Conclusion and Suggestion

CHAPTER - V
BREAKDOWN OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL MACHINERY IN

THE STATES UNDER ARTICLE 356 (PRESIDENT’S RULE)
5.0. Introduction
Article 356 of the Constitution has become a focal point of heated debates,
controversies and bravado in recent times because of its misuse for partisan purposes.
Even the founding fathers of our Constitution apprehended the possible misuse or
employment of it for ‗political purposes‘, or being resorted to ‗for unnecessary‘ or
―intolerant action‘ through political prejudices. Another apprehension was that the Centre
might intervene in petty Provincial matters on the ―slightest pretext of ― resolving
ministerial crisis‖, or purifying or reforming maladministration‖, or ―Mismanagement‖
or ―inefficiency or corruption‖ in a Province or for ―resolving a mere crisis‖ or ―vote of
no confidence in the ministry by the legislature‖, or for ensuring ―good government‖.
This if permitted will result in reducing the autonomy of the state to a farse.1
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar echoed the sentiments of the framers of the Constitution when
he said,2―The proper thing we might expect is that such Articles will never be called into
operation and that they would remain as a dead letter‖. While expressing his opinion on
Article 356, Dr.B.R.Ambedkar said that...
―I share the sentiments that such articles will never be called into operation and
they would remain a dead letter. If at all they are brought into operation, I hope the
President, who is endowed with these powers, will take proper precautions before
actually suspending the administration of the provinces. I hope the first thing he will do
would be to issue a mere warning to a province that has erred, that things were not
happening in the way in which they were intended to happen in the Constitution. If that
warning fails, the second thing for him to do will be to order an election allowing the
1
Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. IX, p.133.
2
ibid.
129
Andhra University, Visakhapatnam

people of the province to settle matters by themselves. It is only when these two remedies
fail that he would resort to this Article 356‖
President‘s rule is an exception and a limitation on the principle of Constitutional

Government in a State. It brings to an end for the time being, a duly elected Government
in the State. During the period of proclamation, the Centre takes over the reign of the
Government in the State. It may be argued that a larger democracy temporarily takes
control of a smaller democracy. This is because the Constitutional machinery in the State
is not suspended. Article 356 is a very tricky power. Exercised properly, it may operate as
a safety valve for the system. Abused or misused it can destroy the Constitutional
distribution of powers between the Union and the States.
The focus of this chapter is on the breakdown of the Constitutional machinery in

the states under Article 356 and its practical implications for the Indian polity. It throws
light on the emergency provisions, particularly the one dealing with the case of failure of
the constitutional machinery of the State, which is predominantly considered on the
ground that these provisions have been invoked a number of (more than 127 times) since
the incorporation of the Constitution but most of the times, the powers vested by these
provisions have been misused by the Centre for the purpose of dissolving State
Governments ruled by political rivalries. Thus, the critical analysis of these provisions
become the subject matter of this research study apart from explaining the scope of these
provisions, the amendments under it and the change that has taken place in its
implementation over the period of time.
5.1. The Constitutional Provision of Article 356
Provisions in case of failure of constitutional machinery in States:
(1) If the President on receipt of a report from the Governor of a State or otherwise, is
satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the government of the State cannot be
carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution, the President
may by Proclamation-
130

(a) assume to himself all or any of the functions of the Government of the
State and all or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by the Governor
or anybody or authority in the State other than the Legislature of the State;
(b) declare that the powers of the Legislature of the State shall be exercisable
by or under the authority of Parliament;
(c) make such incidental or any consequential provisions as appear to the

President to be necessary or desirable for giving effect to the objects of the
Proclamation, including provisions for suspending in whole or in part the
operation of any provisions of this Constitution relating to anybody or
authority in the State.
Provided that nothing in this clause shall authorise the President to assume to
himself any of the powers vested in or exercisable by a High Court or to suspend in
whole or in part the operation of any provision of this Constitution relating to High
Courts.
(2) Any such Proclamation may be revoked or varied by a subsequent Proclamation.
(3) Every Proclamation issued under this article shall be laid before each House of
Parliament and shall, except where it is a Proclamation revoking a previous
Proclamation, cease to operate at the expiration of two months unless before the
expiration of that period it has been approved by resolution of both Houses of
Parliament.
Provided that if any such proclamation (not being a Proclamation revoking a

previous Proclamation) is issued at a time when the House of the People is dissolved or if
the dissolution of the House of the people takes place during the period of two months
referred to in this clause and, if a resolution approving the Proclamation has been passed
by the Council of States, but no resolution with respect to such Proclamation has been
passed by the House of the people before the expiration of that period, the Proclamation
shall cease to operate at the expiration of thirty days from the date on ,which the House of
the People first sits after its reconstitution unless before the expiration of the said period
131

of thirty days a resolution approving the Proclamation has been passed by the House of
the People.
(4) A Proclamation so approved shall, unless revoked, cease to operate on the

expiration of a period of six months from the date of issue of the Proclamation.
Provided that if and so often as a resolution approving the continuance in

force of such a Proclamation is passed by both Houses of the Parliament, the
Proclamation shall, unless revoked, continue in force for a further period of six
months from the date on, which under this clause it would otherwise have ceased to
operate, but no such Proclamation shall in any case remain in force for more than
three years.
Provided further that if the dissolution of the House of the People takes place
during any such period of six months and a resolution approving the continuance in
force of such Proclamation has been passed by the Council of States, but no
resolution with respect to the continuance has been passed by the House of the
People during the said period, the Proclamation shall cease to operate at the
expiration of thirty days from the date on which the House of the People first sits
after its reconstitution unless before the expiration of the said period of thirty days a
resolution approving the continuance in force of the Proclamation has been passed
by the House of the People.
Provided also that in the case of the Proclamation issued under clause (1) on
the 11th day of May 1987 with respect to the State of Punjab, the reference in the
first proviso to this clause to "three years" shall be construed as a reference to five
years.
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (4), a resolution with respect to die
continuance in force of a Proclamation approved under clause (3) for any period
beyond the expiration of one year from the date of issue of such Proclamation
shall not be passed by either House of Parliament unless –
132

(a) a proclamation of Emergency is in operation, in the whole of India or, as
the case may be, in the whole or any part of the State, at the time of
passing of such resolution, and
(b) the Election Commission certifies that the continuance in force of the
Proclamation approved under clause (3) during the period specified in such
resolution is necessary on account of difficulties in holding general
elections to the Legislative Assembly of the State concerned.
5.2. Article 356- A Critical Analysis
The meaning and implications of Article 356 can be easily studied by

dividing it into certain ingredients. They are:
(i) Satisfaction of the President
(ii) Report from the Governor or otherwise
(iii) A situation where the State Government cannot be carried on in

accordance with the provisions of this Constitution
(iv) Proclamation by the President
(v) Consequences of Proclamation
(vi) Period of the Proclamation
5.2.1 Satisfaction of the President
The drastic power under Article 356 can only be applied with the President's
satisfaction. In other words, the existence of President's satisfaction is a condition
precedent to the exercise of power under Article 356.3 The President is head of the
Union and also the Chief Executive. According to Article 53(1), the executive power
of the Indian Union is vested in the President, which is to be exercised, either
directly or indirectly though officers are subordinate to him, in accordance with the
3
1989 AIR 100, 1988 SCR Supl. (3) 155.
133

Constitution. 4 The President, under the Constitution, is vested with enormous
powers. Article 77(1) declares that 'All executive action of the Government of India
shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the President.'5
However, as we have adopted a parliamentary system of government, the

President has to be a nominal or ceremonial executive. Dr. Ambedkar said in the
Constituent Assembly, "Under the Draft Constitution, the President occupies the
same position as the King under the British Constitution. He is head of the State but
not of the executive. He represents the nation but does not rule the nation. His place
in the administration is that of a ceremonial device on a seat by which the nation's
decisions are made known."6
Article 74 (1) stipulates a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the
head to aid and advise the President. But the President is not only to take advice on
all matters but required to act accordingly. 7 There has been a long controversy
regarding the real position of the President vis-à-vis Council of Ministers that
seemed to have settled by the 42nd amendment to the Constitution which in so many
words made it clear that the aid and advice tendered to President by the Council of
Ministers is binding upon him.8 The 44th Constitutional Amendment made a further
progress by giving President an option to send back the advice, either generally or
otherwise for reconsideration but he is bound to act after such reconsideration.9 Thus
for all practical and even legal purposes, the President means the Prime Minister and
his Council of Ministers who are collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha vide
Article 75(3)10. The Constitution vide Article 74 (2) also makes the communication
between the President and the Council of Ministers as secret and no court in India
has the authority to ask the President as to what the aid was and advise tendered to
him by the Council of Ministers.''
4
M.P. Singh, op.cit., p. 341.
5
Jain, M.P. Indian Constitutional Law, Nagpur: Wadhwa and Company, Law Publishers, 2011.
6
Constitution Assembly Debates (Herein after referred to as CAD) Vol. VI, pp. 985-86.
7
ibid, p. 974
8
M.P. Singh, op. cit., p. 341
9
ibid, p. 172
10
ibid.
134

The President also enjoys immunity under Article 361. He is personally
immune from legal actions for his official acts and not answerable to any court for
the same. He cannot be either summoned by any court or amenable to the writs and
directions issued by any court.
However, this does not give a free hand to the Council of Ministers to enjoy
immunity under the President's garb. Though the court cannot inquire about the aid
and advice given by the Council of Ministers, the Court can certainly ask for the
production of material on which the ministerial advice was made. In Bommai‘s case,
the Supreme Court decided that the material on the basis of which, the advice is
given cannot be kept away from the Court and is open to judicial scrutiny. 11 The
apex Court ruled that the satisfaction of the President is not his personal whim, wish,
view or opinion but a legitimate inference drawn from the material placed before
him which is relevant for the purpose. In other words, the President has to be
convinced of or has to have sufficient proof of information with regard to or has to
be free from doubt or certainty about the state of things indicating that the situation
in question has arisen. The President's satisfaction has to be based on objective
material.
5.2.2. Report from the Governor or otherwise
Normally, the President acts on the report from the Governor while taking
any action under Article 356 of the Constitution. Appointed by the President, the
Governor is the head of the State and enjoys the same immunity as the President at
the Centre. He is appointed by the President for five years but remain in the office so
long he enjoys the pleasure of the President.
Under the compulsions of the parliamentary system, the Governor is to act

under the aid and advise of his Council of Ministers except in so far, he is to act
under his discretion, which has not been defined by the Constitution. But it is very
clear that his power to report the breakdown of the constitutional machinery is a
discretionary power, which he is expected to exercise independently of his Council
11
AIR 1994 Vol. III 3 SCC S.R. Bommai & others Vs. Union of India & Others.
135

of Ministers for the Governor's report recommending executive action under Article
356 would mean death for the Council of Ministers and no sensible Council of
Minister would tender such an advise and sign its own death warrant. 12 Dr.
Ambedkar also said, "Such a report by a Governor can hardly be made on the advice
of his Ministers, for, if the Governor is to act on their advice in the matter of
suspension of the operation of the Constitution, the Ministers will never advise him
to take such an action, which would inevitably put an end to their administration." 13
In fact, by the very nature of the power (under Article 356) it cannot be exercised on
the advice of his ministry for it may very often happen that the report may itself be a
condemnation of the Council of Ministers to the effect that the Government run by
the Council of Ministers is not being conducted or is no longer likely to be
conducted in accordance with the Constitution.14
The Administrative Reforms Commission (1969) recommended that before

making a report, 'the Governor should have exhausted his own right to advise and
warn so that his Ministry would have no grievance that it has been kept in dark.15
The question whether the power to report under Article 356 constitutes
Governor's discretionary power was raised in 1959 subsequent to the imposition of
President's rule in Kerala, which has been cited as the most classical case of abuse of
Article 356. It was felt that the Governor should have sent the report on the advice of
the Chief Minister. But the then Home Minister Govind Ballabh Pant stated
categorically that that position was indefensible because the Governor's function in
this sphere was designed to be independent function for the purpose of assisting the
President in discharging a very heavy responsibility.16 But this does not prohibit the
Chief Minister to advise the Governor to recommend the President to impose Article
356.
12
Basu, D.D. Introduction to the Constitution of India, New Delhi: Wadhwa and Company, Law
Publishers, 2011.
13
See Report of the Committee of Governors, 1971, p. l5.
14
A.K. Sen, Role of Governors in the Emerging Patterns of Centre-State Relations in India, (Delhi, ICPS,
1975) p. 65.
15
ARC Report p.27.
16
A.K. Sen, op. cit., p. 66.
136

The Governor's report is a public document and not secret.17 It is also open to
judicial scrutiny to determine the legality of the proclamation. In his report, the
Governor must act bonafide and reasonably and must have materials to sustain his
judgement that the Government of the State could not be carried on in accordance
with the Constitution. If there are no materials or if the materials are such that, no
reasonable person could come to that conclusion, the Governor's action would be
illegal and unconstitutional. 18 Although there are no fixed parameters, which the
Governor is to follow while making his report, he gives details of the reasons and
incidents, which he thinks result in the breakdown of the constitutional machinery.
The importance of the report and especially its content can hardly be
overlooked since it is liable to be the basis of judgement of the court if the
proclamation is challenged. The Karnataka High Court dealt with this issue and
analysed the concept of report. The Court made a differentiation between report and
opinion and ruled that the Governor's report should contain the facts reflecting the
situation that has arisen in the State and the inferences drawn and conclusions
reached by him on the basis of those facts. In case the report only contains the
opinion of the Governor and the President invokes Article 356 on that basis, then
such a proclamation will be void because it is not issued on the basis of President's
satisfaction. In such a case, the Court ruled, it will be factually an expression of
satisfaction of the Governor by the President as his own, instead of expressing his
(President's) satisfaction. Further, the Court held, ―However, if the report of the
Governor discloses the relevant material facts along with his own assessment of the
situation, consideration of the said report by the President would necessarily include
consideration and appreciation of the relevant material facts by the President. The
President's satisfaction may coincide with that of the Governor, but such coincidence
will not render Presidential satisfaction illusory or non-existent one. The satisfaction
17
GOI Reports 1954.
18
Barium Chemicals Ltd. V. Company Law Board, A.I.R.1967 S.C. 295, quoted in A.K. Sen,
op. cit.p.66.
137

arrived at by the President based on the report of the Governor which contained
relevant material facts, cannot be held unconstitutional."19
The Supreme Court in S. R. Bommai case ruled that in case a Ministry seems
to have lost the confidence of the Assembly, the Governor should opt for a floor-test
to determine the issue. However, if due to some reason, floor test is not possible then
he should record the reasons in his report.20
However, there is the otherwise clause, which implies that the President's
source of information could be other than the Governor's report.21 In extreme case, it
may be due to the inability of the Governor to send such a report. In fact, the Draft
Constitution did not contain this otherwise clause. It was introduced during the
second reading of the Draft Constitution. Dr. Ambedkar justified it on the ground of
newly introduced Article 355 (then Article 277A), which made it a necessity since it
was the duty of the Centre to protect every State from external aggression and
internal disturbances, and to ensure that the government of the State is carried on in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Dr. Ambedkar apprehended that
the Governor did not make a report but... ‗Nonetheless the facts are such that the
President feels that his intervention is necessary and imminent, and in such a
situation, we must also give liberty to the President to act even when there is no
report by the Governor.'22
5.2.3. A situation where the State Government cannot be carried on in accordance

with the provisions of this Constitution
Article 356 can be imposed in a particular situation in which a government of

State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution or, to use
the words written in the margin of the Article, breakdown of constitutional machinery.
Dr. Ambedkar in Constituent Assembly had explained that it meant that the form of
19
AIR 1990 Karnataka p. 20.
20
S.R. Bommai Vs. Union of India 1994.
21
Maheshwari, Shriram. President's Rule in India. Delhi: Macmillan, 1977, p.84.
22
CAD Vol. IX, p. l34.
138

Constitution be maintained or as Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar explained responsible
government. Dr. Ambedkar had denied that it meant good governance.
But the issue is whether the words in accordance with the provisions of this
Constitution means merely the letters of the Constitution or include as well the
democratic spirit, conventions and fundamental assumptions on which the Constitution is
based. On this basis, there can be two interpretations of Article 356-narrow interpretation
and wider interpretation. Narrow interpretation limits the interpretation to the written
words of the Constitution, which can be explained by quoting Alladi Krishnaswami
Ayyar who explained it in the Constituent Assembly thus: "The primary thing concerning
the nation and the Union Government is 'to maintain the Constitution.' If the import of
that expression is fully realised, it will be noticed that there cannot be any intention to
interfere with the Provincial Constitution, because the provincial Constitution is a part of
the Constitution of the Union. Therefore, it is the duty of the Union Government to
protect (the States) against external aggression, internal disturbance and domestic chaos
and to see that the Constitution is worked in a proper manner both in the States and in the
Union. If the Constitution is worked in a proper manner in the provinces, or in the States
that is, if responsible government as contemplated by the Constitution functions properly,
the Union will not and cannot interfere."23 The wider interpretation would comprise the
conventions, usages and the democratic spirit underlying the Constitution. If forms of the
Constitution are used to subvert its spirit, then the Constitution can be regarded as having
broken down in the State.24 In Bommai case, Justices Jeevan Reddy and Agarwal ruled
that the words provisions of this Constitution cannot be confined to some articles or
chapters of the Constitution; they mean the whole Constitution including Preamble,
fundamental rights and directive principles.
Article 356 is to be studied along with Article 355, which bestows on the Union
with a duty to protect the State from internal disturbance and external aggression and to
ensure that the government of every State is carried on in accordance with the
Constitution. The Karnataka High Court observed, "A close reading of the provisions of
23
CAD Vol. IX, p. l50.
24
Jain, M.P. op. cit., p. 371.
139

Article 355 and 356 would clearly show that the two Articles together are intended to
achieve a common purpose. The former stipulates the duty of the Union towards the
States to protect them against any external and internal disturbances to ensure that the
Government of every State is carried on in accordance with provisions of the
Constitution. The Article empowers the President to fulfil that duty within the framework
specified therein. Therefore, the extent and limitation of the powers of the President
mentioned in Article 356 of the Constitution must be determined in the light of the
provisions of Article 355 and for all practical purposes; they have to be read together.
When they are so read, it is amply clear that the powers of the President under Article
356 of the Constitution are confined to the performance of the duty of restoring the
normal situation in which the constitutional machinery in a State can function in
accordance with the Constitution by protecting the State against external aggression and
internal disturbances."25In Bommai‘s case, JJ. Sawant and Kuldip Singh ruled, "Article
355 is not an independent source of power for interference with the functioning of the
State Government but is in the nature of justification for the measures adopted under
Articles 356 and 357."26
Undoubtedly, there is vagueness in the words' in accordance with the provisions

of this Constitution' as also described in the previous chapter. They can mean anything. It
may not be wrong to submit that the framers can be faulted for not enumerating definite
parameters determining the breakdown' of constitutional machinery as any vagueness in
the law attracts political manipulations and misuse. However, the Constitution has
definitely enumerated one reason for the use of Article 356. This is Article 36527, which
calls for the invocation of Article 356 in case of failure to comply with, or to give effects
to directions given by the Union. Under Article 256'28, it is the obligation of States to
ensure compliance of laws made by Parliament. It also casts an obligation on the Union
25
AIR 1990 Karnataka.
26
Bommai Judgement op.cit., p.13.
27
See the text of Article 365 in M.P. Singh, op. cit., p.874.
28
ibid., see text of Article 256 in p.679.
140

Government to give necessary directions for the purpose. Article 25729 gives a few more
reasons to Union Government to issue directions to the States. These are as follows:
(a) The states have been instructed to exercise their executive power in such a way so
that the exercise of Union power is neither impeded nor prejudiced and the Union
Government and the later may give direction to the former in this regard.
(b) The construction and maintenance of means of communication declared to be of

national and military importance.
(c) Protection of railways within the State.
In all these matters, the Union Government is empowered to issue directions and
in case of failure on the part of State in their due compliance, the Union Government can
lawfully hold that there is a breakdown of constitutional machinery. However, in
Bommai case, the Supreme Court held that even under Article 365, each and every non-
compliance of directions by the State need not necessarily mean the invocation of Article
356. The non-compliance must be such so as to create a situation where the government
cannot be carried on in accordance with the Constitution.
M.V. Pylee, basing his analysis on the first eight proclamations made the
following observations with regard to the purpose and manner of the proclamation under
Article 356:
(1) The essential condition for the intervention of the Centre is the political
instability in the State, that is, the virtual breakdown of the parliamentary system
of government.
(2) The Union will watch the situation of instability with utmost caution and
provide every opportunity for the formation of an alternative ministry.
(3) If a new election after the dissolution of the State Legislature is called for to
remedy the situation, the defeated Ministry may be allowed to carry on the
administration as a caretaker government pending the new election.
29
ibid., See text of Article 257 in p.680.
141

(4) The proclamation of emergency will only be the last resort when (a) The
existing Ministry does not have the confidence of the Legislature, (b) no
alternative ministry can be formed and (c) the defeated Ministry is unwilling to
carry on as a caretaker government pending new elections.
(5) During the period of emergency, the legislative work of the State will be
transferred to Parliament. Delegation of such work to any administrative
body will be reduced to the minimum.
(6) As soon as the political situation within the State becomes conducive to
responsible government, it will be restored.''30
Another writer has given four categories of situations for Presidential action under
Article356:
(i) Internal violence causing failure of the constitutional machinery of the

State.
(ii) Instability of the State Government due to either intra-party or inter-

party rivalries.
(iii) Recalcitrant attitude of the State Government towards the Union

Government.
(iv) Flagrant breach of the Constitutional provisions by the State

Government.''31
K. Santhanam, member of the Constituent Assembly pointed out three conditions,

which would warrant imposition of President's rule. They are as follows:
(1) Breakdown of law and order within the State.
(2) Wild confusion during the election.
(3) Organised terrorism or intimidation of civil authorities32
30
Pylee, M.V. India's Constitution. Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1974, p.338.
31
Srivastav, Meera. Constitutional Crisis in the States in India. Delhi: Concept, 1980, p.28.
142

The Sarkaria Commissions report while pointing out that any abuse or misuse
of drastic power under Article 356 damages the fabric of the Constitution, argued
that a 'wide literal construction of Article 356(1), will reduce the constitutional
distribution of the powers between the Union and the States to a licence dependent
on the pleasure of the Union Executive' and therefore this power should only be used
in case of failure of constitutional machinery. The failure of Constitutional
machinery need not be connected with external aggression and internal disturbance.
The Commission pointed out that a variety of factors may result the failure or
breakdown of Constitutional machinery but broadly it may be due to:33
(a) Political crisis.
(b) Internal subversion.
(c) Physical break-down.
(d) Non-compliance with constitutional directions of the Union Executive.
It is not claimed that this categorisation is comprehensive or perfect. There can be

no water-tight compartmentalisation, as many situations of constitutional failure will
have elements of more than one type. Nonetheless, it will help determine whether or not,
in a given situation it will be proper to invoke this last-resort power under Article 356.
(a) Political Crisis
A constitutional break-down may be the outcome of the political crisis or

dead-lock. This may occur where—
(i) after a General Election no party or coalition of parties or groups is able to

secure an absolute majority in the Legislative Assembly, and, despite
exploration of all possible alternatives by the Governor, a situation emerges
in which there is complete demonstrated inability to form a government
commanding confidence of the Legislative Assembly;
32
Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. Ill No.11-14 25-28, March 1980, Col. 372.
33
Sarkaria Commission Report on Centre-State Relations, 1988, pp. 171-173.
143

(ii) a Ministry resigns or is dismissed on loss of its majority support in the
Assembly and no alternative government commending the confidence of the
Assembly can be formed;
(iii)the party having a majority in the Assembly refuses to form or continue the
Ministry and all possible alternatives explored by the Governor to find a
coalition Ministry commending a majority in the Assembly, have failed.
In all the above situations, one or more alternatives may be available to the
Governor before he recommends Proclamation of President's rule under Article 356. He
may dissolve the Assembly so that fresh elections may be held, thereby leaving the
political deadlock to be resolved by the electorate. However, the Governor may, in
addition, continue the outgoing Ministry for a short period as a caretaker government
until elections are held and a new Ministry takes over. But the legality of these alternative
courses is one thing and their propriety or feasibility another.
Normally, the power of dissolution of the Assembly is to be exercised by the

Governor on the advice of his Ministry. But such advice ceases to be binding on him as
soon as the Ministry loses majority support and the requirement of Article 164(2) that the
Ministry shall be collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly is no longer
fulfilled. Some State Governments have suggested that, even when President's rule is
proclaimed on account of a political crisis, fresh elections should invariably be held as
early as possible, say, within 3 to 6 months. The question whether the Assembly should
be dissolved has to be examined from a number of angles.
If the Assembly has continued for more than, say, half its normal duration,
dissolution may be a preferred course of action. The political views of the electorate and
their support to the different political parties in the State may have got substantially
transformed since the elections were last held. There may be strong reasons to presume
that the relative strength of the political parties in the Assembly will very likely undergo
a radical alteration if fresh elections are held. Circumstances such as these will clearly
indicate that fresh elections should not be postponed.
144

In any situation other than those described in the preceding paragraph, the
question whether fresh elections should be held, will have to be decided by the Governor
after carefully weighing all relevant considerations. Frequent elections disturb the
continuity of administration and put a brake on the pace of development activities. They
also stir up emotions of the people and tend to distract their attention for prolonged
periods from their normal business. Also, holding of elections at short intervals is a
luxury which the nation's exchequer can ill-afford. At the same time, the People of a State
should not be denied the earliest opportunity to elect an Assembly and Government of
their choice.
In deciding the question of having fresh elections, the Governor should consult
the leaders of the political parties involved and the Chief Election Commissioner. The
Governor should also consider whether, in the law and order situation obtaining in the
State, free and fair elections can be held, without avoidable delay.
We recommend that, in a situation of potential political break-down, the Governor

should explore all possibilities of having a government enjoying majority support in the
Assembly. If it is not possible for such a government to be installed and if fresh elections
can be held without avoidable delay, he should ask the outgoing Ministry, if there is one,
to continue as a caretaker government, provided the Ministry was defeated solely on a
major policy issue, unconnected with any allegations of maladministration or corruption
and is agreeable to continue. The continuance, in these circumstances, of the out-going
Ministry as a caretaker government would be unexceptionable and indeed proper. The
Governor should then dissolve the Legislative Assembly, leaving the resolution of the
constitutional crisis to the electorate. During the interim period, the caretaker government
should be allowed to function. As a matter of convention, the caretaker government
should merely carry on the day-to-day government and desist from taking any major
policy decision.
If the important ingredients described above are absent, it would not proper for
the Governor to dissolve the Assembly and install a caretaker government. The
Governor should recommend proclamation of President's rule without dissolving the
Assembly.
145

(b) Internal Subversion
As a corollary of Article 355, it follows that correlated to the duty of the Union to
preserve the democratic Parliamentary' form of government in the States contemplated by
the Constitution, the States are also under a liability not to carry on the government in a
manner contrary to or subversive of the provisions of the Constitution. In the light of
these principles, the following are some instances of a situation of constitutional break-
down due to internal subversion. 34
(i) Where the government of a State, although carried on by a Ministry enjoying

majority support in the Assembly, has been deliberately conducted for period
of time in disregard of the Constitution and the law;
(ii) Where the Government of the State deliberately creates a dead-lock, or

pursues a policy to bring the system of responsible government envisaged by
the Constitution, to a stand till;
(iii)Where the State Government, although ostensibly acting within the

constitutional forms, designedly flouts principles and conventions of
responsible Government to substitute for themsome form of dictatorship;And
in each of the situations (i), (ii) and (iii) the alternative steps, including other
correctives and warnings, fail to remedy the distortion or bring back the errant
State Government to the Constitutional path;
(iv) Where a Ministry, although properly constituted, violates the provisions of the
Constitution or seeks to use its constitutional powers for purposes not
authorised by the Constitution and other correctives and warnings fail;
(v) Where the State Government is fomenting a violent revolution or revolt with
or without the connivance of a foreign power.
34
ibid.
146

(c) Physical break-down
The following are some instances of physical break-down:
(i) Where a Ministry, although properly constituted, either refuses to discharge its
responsibilities to deal with a situation of 'internal disturbance', or is unable to
deal with such a situation which paralyses the administration, and endangers
the security of the State.
(ii) Where a natural calamity such as an earthquake, cyclone, epidemic, flood, etc.
of unprecedented magnitude and severity, completely paralyses the
administration and endangers the security of the State and the State
Government is unwilling or unable to exercise its governmental power to
relieve it.
(d) Non-compliance with constitutional Directions of the Union Government
The following are illustrations of a breakdown due to non-compliance by a

State Government with the directions of the Union Government:
(i) Where a direction issued by the Union in the exercise of its executive power
under any provision of the Constitution, such as, Articles 256, 257 and 339(2)
or, during an Emergency under Article 353, is not complied with by the State
Government in spite of adequate warning and opportunity, and the President
thereupon holds under Article 365 that a situation, such as that contemplated
in Article 356, has arisen;
(ii) If public disorder of any magnitude endangering the security of the State,
takes place, it is the duty of the State Government to keep the Union
Government informed of such disorder, and if the State fails to do so, such
failure may amount to impeding the exercise of the executive power of the
Union Government and justify the latter giving appropriate directions under
Article 257(1). If such a direction given to the State by the Union Executive
under Article 257(1) is not complied with in spite of adequate warning, the
147

President thereupon may hold that a situation such as contemplated in Article
356, has arisen.35
The Sarkaria Commission report also pointed out those situations in which Article 356
is not to be used. They are:
(i) Mal-administration in the State where the Ministry is enjoying the majority support
in the Assembly.
(ii) Subsequent to the resignation/dismissal of the Ministry, Governor does not explore
the possibility of alternative Ministry.
(iii) Without going for a floor test, the Governor comes to the conclusion that the
Ministry has lost the majority support.
(iv) The ruling party at the state has suffered a massive defeat in the general elections to
the Lok Sabha.
(v) In the situation of internal disturbances, not amounting to or verging of its

abdication of its governmental powers all possible measures have not been
exhausted by the Centre.
(vi) If the President does not give any warning to the concerned State Government to
correct itself. Such a warning is, however, not needed when immediate action is
absolutely necessary.
(vii) Subsequent to the direction or warning, the State Government complies with the
direction or satisfies the Union Executive that the warning or direction was based on
incorrect facts.
(viii) To sort out internal differences or intra-party problems of the ruling Article
(ix) Stringent financial exigencies of the State.
(x) Serious corruption charges against the Ministry.
(xi) Extraneous or irrelevant to the purpose of the Article.36
35
ibid. p. 172
36
ibid, p. l73.
148

D.D Basu enumerates the following situations that could mean the breakdown of
constitutional machinery and the President would be justified in imposing Article
356.They are as follows:
(i) Subsequent to the resignation of Ministry, the Governor finds it impossible to form
an alternative Government.
(ii) Where the party having majority in the Assembly declines to form a Ministry and
the Governor's attempt to find a coalition Ministry able to command a majority have
failed.
(iii) Where after a general election, no party is able to secure a working majority in the
Legislative Assembly.
(iv) When a new State is created as a result of territorial reorganization or upgrading of a

Union Territory and there is no legislature for such State until election is held
therefore, resort may be had to Article 356 as a stopgap arrangement.
(v) Gross mismanagement of the affairs of a State.
(vi) Corruption on the part of the State Government.
(vii) A subversion of the Constitution by the State Government while professing to work
under the Constitution or creating disunity or disaffection among the people to
disintegrate the democratic social fabric; or to subvert its basic features such as
federation or democracy.
(viii) Where a Ministry, although properly constituted, acts contrary to the provisions of
the Constitution or seeks to use its powers to purposes not authorised by the
Constitution and the Governor's attempts to call the Ministry to order have failed.
(ix) Where State Government fails to comply with the directions issued by the Union
even after warning.
(x) Where the Ministry, although having the confidence of the majority in the
Legislature, fails to meet an extraordinary situation, e.g. an outbreak of
149

unprecedented violence great natural calamity such as a severe earthquake, flood, or
a large epidemic, the failure of, which amounts to an abdication of its governmental
power.
(xi) A threat to security of the state owing to external aggression or armed rebellion,
which would have attracted Article 352 (1) or such external aggression or internal
disturbance as would have justified actions under Article 355. In short, a danger to
national integration or security of the state or aiding or abetting national
disintegration or a claim for independent sovereign status.
(xii) A state government entering into an alliance with the foreign power.
(xiii) A political party seeking to subvert the principles of responsible government, and to
set-up a party dictatorship.
(xiv) A large-scale break-down of the law and order, or public order situation.37
D.D. Basu has also visualized those situations, which would imply improper uses
of Article 356.They are:
(i) The Governor recommending the dissolution under Article 356, without probing the
possibility of the formation of an alternative government, after the
resignation/dismissal of the Ministry on losing majority support.
(ii) If the dissolution of the Assembly is sought on the ground that the Chief Minister
belongs to a particular caste or creed
(iii) If a State Government is punished by repeated dissolutions of its Assembly, within a

short period.
(iv) A duly constituted Ministry enjoying the support of the Assembly cannot be
revoked under Article 356 merely for the sake of securing good government.
37
Basu, D.D. Shorter Constitution of India. New Delhi: LexisNexis, 2009.
150

(v) Non-compliance with a provision of the Constitution, which do not give rise to a
situation where the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with
the provisions of the Constitution.
(vi) Dismissal of a duly elected State Government on the ground that the ruling party
had suffered an overwhelming defeat in the election to the Lok Sabha.
(vii) Where, in a situation of internal disturbance not amounting to or verging on

abdication of its governmental powers by the State Government, possible measures
to contain the situation by the Union, in the discharge of its duty under Article 335,
have not been exhausted.
(viii) Where the Governor declines the request of a Ministry, which has not been defeated
on the floor of the House and recommends its suppression, without giving the
Ministry an opportunity to demonstrate its majority support through the floor test
and acting solely on his subjective assessment that the Ministry no longer
commands the confidence of the Assembly. The floor test may be dispensed with
only in exceptional circumstances, such as an atmosphere of violence; it was not
possible to convene a sitting of the Assembly for the purpose.38
J. Ramaswamy in Bommai case enumerated the following situation, which

may justify action under Article 356:
(i) Large scale breakdown of law and order or public order situation
(ii) Gross mismanagement of affairs by a State Government
(iii) Corruption or abuse of its powers
(iv) Danger to national integration or security of the state or aiding or abetting national
disintegration or a claim for independent sovereign status, and
(v) Subverting of the Constitution or creating disunity or disaffection among the people
to disintegrate democratic social fabric
38
ibid, p. 105.
151

(vi) Failure to comply with the directions under Article 365 even after a warning. This
also includes directions given during National Emergency under Article 353-A, and
directions of financial propriety under Financial Emergency
(vii) Even a situation in which Chief Minister of a State is involved in wasteful

expenditure like his life size picture being published in newspapers at the cost of
public exchequer.39
5.2.4. Proclamation by the President
The proclamation issued is not obligatory on the part of the President (i.e. Council
of Ministers) to accept Governor's recommendation. It means it is discretion to invoke or
not to invoke, to decide whether really the situation has arisen in which the drastic
measure is needed. It also means that the President should not act as a rubber stamp. He
must agree to what is being done under his signature. In an extreme case if he is not
comfortable with the Council of Minister's decision or he feels that that the decision is
politically motivated, he may return the Ministry's advice to invoke Article 356. After all
he is to protect, preserve and defend the Constitution, as Ramaswamy, J. said, "The
proviso to sub-article (1) of Article 74, brought by the 44th Amendment itself is a further
assurance that it was issued after due and great deliberations. It also means that the
President personally is actively involved in the decision-making, he is just not a sleeping
partner to the Council of Ministers." Again to quote Ramaswamy, ―It [Article 74(2)] also
assures that the President actively applied his mind to the advice tendered and the
material placed before him to arrive at his subjective satisfaction.‖
5.2.5. Consequences on issuing of Proclamation
Several times the Article 356(1) has been invoked since the advent of the
Constitution.40Reading Article 356 along with Article 357 a pattern has thus come into
existence, whenever the Centre takes over a State Government. So far the Centre has
acted only when the Governor has reported failure of the Constitutional machinery in the
39
S. R. Bommai Vs. Union of India 1994
40
President‘s rule has been imposed over a hundred and twenty five times till 2018. See further Gopal
Subramanium: emergency Provisions Under the Constitution: Supreme but not infallible; Oxford.
152

State and in no case the Centre could act ‗otherwise‘.The Governor makes his report to
the President in his discretion and he is under no constitutional obligation to act in this
matter on the advice of the Council of Ministers.41
The proclamation issued by the President under Article 356(1) is placed before
Parliament. If it is supposed to remain in force only for two months, then there is no need
of further action. But if it is proposed to keep it in force for a longer period, it is to be
ratified by both Houses when a discussion is held on the circumstances leading to the
issue of the proclamation and on the advisability or otherwise of the Central intervention.
Under Article 356(1)(a), the President can assume to himself the powers of the
Governor. One of the Governor‘s powers is to dissolve the Legislative Assembly. As a
result, when the President issues a proclamation assuming the Governor‘s powers, the
power to dissolve the Assembly and hold fresh elections is automatically transferred to
the President.Hence, the Presidential proclamation may dissolve the State Legislature and
hold fresh elections. But it is not inevitable to dissolve the State Legislature whenever a
proclamation is issued. Several times, the State Legislature has been kept in suspended
animation rather than dissolved.
In the meanwhile, Parliament is allowed to exercise the authority and the powers
of the State Legislature whether it is suspended or dissolved. Parliament finds itself
extremely burdensome to exercise the legislative power for the concerned State, and pass
all the legislative measures needed for the State concerned. Ample time period would not
be available to Parliament due to the purpose and measures of All-India importance
would be held up. Therefore, under Article 357(1)(a), Parliament passes an Act and
delegates the legislative power for the State concerned for the duration of the emergency
to the President, i.e., the Central Executive. The President can then enact President‘s Acts
for the State concerned whether Parliament is in session or not.
Each President‘s Act is laid before Parliament which may direct any
modifications to be effected therein and the President would carry out the same by
enacting an amending Act. Provision is usually made in the delegating Act for
41
Jain, M.P. Indian Constitutional Law. Nagpur: Wadhwa and Company, Law Publishers, 2011.
153

appointment of a Parliamentary Committee for consultation in the legislative work.42 All
members in Parliament, from the State concerned are appointed members of this
committee.
As mentioned above, under Article 356(1)(a), the President may assume to

himself all or any function of the State Government and all or any of the powers
exercisable by the Governor. Usually, the President, after assumption of the powers of the
State Government, exercises these powers through the State Governor. The
administration of the State, under the proclamation under Article 356(1), is carried on by
the State Governor as a delegate of the Centre. In effect, the Governor acts on the advice
of the Union Ministry and not the State Ministry. The Governor becomes responsible to
the Central Government which is responsible to Parliament.43The Council of Ministers in
the State does not remain in office. It usually resigns suomotu in anticipation of the
Centre‘s action. If it does not do so, it can be dismissed from office.
5.2.6. Period of the President's rule
The Proclamation under Article 356 may be varied or revoked by a subsequent

Proclamation. The term of a Proclamation without the approval of Parliament or Rajya
Sabha (in case the Lok Sabha is dissolved) is two months. This means that if the
Proclamation is expected to remain in force for only two months, then no further action is
necessary.44 With the Parliamentary approval, it can continue for six months from the
date of its issue. The Parliament approves the Proclamation through a resolution passed
by a simple majority. In case the Lok Sabha is dissolved, the Rajya Sabha must approve it
within the stipulated period of two months and the reconstituted Lok Sabha must approve
it within 30 days of its first sitting, otherwise it will lapse. The Proclamation can, further
be granted another six-month term with the parliamentary approval.
42
Non-consultation with the Committee before enacting the President‘s Act does not render the act invalid.
The words of the statute usually are: The President may ‗whenever he considers it practicable‘ consult the
Committee before enacting an Act for the concerned State. Saiyedbhai Kaderbhai v. Saiyed Intajam
Hussen, AIR 1981 Gujarat 154.
43
Badrinath Vs. Govt. of Tamil Nadu, (2000) 8 SCC 395, 413: AIR 2000 SC 3243.
44
Jain, M.P. op. cit., p. 369.
154

But in any case, the Proclamation cannot remain in force continuously for three
years. After having two consecutive terms of the Proclamation i.e. one year, the
Parliament is barred from approving it further unless two requirements are met- (i) a
Proclamation of emergency is in operation in whole of India or in some part of the State
and (ii) Election Commission certifies that such a resolution is necessary in view of
difficulties in holding elections in the State. Thus, the Constitution only bars the
Parliament from approving a Proclamation, which is to continue for more than one year
from the date of issue of original Proclamation. It, however, does not bar the President
from issuing a third Proclamation. 45 A safe conclusion can be drawn from the above
analysis that even beyond the stipulated period of one year, there may be a maximum of
two months in which the Proclamation may continue for the third time, if the President
feels its necessity. Further, in case of expiration of three years of a Proclamation, the
President may issue a fresh Proclamation undergoing the procedure laid down in the
Article afresh, which, of course, may be challenged in the court of law on the ground of
mala fides.46
The President while issuing a Proclamation of its revocation can shorten the
stipulated term of six-month duration of the President's rule. It is important to know that,
originally, the Constitution provided for a six-month term for the proclamation issued
under Article 356 from the date of passing of the resolution by the second House and
there was no restriction regarding its continuous imposition. The 42nd Amendment Act of
1975 increased the duration of a proclamation from six months to one year. The 44th
Amendment Act of 1978 restored the earlier position to six months but with a change that
the duration would be six months from the date of issue and not from the date of passing
of the resolution by the second House.
5.3. The Imposition of Article 356 in Various States
During the period between 1950-2018, June, Article 356 had been invoked around
127 times. An examination of the imposition of President‘s rule by different prime
45
This actually happened in October 17 1996 when the President issued the Proclamation continuously for
a third time for UP. The Allahabad High Court declared it null and void but due to the stay order granted by
the Supreme Court, the Proclamation continued till March 21, 1997.
46
Supranote12.
155

ministers, that is, different governments (Table 1) shows that with the only exception of
I.K. Gujral, all prime ministers have exercised this power, and without restraint.
Jawaharlal Nehru used it eight times, Lal Bahadur Shastri once, Indira Gandhi thirty-six
times in her first stint and fifteen times in her second stint, Morarji Desai sixteen times,
Charan Singh four times, Rajiv Gandhi six times, V.P. Singh twice, Chandra Shekhar five
times, P.V. Narasimha Rao eleven times, Atal Bihari Vajpayee five times, H.D. Deve
Gowda once, Manmohan Singh twelve times and Narendra Modi five times up to till
date. The first two prime ministers of India—Jawaharlal Nehru and Lal Bahadur Shastri
whose tenures covered a period of 16 years since the commencement of the Constitution
used it more restrictively. Nehru used it eight times in his long tenure of 14 years. Out of
eight instances, only two were controversial—the dismissal of the Patiala and East
Punjab States Union (PEPSU) government in 1953 and the Communist government in
Kerala in 1957. The rest six pertained to internal matter of the Congress Party, although
its propriety was not without question, as this Article was not meant to facilitate internal
party mediation about who should head the state government or to get rid of the leader
disliked by the central leadership.
The expectations of the makers of the Constitution, that these extraordinary

powers would be sparingly used only in-case of Constitutional breakdown was soon
belied. Post independent era witnessed the invocation of this Article on more than a
hundred occasions. A sharp rise in the incidence of the Central rule is noticed from 1967
onwards. This is because of the emergence of multiparty system, fragmentation of
political parties and the rise of regional parties after the fourth general elections.
Imposition of President‘s rule by the Centre during the tenure of the various Prime
Minister from 1951 to date is given below:
156

No. of
Sl.No. Regime Year
Occasions
1 Jawaharlal Nehru 1951-64 8
2 Lal Bahadur Sastri 1964-65 1
3 Smt. Indira Gandhi 1966-77&80-84 51
4 Morarji Desai 1977-79 16
5 Charan Singh 6 months (1979-80) 4
6 Rajiv Gandhi 1984-89 6
7 V.P. Singh 1989-90 2
8 Chandra Sekhar 1990-91 5
9 P.V. Narasimha Rao 1991-96 11
10 H.D. Deve Gowda June 1996-Oct. 1996 1
11 I.K. Gujral Oct. 1996 – March 1998 0
12 A.B. Vajpayee March 1998 – May 2004 5
13 Dr. Manmohan Singh May2004-2014 May 12
14 Narendra Modi May2014 to till date 05
Total 12747
Table. 1
The President's Rule under Article 356 of the Constitution has been one of the
controversial issues in Indian political system. The repeated misuse of Article 356 by the
ruling party or coalition at the Centre has negative consequences on Centre-State
relations and it creates tension between the Centre and the States. Considerable debates
among political parties and scholars have been made on this issue. Some Political parties
have demanded the deletion of Article 356 from the Constitution. To find out the
consequences of the uses and misuses of Article 356 on the Indian political system, we
can analyse the factors leading to the imposition of President's Rule.
5.3.1. Kerala 1965
The Kerala episode brought into sharp focus the question of the scope of Article
356 and the circumstances under which it could be invoked. What is the significance of
47
Government of India Records, 2018.
157

the words ―in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution‖ in Arts. 355 and 356?
Do these words mean merely the letter of the Constitution or include as well the
democratic spirit, conventions and fundamental assumptions on which the Constitution is
based?
On the one hand, it could be argued that since in Kerala there was a government
in office enjoying the confidence of the majority in the Legislature, theoretically, the
administration was being carried on in accordance with the ‗provisions‘ of the
Constitution. On the other hand, it could be argued that the words ‗provisions, of the
Constitution‘ should be interpreted not in a narrow literal sense to signify only the formal
written words in the Constitution but also comprising the conventions, usages and the
democratic spirit underlying the Constitution. If forms of the Constitution are used to
subvert its spirit, then the Constitution can be regarded as having broken down in the
State. As the Preamble to the Constitution declares India as a Sovereign Democratic
Republic, subversion of democracy in any State may be regarded as being against the
‗provisions‘ of the Constitution and action may be taken on that basis.
The Communist Party characterised the Central Government‘s action as political

intolerance on the part of the Congress government at the Centre towards a Communist
Government in a State. The Central Government justified its action on the ground that
law and order had broken down, that Rule of Law and the Constitution had been
subverted in the State, and that the action was inevitable if democratic institutions were to
be protected from being destroyed. The Presidential proclamation was approved by
Parliament by a huge majority.48 In the context, therefore, Central intervention could not
be characterised as unwarranted or unjustified.
It would be difficult to argue that the Centre should remain a passive spectator
when the entire constitutional fabric is being subverted in a State. This would amount to a
violation of Article 355 on the part of the Central Government. Kerala, it may be noted,
was a chronic case for sometime as it fell under the President‘s rule, several times. On
September 10, 1964, again the President assumed the Governance of the State,
48
See Reports of the Lok Sabha Debates, August18-21, 1959.
158

consequent upon the resignation of the Ministry. A general election held in March, 1965,
again resulted in a fragmented House, with no prospect of a stable government. After
consulting the party leaders, the Governor reported to the President that it was not
possible to form the Council of Ministers in the State. The State Legislature was
dissolved again and President‘s rule imposed. A writ petition challenging the Central
action on the ground that the State Legislature could not have been dissolved without its
meeting at all, was rejected by the Kerala High Court. The Court also rejected the
contention that the action of the President was mala fide.49
5.3.2. Haryana 1967
In 1967 general elections the Congress gained majority in the State Assembly and
formed Government on March 10, 1967. In ten days the defections started and 13
members left the party reducing it to a minority. On March 22, 1967, the Congress
Ministry resigned and on the same day Rao Birendra Singh was elected as the leader of
the newly formed Samyukta Dal (United Front). Mr. Singh met the Governor and staked
his claim to form the Government. The Governor accepted the resignation of the old
Ministry and invited Mr. Rao Birendra Singh to form Ministry, on March 24, 1967 the
new Ministry assumed the office. In November 1967 there were defections from ruling
party to opposition parties frequently and the defected members who entered in the ruling
alliance were inducted into the Ministry.
On November 6, 1967 Hiranand Arya, a member of the opposition Haryana

Congress (led by Devilal) defected to the Samyukta Dal and was immediately appointed
as Minister of Agriculture. On November 8, a Congress legislator defected and was
appointed a Minister on November 11, Arya redefected to the fold of Devi Lal‘s Haryana
Congress, and thus kicked it (Ministership) away to expose the Chief Minister‘s (Rao
Birendra Singh‘s) corrupt practices‘, 50further alleging that the Chief Minister had offered
him a ‗bag of money‘ to change sides, which he promptly refused. Thus, merrily
continued the see-saw game of defections and counter defection. Rao Birendra Singh
still commanded a majority of forty legislators in an effective House of seventy-eight.
49
K.K. Aboo Vs. Union of India, AIR 1965 Kerala 229.
50
The Times of India, November 12, 1967, p. 4.
159

On November 17, the Governor, B.N. Chakraborty, sent a report to the President
indicting the Rao Birendra Singh Ministry, highlighting the need for a clean and efficient
administration and a fresh election after the administration had been toned up by a brief
dip into President‘s rule. The Governor observed in this report that political defections
became the chief feature of Haryana politics. The report said: ―the State Congress Party
led by Pandit Bhagwat Dayal Sharma could not forget or forgive Rao Birendra Singh for
having started the game of defection. Efforts were made almost continuously to topple
the Ministry in cooperation with Devi Lal who wanted to form a Ministry under his
leadership. The Chief Minister Rao Birendra Singh, however, out-man euvered Devi Lal
by expanding his Ministry… 51 .The Ministry sought to maintain itself precariously in
power by creating too many Ministers, which is an abuse of Constitutional powers.‘ Such
large number of Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries, numbering at one stage twenty-
three out of ruling party‘s strength of forty-one and twenty-two now out of a total
strength of forty, cannot be justified on any grounds of administrative requirement. The
position is even worse if it is remembered that the ten Jana Sangh members in the
Samyukta Dal, have not accepted any office as Ministers, so that in reality, twenty two
out of the thirty remaining MLAs are holding office. The Government, being preoccupied
with the problem of its own survival, was not able to do much for the people. With such a
thin majority the individual MLAs were making demands which, even if they were
unreasonable, could hardly be resisted by the Chief Minister on account of the constant
threat of defections. Administration was thus paralysed. Every legislator wanted to be a
Minister or a Parliamentary secretary and political support was sought by offering
Ministerial offices at the cost of the tax-payer. As the loyalty of its followers is very
flexible, so the exact majority of the ruling party is not of any consequence. Allegations
have been made by the Opposition that the Ministry is continuing in power through
corruption, bribery, political victimization and distribution of offices ‗but then the
Opposition is also apparently securing defections through no better means or through no
cleaner methods. Allegations were being made openly by both sides that money is being
paid to defectors. While it was difficult to say how far these are true, there are good
reasons to believe that the defections are being secured by none too honourable means.
51
The full text of the Governor‘s report was published in The Patriot, November 22, 1967.
160

Opportunist legislators, whose number is fairly large, can wield tremendous power by
threats of transferring their loyalties. They can do, and are doing, incalculable damage by
interfering in administration. Too frequent transfers at their instance are demoralizing the
(civil) services. Since premature transfers cause a lot of inconvenience, junior officials
tend to succumb to such threats. The Governor further added: ‗if the Assembly is
convened and either the ruling party or the Opposition can establish its majority, even
then there will be no peace or stability in the present circumstances, defections would
continue and the majority on the one day might be reduced to a minority the next day
what would be more unfortunate is that as soon as one party establishes its majority in a
trial of strength in the Assembly, it would like to get the Assembly prorogued…Even
during the inter-session period, attempts would be made, as are now being made, to win
over members from the rival group. Administration will continue to be paralysed since
the Ministry will be kept busy only in maintaining itself in power.‘ He concluded, ‗that it
is better for the President to take action immediately assuming all the functions of the
Government of the State. He emphasised that an immediate dissolution of the State
Assembly is essential. He did not recommend a mere suspension of the Legislative
because in that case, the see-saw game of defections and counter-defections will be
resumed and one party or the other would insist on being allowed to form a Ministry on
the basis of a tenuous majority which will not last since the next Government can as
surely be made ineffective, if not toppled over, by malcontents crossing and re-crossing
the floor.‘
On November 21, 1967, the President, issued the Proclamation dismissing the
Samyukta Dal Ministry and dissolved the State Legislature in Haryana. The Home
Minister, Y.B. Chavan, while seeking Parliamentary endorsement of the Presidential
Proclamation, contended that organised defections had become a new phenomenon in
Indian politics with legislators crossing and re-crossing the floor as many as four or five
times. In this process, the people who had elected them had been cheated and democracy
had been made a farce. The Principal complaint of some of the Opposition leaders was
that the Centre was not applying same yardstick everywhere. A.B. Vajpayee and
BakshiGulam Mohammed favoured legally enforced prevention of defections and
provision for the recall of legislators who changed their party loyalties after election.
161

Rao Birendra Singh filed a writ petition challenging the Presidential Proclamation,
which, however, was dismissed by the High Court.52
The Proclamation of Article 356 in Haryana added an altogether new and novel
dimension to the theory and practice of President‘s rule. Hitherto, the President‘s rule
followed either the defeat of a Ministry or the inability of any party or coalition to form a
Government, the only exception being Kerala (1959). Here, in Haryana President‘s rule
was imposed to get over frequent floor crossings resorted to by unscrupulous politicians
who were either lured by offers of ministerial berths or money.
5.3.3. West Bengal 1971
The State of West Bengal had come under the President‘s Rule for the second
time on March 19, 1970. The Central too was determined not to lift President‘s Rule until
law and order was reasonably restored in the State. It was continued as Suo moto even
after Lok Sabha had been dissolved to seek fresh mandate from the people by the Prime
Minister Smt. Indira Gandhi on December 27, 1971. Later, the elections for Bengal
Legislative Assembly were also decided on January 7, 1971 to hold elections
simultaneously along with the Lok Sabha poll on March 10, 1971. In the elections, the
United Left Front consisting of CPI- M, Forward Block, Marxist, Revolutionary
Communists Party, Worker‘s party, and Biplab, Bangla Congress, and United left
Democratic Front included CPI, Socialist Unity Centre, Forward Block, Gurkha League.
The Congress, the Congress (O) and the Bangla Congress contested the elections
independently. Jyoti Basu, the CPI- M leader, staked his claim to form the Government
as the ULF has emerged as the single latest bloc of Legislators. But the Governor, S. S.
Dhavan wanted Basu to first prove that he had an absolute majority in the Assembly. In
the meantime, the ULDF (accept the Socialist Unity Centre having 7 Legislators) decided
to support a coalition Ministry including the Congress. Accordingly, the ‗Democratic
Coalition‘ was formed on March 23, 1971, consisting of all the parties in the Assembly
except the ULF parties, The Socialist Unity Centre, Revolutionary Socialist Party and
Jharkhand Party and having a combined strength of 142 in the House of 277 (3 seats
52
The Tribune, See supra n.29. Shri Ram Maheswari, March 2, 1968, p. 60.
162

vacant). On April 2, 1971, Ajoy Mukherji, the Bangla Congress leader assumed the office
of Chief Minister of West Bengal this time heading the democratic coalition and the
President‘s Rule was revoked. Slender was the majority behind the Ajoy Mukherji
Ministry, and it received further setbacks within weeks of its formation. Two results in
the three bi-elections held in June of that year went in favour of the CPI-M and one in
favour of the Congress. Further on June 6, three of the five Bangla Legislators led by
Sushil Dhara, the parties General Secretary, broke away and formed an independent
group. Despite this on June 14, 1971, Ajoy Mukherji expressed confidence in the
stability in his Ministry saying that even in Dhara‘s group voted with the opposition, the
Assembly would stand evenly divided, with 140 members supporting him and 140 voting
with the opposition.
Meanwhile, terrorism did not abate in West Bengal, not even to the slightest
degree, and the Government‘s task became much more difficult with the unceasing flow
of Refugees from East Pakistan (at present Bangladesh). On June 25, 1971, AjoyMukerji
advised the Governor to dissolve the Assembly. 3days later, he tendered the resignation
of his Ministry, and President‘s Rule was introduced on June 29, 1971. The reason put
forward by AjoyMukherji asking for the dissolution of the Assembly was that the
Refugee problem had become serious and requires strong majority.
5.3.4. Andhra Pradesh 1973
President‘s Rule in Andhra Pradesh was for an altogether different reason. It

attracted the provisions of Article 356 not on account of the all too familiar, fickleness of
the Legislators loyalty but because of the regional cult53 to which both its people and a
segment of its political leadership have remained committed with varying range of
intensity, ever since the formation of the State in 1956.
The threat of bifurcation of the State into two separate ones of Andhra and
Telangana has been met ever since it became open and intensified in January 1969,
internal adjustments and reshufflings within the ruling Party and by administrative
53
Prof. Shri Ram Maheswari, ―Regionalism in India: Political and Administrative Response‖, in The Indian
Journal of Public Administration, Vol. XIX, No. 4, Oct.- Dec. 1973. Pp. 441-71. And quoted in same
author‘s President‘s Rule in India 1977, Edn. p. 94.
163

devices. To appease the separationists, Brahmananda Reddy the Chief Minister of
Andhra Pradesh in 1964, was made to resign from his office in 1970 at the insistence of
the Congress High command. P. V. Narasimha Rao, who was succeeded in, could not
succeed in snuffing out the Separatist allegation in two regions and was finally asked by
the Party‘s high command to resign and thus pave way for President‘s Rule in the State.
Interesting as it may appear, the decision to ask Narasimha Rao to step down was first
taken by the Political Affairs Committee of the Central Cabinet. In India, on many
occasions the roles of the purely Part organ like the Congress high Command and of the
political executive became in practise indistinguishable:
In the process, either of them gets reduced to the level of a merely ratifying body.
Bowing to the directions of the party high Command, Mr. Narasimha Rao resigned as the
Chief Minister on January 17, 1973 facilitating the imposition of President‘s rule in
Andhra Pradesh on January 18, 1973. Following the Governor‘s recommendation, the
State Assembly was kept in suspended animation to be reactivated after normal
conditions had been restored in the State.54
The resolution seeking Parliament‘s approval of the President‘s Rule, came up for
the discussions in Lok Sabha on February 28 and was voted the following day. In the
course of discussion, B. N. Reddy observed, ‗I would like to ask this House as to why
this situation has been created that 4.5 crore people of Andhra Pradesh have been made to
suffer this President‘s Rule…. The Government there is supposed to be the most stable of
all the Governments in the South. It was also a Congress Government with an absolute
majority…. Today, President‘s rule is proclaimed because it is stated that the Separatist
movement has assumed threatening proportions. This President‘s rule is not a political
solution of the various problems that are being faced by the State. To put it a nut shell, it
is only a continuation of the CRP (Centre Reserve Police) and military Government that
had been perpetrated by the Government of Sri Narasimha Rao, which is completely
54
Addressing a meeting of the Congress legislators, Narasimha Rao observed, ‗During President‘s rule the
Assembly would be suspended and not dissolved. You will all remain members but not function as such‘.
(The Times of India, 18 January 1973. p. 6)
164

unconnected and unaware of the problems of the people. 55 The Parliament was again
approached for continuance of President‘s rule for second term of up to six months. In
December 1973, the central leadership of the Congress party decided in favour of
forming the Government in Andhra Pradesh and with this being done all the necessary
rituals were completed very swiftly. Accordingly, on December 8, 1973, J. Vengal Rao
was elected as leader of the Congress Legislature party; the Governor sent his report to
the President, recommending revocation of latter‘s rule. On December 10, 1973, the
Congress Ministry formally returned to the State after an absence of nearly 11 months.
5.3.5. Orissa 1973
The party position in the 140-member Orissa Assembly resulting from the
elections held in March 1971 stood as follows: Congress-51, Swatantra Party-36, Utkal
Congress-32, Praja Socialist Party-4, CPI-4, Jharkhand-4, CPI(M)-2, Congress(O)-1, Jana
Congress-1, and Independents-4. As is amply confirmed by these figures, Orissa
continued to be in love with coalitions. As soon as the election results were out, the
Governor initiated the Constitutional process by inviting the Congress, the single largest
party in the assembly, to form the Ministry. Unwilling to have a coalition Ministry, the
Congress was anxious to secure a complete merger of the Utkal Congress with it in order
to obtain the necessary majority and then assume office, this demand was unacceptable to
the Utkal Congress. Meanwhile, the Utkal Congress formed a United Front with the
Swatantra Party and the Jharkhand headed by Biswanath Das who at that time was not a
member of the Assembly and did not belong to any party. On April 3, 1971 United Front
having a majority support of 72 (three independents supporting it) in the 140-member
Assembly formed the Government. This Ministry fell in June as a result of floor crossing
by some foot-loose legislators and the Congress-led Ministry came into power, its Chief
Minister being Nandini Satpathy, who at the moment was not a member of the Assembly
and she came from the Centre. Satpathy‘s induction into the State level Congress was
regarded by many Congressmen as an imposition on the State party by the high-
command. Moreover, the Congress could come into power only by encouraging floor-
55
The Lok Sabha Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. XXX NO. 8 Col 233-35 see also supra n. 29 Shri Ram
Maheshwari p.95.
165

crossing and admitting the defectors from the Swatantra and the Utkal Congress. In
January 1972 HarekrushnaMahatab and four of his supporters broke away from the
Congress to form a separate group thereby reducing the party‘s strength to 78 in a House
of 140 members. The Utkal Congress, dissolved earlier was revived on November 12,
and commanded a group of 18 legislators under the leadership of Biju Patnaik. On
January 29, 1973 the Utkal Congress, Swatantra Party and HarekrushnaMahatab‘s group
formed an alliance, called the Orissa Pragati legislature party, which consisted of 47
members. On June 29, 1973, in a desperate bid to stall defection from the party, the
Chief Minister doubled the size of her Council of ministers, and appointed Nilamani
Routray, the former leader of the Utkal Congress legislature party, as Deputy Chief
Minister. This did not completely mollify Routray who, as The Time of India put it,
‗continued to press the Congress High-Command to admit Mr. Patnaik and his men into
the Congress. The Party‘s Central leaders were apparently willing to meet Mr. Routray‘s
demand half-way by taking in most of the Utkal Congress MLAs. But they could not
bring themselves to excuse Mr. Patnaik‘s role the recent by-election in the Cuttack
constituency.56 Any such compromise, however, was not acceptable to Mr. Routray and
Mrs. Satpathy seems to have only anticipated his walk over to the opposition by
dismissing him from her Cabinet within a few hours of tendering its resignation to the
Governor and asking him to dissolve the State Assembly.‘57
On March 1st, the Chief Minister resigned and advised the Governor, B.D. Jatti, to
dissolve the Assembly because she wanted to ‗get a clear verdict from the electorate for
her progressive measures. Explaining why she chose to resign, she alleged that intrigues
by her colleagues, made it ‗impossible for us to give undivided attention to the problems
of the State. The Governor immediately prorogued the Assembly which as then in session
and recommended imposition of President‘s rule.
Meanwhile the opposition leader, Biju Patnaik, staked his claim to be invited to
form the Ministry, asserting that he was in a position to form a stable Ministry. He
56
Nandini Satpathy contested for the Assembly from this constituency. See supra n.29 Shri Ram
Maheswari, p. 97.
57
The Times of India, 2 March, 1973, p.6.
166

alleged that the Chief Minister had denied an opportunity to the opposition to defeat her
in the Assembly by when it was in session.
5.3.6. Rajasthan 1977
The Allahabad High Court set aside the election of Smt. Indira Gandhi, the Prime
Minister of India and the leader of the Congress Party. The opposition parties had given a
call to launch a movement with a view to compelling Smt. Indira Gandhi to resign from
her post of Prime Minister. In June 1975 the emergency was declared on the ground of
internal disturbance. As result of the excess occurred during emergency period, the
Congress Party lost their mandate in the Parliamentary elections held in March 1977.
Then she advised the President of India to lift the emergency along with her resignation
letter. The Janata Party came into power at Centre with a landslide victory. No Congress
Party candidate won to the Parliament in the States of Bihar, U.P., Punjab, Haryana, and
Himachal Pradesh. In Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan one seat in each, in Orissa and
West Bengal 4 and 3 seats respectively, totally in 9 Stats the Congress Party was rejected
by the voting of Ballot. At the time of dissolution of the Parliament as on January 18,
1977, the Congress Party strength was 350, which was reduced to 153 in 1977, Janata
Party came to power at the Centre under the leadership of Sri Morarji Desai.
The Home Minister Charan Singh made an appeal to the Chief Ministers of the
said 9 States to advise the Governor for dissolving their State Assemblies ―in exercise of
power under Article 174(2B) and seek fresh mandate from the electorate.‖ But the
Congress Chief Ministers bluntly refused. The reason for this being that an
unprecedented political situation had arisen due to the rejection of candidates belonging
to the ruling party in those States. The situation, according to him, had created a sense of
diffidence at different levels of administration and that the people by and large did not
appreciate the propriety of continuance in power of a party which was unmistakably
rejected by the electorate. He further went on to say that the climate of uncertainty,
diffidence and disrespect had given rise to serious threats to law and order, which gave
rise to a Constitutional crisis, which can be resolved only by the imposition of President‘s
rule under Article 356. This is politically and constitutionally wrong. The victory of one
cannot be applied against the other. As such the mandate given by the electorate was for
167

ruling the centre and not for the Governance of the State administration. The possibility
of different political parties being in power at the Centre and in the States was never
overlooked while the Constitution was framed and it cannot be argued with any modicum
of political morality that the party in per at the Centre should also be in power in the
States. The policies of forced dissolution especially on the threat to apply Article 356 has
helped the ruling party at the Centre in 1980 to manage a complete shift of loyalties as
experienced in Haryana and Himachal Pradesh, where the Janata MLAs have switched
over their loyalty overnight to the Congress(I). There upon six out of nine States filed
suits under Article 131 together with petitions under Article 32 in the Supreme Court.58
Their contention was that the Home Minister‘s letters to the Chief Ministers were
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court rejected the State Government‘s petitions and
upheld the Centre‘s action of dissolving their Assemblies under Article 356 cl (1) on
receipt of a report from Governor or otherwise. The words ‗or otherwise‘ indicate that
the President may act under Article 356(1) on information received from sources other
than the Governor‘s report. This would include Union agencies such as the report of
some Union Minister or the advice of the Union Council of Ministers. On the other hand,
the word ‗shall‘ in Article 74(1) suggests that whether the President has or has not
received a report from the Governor, the President can act under Article 356(1) only in
accordance with the advice tendered by the union Council of ministers, and if the latter so
advise, the President cannot but issue a proclamation under Article 356(1) in respect of
the State concerned.59Accordingly on April 30, the Union Home and Law ministers Mr.
Charan Singh and Shanthi Bhushan met the President and submitted their opinions.
However, the then Acting President B.D. Jatti informed them that he required some more
time to reconsider the recommendations of the Government.
The Prime Minister Mr. Morarji Desai sent his letter with N.M. Mukerji to
President Jatti reminding him of his Constitutional position and duties under the
Constitution of India. Then the President signed the proclamation bringing the said nine
States under President‘s rule on April 30, 1977 and paved the way for the fresh poll by
the middle of June 1977.
58
State of Rajasthan Vs. Union of India AIR, 1977 SC. 1361.
59
ibid.
168

While the leaders of the Janata Party and others like JB. Kripalani, Jaya Prakash
Narayan and Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit hailed the move the leaders of the Congress Party
and the CPI condemned it. It was described by the Congress Party as a dictatorial act and
a blow to the federal set up of the Indian polity. The Chief Ministers of Uttar Pradesh,
Bihar, Rajasthan and other also termed the decision of the Union Government as a ‗sad
and unfortunate‘ development in the Parliament history of India. S.S. Ray, the then Chief
Minister of West Bengal reportedly said: ―there is a saying in Bengali that whosoever
went to Sri Lanka became a Ravana, Mr. Charan Singh is now in Sri Lanka and,
therefore, he is entitled to become a Ravana.‖ The advice to dissolve the nine Stat
Assemblies was opposed on the following grounds:
A. The election issues of the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies were different; hence,
there was no justification to take such a drastic step on the basis of the result of the
Lok Sabha elections.
B. It is a well-established principle that a Government remains in office so long as it

enjoys the majority support in a House. There are no provisions of recall in our
Constitution. Hence, the thesis of the confidence of the electorate cannot be applied
in the Indian Parliamentary system.
C. Such a step would undermine the federal spirit of our Constitution.
D. The decision was politically motivated, keeping in view, the Presidential elections,
which were to be held before August 12, 1977.
E. There were no reports from the State Governors about the failure of Constitutional
machinery. This was known as ‗forced Constitutional dissolution.‘
However, arguments were advanced justifying the decision taken by the Janata
Government against the nine State Congress Ministries.
Firstly, the elections held in March 1977, were a sort of ―referendum‖ on the basis
of issues of ―Liberty and Freedom vs. Dictatorship‖ and elections were not an ordinary
169

one for the Prime Minister.60Most of the union Ministers and sitting MPs had lost the
poll, which was an indication that the Congress Party had lost the political credibility and
the confidence of the electorate. This contention substantially proved to be true when the
elections in the nine State Assemblies were held in June 1977 and the Congress Party was
defeated.
Secondly, the State Governments in question had ratified the 42nd Constitutional
Amendment Act, 1976, which aimed at curtailing the jurisdiction of the State Legislature
by transferring certain subjects from the State list to the concurrent list.
Thirdly, the President under the word ‗otherwise‘ of Article 356 was entitled to
impose President‘s rule in any State even without seeking the report from the State
Governor.
Fourthly, except the Assemblies of U.P., and Orissa; the rest seven Assemblies
have completed five years.61Their term was extended from five to six years by the 42nd
Constitutional Amendment Act, which had been passed by a ‗Captive Parliament‘ and
ratified by the ‗Captive Assemblies‘ also. Since that Parliament had no such mandate
from the people, it had no (moral or Constitutional) authority to extend the expired period
of any Assembly.62Even the Governments of U.P. and Orissa had no moral right to stay
on in office because the rule of law in these States had ceased to exist in the wake of the
extra-constitutional Centres of power. The people were forcibly sterilized and their
Houses were bulldozed without due authority of law.
And lastly, the Union Government was entitled to give a ‗written warning‘ to the
States as Dr. Ambedkar had asserted in the Constituent Assembly. ―If it is not headed by
a State Government, a better directive for the Centre is to impose such a President‘s rule,
ordering fresh elections to seek a fresh verdict of the people.‖
Whatever reasoning or justification may be given, the step for the mass-
dissolution of the State Assemblies simply on the stand that in the Lok Sabha elections,
60
Capadia N.C., Political Crisis and Polls in India, op.cit., p.122.
61
The Times of India, 1 May, 1977, p.6.
62
―Stability with Freedom‖, The Times of India, 6 December, 1979.
170

the electorates had chosen a party different to that of ruling parties in the States has
contributed the most extensive use of President‘s rule that Indian politics had ever
witnessed. It was significant for two reasons.
First, it extended further the width of the interpretation of Article 356. Article
356 can be used when the President feels that the State in question cannot be governed
according to the provisions of the Constitution. There are two interpretations of the
actions of the Janata party in imposing President‘s rule on nine States. The wider view is
that President‘s rule can be imposed in a State if the President, advised by the party at the
Centre, is convinced that the party in power in a State does not enjoy the support of the
electorate. It was also suggested that it must be alleged that this loss of credibility with
the electorate must also result in administrative difficulties or the like. This is an
extremely wide interpretations. If this interpretation is accepted, the Centre would have
incalculable powers over the States. The narrower interpretation suggested by Justice
Bhagwati and Justice Gupta in the Supreme Court is that the imposition of the President‘s
rule on the grounds suggested by the Janata Government were only justified under the
particular circumstances, whereby an emergency had just ended and the Janata Party had
won a cataclysmic victory against the Congress. Janat‘s electoral victory was in those
very States in which the Congress claimed that the legislatures still enjoyed the support of
the electorate. In actual fact, the narrow interpretation can be extended so that the fate of
State Governments can be made to depend on the elections to the Lok Sabha. There is no
doubt that although the Congress Ministries were toppled in the elections that followed,
one of the reasons for Charan Singh‘s imposing President‘s rule was to try and influence
election to the Rajya Sabha. These elections were in the offing indeed, there was nothing
that Parliament could do because the dissolution of the State legislatures ordered by the
President could not be revoked by Parliament.
The second significant contribution of this imposition of President‘s rule on nine

States was that it was not imposed on the advice of the Governors of the States. Under
the provisions of the Constitution, the President can act on the advice of the Governors or
otherwise. We have already seen that there was a considerable discussion in the
Constituent Assembly on the inclusion of the words ‗or otherwise‘ in the provisions of
171

the draft predecessor to Article 356. This was the first time such an extensive exercise of
the power under Article 356 was indulged in suo moto. If this trend was allowed to
continue, then the advice given by the Governor would become unnecessary. The
President would act only on the advice of his Cabinet without taking into account the
views of the man on the spot.
This exercise of power by the Janata Government was very controversial. Even
though the Supreme Court had taken the views that such an exercise of power was not
unconstitutional, many people felt that even under the unusual circumstances that was not
a valid use of the power to impose President‘s rule under Article 356.63
The Janata Party was reduced to a minority due to dissensions and defections, the
Prime Minister Mr. Morarji Desai tendered his resignation of his Government on July 15,
197964and informed the President that his party continued ―to be the largest single party‖
in the House. Desai had expected that President would invite him again as a leader of the
single largest party in the House. The President Sanjeeva Reddy invited Mr. Charan
Singh, to form the Government after the opposition leader of the Congress Mr. Y.B.
Chavan expressed his inability to form the Government, but within few days he submitted
his resignation even without facing the Parliament, since the Congress Party withdrew
their support to Mr. Charan Singh. The President dissolved the Parliament and ordered
for fresh elections.
In the elections for seventh Lok Sabha held in January 1980, Congress Party again
came to power with massive victory with an appeal to voters to choose between the
―Continuance of the present political instability and strong stable Government at the
Centre.‖ The Prime Minister Smt. Indira Gandhi decided to apply the same political
yardstick Article 356 against the Janata Party dominated Governments in the States
which had been used against the Congress led State Governments in April 1977.
Accordingly, President Sanjeeva Reddy signed proclamations relating to dismissing the
nine Non-Congress-I State Governments under Article 356 of the Indian Constitution.
The decision for dissolution of the non-Congress-I State Ministries was not a surprise.
63
Dhawan, Rajeev. President’s Rule in the States. N. M. Tripathi. 1979, p.99.
64
Kapoor, A.C. Constitutional History of India. Delhi: S.Chand, 1985, p.566.
172

Howsoever impressive the political considerations, logic of Home Minister Zail Singh‘s
proposal for an ―automatic dissolution of opposition-led State Assemblies after the Lok
Sabha elections‖ is neither consistent with the existing provisions of the Constitution nor
is it in consonance with the nature of a Federal polity, which the Constitution establishes
nor was it ever the intention of the Constitution-makers to choke the channels of
responsible Government through dubious means and intentions.
Our Constitution is generally described as ‗Quasi-Federal‘ but Dr. B.R.

Ambedkar claimed that it is a Federal system. Whatever reasoning or justification may
be given, the step for the mass-dissolution of the State Assemblies simply on the stand
that in Lok Sabha elections, the electorates had chosen a party different to that of ruling
in the States is basically against the spirit of our Federal Constitution.65
There is no doubt that the power conferred by Article 356(1) is in the nature of a
political power. The scope of the Courts to interfere with the exercise of their power
must necessarily be narrow. It can interfere only on the grounds of malafides. Yet
reactions of all the opposition parties were sharp and severe. 66The arguments for and
against the Constitutional massacre were precisely the same on both the occasions. The
only difference was that the defenders of 1977 became the critics of 1980 and vice versa.
It can be argued that ‗what is sauce for the gander is sauce for the goose.‘
The Union Law Minister, P. Shivshankar, justified the action of his Government
on the three pleas:
There was delay on the part of States ruled by the non-Congress (I) parties to
ratify the Constitution (45th Amendment) bill.
A. There was likelihood that these States might block other progressive measures in
future.67
65
Kripalani, J.B. ―Eroding the Federal structure,‖ The Indian Express, 5 March, 1980.
66
In 1980, the Congress (I) won 249 seats out of the 350 seats of the Lok Sabha in 9 States, while in 1977 it
won only nine out of 294 seats.
67
The Hindu, 20 February 1980, p.10.
173

B. These Governments had lost the confidence of the electorate as reflected in the recent
Lok Sabha elections.
The Union Home Minister, Zail Singh, defended the above action as being in
accordance with the best principles of democracy. He quoted the speeches and letter of
Charan Singh when he had extolled the dissolution of the Congress ruled State
Assemblies in 1977.
The decision of the Congress (I) was critically denounced by political leaders as
‗politically motivated, partisan and a complete repudiation of the federal character of the
Constitution.‘ The Lok Dal President and former Prime Minister, Charan Singh,
reportedly described that the democracy in India was in ‗mortal danger.‘ The Janata
party condemned the Centre for adopting double standards in not dissolving the
Assemblies in Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and Karnataka, which shifted their political
loyalty to the Congress (I) with the poll verdict.68Acharya J.B. Kripalani called it ―an
affront‖ to democracy and reacted that the future appeared ―ominously dark‖. In
substance, the action of the Congress (I) Government was criticized on the following
grounds:
A. The Congress (I) encouraged the politics of defections in Haryana, Himachal

Pradesh and Karnataka, where the opposition had also to face the poll-debacle. It
spared them as the ruling party at the Centre could form its Government through
defection mechanisms.
B. The victory of the Congress (I) in a number of States was not as overwhelming
and sweeping as that of the Janata Party in 1977. For instance, in 1980, the
Congress (I) won 51 of the 85 Lok Sabha seats in U.P., and 30 of the 54 seats in
Bihar, while in 1977, the Janata Party had won all the seats in these States.69
68
The Hindustan Times, 19 February 1980, p.8.
69
The Ruling Congress (I) secured 35.95% in U.P., 36.15% in Bihar, 41.65% in Rajasthan and 4717% in
Madhya Pradesh, i.e., the party secured a minority votes in the 1980 elections.
174

C. The mere fact that a party wins in Parliament cannot legally form the basis for its
assertion that the States must follow suit. The State‘s representatives are
normally elected on local issues.70
D. The spirit of our Constitution is federal one and the drastic power under Article
356 should be used only in extra-ordinary circumstances as a ‗last resort‘ as Dr.
Ambedkar had pleaded before the Constituent Assembly.71
E. There was no issue like ‗Democracy Vs. Dictatorship‘ in the Parliamentary

elections of 1980. In the January 1980 elections, the electorate were to
demonstrate the choice for the Office of Prime Minister.
F. Lastly, the nine Congress (I) Assemblies had been operating within their five-year
term. Their position was not like that of the Congress-dominated legislatures in
1977, which had been gifted extra one year by the 42nd Constitution Amendment
act 1976 to which the then Parliament was lawfully not authorized.
5.3.7. Nine Assemblies dissolution in 1980
In 1980, Article 356 was invoked by the Congress (I) Government more or less in
similar circumstances in which it was invoked in 1977 by the Janata Government at the
Centre. The State Assemblies of 9 States of Rajasthan,Uttar Pradesh, Bihar,Madhya
Pradesh, Punjab, Orissa, Gujarat, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu were dismissed and the
President rule was imposed on them,as they no longer represent the wishes and
aspirations of the electorate. The facts leading to the dissolution of the nine Assemblies
were as follows:
As stated earlier, in 1977 Lok Sabha elections the Janata Party had secured a
landslide victory and formed the Government at the Centre. But due to internal
dissensions and defections from the party it was reduced the minority and the then Prime
Minister, Mr. Morarji tendered the alliance to form the Government, but before he could
face the Parliament he tendered his resignation and advised the President to dissolve the
70
Nayyar, Kuldip. ―Exploiting the Constitution‖. The Indian Express, 24 February, 1980, p.3.
71
CAD, Vol. IX, p.175.
175

Lok Sabha and order fresh elections. In the elections the Congress (I) secured a massive
majority by capturing 351 seatsin the House and Janata Party could secure only 31 seats.
On the date on which the Congress (I) took office at the Centre, the Janata Partywasin
power in various States. On February 18, 1980 the Centre dissolved the Assemblies of the
aforesaid nine States and imposed President Rule in them. The grounds on which
Assemblies were dissolved were the same as those advanced by the Janata Government
in 1977. The Congress (I) contended that after the Lok Sabha elections in December
1979, as in1977, the State Governments and Assemblies concerned no longer
represente3d the wishes and aspirations of the electorate. The dissolution order, however,
did not mention any reasons for dissolution presumably due to the fear that if reasons
were given it might be challenged in the Court of law.
On the basis of the facts given above, it may be submitted that the Janata
Government‘s case for dissolution of nine Assemblies in1977 stood on more solid basis
constitutionally (rejection of 42nd Amendment Act)and also politically (total rejection of
Congress in the elections in nine States) than that of the Congress Government‘s case in
1980. The precedent of dissolving popular Governments was created by the Congress
Party itself. The Kerala Ministry was dismissed in 1959 on the ground that it had lost the
confidence of their electorate. Ironically, the Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi was the
President of the Congress Party at that time. The argument that the opposition parties in
the various States would block the progressive measures is also not valid argument
because the Constitution gives the Centre enough sanction against such States. No State
government could afford to ignore to implement the directives of the Centre. The politics
of replying in kind is bound to lead to a climate uncongenial to give and take mutual
tolerance that must mark the working of a parliamentary system. This need to be borne in
the limited context of the Rajya Sabha election. One of the main reasons forhaving a
bicameral legislature is to have the Upper House act as a check on the Lower House,
even blocking and delaying legislation and thus providing occasion for second thoughts.
There can no doubt be delays in enacting laws but such difficulties can always be
resolved through dialogue and persuasion, methods crucial to the democratic process.
The Janata Congress party which was in majority in the Upper House. Thus what is
needed is a climate of understanding between the ruling and opposition parties, a broad
176

consensus in the matters of national interest and not the politics, abroad consensus in the
matters of national interest and not the politics of confrontation. A heavy responsibility
rests on all political parties, particularly the Congress (I) which has an overwhelming
majority in the Lok Sabha.72
5.3.8. Madhya Pradesh 1992
After the 1990 elections, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) formed the
Governments in the States of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh and Uttar
Pradesh. The Kar Sevaks who gathered at Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri Masjid in Ayodhya
in response to the call of their organizations namely BJP, Viswa Hindu Parishad (VHP),
Bajarang Dal, Shiv Senaand others demolished the structure, in the disputed area, on
December 6, 1992. Immediately Mr. Kalyan Singh the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh
submitted his resignation on the same day following the demolition of Masjid structure.
The Central Government dismissed the ministry and dissolved the legislative Assembly
of Uttar Pradesh under Article 356 on December 6, 1992.
On December 10, 1992, the Government of India banned RSS, VHP, Bajrang Dal
and Jamait-e-Islami Hind under section 3 (1) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,
1967 (37 of 1967). The ban of RSS was for the third time in its 67-year-old of existence.
Earlier it attracted similar action after the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi in 1948 and
later during the emergency days.73
The Congress Working Committee on December 14, 1992 decided in principle

that the Union Government should dismiss the other three Governments of Madhya
Pradesh, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh. The CPI (M) leaders Hari Kishan Singh
Surjeeth and Jyoti Basu also demanded the dismissal of these three Governments when
they met the Prime Minister on December 14, 1992. The National Front has also
demanded the dismissal.74
72
The Hindustan Times, Feb. 19, 1980.
73
The Hindu, 12 December 1992. p.12.
74
The Hindu, 17 December 1992. p. 10.
177

Serious disturbances occurred leading to loss of life and property and breakdown
of law and order in various parts of the country. The State Assemblies of Madhya
Pradesh, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh were dissolved and President‘s rule was
imposed on December 15, 1992.
On December 8, 1992, the Governor, of Madhya Pradesh, Kunwar Mohammad

Ali Khan sent a report to the President setting out the ―fast deteriorating law and order
situation in the State in the wake of wide-spread acts of violence, arson and looting‖. He
observed in his report that ―the lack of faith in the ability of the State Government to stem
the tide primarily because of the political leadership‘s overt and covert support to the
associate communal organisations seem to point out that there is breakdown of the
administrative machinery of the State.‖ He followed it up with another report on
December 10, 1992, wherein he mentioned about the violence spreading to hitherto
peaceful areas. On December 13, 1992, he sent his third report, enclosing the photocopy
of a letter received from the Executive Director, Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited
(BHEL), Bhopal dated December 11, 1992. The Governor stated that the said letter
indicated the ―abject failure of the law and order machinery to provide safety and security
in life and property in the area in and around BHEL factory‖. The letter also spoke of
―the pressure brought on the administration to accommodate the so-called Kara Sevaks in
BHEL area.‖ The Governor termed them as extremely serious developments that deserve
a high-level probe. The third report further Stated that ―with the reported Statement of the
Chief Minister, Shri Sunder Lal Patwa, that the decision of banning the RSS and VHP
was unfortunate, the State Government‘s credibility to sincerely implement the Centre‘s
direction in the matter is under a cloud… There is a question, as to how the BJP leader,
such as, Sri Patwa who swore by the values and traditions of the RSS will be able to
implement the ban both in letter and spirit. The Viswa Hindu Parishad‘s decision to
observe December 13 as ―Black day‖. Across the country to protest against the above-
mentioned ban and its decision to observe ―protest week‖ against these ―heinous laws‖.
From December 14 to 20, are moves fraught with danger, particularly in the present
context.‖ The Governor recommended that, ―considering this and looked in background
of the RSS etc.; Contemplating on a fresh strategy to chalk out its future plan and
possibility of the leaders of the banned organisations going underground taking
178

advantage of the soft reactions of the administrations have reasons to be convinced that
there should not be any further delay in imposition of President‘s rule.75
The Rajasthan Governor Dr. M. Chenna Reddy while recommending imposition

of President‘s rule in the state of Rajasthan had stated the following facts:
―The Government of Rajasthan has played ‗an obvious role‘ in the Ayodhya
episode. The BJP has control over RSS, VHP and Bajrang Dal, which are now banned by
the central. The set ban is not being implemented at all. Indeed, one of the Ministers had
resigned and along with 22 MLAs and 15500 BJP workers had participated in the Kar
Seva at Ayodhya on December 6, 1992. They were given a similar royal welcome by the
influential people in the set up running the Government. The law and order has been very
bad for more than a week, the dominant character being the anti-minority on whom
largely atrocities have been committed. The administrations could not function
effectively under the present political set up‖. He expressed the apprehension that, ―it
would be extremely difficult to expect the administration to function objectively,
effectively and in accordance with rule of law and that a situation had arisen in which the
Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with provisions of the
Constitution‖.76
The Governor of Himachal Pradesh, Virendra Verma and sent a report to the
President on December 15, 1992. Wherein he stated inter alia: ―There is no dispute on the
point that the Chief Minister and the Cabinet had instigated the Kar-Sevaks from
Himachal Pradesh to participate Kar-Seva on December 6, 1992. Some of the Ministers
expressed their desire even openly to participate in Kar-Seva provided; the Party high
command permitted to do so. Consequently, a large number of Kar-Sevaks including
some BJP MLAs participated in Kar-Seva from Himachal Pradesh. A member of the
Vidhan Sabha publicly admitted that he had participated in the demolition of the Babri
Masjid (Indian Express December 15, 1992, Chandigarh edition). Though Sri. Santha
Kumar met me on December 13, 1992 and had informed me that he desired to implement
the ban orders imposed by the Government of India on RSS, VHP and three other
75
Judgement Today, 1994 (2) SC 215.
76
ibid.
179

organisations that he had already issued directions in this regard but since Chief Minister
himself is a member of RSS, he is not in a position to implement these directions
honestly and effectively. Most of the people of this State also feel alike…. As a matter of
fact, when the Chief Minister himself and some of the colleagues are members of the
banned RSS, it is not possible for the administrative machinery to ban honestly,
especially when some of the ministers are openly criticising the ban on this Communal
organizations.‖ He therefore, recommended imposition of the President‘s rule.77
On December 15, 1992, the President issued three proclamations on the three
Governments of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh and dissolved their
Legislative Assemblies. The action was purported to be taken on the basis of the reports
of the Governors concerned as well as on the basis of other information received.78
The validity of the Presidential proclamation was immediately challenged by the

Governments of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh before their
respective High Courts by piling writ petitions. The petitioners challenged the
proclamation as malafide, vitiated by extraneous considerations and an instance of
Political Vendetta. Further, it was submitted on behalf of the petitioners that incidence of
disturbance to law and order cannot attract action under Article 356, in any event in
Himachal Pradesh, there was not a single instance and all three Governments were
faithfully implementing all Central and State laws. The impugned proclamations, they
submitted, are the results of internal differences among the leaders of the Congress Party
are not supportable in law.79
The Madhya Pradesh High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the
Government of Madhya Pradesh and whereas, the writ petition relating the Rajasthan and
Himachal Pradesh were withdrawn later and transferred to the Supreme Court for
decision. In a Historic judgement, the Madhya Pradesh High Court by two by one
majority held in Sundarlal Patwa v. Union of India,80 that the Presidential order imposing
President‘s rule in the State was invalid and unconstitutional and as being beyond the
77
ibid.
78
ibid.
79
ibid.
80
Sundarlal Patwa Vs. Union of India, AIR 1993, M.P., 214.
180

Article 356 of the Constitution. The Court said that in their report recommending the
dismissal of the Patwa ministry and resolution of the Assembly, the Governor failed to
substantiate as to how the Constitutional Machinery had broken down. There were no
evidences of the State Government having defied Central Directives mere worsening of
the law and order situation in a State due to sudden break of violence did not call for an
extreme step of imposition of President‘s rule. The Governor‘s report to the Centre had
not provided any other material to justify the case for a Constitutional breakdown of a
State. The Court said that Central intervention in a situation of deteriorating law and
order could be justified through the deployment of Army in the affected areas. But the
imposition of President‘s rule straight away in this circumstance as beyond the scope of
Article 356, as regards the contention that after it had been ratified by the Parliament, the
Court cannot sit in judgement on presidential proclamation, the Court said that the
proclamation had been invalid for a period of two months before the Parliament gave its
approval. The Parliamentary approval merely gives further extension to the proclamation.
In approving the Presidential order, the Court held Parliament did not sit in judgement
over satisfaction of the President reached on the advice of the Union Cabinet for
imposing President‘s rule for two months prior to the issue coming up before Parliament.
The Central Government filed an appeal against the Madhya Pradesh High Court
judgement in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court had stayed the operation of the
judgement till the disposal of the case.
The Supreme Court in its judgement in S. R. Bommai vs. Union of India81 held
the imposition of President‘s rule in these three states of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and
Himachal Pradesh as constitutional. The Court held that ‗Secularism‘ is basic feature of
the Constitution and any State Government, which acts against that ideal, can be
dismissed by the President. It was held that in matters of State, religion has no place, no
political party can simultaneously be a religious party and politics and religion cannot be
mixed.
81
1994 3 SCC 1.
181

5.3.9 Karnataka 1989
By a proclamation dated April 21, 1989 the President dismissed the Government
of Karnataka, dissolved the Legislative Assembly, took over the powers of the
Government and vested the powers of the State Legislature with Parliament and made
other incidental and ancillary provisions suspending several provisions of the
Constitution with respect to that State. The proclamation does not contain any reasons
except barely reciting the satisfaction of the President. The satisfaction is stated to have
been formed on a consideration of the report of the Governor and other information
received by him Mr. S.R. Bommai was the Chief Minister then.
The Janata Legislative Party emerged as the majority party in the State
Legislature following elections to the Assembly in March 1985. Mr. Ramakrishna Hegde
was elected as the leader of the Janata Legislature Party and was sworn in as Chief
Minister in March 1985. In August 1988, Hegde resigned and Bommai was elected as the
leader and sworn in as the Chief Minister on August 30, 1988. In September 1988, Janata
Party and Lok Dal (B) merged resulting in the formations of Janata Dal. The Janata Party
in Karnataka Legislature was renamed at Janata Dal. On April 15, 1989 the Ministry was
expanded by Bommai including thirteen more members. On April 17, 1989, a legislator,
Kalyan Rao Mallaker defected the party and presented a letter to the Governor
withdrawing his support to the Janata Dal Government. On the next day, he met the
Governor and presented nineteen letters purported to have been signed by one B.J.P.
Legislator. One, associate independent legislator withdrawing their support to the
Government. The Governor is said to have called the Secretary of the Legislature
Department and got the authenticity of the signatures on the letters verified. He did not,
of course, inform Bommai about these developments. On April 19, the Governor sent a
report to the President stating that there were dissensions in Janata Party which led to the
resignation of hedge earlier and that, even after the formation of the Janata Dal, there
have been dissensions and defections. He referred to the letters received by him from
defecting members and opined that on that account, the ruling party has been reduced to
minority in the Assembly. He started that the council of Ministers headed by Bommai
does not command aa majority in the House and that, therefore, it is not appropriate
182

under thee contribution to have the state administered by an executive consisting of
course of ministers who did not command the majority in the House. He opined that no
other party is in a position to form the Government and recommend action under Article-
356(1).
On April 20, 1989 seven legislators out of those who were said to have submitted
the letter to the Governors, complaining that their signatures were obtained by force. On
the same day, the State Cabinet met decided to convene the Assembly Session on April
27, 1989. The Chief Minister and the Law Minister met the Governor on that day itself
and informed him about the summoning of the Assembly Session. They also brought to
the Governor‘s notice the recommendation of the Sarkaria Commission that the support
and strength of the Chief Minister should be tested on the floor of the Assembly. Mr.
Bommai offered to prove his majority on the floor of the House. He even expressed his
readiness to prepone the Assembly Session if so desired by the Governor. He also sent a
telex message to that effect to the President of India. In spite of all these, the Governor
sent another report to the President of India on April 20, 1989 referring to the letters of
members withdrawing their earlier letters and opined that, the said letters were evidently
obtained by Bommai by pressurizing those M.L.As. He reported that, ―horse trading is
going on and atmosphere is getting vitiated.‖ He reiterated his opinion that Bommai has
lost the confidence of the majority in the State Assembly and requested that action be
taken on his previous letter. On that very day the President issued the proclamation under
Article 356, which has been exercised several times. It says, that the said action was
taken on the basis of, ―the report from the Government of the State of Karnataka and
other information received.‖
The validity of the proclamation was challenged by Bommai and certain other
members of the Council of Ministers by way of a Writ Petition (W.P. 7899 of 1989) in
the Karnataka High Court. The Union of India (the first respondent in the Writ Petition)
submitted that the decision of the President of India based on the report of the Governor
and other information brought to his notice is not justifiable and cannot be challenged in
the Writ Petition, while making report it was submitted, the Governor does not set on the
aid and advice of his Council of Ministers but in his individual capacity. The report of the
183

Governor cannot be challenged in view of Article 361 of the Constitution nor can he or
the President be compelled to disclose the information or material upon which they have
acted. Article 74(2) was said to be a bar to the Court enquiring into the said information,
material and advice. It was also submitted that the proclamation has since been approved
by both Houses of Parliament under Clause (3), of Article 356. The State of Karnataka,
submitted that the Governor had taken into consideration of all the facts and
circumstances prevailing in the State while submitting his report and that the
proclamation issued on that basis is objectionable.
On the Judgment of High Court, the Supreme Court gave its historic
pronouncement and set aside the Judgment by observing following six points:
1) The proclamation under Article 356(1) is not immune from judicial scrutiny the
Court can examine whether the satisfaction has been formed on wholly
extraneous material or whether there is rational news between the material and the
satisfaction.
2) In Article 356, the President means the President and the Union Council of
Ministers. The satisfaction referred to therein is subjective satisfaction. This
satisfaction has no doubt to be formed on a consideration of all the facts and
circumstances.
3) The two reports of the Governor conveyed to the President essential and relevant
facts, which were relevant for the purpose of, Article 356. The facts states in the
Governor‘s Report cannot be stated to be irrelevant. They are perfectly relevant.
4) Where the Governor‘s ‗personal bonafides‘ are not questioned, his satisfaction
that no other party is in a position to form the Government, has to be accepted as
true and is based upon a reasonable assessment of all the relevant facts.
5) Recourse of floor test was neither compulsory nor obligatory. It was not a pre-
requisite to sending up a report recommending action under Article 356(1).
6) The introduction of 10th schedule to the Constituti9on has not affected in any
manner the content of the power under Article 356.
184

The Supreme Court observed that no Constitutional crisis has existed as reported
by the Governor. So, the Governor‘s reports, which were consisting of irrelevant facts
like Constitutional break down are completely irrelevant. Here the satisfaction of the
President is also not basically correct. Hence, the Court pointed out that the proclamation
of the President Rule under Article 356 in Karnataka was unconstitutional in sense.
5.3.10. Uttar Pradesh 1996
The U.P. Legislative Assembly election results of October 1996 were announced
but no party has secured majority. Hence the newly constituted Assembly was kept
under suspended animation and the President‘s rule was re-imposed on October 17, 1996
similar to that of the State of Kerala in 1964. The President‘s proclamation of 17th
October 1996 of U.P. was approved by the House of Parliament on December 5, 1996.82
The imposition of President‘s role in Uttar Pradesh even after the formation of the
Legislative assembly had evoked strong resentment from legal and political circles. Mr.
JagannadhaMisra former Union Minister pointed out the decision of the Congress Party
to support the United Front Government at the centre.83 Mr. Kalyan Singh observed that
―Romesh Bandari was a slur on democracy as he had sullied the great traditions left by
illustrious Governor‘s from Sarojini Naidu and K.M. Munshi‖.84The B.J.P., declared that
the aim of the united Front was to secure the power at Uttar Pradesh through
unconstitutional means and denying the BJP, its rightful place in the polity, gained
through the electoral process.85 The Governor‘s duty is to install a Government and the
Government has to prove its majority. If he needed a precedent Mr. Bhandari needed
only to follow example set by the formal President Venkatraman and Shankar Dayalk
Sharma. 86 The imposition of President‘s rule in Uttar Pradesh was challenged in
Allahabad High Court. In a land mark judgement, a three Judge bench of the High Court
held that the President proclamation imposing President‘s rule under Article 356 in the
State of Uttar Pradesh and subsequently its approval by Parliament is unconstitutional
82
The Hindu, 7 December, 1996, p.10.
83
The Times of India, October 20, 1996, p. 4.
84
The Hindu, October 20, 1996, p.12.
85
The Hindu, October 20, 1996, p.10.
86
Pandey, J.N. Constitutional Law of India. Allahabad: Central Law Agency, 2013.
185

and was based on wholly irrelevant and extraneous grounds and therefore, liable to be
quashed. However, to avoid any crisis as a result to the quashing of aforesaid
proclamation, the court, by applying the doctrine of prospective overruling, directed that
the judgment shall come into operation with effect from December 26, 1996. Justice
B.M. Lal said that the Governor did not explore all the possibilities to form the
Government in the State. The President‘s rule could not extend beyond one year unless
the condition provided in Article 356 is present. In the present case, the President‘s rule
was continued beyond one year without complying with the conditions laid down in sub-
clauses (a) and (b) of clauses (5) of Article 356.87
The Union Government however, went on appeal against Allahabad High Court‘s
decision while the matter is pending in the Supreme Court due to sudden political
developments in UP, the BSP; BJP coalition headed by Ms. Mayawati formed the
Government in Uttar Pradesh on March 21, 1997. Accordingly, the President‘s rule was
revoked.88
5.4. Recent Imposition of President’s Rule
5.4.1 Bihar 2005
Election to the State of Bihar was notified by the Election Commission on 17th
December, 2004. Polling for the said election was held in three phrases, i.e., 3rd, 5th and
13th February, 2005. Counting of votes took place on 27th February, 2005. Results were
declared by the Election Commission on 4th March, 2005. Following is the party-wise
position:
87
ibid.
88
The Hindu, March 23, 1997, p.12.
186

S. No. Party No. of Votes
i) R.J.D. 75
ii) J.D.(U) 55
iii) B.J.P. 37
iv) Congress (I) 10
v) B.S.P. 02
vi) L.J.P. 29
vii) C.P.I. 03
viii) C.P.I. (M) 01
ix) C.P.I.(ML) 07
x) N.C.P. 03
xi) S.P. 04
xii) Independents 17
Table. 2
The L.J.P., consisting with 29 MLAs decided not to support either of the groups
in the formation of the Government. The 17 independents did not express their support to
any one of the groups. There upon the Governor of Bihar sent a report on 27-4-2005
recommending that the newly Constituted Assembly be kept in Suspended animation
stating that he explored all possibilities and was fully satisfied that no political party or
coalition of parties or groups was able to substantiate its claim of majority in the
Legislative Assembly. A situation has emerged in which no political party or a group
appears to be in a position to form a stable Government commanding a majority in the
House. This situation has led to the imposition of President‘s Rule on 7th March, 2005.
The Governor on 22-05-2005 sent another report to the President stating that none of the
political parties either individually or with the pre-selection combination or with post-
election alliance, could stake claim to form a popular Government commanding majority
in the House. Further, he stated that there is certain newspaper and other reports gathered
187

through meeting with different party functionaries that large scale horse trading is taken
place. This is an alarming feature and affects the Constitutional provisions and safeguards
built therein. In view of this report, the Union Cabinet met around 11.00 p.m., on the
same day and took a decision so as to accept the report of the Governor and thus, sent a
fax message to the President of India, who had already left for Moscow, recommending
the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly of Bihar. He has accorded his approval
forthwith. After due process the notification was issued formally at 14-30 hrs. (IST) on
23rd May, 2005 dissolving the Bihar Assembly.89
In this context it is appropriate to refer to the remarks of Hon‘ble Justice

Sabharwal. Sabharwal.J. in Rameshwar Prasad V. Union of India dealing with the
question of Governor‘s discretion in appointing a Chief Minister observed, 90 ―The
Governor cannot, in the exercise of his discretion or otherwise, do anything what is
prohibited to be done. The Constitution enjoins upon the Governor that after the
conclusion of elections, every possible attempt is made for formation of a popular
Government representing the will of the people expressed through the electoral process if
the Governor acts contrary by creating a situation.‖
Further he stated,91 ―If a political party with the support of other political party or
other MLA‘s stakes claim to form a Government and satisfies the Governor about its
majority to form a stable Government, the Governor cannot refuse formation of
Government and override the majority claim because of his subjective assessment that the
majority was cobbled by illegal and unethical means. No such power has been vested
with the Governor. Such a power would be against the democratic principles of majority
rule. Governor is not an autocratic political ombudsman. If such a power is vested in the
Governor, the consequences can be horrendous. The ground of maladministration by a
State Government enjoying majority is not available for invoking power under Article
356. The remedy for corruption or similar ills, and evils lies elsewhere and not in Article
356(1)‖, in the same vein it has to be held that the power under Tenth Schedule for
defection lies with the Speaker of the House and not with the Governor. The power
89
Rameshwar Prasad Vs. Union of India SCJ 2006, p.492.
90
ibid., p.477.
91
ibid., p. 556.
188

exercised by the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule is of judicial nature. Dealing with the
question whether power of disqualification of a member of the House vests exclusively
with the House, to the exclusion of judiciary, which in Britain was based on certain
British Legislature practices. As far as India is concerned, it was said in Kihoto‘s case
that: ―It is, therefore, inappropriate to claim that the determinative jurisdiction of the
Speaker or the Chairman in the Tenth Schedule is not a judicial power and is within the
non-justiciable legislative area.‖ The Governor cannot assume to himself aforesaid
judicial power and based on that assumption come to the conclusion that there would be
violation of Tenth Schedule and use it as a reason for recommending dissolution of
Assembly.
The Constitutio0n of India grants immunity to the Governors provided in Article

361. Article 361(1) inter alia, provides that the Governor shall not be answerable to any
act done or purported to be done by him in the exercise and performance of those powers
and duties. The Court held that the immunity granted does not affect the power of this
Court to judicial review of the Proclamation issued under Article 356(1) of the
Constitution of India on the ground of malafides or it being ultravires and that it would be
for the Government to satisfy the Court and adequately meet such ground of challenge. A
mala fide act is wholly outside the scope of the power and has no existence in the eyes of
the law. Further it held that the expression ‗purported to be done‘ in Article 361 does not
constitute the Acts which are malafide or ultravires and thus, the Government in support
of the Proclamation under article 356(1) shall have to meet the challenge. The immunity
granted under Article 361 does not mean that in the absence of Governor, the grounds of
malafide or being ultravires would not be examined by the Court.92
The State of Bihar was brought under President‘s rule on March 28, 1995 for
getting the approval of the State budget before March 31 of 1995 since the life of the
State Assembly was due to end by March 15. Due to a sudden development the Election
Commission on March 1, 1995, rescheduled the election to March 11, 15, 19 instead of
5,7 and 9 of March due to internal disturbance within the Bihar State for conduct of
peaceful free and fair elections. Due to these unavoidable circumstances, to enable
92
ibid., p. 556-558.
189

Parliament to seek a vote on account regarding the financial commitments of the State
before the close of financial year i.e., March 31, 1995President‘s rule was imposed in
Bihar. Further the Election Commission directed the Government to take immediate steps
to reinforce the deployment of Para-military forces, replace ill-informed statutory and
election officials, stream line coordination in the law and order to conduct the elections.
However, it was for the first time that a State was brought under the President‘s rule for
getting approval or the interim budget of the State by the Parliament.
After elections, Laloo Prasad Yadav of Janata Dal again formed the Government
in the State of Bihar in April 1995. Accordingly, the President‘s rule in Bihar was lifted.
5.4.2. Goa 2005
The Congress (I)-led UPA Government at the Centre also imposed the President's
Rule in Goa on March 4, 2005 and kept the State Legislative Assembly under suspended
animation, because the Congress (I)-led United Legislature Party coalition government
headed by Pratap Singh Rane win the vote of confidence in the State Legislative
Assembly with pro tern Speaker casting his vote in favour of the Rane government and
not allowing one member to vote. It led to the imposition of President's Rule in this case.
So, imposition of President's Rule in Goa was constitutionally justified. In fact, The
United Legislature Party government led by Pratap Singh Rane was sworn as a Chief
Minister on February 2, 2005 after the State Governor, S.C. Jamir, dismissed the BJP -led
Manohar Parrikar government. He could not seek the trust vote on February 2, 2005
owing to noisy scenes in the House. On February 2, 2005, the Speaker declared the
Confidence motion to be carried. But ordered one member to go out of the House.
Within minutes of the Parrikar government winning the confidence of the House, the
Governor dismissed the Parrikar government, and Congress (I) Party leader Pratap Singh
Rane was installed as the new Chief Minister.93
93
The Hindustan Times, March 5, 2005.
190

5.4.3. Karnataka 2007
The Union Cabinet recommends President‘s rule in Karnataka on 5th October

2007. In Assembly elections on party secured requisite majority to form the Government.
The BJP was the single largest party.The congress against which was the people‘s
mandate, forged a coalition with Janata Dal of Kumar Swami. After sometime the
coalition failed. However, Kumar swami formed a coalition with the B.J.P. It was agreed
that they would hold the Chief Minister ship term-wise. But Kumar Swami in his term
rejected this agreement. The President rule was imposed and the Assembly was kept in
suspended animation. But after sometime Kumar Swami agreed to support B.J.P. but Dev
Gauda imposed twelve conditions to support the government in the Assembly at the time
of vote of confidence. The B.J.P. Chief Minister tendered his resignation and the
President rule was again imposed and the Assembly was dissolved.94
5.4.4. Nagaland 2008
The Union Cabinet had decided to recommend President's Rule and placing the
Assembly in suspended animation after a controversial ruling by the Assembly Speaker
on the opposition Congress-sponsored no confidence motion led to political uncertainty
in the state. The President received the recommendation and issued the proclamation of
President's Rule in Nagaland 0n January 3 2008.
The Nagaland People's Front (NPF)-led Democratic Alliance Government

survived the no-confidence motion 23-19 on December 13 after the Speaker debarred
three Independents from taking part in the voting. He contended that they had earlier
supported the NPF and now wanted to support the Congress. The vote of nine dissident
NPF MLAs was also invalid as they went against the party whip, the Speaker had ruled.
The Congress questioned the decision and maintained that the Neiphiu Rio
Government had been voted out of power. Party legislators had demanded the
Government's dismissal, alleging constitutional impropriety on the part of the Speaker.
The Congress central leadership had backed the demand of its state unit, saying the
Opposition had won the no-confidence vote.
94
The Times of India, October 6, 2007.
191

The Congress argued that the Opposition had the support of 31 legislators in the
60-member Assembly. This included 17 from the Congress, two from the JD (U), three
Independents and 9 from the ruling Nagaland People's Front who voted against their own
party. The Union Cabinet decision on President's Rule came after the Government
consulted the Union Law Ministry and concluded that the Speaker's ruling was deemed to
be in violation of rules and procedures.
5.4.5. Meghalaya 2009
The Union government impose President's Rule in Meghalaya on 18 March

2009, 95 where the Nationalist Congress Party-led government survived a controversial
confidence vote in the state assembly. The Centre had received a report from Governor R
S Moosahary about breakdown of the Constitutional machinery in the state and
recommended President's rule. The cabinet accepted the governor's report and a suitable
recommendation was being sent to President Pratibha Patil. Assisted by the Speaker, who
did not validate the votes of four rebel members, while ignoring the Governor's directive,
however, exercised his casting vote to break a tie, the NCP-led Meghalaya Progressive
Alliance government had survived on a confidence vote in the assembly.
Speaker B M Lanong suspended five Members of Legislative Assembly, who

withdrew support to the government, under the Anti-Defection Law, ignoring the
governor's directive that he maintains status quo on the voting rights of members and cast
his vote, when there was a tie in the 60-member House during division.
5.4.6. Jharkhand 2009 & 10
The President‘s rule was imposed19 January 2009 & 1 June 2010 in the State of
Jharkhand due to political uncertainty when the Chief Minister Shibu Soren lost a bye-
election. The state Assembly has been kept under sues ended animation. The decisions
were passed on Governor‘s report on a political deadlock after the Chief Minister
resigned after losing the bye-election within six months after becoming the Chief
Minister. The State which went to election in 2005 has seen three Chief Ministers with
Soren becoming the Chief Minister on two occasions, BJP Arjun Munda for 17 months
95
The Indian Express, March 18, 2009.
192

and Madhu Koda an independent backed by Congress and JMM remained for two
years.96
5.4.7. Andhra Pradesh 2014
In Andhra Pradesh from February 28, 2014 to June 8, 2014, due to a political
crisis caused by the resignation of the then Chief Minister, N. Kiran Kumar Reddy and
other Congress legislators on February 19, during the protest against the Andhra Pradesh
Reorganisation Bill that bifurcated the state and created a separate state of Telangana.97
5.4.8. Maharashtra 2014
The imposition of President‘s rule was manifested on September 28, 2014, in

Maharashtra after the Congress-Nationalist Congress Party alliance split ahead of the
Assembly elections in October 2014 98 in poll-bound Maharashtra after the then Chief
Minister, Prithviraj Chavan resigned, ensuing the break-up of 15-year-old Congress-NCP
alliance in the state.
5.4.9. Jammu &Kashmir 2008, 15 & 16
Governor's rule was imposed in the state on 1July 2008 to 5January 2009 after the
PDP withdrew support to Ghulam Nabi Azad-led Congress-PDP coalition government in
July 2008.Of course, on June 28, 2008, the PDP withdrew the act of supporting the
government,ensuing widespread protests during the Amarnath Land row agitation that
pitted Hindu-dominated Jammu region against the Muslim-majority Kashmir valley.
Azad wanted to seek a vote of confidence in the Legislative Assembly on 7 July, but
opted for resignation instead. The central rule was put to an end on January 5, 2009,
when Omar sworn in as the youngest Chief Minister of the state.
Soon after the assembly election results on 23 December 2014, the Governor‘s
rule was imposed in the state. It threw up a hung assembly with no party or combination
of parties able to stake claim for government formation and caretaker Chief Minister
96
The Times of India, January 20, 2009.
97
The Hindu, February 29 & 30, 2014.
98
The Times of India, September 28, 2014.
193

Omar Abdullah asked to be relieved from the duties by January 7, 2015. In 2015, 9
January to 1 March, Governor‘s rule was imposed in the state.99Again, Governor‘s rule
was imposedfor87 days in the state on 8 January, 2016 because of the death of the then
Chief Minister, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed.
5.4.10. Arunachal Pradesh 2016
On January 26, 2016, President‘s rule was imposed in Arunachal Pradesh on

various grounds, including dissidence. The then Governor, JP Rajkhowa mentioned cow
slaughter, threats and an episode with the then Chief Minister,NabamTuki‘s council of
ministers that almost resulted in physical assault as considered to be some of the reasons
for the imposition of President‘s rule in the state. The Governor had sent six reports to the
President claiming that ‗Constitutional machinery has broken down in the state‘.100
However, the primary reason that was stated for the move was that the party had
split in December, wherein 21 of its members had teamed up with 11 BJP members and
ousted the Speaker and the Chief Minister in two assembly sessions. On the basis of the
report submitted by the Governor, the apex court took up the case for hearing.
When the apex court of the country was approached in this matter, their stand was
clear - the Governor of a state holds ‗complete immunity‘ and thus would not be
answerable to the judiciary for a decision taken in their official capacity. Attorney
General Mukul Rohatgi, in the course of argument drew the bench‘s attention to Article
361 (1) of the Indian Constitution, which protects the President and the Governor from
legal action. The clause verbatim states that, ‗The President, or the Governor or
Rajpramukh of a State, shall not be answerable to any court for the exercise and
performance of the powers and duties of his office or for any act done or purporting to be
done by him in the exercise and performance of those powers and duties‘. Once Supreme
Court weighed in on the legality of the matter, a floor test was conducted which helped
Kalikhopul assume office as the Chief Minister, which led to the withdrawal of
President's rule in the state.
99
The Times of India, January 9 &10, 2015.
100
The Hindu, January 27, 2016.
194

5.4.11. Uttarakhand 2016
On March 18, 2016 during passing of the state Budget, rebel 9 MLAs of Congress
joined hand with opposition and asked for a division of vote. If the budget failed to pass,
Harish Rawat government would have fallen as it was a money bill. But the speaker
refused division of vote and passed the budget by voice vote.
Based on the apex court's stand on April 22, Rawat had to step down again. Since,
the apex court did not have the verdict copy of the High Court on the day it was first
slated for hearing; it stayed the Uttarakhand High Court judgement. The case was then
listed for hearing on April 27. The bench had then recorded Rohatgi‘s undertaking which
said, "Union of India shall not revoke the Presidential proclamation till the next date of
hearing".
Supreme Court in its previous hearing had stated that they would want to wind up
this issue before the court breaks for summer vacation on May 16101. However, as stated
earlier, the Supreme Court in its last sitting has suggested that President's rule could
temporarily be lifted for two days to conduct the floor test, which could aid the court in
making a decision.
Looking at court's attitude, it does look like a floor test will be held sooner or later
in Uttarakhand. Whether the 9 dissenting MLAs are allowed to take part may decide the
fate of Harish Rawat.
5.4.11.1. Floor Test
After taking into account the agreement, the bench in its order said, ―a special
session of Uttarakhand legislative assembly be summoned/convened on 10th May,
2016, commencing 11.00 a.m. The vote of confidence is the only agenda in the
assembly that could be sought by Harish Singh Rawat. Besides the said Agenda,
nothing else would be discussed in the assembly. However, the proceedings at the
assembly are likely to be absolutely peaceful in manner and without any sort of
101
The Times of India, May 17, 2016.
195

disturbance. The court supposes that all the members and all who are concerned with
the affairs of the assembly shall abide by the same in letter and spirit. 102‖
The court sought the Chief Secretary and the Director General of Police,
Uttarakhand to see that all the qualified members of the legislative assembly attend the
assembly freely, safely and securely and, thereby, no interference or hindrance is
caused by anyone therein. The assembly session commences at 11.00 am for the floor
test of the assembly and will be over by 1.00 pm. Soon after the confidence motion, a
division of the house will occur and, subsequently, the members who are inclined to
vote in favour of the motion will sit on one side and the others who are against the
motion will sit on the other wing side.
The Principal Secretary of the legislative assembly was asked to see to it that
the voting was done and recorded appositely. The members who are inclined to vote in
favour of the motion would like to vote individually by raising their hands, which will
be counted by the Principal Secretary. Likewise, it is the case of the members who
vote against the motion. The entire proceedings will be video-graphed and the video
recording will be placed before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court released the
results at 10.30 am on 11 May, 2016. The result to be followed for that time and the
Proclamation would be imposed and after that it would be revoked.103
5.5. Floor Test of Karnataka 2018
In the Karnataka results of the elections rolled in on May 15, 2018, 104 the
BJP emerged as the single largest party with 104 seats, but is short of an outright
majority. Meanwhile, Congress bearing 78 seats lent a helping hand to the JDS, with 38
seats, to try and form the government. So, the INC-JDS coalition, together with the
Bahujan Samaj Party and two independents have the support of 117 MLAs, well over the
majority mark of 112.Then, the BJP and the INC approached the governor of Karnataka,
VajubhaiVala, to stake a claim in order to form the government. The governor offered the
BJP, as the largest party, the first chance; the INC and the JDS protested, arguing that
102
The Times of India, May11, 2016
103
The Supreme Court Judgement, May 11, 2016.
104
http://www.thehindu.com. May 16, 2018.
196

they could prove they had an absolute majority, they must be invited to form the
government instead. This ended on the night of May16, when the INC-JDS
coalition approached the Supreme Court of India in an attempt to block the swearing in of
B.S. Yeddyurappa. The Supreme Court refused the block the swearing-in, but the
swearing-in and the formation of government would be subject to the final outcome of
the case filed the INC and JDS. Although the verdict was favourable for the BJP, the test
for the party will come over the next few days as the party tries to prove a majority. The
INC and JDS have taken extreme steps to prevent any MLAs from going over to the BJP,
including busing them out of state. Yet, reports indicate at least two or three MLAs were
not part of the group that was transported out of Karnataka, and could be at risk for
defection. The leader of the JDS, H.D. Kumaraswamy, has also alleged that the BJP had
made overtures to JDS MLAs, offering bribes of 1 billion Indian rupees ($14 million) and
cabinet positions in exchange for support. The BJP has vehemently denied this charge.
The two-day-old BJP government collapsed on Saturday as Chief Minister BS
Yeddyurappa quit even before the scheduled floor test at 4 pm. With strength of 104
members, BJP was short of 7 members for the magic number of 111 to win the vote of
confidence. As the efforts by BJP strategists to woo the opposition Congress and JD(S)
members proved futile and defeat stared him in the eye, Yeddyurappa chose to quit
without pressing for voting on the confidence motion.
The Karnataka Governor VajubhaiVala invited former Chief Minister and JD-S
State President H D Kumaraswamy to form the next government in the State and gave
him 15 days‘ time. The JD(S) leader is set to become the chief minister for a second
time on May 23.The Assembly drama ended on an emotional note with Yeddyurappa
using the opportunity to make an emotional speech, Atal Vajpayee in 1996, before
heading to Raj Bhavan to tender his resignation to the Governor.
5.6. Impact of President's Rule
5.6.1. Legislative Impact
When a Proclamation under Article 356 has been issued in respect of a State, the
President may declare that the powers of the Legislature of the State shall be exercisable
197

by or under the authority of Parliament. Article 356 (I) (b) says "The President may by
Proclamation declare that the powers of the Legislature of the State shall be exercisable
by or under the authority of Parliament". 105
When the President declares that the powers of the Legislature of the State will be
exercised by the Parliament, he has three options, namely, (a) he may remove the
Ministry but keep the State Legislature under suspension, (b) he may remove the Ministry
and abolish the Legislature but the Speaker of the Assembly may continue in office, (c)
he may remove the Ministry and may merely suspend the Assembly by the first
Proclamation but may later on dissolve it.
Regarding the delegation of powers by Parliament to the President, Parliament

can delegate to the President only the 'law-making' powers and not all powers of the State
Legislature. This is so because under Article 356(I) (b) Parliament itself does not exercise
'all the powers' of State Legislature. Parliament cannot delegate to the President the
financial functions of the State Legislature. Article 357 (I) (c) stated that, "It shall be
competent for the President to authorise when the House of the People is not in session
expenditure from the Consolidated Fund of the State pending the sanction of such
expenditure by Parliament".106
It should be noted that even without the delegation of legislative powers under
Article 357(2) (a) the President will have the powers of law-making in respect of the
matters mentioned in the State List. According to Article 357 (2) (a), "Any law made in
exercise of the power of the Legislature of the State by Parliament or the President or
other authority referred to in sub clause (a) of clause (I) which Parliament or the
President or such other authority would not, but for the issue of a Proclamation under
Article 356, have been competent to make shall, after the Proclamation has ceased to
operate, continue in force until altered or repealed or amended by a Competent
Legislature or other authority". 107
105
Government of India (2011), Article 356 (I) (B), The Constitution of India. New Delhi: Legislative
Department, p. 10.
106
ibid., p. 102.
107
ibid.
198

This would be so because the executive power of the Union extends to the matters
in respect of which the Parliament has power to make laws and the President by
Proclamation declares that the powers of the State Legislature shall be exercisable by or
under authority of Parliament. The President, however, automatically gets the power of
making laws by issuing ordinance in respect of matters mentioned in the State list.
But when the Legislative powers are not delegated by Parliament to the President
under Article 357 (I) (a), the President may make laws for the State where the
constitutional machinery has failed by issuing Ordinances under Article 213, and
whenever, he does so, he will have to place it on the table of Parliament. Because it is
Parliament which exercises the power of the State Legislature under Article 357(1) (a). If
the powers are delegated by the Parliament to the President, he may, if authorised, further
delegate them to any other authority, may be to the Governor or someone else and while
doing so, he may impose conditions, which he may deem fit.
Whenever, Parliament or the President or someone else exercises the Legislative

powers of the State Legislature under Article 357, he may make Jaws which he could not
have been competent to make, had the Proclamation under Article 356 not been issued.
It may be mentioned here that –
(1) Under Article 357(1)(a) the President can make Laws even when the Parliament is
in session.
(2) Under Article 357(1)(a) the President gets the law-making power in respect of the
matters mentioned in the State List.
(3) Laws made under Article 357(1)(a) are to be operative only in the State where the
constitutional machinery has failed. No such positive approval is needed in the case
of laws made under Article 357(1)(a). Laws made under this Article are to operate
unless both the Houses of Parliament either disapprove of them or suggest certain
modifications therein. 108
108
Destha, Sunil, President's Rule in the States: Constitutional Provisions and Practices, New Delhi: Deep
and Deep, 1993, pp.75-76.
199

5.6.2. Administrative Impact
When a Proclamation is made under Article 356, the President may assume to
himself all or any of the functions of the Government of the State. Article 356 (I) (a)
states that ''The President may by Proclamation assume to himself all or any of the
functions of the Government of the State and all or any of the powers vested in or
exercisable by the Governor or anybody or authority in the State other than the legislature
of the State."109
In practice, the President generally delegates the power to the Governor of the
State where President's Rule has been imposed. But this rule is subject to the superior
authority of the President, which means of the Council of Ministers. The Council of
Ministers at the Union is answerable to Parliament in all matters concerning the
administration of the State concerned.
Thus, a State administration during the President's Rule under Article 356
virtually comes directly under the directions and control of the Union Government.
Under President's Rule the duly elected State Government is dismissed and Executive
authority of the concerned State delegated to the Governor and his Civil Servant
Advisors. Usually Consultative Committee of the Members of Parliament of the State
concerned is made, which gets associated with the administration of State. But this
Committee is purely an advisory body and has no powers. The Parliament also has a very
nominal role when it passes the State budget, because Parliament does not have sufficient
time to discuss the details of State administration. Hence, President's Rule is essentially a
bureaucratic rule. 110 In practice, the State Governor and his advisors function like a
Council of Ministers of the State concerned. "This is a plain outwitting of democracy
because neither the Governor nor his advisors are elected by the people and as such they
do not represent the people."111
109
Government of India (1991), Article 356 (I)(a), The Constitution of India, Legislative Department, pp.
100-101.
110
Siwach, J.R. Politics of President's Rule in India. Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1979, p.
102.
111
Singhvi, G.C. "Our Representative Democracy: Some Incompatible Practices," Indian Journal of Public
Administration, vol. XLVI, no. I, New Delhi, January-March, 2000, p.ll6.
200

5.6.3. Financial Impact
Under President's Rule the President is authorised to carry out expenditure from
the Consolidated Fund of the State. Article 357 (1) (c) states, "The President is competent
to authorise, when the House of the People is not in session, expenditure from the
Consolidated Fund of the State pending the sanction of such expenditure by
Parliament."112
If the President makes a law, after the law-making powers have been delegated to
him, a positive approval of Money Bills form Parliament is absolutely essential. Since the
financial powers, cannot be delegated to the President, its logical corollary is that it
becomes absolutely essential that a particular tax should be imposed immediately. The
President, it seems, can do so only by issuing an Ordinance under Article 213. Whenever
he does so, the Ordinance shall have to be placed before the Parliament for its positive
approval. Article 213(1) states that "If at any time, except when the Legislative Assembly
of a State is in session, or where there is a Legislative Council in. a State, except when
both Houses of the Legislature are in session, the Governor is satisfied that circumstances
exit which render it necessary for him to take immediate action, he may promulgate such
Ordinances as the circumstances appear to him to require". 113
S.R. Maheshwari pointed out that a study of the laws and the budgets passed for
the States under Article 356 discloses that radical changes in the policy, especially those
having political implications and major taxation measures, are generally not
contemplated during the continuance of President's Rule. 114
It may be concluded that Article 355 imposes duty upon the Union Government to
protect every State against external aggression and internal disturbance and to ensure that
the Government of every State is carried on in accordance with the provisions of this
Constitution. The President can act under Article 355, i.e., without imposing President's
Rule, but it has not been done in practice. Article 356, however, provides power to the
112
Government of India, Article 357 (I) (c), The Constitution of India, New Delhi: Legislative Department,
1991, p. 102.
113
ibid., Article 213 (I), p.54.
114
Maheshwari, Shri Ram. President's Rule in India, New Delhi: Macmillan, 1977, p. 135.
201

President to impose President's Rule in case constitutional machinery fails in a State.
Article 365 also empowers the President to impose the President's Rule where any State
has failed to comply with, or to give effect to, any directions under Articles 256 and 257
issued by the Union Government. These provisions make Union Government competent
for the use of legislative, administrative and financial powers of the State concerned.
During President's Rule the Indian federal system turns into a Unitary system and the
State administration comes under direct control of the Union Government. The State
Governor becomes the real ruler of the State concerned and no more remains a mere
ceremonial head. Therefore, these provisions are a negation of the principles of
federalism. As A.S. Narang (2005) points out, in its present form Article 356 is not only
dangerous for State autonomy, but also is against the basic norms of democratic
governance. 115
It is evident that there is a lack of effective safeguards against the abuse of Article
356 of The Indian Constitution. The safeguard of ‗parliamentary approval‘ - outlined in
Article 356(3) -of a Proclamation under Article 356(1) could be biased because the Party
that is in power at the Centre generally dominates Parliament by a majority vote.
Furthermore, even a vote in Parliament declaring a particular imposition (or failure to
impose) of President‘s Rule to be wrongful cannot undo the damage already done.
However, the repeal of Article 356 is not advisable because the Indian polity is
rife with crises and there has to be some contingency against a constitutional deadlock in
a State.
To enable the Governors to perform their functions properly in accordance with

the provisions of the Constitution, it is essential that only right persons are appointed as
Governors. A Governor must be an impartial person who by his ability, character and
behaviour inspires respect. Discredited, defeated and ―burnt out‖ politicians should not be
appointed as Governors.
115
Narang, A.S. "President's Rule and Governance of States", cited in Akhtar Majeed (ed.), Federal India:
A Design for Good Governance, New Delhi: Manak Publications, 2005, p. 146.
202

It is further suggested that a Governor should remain in office for his full five
years term and the procedure for his removal should be made the same as prescribed for
judges of the Supreme Court and he should be ineligible for any other office under
Government after retirement.
It is also necessary to evolve and develop certain healthy and democratic

conventions and the Governor should be guided by these conventions while exercising
their discretionary powers under Article 356. It is equally important to evolve and
develop certain norms, principles and procedure in order to protect the federal and
democratic federal fabric of the Constitution.
Another option is to introduce further checks on the exercise of power under

Article 356, by amendment. Even this is not advisable because it defeats the very purpose
of the Article of dealing expeditiously with emergencies of constitutional failure in a
State.
In fact, the provisions contained in Article 356 relating to the 'Failure of the
Constitutional Machinery in States', needs a fresh look for protecting State autonomy.
In the long run 'public opinion' alone can effectively curb the abuse of the power,
exercised under Article 356. In order to achieve this purpose, we will have to mobilise
'vigilant public opinion'. Thus, if will also be necessary to evolve certain norms for this
purpose so that political considerations are kept aside while exercising the power under
Article 356, so that democracy and federalism may properly flourish in our country.
203

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CHAPTER - V

BREAKDOWN OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL MACHINERY IN

Andhra University, Visakhapatnam

President‘s rule is an exception and a limitation on the principle of Constitutional

The focus of this chapter is on the breakdown of the Constitutional machinery in

5.1. The Constitutional Provision of Article 356

Provisions in case of failure of constitutional machinery in States:

Andhra University, Visakhapatnam

(c) make such incidental or any consequential provisions as appear to the

(2) Any such Proclamation may be revoked or varied by a subsequent Proclamation.

Provided that if any such proclamation (not being a Proclamation revoking a

Andhra University, Visakhapatnam

(4) A Proclamation so approved shall, unless revoked, cease to operate on the

Provided that if and so often as a resolution approving the continuance in

Andhra University, Visakhapatnam

5.2. Article 356- A Critical Analysis

The meaning and implications of Article 356 can be easily studied by

(i) Satisfaction of the President

(ii) Report from the Governor or otherwise

(iii) A situation where the State Government cannot be carried on in

(iv) Proclamation by the President

(v) Consequences of Proclamation

(vi) Period of the Proclamation

5.2.1 Satisfaction of the President

Andhra University, Visakhapatnam

However, as we have adopted a parliamentary system of government, the

Andhra University, Visakhapatnam

5.2.2. Report from the Governor or otherwise

Under the compulsions of the parliamentary system, the Governor is to act

Andhra University, Visakhapatnam

The Administrative Reforms Commission (1969) recommended that before

Andhra University, Visakhapatnam

Andhra University, Visakhapatnam

5.2.3. A situation where the State Government cannot be carried on in accordance

Article 356 can be imposed in a particular situation in which a government of

Andhra University, Visakhapatnam

Andhra University, Visakhapatnam

Undoubtedly, there is vagueness in the words' in accordance with the provisions

Andhra University, Visakhapatnam

(b) The construction and maintenance of means of communication declared to be of

(c) Protection of railways within the State.

Andhra University, Visakhapatnam

(i) Internal violence causing failure of the constitutional machinery of the

(ii) Instability of the State Government due to either intra-party or inter-

(iii) Recalcitrant attitude of the State Government towards the Union

(iv) Flagrant breach of the Constitutional provisions by the State

K. Santhanam, member of the Constituent Assembly pointed out three conditions,

(1) Breakdown of law and order within the State.

(2) Wild confusion during the election.

(3) Organised terrorism or intimidation of civil authorities32

Andhra University, Visakhapatnam

(a) Political crisis.

(b) Internal subversion.

(c) Physical break-down.

(d) Non-compliance with constitutional directions of the Union Executive.

It is not claimed that this categorisation is comprehensive or perfect. There can be

(a) Political Crisis

A constitutional break-down may be the outcome of the political crisis or

(i) after a General Election no party or coalition of parties or groups is able to

Andhra University, Visakhapatnam

Normally, the power of dissolution of the Assembly is to be exercised by the

Andhra University, Visakhapatnam

We recommend that, in a situation of potential political break-down, the Governor

Andhra University, Visakhapatnam