1. Javellana vs Executive Secretary, G.R. No.

L-36142 March 31, 1973

P: The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those lacking the
qualifications and having the disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution the right of
suffrage.

F: Javellana, as a Filipino citizen and a qualified and registered voter and as a class suit
filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them from implementing any of the
provisions of the proposed Constitution not found in the present 1935 Constitution. He
further alleged that the President had announced the immediate implementation of the
new constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including without authority to create the
Citizens Assemblies; without power to approve proposed constitution; without power to
proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution; and the
election held to ratify the proposed constitution was not a free election, hence null and
void.

I: Whether the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been
ratified validly conforming to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions.

R: No. The Proceedings held in such Citizen’s Assemblies were fundamentally irregular,
in that persons lacking the qualifications prescribed in Article V Section 1 of the 1935
Constitution were allowed to vote in said Assemblies. And, since there is no means by
which the invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age can be separated or
segregated from those of the qualified voters, the proceedings in the Citizen’s
Assemblies must be considered null and void.
2. Jacobson vs Massachusetts 197 US 22 (1905)

P: The United States does not derive any of its substantive powers from the Preamble of
the Constitution. It cannot exert any power to secure the declared objects of the
Constitution unless, apart from the Preamble, such power be found in, or can properly
be implied from, some express delegation in the instrument.

F: The city of Cambridge adopted a regulation requiring all of its inhabitants who were
not vaccinated against smallpox in the last five years to be vaccinated or
revaccinated. The state imposed a $5 fine for people over 21 who violated this law,
although it provided an exception for children with a doctor's certificate as they are not fit
for vaccination. Jacobson, an individual over 21, refused to comply with the vaccination
requirement and faced a criminal complaint where was found guilty. He sued the State
claiming that it exceeded its own powers for adopting the regulation.

I: Whether the regulation is may be deemed unconstitutional on the grounds that it was
arbitrary, oppressive or not reasonably required for the safety of the public

R: No. the vaccination law did not violate the 14th Amendment because the police
power of the state may be allowed to constrain individual liberties through reasonable
regulations when required to protect public safety. The efforts by Cambridge to stamp
out smallpox are substantially related to the protection of public health and safety. There
has been nothing to clearly justify the Court holding the statute to be unconstitutional.
3. Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board 9 SCRA 27 (1963)

P: Under the express terms of the Constitution, it is doubful whether the arrest of an
individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely
to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative
investigation. The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case
and administrative proceedings. One suspected of a violation of an administrative nature
is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge. In
deportation proceedings, a warrant of arrest may be issued only if there is a final order of
deportation.

F: Special Prosecutor Galang charged petitioners before the Deportation Board, having
purchased US dollars without the necessary license from the Central Bank, which was
then secretly remitted to Hong Kong. Petitioners attempted to bribe officers of the PHL
and US governments to evade prosecution for the unauthorized purchase. In effect,
Deportation Board issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner (E.O. No 398, series of 1951).
Upon fixing of bonds, petitioner was temporarily set free.

I: 1. Whether the President has authority to deport aliens.

2. Whether the Deportation Board also has authority to file warrants of arrest.

R: 1. YES. The Revised Administrative Code authorizes unto the President power to
deport, expel or exclude from the PH a subject of a foreign power provided there is a
prior investigation conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground
upon which such action is contemplated. In such case the person concerned shall: be
informed of his charges, be allowed preparation of his defense, be heard by himself or
counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing
witnesses.

2. Yes. but only after investigation has resulted to the actual order of deportation.
However, in the case at bar, Executive Order No. 398 allowing the Deportation Board to
issue the warrant was declared illegal. As a consequence, the order of arrest issued by
respondent is declared null and void.
4. Republic of the Philippines vs Villasor, [G.R. No. L-30671. November 28, 1973)

P: A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete
theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against
the authority that makes the law on which the right depends

F: A decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R in favor of respondents

of that case and against the petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award subject of
Special Proceedings. Respondent Honorable Villasor, issued an Order declaring said
decision of final and an alias writ of execution against the properties of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines. Petitioner filed prohibition proceedings and alleged that
respondent Judge acted in excess of jurisdiction [or] with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance as the funds and properties of
the AFP are considered public in nature.

I: Whether the state can be sued without its consent.

R: No. The provision of Sec 3 Article XVI declares that “the State may not be sued
without its consent”. This provision is merely a recognition of the sovereign character of
the State and express an affirmation of the unwritten rule insulating it from the
jurisdiction of the courts of justice. Another justification is the practical consideration that
the demands and inconveniences of litigation will divert time and resources of the State
from the more pressing matters demanding its attention, to the prejudice of the public
welfare.
5. Professional Video vs. TESDA, 591 SCRA 83 (2009)

P: The proscribed suit that the state immunity principle covers takes on various forms,
namely: a suit against the Republic by name; a suit against an unincorporated
government agency; a suit against a government agency covered by a charter with
respect to the agencys performance of governmental functions; and a suit that on its
face is against a government officer, but where the ultimate liability will fall on the
government.

F: Professional Video Inc. (PROVI) signed and executed the “Contract Agreement
Project PVC ID Card issuance” for the provision of goods and services in the printing
and encoding of the PVC cards in exchange for payment of specified sum of money from
TESDA. PROVI filed a complaint for collection alleging that TESDA still owed an
outstanding balance and remains unpaid. TESDA claims that it entered the Contract
Agreement and Addendum in the performance of its governmental function, hence its
immune from suit.

I: Can TESDA be sued without its consent?

R: No. TESDA performs governmental functions,from the perspective of this function,

the core reason for the existence of state immunity applies i.e., the public policy reason
that the performance of governmental function cannot be hindered or delayed by suits,
nor can these suits control the use and disposition of the means for the performance of
governmental functions.
6. US vs Guinto, [ G.R. No. 76607. February 26, 1990 ]

P: State Immunity cannot be invoked by the petitioners for the fact that they entered into
a contract with a private party, commercial in nature.

F: Private respondents sued several officers of the US Air Force regarding a bidding for
barbering services contract wherein Ramon Dizon won the bidding. The private
respondents complained with the contention that Dizon also bid for the Civil Engineering
(CE) area which was not included in the bidding invitation. The contract expiry of the CE
barbershop was extended only until the end of June 1986. Hence, the respondents filed
a petition, with a prayer to compel PHAX and the individual petitioners to revoke the
award to Dizon, and conduct a rebidding to allow the private respondents to continue
operating their concessions by a writ of preliminary injunction pending litigation. To
maintain status quo, Respondent court issued an ex parte order to the petitioners.
Petitioners filed a motion for dismissal and contended that the action was in effect a suit
against the US Force.

I: Whether or not the petitioners can use State Immunity as defense.

R: No. Under Art. XVI, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution, it does not mean that at all times, the
State may not be sued. There needs to be a consideration on if they were indeed acting
within the capacity of their duties, or if they enter into a contract with a private party. The
barbershops, subject of the bidding awarded were commercial enterprises, operated by
private persons, therefore they are not agencies of the US Armed Forces nor part of
their facilities. Although the barbershops provide service to the military, they were for a
fee
7. Traders Royal Bank vs Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) and Hon. Cendana, [ G.R.
No. 68514. December

P: Immunity from suit may be waived by an implied consent to be sued as when,

through its officers and agents, the state enters into a contract in furtherance of a
legitimate aim and purpose. By doing so, the state descends to the level of the citizen
and its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into such contract.

F: Traders, a banking institution entered into a loan agreement with the NMPC, a
government instrumentality and PSI. NMPC and PSI did not make any payments on
their obligation and did not comply with the conditions agreed upon. Hence, Traders filed
a complaint to collect the whole amount of the loan. After NMPC's motions to dismiss
were denied by CFI, they filed for Certiorari with the IAC on the grounds that government
property cannot be attached, removed, concealed or disposed of. The IAC granted the
same ruling that NMPC's act of entering into a contract did not mean that it voluntarily
waived its immunity from suit as NMPC truly has no personality of its own.

I: Whether NMPC’s act of entering into a contract means that it voluntarily waived its
immunity from suit

R: Yes. NMPC was engaged in an undertaking which was not incidental to

disseminating governmental information. Only is it immune when a non-governmental
function is undertaken as an incident to a governmental function, hence there is no
waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity.
8. NHA VS. Heirs of Guivelondo, 404 SCRA 389 (2003)

P: If the funds belong to a public corporation or a government-owned or controlled

corporation which is clothed with a personality of its own, separate and distinct from that
of the government, then its funds are not exempt from garnishment. This is so because
when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign
capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation.

F: NHA called the alleged claimants of the the land, herein respondents, they intend to
develop as a socialized housing project. Respondents waived their objections to
petitioner’s power to expropriate their properties. A motion for execution was filed by the
respondents for payment of just compensation and was then granted by thecourt. The
petitioner filed with the trial court a Motion to Dismiss the civil case complaint for eminent
domain, alleging that the implementation of its socialized housing project was rendered
impossible by the unconscionable value of the land sought to be expropriated, which the
intended beneficiaries can’t afford.

I: WHETHER OR NOT WRITS OF EXECUTION AND GARNISHMENT MAY BE

ISSUED AGAINST THE STATE IN AN EXPROPRIATION WHEREIN THE EXERCISE
OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN WILL allegedly NOT SERVE PUBLIC USE
OR PURPOSE

R: socialized housing is always for the public used and that the public purpose of the
socialized housing project is not in any way diminished by the amount of just
compensation that the court has fixed. However, the doctrine of state immunity cannot
be applied to the NHA, although it is “public in character”, it is only public in character
since it is government-owned, having a juridical personality separate and distinct from
the government, the funds of such government-owned and controlled corporations and
non-corporate agency, although considered public in character, are not exempt from
garnishment.
9. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan 484 SCRA 119 (2006)

P: A State's consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into such contract
whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise therefrom,
breach of which on its part gives the corresponding right to the other party to the
agreement.

F: PCGG sequestered Negros Occidental Golf and Country Club, Inc. (NOGCCI), which
shares were supposed to be owned by Roberto Benedicto. The PCGG entered into a
Compromise Agreement with Benedicto and lifted the sequestration on his 227 shares.
Because PCGG did not seem intent to return the shares to him as agreed upon,
Benedicto instituted actions against the Commission. In all instances, the
Sandiganbayan ruled in favor of Benedicto and directed PCGG to return the shares or
pay, in default. Subsequently the PCGG filed the instant petition before the SC
contending amonng others that PCGG is immune from any lawsuit following the
principle of the non-suability of the State.

I: Whether PCGG is immune from any lawsuit.

R: No, by entering into a Compromise Agreement with Benedicto, the PCGG had
stripped itself of its immunity from suit and placed itself in the level of its adversary.
When the State enters into a contract through its officers and agents, in furtherance of a
legitimate aim or purpose and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority, whereby
mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise therefrom, the State
may be sued even without its express consent. By entering into a contract, the sovereign
descends to the level of the citizen.
10. Republic VS. Hidalgo 477 SCRA 32 (2005)

P: Consent to be sued does not include the execution of judgement against it. The
power of the court ends when the judgement is rendered.

F: The Office of the President, during the administration President Marcos, wrested
possession of the disputed Arlegui property and somehow secured a certificate of title
over it without a conveying deed having been executed to legally justify the cancellation
of the old title in the name of private respondent/property owner Tarcilla Mendoza and
the issuance of a new one in the name of petitioner Republic. Private respondent filed an
action for the annulment or declaration of nullity of the title and deed of sale and
reconveyance against the Republic. The case was initially dismissed due to state
immunity and was re-raffled with respondent Hidalgo as presiding Judge. In a decision
by default, Mendoza’s petitions were GRANTED and the court ordered the Republic
topay the private respondent just compensation. A writ of execution was issued but was
prayed by petitioner to be nullified as it was rendered in violation of the Constitution.

I: Whether the issuance of the Writ against petitioner is valid.

R: No. The assailed trial court’s issuance of the writ of execution against government
funds to satisfy its money judgement is null and void. Consent to be sued does not
include the execution of judgement against it. The power of the court ends when the
judgement is rendered. Government funds and properties may not be seized under writs
of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgements. Judgements against the state
generally operate merely to liquidate and establish the plaintiff’s claim in the absence of
express provision.