CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

CASES FOR MIDTERMS

JMM PROMOTIONS VS. CA | GR NO. 120095

POLICE POWER

 A thorough review of the facts and circumstances leading to the issuance of the assailed
orders compels us to rule that the Artist Record Book requirement and the questioned
Department Order related to its issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant
to a valid exercise of the police power.
 Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling,
business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of
the police power by the state particularly when their conduct affects either the execution
of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public health
and welfare and public morals. According to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas, it must of course be within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the
mode and manner in which every one may so use of his own property so as not to pose
injury to himself or others.

PHIL ASS. VS. DRILON | GR NO. 81958

POLICE POWER

 It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police power measure.
The only question is whether or not it is valid under the Constitution.
 The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined
as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare." 5 As defined, it consists of (1) an
imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good.
It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms
to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.

REPUBLIC VS. GINGOYON | GR NO. 166429

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE (SECTION 1)

EMINENT DOMAIN (SECTION 9)

 Equal protection demands that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. For purposes of
expropriation, parcels of land are similarly situated as the buildings or improvements
constructed thereon, and a disparate treatment between those two classes of real
property infringes the equal protection clause.
 While eminent domain lies as one of the inherent powers of the State, there is no
requirement that it undertake a prolonged procedure, or that the payment of the private
owner be protracted as far as practicable. In fact, the expedited procedure of payment,
as highlighted under Rep. Act No. 8974, is inherently more fair, especially to the

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 layperson who would be hard-pressed to fully comprehend the social value of
expropriation in the first place. Immediate payment placates to some degree whatever
ill-will that arises from expropriation, as well as satisfies the demand of basic fairness.
 Two stages in the expropriation of lands: The first is concerned with the determination
of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the
propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an
order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a
lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose
described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as
of the date of the filing of the complaint". The second phase of the eminent domain
action is concerned with the determination by the court of "the just compensation for
the property sought to be taken." This is done by the court with the assistance of not
more than three (3) commissioners. It is only upon the completion of these two stages
that expropriation is said to have been completed.

MCIA VS. MARCOS | GR NO. 120082

POWER OF TAXATION

 Since the last paragraph of Section 234 unequivocally withdrew, upon the effectivity of
the LGC, exemptions from real property taxes granted to natural or juridical persons,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, except as provided in the said
section, and the petitioner is, undoubtedly, a government-owned corporation, it
necessarily follows that its exemption from such tax granted it in Section 14 of its
charter, R.A. No. 6958, has been withdrawn. Any claim to the contrary can only be
justified if the petitioner can seek refuge under any of the exceptions provided in Section
234, but not under Section 133, as it now asserts, since, as shown above, the said
section is qualified by Section 232 and 234. In short, the petitioner can no longer invoke
the general rule in Section 133 that the taxing powers of the local government units
cannot extend to the levy of: (o) taxes, fees, or charges of any kind on the National
Government, its agencies, or instrumentalities, and local government units.
 Finally, even if the petitioner was originally not a taxable person for purposes of real
property tax, in light of the forgoing disquisitions, it had already become even if it be
conceded to be an "agency" or "instrumentality" of the Government, a taxable person
for such purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of Section 234 of
exemptions from the payment of real property taxes, which, as earlier adverted to,
applies to the petitioner.
 Besides, nothing can prevent Congress from decreeing that even instrumentalities or
agencies of the government performing governmental functions may be subject to tax.

PLANTER PRODUCTS VS. FERTIPHIL | GR NO. 166006

POLICE POWER

POWER OF TAXATION

 Police power and the power of taxation are inherent powers of the State. These powers
are distinct and have different tests for validity. Police power is the power of the State to

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 enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote
the general welfare,39 while the power of taxation is the power to levy taxes to be used
for public purpose. The main purpose of police power is the regulation of a behavior or
conduct, while taxation is revenue generation. The "lawful subjects" and "lawful means"
tests are used to determine the validity of a law enacted under the police power. The
power of taxation, on the other hand, is circumscribed by inherent and constitutional
limitations.
 Taxes are exacted only for a public purpose. The ₱10 levy is unconstitutional because it
was not for a public purpose. The levy was imposed to give undue benefit to PPI.

CITY OF MANILA VS. LAGUIO | GR NO. 118127

POLICE POWER

REQUISITES FOR AN ORDINANCE TO BE VALID

 The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that
for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by
law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3)
must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5)
must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
 Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when they are not contrary to the
Constitution and to the laws.38 The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must
pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency with the
prevailing laws. That ordinances should be constitutional uphold the principle of the
supremacy of the Constitution. The requirement that the enactment must not violate
existing law gives stress to the precept that local government units are able to legislate
only by virtue of their derivative legislative power, a delegation of legislative power from
the national legislature. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise
powers higher than those of the latter.
 The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to
the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise
must be reasonable and for the public good.43 In the case at bar, the enactment of the
Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and
repugnant to general laws.

GALLARDO VS. PEOPLE | GR NO. 142030

PROBABLE CAUSE

 . A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient
evidence to secure a conviction. It is enough that prosecutors believe that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the
reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charges.

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NALA VS. BARROSO | GR NO. 153087

RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES (SECTION 2)

 Considering that the search and seizure warrant in this case was procured in violation of
the Constitution and the Rules of Court, all the items seized in petitioner’s house, being
"fruits of the poisonous tree", are "inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." The
exclusion of these unlawfully seized evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.37 Hence, the
complaints filed against petitioner for illegal possession of firearms and explosive based
on illegally obtained evidence have no more leg to stand on.38 Pending resolution of
said cases, however, the articles seized are to remain in custodia legis.

MICROSOFT VS. MAXICORP | GR NO. 140946

RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES (SECTION 2)

PROBABLE CAUSE

SPECIFICITY OF SEARCH WARRANT

 The testimonies of these two witnesses, coupled with the object and documentary
evidence they presented, are sufficient to establish the existence of probable cause.
From what they have witnessed, there is reason to believe that Maxicorp engaged in
copyright infringement and unfair competition to the prejudice of petitioners. Both NBI
Agent Samiano and Sacriz were clear and insistent that the counterfeit software were
not only displayed and sold within Maxicorp’s premises, they were also produced,
packaged and in some cases, installed there.
 The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and
standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As
implied by the words themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with probability, not
absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof
beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent
man,24 not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial.
 A search warrant must state particularly the place to be searched and the objects to be
seized. The evident purpose for this requirement is to limit the articles to be seized only
to those particularly described in the search warrant. This is a protection against
potential abuse. It is necessary to leave the officers of the law with no discretion
regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that no unreasonable searches and
seizures be committed.
 It is only required that a search warrant be specific as far as the circumstances will
ordinarily allow. The description of the property to be seized need not be technically
accurate or precise.
 A partially defective warrant remains valid as to the items specifically described in the
warrant.

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SALVADOR VS. PEOPLE | GR NO. 146706

RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES (SECTION 2)

 Here, it should be noted that during the incident in question, the special mission of the
PAF operatives was to conduct a surveillance operation to verify reports of drug
trafficking and smuggling by certain PAL personnel in the vicinity of the airport. In other
words, the search made by the PAF team on petitioner and his co-accused was in the
nature of a customs search. As such, the team properly effected the search and seizure
without a search warrant since it exercised police authority under the customs law.

PEOPLE VS. VALDEZ | GR NO. 129296

PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE

 We find no reason to subscribe to Solicitor General's contention that we apply the "plain
view" doctrine. For the doctrine to apply, the following elements must be present: (a) a
prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; and (c) the evidence
must be immediately apparent; and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence
without further search.
 Hence, there was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search of appellant's
premises. Note further that the police team was dispatched to appellant's kaingin
precisely to search for and uproot the prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain
view" applies only where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.37 Clearly, their
discovery of the cannabis plants was not inadvertent.

RAMIREZ VS. CA | GR NO. 93833

PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE (SECTION 3)

ANTI-WIRETAPPING LAW

 "Even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with
another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this
provision of R.A. 4200.

CHAVEZ VS. GONZALES | GR NO. 168338

CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER RULE

 Applying the foregoing, it is clear that the challenged acts in the case at bar need to be
subjected to the clear and present danger rule, as they are content-based restrictions.
The acts of respondents focused solely on but one object—a specific content— fixed as
these were on the alleged taped conversations between the President and a COMELEC

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 official. Undoubtedly these did not merely provide regulations as to the time, place or
manner of the dissemination of speech or expression.
 This is not to suggest, however, that the clear and present danger rule has been applied
to all cases that involve the broadcast media. The rule applies to all media, including
broadcast, but only when the challenged act is a content-based regulation that infringes
on free speech, expression and the press.
 For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present
danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free
press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly
endangers the national security of the State.
 Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an
official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an "act" does
not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official circular. Otherwise,
the non formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the easy
circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint. The press statements at bar are acts
that should be struck down as they constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on
the right to free speech and press.
 In VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The writs of certiorari and prohibition are
hereby issued, nullifying the official statements made by respondents on June 8, and 11,
2005 warning the media on airing the alleged wiretapped conversation between the
President and other personalities, for constituting unconstitutional prior restraint on the
exercise of freedom of speech and of the press

TULFO VS. PEOPLE | GR NO. 161032

FREEDOM OF SPEECH, EXPRESSION, AND OF THE PRESS (SECTION 4)

 To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute
a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that
while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because
every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false
imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is
directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In
order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must
either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the
comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial
that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from
the facts.
 In order that the publication of a report of an official proceeding may be considered
privileged, the following conditions must exist: (a) That it is a fair and true report of a
judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or
of a statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act
performed by a public officer in the exercise of his functions; (b) That it is made in good
faith; and (c) That it is without any comments or remarks.
 The printer of a publication containing libelous matter is liable for the same by reason of
his direct connection therewith and his cognizance of the contents thereof. With regard

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 to a publication in which a libel is printed, not only is the publisher but also all other
persons who in any way participate in or have any connection with its publication are
liable as publishers.

SWS VS. COMELEC | GR NO. 147571

FREEDOM OF SPEECH, EXPRESSION, AND OF THE PRESS (SECTION 4)

 O 'Brien test. Under this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental interest is "not
unrelated to the Expression of free expression." Moreover, even if the purpose is
unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the law should nevertheless be invalidated
if the restriction on freedom of expression is greater than is necessary to achieve the
governmental purpose in question.
 Thus, contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General, the prohibition imposed by §5.4
cannot be justified on the ground that it is only for a limited period and is only
incidental. The prohibition may be for a limited time, but the curtailment of the right of
expression is direct, absolute, and substantial. It constitutes a total suppression of a
category of speech and is not made less so because it is only for a period of fifteen (15)
days immediately before a national election and seven (7) days immediately before a
local election.
 To summarize then, we hold that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint
on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of
expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the
governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than
suppression of freedom of expression.

INC VS. CA | GR NO. 119673

FREEDOM OF RELIGION (SECTION 5)

 The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent
appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the
subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no
showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity
and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious
speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a
substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground.

MARCOS VS. COMELEC | GR NO. 119976

LIBERTY OF ABODE (SECTION 6)

DOMICILE VS. RESIDENCE

 There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a

place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a
residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile

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 is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have
but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places
of residence. His place of residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any
means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will
constitute domicile.
 Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil
law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear
is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of
husband and wife — the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual
residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law
delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she
kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium
necessarium.
 In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this
court up to this point, we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh
heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or
domicile in the First District of Leyte.

BANTAY REPUBLIC VS. COMELEC | GR NO. 177271

RIGHT TO INFORMATION (SECTION 7)

 Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion
right of access to official records are not absolute. As articulated in Legaspi, supra, the
people’s right to know is limited to "matters of public concern" and is further subject to
such limitation as may be provided by law.
 As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the
names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec
committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the
petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective
petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.
 In all, we agree with the petitioners that respondent Comelec has a constitutional duty
to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the
herein petitions.

TRADE UNIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES (TUCP) VS. NHC | GR
NO. L-49677

RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATIONS (SECTION 8)

 The workers or employees of NHC undoubtedly have the right to form unions or
employees' organizations. The right to unionize or to form organizations is now explicitly
recognized and granted to employees in both the governmental and the private sectors.
The Bill of Rights provides that "(t)he right of the people, including those employed in
the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged".

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  There is, therefore, no impediment to the holding of a certification election among the
workers of NHC for it is clear that they are covered by the Labor Code, the NHC being a
government-owned and/or controlled corporation without an original charter. Statutory
implementation of the last cited section of the Constitution is found in Article 244 of the
Labor Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 111.
 The records do not show that supervening factual events have mooted the present
action. It is meet, however, to also call attention to the fact that, insofar as certification
elections are concerned, subsequent statutory developments have rendered academic
even the distinction between the two types of government-owned or controlled
corporations and the laws governing employment relations therein, as hereinbefore
discussed. For, whether the employees of NHC are covered by the Labor Code or by the
civil service laws, a certification election may be conducted.

BANGALISAN, ET. AL. VS. CA | GR NO. 124678

RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATIONS (SECTION 8)

 It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that employees in the public service may not
engage in strikes. While the Constitution recognizes the right of government
employees to organize, they are prohibited from staging strikes, demonstrations,
mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary
stoppage or disruption of public services. The right of government employees to
organize is limited only to the formation of unions or associations, without including
the right to strike.
 Petitioners contend, however, that they were not on strike but were merely
exercising their constitutional right peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances. We find such pretension devoid of merit.
 The ability to strike is not essential to the right of association. In the absence of
statute, public employees do not have the right to engage in concerted work
stoppages for any purpose.
 It bears stressing that suspension of public services, however temporary, will
inevitably derail services to the public, which is one of the reasons why the right to
strike is denied government employees.