intelligence

Intelligence operators

The agent of influence

ALFONSO MONTAGNESE

Itonthetheworld
present international scenario, so deeply and irreversibly changed if compared
of some decades ago,the limits of the so-called "hard power" in protecting 1

national security arebecoming more and more evident and the strengthof the so-called
"soft power"2 is increasingly coming to the surface. This is a new way for a Country
to express itspower, and -despite being very different from the usual means to demon-
strate power - it may allow the Country at issue to protect its vital interests. At the sa-
me time, mostly resorting to influence activities3 , soft power may orient and shape not
only the intra-state reality but also the international one, according to a Country's
strategic goals.
But what do we mean by "influence"?What does influence appeal to in order to produ-
ce its effects? How can an influence campaign be carried out? What are its goals and
what the techniques it makes use of? And, especially, who are the key players of this
kind of activity and what is the relationship between intelligence and influence opera-
tions? How and to what extent can influence operations effectively support gover-
nments, both in their national and international activities, with an eye to actions rela-
ted to the management of national security and to the protection of a Country's inte-
rests? This short contribution will try to concisely answer all the above-mentioned
questions. Nevertheless, it is not to be intended as an exhaustive analysis, but as a "se-
minal " article aimed at stimulating domestic discussion and deeper analysis on the
subject. In addition to this, it represents the starting point ofa research activity regar-
ding methods and techniques to employ influence for a Country's security and defen-
ce purposes.

1 This concept aims at encompassing the traditional political, military, economic and financial tools used in
the past to «measure» the power of a State and its capacity of influence in the international system.
2 Joseph Nye, professor at Harvard University and former President of the US National Intelligence Coun-
cil, in 2004 gave birth to the concept of soft power, in contrast to that of hard power. J. S. NYE, Soft Power:
un nuovo futuro per l’America, Einaudi, Torino, January 2005.
3 P. Cornish, J. Lindley-French, C. Yorke, Strategic Communications and National Strategy, Chatham Hou-
se, September 2011.

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Books are weapons in the war of ideas4

Definition of influence

Before understanding how influence works and who its players are, to define
its outlineit is necessary to give an overview of the most recent definitions
provided by Italian governmental agencies and officials.
The Italian Dipartimento delle Informazioni per la Sicurezza5 (DIS)gave its de-
finition of influence as an "attività condotta da soggetti, statuali o non, al fine
di orientare a proprio vantaggio le opinioni di un individuo o di un gruppo"6
.Such a concise definition, expressed in a simple language and for promotio-
nal and educational purposes7 , provides the following primary essential of
influence:

¢ the actors, which may be state or non-state actors;

¢ the purposes, which consist of achieving a comparative advantage vis-
a-vis a counterpart;
¢ the method, that is opinion-orienting;
¢ the target, which may be a single or a group.

It is possible to learn something more about influence completing the above-

mentioned definition with another one strictly linked to it, whichis "informa-
tion warfare" (IW), defined by the DIS as a "concetto basato sull'idea che quel-
lo informativo sia un vero e proprio dominio in cui tra Stati ovvero tra Stati ed
attori non statuali, si gioca un confronto che vede le informazioni costituire,
ad un tempo, strumento di offesa ed obiettivo. In questo contesto, il termine
indica le azioni intraprese al fine di acquisire superiorità nel dominio informa-

4 This slogan was realised by the US Office of War Information (OWI) and was included in a poster used to
promote the intervention of the US in the II World War in the eyes of the public opinion and to support the
US fighting force deployed in different battle fronts. OWI, instituted by Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Order No.
9192 of June 13, 1942, was a branch of the US Presidential Executive Office. Its competences were about
planning and conducting influence and propaganda campaigns on a large scale, even beyond US borders,
and, apart from posters, it made use of radio programmes, movies and magazines. OWI carried out its ac-
tivities in collaboration with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) – the forerunner of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency (CIA) – and with the Psychological Warfare Services (PWB), an agency created on July 1943
by the Anglo-American military government to perform the same task as OWI in support of the military
operations conducted by the Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ). After abolishing OWI, on September
15, 1945, its competences were assigned to the Department of State.
5 “Italian Security Intelligence Department”. http://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/web.nsf/pagine/en_dis .
6 “Activities conducted by state or non-state actors in order to condition the opinion of a whole group or of
a single individual for their own benefit”. Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri – Dipartimento delle In-
formazioni per la Sicurezza, Il linguaggio degli Organismi Informativi – Glossario Intelligence, Quaderni
d’Intelligence, Gnosis, June 2012.
7 The publication of the Glossario (dictionary) is one of the activities falling under the DIS’s competencies.

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tivo minando i sistemi, i processi ed il patrimonio informativo dell'avversario

e difendendo al contempo i propri sistemi e le proprie reti nonché, più in ge-
nerale, l'impiego delle informazioni ai fini del perseguimento degli interessi
nazionali. [l'IW] include anche una serie di attività tipiche della tradizione in-
telligence - ma che oggi possono avvalersi delle potenzialità offerte dal pro-
gresso tecnologico - quali […] l'influenza"8 . Besides emphasizing the central
role of information, through the analysis of this latter definition it is possible
to maintain that influence is an activity:
¢ typical of intelligence agencies;
¢ which allows two or more actors to have a confrontation;
¢ carried out in the field of information domain, which ends up to be its
"battle-field";
¢ based on information, (also) used as an offensive tool;
¢ to be conducted effectively thanks to the use of new technologies, too.
Francesco Cossiga included influence9 in the so-called "attivitàd'intelligence
non ordinaria"10 , describing it as an activity through which "si cerca di deter-
minare a proprio vantaggio la politica di un certo Paese"11 and conferring it a
mainly offensive nature12 , since it aims at "aggredire il Paese d'interesse […]
influenzandoneilprocessodecisionale"13.Cossiga included "interference14"
among the above-mentioned offensive non-ordinary intelligence activities: a
particular influence activity conducted on a very large scale using "posizioni
importanti" (ad esempio radio-televisive, possesso dei mezzi d'informazione,
centrali finanziarie o singole attività finanziarie acquisite occultamente o an-
che "apertamente")15" .

8 “Concept based on the idea that information is a real battle-field among state and non-state actors where
the information itself is both a weapon and a target at the same time. In this context, the term refers to ac-
tions undertaken in order to achieve superiority in the informative domain undermining the information
process, system and data of the enemy, and protecting an actor’s systems and networks, as well as using
this information pursuing national interests. [IW] also includes a series of specific intelligence-like activi-
ties, which presently can take advantage of the potentialities offered by technological progress, such as
influence”. Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri - Dipartimento delle Informazioni per la Sicurezza, Il
linguaggio degli…cit.
9 F. Cossiga, I Servizi e le attività di informazione e di controinformazione - Abecedario per principianti,
politici e militari, civili e gente comune, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, March 2002.
10 “Non-ordinary intelligence activities”. The term refers to activities not falling into the «ordinary» activi-
ties of information collection and assessment, according to Cossiga’s classification.
11 “An actor tries to turn into its own favour the policy of a country”. F. COSSIGA, I Servizi e…op. cit.
12 Offensive intelligence activities are opposed to defensive ones, which comprise «counter-influence» ope-
rations, defined by Cossiga as activities contrasting influence and intervention operations. Ibidem.
13 “Attack the country of interest […] influencing its decision-making process”. Ibidem.
14 According to general international law and to the United Nations Charter, Article 2(7), interference can
be considered as a limitation to a country’s national sovereignty for its being an unlawful intrusion in the
field of its «domestic jurisdiction». M. R. SAULLE, Lezioni di diritto internazionale, Edizioni Scientifiche
Italiane, Napoli, 1998.
15 “Prominent positions such as control over networks, ownership of media, financial districts or of a single finance
corporation taken over either covertly or even overtly”. F. COSSIGA, I Servizi e…op. cit.

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General Mario Maccono, formerly Director of the SISMi16 training school, and
General Maurizio Navarra, formerly senior official of the SISDe17 , stressed
how complementary influence and other typical intelligence activities are.
These latter - which include interference, disinformation, and intoxication -
are employed in a coordinated and combined way to plan and conduct offen-
sive operations18 aimed at destabilizing19 an opposing country (or another or-
ganization).
After reviewing the main definitions of influence, gathered from Italian un-
classified documents, it is necessary to concentrate the analysis on the actors
involved in influence operations: the agents of influence, focusing on their re-
lationship with those agencies usually in charge of the planning, coordination
and management phases of the relevant activities: intelligence services. With
respect to this last aspect it needs to be pointed out how influence - especially
at strategic level-takes place thanks to a complex "ecosystem" made out of a
wide set of organizations20 , whose competences are not always so strictly
marked out and whose actual functions are not so easily recognizable, and of
individuals, some of whom sometimes not even aware of the part they play21
and of the ultimate aim of their actions.

The agent of influence and intelligence

The CIA defined the agent of influence as the “most dangerous and least
publicized of all agents” 22, tracing back to the Bible the first influence opera-
tion historically documented, and whose protagonist is Hushai the Archite23.
16 “Military Intelligence and Security Service”. It was the Italian military intelligence agency until 2007, now.
replaced by AISE, the “External Intelligence Security Agency”
http://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/web.nsf/pagine/en_aise .
17 “Intelligence and Democratic Security Service”. It was the Italian domestic intelligence agency until 2007,
now replaced by AISI, the “Internal Intelligence Security Agency”.
http://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/web.nsf/pagine/en_aisi .
18 M. Navarra, M. Maccono, “La destabilizzazione”, Per Aspera ad Veritatem, n. 24, Roma, September – De-
cember 2002.
19 According to Edward Luttwak, the planning stage of a destabilization campaign, necessary to perform a
coup d’etat, needs to chiefly influence the decision-making process of the enemy’s bureaucracy. E. Lutt-
wak, Coup d’Etat - A Pratical Handbook, Fawcett Premier Book, New York, 1969.
20 Influence operations planned by intelligence agencies can be carried out both resorting directly to their
own agents of influence, and indirectly to think tank, consultancy companies, networks (radio, newspa-
pers, etc.), cultural organizations, training, research and academic centres, clubs and other organizations
present in the civil society and able to affect opinions, ideas and feelings and, therefore, on the beha-
viours and attitudes of groups or of single individuals.
21 P. Cornish, J. Lindley-French, C. Yorke, Strategic…cit.
22 C. N. Geschwind, “The Tale of Hushai the Archite - The influence agent in Biblical times”, CIA - Center
for the Study of Intelligence, Studies in Intelligence, vol. 13-2, 1969.
23 Hushai the Archite, counselor of King David, intervened as an agent of influence in favour of the King in
countering his son Absalom, who wanted to usurp the throne. Hushai, instructed to do so by King David,
pretended to defect to Absalom as his new counselor. Therefore, he was able to influence his perceptions
and decisions so as to disadvantage him on the battle-field and thus causing his defeat.

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General Ambrogio Viviani, formerly person in charge of the SISMi coun-

ter-espionage, defined the agent of influence as “un agente segreto che opera
sotto mentite spoglie ma apertamente, senza commettere alcun reato, diffon-
dendo idee, sostenendo teorie, dirigendo movimenti di opinione, secondo le
direttive ricevute e seguite allo scopo di conseguire determinati effetti nell’am-
biente avversario in funzione degli obiettivi della politica del proprio Paese.
[Ma] è anche colui che per convinzione personale agisce nello stesso modo,
senza rendersi conto di essere […] manipolato da altri e quindi senza rendersi
conto, magari in buona fede, di operare per interessi estranei ed esterni e addi-
rittura in contrasto con i propri e con quelli del proprio Paese”24.
Walter Raymond, political analyst and professor at Virginia Commonwe-
alth University, included agents of influence among the human intelligence
(HUMINT) resources, defining them as “persons with influence in one coun-
try secretly promoting the interests of another”25. Bearing in mind an agent of
influence’s supposed primary quality: the ability to influence, Cossiga narro-
wed the categories from which an agent of influence may be recruited to “qua-
dri dirigenti di un Paese o «aiutati» a salire ad alti livelli della vita politica, bu-
rocratica, scientifica, finanziaria, bancaria o attraverso individui di particolare
autorevolezza personale, culturale e morale”26.
Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt maintain that the easiest and more di-
rect way to influence the enemy’s decision making and behaviour is emplo-
ying an agent of influence, defined as “an agent whose task is to influence di-
rectly government policy rather than to collect information”27. A distinction
between influence and intelligence collection arises from the above-mentio-
ned definition. Nevertheless, such a distinction is well defined only in theory,
while in practice it proves to be indefinite since the agent of influence may al-
so deal with collecting sensitive and/or secret information in addition to per-
forming his main activity in the field of influence. Such a possible double use
of the agent of influence originates from the privileged position he enjoys in
the target government, which, besides allowing the agent of influence himself
to directly affect the target perceptions, as well as their behaviour and deci-

24 “A secret agent who acts under false pretences but overtly and without committing any crime. Instead,
the agent of influence spreads ideas, maintains certain arguments and leads opinion movements on the
basis of the instructions he receives and complies with in order to achieve certain effects for the enemy’s
establishment, which can be functional to his own country’s interests. [Also] he is sometimes so commit-
ted to his activity that he does not even realise that he is […] influenced by other subjects in his actions
and that he might be acting, maybe in good faith, for others’ interests or even against his own or his coun-
try’s ones”. A. Viviani, Servizi segreti italiani, 1815 - 1985, Adkronos Libri, Roma, 1986.
25 W. J. Raymond, Dictionary of Politics - Selected American and Foreign Political and Legal Terms, Brunswick,
1992.
26 “Executives of a country or people «helped» to advance in the fields of politics, bureaucracy, science, fi-
nance, banking, or still, particularly prestigious people, either personally, culturally or morally”. F. Cos-
siga, I Servizi e…op. cit.
27 A. Shulsky, G. Schmitt, Silent Warfare…op. cit.

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sions, lets him access sensitive information, sometimes essential for the very
planning and performing of influence operations. Once again the above-men-
tioned interconnection between intelligence and influence emerges. Moreo-
ver, Shulsky and Schmitt explain that the agent of influence is not necessarily
in the permanent staff of an intelligence service and, therefore, the relation-
ship between the agent and the service is frequently flexible and varies accor-
ding to the circumstances and the operative context in which the agent is em-
ployed. Bearing in mind the «variable level of relationship» between intelli-
gence services and agents of influence, these latter can be placed in three diffe-
rent categories, depending on their level of awareness and/or on the degree of
control exercised by the agencies over the agents:

- the so-called «trusted contacts»: individuals who are not inclined to be

instructed on how to proceed, despite sharing the same ideals and objec-
tives of the foreign country whose intelligence agency they are employed
for; generally, they are not paid for their activities;
- «controlled agents»: agents who are instructed on how to conduct in-
fluence operations by the very same agencies they work for, despite not
being necessarily on their permanent staff; generally, they are paid for
their activities;
- «unaware agents»: agents who, despite not being on the staff of the intel-
ligence agency they are employed for, act unwittingly, persuaded and/or
misled by agents of the agency itself 28 and sometimes against their own
interests, as already pointed out by General Viviani.

Such a categorization of the agents of influence reflects that of the complex

intelligence apparatus of the former Soviet Union29, whose influence opera-
tions were managed by the Service A30 (formerly Department D, until 1968) of
the Komitet Gosudarstvennoj Bezopasnosti (KGB). The Soviet intelligence
(and today the Russian one) included influence, as well as disinformation ac-
tivities, among the so-called «active measures»31. Paolo Guzzanti claims that,
as per their previous Soviet apparatus, Russian information and security ser-
vices are highly competent in the field of influence and disinformation32. The-
se activities are performed using “media, politici e diplomatici ma […] anche

28 R. H. Schultz, R. Godson, Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy, Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1984.

29 A. Shulsky, G. Schmitt, Silent Warfare…op. cit.
30 P. Guzzanti, I servizi russi: dal KGB a Putin, material presented and handed out by the author for his lec-
ture during the Master in Intelligence and National Security (a.y. 2009/2010), at Link Campus University
of Malta, Roma, June 25, 2010.
31 Ibidem.
32 Also the Italian intelligence community finds a strict connection between influence and disinformation,
and includes both these activities in the information warfare macro-category (see notes 8 and 18). Presi-
denza del Consiglio dei Ministri – Dipartimento delle Informazioni per la Sicurezza, Il linguaggio degli…cit.

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[…] agents provocateurs, agenti doppi e […] agenti di influenza”33 and, lately
more and more resorting to international organizations specialized in public
relations and marketing.
Angelo Codevilla, professor of International Relations at Boston Universi-
ty and former member of the US Senate’s Select Committee on Intelligence,
described agents of influence as “allies in the councils of a foreign power”34,
employed by a State in order to express its «political warfare» capabilities35.
He added that:

- agents of influence do not merely carry out orders nor are generally dri-
ven by monetary rewards;
- although this kind of activities are basically conducted overtly (since the
agents have to show their feelings, behaviour and sympathies, in order to
influence others’ opinions), nevertheless, the coordination procedures
and the networks agents of influence use to stay in connection with the
agency they work for are likely to remain secret (for the agents and the
real aim of the operation not to be discovered);
- an excessive exploitation of agents of influence risks overexposing them
and identifying them by the target security services;
- an accurate planning activity and reasonable, sound plans to be carried
out are required prior to resorting to agents of influence, especially if
they supposed to be placed in positions of power in the enemy’s gover-
nment, in the long run36;
- influence operations can actually guarantee considerable results only if
supported by intelligence (about the context the operation has to be car-
ried out in and the real ability of the agent of influence) and counterintel-
ligence (on the agent’s actual intentions and his level of cooperation and
loyalty).

33 “Both political and diplomatic media but […] also […] agents provocateurs, double agents and agents of
influence”. P. Guzzanti, I servizi russi…cit.
34 AA. VV., Political Warfare and Psychological Operations – Rethinking the US Approach, by F. R. Barnett,
C. Lord, National Defense University Press, Washington DC, 1989.
35 “Political warfare is a term […] that seems useful for describing a spectrum of overt and covert activities
designed to support national political-military objectives”. Ibidem.
36 A classic example is the case of the South Vietnamese generals recruited by the US in the 1960s. Firstly,
they were employed as agents of influence to condition the policy of President Diem (who in turn had be-
en a US agent of influence since the early 1950s), and then to succeed him after a coup d’etat, in Novem-
ber 1963. Although the new leadership had been chosen and supported by the CIA and the Washington
diplomacy, after being placed in power, it turned out to be corrupted, inefficient and not favouring US in-
terests in South Vietnam and in the region. Moreover, since no plan had been arranged between the Viet-
namese agents and the US for the period following the generals taking the power in the country, the US
could not take advantage from the situation to turn in their favour the war in Vietnam.

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From the american revolution to present: example of how agents of influen-

ce are employed

To better understand how and to what extent agents of influence can de-
termine events - or, at least condition them -, it may be useful to list some do-
cumented cases from different historical periods, countries and fields of ac-
tion.
According to the CIA Directorate of Operations37, Benjamin Franklin - one
of the US founding fathers – conducted paramilitary and propaganda activi-
ties and was one of the most crucial agents of influence of the Northern colo-
nies during the American Revolution38. In fact, while in Paris as a diplomatic
agent, he managed to convince France to provide the US with logistic, milita-
ry and economic support and to sign an anti-British agreement.
William Stephenson acted as a British agent of influence during World
War II in the USA, not only to analyse and monitor US activities, but especial-
ly to influence its establishment in favour of British interests39. In May 1940
Stephenson established in New York the British Passport Control Office40
(BPCO) as a cover office of the British Security Coordination41 (BSC), reporting
directly to the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), commonly referred to as MI6.
Thanks to the above-mentioned BPCO and an influence network of more than
three thousand people 42, Stephenson turned the main US press organizations
(The Herald Tribune, The New York Post, The Baltimore Sun, etc.) in Great
Britain’s favour, convincing the US public opinion and the government to take
the field against Nazi Germany and its allies43.
James Angleton was chief of the Counterintelligence Staff of the CIA and
responsible for coordination with foreign intelligence services. He was in clo-
se contact with Israel and its intelligence agencies44 and, probably, was an
Israeli agent of influence employed by Tel Aviv to acquire nuclear technology
and other sensitive military information as well as affect some choices of the

37 P. K. Rose, The founding fathers of American intelligence, CIA - Directorate of Operations - Center for the
Study of Intelligence, Books and Monographs, 1999.
38 www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/benjamin-franklin.html.
39 W. Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid – The Secret War, Lyons Press, Toronto, 2000.
40 www.nytimes.com/1989/02/03/obituaries/william-stephenson-british-spy-known-as-intrepid-is-dead-at-93.html.
41 H. B. Peake, The Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf, CIA - Center for the Study of Intelligence, Studies in In-
telligence, vol. 53-1, March 2009.
42 www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/aug/19/military.secondworldwar.
43 Edward Luttwak maintained that during the period immediately preceding the US going to war (1941),
British- and German-oriented influence groups and lobbies were operating in America. Their aim was to
influence the US decision-making as per their intervention in the Second World War. E. LUTTWAK,
Coup d’Etat…op. cit.
44 M. Holzman. James Jesus Angleton, the CIA, and the Tradecraft of Counterintelligence, University of
Massachusetts, 2008.

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American leadership. To this end, he obtained economic and military support,

respectively through loans and financing and through weapons and expert
statements45 provided to Israel.
Harry Dexter White, senior official of the US Department of the Treasury,
acted as a Soviet agent of influence46. In addition to providing Soviet intelli-
gence with sensitive information, he tried to condition the US decision-ma-
king in some circumstances. In particular, he drafted some proposals to be
presented at the Yalta Conference in 1945, aimed at favouring Soviet interests,
such as the dismantling of German chemical, electrical, and metallurgic indu-
stries, the extension of a long-term (thirty-five-year), low-interest loan to Mo-
scow and the grant of half of the war reparations due from Germany to the Al-
lies. Nevertheless, only White’s last proposal was accepted by the Gover-
nment, due to the strong opposition of the US Department of State.
Arne Treholt, official of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, acted
as a Soviet agent of influence in the Cold War years and until his arrest in Ja-
nuary 198447. Working as a diplomat and using various prestigious assi-
gnments, both national and international, he conditioned Norwegian policies
to the benefit of the Soviet Union between 1976 and 1984. He also used his
connections in the media to promote stories unfavourable for the US and the
NATO.
Eli Cohen was a Israeli agent of influence in Syria. He was an undercover
agent for the Mossad, and, after penetrating the Syrian Ba’ath party (in power
since 1961), he was given a false identity: Kamil Amin Thabit. By doing so, he
established good connections with the Syrian government, orienting its deci-
sion-making until he was arrested and killed, hung publicly in 196548.
In the period between 1918 and 1924, Benito Mussolini acted as a British
agent of influence49, on the payroll of the Security Service (better known as
MI5). Especially, while working as director of the newspaper “Popolo d’Ita-
lia”, he organized a press campaign to favour the UK and France in the eyes of
the Italians, for Italy’s intervention in the First World War against Central Eu-
ropean countries. Hereinafter, following his rise to power in 1922, Mussolini
took some measures consistent with the British project to sabotage a possible
Italian energetic independence, such as abolishing the Italian Direzione Gene-
rale dei Combustibili 50 (DGC), established to reduce Italy’s dependence on
fuels from foreign countries and their oil companies (many of which were Bri-
tish).
Luigi Barzini jr. was a successful Italian journalist. He founded the Servi-

45 W. J. Raymond, Dictionary of Politics…op. cit.

46 A. Shulsky, G. Schmitt, Silent Warfare…op. cit.
47 Ibidem.
48 A. Giannuli, Come funzionano i servizi segreti, Ponte alle Grazie, Milano, December 2009.
49 M. J. Cereghino, G. Fasanella, Il golpe inglese, Chiarelettere editore, Milano, 2011.
50 “Directorate General of Fuels”.

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zio Informazioni Stampa Italiana51 (SISI) and acted for a long time (between
the Fascist period and the early 1960s) as a British agent of influence52. In the
post war period, he was involved in several propaganda campaigns sponso-
red by the Anglo-American Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB)53 and subse-
quently by British intelligence54, not only to control and limit Soviet influence
and propaganda in Italy, but also to “esercitare un controllo sull’opinione pub-
blica interna italiana e screditare l’immagine del nostro paese all’estero”55. In
addition to the several press campaigns conducted in favour of the UK, Barzi-
ni also wrote the famous book “The Italians56”, reported57 to be a climax of the
strong and sharp anti-Italian actions of influence exerted by the UK. The ad-
vertising, promotion and distribution activities of the book were borne by the
British Information and Security Services58.
According to what maintained by Gian Paolo Pelizzaro59, Ruggero Zan-
grandi, who was an Italian writer and journalist, acted as a Soviet agent of in-
fluence60 in Italy during the Cold War. In particular, Zangrandi launched a
sharp journalistic inquiry on the newspaper “Paese Sera”, aimed at undermi-
ning the Italian Servizio Informazioni Forze Armate61 (SIFAr) and to discredit
its activities.
Pierre-Charles Pathé, a French journalist well connected in the country’s
politics and economy, acted as a Soviet agent of influence62. Pathé conducted
an important influence campaign on behalf of the KGB and, from 1976 to 1979,
he published “Synthése”, a bulletin of political analysis for the French ruling
class, aimed at undermining the NATO and, more in general, the West in fa-
vour of the Soviet Union’s interests in France, as well as fostering cooperation

51 ”Italian Press Information Service”.

52 M. J. Cereghino, G. Fasanella, Il golpe…op. cit.
53 See note n. 2.
54 In Great Britain, after abolishing the PWB, propaganda, PSYOP, influence and disinformation operations
abroad were overseen by the Foreign Office, and, by a particular office called Information Research De-
partment (IRD), while in the US these activities were shared between the Department of State (as already
mentioned in note 2) and the CIA.
55 “Exert control over Italian public opinion and give Italy a bad name abroad”. M. J. Cereghino, G. Fasanella, Il
golpe…op. cit.
56 L. Barzini jr., The Italians, Hamish Hamilton, Londra, 1964
57 M. J. Cereghino, G. Fasanella, Il golpe…op. cit.
58 F. S. Saunders, La guerra fredda culturale. La Cia e il mondo delle lettere e delle arti, Fazi Editore, Roma, 2004.
59 Researcher, essayist and journalist. He was consultant of the Italian Parliamentary boards of enquiry on
terrorism, on the Mitrokhin dossier and on the activities carried out by the Italian intelligence.
60 Interview to Gian Paolo Pellizzaro by Gabriele Paradisi, published on June 13, 2007 on the online new-
spaper “Il Legno Storto”, to be found at the link:www.legnostorto.com/index.php?option=com_con-
tent&task=view&id=17854.
61 “Armed Forces Information service”: the Italian military intelligence agency, active since the 1940s to 1965
in the field of counterintelligence. Such functions were then passed to and performed by the SID, “Servi-
zio Informazioni Difesa” (Defence Information Service) and by the SISMi (see note n. 16).
62 A. Shulsky, G. Schmitt, Silent Warfare…op. cit.

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between Moscow and Paris.

Some members of the American Congress affirmed that Huma Abedin,
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, was an agent of
influence of the Muslim Brotherhood63. According to this theory, Abedin took
advantage of her position in the Department of State and managed to influen-
ce US foreign policy (in the first Obama administration) in favour of the Mu-
slim Brotherhood: supporting their proselytism and indoctrination activities
in the US and financing Egypt (where the Society of the Muslim Brothers re-
presents the major political power) or other countries where the Muslim Bro-
therhood play an active role directly or through networks related to them.

Intelligence agencies and the management of influence activities

As already mentioned, agents of influence are not always in the perma-

nent staff of intelligence agencies and benefit from a high degree of freedom in
conducting their activities. Nevertheless, all the management and coordina-
tion behind them are carried out by organizations directly or indirectly linked
to the intelligence community and the national security apparatus of a State,
particularly when complex, highly awkward, long-term influence campaigns
are to take place.
The agency in charge of managing an influence campaign has to take on
responsibility of the action-planning necessary for the agent to carry out his
actions. In this kind of action-planning the following have to be supplied:
-an analysis of the context in which the activity has to take place;
-the identification of the main goal of the campaign and the time needed to
reach it;
-the identification of the targets to be reached, either individuals (a politi-
cal leader, a military commander, etc.), small groups (the editorial staff of
a newspaper, the management of a political party or a company, etc.), or
broader groups (a school of thought, the public opinion of a country, etc.);
-the choice of the most suitable tools and means to reach these targets;
-a comparison between the relevant cost and benefits of the operation.
A supervision activity must follow the strategic-planning phase, to conti-
nuously monitor the trend of the campaign in order to improve it, if necessa-
ry, or, in the worst case, even suspend the operation itself. The coordination
and supervision body underlying the campaign must be aware of the possible
unexpected effects caused by the campaign itself.

63 Michele Bachmann, Louie Gohmert, Lynn Westmorleand, Trent Francks and Thomas Rooney, all mem-
bers of the Republican party, on June 13, 2012 formally requested Ambassador Harold Geisel, Deputy In-
spector General of the US Department of State, to investigate into the Muslim Brotherhood’s capacity to
influence American foreign policy and to verify if the involvement of the Muslim Brotherhood (or anyo-
ne linked to them) has been reported with regard to some choices and measures taken while Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton was in office.

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To list some of the organizations in charge of the planning and manage-

ment of influence operations, in addition to the above-mentioned American
OWI, Anglo-American PWB, British IRD and BSC and Soviet’s KGB Service A,
we can mention the Special Groups64, the CIA National Clandestine Service65
(NCS) and the Office of Strategic Influence66 (OSI) of the US Department of
Defense.

The main leverages of agent of influence

The comparative analysis of the various definitions of influence and the

exam of some of the above-mentioned cases of influence demonstrate that in-
fluence is based on the employment of information to create cognitive and
psychological effects able to distort perceptions and condition behaviours, at-
titudes, and opinions. It is no coincidence that one of the sciences which has
focused more on influence is social psychology. According to social psycholo-
gists, influence is to be intended as a constructive process “effetto dell’incon-
tro tra l’esperienza del bersaglio e lo stimolo a cui esso è esposto [per cui] il de-
stinatario (o bersaglio) compia un riaggiustamento del proprio comportamen-
to, delle idee o dei propri sentimenti in conseguenza del comportamento, del-
le idee o dei sentimenti espressi da altri (fonte o agente di influenza)”67. The
«readjustment» of the influenced subject (or «target») may be induced not on-
ly through the use of verbal messages and arguments, but also through ima-
ges, sounds, and behaviours. Hence we can maintain that the information
used in a process of influence is of the most different types. An agent may in-
fluence behaviours, attitudes, and opinions both resorting to completely true
information (in this case credibility and charm factors prevail), and to decep-
tion techniques68.
64 Groups created in the early 1960s by President John Fitzgerald Kennedy, expert in specific subjects and
with an interdepartmental composition. For instance, the Special Group - Counter-Insurgency (CI), was
supposed to coordinate the Department of State, the CIA Department of Defense, the US Agency for In-
ternational Development (USAID) and the US Information Agency (USIA) programs for stabilizing stra-
tegically relevant countries such as Vietnam, Korea, Cambodia, Venezuela, etc... Propaganda and in-
fluence were among the activities the Special Group CI had to coordinate. J. H. MICHAELS, “Managing
Global Counterinsurgency: the Special Group (CI) 1962-1966”, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 35-1, 2012.
65 Created in 2005 and previously known as the Directorate of Operations of the CIA. One of its divisions is
the Special Activities Division, which includes, as one of its tasks, conducting covert influence opera-
tions.
66 Agency of the US Department of Defense, operative from October 30, 2001 to February 2002, created to
support military operations outside the US, in charge of influence, disinformation and propaganda acti-
vities. S. L. Gough, The Evolution of Strategic Influence, US Army War College - Strategy Research Pro-
ject, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 2003.
67 “Deriving from the encounter between the experience made by the target and the stimulus it is exposed
to, which makes the target readjust its behaviour, ideas or feelings as a consequence of someone else’s
(source or agent of influence) behaviour, ideas or feelings. A. MUCCHI FAINA, L’influenza sociale, Il Mu-
lino, Bologna, 1996.
68 A. Montagnese, Intelligence e deception strategica: manipolazione percettiva ed influenza dei processi decisionali
di vertice, Istituto Italiano di Studi Strategici “N. Machiavelli”, Roma, April 2012.

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In the analysis of influence and its working mechanisms, social psychology

pays much attention to the study of the social context the target is set in and the
relationships between the target and the agent of influence («source»)69.
The process of influence and, consequently, the results of the process itself
are linked to three factors concerning the relationship between target and
source:
- the authority the agent of influence exerts on the target according to his
social position. In order for the effects coming from this factor to be fulfil-
led in the process of influence, the social context in which the action oc-
curs must be hierarchically structured, characterised by a social differen-
ce between the agent of influence and the target, and by the possibility
for the agent to pressure the target through the use of coercive power;
- the credibility deriving from the consideration the agent of influence can
benefit from. A credible subject, unlike an authoritative one, can influen-
ce his target without any need for his leading hierarchical position to be
recognised and without resorting to any pressure and/or sanctions. The
consideration enjoyed by the agent of influence is the consequence of his
education, intelligence, social status, professional achievements, compe-
tence and reliability granted to him;
- the charm related to the pleasure and/or interest the agent of influence
arouses in the target. In this case, aesthetic (beauty, likeness, etc.) and
emotional (liking, similarity70, etc.) factors are involved.
In order to condition behaviours, opinions and attitudes, the agent of in-
fluence has to leverage one of the above-mentioned factors or a mix of the sa-
me. In case the authoritative aspect overcomes, there will be a «normative» in-
fluence, otherwise - if the predominant factors are credibility or charm – it is
possible to talk of «informational» influence. The change of behaviour, opi-
nions and attitudes in the target caused by resorting to normative influence is
due to the will of the target himself to conform with the expectations of the so-
cial group he belongs to and to avoid being sanctioned for not complying with
behaviour or ideology rules. On the other hand, the change produced by in-
formational influence is due to the fact that the target accepts information ob-
tained about the agent’s real competence and reliability in a particular field as
evidence about reality; therefore, he considers the agent of influence as a pre-
cious source of inspiration and an example to be followed71.
The social context in which an influence operation is carried out is another
factor likely to affect the result of the same. Indeed, space and time are likely

69Mucchi Faina, L’influenza sociale… op. cit.

70 Demographic similarity (same ethnic group, geographic origin, age, etc.) affects more the behaviour,
while ideological similarity (same political ideas, similar opinions on a subject, etc.) affects more attitu-
des.Mucchi Faina, L’influenza sociale… op. cit.
71.M Deutsch, H. B. Gerard, “A study of normative and informational social influences upon individual judgment”,
Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology, vol. 51, 1955.

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to considerably affect the target’s reactions and him changing behaviours, opi-
nions and attitudes. As far as space factor is concerned, the persuasive effect of
an action tends to increase if the target deems the environment pleasant and
comfortable72. As for time factor, instead, the main aspects to be taken into ac-
count are two: the historical period (opinions and behaviours are variable and
evolve gradually according to the trends of a specific historical period) and
the target’s evolutionary period (given by the target’s «maturity» as well as its
being prone to outer interferences in a given time frame).

Conclusions

The present international order is characterized by a lack of global leadership, a sta-

te of strategic confusion and, consequently, by a high level of uncertainty73 and a non-li-
near development of the events, especially with regard to security-related issues74. This
ever-changing and fluid situation is highly emphasised by the huge spread and rapid
progress of new information and communication technologies and by the gradual em-
powerment of non-State actors75. In this scenario, single countries - especially medium-
sized ones, like Italy - are no more in a position to unilaterally and significantly affect the
international order76, particularly if they simply resort to conventionally recognized me-
ans of power such as military power, policy-making and diplomacy, and economic/fi-
nancial competitiveness. The mix of traditional means of power and those related to in-
fluence, persuasion and attraction, defined «smart power»77, is the most effective expres-
sion of power for a country to claim its geopolitical position and to reinforce its own na-
tional interests.Therefore, Italy should increase its smart power. It should especially ac-
quire new abilities in the field of influence, also resorting to information and communi-
cation technologies78. Such influence capabilities should be employed in an integrated,
synergic and coordinated way together with capabilities already shown in the past by
diplomatic, military, and intelligence agencies, as well as by the whole Italian national
security system.
72 Mucchi Faina, L’influenza sociale… op. cit.
73 F. Fukuyama, Blindside, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2008.
74 In the National Intelligence Council (NIC) research program Global Trends, The US intelligence community stressed mo-
re than once the complexity of the global scenario and the difficulty to forecast the future – even in a middle-term period -
due to the ever-growing likelihood that “discontinuities, shocks, and surprises” take place. US National Intelligence
Council (NIC), Global Trends 2025: a Transformed World, November 20, 2008.
75 European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), Global Trends 2030 - Citizens in an interconnec-
ted and polycentric world, October 2011.
76 A. Evans, D. Stevens, Organizing…cit.
77 J. Nye,“Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power”, Foreign Policy, July - August 2009.
78 For instance, a proactive use of social media, properly set in the national security strategy framework,
would certainly allow governmental agencies to express high capabilities, both offensive (influence, pro-
paganda, deception, disinformation, and perception management operations) and defensive (counter-
propaganda, counter-interference, counter-deception, warning, etc.). It is not a chance that presently so-
me of the most effective agents of influence are bloggernetworking

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