North Korea-China Relations: An Asymmetric Alliance

Author(s): Sangit Sarita Dwivedi

Source: North Korean Review , FALL 2012, Vol. 8, No. 2 (FALL 2012), pp. 76-93
Published by: McFarland & Company

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/43910314

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North Korea-China Relations:
An Asymmetrie Alliance

Sangit Sarita Dwiveäi

Abstract

This paper examines North Korean alignment with China during the Cold War
and the post-Cold War period, taking into account the different factors enumerated
by Stephen Walt's balance-of-threat theory in his seminal work The Origins of
Alliances that affect the level of threat: aggregate power, geographic proximity, offen-
sive power, and aggressive intentions. The nature of the alliance between North Korea
and China is determined by their attitudes toward South Korea and the United States.
From a theoretical angle, this paper adopts a realist viewpoint, focuses on security
concerns of state actors, and does not take into account the value of alternative the-
oretical viewpoints.

Keywords: North Korea, China, South Korea,

United States, Stephen Walt, perceptions

Introduction

The aim of this paper is to examine North Korean threat perceptions in the con-
text of Stephen Walťs balance-of-threat theory. This theory argues that states actu-
ally react to perceived threat rather than to power, and aim to balance it. North
Korea, as surrounded by four big powers- China, Russia, Japan, and the United
States (U.S.) - perceives the U.S. policy toward itself, and the strengthening of

Bharati College , University of Delhi , India , Flat No C-203, Rajasthan Apart-

ments, Sector 4, Plot No 36, Dwarka New Delhi 110078, India ; + 9811687816 ;
sangitsarita@gmail.com

North Korean Review / DOI: I0.3172/NKR.8.2.76 / Volume 8, Number 2 / Fall 2012 / pp. 76-93 /
[[BP ISSN 1551-2789 (Print) / ISSN 1941-2886 (Online) / © 2012 McFarland & Company, Inc.
McF

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U.S.-South Korea security cooperation, as posing serious threatening challenges. To
balance this threat, North Korea has developed an alliance system with the People's
Republic of China (PRC) based on common ideology,1 anti-Japanese sentiment, and
anti-U.S. sentiment. Geographically, North Korea shares an 800-mile-long frontier
with China. Historically, China and Korea have had shared relations, symbolized by
a hierarchical tributary system. In this age-old relationship, China enjoyed the role
of "big brother" to Korea's "little brother." Culturally, ideologically, and socially,
North Korea belonged to the Chinese zone of influence. Common threat perceptions
alone would have argued for a cooperative arrangement between these two coun-
tries. China was vast, powerful, economically strong, and therefore the dominant
party. Hence, it was a partnership not between equals, but between two unequal
states- one strong and powerful and the other a client.

The Korean Peninsula, Hub of the

Balance of Power in East Asia

Much of Korea's history is "the story of its struggle, not always successful, to
maintain its independence against external pressures."2 Contrary to its name, the
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) is located within one of the world's most heavily mili-
tarized areas. There is little "strategic depth" between the DMZ and the capital cities
of Pyongyang, which is about 125 km north of the DMZ, and Seoul, which is approx-
imately 40 km south of the DMZ. Following the consolidation of Soviet dominance
of Eastern Europe and the signing of the "Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance
and Mutual Assistance," the United States perceived that the consequences of a South
Korean defeat would be highly detrimental to its own political and strategic inter-
ests. Chinese leaders had concluded that intervention in the Korean War would tem-
per and caution Washington, whereas inaction would embolden it. Thus, the Korean
War of 1950-1953 reminded China of the importance of Korea to its national secu-
rity. The Korean War ended, but the peninsula remained divided at the Demilita-
rized Zone.

Threat Perceptions until 1979:

The North Korean Perspective

The U.S. Threat. North Koreans harbor a very deep grudge against the United
States for two main reasons: the division of Korea and the American occupation of
the southern part of Korea from 1945 to 1948. North Koreans also resent other Amer-
ican actions taken since 1953, the mutual security agreement with South Korea, and
the maintenance of 36,000 American troops in South Korea. As the United States
treated North Korea as a mere satellite of the Soviet Union, the relationship between
the United States and North Korea developed to take the form of ideological con-
frontation; that is, capitalism versus socialism. From Pyongyang's point of view, a
long and unbroken period of American nuclear hegemony in East Asia was inter-

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preted as a clear threat to its security. North Korea is the only country in the devel-
oping world that has faced a direct threat from a superpower's nuclear weapons from
its very inception.3 During the Korean War, President Truman (at the behest of Gen-
eral Douglas MacArthur, who in July 1950 suggested a plan to use atomic bombs)
seriously considered using nuclear weapons, but other allied nations objected.
The South Korean Threat The hostility between North Korea and South Korea
is not only mutual but evenly matched. The North Korean version of history argues
that the Democratic People's Republic (DPRK) in the north is the only legitimate
government representing the entire Korean people, and that it was American "impe-
rialism" and its creature, the South Korean regime, that prevented unification. On
the other hand, since 1948 the South Korean policy toward North Korea has been its
claim that as the Republic of Korea (ROK), it is the sole legitimate government on
the Korean Peninsula and that the regime in Pyongyang is illegitimate. On August
12, 1948, the United States declared that that the government in Seoul was "the Korean
government" and established formal diplomatic ties with it.4 The conclusion of the
ROK-Japan Basic Treaty was signed on June 22, 1965, and appeared to the North
Korean regime as the start of a "tripartite military alliance" between the United States,
Japan, and the ROK. The prospect of the South becoming superior was perceived by
the North as threatening, thus further intensifying the arms race. North Korean
threat perceptions increased when South Korea's President Park stated, in June 1975,
that "South Korea would and could develop its own nuclear weapons if the U.S.
nuclear umbrella is withdrawn."5
To summarize, American nuclear hegemony, the spectacular economic growth
of South Korea under the leadership of President Park Chung Hee, and the ROK-
Japan treaty were the factors mainly responsible for the increasing threat perceptions
of North Korea. The DPRK and the PRC perceived the ROK as an American client
regime, and as a U.S. base from which the U.S. "imperialists" could launch an inva-
sion against China and North Korea.6

North Korean Responses

To cope with the perceived threat, the North Korean regime concentrated its
energies on how to unify the peninsula on its own terms. The 1970s can be charac-
terized as a North Korean attempt to sideline South Korea by using the Non-Aligned
Movement platform. From the ideological viewpoint, North Korea stressed its hatred
of U.S. imperialism in the context of the movement of the Socialist International,
and diplomatically within the framework of the alliance with the Soviet Union and
China. At the same time, North Korea presented th e juche idea (self-reliance), with
which it developed its antagonistic anti-U.S. campaign.
Internal Balancing : The Nuclear and Missile Program . It is difficult to estimate
North Korea's military expenditures, as the society is tightly closed to the outside
world. For North Korea, the period from 1953 to 1960 had to do with rebuilding,
repairing, and even enhancing its capabilities. The "four military lines" (i.e., arm-
ing of the entire population, fortifications of the entire country, professional train-

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ing of all soldiers, and modernization of weapons) were announced as a new central
tenet for military policy at the end of 1962.7 North Korea signed a nuclear coopera-
tion agreement with the Soviet Union in 1956 and then signed a second nuclear coop-
eration agreement with the Soviet Union and the PRC in 1959.8 During the mid- and
late 1970s, North Korea was engaged in planning an indigenously built 30 MWe reac-
tor at the Yongbyon facility.9 North Korea was able to begin its own small-scale mis-
sile program with Chinese assistance in the 1960s, gradually expanding in the 1970s
by modifying the Soviet Union's Scud-B short-range ballistic missiles and produc-
ing a Scud-C version. In 1975, North Korea imported from China a Dong Feng-61
("East Wind") missile, but the project was suspended in 1978. The triangular shape
of the Northern alliance with the PRC and the Soviet Union made it possible for the
DPRK to diversify the channels of support.
External Balancing : China . North Korea was the only Third World country to
be liberated by the Soviet Red Army after World War II, and its leaders were trained
and placed in power by the Soviets themselves.10 As Sino-Soviet relations began to
deteriorate after 1959 and became hostile in the 1960s, the North Koreans slowly
gravitated toward the Chinese position. North Korea was closer to the theoretical con-
struct and ideological syndrome of Chinese communism than to the East European
variety. Because of the ideological rifts during the Cold War era, the United States
was perceived as the greatest external threat to both the PRC and the DPRK in the
1950s. This perception influenced China's decision to assist North Korea, as Beijing
feared an American military presence on the Korean Peninsula. China had provided
extensive economic assistance to the North during its troubles, creating a situation
of asymmetrical interdependence. North Korea concluded a bilateral mutual assis-
tance pact and signed a mutual defense treaty with the PRC in July 1961 while step-
ping up its "defense construction." These defense treaties, with the Sino-Soviet
alliance treaty, represented a triple alliance system among China, the Soviet Union,
and North Korea in Northeast Asia.11 The Beijing-Pyongyang treaty constitutes a
more binding and unqualified commitment than the U.S.-South Korean mutual secu-
rity treaty, which conditions U.S. intervention on consultations with Congress.12
The Cultural Revolution and tensions over border disputes led to a major rup-
ture in Chinese-North Korean relations in the 1960s. Friendly relations were restored
after the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in April 1969. The main
turning point in Sino-North Korean relations was Premier Zhou Enlai's visit to North
Korea from April 5 to 7 in 1970. Recalling their "blood-cemented militant friend-
ship," Zhou said, "China and Korea are neighbors as closely related as lips and teeth,
and our two peoples are intimate brothers."13 A major factor contributing to the
revival of the Pyongyang-Peking friendship was their shared hostility toward Japan
and their increased fear of Japan's growing strength. During 1969 and 1970, three sig-
nificant developments contributed to the revival of the Pyongyang-Peking friend-
ship.14 First, the Nixon doctrine, announced in November 1969, urged a positive
Japanese role in the maintenance of Asian security. Second, in the Nixon-Sato joint
communique, Premier Sato stated that "the maintenance of peace and security in the
Taiwan area" was "a most important factor for the security of Japan" and that "the

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security of the Republic of Korea" was "essential to Japan's own security." The third
development was the extension of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in June 1970. Fol-
lowing these developments, North Korea and China accelerated their campaign
against U.S.-Japanese collusion. In the Shanghai communique issued at the end of
President Nixon's visit to China in February 1972, Beijing declared its firm support
of the DPRK's "eight-point program for the peaceful unification of Korea" and its
stand for the abolition of the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilita-
tion of Korea, while the U.S. pledged that it would "support efforts of the ROK to
seek a relaxation of tension and increase communications in the Korean Peninsula."15
The journey to "client state" was nearly complete.

The DPRK's Threat Perception in the 1980s

As the U.S.-Soviet détente in the 1970s turned into a global rivalry in the 1980s,
the Northeast Asian balance of power began to polarize into two blocs: the U.S.-
Japan-PRC triangle and the Soviet Union. The issue to understand in this period is
how this affected the perceived threat against the DPRK. The new triplets- the United
States, Japan, and the ROK's military coordination - added fuel to North Korea's
insecurity. This triple alliance in East Asia signaled accelerated arms buildups in the
United States, Japan, and South Korea.16 A strong U.S. security alliance with South
Korea and Japan; their efforts to enhance allied military capabilities, including the
redeployment of U.S. forces in South Korea; continuing modernization of South
Korean forces; and the development of theater missile defenses all enhanced North
Korean threat perception.
Sino-Soviet Economic Policy . North Korea also felt threatened by the Chinese pol-
icy of liberalizing its economy, which was termed an "open door policy." The policy
was formulated in 1978 and vigorously followed in the 1980s. North Korea took it as
a withdrawal of the Chinese commitment to communism. The new president of the
USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, also announced the policies of glasnost and perestroika ,
which could again be perceived as deviations from communism. These policies made
North Korea more insecure, and it tried to keep a "safe distance" from both of the
allies. At the same time, North Korea became concerned about its self-reliance
defense, which was symbolized by the ideas of juchey meaning autonomy, and its
corollary jawi, meaning self-reliant defense. By the end of the 1980s, the DPRK had
clearly lost the historic race with the ROK, and its own allies, the USSR and the PRC,
were forging new links with Seoul in order to strengthen their own economies.

Major Responses
The North Korean response to the setbacks of the 1980s was defensive. North
Korea was facing problems on all fronts: it was politically unstable, economically ail-
ing, and militarily weak, whereas its counterpart's performance was quite satisfac-
tory. To overcome these problems, North Korea's Comprehensive Peace Initiatives
of November 7, 1988, were composed of four principles for the guarantee of unifi-

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cation: the pursuit of unification, the withdrawal of U.S. troops, a reduction of arma-
ments in both the North and the South, and direct negotiations between North and
South Korea.17
Internal Balancing . In responding to perceived threats, North Korea tried to
resolve various crises by demanding direct talks with the United States to establish
peace on the peninsula. In this decade, the concept of security involved not only mil-
itary power, but also economic and political power. North Korea attempted to get
greater world attention in the 1980s, and the nuclear program could be a very effec-
tive means. Around 1980, Pyongyang initiated the building of industrial-scale nuclear
facilities that could produce substantial amounts of nuclear energy. The North made
an effort to broaden the international relationships driven by economic priorities,
although political and strategic considerations were important. In this decade, both
sides, North and South Korea, set up a "North-South Economic Cooperation Com-
mittee." They reached agreements on the reuniting of separated families, exchange
of mails, visits, and so on.
North Korea believes that it is necessary to improve the foreign-relations envi-
ronment for the purpose of promoting U.S.-DPRK relations, and that it is essential
to maintain economic relations with China in order to manage internal economic
activities. On the other hand, China is expected to seek the maintenance and expan-
sion of its influence on North Korea through food and energy assistance, while har-
boring a feeling of distrust as North Korea forced through nuclear tests, and paying
close attention to movements in U.S.-DPRK and inter-Korean relations.
External Balancing: China. The maintenance of a close relationship with Pyong-
yang remained one of the cornerstones of China's policy toward the Korean Penin-
sula in the decade of the 1980s. For China, loyalty with North Korea became impor-
tant not only for Cold War reasons but also for strategic ones vis-à-vis the new Soviet
threat. China's difficult relations with Vietnam, Cuba, Mongolia, and Albania only
increased the strategic value of North Korea. It was in China's political and security
interests to maintain friendly relations with North Korea. During the 1980s, China
adopted a dual approach, on the one hand strengthening its traditional ties with
Pyongyang and, on the other, promoting its relations with Seoul. The bilateral trade
volume, between China and the DPRK declined from $562 million in 1989 to $483
million in 1990.18 In 1986, yielding to North Korea's protests again, Beijing sus-
pended the construction of the first Sino-South Korean joint venture - the Fuzhou
Refrigerator company between Fujian Province and the Daewoo Group - for almost
a year.19
In January 1984, the Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang, in an effort to reduce ten-
sion on the Korean Peninsula, officially assumed the role of an intermediary between
North Korea on the one hand and the United States and South Korea on the other.20
The North Korean leadership, through the intermediary of China, proposed three-
party talks among South and North Korea and the United States. China made it clear
that it advocated a nuclear-free zone on the peninsula and supported efforts to resolve
the issue through consultation with all concerned parties. The nature of the alliance
between North Korea and China underwent a critical change to the extent that an

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alliance existed but became more flexible. In the 1990s, the DPRK entered an entirely
different phase.
A decade of international politics since the end of the Cold War provides suffi-
cient evidence to assess the value of the theory of alliance, because significant events
occurred within this period. With the end of the Cold War, traditional security threats
have substantially diminished in various parts of the world, especially in Europe.
Nonetheless, in East Asia the traditional notions of security threats continue to dom-
inate the security discourse, as the arms race and the security dilemma remain over-
riding concerns.

The DPRK's Threat Perception in the 1990s

A noted observer of the Korean situation has remarked that the "Korean Penin-
sula is a Cold War island in a post-Cold War sea."21 The end of the Cold War in
Europe, the aftermath of the Gulf War, and the collapse of communism in the for-
mer Soviet Union - all of which took place in 1989-1991- were bound to have a
profound impact on the Northeast Asian region. At the beginning of the 1990s, the
polarization of international relations was replaced by a balance of forces based partly
on military power and partly on economic potential. In some aspects, the legacies of
the Cold War era are being kept intact, coupled with some new variations.
The End of the Cold War. The years 1990-1991 were very momentous for the
Korean Peninsula. It was in September 1990 that the first dialogue took place at prime
ministerial level between North Korea and South Korea. Japan suddenly began to open
up a dialogue with North Korea. The United States unilaterally withdrew about 4,000
troops from South Korea as a part of President George H. W. Bush's plan to reduce
American forces in South Korea. In 1991, the United States decided to remove all land-
based and later air-based tactical nuclear weapons from overseas bases. On the other
side, 1991 was also the year of the Soviet decision to end the sale of oil and other
goods to North Korea at "friendship prices." Finally, 1991 ended with two historic
agreements between North and South Korea, one on non-aggression and the other
on denuclearization. In North Korea's perception, the passing of the Cold War had
not diluted existing tensions, but instead had facilitated the emergence of new com-
petitors. The demise of socialism and the normalization of the relationship between
North Korea's allies and its adversaries - Russia and China with South Korea - with-
out "cross-recognition" of the DPRK by the United States or Japan, had been widely
viewed as a danger to its security. After two decades of two opposing Koreas, North
Korea capitulated on the United Nations (UN) membership issue, and both Korean
governments were admitted into the UN in 1991. Improving relations between South
Korea and the socialist countries in general, and the Soviet Union and China in par-
ticular, made North Korea suspicious.
The Changing Military Balance. On September 27, 1991, President George H. W.
Bush announced that the United States had decided to withdraw all its nuclear
weapons from South Korea. After eight rounds of inter-prime ministerial talks
December 1991, the two Koreas committed themselves to making the Korean Peni

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sula free of nuclear weapons and signed the historic Agreement on Reconciliation,
Non-Aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation. Threats and counter-threats were
being exchanged between North Korea on the one side and the United States, Japan,
and South Korea on the other. President Clinton, during his visit to South Korea,
warned North Koreans that if they ever developed and used nuclear weapons, "it
would be the end of their country."22 This resulted in the bilateral Agreed Frame-
work of 1994, which led to the formation of a multilateral organization to implement
the agreement, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).
In line with this policy, the South Korean president, Kim Dae-jung, adopted the rec-
onciliatory "Sunshine Policy" toward North Korea. From 1990 on, the North's econ-
omy was estimated to have had continuous "negative growth" for seven years. To
make matters worse, North Korea's two former socialist allies- the USSR and
China - had cut their already shrinking aid and demanded hard currency payments
in trade. The North Koreans demanded that the United States withdraw its nuclear
weapons from South Korea, stop nuclear war exercises directed against North Korea,
allow IAEA inspections of nuclear facilities in South Korea, and give "legally bind-
ing" assurances not to use nuclear weapons against North Korea. Any attempt to dis-
mantle the North Korean nuclear capability was suspected by Pyongyang and
perceived as another threat against its independence in foreign relations.

Major Responses by North Korea

In a bid to compensate for diplomatic setbacks, North Korea made diplomatic

efforts toward the remaining socialist countries, and on April 8, 1992, it adopted the
"North Korean Declaration" to strengthen the solidarity of socialist political parties.
North Korea sought to improve relations with the United States and Japan. Follow-
ing the end of the Cold War, it joined the inter-Korean Red Cross talks and made
sports exchanges with the South. North Korea responded with increased diplomatic
efforts toward non-aligned nations. Thus Pyongyang tried to take protective meas-
ures against possible external threats.
Internal Balancing: The Nuclear Problematic . Due to the economic decline of the
1990s, the North Korean government was not in a position to invest in moderniza-
tion of the armed forces and the purchase of new weapons. North Korea seemed to
have had only two ways to respond to the trend - either increase its manpower or
go for nuclear weaponization. In North Korea's perception, the possession of nuclear
weapons offered an effective defense against possible South Korean political coer-
cion and an effective deterrent against possible American nuclear blackmail. By using
this leverage, DPRK has gained political concessions, security guarantees, and a $4.5
billion energy aid program as part of its October 1994 Agreed Framework deal with
the United States.23 The DPRK announced its withdrawal from the Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty on March 12, 1993. On April 10, 1993, North Korea responded to the UN
Security Council president's statement, saying that "if the UN Security Council wants
to deal with the nuclear issue from the stand of guaranteeing world peace and secu-
rity it must call into question, first of all, the U.S. which was the first country in the

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world to develop nuclear weapons and has the largest arsenal of such weapons."24 It
was due to the Chinese opposition to any harsh resolution that the Security Coun-
cil came out with a mild resolution. Tension on the Korean Peninsula decreased only
when the United States adopted a "give and take" diplomatic style in recognition of
the fact that Pyongyang's recalcitrance could be read as a bargaining tactic to get
something in return for giving up the nuclear option.25 Thus, the first nuclear crisis
was solved in 1994. North Korea has followed a policy of excluding South Korea from
negotiations concerning arms control and security issues ever since the signing of
the Agreed Framework.
Missile Proliferation. The North Korean missile program has expanded from the
1960s and 1970s development and deployment of tactical artillery rockets, to the
development and deployment of short-range ballistic missiles in the 1980s, and, in
the 1990s, to the development and deployment of medium-range ballistic missiles.
From Pyongyang's perspective, the U.S. NMD (National Missile Defense)/TMD (The-
ater Missile Defense) plans were pre-programmed to avoid direct confrontation with
Beijing and Moscow, hiding behind the excuse of North Korea as a rogue state but
also reinforcing Japan's military role in East Asia, as preparations for another war in
Asia.26 By the mid-1990s, it had deployed No-dong missiles that were capable of
reaching Japan. Although the primary motivation for North Korea's missile program
appears to be related to security concerns, the export of missiles and missile tech-
nology to Middle East and South Asian countries for money has also become an
important consideration. North Korea started to export ballistic missiles and related
materials and technology, and this export business has earned a significant portion
of North Korea's hard currency.
The crucial question for North Korea is, what has changed and what remains
constant in China's policy toward North Korea? Beijing's top priority continues to
be domestic economic growth. China believes that it needs a stable and peaceful
external environment for domestic economic modernization. Further, China's over-
all strategic position in East Asia does not provide it leverage to be confrontational
with any other major regional player. Any wrong calculation by China will only result
in further consolidation of the United States' security role in East Asia, exacerbat-
ing what Beijing sees as an unfavorable strategic position.
External Balancing : China . The end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the
Soviet Union, and the end of the Sino-Soviet conflict transformed the conditions for
maintaining the "lips-to-teeth" ties. Pyongyang-Beijing ties reached a nadir in Sep-
tember 1992, a month after Beijing's diplomatic recognition with Seoul. The PRC's
economic restructuring program led Beijing to put pressure on Pyongyang to inten-
sify its contacts with Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo; to engage in domestic economic
reform; and to accept a simultaneous admission of the two Koreas into the United
Nations. China has been reinforcing its political and security relationship with North
Korea, as witnessed by its decision in October 1994 to withdraw the delegation of the
Chinese People's volunteers from the Military Armistice Commission (MAC). This
move conformed to DPRK policy, whereby the DPRK abandoned the MAC on April 29,
1994.

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 In keeping with its security interests, China is trying to avoid the collapse of
North Korea. It has a long land border with the poorest states of North Korea and
runs the risk of being burdened with refugees. Arms transfers from China were
reduced to an almost minimal level in the 1990s. However, a combination of anti-
American feeling and the nuclear crisis helped to restore some of their former inti-
macy. In 1999, the visit of Kim Yong-nam to Beijing signaled a positive trend. In
interviews with South Korean scholars and the media in January 1999, the PRC's
ambassador to South Korea, Wu Dawei, asserted that the 1961 Sino-DPRK Treaty on
Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Agreement is alive, and there are no revision
negotiations of any kind in the works.27
There was a rapid deterioration of Sino-American relations in 1999. Events such
as the U.S.-Japan defense cooperation, their development of the Theater Missile
Defense system, the U.S./NATO war against Yugoslavia, and the American bombing
of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo War in early May 1999 wors-
ened the Sino-U.S. relationship and the Chinese perception of threat. China now felt
surrounded by the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK alliances. The Kosovo crisis also set
alarm bells ringing in North Korea. Thus, Beijing's relations with North Korea began
to be renormalized in 1999, due to shared perceptions of threat related to the U.S.-
led war against the former Yugoslavia over Kosovo. The United States' global behavior
clashed directly with China's national interests (its economic priorities, reunifica-
tion with Taiwan, and continued CCP rule). Because China saw the United States as
a present threat to its interests in Northeast Asia, the Sino-North Korean relation-
ship was revived. There was a visible improvement in Sino-North Korean relations
from 1999 to 2001. In May 2000, the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il, chose Bei-
jing for his first state visit since June 1983, and this was followed by another visit to
China in January 2001. In October 2000, China dispatched a military delegation to
Pyongyang, headed by Defense Minister Chi Haotian, to celebrate the fiftieth anniver-
sary of its entry into the Korean War - the "War to resist America and aid Korea,"
in Beijing's lingo- and to reaffirm Sino-DPRK military ties; and a civilian delega-
tion to Seoul, headed by Prime Minister Zhu Rongji, to elevate Sino-ROK relations
from a "cooperative partnership" to a "full-scale cooperative partnership," pushing
the United States and Japan onto the sidelines.28 China made a commitment to take
military action if its ally was attacked by a common adversary.
North Korea's nuclear brinkmanship was the first nuclear proliferation crisis of
the post-Cold War era. North Korea used its nuclear threat in bargaining with its
adversaries. China abstained from voting on North Korea's nuclear issue at the UN
and the IAEA. The U.S. secretary of state, Colin Powell, warned Chinese vice pres-
ident Hu Jintao that the hard-liners in Washington were willing to use force to effect
regime change in North Korea. During this period, the PRC held discussions with
the DPRK to resolve the dispute and promoted dialogue between the United States
and the DPRK. China appeared to accept North Korea's plea that their nuclear
weapons were intended to counter the perceived threat from the United States,
although China had argued that the DPRK's legitimate security interests must take
into account the goal of denuclearizing the peninsula.29 Chinese analysts are calling

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for a serious reassessment of Beijing's DPRK policy and its underlying assumptions.
They argue that North Korea's tests seriously undermine China's security by strength-
ening military alliances between the United States, Japan, and South Korea, and could
lead to regional arms races and trigger nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia. In the
words of Dick Nanto and Mark Manyin, North Korea employs a cycle of provoca-
tions and bluster, followed by a charm offensive and requests for aid, and then a
return to provocations. In 2010, it entered into the provocation phase by precipitat-
ing events that are directly counter to Chinese national interests.30 In March 2010,
North Korea was found to have torpedoed a South Korean naval ship, the Cheonan ,
killing nearly fifty crew members.
China wishes to maintain its relationship with Pyongyang, as North Korea is
one of its few remaining allies. However, Pyongyang indirectly threatens China with
the collapse of the North Korean state to extract economic support from Beijing even
when Pyongyang defies China's wishes.31 China fears instability in North Korea and
hence is willing to provide Pyongyang with a certain amount of aid. Beijing has made
its stance on the matter of nuclear proliferation clear by supporting UN sanctions
against North Korea following Pyongyang's detonation of nuclear devices in 2006 and
2009. Yet Beijing has continued to provide economic support for Pyongyang that
diminishes the effect of those sanctions. The changing international balance of forces
has forced one change in North Korean tactics. The DPRK had consistently opposed
a "two Koreas policy" or cross-recognition, which would have permitted the ROK
and the DPRK to join the UN as two separate states.
In the 1990s, other sets of asymmetrical mutual interests and perceptions
emerged, namely, Beijing-Seoul, Beijing-Pyongyang, and Seoul-Pyongyang. Differ-
ences in domestic and foreign policy between China and North Korea make it difficult
to sustain the traditional "lips-to-teeth" relationship. Although North Korea and
China may be allies today, that may not always be the case in the future. China wishes
to maintain the status quo of the two Koreas, which means continuing its support
for the weaker DPRK at any cost. Beijing has come to the understanding that any
weakening of influence over North Korea would degrade its strategic status- and its
interest in Northeast Asia in general, and in the Korean Peninsula in particular. The
political and ideological affinity that exists between Beijing and Pyongyang may have
acted as a binding force between the two states in an era of communist collapse.
China often pressed the United States to offer the DPRK a pledge of non-aggression
to dilute North Korea's sense of insecurity. China continues to support North Korea's
recognition by the United States and Japan, which it regards as a necessary step
toward reducing Pyongyang's sense of isolation and insecurity.
North Korea has earned a reputation for promoting "the power of the weak." In
spite of its weakness vis-à-vis the United States, North Korea has used this to its
advantage. Brendan Howe asserts that it is not the increasing strength of North Korea
that poses the threat to regional security, but rather Pyongyang's increasing weak-
ness-an "insecurity dilemma" rather than a security dilemma.32 Cold War percep-
tions are still disturbing the relationship between the North and the South. The
situation on the Korean Peninsula does not seem to be moving toward stability, or

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it can be said that the crisis is the same due to the imbalance of power between North
Korea and South Korea. Since early 2000, North Korea has established diplomatic
relations with Italy, Australia, and the Philippines, and it has agreed to move toward
normalizing ties with Canada, the United Kingdom (UK), and New Zealand. All of
the European Union (EU) states, except for France, have now established diplomatic
relations with North Korea. While only the UK, Germany, and Sweden from West-
ern Europe, and Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania from Eastern Europe, have embassies
in Pyongyang, the EU has an ECHO (the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid
Department) office, and other countries send staff from time to time. Both Italy and
Switzerland have aid agencies present in Pyongyang. The EU has been a significant
humanitarian aid donor to North Korea since the mid-1990s, and has also promoted
energy development. The EU joined the executive board of the KEDO, which over-
saw the construction of two new light- water nuclear reactors in North Korea and other
Agreed Framework energy provisions.33 These situations reflect North Korea's efforts
to overcome the perceived danger to its security and survival. Thus the shadow of
the Cold War still persists. The U.S. president George W. Bush, in his State of the
Union address of January 29, 2002, referred to North Korea along with Iraq and Iran
as constituting an "Axis of Evil."
Chinese distrust of U.S. intentions continues to play a role in Sino-U.S. rela-
tions and also affects China's preferences toward the Korean Peninsula. Until 2002,
China had remained largely on the sidelines in peninsula affairs. The discovery of a
North Korean highly enriched uranium (HEU) program in 2002 caused Beijing to
fear that the United States was contemplating military action to remove the Kim
regime. Since then, Pyongyang has participated in Six- Party Talks- held between the
United States, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and Russia - to address the issue
of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. The view that Beijing values North
Korea as a buffer against U.S. forces stationed in South Korea is perhaps the most
prevalent explanation of Beijing's continued support for Pyongyang. Considering the
growing tension between the United States and China in the economic and security
sectors, the need to keep a buffer between U.S. and Chinese forces continues to be
vital. While violence between the ROK and the DPRK is undesirable, a conflict
between China and the United States would have much greater economic and secu-
rity consequences. Pyongyang's utility as a buffer state between Chinese and U.S.
forces is increasingly invalidated as Pyongyang's provocations invite greater U.S. mil-
itary presence in the region. ROK and U.S. forces held combined naval exercises in
late 2010 in China's Yellow Sea, which greatly vexed Beijing. While these reactions
to North Korean provocations depreciate North Korea's value as a buffer, such a role
will not be completely invalidated until such point as Beijing believes that war is
imminent.

The policy makers of South Korea, and regional powers such as the United States,
China, Japan, and Russia, should take the scenario of the possible collapse of North
Korea seriously, while making efforts to promote peace on the Korean Peninsula by
creating a stable North Korea.34 Beijing prefers to keep the Kim regime in power
because it is the only option that meets its strategic priority for stability. Beijing's

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behavior in response to North Korean provocations and Beijing's perspective of the
North Korean nuclear threat support this view. Pyongyang's recent successes in devel-
oping nuclear capabilities increase rather than decrease its ability to continue black-
mailing the international community. Beijing's recent behavior indicates that it shares
this view, as evidenced by the December 2010 agreement with Pyongyang to invest
$2 billion in a joint Chinese-North Korean special economic zone.35 China's support
for North Korea is reluctant, but it is required by Beijing's pragmatic realpolitik
approach.
North Korea's foremost foreign policy objective today is simply regime survival.
Pyongyang is attempting to force the international order to accept it as a nuclear
weapons state, and thereby render itself largely immune from external intervention
and regime change. Pyongyang views the United States simultaneously as its great-
est adversary and the key to achieving security in the future. North Korea also engages
in nuclear brinkmanship in an effort to pressure the United States to offer guaran-
tees for its security. It is primarily because of North Korea's threat to stability in the
region that China has increasingly involved itself in peninsula affairs over the past
decade. China and North Korea share ancient cultural ties spanning centuries. Due
to divergent paths taken by their respective leaders under the PRC and the DPRK,
those ties have greatly diminished. North Koreans live in the most isolated nation in
the world, under the most totalitarian regime in history. While the Chinese and
North Koreans no longer share a "big brother-little brother" relationship, they do
share some common interests and perceptions. Foremost is their continued hatred
for the Japanese, stemming from the legacy of Japan's colonial occupation of both
nations. Distrust of the United States is also shared by both, although to a much
greater level in Pyongyang than in Beijing.
To North Korea, China is a major source of aid and trade, providing 70 percent
of its foreign trade, 90 percent of its oil, 80 percent of its consumer goods, and 45
percent of its food. North Korea is believed to make up some 40 percent of China's
international aid budget. China is most comfortable with a relatively weak and not
necessarily Western-aligned state on its border. With a unified, democratic Korean
Peninsula, China would also be relatively isolated in the region. China and North
Korea have vastly different security and economic priorities. China's broader strate-
gic objectives are to maintain stability and peace in order to continue its economic
rise. North Korea has devolved into an economically failed state, heavily dependent
on international support to continue to move forward. Its primary internal security
concerns revolve around a need to perpetuate its totalitarian control over the pop-
ulation. The single greatest commonality between Beijing and Pyongyang in terms
of strategic security perceptions is a shared view of the United States as the most crit-
ical external factor affecting their ability to achieve their respective political objec-
tives. In China's case, the United States holds the key to China's continued peaceful
rise and is perceived as the greatest obstacle to Beijing's desires for reunification with
Taiwan. North Korea perceives the United States as a much more immediate threat
and fears that it may pursue military options to overthrow the regime.
Reunification of Korea by absorption would result in a nation that is aligned with

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Washington rather than Beijing. This would eliminate North Korea's value as lever-
age against the U.S. position on Taiwan or as a buffer between U.S. and Chinese
forces. Until there is a significant change in the dynamics of Sino-U.S. relations, Bei-
jing will continue to prefer the existence of a separate North Korean state over any
reunification scenario. Beijing prefers North Korea to undergo a gradual evolution
into a stable and economically prosperous, non-nuclear regime, aligned with Beijing
in the long term. China's response to Pyongyang's provocations, an analysis of
Pyongyang's significance to China, and an assessment of China's perception on war
and collapse on the Korean Peninsula all indicate that Beijing is against any policy
of regime change. Pyongyang has demonstrated that it is keenly aware of its strate-
gic importance to China and has utilized that knowledge to counter Beijing's eco-
nomic leverage. China has more diplomatic and economic sway over North Korea
than any other country. The Chinese are not willing to sacrifice both their leverage
and the status quo in exchange for tougher policies that would marginalize the pre-
carious Pyongyang regime.

Summing Up

The balance-of-threat theory suggests that states form alliances to counter per-
ceived threats. This theory provides an excellent explanation for the balance of power
in a bi-polar world. Geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive inten-
tions affect the threat level. Geography determines the balance of power in East Asia.
The geography of Korea has shaped its history. The division of the peninsula into
North and South Korea at the end of World War II was also attributable mainly to
geopolitical factors. The international relations in the East Asia region evolved into
multi-polar relations owing to the changing balance of power. Through a series of
alliances, all four of the big powers- the United States, Russia, China, and Japan -
are linked, directly or indirectly, to the defense of one of the two Koreas. In these
circumstances, North Korea has continued to be concerned with national security.
In Pyongyang, there is substance to the fear and suspicion of external powers.
Pyongyang has perceived itself to be under nuclear threat from the United States, and
therefore security has been one of the main motivating forces behind the Sino-DPRK
alliance. As North Korea's geographic location is in close proximity to China, it has
existed as an autonomous state by virtue of its powerful neighbor. China-North
Korea ties are prompted by ideological homogeneity and geographic proximity. The
roles of South Korea and the United States have been examined, with a new under-
standing of the issue of threat perception by North Korea.
During the Cold War, the Sino-DPRK balance of threat was forged to counter
the perception of ROK-U.S. hegemony in the region. And it did effectively balance
the threat when the interests of the United States, the USSR, China, and Japan inter-
sected on the Korean Peninsula. Even after the Cold War, the four powers had vested
interests on the peninsula. Kei Koga asserts that North Korean foreign policy can
be explained by neoclassical realism, which regards distribution of power in the

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international system as an independent variable, domestic perception of the system
and domestic incentives as intervening variables, and foreign policy decision mak-
ing as a dependent variable.36 The current distribution of power in the international
system does not favor North Korea. Since the end of the Cold War, North Korea has
faced grave security threats from inside and outside the state. North Korea's secu-
rity has become much more vulnerable vis-à-vis hostile states in the region, espe-
cially the United States, than during the Cold War. As long as the United States
maintains its role as the protector of South Korea and the U.S.-ROK defense treaty
is in effect, the inter-Korean security relationship can be viewed in the broader
framework. The North fears that the more powerful South would overwhelm its
political system, ideology, institutions, and so on. Pyongyang will demand the with-
drawal of U.S. combat aircraft with offensive potential, which, since the experience
of the second Gulf War, the Kosovo war, and the Afghan war, represent the greatest
threat to North Korea. Pyongyang needs Beijing to survive. Beijing cannot afford to
let Pyongyang collapse.
China used to assert that it did not possess any real diplomatic or political
authority over North Korea. China is now viewed as the only major power that retains
some influence over North Korea. There is an asymmetric interdependence in assis-
tance of all sorts (political, military, and economic). Since the collapse of the Soviet
Union, China has regularly been North Korea's largest trade partner and greatest
source of external aid, a trend that seems to have been increasing in recent years.
Presently, China is also serving as the venue for North Korea's negotiations with
South Korea, Japan, and the United States. The PRC recognizes the utility of Korea
in projecting its identity as a great power. This is due to Pyongyang's reliance on Bei-
jing for all sorts of support. China also feels the need to sustain one of the few remain-
ing socialist countries following the collapse of communism. China's security
relationship and alliance policy toward North Korea are undergoing a change. While
China has selectively reformed its economy and opened itself to the outside world,
North Korea remains an isolated country. North Korea can no longer rely on the Chi-
nese guarantee of mutual assistance in the same way it did in the 1950s.
It is true that in order for Pyongyang to survive, it needs Beijing's support. But
it is equally true that Beijing cannot achieve its goals of regional stability or main-
tain North Korea as a buffer and as leverage against the U.S. position on Taiwan if
it allows Pyongyang to collapse. While China today is the world's second-largest
economy and is increasingly globally integrated, North Korea is one of the world's
poorest nations and possibly the most isolated. While Chinese and North Koreans
retain some cultural bonds, the big brother-little brother relationship has long since
faded. The two most important remaining cultural perceptions shared by the Chi-
nese and the North Koreans are as "mutual hostages" in terms of anti-U.S. and
anti-Japanese sentiment. Externally, both China and North Korea perceive the United
States as the primary means and obstacle to achieving their respective political objec-
tives. Beijing makes it clear that stability and economic development are its main
strategic priorities, and that reunification with Taiwan is one of its most important
national objectives. Pyongyang scares Beijing by escalating regional tensions that

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increase the chance of war and collapse, and by directly threatening to develop closer
relations with Taiwan.
Once an alliance is established, the smaller ally restricts the larger power. This
alliance is marked by a high but declining degree of interdependence. Due to the large
power's dependence on the alliance, the smaller ally was assured of material and mil-
itary aid. The larger power's tendency to intervene in the domestic affairs of the
smaller state was influenced by its own dependence on the alliance. Within these
limits, the smaller ally was in a good position to resist attempts by the larger ally to
interfere. The primary objective of this alliance for North Korea is to gain large-
power support for its existence. North Korea had the advantage of being geo-
graphically close to China and therefore got support from its larger ally. The notion
of interdependence was an important factor behind the aid extended to North
Korea.

The changes in the security environment on the Korean Peninsula have brought
about changes in the security policy and the perceptions of the alliance between the
alliance partners of the two camps. A broad scope for dialogue scarcely exists between
North and South Korea, and is not present between Washington and Pyongyang. To
cope with the perceived threat, the North Korean regime is determined to unify the
peninsula on its own terms. China and North Korea hoped that through their alliance
they would prevent unification of Korea on the other's terms. North Korea's quest
for "unification" of the two Koreas may be only rhetoric. China might continue to
provide North Korea with the assistance needed to allow the North Korean regime
to survive. The effort here has not been to reinvent the balance-of- threat theory, but
to examine some of its findings in a different geographic region. This paper has
assessed and compared the utility of Walt's theory in Cold War and post-Cold War
international politics in explaining the alliance between Beijing and Pyongyang.

Notes
1. It is true that both China and North Korea are communist nations, but the nature and
operations of the two states are quite different. For North Korea, it is more like Confucian-Stalin-
istic despotic socialism, whereas for China it is more like a market-driven Communist Party dic-
tatorship. Since the foundation of the PRC and North Korea, they have begun their own
understandings of building socialist society. However, both nations had numerous similarities dur-
ing the era of the 1950s to the 1970s. The types of socialism in the two countries diverged after the
1970s, when China started to implement a market-oriented economy.
2. A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia : Challenge to American Policy (New York:
Harper, 1950), p. 287.
3. Leonard Spector and Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1990), p. 119.
4. Kenneth Quinones, "South Korea's Approaches to North Korea: A Glacial Process," in
Kyong-Ae Park and Dalchoong Kim, eds., Korean Security Dynamics in Transition (New York: Pal-
grave, 2001), p. 21.
5. Tae-Hwan Kwak and Wayne Patterson, "The Security Relationship between Korea and
the United States, 1960-1984," in Yur-Bok Lee and Wayne Patterson, eds., One Hundred Years of
Korean-American Relationsy 1882-1982 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1986), p. 110.
6. Manwoo Lee and Richard W. Mansbach, eds., The Changing Order in Northeast Asia and
The Korean Peninsula (Seoul, Korea: Institute For Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnan University, 1993),
p. 159.

North Korea-China Relations 91

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 7. Hans-Jaochim Schmidt, "Confidence and/or Control? Seeking a New Relationship
between North and South Korea," PRIF Reports , no. 62 (Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute, 2002),
p. 3.
8. Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "North Korea - Set to Join the Nuclear Club?" Jane's Defence
Weekly 12, no. 12 (1989): p. 594.
9. Michael Ertman, "North Korea, Arms Capabilities and Implications," Korea and World
Affairs 17, no. 4 (1993): p. 608.
10. Hongchan Chun, "Moscow's Policy Lines toward Pyongyang under Gorbachev," in Hong
Yung Lee and Chung Chongwook, eds., Korean Options in a Changing International Order (Berke-
ley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1993), p. 55.
1 1. Sung-Hack Kang, "Strategic Metamorphosis from Sisyphus to Chameleon? North Korean
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12. Selig S. Harrison, "The Future of US Forces in Korea," in Kyong-Ae Park and Dalchoong
Kim, eds., Korean Security Dynamics in Transition (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 76-77.
1 3. Chin O. Chung, Pyongyang between Peking and Moscow: North Korea s Involvement in the
Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1958-75 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1978), p. 136.
14. Ibid., pp. 134-135.
15. Chun-tu Hsueh, Korea m Chinas Foreign Policy, m Chun-tu Hsueh, ed., Chtnas For-
eign Relations: New Perspective (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 62.
16. Taik- Young Hamm, Arming the Two Koreas: State , Capital and Military Power (London:
Routledge, 1999), p. 83.
17. Yang Byung Kie, "Changes in North Korea's Military Policy and East Asian Security,"
Korea Focus 11, no. 1 (2003): pp. 53-54.
18. Jia Hao and Zhuang Qubing, "Chinas Policy toward the Korean Peninsula," Asian Sur-
vey 32, no. 12 (1992): pp. 1143-1144. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.1992.32.12.00p0228q
19. Ibid.
20. Chong-Sik Lee, Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension (Stanford, CA: Hoover Insti-
tution Press, 1985), p. 173.
21. Bruce Cumings, "Power and Plenty in Northeast Asia," World Policy Journal , Winter
1987/88, p. 102.
22. Hamm, Arming the Two Koreas , p. 88.
23. Andrew Mack, "Proliferation in Northeast Asia, Occasional Paper No. 28, Henry L.
Stimson Center (Washington, DC, 1996), p. 24.
24. K. D. Kapur, Nuclear Diplomacy in East Asia: US and the Korean Nuclear Crisis Manage-
ment (New Delhi: Lancers Books, 1995), p. 116.
25. Leon V. Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 21.
26. Samuel S. Kim and Tai Hwan Lee, "Chinese-North Korean Relations: Managing Asym-
metrical Interdependence," in Samuel S. Kim and Tai Hwan Lee, eds., North Korea and Northeast
Asia (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), p. 123.
27. Ibid., p. 122.
28. Ibid., p. 115.
29. Michael R. Chambers, "Dealing with a Truculent Ally: A Comparative Perspective on
China's Handling of North Korea," Journal of East Asian Studies 5, no. 1 (2005): pp. 43, 49, 58.
30. Dick K. Nanto and Mark E. Manyin, "China-North Korea Relations," North Korean
Review 7, no. 2 (2011): p. 96. http://dx.doi.Org/10.3172/NKR.7.2.94
31. China's "three no's" in regards to North Korea have been no nukes, no war, and no col-
lapse. These are the fundamental priorities on the Korean Peninsula.
32. Brendan Howe, "North Korea's Insecurity Dilemma," North Korean Review 6, no. 2 (2010):
p. 75. http://dx.doi.Org/10.3172/NKR.6.2.74
33. Wade L. Huntley, "Rebels without a Cause: North Korea, Iran and the NPT," Interna-
tional Affairs 82, no. 4 (2006): p. 727. http://dx.doi.Org/10.llll/j.1468-2346.2006.00565.x
34 Dong Ho Han, "The Future of the Two Koreas: How to Build Peace on the Korean Penin-
sula," North Korean Review 7, no. 1 (2011): p. 50. http://dx.doi.Org/10.3172/NKR.7.l.49
35 "China Plans Massive Investment in North Korea," Agence-France Presse , January 6, 2011,
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ ALeqM5hJMKJUmXhpQ80JHiZ53hcAalNZw?doc
Id=CNG.15bd5dcd9923ecledel841c7911a83dc.4dl (accessed November 22, 2011).

92 North Korean Review, Fall 2012

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 36. Kei Koga, "The Anatomy of North Korea's Foreign Policy Formulation," North Korean
Review 5, no. 2 (2009): p. 22. http://dx.doi.Org/10.3172/NKR.5.2.21

Biographical Statement

Dr. Sangit Sarita Dwivedi has been assistant professor in the Department of
Political Science, Bharati College, and at the University of Delhi, since 2004. She
received her Ph.D. from CIPOD, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru
University in 2008. She completed an M.Phil, from the Department of East Asian
Studies, University of Delhi, in 2002; a master of arts in political science from the
University of Delhi in 1999; and she graduated from the University of Delhi in polit-
ical science (honors) in 1997.

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