Jan III Sobieski 143.144 Kyoto 126, 128 longstreet. James 211, 213
Dumouriez. Charles Francois 177-79 First Army (French) 244 Genoa 85. 114 Halidon Hill 73 Hor sfall. C.M . 2 18 jan issaries 80.88.88, 110. 111. 112, 112. Kyushu 69.7 0 tonca namata 33
Dun bar 71. 141 First Army (Russian) 229.230.231 George.lake 165 Halifax 16 5 Hosho 261 142. 144, 156 tonca segmenr ata 33
Dunk er Ch urch 208.209 First Army (US) 268 Georgette Ap ril 1918 offensive 243 Hall, Edward 95 Hosogawa. Boshiro 261 Japan 12,24,4 7.69-70.123, 125-27, laCoruria 118 lorraine 178.236-39
Dup p tin Moor 73 First Rhod e Island Regiment 173 Gerard of Ride fo rt 63 Han 36-37 Hosprteners 61.64.67 182,223,225,228,263.276-78,2 79, la Goletta 117 lost Order 207
Dzh unga rs 124 Flanders 120 Gerhard of Augs bu rg 51-53 Hen em pi re 17. 18 Hostilian 45 280; Amer ican air attack on 27 6-78 la Hir, George 236 tostwnhiel. battle of 139
Flet cher. Frank 262 Germany 42-4 3, 48,5 1-5 3, 103, 129- 32, Han Xin 37 Hath, Hermann 252.256 javelins 28, 30 lahore 164 loudon, Gideon Ern st von 161. 162
East China Field Army 279- 81 Fleur us 179 133- 35,149- 52. 159- 62.1 88-92,216, Hen eu 192 Hougoumont 196 Jean Ie Bel 74 l ancashire 89,95,97 louis 11 of Jagiello 110.110-12
East Ind ia Companies 163.164 Hed den: battle 93, 95- 9 7 217. 224.225.229, 231. 237.238, 240, Hancock , Wi nfiel d Scott 2 13 Howa rd , Charles, l or d of Effi ng ham 119 Jethcoe. Sir John 232,232-35 l ancer s 100; 21st 220 louis XIV 142, 149
Eastern Army (Japanese) 126 Flor en ce 106 287 Hann iba l 17,18.32,32-35 Howard. Edmund 95.96 Jemappes:battle 148, 177 - 79,193 lances 42,94 louis XVI 178 .179
Eastern Front 238 flotillas 24 Germany Arm y Gro up Centre 224 Hano i 282 Howard. Oliver 212 Jena. battle of 162 l and au 152 louis XVIII 193
Eastern Roman Em pire 48 Foeti. Ferd inand 243.2 44 Gertysbu rq. bettte 181, 2 10 - 14 Hanover 215 Howard , Sir Thomas 95 Jerusalem 62.64 landsknechts 103-05,106,1 06 louis Napoleon 205
Ede rheim 134-35 Formidable 185 ghufams 63 Happ yT ime , fir st/second 265-66 Howard. Thomas . Duke of Norfolk Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) 279 langdale, Sir Marmaduke 140 louis of France, St 64
Edessa 61 Fort Carillo n (later TIconderoga) 165. Gibraltar 183 Harald of Norway, King 54.55 90-91 Jiang su province 237,80 Lanqocrt, battle of 141 louis Philippe. King 179
Edgeh ill s. battle of 138 167.168.169 Gifu Prefect ure 125 - 27 Harbi n 280 Howard. Thomas, Earl o f Surrey 95 -97 Joff re, Joseph 236-39 Lannoy, Charle s de 103-05 louisbourg 165
Ed inburgh 95 Fort Clinton 170 Giustiniani l ong o, Giovanni 86.88 Harf1eur 81 Howitzer 242 Johann Georg lll 143 laos 292 low Countries 74,149
Ed im e 44,85. 142 Fort Consti tution 170 Gloucester . Earl of 71.73 Harlech Castle 141 Huai River 280 Jo hn George, Elector of Saxony 129 lara. General 199 loyalists 173
Edo ITokya) 128 Fort Ooua umont 238 Glouces te r. Eng land. siege of 138 Harold. King 46.47.48,54 -57 Huai-Hai : battle 224 , 279- 8 1 John III Sobiesk i 145 latin America 148 lublin 275
Edw ard Duke of Yo rk 83 f ort Duquesne 165 Gloucester . New Jersey 176 Harper's ferry 207 Hudson.Rver 168 ,170,172 John of Austr ia. Don 94.114 -17. 115 latin American Wars of Independence ludendorff. Erich 229,229-31 .241 ,242.
Edw ard I 71 f ort Edwar d 170 Gne isena u. General Cou nt 188 Harrisonburg 210 Hue 285.286 Jo hn of luxembourg. King of Bohemia 181 244
Edw ard 1148. 71- 73 f ort Georg e 165 Godwin of Wessex 54 Heryana d ist rict 107-09 Hughes, G. E. 268 76 latvia 250.2 73 ludovisi Sarco phagus 45
Edw ard III 74-77. 75,81,82 f o rt Mo ntgom ery 170 Golden Hord e 78 Hasting s; battl e 46. 47. 48, 54 - 57 Hun. siege of 138 Jomini, Antoine Henr i 192 l e Man s 272 luftwaffe 245.2 46-47.248,249,251 ,
Edwa rd the Confessor 54 Fort Niagar a 167 Golde n Horn 86,88 Hatfield, Thomas 76 Humphrey of Gloucester 83 Jordan . River 62 t ech River 51 257.258
Edw ard Prin ce of Wares 75.76 Fort Ont ario 16S Gomarra, Francisco lopez d e 98 Hartin : ba ttl e 48, 6 1--64 Hundred Years War 74.81 Julius Caesar 38 techfeld: battle 48, 5 1- 53 luoyang 136
Effing ham. Charl es Howard l o rd of 119 Fort Oswego 165 Gongxian 37 Hawker Hurrican e 247 Hungary 51.65,67.68,85,93.110-12. Junin 198 lee, Robert E. 200,201 ,206-12.2 13,214 lusitanians 33
Eger, River 133 Fort Will iam Hen ry 165 Good Hope. Cape of 225 Haye Satnte.La 196.197 123,142.149,157.231 ,2 73 Junkers Ju 87 Stuka 246 ,248 Lefeb vre. Georges 179 Lutherans 129
Egypt 38. 39.40, 47.48.59.61 . 113.218 Fort William. Calcutta 163 Gorcnakov, General 205 Hayman. Francis 164 Hungerford, Walter 82 Junyo 261 Leqanes. Marquis of 133 tutzen 132
Eg ypt ian Army 218 Forth. River 71 GordonCharles 218 Hebel province 136-37 Hun s 44,51 .65 Jutl and; battle 187. 22 3. 232- 35 legions, Roma n 32, 42 Lii tzow 233.234
Eig ht h Army (German ) 229.230 fortifications 108.113.143.175 Gordov, Vasily 256,257 Heilbronn league 133 Huntingdon. Earl of 75 Leqmc a see liegnitz; battle luxembourg 177
Eisenho w er. Dwight D. 269 fortresses 128. 236 GOring. Hermann 247.248.257,258 HeinkeIHel11246.246 Huntley, Earl of 96 Kabul 107. 109 leicester 138 lyd ia 19
EI Penon 201 Fourth Arm y (British) 240-42.244 Gorlice- Tarn6w cam paign 231 Heller, Rupe rt 105 Husevn , Sultan 79 Kadan 67,68 Lekestersture 89 -91
Elba 193 Fourth Panzer Army 2S2. 256. 257. 274. Go ths 44,4 5 hel met s 27.43.64,83.97. 143.230; hu s~rs 160 Kaga 261-63 leipzig 14-1 5, 129-32 ; battle 181. Macdonald. Hector 220
Elbe. River 42. 224 275 Gouffier, Guillau me. Seigne ur de 'Boeo t ian' 34; Pembrid ge helm 76 hypa spists 28 Kaqekatsu, Uesugi 126 188 -92, 193 Macedonia 27,39,41 .27.58
Eleusis. Bay of 24.2 5 frameo 42 Bonnive t 103. 106 Hen ry II of Sifesla 67,68 Kahlenberg 144 Leitben 162 machine guns 239.244.289; seea/so
Elizabet h I 118, 119 Frame ries 178 Graham, William, Earl o f Mo ntro se 96 Hen ryl V 121 Iconium 60 Kalach 257 l ei 51 submachine guns
Elster. River 188.192 Fran ce 47,4 9- 50. 51. 74- 77.81 -84. 90. Gran Col ombia 198 Hen ry V 48,8 1, 81 - 84 Idiaquez reg iment 134 Kalak 288 LeMay . Curti s 276,277 Madagasca r 225
Elve, River 2 15 95, 103,149,1 59,1 6 5,1 72.174.1 77. Gran d Fleet (British) 232, 234- 35 Hen ry VII 89.89-91 Idiaquez. Oon Juan de 118 Kalkriese 42 leningrad 250 Maeander River 26
England 54-57.74.88-91 .95-97. 178,192, 193.205,209.216.218.224. Grande Armee 188 Hen ry VlII 95. 103 teyasu. Tokugawa 125. 126. 128 Kamakura 70 lennox. Matthew Stuart , Earl of 96,9 7 Magdeburg 51
118-21. 138-41. 238.248 225.2 29.230.23 1.236-39.240-44. Gran t. Ulysses S. 200 Hepburn , Adam. Earl of Bothwell 96 lies de s Seiotes 176 Kanawha Valley 206 leopold, Emperor 142, 143 Magnesia 26
Eng lish Civi l War 138 268-72, 287; fall of 265; liberatio n o f Grattan 44 Herefor d . Earl of 71,73 Iller, River 51 Kantoplain 126, 128 lepanto: battle 93,94. 113- 17 Mag o 33
Enigma enc od ing machines 264.267 268 Gravelines 120,121 Herod ot us 19, 25 Immortals, the 27 Kanua 109 leslie, Alexander 139 Magyars 48,51 ,53
Enoia Gay 277 Francis I of Aust ria 188.192 Graves, Admiral Thomas 174 Hesseo-Darmstedt regiment 162 Imperial Arm y ( Reic h ~ rmee) 159 -62 Kara (Black) Tater s 80 tesneia 154 Mahan, Alfred Thayer 182. 227
Enrerpr ise 262.2 63 Frenctstof rre nce '03,103-Q6 Gravi na. Admiral Oon Fed erico 185,186 Hessians 170 Im pe rial Guard . French 194.1 97 Karabagh 79 tevkes 38 Maharbal 33. 35
Ephesus 60 Frencots.Herman von 230 Great Italia n Wars 103 Hid desen 4 3 Inca empire 15, 94 Karakoram 66 Lexingron 260 Mahdiyya 218
Erro l, Earl o f 96 Francon ia 144 Great No rthern War 153 Hid eaki. Kobaya kawa 127 Indefatigable 233 Karakoyunlu Turkmeos 79 Leya. Antonio de 104 Maidenek 275
Ersekujvar/Neuhasel 142.143 Era nco-Prussia n War 217 Greece 17.19-22.23-26.38-41 .48 Hid eie, Ukita 126 Ind ia 15.7 8, 94.1 07-09. 124, 163-64, Karaman 85 li Zich eng 136-3 7 Maine Regiment. 20th 213
Erwitte, Colo nel 130, 132 Frank s 49- 50. 60-62 Greene , Nath an ael 169 Hideyoshi, Hid etada 128 175 Karbala 288 liaotung Penin sula 228 Malatya 58
Erzincan 60. 79 Franks. To m m y 287.288 g renades 242. 243, 289; rifl e 272 Hideyc shi, Toyot om i 126.128 Indian Ocean 113,225 ,260 Kathe rine of Valois 84 libya 33.34 Malaya 260
Erzurum 60,79 Fraser. Simo n 171 Grou ch y. Emmanuel de 196, 197 High Seas Fleet (Germ an) 232- 34, 234, Indo-China 226,283,284 Kawasaki 277 Lichfield . garrison of 89 Malazg irt 58
Essex. Earl of 139 Fred eqa r, Chroni cle of 49. 50 Guad alupe Hid alg o 202; Treaty of 202 235 Indo-China War 282 Keedysville 207 liddell Hart , Captain Basil 14 Malplaq uet 151
Estonia 273 Fred erick II. Empe ror 67 Guam 260 Hig hlan ders 96,97 Indus. River 19 Keith . Sir Robert 73 liebertwolkwitz 189 Malta , Knights o f 114
Eudo. Duke 49. 50 Frederick. Maryland 207, 211 Guderian , Hein z 251-54 HiII, A. P.207. 209.211 .212 infantry 16- 17. 19. 2 1,22. 27. 28. 32. 34, Kelly , Robert 221 liegnitz: battle 47, 65-68 Mamluks 47
Eugen e of Savoy. Prince 6.150,156-58. Fred erick th e Great 148.159.159-62 gue rrilla tactics/wa rfa re 224.279 Hill, D.H . 207. 208 35,3 7,44,45,48,5 1.5 3. 58.62.64.66, Kemah . fortress of 79 light Divi sion 203 Manassas, second battle of 206
156-57 Frede rick-Wil he lm III '92 Gulf War 223,288 Himalayas 27.31 71,80,83,90,94,103.107, 110. 112. Kenshin . Uesug i 126 ligny 195, 196 Manchester, England 138
Euphrates. River 27. 79 French Civi l War 118 Guling 37 Himeji Castle 128 114, 130. 131. 134, 139. 140. 14 3. 150, Keza. Simon de 53 lima 198 Manchuria 225,228.279-81
Eur asia 18. 78.2 24 Frenc hRe volut ion 140,177.179.193 Gumbin nen, battle of 229 Hindenburg line 240, 242. 244 151, 154, 155. 159, 160, 162-64, 182. Khalifa 218-2 1 lincoln. Abraham 206.106,209,212 Manchus 123. 134. 136, 137
Ew ell. Rich ard 210.213 friga tes 184.226 gunboats 204.219, 220 Hindenburg. Paul von 229,229-31,244 190. 199. 2 12. 220, 223. 230, 236. 237, Khartoum 218-21 lindemann, Georg 274 Manhattan Project 277
Eyu b 86 Frit igern 44-45 gunpowderweaponry93,105 .107,108 Hind ustan 12.93 238.242.250,269 Khrushchev. Nik ita 280 lindenau 189-9 1 Manila 228
Froissart 75,76 guns 75,81 ,85. no, 134, 154, 155. 178, Hipper, Franz 232.233 Ingolstadt 152 Kiev 251 Linz 143 Mansfield, Joseph 208
Fabius Maximu s 32 Frun sberg . Geor g von 105, 106 182,185.186.2 04, 207,2 14.2 19.225. Hippies 19. 20 Inkerman:battle 181,182, 20 3-05 Kirkuk 288,290 lisbon 118 Manstein, Erich von 257.258
Fairfax. Sir Thoma s 139 Fukien 70 231,2 43.1 43,2 44; ant i-aircraft 247. Hiro shima 276, 277-78 InnocentXl,Pope 143 Ktske 263 list. Siegmund 255 Manzikert : battle 48, 58-60
Feleise 272 Furstenber q.C curu 130, 131 261; bow 119;field 143, 157; Hiryu 261,2 62, 263 Invincibfe 233 Kttchener. Herbert 218,218-21 .219 lithuania 142,250 Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) 279-81
Felkeohayn. Erich von 236- 39 fusta s 115 match lock 107, 109;needl e 2 16; Hitler. Adolf 174,224, 245.248,249, 250. Iran 19.27.78,80,287-90 Krzrlrrmak. River 79 little Round Top 213 Marat has 164
Falkirk 71 pe rcu ssio n rifl e 181; pi stol s 131.15 1; 254.255.256. 257,258,2 69.270, 272. Iraq War 224. 28 7- 90 Kluge. Gunther von 270,272 liu Bang 36-37 Marathon 22;battle 12.17. 19- 22
Famagu sta 113.114 Gainsbor ough. Thom as 175 smoot hbo re 94; stem 119;seea/so 275 Irb il 27 knights 5.48,55.62.66,71 ,72.75,76. liu Bocheng 279,280.281 Marcellinus, Ammianus 44,45
Fashoda 22 1 Gaixi a; battl e 17. 36- 37 pistols ; rifles; submac hi ne gu ns Ho Chi Minh 282 Ireland 172.175 77,83.97. 125; o f Malta 114;Teutonic liu Zhi 280 Marchand. Jean-Bapti ste 221
Fenton. Roger 203 Galilee , Seaof 61 Gustavus Ado lphus. King 123.129. 129, Hoepner. Erich 252 Ireton, Henry 140 67,23 1 livy 33.35 Mardonius, Gene ral 26
Ferd inand II. Holy Rom an Empe ror 123. ga/iots 115 131-33.151 Hokkai do 126 I~ , Prince 80 Kobe 277 lobi Bastion 143 Mariana Islands 276
129 Gallas, Count Ma tteo 133 Gut hrie. William P. 129 Holowczyn 153 Isabella of France 75 Kohl, Helmuth 239 loderbach st ream 130, 131 Marignano 103
Ferdina nd . King of Hungary 133 gal1easses 116 Guy oflusig nan 61-64 Holstein 215 Isola no, Count 130 Kolmberg 189 lodi 103 Mark Antony 17.38-41 ,39
Ferdi na nd of Habsbu rg . Archduke 112 galleys 114,116-17 Gurnen 36.37 Holstein infantry regiment 130,131 Istanbul 13.85.117.142,156 Komarom (Komorn) 142 lod i dynasty 107 Markleeberg 189
I Fernando. Prince 133 Gallie ni, Joseph 236 Guzman , Gaspar de 133 Holy land 61.61 .64.114 Italy 32-35.38.51 .103-Q6.183; Konig 233 lodl. Daulat Khan 107 Marlborough, John Churchill. 1st Duke

I 300 301

-
I
...
INDEX INDEX

of 148. 149, 149-52 Montreal 168 Normans 54-57.60 Panzer divisions 268.272 ,275 pi/urn 33 Rezen 133, 134 Sceoe Flow 235 Solferino 215.216.217
Ma rmara, Sea o f 86.88 Mo ntrose. William Graham. Earl of 96 North Africa 33.47.114,255 Panze r Gro up Wes t 269 'Ping -Jin' campaig n 280 Rhine. Rive r 49 , 152 Scarpe , battle ofthe 242 Somrne, battle of the 239.244
Marmont. Auguste de 190 Mo ray , Earl of see Randolf . Thomas North America 13. 124. 148. 165 . 177 Papelotte 196 pisto ls 131 Rhineland 149, 178 Scheer, Reinhard 232 -35 Somme, River 74.82.239
Ma rne . River 231.240 Mo rea, the (Pelc po nnese) 85,156 North German Confederation 217 Pappenheim ,Count 130-32 Pittthe Elder, William 165 Richard III 48.89 .89-91 ,95 Schellenberg Heigh ts 150.152 sonar detection eq uipment 264
Marshall, George C. 280 Mo rgan, Daniel 169,171,172 North Korea 287 Paris 177,178.193 ,221 ,231 ,236 Pittsburg 165 Richmond , Henry Tudor , Earl of 89 schtlt rc rns 72,73 50ryu 261 -63
Marsto n Moor. bat tle of 139.1 40-41 Mo rt Homme rid ge 238 North Sea 225,232 -35 Paris. Matthew 65 Plainsof Abraham 167 Riedesel. Frederick 169,170-71 Schleswig 215,234 Sosjus. Gaius 39,41
Martel , Charles 49- 50 Mortain 272 North ,lord 176 Park.Sir Keith 247,248 Plassey: batt le 15.147 , 163- 64 rifles 163,182 ,216,219,243 ; Enfield Schlieffen Plan 231 Soubtse, Prince de 160-61
Maryla nd 206-10 mortars 86,143 ,242 .243 Northampton 138-41 Parliamentarians 139-41 Pletaea 20-21 ,26 182; l ee-Metf ord magazin e 219; Schme tder. Hans 255 South America 199
Maskana 63 Moscow 154.255 ,257; batt le fo r 224, Northampton, Earlof 75 Parma 114 Pletsse. River 188, 189 Martin i-Henry 219; Minie 204 Schortauer Heights 161 South Atlantic 206
Masurian lakes. battle of the 231 250 -54 Northern Fleet (Mongol) 70 Parma, Duke of 118-21 Plutarch 27 Rio Grande 200,202 Schreiber, Georges 265,267 South Mountain, batt le of 207
Meurcntus. Duke of Marseille 50 Mosu l 288-90 Northumberland 95-97 Parmenio, General 27,28 .31 Plymouth, Engl and 118, 119 Robert I of Scotland (Robert Bruce) 71. Schut, Cornelius 133 Southern Fleet (Mongol) 70
Max Emanuel of Bavaria 149- 52 Mo teuczoma Xocoyotl 98-102 Northumberland . Henry Percy, Earlof 90 Parthe, River 191 Pocock, Nicho las 184 71-73 Schuyler, Philip 169 Southwest Front (Stalingrad) 257
Maximi lian II Emanuel 143 Mugha lempire 109,163 Northwest Front 229 Pas-de-Calais 268 Podelwitz village 131 Rochefort, Joseph 263 Schwarzenbe rg. Prince Kart Philipp von Soviet Union 249,254,278,280.281
McClellan. George B. 200, 206-09 Mugha ls 93,94 .107 ,124 Norway 247 Pasha, Hacr Halil 158 Pohl, Hugo von 232 Rockingham , Marquis of 176 188-90 Spain 32,33 ,47 ,49,50,51 , 102, 103,
Meade, George Gordon 211-13.2 13, Muhi, battle of 112 Noyon , battle of 241 Pasha, Ibrahim 143,145 Poissy 74,75 Rocroi. battle of 141 Scipio African us 33 114,121 ,174.183 -87 ,198,199 ,225
214 Mulberry harbours 269 Numidia 33 Pasha, Ishak 86 Poitfers: battle 47, 49- 50 Rodney, Admiral 174,1 76 Scipio. Publius 33 Sparta 17,20 ,22
Medina 289 Munnuza 49 Nussberg 145 Pasha, Kara Mehmed 145 Poland 65-68,1 42,153 ,229-31 ,275 Rokossovsky, Konstantin 257-59 Scotland 71-73,89.95 , 141 spears 27,33 .42 ,50,55.73 ,89
Medina Sidonia, Duke of 118-21 Muong Thanh Brid ge 283 Pasha, Kara Mustafa 142,142-45 Pole, Richard de la, Duke of Suffo lk 106 Roman empire 18, 38,44 ; Eastern 48 Scott, Winfield 200,200-02 Spencer 267
Mediterranean 27,48,93. 94, 110, 113, Murat, Joachim . King of Naples 189. 190 oarsmen 20,39 ,100 Pasha, Karaca 86 Polk. President James K. 200 Romania 273 Scythtans 27 Spit fire IS, 247,249
117,183 ,184 ,225 ,249,266 Murshidabad 164 Oberglau 150 Pasha, KoprUlu Mehmed 142 Polo, Marco 68,69 Romanian Fourt h Army 257 Seaof Japan, Battle of t he 225 Springs of Cresson 61
Mehme d L Sultan 80 Musa,Prince 80 Oceania 181 Pasha, Kcp ruluzede Fazil Ahmed 142 Polt ava:ba ttle 146-47,148 ,148 , 152- 55 Romanus IV Diogenes 58-60 Sebasteia 58 Spruance . Raymond 262
Mehmed II, Sultan 85,85 -88 muske teers 130-31 ,13 4 Octevien see Augustus Pasha, Pertev 115 Polybtus 18,33 Rome 17,32,35 ,41.42,114 Sebastian, General 44,45 St Germain , Count de 161, 162
MehmedlV,Sultan 142 muskets 155, 182;f1intloc k 94; torador Octavius , Marcus 41 Pasha, Sari Mustafa 157 Pommern 234 Rommel, Erw in 268,269-72 Second America n Division 241 St Helena 197
MehmedlV,Sultan 145 164 Odon , River 270 Pasha, Sokullu Mehmed 113 Ponthieu 74 Roos, Major General 155 Second Army (British) 244,2 71 StLaw rence, River 165,166,168
Melttene 58 Mustafa , Prince 80 Ofanto, River 33 Passerowitz. peace t reaty of 158 Port Arth ur 225,227,228,280 Rosily, Admiral 183 Second Army (Prussian) 216 St L6 270,271.272
men-at-arms 75,76 ,77 ,82 ,90 ,106 Myshkova , River 257 Oqcdel. Khan 68 Passau 53,143 Portland Bill 119 Rossbach: battle 148, 159 - 62 Second Army (Russian) 229,230,231 St Margaret's Bay 245
Menguc hekids 60 Oka, River 253 Passcbendaele 240 Portuguese 113 Rosyth 232 Second Battle of Newbury 139 St Mihie l 243
Menshikov, Prince Alexande r Nagamasa, Kuroda 125 Otid.Cnstobat de 100 Pastenburq 275 Potomac, Army of t he 206 Rouen 84 Second Pacific squad ron (Russian) 225, St Quentin canal 249
Danilovitch 154, ISS, 203, 204 Nagasaki 276,277-78,278 Olympias 18 Parra! 38 Potomac , River 206-10 RoundTops 212-13 226 St Quentin , Mont 242
merchant shipping 264-66 Nagoya 126, 277 Omaha beach 268 Patra s.Gulf of 114,115 Praeneste 40 Rowton Heath 141 Second Panzer Army 251,252 Stalin 250,252 ,256,259,273
Merian t he Younge r, Matthaeus 124 Nagumo 262 Omdu rman : battle 181,182, 218- 21 Patton , George S. 272 Prague 217; Peace of 135; Treaty of 217 Royal Canadian Navy 264 Seqestes 42 Statingrad: battle 12,224 .214, 255- 59
Merode-Wes terloo, Com te de 149 Nagumo, Chuichi 260,261 Ontario, lake 165,168 Patzinacks 58 Preston 141 Royal Navy 246, 264 Seifertshain 190 Stamford Bridge 55
Merovingian royal house 49 Najaf 288,289 Operation Baqratlcn 224, 273 - 75 Paullus. Aemi lius 33,35 Prigny, Commander J-B 183 Royal Sovereign 186 Seine, River 74,7 5, 272 Stanley, l ord Thomas 89.90
Mesopotamia 27-31 ,32 ,47 Nanjing 280,281 Operat ion Blue 255-56 Paulus, Friedrich 255-59,159 Princ ipe de Astu rias 185 Royal Warwickshires 219 Sekigahara: battle 12,123, 125- 28 Stanley, Sir Ed ward 95
Messerschmitt Bf 109 245,246,247 ,248. Nantes 32,104,186,188,272 Operation Bfuecoat 272 Peusenlas 26 Prtttwitz. Max von 229 Royalists 138-41 SelimtheGrim 107 Stanley. Sir William 89,90.91
249 Napoleon 152, 162, 181, 183, 184, Operation Castor 282 Pavia 33; battle 93, 94, 103 -06 Probstheida 191 Bozbesrvensky. Zinovy 225, 225- 28 Seljuks 48,60 Starhemberg, Count Ernst Rudiger von
Messerschm itt Bf 110 246 187-92,193,193 -97 Operation Cobra 272 pa vises 76 Provence 50 Rumeli Htsan 85 Seminary Ridge 212-14 143
Messina 114 Nepoteonic wars 188,193 ,199 Operation Desert Sto rm 287 Pavlov, Lieutenant General 204 Prussia 148,159,162 ,177 , 178,188,193 , Rumelia 79,1 10,11 1 Senlac Hill 55 Stavka 273
Meulener, Pieter 134 Narbonne 50 Operat ion Drumroll 266 Peaceof Prague 135 215,216,217 ,229-31 ,275 Rundstedt. Gerd von 251,269,2 70 sepoys 163 Steevens.G. W. 218
Meuse, River 236,238 Nerve 155 Operat ion Epsom 269,270 peace offensives, German 240 Psellus, Michael 58 Rupe rt of the Rhine, Prince 139,140 Serbia 48,85 Stephen Lazarevkh of Serbia 80
Mexican War 202 Narvaez, Panfilc de 98,99 Operation Iraqi Freedom 288-90 Peach Orchard 213 Psyttaleia 24,26 Russia 47,66-68,14 7,153, 159.1 77, Serna, Jose de La 198-99 Stillwater 169
Mexico 93,98 -102 ,200,202 Naseby: batt le 123, 124, 138-4 1 Operation Meetinghouse 277 Peale, Charles Wilson 169, 174 Publkota. l ucius Getlius 41 188,203 ,224 ,22 5,228 ,231 ,240, Seton, Alexande r 72 Stirl ing 71
Mexico City 98, 102; batt le 181, 200 -02 Nash, Paul 247 Operation Overlord 268 Pearl Harbo r 260,262 ,263 Puebla 201 250-54,274,287 Sevastopol 203-05 Stoke-by -Newark 91
Michael offensive 24' Nasiriya 288 Operation See/owe 245, 249 Peloponnese 23-26,38 ,40,85 ,1 56 Punic Wars 32 RussianCivil War 140 Seven Days' Battles 206 Strachan, Sir Richard 186
MichaelVtI Doukas 60 Nationa l Convention 177- 79 Operation Totalize 272 Pembridge helm 76 Punjab 107,109 Russian Revolution 240 Seven YearsWar 162 Stuart, J. E. B. ('Jeb1 207,211
Middle East 68, 78,110, 113,255 Nationa list 12th Army (Ch inese) 281 Operation Typhoon 251,252 -53 Pernbrokeshire 89 Russo-JapaneseWar 224, 22S, 228 Seventh Army (German) 272 Stuart, John, Duke of Albany 104
Middle Hungarian Princi pality 142 Nationa list Party (Chinese) 279 Operation Uranus 257 Peng Yue 37 Qatar 288 Ryujo 261 Seville 98 Stuart , Matthew, Earl of Lennox 96,97
Midlands 139, 141 Nations, Battle of th e see Leipzig Oppeln 67 Pengcheng 37 Oin dynasty 36 Seydlitz. General Friedr ich Wilhelm SuYu 279,281
Midway: battle 223, 260 -63 Native Americans 148. 165 Orban 85 Peninsular War 187 Quaregnon 178, 179 Seale. River 160 161-62 Subedei 67,68
Mikasa 225,227 ,228 Naupectus 113-17 Orel227 Permefether. Brigadie r General 204 Quatre Bras 195 Sabres 143 Sforza, Francesco 106 submachine guns 256
Mikuma 263 Navarre, Henri 282 Orhan 85,86 Pennsylvania 206,210-14 Quebec : battle 13,147 , 16 5- 68 Sachsen-Hildbu rghausen , Prince of 160, She. River 137 su bmarines 228,263
Mi lan, captu re of 103 Nazareth 47 Oriflamme 75 Penny, Edward 168 Queen Elizaberh dreadnoughts 233 162 Shah Rukh 79 Sucre, Antonio Josed e 198-99, 199
Military Assistance Comma nd Vietnam Nebogatov, N. !. 225 Orsha 274 People 's Army of Vietnam 284-86 Queen Mary 232,233 Sachsen-Teschen. Albert Duke of Shanghai 280, 281 Sudan 48,218-21
284 Nelson, Horatio 168,183,183-87,18 7 Orsova 110 People 's liberation Arm y (Chinese) Quinua 199 178-79 5hanhaiguan :battle 123,134, 136-37 Sudan Mi litary Railway 21B
Miltiades 21 Neresheim 133,135 Osaka 127,128, 277;Castle 126;battle 279-81 Quitman, John A. 201-02 Saddam Hussein 287-90 Sharpsburg 206-09 Suenaga, Takezaki 69
Ming dynasty 70, 124, 136 Netherlands 103,117 ,118, 14B, 177 of 128 Pera 86 Sadowa:battle 181, 181,182 , 215- 17 shells 182, 238, 239 SuezCanal 113,225
Minsk 274,275 New England 172 Osama bin Laden 287 Raab 142 Safavids 110,113 Shenandoah Valley 210
Percy, Henry, Earlof Northumberland 90 Suffolk. Duke of 83
Mi ran Shah, Prince 79 New Guinea 260 Osliab ia 226,227 radar 265,266 Saffuriyah 62,64 Shenyang 280
Perevclochna 155 Suffolk. Richard de la Pole, Duke of 106
Mitsu nari,lshida 126-28 New Jersey 173-76 Osman, House of 80 RAF 249; Bomber Command 270; Saigon 285 shield-walls 48, 55, 56, 56 SUleyman I, Sultan (t he Magnificent)
Persia 19,23 ,24,47 ,66,78,94
Mitsuyoshi,Tosa 117 New Mexico 202 Osnabruck 43 Coastal Command 266; Fighter Sainte-Fey, battle of 168 shields 20, 21,3 3,33, 76, 143 110,110-12,145
Persian empire 31
Mitterand, Franc;ois 239 New Mode l Army 139-41 Otto I 51-53 , 51 Command 245,246 ,247 -49 Sakhalin Island 228 Shingen , Takeda 126 SUleyman, Prince 80
Peru 102, 198-99
M6cke rn 189,190 New York 170,173 ,174 ,176 Ottoman empire 110,112,113 Raglan,General Lord 203,204 Saladin 48,61 ,6 1-64 Shock and Awe campaign 28B Su/rana 114,116
Pescara. Fernando Francesco d 'Avolcs.
Mode l, Walte r 272,274,275 Ney, Michel 190, 195 Ottomans 47, 79,80,B5, 86,88, 93, 94, Rajputs 109 Salamis: battle 17, 18, 23- 26 Shoho 260 Suluk, Mehmed 116
Marq uisde 103,106
Mogam i 263 Nkaea 60 107,108,111 ,113,123 , 142.145 ,156, Rak6czi It, Ferenc 156 Salisbury, l or d 218 Siberia 124, 147, 252,253 Sumner , Edw in V. 208,209
Petein. Henri Philippe 238, 238
MoMcs: batt le 93,94, 110-12 Nicodemus Hill 208 158 Ramezay,Commandantde 167 Samarkand 78, 80 Sickles, Daniel 213
Peter the Great 147,153 ,15 3,1 55 Surrey, Thomas Howard , Earlof 95-97
Mohi 68 Nicopolts 48 Ottoman-Venetian war 142 Ramillies 151 Sarnnites 32 Slculus. Diodorus 27, 30 Susa 19
Petervarad (Peterwardein) 156
Molino del Rey 201 Nicosia 113 Oxenstieme. Chancello r 133 Randolf, Thomas 72 Samsonov, Alexande r 229-31 siegetechniquesfwarfa re 48,81 , 175, Sussex 54-5 7
Phaedippides 22
Molony, Brigadier C. J. C. 14 Nikopolis 41 Oxfo rd 141 Ranthambhor 108 Sandoval.Gonzalode 100-01 283 Suxian 281
phalangites 28
Mott ke, Helm uth von lBl ,115,215-17 Ntle.battle of t be 183,185 Oxfo rd. John de Vere, Earlof 89- 91 Raymond III of Tripoli 61,63 Santa Anna, Antonio lopez de 200, Silesia 159,160, 162; Army of 188,190 Swabia 51,133 ,144
phalanx 28, 29, 29, 30
Monet, Antonio 198, 199 Nile, River 218 Real 116 200-02 Sima Qian 36
Phaleron, Bayof 26 Sweden 131,132 ,133 ,148,153 ,155 ,
Mongolia 66, 124 NileVatley 218,221 Pacific Fleet (US) 260,263 Red Army 140,250,254 ,2 55 Santa Cruz. Marquis of 118 Singapore 260 159,188
Philadelphia 172
Mongols 12,47,51 ,65 ,66,67 ,67,68,70, Nimes 49 Pacific Ocean 18,69,124 ,128 ,166,202 , Red Sea 113 Santissimarrinidad 185 sipoh is 143,156 Swiepwald 216
Philip II of Spain 15,114,118, 118,
112,123 Nimitz, Chester 161,262-63 223,224, 260-63 redoubts 154,155 ,169 Saratoga:battle 147, 16 9- 72 .176 Siraj-ud-dowla. Nawab of Bengal swords 42,48 , 50, 55, 71, 94, 136
119-21
Mons 177- 79 Ninth Panzer Army 274 Pacific squadron, Russian 225 Redoubtable 185, 187 Sardis 19 163-64
Philip IVof Spain 133 Syria 39,42 ,47,48,59,60,61 ,78 ,80
Mon t Saint Jean 194, 196 Ni~ 158 Pacific War 276 Rehnskold , Coun t Carl Gunt her 154, 155 sarissae 27 Sivas 58,79 ,80 Szapolyai, Janos 112
PhilipVofSpain 149
Mon tcalm , louis·Joseph, Marquisde Noailtes, Franc;oisde 113 Palestine 48,64 Reichardtswe rben 161-62 Saudi Arabia 288 Sixth Arm y (German) 255,256,257 ,259 Szekesfehervar 143
Philip VI of France 74-7 5, 77
165,165-68 Nob unaga, Oda 126 palisades 42 Reichsarmee see Impe rial Army Sava, River 157 Sixty-Second Army (Russian) 256 Szentgo ttMrd 142
Philippines 15, 260
Montezuma , King see Moteuczoma No rdlingen: battle 123,124 , 133- 35 Pafmerston, Lord 205 Rennenkampf, Pavel 229,230 Savannah 176 Skaggerak Strait 232-35 Szoreny 110
Phoenicians 24
Xocoyotl Norfo lk. Thomas Howard, Duke of Pancsova 157 Resistance, French 268 Savoy 114 Skarabo rg batta lion 148
Pickett , Geo rge 214
Montgomery, General Bernard 268-72, 90-91 pandours 160 RevolutionaryWars 177,193 Saxony 129,133 ,143 ,144 ,153 ,159-62 , Smo lensk 251 Tacit us 42
pike s/pikemen 28,48 ,71 ,89,93 ,96,
269 No rmandy 54,74 -77 ,81 ,268-72 ;battle Panipat First Battle of 9, 12,94 , 10 7- 09; ReynaldofChinillon 61-63 160,188,215 Smyrna 60 Taharten 79
105,106
Mon tmorency camp , Quebec 166 for 224. 268- 72 , 273 Third Battle of 164 Reynold s, Joseph 212 Scandinavia 54 Soimonov, lieutenant General 204 Taiwan 279,281
Pittow, Gideon J. 201

302 303
 I NDE x

Talbot. Sir Gilbert 89 Tostig 54,55 Varna 48 Watson, Charles 163

Taliban 287 Toulon 183 varro. Ierennus 33,34,35 warteqhse 77
TaUard . Ca mille de 1SO Toulouse, battle of 49 Varus , Quintilius 42 ,43 Wavre 196
Tam erlane SeE' Tim u r rh e lame Tours 49 vassals 48.80 wekhs . MaliCimilian von 258
Tan Zhenlin 179 .281 Irefelqer.battle 168,181 . 18 3 - 87,228. Vasto, Avolos d'Aqu.no. Marquis de 105 Wellington. Du ke of 193,193-97
tanks 7,213.140.2 41-43.171,272.273. 235 Vatutin, Nikolai 257 wencestasof Bohemia 67
275 Trensoxanie 78,107 Vauxaillon ]44 Western Army (Japanese, Sekigahara l
Tannenberq : battle 223.224, 229- 3 1 Transylvania 111,142 Velasquez. Diego 98 126,127
Taranto 32 Irasimene. lake 32.35 Veneto 217 Western Front 223 , 2 40 -44
Tarcbaniotes. General Joseph 59 treaties: Allahabad 164; Ceteeu- Venice 85,106,113,114, 117. 156, 217 Westmoreland , William 284 ,285
Tartars 66 .80. 143. 145, 154, 156 Cambresis 106;GuadalupeHidalgo Vera Cruz 200 Westphalia 136
Task Force 16 262 201 ; Karlowitz 145, 156; Madrid 106; Verdun 239; battle 223. 236- 39,244; Weyand. Fred erick C. 285
Task Fo rce 27 262 Paris 20S; Portsmouth 228 ; Prague Treaty of 236 Wheatfield 213
Taupedel. Colonel 134 217 ; Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship vere. John de 89 -91 White Mountain. battle of 135
Icbemaye. River 204 and Atlian<;e 280;Vasvar 142;Verdun Verger, Jean -Bapnste-Antcme de 173 Widukind of Corvey 51-53
Iemesvar 156. lSB 236 vicennno 114 Wilhelm II, Kaiser 232 ,235
Tempters 62.64.67 Trebbia 32 Vicksburg,Mississippi 214 Wilhelmshaven 232. 234
Te noch titlan: battle 1S. 93. 99. 98 -102. Iremouiue.Louis de ta 103, 106 Victory 185, 186 William of Poiners 54
202 Trier 45 Vienna 53,123,113,144, 156; battle WilliamofTyre 61 .61 ,64
TenthArmYI French ) 241 Trier Apocalypse 48 142-45 William th e Conqueror 54,54-57
Tepeyacac 101 Trincomalee 260 Viennese Aulic War(ouncil 156 Williamsburg peninsula 174
ferumoto .Mori 126 Tripoli 61 Viet (ong 284-86 wolfe.James 165 -68
Tet Offensive 224, 284- 86 tri remes IB, 26, 40 Viet Minh 282-83 wolfpecks 265
tetwnou 69 Trois-Rivieres 168 Vietnam 224 ,282-83,284-86 Wootton,John 151
Tetzcoco 99 . 100 Trumpington, Rogerde 7} Vigo 183 Worcester 141
Teutobu rg Fore st battle 17,18, 42- 43 Tsushima: battle 15,223,224. 2 25 - 28 Villeneuve, Pierre . Comte de 183,185, World War I 223 ,232-35,236-39.
Teu t on ic Kn ig ht s 67,231 Tudor dynasty 91,95 186.186-87 240-44
Tham es estu ary 118 Tud or, Henry, Earl of Richmond see Virgil 38, 41 World Wa r II 14,223,2 45 -49,250-54.
Tha m es. River }46 Henry VII Virginia 171,173,174,209,210,214 255-59.260-63,264-67,268-72,
Thebe s 23.3 4 tulughma 108, 109 Virginia Capes , battle of t he 174 273-75.276-78
t heg ns 55.56 rumen 66 Visigoths 18 Worth, William J. 201
Them istocl es 24,14.26 Tun is 117 vistuta. River 229 ,275 Wu Sanqu! 136-37
Ther m op yl ae 17. 23 Tu n isia 48 vttebsk 274 Wlirt temberg 133,135
Tbe rou nne 9S Iur'an 63 Vladivostok 225 -28
Thessaly 31 Tu rkey 44-45,58-60,78-80,85-88,154, Vo Nguyen Giap 282 -83,285 Xerxes I 13,23-26
Theuderic IV 49 155.203 .205 voie Secree 239 Xren In cid en t 279
Third Army (British) 241 .244 Turnham Green. ba ttle of 138 Volga canal 253 Xiang Yu 36 -37
Third Armyl f rench) 241 Tuscany 114 Volga, River 224 ,255 Xiany ang 36,37
Thi rd Army IUS) 272 Tweed, River 95 Volgagrad 255 -59 Xinkiang 124
Third Pacific Squadron (Russian) 225 . Typhus 113 Vander Tann 233 Xochimilco 100
226 Vorskal, River 154 xuellenq. Zhang 279
Thi rd Panzer Army 252 ,274 u-boets 235 ,264,266,166,167 Vrana 2 1 Xuzhou 280 .281
Thi rd Roma nian Army 257 Ugaki, Matome 263 Vyazma 252
Thirteen Colonies 147,169 Ukraine 153 -55,203-05,250,251 ,273 Yakovetski wood 154, 155
Thirty Years War 123,124,129. 133, 142, Ukrainian Front. tst 275 Wachau 189 Yalu River 279
151 Ulm 51, 152;banleof 186 wedicourt 74,77 Yamamoto.tsoroku ]60,260-63
Thbkbly.lmre 142 Ul rich . Bishop 51 wagon forts 44,45 Yamoto 261
Thomas o f Elm ham 81 Ultra intelligence 264 .266,267 wagons 108, 134 Yan'en 279
Thomas Palaeologus 85 UmmQasr 288 Walder, D. ]]B Yangzi , River 37.281
Thrace 44 Union. the 206 .207,208,210-14 Wales 89 ,91 ,138,139,141 Yellow River 37
Th ree Em pe ro rs. Bartle of t he see United Nations 287 Walker, Robert 139 Yellow Sea, Battle of the 225 .227,228
leipZig United States 147,224,228,263,266, Wallachia 110,156 Yemen 48
Thuringia 160 267 ,284,285 Wallenstein. Albrecht Wenzel von 129, vererneoko. Andrei 257
Thurn, General 134 Upplandregiment 148 132 Yokohama 277
Tianjin 280 Ural Mountains 251 waner. Jeen -Jecques 1] 9 York 55:siegeof 139
Tianjin-Pukou Railway 281 Urban II, Pope 60 Wangler infantry regiment 130 York. River 176
Tibenas 63 ,64 Urbino 114 war elephants 78,94 . 108,109,109 York, Edward Duke of 83
Ticinu~cino, River 33.104 US 20th Air Force 276 War of Independence (Peru) 199 Yorktown 260 ,262.263
Tikrit 290 US Army Central Command 288 War of the Austrian Succession 151 Yorktown:battle 147, 173 - 76
Tilly, Count (Jean Tzeeclaesl 129-32 US Navy 264.266 War of the Spanish Succession 149,156 Yuan dynasty 69 ,70
Timoshenko, Semyon 252 US Special Forces 289 ,290 Warrior 233 Yugoslavia 111, 156-58
Timur t he lame 47,70,78-80.80,107 USAAF 276 ,277 Wars of Independence (En gland- Yusuf. Kara 79
TIacopan 100, 100 Uzbekistan 78 Scotland) 71
Tlaxceltan 98,99 Wars of Religion 106 lahir-ud-din Muhammad see Babur
Ilaxceltecs 100 velens. Empe ror 18,44-45.45 Warsaw 224 .275; uprising 275 lama. battle of 35
Togo, Heihachiro U5,22S-28 velentmlen I 45 warships 39.40.118,226.228 zaribas 219
Tokat 79.80 Valmy 178 Warwick. Earl of 75 Zhilinski. vakov 229
Tok ugawa 128 Valois dynasty 106 Washington 206 ,211 ,213.284,286, Zh ukov, Georgi 252-53,256
Tokyo 70,126,128.276-78 Valois, Charles de, Duc d'Alencon 106 287 ,288 Zimony 110
Tomon, Archbishop Pill 110 Van Dyck. Anthony 138 Washington, George 172,174, 174 Zouaves 205
Topkapi Palace 88 va rad 142 Waterloo: battle 12, 149.1 81, 18 2, Zuiho 261
Tcshne. M aed a 126 Vara ng ian Gua rd 59 193 -97

304
AN INTE RNATI ONALTEAM OF MILITARY HISTORIANS RECONSTRUCTS AND ANALYZES
THE SEVENTY DEC ISIVE BATTLES THAT SHAPED WORLD HISTORY

Ancient World
490 BC Marathon· 480 BC Salamis· 3J I BC Gaugamela • 216 BC Cannae
203 BC Gaixia ·31 BC Actium • AD 9 Teutoburg Forest· 37B Adrianople

Medieval World
7J2 Poitiers· 955 Lechfeld· 10 66 Hastings· 1071 Manzikert· 11 87 Hattin
1241 Lieg nitz · 1281 Hakata Bay· 1314 Bannockburn· 134 6 Crecy- 1402 Ankara
1415 Agincourt • Im The Fall of Constantinople· 14 85 Bosworth

Sixteenth Century
1513 Flodden· 1521 Tenochtitlan· 1525 Pavia· 1526 Panipat· 1526 Mohacs
1571 Lepanto· 1588 The Armada

Seventeenth Century
1600 Sekigahara • 163 I Breitenfeld • 1634 Nordlinqen • 1644 Shanhaiguan
164 5 Naseby • 1683 Vienna

Eighteenth Century
1704 Blenheim· 1709 Poltava • 1717 Belgrade· 1m Rossbach· 1m Plassey
Im Quebec· 1777 Saratoga· 1781 Yorktown· 1792 Jemappes

Nineteenth Century
IB05 Trafalgar· 18 13 Leipzig· 1815 Waterloo· 1824 Ayacucho • 1847 Mexico City
1854 Inkerman • 1862 Antietam· 1863 Gettysburg· 1866 Sadowa • 1898 Omdurman

Modern Times
190 5 Tsush ima· 1914 Tannenberg· 191 6 Jut land · 191 6 Verdun
1918 The Western Front· 1940 Battle of Britain· 1941 Battle for Moscow
1942 Stalingrad • 1942 Midway · 194 3 Battle of the Atlantic· 1944 Battle for Normandy
1944 Ope ration Bagration • 1945 The American Air Attack on Japan
194 8-4 9 Huai -Hai • 1953 - 54 Dien Bien Phu • 1968 The Tet Offensive
2003 The Iraq War

IS B N 0-500-251 2 5 -8
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Thames & Hudson 9 780500 251256
ISBN-,3: 9784500-25125-6