HO 7 Judicial Department

HAND OUT No.
7 – JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
By; Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
Constitutional Law 1, 1st Semester SY 2014-2015
P.U.P. College of Law
C. The Judicial Department

Prof. Barlongay: Of the three departments of government, two departments (Executive
and Legislative) are considered as active. On the other hand, the Judiciary is considered
as passive. It is passive in the sense that it has to wait for a case to be filed before it
can act.
J. Cruz: To maintain the independence of the Judiciary, the following safeguards have
been embodied in the Constitution:
(1) The SC is a constitutional body. It cannot be abolished nor may its

membership or the manner of its meetings be changed by mere
legislation. [Art. VIII, Sec. 4 (1)]
(2) The members of the judiciary are not subject to confirmation by the
CA.
(3) The members of the SC may not be removed except by
impeachment. (Art. IX, Sec. 2.)
(4) The SC may not be deprived of its minimum original and appellate
jurisdiction as prescribed in Art. X, Sec. 5 of the Constitution. (Art.
VIII, Sec. 2.)
(5) The appellate jurisdiction of the SC may not be increased by law
without its advice and concurrence. (Art. VI, Sec. 30.)
(6) The SC now has administrative supervision over all lower courts and
their personnel. (Art. VIII, Sec. 6.)
(7) The SC has exclusive power to discipline judges of lower courts. (Art.
VIII, Sec. 11.)
(8) The members of the SC and all lower courts have security of tenure,
which cannot be undermined by a law reorganizing the judiciary.
(Id.)
(9) They shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial
or administrative functions. (Art. VIII, Sec. 12.)
(10) The salaries of judges may not be reduced during their continuance
in office. (Art. VIII, Sec. 10.)
(11) The judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. (Art. VIII, Sec. 3.)
(12) The SC alone may initiate rules of court. [Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (5).]
(13) Only the SC may order the temporary detail of judges. [Art. VIII, Sec.
5 (3)]
(14) The SC can appoint all officials and employees of the judiciary. [Art.
VIII, Sec. 5 (6)]
1. THE SUPREME COURT
A. COMPOSITION
Art. VIII, Sec. 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a

Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc
or its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.
Creation
 The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1, par. 1.)
Hand Out No. 7 – Judicial Department
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
Page 2 of 52
 The Supreme Court is a constitutional body. As such it cannot be abolished by

the Congress for the power to destroy only resides in the one who has the power
to create.
 The lower courts (Court of Appeals, Regional Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts), on the other hand, are
established by law, and so could be abolished by law, provided the security of
tenure is not undermined.
Composition
 The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and 14 Associate

Justices. [Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1)]
 Under the 1935 Constitution, the Supreme Court was composed of eleven (11)
justices in all; in 1973, fifteen (15) Justices.
Mode of Sitting
 It may sit en banc, or in its discretion, in divisions of 3, 5 or 7 members (or 5, 3

or 2 divisions). [Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1)]
 In 1935, the rule was that the SC may sit en banc or in 2 divisions, "unless
otherwise provided by law." Congress decided against allowing the SC to sit in 2
divisions on the theory that there is only one Supreme Court. And so, it provided
in the Judiciary Act of 1948 the rule that the SC may only sit en banc. But the
reality was that the dockets were crowded. This prompted the framers to
eliminate one phrase "unless otherwise provided by law" in 1956, and in effect
leave the decision to the SC on whether to sit en banc or in 2 divisions, if it sat
on divisions.
 In 1987, not only was the discretion retained, but also the divisions were
increased. There may be 5, 3 or 2 divisions made up of 3, 5 or 7 members,
respectively. At present, the SC sits either en banc or in 3 divisions.
One Supreme Court
 When the SC sits in divisions, it does not violate the concept of a "one Supreme
1
Court" because, according to the case of United States vs. Limsiongco, the divisions
of the SC do not diminish its authority, because although it sits in divisions, it
remains and co-functions as one body.
 This "One Supreme Court" doctrine is strengthened by the provision that "when
the required number (in a division) is not obtained, the case shall be decided en
banc: provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a
decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by
the court sitting en banc. [Art. VIII, Sec. 4(3)]
Strict Composition
 In the case of Vargas vs. Rilloraza, the SC held that the temporary designation of
judges of the CFI and the Court of Appeals in the Supreme Court to constitute a
quorum due to disqualification of some of the justices, is unconstitutional. There
is but one Supreme Court whose membership appointments are permanent.
1
G.R. No. L-16217, October 9, 1920 (41 Phil 94)
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Vargas vs. Rilloraza, G.R. No. L-1612, February 26, 1948 (80 Phil 297)
FACTS: Petitioner Vargas filed a motion assailing the constitutionality of People's Court Act which provides
that any justice of the SC who held any office or position under the Philippine Executive Commission or under
the government called Philippine Republic, may not sit and vote in any case brought to that court under sec.
13 hereof in which the accused is a person who held any office or position under either both the Philippine
Executive Commission and the Philippine Republic or any branch, instrumentality or agency thereof. If on
account of such disqualification, or because of any of the grounds of disqualification of judges, in R 126, sec.
1 of the ROC, or on account of illness, absence of temporary disability, the requisite number of justices
necessary to constitute a quorum in any case is not present, the President may designate such no. of judges
of the CFI, judges at large of CFI, cadastral judges, having none of the disqualification set forth in the above
law, as may be necessary to sit temporarily as justice of the SC in order to form a quorum.
HELD: (1) Congress does not have the power to add to the existing grounds for disqualification of a justice
of the SC. To disqualify any of these constitutional component member of the court- especially as in this case,
a majority of them-- in a treason case, is nothing short of depriving the court itself of its jurisdiction as
established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. It would
seem evident that if Congress could disqualify members of SC in taking part in the hearing and determination
of certain "collaboration" cases, it could extend the disqualification to other cases.
(2) The designation provided (a CFI-judge to sit as a SC justice if the SC does not have the required quorum)
is repugnant to the constitutional requirement that members be appointed by the Pres. w/ the consent of the
CA. (This was under the 1935 Constitution w/c required confirmation from the Commission on Appointments.)
It will result in a situation wherein 6 members sitting will not be appointed and confirmed in accordance with
the Constitution.
(3) However brief or temporary may be the action or participation of a judge designated, there is no escaping
the fact that he would be participating in the deliberations and acts of the SC and if allowed to do so, his vote
would count as much as any regular justice.
B. APPOINTMENT AND QUALIFICATIONS
Art. VIII, Sec. 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the

Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines. A member of the Supreme Court
must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen
years or m ore a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice
of law in the Philippines.
Judicial and Bar Council
Id., Sec. 8. (5) The (Judicial and Bar) Council shall have the
principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It
may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme
Court may assign to it.
Id., Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower
courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least
three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments
within ninety days from the submission of the list.
Qualifications
(1) Natural-born citizen [Art. VIII, Sec. 7(1)]
(2) At least 40 years of age (id.)
(3) At least 15 years of experience as a judge of lower court, or practice of law in the
Philippines (id.)
(4) Of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence [Art. VIII, Sec. 7(3)]
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C. SALARY
Art. VIII, Sec. 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court and of judges of lower
courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office,
their salary shall not be decreased.
 Unless the Congress provides otherwise, the CJ shall receive an annual salary of
P 240,000 and the Associate Justices shall receive P 204,000 each. (Art. XVIII, Sec.
17.) – Research the current salaries of the Chief Justice and all the other Associate Justices
 The salary of lower court judges is not initially fixed by the Constitution but by
the law.
 During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. (Art. VIII,
Sec. 10.)
 But it may be increased by law, to take effect at once. Reasons are: [1] the
Constitution does not prohibit it; [2] the Judiciary plays no part in the passage of
the law increasing their salary unlike the Congress and the Executive, and so
there can be no conflict of interest; and [3] this will promote the independence
of the Judiciary.
Query: Is the imposition of income tax on the salary of the Justices and Judges a
diminution of their salary as prohibited by the Constitution?
ANSWER: Under the 1935 Constitution (Art. VIII, Sec. 9), it was provided that the
members of the Judiciary "shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law,
which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office."
2
In the case of Perfecto vs. Meer , the SC ruled that salaries of judges were not
subject to income tax, for such would be a diminution of their salary, in
contravention of the Constitution. This happened after Justice Perfecto refused to
pay the assessment of income tax made upon him by the Collector.
Responding to this, Congress passed a law providing that the constitutional

provision against the diminution of salaries of members of the judiciary should not
be interpreted to mean an exemption from income tax. (Sec. 13, RA 590.)
But the Court struck this statute down as unconstitutional when as in the previous
case, Judge Endencia refused to pay his taxes; thereby giving the SC an
opportunity to make the pronouncement in the case of Endencia vs. David. The SC
3
ruling invalidating the statute was based on the reason that the legislature had no
power to interpret the Constitution, such power being lodged in the judicial branch,
and so when it did, it violated the separation of powers under the Constitution.
Compare the 1973 Constitution, Art. XV, Sec. 6
Aware of this ruling, the framers of the 1973 Constitution clearly provided in Art.
XV, Sec. 6 that:
Art., Sec. 6. No salary or any form of emolument of any public

officer or employee, including constitutional officers, shall be
exempt from the payment of income tax.
2
G.R. No. L-2348, February 27, 1950 (85 Phil 552)
3
G.R. No. L-6355-56, August 31, 1953 (93 Phil 696)
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thereby avoiding a SC contrary, self-defensive ruling.
This provision in the 1973 Constitution, however, is not found in the 1987
Constitution, prompting some judges including Nitafan, to contend that the old
ruling in Perfecto and Endencia is thereby deemed revived. But the SC this time did
not uphold the old ruling.
Not exempt from income tax
In the case of Nitafan vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (July 1987) , the Court ruled
that under the 1987 Constitution, the salaries of members of the Judiciary are not
exempt from taxes. It anchored its decision on the deliberation of the Constitutional
Commission, that is, on the legislative history of the present Art. VIII, Sec. 10.
A draft of the present Art. VIII, Sec. 10 when originally presented to the body,
expressly exempted the salary of judges from taxation. But when this draft was
discussed on second reading, the sentiment was against the exemption, the reason
being that like any other citizen, judges and justices must pay their share in the
burden of maintaining the government. So this express exemption was deleted
from Art. VIII, Sec. 10 and so it was when the draft was adopted by the body.
There was a plan to insert a similar provision as that found in Art. XV, Sec. 6 of
1973, but through oversight, the constitutional commission failed to insert one.
Yet, the intent was clear to have one, and so it must be read into the Constitution,
the SC concluded.
Nitafan vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-78780, July 23, 1987
FACTS: Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila, seek to
prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial
Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.
In a nutshell, they submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers
constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution mandating that '(d)uring their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased,'
even as it is anathema to the ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."
HELD: The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question
until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment
of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of
the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers
and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in
ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.
Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and deliberations
of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining
the government and should share the burden of general income taxation equitably.
D. SECURITY OF TENURE
Art. VIII, Sec. 11. The members of the Supreme Court and judges of
lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach
the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the
duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the
power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal
by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in
the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
Page 6 of 52
Id., Sec. 2. xxx

No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it
undermines the security of tenure of its Members.
Reorganization
 It is highly doubtful if this provision applies to the SC. The power to reorganize
involves the power to create and destroy. Since the SC is a creation of the
Constitution and not of Congress, it may not be created nor destroyed, and
ultimately reorganized by Congress.
De la llana vs. Alba, G.R. No. L-57883, March 12, 1982 (112 SCRA 294)
FACTS: Sec. 144 of BP 129 replaced the existing court system, with the exception of the SC and the SB, with
a new one and provided that upon the completion of the reorganization by the President, the courts affected
"shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office." Petitioner,
judge of the city court of Olongapo, and 7 members of the Bar questioned the validity of the Act in an action
for prohibition, on the ground that it contravened the security of tenure of judges. They sought to bolster
their claim by imputing lack of Good Faith in the enactment of the Act and by characterizing it as an undue
delegation of legislative power because of Sec. 41, which authorizes the President to fix the compensation of
those who would be appointed under it "along the guidelines set forth in LOI No. 93, pursuant to PD 985, as
amended by PD 1597."
HELD: The imputation of lack of Good Faith disregards the fact that the Act was the product of careful study
and deliberation not only by the Batasan Pambamsa but also by a Presidential study committee (composed of
the Chief Justice and Minister of Justice as co-chairmen, with members drawn from the SC and Ministry of
Justice.) The study group called attention to the clogged dockets of the courts and the possible worsening of
the situation as a result of population growth and rising expectations, and the adverse effect of this on the
developmental programs of the govt. It was this problem which the Act seeks to solve. xxx [T]he abolition
of an office is within the competence of a legislative body if done in GF. The test is whether the abolition is in
GF. As that element is present in the enactment of BP 129, the lack of merit of the petition becomes
apparent.
(2) However, while there can be no claim to security of tenure where the office no longer exists, in their
effect there is no difference bet. removal and the abolition of office. In either case, the effect on the
incumbent is one of separation. Accordingly, in the implementation of the law it would be in keeping with the
spirit of the Constitution that, as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, the SC be consulted and
that its view be accorded fullest consideration. This is not rendering advisory opinion because there is no
question of law involved. Neither is there intrusion into the appointing process because only incumbents are
involved.
(3) As to the charge of undue delegation, the provisions of Sec. 41 that the Pres. should fix the compensation
of those who will be appointed to the new courts "along the guidelines set forth in LOI No. 93, pursuant to PD
985, as amended by PD 1597" constitutes a sufficient ground.
E. REMOVAL
Art. XI, Sec. 2. The xxx Members of the Supreme Court xxx may be
removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of,
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other
public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment.
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* See procedure for impeachment under Other Powers of Congress.
 Members of the SC cannot be removed except by impeachment. Thus, a SC

justice cannot be charged in a criminal case or a disbarment proceeding, because
the ultimate effect of either is to remove him from office, and thus circumvent
the provision on impeachment.
In Re: Raul Gonzales, A.M. Nos. 88-4-5433, April 15, 1988
HELD: A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a
qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be
charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his
incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offense
which carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or any penalty service of which would amount to
removal from office.
A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of
impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme
Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally or
administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or misbehaviour that may be proven against him
in appropriate proceedings.
The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independence and separation of powers. The
rule is important because judicial independence is important. Without the protection of this rule, Members of
the Supreme Court would be vulnerable to all manner of charges which might be brought against them by
unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties who, for any number of reasons might seek to affect
the exercise of judicial authority by the Court.
F. FISCAL AUTONOMY
Art. VIII, Sec. 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.

Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the
legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year
and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.
Bengzon vs. Drilon, G.R. No. 103524, April 15, 1992 (208 SCRA 133)
HELD: As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman
contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch
that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of
compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the
government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the
course of the discharge of their functions.
FISCAL AUTONOMY means freedom from outside control. The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions,
and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their
constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent
constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal
autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the
Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our
constitutional system is based.
G. JURISDICTION
(1) The Power of Judicial Review
Art. VIII, Sec. 5. xxx

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:
Page 8 of 52
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,

international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
 The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1, par. 1.)
Scope of the Judicial Power
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to: (Art. VIII, Sec. 1, par. 2)
1. Settle actual controversies, involving rights which are legally demandable

and enforceable; and
 This is the classical definition of judicial power that contemplates a case where
the party-plaintiff has a cause of action against the party-defendant, that is, the
plaintiff has a right corresponding to the defendant's obligation, which right was
violated by the defendant, thereby resulting in injury.
2. Determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (EXPANDED JURISDICTION)
 As early as the case of Angara vs. Electoral Tribunal, the SC held that when it
performs his checking function of the co-equal branches, it is merely performing
a duty imposed upon it by the Constitution; that it acts as the mechanism that
implements the "supremacy of the Constitution." The extent to which it
exercises this function, however, has been limited by the political question
doctrine.
Angara vs. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936 (63 Phil 139)
FACTS: In 1935, the National Assembly adopted a resolution that "all members-elect, with no election protest
filed on or before 3 December 1935 are deemed elected." The Electoral Commission, a constitutional body,
on the other hand set the 9 December 1935 as the deadline for the filing of election protest.
Ynsua, who lost to Angara, filed a motion of protest (complaint) on 8 December 1935. This was entertained
by the Electoral Commission. Angara contended that the deadline set by the National Assembly was
controlling. Who prevailed?
HELD: The SC, through J. Laurel, ruled for Ynsua, thereby upholding the authority of the Electoral
Commission, in view of the constitutional provision granting the electoral Commission jurisdiction over election
protests.
In justifying the power of judicial review, J. Laurel pointed out that when the court allocated constitutional
boundaries, it neither asserts supremacy, nor annuls the acts of the legislature. It simply carries out the
solemn and sacred obligations imposed upon it by the constitution to determine conflicting claims and to
establish for the parties the rights which the constitution grants to them. This is in truth all that is involved in
what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.
Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to
sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.
Tocao vs. CA, GR No. 127405, September 20, 2001
HELD: The inherent powers of a Court to amend and control its processes and orders so as to make them
conformable to law and justice includes the right to reverse itself, especially when in its honest opinion it has
Page 9 of 52
committed an error or mistake in judgment, and that to adhere to its decision will cause injustice to a party
litigant.
a. Conditions for the Exercise of Judicial Review

4
 In the doctrinal case of People vs. Vera, J. Laurel laid down the doctrine that
judicial review can only be exercised in an actual case and controversy.
 This means (1) a party with a personal and substantial interest, (2) an
appropriate case, (3) a constitutional question raised at the earliest possible
time, and (4) a constitutional question that is the very lis mota of the case, i.e.
an unavoidable question.
 Justiciable Question - A justiciable question is one which is inherently

susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law, as where the court
finds that there are constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of the powers
conferred on a political branch of the government. 5
Belgica vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. 208566, November 19, 2013 – PDAF Case
HELD: The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or
validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with
the legal requisites for judicial inquiry,6 namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for
the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity ; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. 7 Of these requisites,
case law states that the first two are the most important8 and, therefore, shall be discussed forthwith.
IBP vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000 (338 SCRA 81)
HELD: An “ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY” means an existing case or controversy which is both ripe
for resolution and susceptible of judicial determination, and that which is not conjectural or anticipatory, or
that which seeks to resolve hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems. A petition raising a constitutional
question does not present an “actual controversy,” unless it alleges a legal right or power. Moreover, it must
show that a conflict of rights exists, for inherent in the term “controversy” is the presence of opposing views
or contentions. Otherwise, the Court will be forced to resolve issues which remain unfocused because they
lack such concreteness provided when a question emerges precisely framed from a clash of adversary
arguments exploring every aspect of a multi-faceted situation embracing conflicting and demanding interests.
The controversy must also be justiciable; that is, it must be susceptible of judicial determination . X x x
“LEGAL STANDING” or LOCUS STANDI has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged. The term “interest” means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree,
as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest . The gist of the
question of standing is whether a party alleges “such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”
HELD: Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which "involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. 9 In other words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights that
can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence." Related to the requirement of
4
G.R. No. L-45685, November 16, 1937 (66 Phil 56)
5
Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al.,
G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.
6
Joya vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 96541, August 24, 1993, 225 SCRA 568, 575.
7
Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA 78, 148.
8
Joya vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, supra note 1, at 575.
9
Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP),
G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, and 183962, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402, 450.
Page 10 of 52
an actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for
constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something
had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged
action."10 "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as
they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions."11
ABAKADA Party List vs. Purisima, GR No. 166715, August 14, 2008
HELD: An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial adjudication. A closely related requirement is ripeness, that is, the question must be ripe
for adjudication. And a constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the governmental act being
challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. Thus, to be ripe for judicial
adjudication, the petitioner must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that
can be redressed by a favorable decision of the Court.
In this case, aside from the general claim that the dispute has ripened into a judicial controversy by the mere
enactment of the law even without any further overt act, petitioners fail either to assert any specific and
concrete legal claim or to demonstrate any direct adverse effect of the law on them. They are unable to show
a personal stake in the outcome of this case or an injury to themselves. On this account, their petition is
procedurally infirm.
Araullo vs. Aquino III, GR No. 209287, July 1, 2014 – DAP case
HELD: An actual and justiciable controversy exists in these consolidated cases. The incompatibility of the
perspectives of the parties on the constitutionality of the DAP and its relevant issuances satisfy the
requirement for a conflict between legal rights. The issues being raised herein meet the requisite ripeness
considering that the challenged executive acts were already being implemented by the DBM, and there are
averments by the petitioners that such implementation was repugnant to the letter and spirit of the
Constitution. Moreover, the implementation of the DAP entailed the allocation and expenditure of huge sums
of public funds. The fact that public funds have been allocated, disbursed or utilized by reason or on account
of such challenged executive acts gave rise, therefore, to an actual controversy that is ripe for adjudication by
the Court.
Cutaran vs. DENR, G.R. No. 134958, January 31, 2001 (350 SCRA 697)
HELD: From a reading of the records it appears to us that the petition was prematurely filed. Under the
undisputed facts there is as yet no justiciable controversy for the court to resolve and the petition should have
been dismissed by the appellate court on this ground.
We gather from the allegations of the petition and that of the petitioner’s memorandum that the alleged
application for certificate of ancestral land claim (CALC) filed by the heirs of Carantes under the assailed DENR
special orders has not been granted nor the CALC applied for, issued. The DENR is still processing the
application of the heirs of Carantes for a certificate of ancestral land claim, which the DENR may or may not
grant. It is evident that the adverse legal interests involved in this case are the competing claims of the
petitioners and that of the heirs of Carantes to possess a common portion of a piece of land. As the
undisputed facts stand there is no justiciable controversy between the petitioners and the respondents as
there is no actual or imminent violation of the petitioners’ asserted right to possess the land by reason of the
implementation of the questioned administrative issuance.
A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY has been defined as, “a definite and concrete dispute touching on the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests” which may be resolved by a court of law through the
application of a law. Courts have no judicial power to review cases involving political questions and as a rule,
will desist from taking cognizance of speculative or hypothetical cases, advisory opinions and in cases that has
become moot. Subject to certain well-defined exceptions courts will not touch an issue involving the validity
of a law unless there has been a governmental act accomplished or performed that has a direct adverse effect
on the legal right of the person contesting its validity. In the case of PACU v. Secretary of Education the
petition contesting the validity of a regulation issued by the Secretary of Education requiring private schools to
10
Francisco, Jr. v. Toll Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 166910, 169917, 173630, and 183599, October 19, 2010, 633 SCRA
470, 493, citing Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral
Domain (GRP), G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, and 183962, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402, 405.
11
Id. at 492, citing Muskrat v. U.S., 219 U.S. 346 (1913).
Page 11 of 52
secure a permit to operate was dismissed on the ground that all the petitioners have permits and are actually
operating under the same. The petitioners questioned the regulation because of the possibility that the permit
might be denied them in the future. This Court held that there was no justiciable controversy because the
petitioners suffered no wrong by the implementation of the questioned regulation and therefore, they are not
entitled to relief. A mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education will withdraw the permit does not
amount to justiciable controversy. The questioned regulation in the PACU case may be questioned by a
private school whose permit to operate has been revoked or one whose application therefore has been
denied.
This Court cannot rule on the basis of petitioners’ speculation that the DENR will approve the application of
the heirs of Carantes. There must be an actual governmental act which directly causes or will imminently
cause injury to the alleged legal right of the petitioner to possess the land before the jurisdiction of this Court
may be invoked. There is no showing that the petitioners were being evicted from the land by the heirs of
Carantes under orders from the DENR. The petitioners’ allegation that certain documents from the DENR
were shown to them by the heirs of Carantes to justify eviction is vague, and it would appear that the
petitioners did not verify if indeed the respondent DENR or its officers authorized the attempted eviction.
Suffice it to say that by the petitioners’ own admission that the respondents are still processing and have not
approved the application of the heirs of Carantes, the petitioners alleged right to possess the land is not
violated nor is in imminent danger of being violated, as the DENR may or may not approve Carantes’
application. Until such time, the petitioners are simply speculating that they might be evicted from the
premises at some future time. Borrowing from the pronouncements of this Court in the PACU case, “They
(the petitioners) have suffered no wrong under the terms of the law – and, naturally need no relief in the form
they now seek to obtain.” If indeed the heirs of Carantes are trying to enter the land and disturbing the
petitioners’ possession thereof even without prior approval by the DENR of the claim of the heirs of Carantes,
the case is simply one of forcible entry.
Cruz vs. Sec. of DENR, G.R. No. 135385, 347 SCRA 128 (2000)
FACTS: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens
and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known
as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. A
preliminary issue resolved by the SC was whether the petition presents an actual controversy.
HELD: Courts can only decide actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases. The threshold issue,
therefore, is whether an “appropriate case” exists for the exercise of judicial review in the present case.
In the case at bar, there exists a live controversy involving a clash of legal rights. A law has been enacted,
and the Implementing Rules and Regulations approved. Money has been appropriated and the government
agencies concerned have been directed to implement the statute. It cannot be successfully maintained that
we should await the adverse consequences of the law in order to consider the controversy actual and ripe for
judicial resolution. It is precisely the contention of the petitioners that the law, on its face, constitutes an
unconstitutional abdication of State ownership over lands of the public domain and other natural resources.
Moreover, when the State machinery is set into motion to implement an alleged unconstitutional statute, this
Court possesses sufficient authority to resolve and prevent imminent injury and violation of the constitutional
process.
In addition to the existence of an actual case or controversy, a person who assails the validity of a statute
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that, he has sustained, or will sustain, a direct
injury as a result of its enforcement. Evidently, the rights asserted by petitioners as citizens and taxpayers are
held in common by all the citizens, the violation of which may result only in a “generalized grievance”. Yet, in
a sense, all citizen's and taxpayer's suits are efforts to air generalized grievances about the conduct of
government and the allocation of power.
David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006
HELD: An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of
judicial resolution. It is “definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interest;” a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief. The Solicitor General refutes the
existence of such actual case or controversy, contending that the present petitions were rendered “ moot and
academic” by President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021.
Such contention lacks merit.

Page 12 of 52
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline
jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
The Court holds that President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and
academic. During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners,
committed illegal acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify
these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital issues that must be resolved in the present petitions. It must
be stressed that “an unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no
protection; it is in legal contemplation, inoperative.”
The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in
resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation
of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over the instant
petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is no
question that the issues being raised affect the public’s interest, involving as they do the people’s basic rights
to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate
guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating
the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection
given by constitutional guarantees. And lastly, respondents’ contested actions are capable of repetition.
Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review.
In their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case, respondents cited Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban’s Separate Opinion in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary. However, they failed to take into account
the Chief Justice’s very statement that an otherwise “moot” case may still be decided “ provided the party
raising it in a proper case has been and/or continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its
issuance.” The present case falls right within this exception to the mootness rule pointed out by the Chief
Justice.
HELD: Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that "the moot and
academic‘ principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case."
The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second,
the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. 12
The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners – they essentially
allege grave violations of the Constitution with respect to, inter alia, the principles of separation of powers,
non-delegability of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability and local autonomy.
The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved – the
constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have been and continue
to be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of
paramount public interest. X x x x
The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the practical need for a definitive ruling
on the system‘s constitutionality. As disclosed during the Oral Arguments, the CoA Chairperson estimates that
thousands of notices of disallowances will be issued by her office in connection with the findings made in the
CoA Report. In this relation, Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) pointed out that
all of these would eventually find their way to the courts. Accordingly, there is a compelling need to formulate
controlling principles relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and the public,
not just for the expeditious resolution of the anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the
government may be guided on how public funds should be utilized in accordance with constitutional principles.
Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the recognition that the preparation and
passage of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence . The relevance
12
Mattel, Inc. v. Francisco, G.R. No. 166886, July 30, 2008, 560 SCRA 504, 514, citing Constantino v. Sandiganbayan
(First Division), G.R. Nos. 140656 and 154482, September 13, 2007, 533 SCRA 205, 219-220.
Page 13 of 52
of the issues before the Court does not cease with the passage of a "PDAF -free budget for 2014." The
evolution of the "Pork Barrel System," by its multifarious iterations throughout the course of history, lends a
semblance of truth to petitioners‘ claim that "the same dog will just resurface wearing a different collar." In
Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,13 the government had already backtracked on a previous course of action yet
the Court used the "capable of repetition but evading review" exception in order "to prevent similar questions
from re-emerging." The situation similarly holds true to these cases. Indeed, the myriad of issues underlying
the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of
repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review.
Araullo vs. Aquino III, GR No. 209287, July 1, 2014 – DAP case
HELD: A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. 14
The Court cannot agree that the termination of the DAP as a program was a supervening event that
effectively mooted these consolidated cases. Verily, the Court had in the past exercised its power of judicial
review despite the cases being rendered moot and academic by supervening events, like: (1) when there was
a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) when the case involved a situation of exceptional character and was
of paramount public interest; (3) when the constitutional issue raised required the formulation of controlling
principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) when the case was capable of repetition yet
evading review.15
Assuming that the petitioners’ several submissions against the DAP were ultimately sustained by the Court
here, these cases would definitely come under all the exceptions. Hence, the Court should not abstain from
exercising its power of judicial review.
Gonzales vs. Narvasa, G.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000 (337 SCRA 733)
HELD: It is alleged by respondent that, with respect to the PCCR [Preparatory Commission on Constitutional
Reform], this case has become moot and academic. We agree.
An action is considered “moot” when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues
involved have become academic or dead. Under E.O. No. 43, the PCCR was instructed to complete its task on
or before June 30, 1999. However, on February 19, 1999, the President issued Executive Order No. 70 (E.O.
No. 70), which extended the time frame for the completion of the commission’s work x x x. The PCCR
submitted its recommendations to the President on December 20, 1999 and was dissolved by the President on
the same day. It had likewise spent the funds allocated to it. Thus, the PCCR has ceased to exist, having lost
its raison d’ être. Subsequent events have overtaken the petition and the Court has nothing left to resolve.
The staleness of the issue before us is made more manifest by the impossibility of granting the relief prayed
for by petitioner. Basically, petitioner asks this Court to enjoin the PCCR from acting as such. Clearly,
prohibition is an inappropriate remedy since the body sought to be enjoined no longer exists. It is well-
established that prohibition is a preventive remedy and does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait
accompli. At this point, any ruling regarding the PCCR would simply be in the nature of an advisory opinion,
which is definitely beyond the permissible scope of judicial power.
ABS-CBN vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133486, January 28, 2000 (323 SCRA 811)
FACTS: In connection with the May 11, 1998 elections, the COMELEC issued a resolution prohibiting the
conduct of exit polls on the ground, among others, that it might cause disorder and confusion considering the
randomness of selecting interviewees, which further makes the exit polls unreliable. The constitutionality of
this resolution was challenged by ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation as violative of freedom of expression.
The Solicitor General contends that the petition has been rendered moot and academic because the May 11,
1998 election has already been held and done with and, therefore, there is no longer any actual controversy
to be resolved. Resolve.
HELD: The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to the May 11, 1998
election, its implications on the people's fundamental freedom of expression transcend the past election. The
holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our democratic government. By its very nature, exit polling is
13
G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 656.
14
Funa v. Ermita, G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 308, 319.
15
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424, May 3, 2006,
489 SCRA 160, 214-215.
Page 14 of 52
tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only postpone a task that could well
crop up again in future elections.
In any event, in Salonga v. Cruz Pano, the Court had occasion to reiterate that it “also has the duty to
formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the SYMBOLIC
FUNCTION of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.” Since
the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being invoked here, we have resolved to settle, for
the guidance of posterity, whether they likewise protect the holding of exit polls and the dissemination of data
derived therefrom.
University of San Agustin vs. CA, G.R. No. 100588, March 7, 1994 (230 SCRA 761)
HELD: The petition which was filed by private respondents before the trial court sought the issuance of a writ
of mandamus, to command petitioners to admit them for enrolment. Taking into account the admission of
private respondents that they have finished their Nursing course at the Lanting College of Nursing even before
the promulgation of the questioned decision, this case has clearly been overtaken by events and should
therefore be dismissed. However, the case of Eastern Broadcasting Corporation (DYRE) v. Dans is the
authority for the view that “even if a case were moot and academic, a statement of the governing principle is
appropriate in the resolution of dismissal for the guidance not only of the parties but of others similarly
situated.” We shall adhere to this view and proceed to dwell on the merits of this petition.
City of Pasig vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 125646, September 10, 1999 (314 SCRA 179)
HELD: Neither do we agree that merely because a plebiscite had already been held in the case of the
proposed Barangay Napico, the petition of the Municipality of Cainta has already been rendered moot and
academic. The issue raised by the Municipality of Cainta in its petition before the COMELEC against the
holding of the plebiscite for the creation of Barangay Napico are still pending determination before the
Antipolo Regional Trial Court.
In Tan v. Commission on Elections, we struck down the moot and academic argument as follows –
“Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non-compliance with
constitutional requisites, the fact that such plebiscite had been held and a new province
proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case before Us cannot truly be viewed as already
moot and academic. Continuation of the existence of this newly proclaimed province which
petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born, deserves to be inquired into by this
Tribunal so that, if indeed, illegality attaches to its creation, the commission of that error
should not provide the very excuse for perpetration of such wrong. For this Court to yield to
the respondents’ urging that, as there has been fait accompli, then this Court should passively
accept and accede to the prevailing situation is an unacceptable suggestion. Dismissal of the
instant petition, as respondents so propose is a proposition fraught with mischief.
Respondents’ submission will create a dangerous precedent. Should this Court decline now to
perform its duty of interpreting and indicating what the law is and should be, this might tempt
again those who strut about in the corridors of power to recklessly and with ulterior motives,
create, merge, divide and/or alter the boundaries of political subdivisions, either brazenly or
stealthily, confident that this Court will abstain from entertaining future challenges to their
acts if they manage to bring about a fait accompli.”
Matibag vs. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002 (380 SCRA 49)
FACTS: Respondents assert that the petition fails to satisfy all the four requisites before this Court may
exercise its power of judicial review in constitutional cases. Out of respect for the acts of the Executive
department, which is co-equal with this Court, respondents urge this Court to refrain from reviewing the
constitutionality of the ad interim appointments issued by the President to Benipayo, Borra and Tuason unless
all the four requisites are present. X x x
Respondents argue that the second, third and fourth requisites are absent in this case. Respondents maintain
that petitioner does not have a personal and substantial interest in the case because she has not sustained a
direct injury as a result of the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason and their assumption of
office. Respondents point out that petitioner does not claim to be lawfully entitled to any of the positions
assumed by Benipayo, Borra or Tuason. Neither does petitioner claim to be directly injured by the
appointments of these three respondents.
Page 15 of 52
Respondents also contend that petitioner failed to question the constitutionality of the ad interim
appointments at the earliest opportunity. Petitioner filed the petition only on August 3, 2001 despite the fact
that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were issued as early as March 22, 2001.
Moreover, the petition was filed after the third time that these three respondents were issued ad interim
appointments.
Respondents insist that the real issue in this case is the legality of petitioner’s reassignment from the EID to
the Law Department. Consequently, the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments is not the lis mota of
this case.
HELD: We are not persuaded.
Benipayo reassigned petitioner from the EID, where she was Acting Director, to the Law Department, where
she was placed on detail. Respondents claim that the reassignment was “pursuant to x x x Benipayo’s
authority as Chairman of the Commission on Elections, and as the Commission’s Chief Executive Officer.”
Evidently, respondents’ anchor the legality of petitioner’s reassignment on Benipayo’s authority as Chairman of
the COMELEC. The real issue then turns on whether or not Benipayo is the lawful Chairman of the COMELEC.
Even if petitioner is only an Acting director of the EID, her reassignment is without legal basis if Benipayo is
not the lawful COMELEC Chairman, an office created by the Constitution.
On the other hand, if Benipayo is the lawful COMELEC Chairman because he assumed office in accordance
with the Constitution, then petitioner’s reassignment is legal and she has no cause to complain provided the
reassignment is in accordance with the Civil Service Law. Clearly, petitioner has a personal and material stake
in the resolution of the constitutionality of Benipayo’s assumption of office. Petitioner’s personal and
substantial injury, if Benipayo is not the lawful COMELEC Chairman, clothes her with the requisite locus standi
to raise the constitutional issue in this petition.
Respondents harp on petitioner’s belated act of questioning the constitutionality of the ad interim
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason. Petitioner filed the instant petition only on August 3, 2001,
when the first ad interim appointments were issued as early as March 22, 2001. However, it is not the date of
filing of the petition that determines whether the constitutional issue was raised at the earliest opportunity.
The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a competent court
that can resolve the same, such that, “if it is not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered on appeal.”
Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason
when she filed her petition before this Court, which is the earliest opportunity for pleading the constitutional
issue before a competent body. Furthermore, this Court may determine, in the exercise of sound discretion,
the time when a constitutional issue may be passed upon. There is no doubt petitioner raised the
constitutional issue on time.
Moreover, the legality of petitioner’s reassignment hinges on the constitutionality of Benipayo’s ad interim
appointment and assumption of office. Unless the constitutionality of Benipayo’s ad interim appointment and
assumption of office is resolved, the legality of petitioner’s reassignment from the EID to the Law Department
cannot be determined. Clearly, the lis mota of this case is the very constitutional issue raised by petitioner.
In any event, the issue raised by petitioner is of paramount importance to the public. The legality of the
directives and decisions made by the COMELEC in the conduct of the May 14, 2001 national elections may be
put in doubt if the constitutional issue raised by petitioner is left unresolved. In keeping with this Court’s duty
to determine whether other agencies of government have remained within the limits of the Constitution and
have not abused the discretion given them, this Court may even brush aside technicalities of procedure and
resolve any constitutional issue raised. Here the petitioner has complied with all the requisite technicalities.
Moreover, public interest requires the resolution of the constitutional issue raised by petitioner.
 GENERAL RULE: A request for advisory opinion cannot come in the category of
an actual case or controversy since the issue raised does not involve any conflict
in law that has assumed the proportions of a full-blown dispute. The court in this
case is being asked only to counsel and not to decide.
EXCEPTION: When the purpose is to solicit from the court a declaratory

judgment involving the interpretation of the rights and duties of a person under
the provisions of a deed, will, contract, or other written instrument, or a statute
or ordinance, the case is deemed an actual controversy over which the courts
may validly assume jurisdiction.
Page 16 of 52
LEGAL STANDING
 Legal standing, as a requisite for the exercise of judicial review, refers to "a right of appearance in a
court of justice on a given question."16
 Locus standi is defined as “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In

private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule as contained in Section 2, Rule
3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted
or defended in the name of the real party in interest.” Accordingly, the “real-party-in interest” is “the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.” Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right
to the relief sought.17
 "Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act
that is being challenged. The term "interest" means a material interest, an interest in issue affected
by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.18
De Castro vs. Judicial Bar Council, GR No. 191002, March 17, 2010
HELD: Black defines locus standi as “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” 19 In
public or constitutional litigations, the Court is often burdened with the determination of the locus standi of
the petitioners due to the ever-present need to regulate the invocation of the intervention of the Court to
correct any official action or policy in order to avoid obstructing the efficient functioning of public officials and
offices involved in public service. It is required, therefore, that the petitioner must have a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy, for, as indicated in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co.,
Inc.:20
The question on legal standing is whether such parties have “alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” 21
Accordingly, it has been held that the interest of a person assailing the
constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to
show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he
sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of
its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It
must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some
right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected
to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.22
HELD: "The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in
any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing." 23
Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly,
assert that they "dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury." Clearly, as taxpayers, they
possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing "Pork Barrel System" under which the
taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are
16
Black’s Law Dictionary, 941 (6th Ed. 1991).
17
18
I.B.P. vs. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000)
19
Black’s Law Dictionary, 941 (6th Ed. 1991).
20
G.R. No. 155001, May 5, 2003, 402 SCRA 612.
21
Citing Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, G.R. No. 118910, July 17, 1995, 246 SCRA 540, 562-563, citing Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 7 L. Ed. 633 (1962).
22
Citing Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, supra; Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000; 342 SCRA 449, 478.
23
La Bugal- B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Sec. Ramos, 465 Phil. 860, 890 (2004).
Page 17 of 52
bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers
have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money
is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law,24 as in these cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues they
have raised may be classified as matters "of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest."25
HELD: In view of the number of petitioners suing in various personalities, the Court deems it imperative to
have a more than passing discussion on legal standing or locus standi.
Locus standi is defined as “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits,
standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interest.” Accordingly, the “real-party-in interest” is “the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”
Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public
right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may
be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a “stranger,” or in the
category of a “citizen”, or “taxpayer.” In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek
judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public
order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.”
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both citizen and taxpayer standing in public actions. The distinction
was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer’s suit is in a
different category from the plaintiff in a citizen’s suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the
expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held
by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: “In matter of mere public right, however, the
people are the real parties. It is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a
public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied.” With respect to
taxpayer’s suits, Terr v. Jordan held that “the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts
to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied.”
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act with
which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service,
the United State Supreme Court laid down the more stringent “direct injury test” in Ex Parte Levitt, later
reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power
to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a
direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest
common to all members of the public.
This Court adopted the “direct injury test” in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person
who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The Vera doctrine was upheld in a
litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers’ Association v. De la
Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix.
However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court in
the exercise of its discretion. This was done in the 1949 Emergency Powers Cases, Araneta v. Dinglasan,
where the “transcendental importance” of the cases prompted the Court to act liberally. Such liberality
was neither a rarity nor accidental. In Aquino v. Comelec, this Court resolved to pass upon the issues raised
due to the “far-reaching implications” of the petition notwithstanding its categorical statement that
petitioner therein had no personality to file the suit. Indeed, there is a chain of cases where this liberal policy
has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute
actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.
24
Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Honorable Vicente Q. Roxas, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 227, G.R. No. 125509, January 31, 2007, 513 SCRA 457, 470.
25
Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA 410, 421.
Page 18 of 52
Thus, the Court has adopted a rule that even where the petitioners have failed to show direct injury, they
have been allowed to sue under the principle of “transcendental importance.” Pertinent are the following
cases:
(1) Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, where the Court ruled that the enforcement of the constitutional right
to information and the equitable diffusion of natural resources are matters of transcendental importance
which clothe the petitioner with locus standi;
(2) Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora, wherein the Court held that “given the transcendental
importance of the issues involved, the Court may relax the standing requirements and allow the suit to
prosper despite the lack of direct injury to the parties seeking judicial review” of the Visiting Forces
Agreement;
(3) Lim v. Executive Secretary, while the Court noted that the petitioners may not file suit in their capacity as
taxpayers absent a showing that “Balikatan 02-01” involves the exercise of Congress’ taxing or spending
powers, it reiterated its ruling in Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora, that in cases of
transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely and standing requirements
may be relaxed.
By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers,
voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the
following requirements are met:
(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the
tax measure is unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law
in question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes
upon their prerogatives as legislators.
Significantly, recent decisions show a certain toughening in the Court’s attitude toward legal standing.
In Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, the Court ruled that the status of Kilosbayan as a people’s organization does not
give it the requisite personality to question the validity of the on-line lottery contract, more so where it does
not raise any issue of constitutionality. Moreover, it cannot sue as a taxpayer absent any allegation that public
funds are being misused. Nor can it sue as a concerned citizen as it does not allege any specific injury it has
suffered.
In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Comelec , the Court reiterated the
“direct injury test” with respect to concerned citizens cases involving constitutional issues. It held that “there
must be a showing that the citizen personally suffered some actual or threatened injury arising from the
alleged illegal official act.”
In Lacson v. Perez, the Court ruled that one of the petitioners, Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), is not
a real party-in-interest as it had not demonstrated any injury to itself or to its leaders, members or supporters.
In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, the Court ruled that only the petitioners who are members of Congress
have standing to sue, as they claim that the President’s declaration of a state of rebellion is a usurpation of
the emergency powers of Congress, thus impairing their legislative powers. As to petitioners Sanlakas, Partido
Manggagawa, and Social Justice Society, the Court declared them to be devoid of standing, equating them
with the LDP in Lacson.
Now, the application of the above principles to the present petitions.
The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and Llamas, is beyond doubt. The
same holds true with petitioners in G.R. No. 171409, Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They
alleged “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives
pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the Solicitor General does not question their legal standing.
Page 19 of 52
In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition Congressmen alleged there was usurpation of legislative powers. They
also raised the issue of whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming
powers incident to Martial Law are used. Moreover, it is in the interest of justice that those affected by PP
1017 can be represented by their Congressmen in bringing to the attention of the Court the alleged violations
of their basic rights.
In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI), this Court applied the liberality rule in Philconsa v. Enriquez, Kapatiran Ng Mga
Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc.
v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, and Tanada v.
Tuvera, that when the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an
interest in the execution of the laws.
In G.R. No. 171483, KMU’s assertion that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violated its right to peaceful assembly
may be deemed sufficient to give it legal standing. Organizations may be granted standing to assert the
rights of their members. We take judicial notice of the announcement by the Office of the President banning
all rallies and canceling all permits for public assemblies following the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz et al., who are national officers of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) have no legal standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP as
an institution or its members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5. In
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, the Court held that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to
preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing
in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry.
However, in view of the transcendental importance of the issue, this Court declares that petitioner have locus
standi.
In G.R. No. 171424, Loren Legarda has no personality as a taxpayer to file the instant petition as there are
no allegations of illegal disbursement of public funds. The fact that she is a former Senator is of no
consequence. She can no longer sue as a legislator on the allegation that her prerogatives as a lawmaker
have been impaired by PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Her claim that she is a media personality will not likewise aid
her because there was no showing that the enforcement of these issuances prevented her from pursuing her
occupation. Her submission that she has pending electoral protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is
likewise of no relevance. She has not sufficiently shown that PP 1017 will affect the proceedings or result of
her case. But considering once more the transcendental importance of the issue involved, this Court may relax
the standing rules.
It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but corollary to the bigger question of
proper exercise of judicial power. This is the underlying legal tenet of the “liberality doctrine” on legal
standing. It cannot be doubted that the validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is a judicial question which is
of paramount importance to the Filipino people. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine society
now waits with bated breath the ruling of this Court on this very critical matter. The petitions thus call for the
application of the “transcendental importance doctrine”, a relaxation of the standing requirements for the
petitioners in the PP 1017 cases.
This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi.
I.B.P. vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000 (338 SCRA 81)
FACTS: Asserting itself as the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to uphold
the rule of law and the Constitution, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) filed a petition before the SC
questioning the validity of the order of the President commanding the deployment and utilization of the
Philippine Marines to assist the Philippine National Police (PNP) in law enforcement by joining the latter in
visibility patrols around the metropolis. The Solicitor General questioned the legal standing of the IBP to file
the petition? Resolve.
HELD: "Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The term "interest" means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The gist of the
question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Page 20 of 52
In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law
and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its
locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while
undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which
is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards above-stated, the IBP has failed to
present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. Its fundamental purpose which, under
Section 2, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, is to elevate the standards of the law profession and to improve
the administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be affected by the deployment of the Marines. It should
also be noted that the interest of the National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone,
absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present action. To be sure, members of the BAR,
those in the judiciary included, have varying opinions on the issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has
duly authorized the National President to file the petition, has not shown any specific injury which it has
suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned governmental act. Indeed, none of its members, whom the
IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility
patrols. Neither is it alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that their civil liberties have been
violated by the deployment of the Marines. What the IBP projects as injurious is the supposed "militarization"
of law enforcement which might threaten Philippine democratic institutions and may cause more harm than
good in the long run. Not only is the presumed "injury" not personal in character, it is likewise too vague,
highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing. Since petitioner has not successfully
established a direct and personal injury as a consequence of the questioned act, it does not possess the
personality to assail the validity of the deployment of the Marines. This Court, however, does not categorically
rule that the IBP has absolutely no standing to raise constitutional issues now or in the future. The IBP must,
by way of allegations and proof, satisfy this Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain judicial resolution of the
controversy.
Liberal attitude on locus standi:
Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a
suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved. In not a
few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is
able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. Thus, when the issues raised are of
paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. In this case, a
reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of
this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace and order
are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the
Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away. It
will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve
the issue now, rather than later.
b. ALL COURTS CAN EXERCISE JUDICIAL REVIEW
 The review power of the SC implies that it has appellate jurisdiction over final
judgments of lower courts on cases with constitutional issues. If so, inferior
courts have original jurisdiction over constitutional cases although they decide
the case only at first instance, their decision being always reviewable by the SC.
Thus, for instance an RTC can rule on the constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion
Law.
 In the case of J.M. Tuason & Co. vs. CA,26 RA No. 2616, which provided for the
expropriation of the Tatalon Estate, was claimed to be unconstitutional. This
issue said the SC, could be resolved by the CFI in the ejectment case filed before
it by the evictees of the estate, since the 1935 Constitution contemplated that
inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality issues,
that it spoke of appellate review of "final judgment of inferior courts" in cases
where such constitutionality happens to be in issue. The 2/3 vote of the SC re-
quired by Sec. 10 of Art. VII restricted the decisions of that Court only in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
Said the court: The Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should
have jurisdiction in cases involving the constitutionality of any treaty or law, for
26
G.R. No. L-18128, December 26, 1961 (3 SCRA 696)
Page 21 of 52
it speaks of appellate review of the final judgment of inferior courts, in cases

where such constitutionality happens to be in issue. The 2/3 vote of the SC,
required by Sec. 10, Art. VIII, of the 1935 Constitution, conditions only decisions
of that court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
Drilon vs. Lim, G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994 (235 SCRA 135)
HELD: We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Section
187, this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the
valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. Specifically, BP 129 vests in
the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation, even as the accused in a criminal action has the right to question in his defense the
constitutionality of a law he is charged with violating and of the proceedings taken against him, particularly as
they contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover, Article VIII, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in
mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the
doctrine of separation of powers. As the questioned act is usually the handiwork of the legislative or the
executive departments, or both, it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer
to the higher judgment of this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a
thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority of those who participated
in its discussion.
In the case of Ynot vs. IAC,27 the SC reversed the RTC's holding that it had no authority to
rule on the validity of EO 626-A, banning the transporting of carabaos from one
province to another. The Court pointed out, that since it has jurisdiction to review,
revise, reverse, modify or affirm final judgments of lower courts in constitutional cases,
then the lower courts can pass upon the validity of a statute in the first instance.
The SC then struck down the law for being arbitrary and for unduly delegating
legislative power.
Ynot vs. IAC, G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987 (148 SCRA 659)
FACTS: Petitioners' 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police for having been transported from Masbate to
Iloilo in violation of EO 626-A. He brought an action for replevin, challenging the consitutionality of the EO.
The trial court sustained the confiscation of the animals and declined to rule on the validity of the law on the
ground that it lacked authority to do so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC. Hence this petition for review.
HELD: (1) Under the provision granting the SC jurisdiction to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on
appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide final judgments of lower courts" in all cases
involving the constitutionality of certain measures, lower courts can pass upon the validity of a statute in the
first instance.
(2) There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals (except where there at least 7 yrs. old if
male and 11 yrs old if female upon the issuance of the necessary permit) the EO will be conserving those still
fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion. We do not see, however, how the
prohibition of the interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering
that they can be killed any where, with no less difficulty in on province than in another. Obviously, retaining
the carabao in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another
province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as
otherwise, so says the EO, it could be easily circumsbcribed by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so.
However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be
prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant, dead
meat.
(3) In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were
returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond which
27
148 SCRA 659
Page 22 of 52
was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The EO
defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out
forthright. The measures struck him at once and pounced upon the petitioner wiyhout giving him a chance to
be heard, thus denying him elementary fair play.
(2) Judicial Review and Political Questions.
Art. VIII, Sec. 1. Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme

Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle

actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
 The second aspect of the definition of judicial power modifies the political
question doctrine. As enunciated in the case of Tanada vs. Cuenco,28 a political
question is one to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or one in
respect to which full discretionary capacity is given to the other branches of the
government.
 It does not mean, however, that the political question doctrine has been
completely abrogated by the Constitution, such that if those cases where the SC
invoked the doctrine were decided now it would have to decide the case on its
merits. It is submitted that what the Constitution overrules is only the ruling in
the case of Garcia Padilla vs. Ponce-Enrile, where the SC held that the question
29
on the validity of the proclamation of martial law is beyond judicial review, so

that when the President says that there is a need for such proclamation, his
words are binding on the Courts, and all that the citizen can do is trust in the
good faith of the President.
 Indeed, as already noted in the Commander-in-Chief power of the President

above, Art. VII, Sec. 18 authorizes the SC to review, in an appropriate
proceeding (like a habeas corpus petition), filed by a citizen (who, under the
Rules of Court, could be the detainee himself, or anyone else in his behalf), the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension.
 Beyond this, the political question doctrine is not a dead issue. In fact, the
Supreme Court continues to invoke it as in Lawyers' League for a Better Philippines
vs. Aquino30, In re Bermudez31 and Marcos v. Manglapus.32
Garcia vs. BOI, G.R. No. 92024, November 9, 1990 (191 SCRA 288)
HELD: In this case, the court ruled that it has a constitutional duty to step into the controversy and determine
the paramount issue. Said the court, "[t]here is before us an actual controversy whether the petrochemical
plant should remain in Bataan or should be transferred to Batangas, and whether its feedstock originally of
naphtha only should be changed to naphtha and/ or liquified petroleum gas as the approved amended
application of the BPC, now Luzon Petrochemical Corp. (LPC), shows. And in the light of the categorical
admission of the BOI that it is the investor who has the final choice of the site and the decision on the
feedstock, whether or not it constitutes a grave abuse of discretion for the BOI to yield to the wishes of the
investor, national interest notwithstanding.
28
G.R. No. L-10520, February 28, 1957
29
G.R. No. L-61388, April 20, 1983
30
May 22, 1986 in G.R. No. 73748
31
G.R. No. 76180, October 24, 1986
32
G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989
Page 23 of 52
The Supreme Court held that the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in approving the transfer of the
petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and authorizing the change of feedstock from naphtha only to
naphtha and/or LPG for the main reason that the final say is in the investor all other circumstances to the
contrary notwithstanding. No cogent advantage to the government has been shown by this transfer. This is a
repudiation of the independent policy of the government expressed in numerous laws and the Constitution to
run its own affairs and the way it deems best for the national interest.
Dissenting : The decision of the BOI may be extremely unwise and inadvisable, but the SC may not, for that
reason annul the BOI's action or prohibit it from acting on the manner that lies within its particular sphere of
competence, for the Court is not a judge of the wisdom and soundness of the actions of the two other co-
equal branches of the Government, but only of their legality and constitutionality.
I.B.P. vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000 (338 SCRA 81)
HELD: As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it refers to a matter which is appropriate for
court review. It pertains to issues which are inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by
law. Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional cases
brought before it even in instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court hesitates
to rule on are “political questions.” The reason is that political questions are concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act or measure being assailed. Moreover, the political
question being a function of the separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with the workings
of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and
the Constitution.
As Tanada v. Angara puts it, POLITICAL QUESTIONS refer “to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government.” Thus, if an
issue is clearly identified by the text of the Constitution as matters for discretionary action by a particular
branch of government or to the people themselves then it is held to be a political question. In the classic
formulation of Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr, “[p]rominent on the surface of any case held to involve a
political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or
the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on the one question.”
The 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial review by providing that “[T]he Judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” (Article VIII,
Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution) Under this definition, the Court cannot agree x x x that the issue involved is a
political question beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to review. When the grant of power is qualified,
conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been
met or the limitations respected, is justiciable - the problem being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom.
Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court . When political
questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination as to whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being
questioned.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility. Under this definition, a court is without power to directly decide matters over
which full discretionary authority has been delegated . But while this Court has no power to substitute its
judgment for that of Congress or of the President, it may look into the question of whether such exercise has
been made in grave abuse of discretion. A showing that plenary power is granted either department of
government may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or abuse thereof may give
rise to justiciable controversy.
ISSUE: Is the President’s power to call out the armed forces as their Commander-in-Chief in order to prevent
or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion subject to judicial review, or is it a political question?
Page 24 of 52
HELD: When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the
intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to
overrule the President's wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an examination of
whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a
manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full
discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the President's decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to
discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification
for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse
was committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional
provision on civilian supremacy over the military. In the performance of this Court's duty of “purposeful
hesitation” before declaring an act of another branch as unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of
discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the President's judgment. To doubt is to sustain
Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001
ISSUE: Is the legitimacy of the assumption to the Presidency of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo a political
question and, therefore, not subject to judicial review? Distinguish EDSA People Power I from EDSA People
Power II.
HELD: Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano v.
President Corazon C. Aquino, and related cases to support their thesis that since the cases at bar involve the
legitimacy of the government of respondent Arroyo, ergo, they present a political question. A more cerebral
reading of the cited cases will show that they are inapplicable. In the cited cases, we held that the
government of former President Aquino was the result of a successful revolution by the sovereign people,
albeit a peaceful one. No less than the Freedom Constitution declared that the Aquino government was
installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people “in defiance of the provisions of the 1973
Constitution, as amended.” It is familiar learning that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful
revolution by people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the
constitutional loop. In checkered contrast, the government of respondent Arroyo is not revolutionary in
character. The oath that she took at the EDSA Shrine is the oath under the 1987 Constitution. In her oath,
she categorically swore to preserve and defend the 1987 Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is
discharging the powers of the presidency under the authority of the 1987 Constitution.
In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II is clear . EDSA I
involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrows the whole government. EDSA II is
an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for
redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the
legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II
is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice
President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political question; EDSA II involves
legal questions. X x x
Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution
require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably Section 1 of Article II,
and Section 8 of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under Section 11 of Article VII. The
issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct
calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v.
Madison, the doctrine has been laid down that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is x x x.” Thus, respondent’s invocation of the doctrine of political question is
but a foray in the dark.
HELD: The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies‖ carries the assurance
that "the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government." 33 Essentially, the
foregoing limitation is a restatement of the political question doctrine which, under the classic formulation of
Baker v. Carr,34 applies when there is found, among others, "a textually demonstrable constitutional
33
Francisco, Jr. v. Toll Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 166910, 169917, 173630, and 183599, October 19, 2010, 633 SCRA
470, 493, citing Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral
Domain (GRP), G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, and 183962, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402, 405.
34
369 US 186 82, S. Ct. 691, L. Ed. 2d. 663 [1962].
Page 25 of 52
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department," "a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it" or "the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for non- judicial discretion." Cast against this light, respondents submit that the "the political
branches are in the best position not only to perform budget-related reforms but also to do them in response
to the specific demands of their constituents" and, as such, "urge the Court not to impose a solution at this
stage."
The Court must deny respondents‘ submission.
Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions which are
within its province to resolve. A political question refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are
to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure." 35 The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork
Barrel System" is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather
a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of
the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are incapable of
rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the present Constitution has
not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed
therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cannot be any clearer: "The judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. It includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." In Estrada v.
Desierto,36 the expanded concept of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution and its effect on the political
question doctrine was explained as follows:
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine
when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt
not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision,
however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. x x x
(Emphases supplied)
It must also be borne in mind that ― when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does
not assert any superiority over the other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature or the executive, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution."37 To a great extent, the Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms undertaken by its co-equal
branches of government. But it is by constitutional force that the Court must faithfully perform its duty.
Ultimately, it is the Court‘s avowed intention that a resolution of these cases would not arrest or in any
manner impede the endeavors of the two other branches but, in fact, help ensure that the pillars of change
are erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of the people that each great
branch of government, within its own sphere, contributes its share towards achieving a holistic and genuine
solution to the problems of society. For all these reasons, the Court cannot heed respondents‘ plea for judicial
restraint.
(3) Jurisdiction over criminal cases where penalty imposed is reclusion

perpetua
Art. VIII, Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
xxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:
35
Tañada v. Cuenco, 100 Phil. 1101 (1957) unreported case.
36
406 Phil. 1 (2001).
37
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).
Page 26 of 52
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion

perpetua or higher.
 In the case of People vs. Daniel,38 and as affirmed in the case of People vs. Ramos,39
both being rape cases where the trial court imposed lesser penalties because of
misappreciation of the aggravating and qualifying circumstances and on appeal
the penalty was increased. The majority opinion held that "henceforth, should
the CA be of the opinion that the penalty of death or reclusion perpetua should
be imposed in any criminal case appealed to it where the penalty imposed by the
trial court is less than reclusion perpetua, the said Court, with comprehensive
written analysis of the evidence and discussion of the law involved (should)
render judgment expressly and explicitly imposing the penalty of either death or
reclusion perpetua as the circumstances warrant, refrain from entering
judgment, and forthwith certify the case and elevate the entire record thereto to
this Court for review." Chief Justice Castro, for the majority, explained: Art. X,
Sec. 5 (2) (d) [now Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (2) (d)] provides that the SC shall have
appellate jurisdiction over "final judgements and decrees of inferior courts" in
criminal in which the "penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment." Unless the
CA renders judgment and imposes the penalty of death or reclusion perpetua,
there would be no judgment for SC to review. Indeed, Section 34 of the Judiciary
Act of 1948 and the present Rule 124, Sec. 13 provide that, whenever the CA
should be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment should be
imposed, "the said court shall refrain from entering judgment thereon, and shall
forthwith certify the case brought before it on appeal," which that it is not
prohibited from rendering judgment. In other words, the CA is not prohibited
from rendering judgment but from "entering judgment." The distinction bet. the
two is well established.
 The phrase "entering judgment" is not to be equated with an "entry of judgment"

as the latter is understood in Rule 36 in relation to Sec. 8, Rule 121 and Sec. 16,
Rule 124, ROC. "Entry of judgment" presupposes a final judgment-- final in the
sense that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court or appellate
court within the reglamentary period. A judgment in a criminal case becomes
final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence
has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly
waived in writing his right to appeal. It is only then that there is a judgment
which is to be entered or recorded in the book of entries of judgments.
Rule 124, Sec. 13. xxx
Whenever the Court of Appeals should be of the opinion that the penalty of
reclusion perpetua or higher should be imposed in a case, the Court after
discussion of the evidence and the law involved, shall render judgment
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua or higher as the circumstances
warrant, refrain from entering judgment and forthwith certify the case and
elevate the entire record thereof to the Supreme Court for review.
(4) Article VII, Sec. 18, par. 3
Art. VII, Sec. 18. xxx

xxx
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed
by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.
38
G.R. No. L-40330, November 20, 1978 (86 SCRA 511)
39
G.R. No. L-49818, February 20, 1979 (88 SCRA 466)
Page 27 of 52
(5) Article VII, Sec. 4, par. 7

xxx
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President, Vice-President, and may promulgate its rule for the
purpose.
Lopez vs. Roxas, G.R. No. L-25716, July 28, 1966 (17 SCRA 756)
FACTS: In 1965, the 2 Houses of Congress in joint session proclaimed petitioner Fernando Lopez elected to
the Office of the Vice-President of the Philippines. His closest opponent, respondent Gerardo Roxas, then filed
with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) an election protest contesting the election of petitioner herein as
VP upon the ground that it was not he, but said respondent, who had obtained the largest number of votes
for said office. Petitioner Lopez then instituted this Original Action to prevent the PET from hearing and
deciding the aforementioned election contest, upon the ground that R.A. No. 1793, creating said Tribunal, is
"unconstitutional" and that, "all proceedings taken by it are a nullity".
ISSUE: Whether R.A. 1793 is unconstitutional
HELD: NO. Section 1, Art. VIII of the Constitution vests in the judicial branch of the government, not merely
some specified or limited judicial power, but the entirety or "all" of said power, except, only, so much as the
Constitution confers upon some other agency, such as the power to "judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications' of members of the Senate and those of the House of Representatives, which is
vested by the Constitution solely in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal,
respectively.
R.A 1793, creating the PET, has the effect of giving a defeated candidate the legal right to contest judicially
the election of the President-elect or the VP-elect. By providing that the PET "shall be composed of the Chief
Justice and the other 10 Members of the SC", R.A. 1793 has conferred upon such court an additional exclusive
original jurisdiction. It has not created a new and separate court. It has merely conferred upon the SC the
functions of a PET. The PET is not inferior to the SC since it is the same court, although the functions peculiar
to said Tribunal are more limited in scope than those of the SC in the exercise of its ordinary functions.
The authority of the PET to declare who has the better right to office does not abridge constitutional tenure.
If the evidence introduced in the election protest shows that the person really elected is the protestant, not
the person declared elected by Congress, then the latter had legally no constitutional tenure whatsoever, and,
hence, he can claim no abridgment thereof. Moreover, in the imposition of new duties upon the SC, the
Congress has not, through R.A. 1793, encroached upon the appointing power of the Executive. It constitutes
neither the creation of an office, nor the appointment of an officer. Said law is constitutional.
(6) Article IX, A, Sec. 7
Art. IX, A, Sec. 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote

of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty
days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A
case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon
the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by
the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision,
order or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty
days from receipt of the copy thereof.
H. CONGRESSIONAL POWER OVER JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Art. VIII, Sec. 2. The Congress shall have the power the define,
prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts but may
Page 28 of 52
not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases

enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
xxx
But while the jurisdiction of courts is a matter of legislative apportionment, the

Constitution sets certain limitations on this prerogative:
1. It cannot decrease the constitutionally set jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
 It may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
2. It cannot increase the constitutionally set appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme

Court.
Art. VI, Sec. 30. No law shall be passed increasing the

appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in
this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.
3. It can increase the original jurisdiction of the SC (pursuant to its general power).
4. It can make the jurisdiction of the SC concurrent with lower courts (pursuant to
its general power).
 Thus, under the Rules of Court, the original jurisdiction of the SC is

concurrent with the RTC and in the case of the special civil actions, with
the CA.
5. It cannot pass a law reorganizing the judiciary when it undermines the security
of tenure of its members. (Art. VI, Sec. 2, par. 2)
Mantruste Systems, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. Nos. 86540-41, November 6, 1989
FACTS: Mantruste (MSI) entered into an interim lease agreement with DBP, owner of Bayview Plaza Hotel
wherein the former would operate the hotel for a minimum of 3 months or until such time that the said
properties are sold to MSI or other third parties by DBP. Subsequently, the President issued Proclamation 50
which sought to the expeditious privatization of government assets. The Bayview Hotel properties were
among the government assets identified for privatization and were consequently transferred from DBP to the
Asset Privatization Trust (APT) for disposition. The properties were subsequently awarded to the Makati-Agro
Trading and La Filipina Corp. MSI filed a complaint for the issuance of a restraining order enjoining APT from
approving the winning bid and awarding the Bayview property to private petitioners and from ejecting MSI
from the property or from terminating the contract of lease. The CA nullified the lower court's decision for
being violative of Sec. 31 of Procl. 50-A.
HELD: Section 31 of Proclamation No. 5-A prohibited courts and administrative agencies from issuing any
restraining order or injunction against the Asset Privatization Trust in connection with the acquisition, sale or
disposition of assets transferred to it, nor against any purchaser of assets sold by the Trust to prevent such
purchaser from taking possession of any assets purchased by him. Said Section does not infringe any
provision of the Constitution. It does not impair the inherent power of the courts "to settle actual
controversies which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the govt." The President, in the exercise of her legislative power under the Freedom
Constitution, issued said Proclamation to prevent courts from interfering in the discharge of the Executive
Department of its task of carrying out the expeditious disposition and privatization of certain govt.
corporations and/or the assets thereof, absent any grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction on its part. This proclamation, not being inconsistent with the Constitution and not having been
repealed or revoked by Congress, has remained operative.
While the judicial power may appear to be pervasive, the truth is that under the system of separation or
powers, the powers of the courts over the other branches and instrumentalities of government is limited to
the determination of whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
Page 29 of 52
jurisdiction in the exercise of their authority and in the performance of their assigned tasks. Courts may not
substitute their judgment for that of the APT, nor block, by an injunction, the discharge of its functions and
the implementation of its decisions in connection with the acquisition, sale, or disposition of assets transferred
to it.
Villavert vs. Desierto, GR No. 133715, February 13, 2000
HELD: In Fabian v. Desierto, Sec. 27 of RA 6770, which authorizes an appeal to this Court from decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases, was declared violative of the proscription in
Sec. 30, Art. VI, of the Constitution 20 against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court
without its advice and consent. In addition, the Court noted that Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
precludes appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, like the Office of the Ombudsman, to the Supreme Court.
Consequently, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases should be taken
to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, as reiterated in the subsequent case of Namuhe v. Ombudsman.
The Supreme Court's Jurisdiction
A) Original jurisdiction [Art. VIII, Sec. 5(1)]
(1) Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls.
(2) Petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas
corpus.
(3) Sufficiency of factual basis of proclamation of martial law and suspension of

privilege of writ of HC
 Note that the SC does not have jurisdiction over declaratory relief cases,
which must be filed with the RTC (In Re Bermudez said so too, and yet
gave due course to the petition.)
 The first case (ambassadors, etc.) is made concurrent with RTCs by law
(Judiciary Act of 1948). The second case (special civil actions) is
concurrent with the CA and the RTC, with respect to inferior bodies.
B) Appellate Jurisdiction
 The Supreme Court shall have the power to review, revise, reverse, modify, or
affirm on (a) ordinary appeal, or (b) petition for review on certiorari, as the law
or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgment and orders of lower courts in
the following cases:
(1) Cases questioning the constitutionality or validity of any (a) treaty, (b)
international and executive agreement, (c) law or statute, (d) presidential
decree, (e) proclamation, (f) order, (g) instruction, (h) ordinance, or (i)
regulation.
(2) Cases questioning the legality of an (a) tax, (b) impost, (c) assessment, or
(d) toll, or (e) any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
(3) Cases in which the jurisdiction of lower courts is in issue.
(4) Criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
(5) Cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
(6) Orders of the Constitutional Commissions.
Appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in two ways:

Page 30 of 52
1. Ordinary appeal
 This is obligatory on the courts, so the appellant possesses this "as a matter of
right". Under this mode, the SC can pass on both questions of fact and law.
 Ordinary appeal to the SC is allowed by law in criminal cases where the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher, including those involving other offenses
which, although not so punished, arose out of the same occurrence or which may
have been committed by the accused on the same occasion (to ensure uniformity
of decision). (Sec. 17, Judiciary Act of 1948).
 The other case is the automatic review by the SC of criminal cases where the
death penalty is imposed. This is unlike the ordinary appeal taken where the
penalty is reclusion perpetua or higher, for in this case, the review is automatic.
The reason why it is not automatic in the first case (reclusion perpetua) is that
on appeal, the appellate court may increase the penalty imposed by the trial
court (to death) so that the convict must first waive his right against double
jeopardy, precisely by voluntarily making the appeal, before the SC can reopen
the case on appeal. But the case is different when death is imposed because the
worst that could happen on automatic appeal is that the judgment is affirmed.
 Naturalization and denaturalization cases under the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Sec.
17) used to be directly appealable to the SC. But this is deemed to have been
amended by the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (BP 129) which, in Sec.
5(3), makes all cases decided by the RTC, appealable to the CA, except those
made directly appealable to the SC by (i) the Constitution, (ii) BP 129 and (iii)
Sec. 17 [3(i)] and Sec. 17 [4(4)]of the Judiciary Act of 1948. Naturalization and
denaturalization cases do not fall under any of the exceptions.
2. Petition for review on certiorari
 This is not discretionary on the SC. It has the authority not to give due course to
the petition, if the petition shows no merit on its face. Thus, mode provided for
in Rule 45, is limited to pure questions of law. All other cases can be appealed to
the SC using this mode.
 The Constitution now provides that "no petition for review or motion for
reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied
without stating the legal basis therefor." (Art. VIII, Sec. 14, par. 2)
 The four (4) other cases falling under the appellate jurisdiction of the SC (viz,
constitutionality, tax, jurisdiction and pure questions of law), are appealable to
the SC by petition for review on certiorari. However, in cases involving
constitutionality, tax, or jurisdiction, when the resolution of the main issue
depends on a controverted question of fact, the case must be appealed to the CA
on both, questions of fact and law, and the decision of the CA is then raised to
the SC by petition for review on certiorari on pure questions of law. (Sec. 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948)
Certiorari
 The certiorari referred to in 5(1) (when the SC exercises original jurisdiction) is

the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, where the question raised is a
"jurisdictional question," that is, (a) lack of jurisdiction, (b) excess of
jurisdiction, or (c) grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Page 31 of 52
 The certiorari referred to in 5(2) (when the SC exercises appellate jurisdiction) is

certiorari as an ordinary mode of appeal, where the issue raised is "error of
judgment" or error of law.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS
(1) Supervision of lower courts
Art. VIII, Sec. 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative

supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.
 In the case of Noblejas vs. Teehankee,40 the SC held that although the
Commissioner of Land Registration is given the rank of judge of the CFI, he is
still an administrative official, hence outside the jurisdiction of the SC and cannot
be investigated by it as if he were a lower court judge. Otherwise, the SC would
be performing a non-judicial work.
(2) Temporarily assign judges to other stations in the public interest
Art. VIII, Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the xxx power (to)
xxx
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as
public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not
exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.
(3) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid miscarriage of justice [Art.
VIII, Sec. 5 (4)]
(4) Discipline of lower court judges
Art. VIII, Sec. 11. xxx The Supreme Court en banc shall have the
power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal,
by a vote of a majority of the members who actually took part in
De Vera vs. Pelayo, G.R. No. 137354, July 6, 2000 (335 SCRA 281)
ISSUE: May the Ombudsman validly entertain criminal charges against a judge of the regional trial court in
connection with his handling of cases before the court?
HELD: Petitioner criticizes the jurisprudence (Maceda v. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464 [1993] and Dolalas v. Office
of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, 265 SCRA 818 [1996]) cited by the Office of the Ombudsman as erroneous and
not applicable to his complaint. He insists that since his complaint involved a criminal charge against a judge,
it was within the authority of the Ombudsman not the Supreme Court to resolve whether a crime was
committed and the judge prosecuted therefor.
The petition cannot succeed.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the Ombudsman committed no grave abuse of discretion warranting
the writs prayed for. The issues have been settled in the case of In Re: Joaquin Borromeo. There, we laid
down the rule that before a civil or criminal action against a judge for a violation of Arts. 204 and 205
(knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order) can be entertained, there must first be “a final and
authoritative judicial declaration” that the decision or order in question is indeed “unjust.” The
pronouncement may result from either:
(a) an action of certiorari or prohibition in a higher court impugning the validity of the
judgment; or
(b) an administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court against the judge precisely for
promulgating an unjust judgment or order.
40
G.R. No. L-28790, April 29, 1968
Page 32 of 52
Likewise, the determination of whether a judge has maliciously delayed the disposition of the case is also an
exclusive judicial function (In Re: Borromeo, supra, at 461).
“To repeat, no other entity or official of the government, not the prosecution or investigation
service of any other branch, not any functionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial
order or decision – whether final and executory or not – and pronounce it erroneous so as to
lay the basis for a criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or
order. That prerogative belongs to the courts alone.
This having been said, we find that the Ombudsman acted in accordance with law and jurisprudence when he
referred the cases against Judge Pelayo to the Supreme Court for appropriate action.
People vs. Gacott, G.R. Nos. 115908-09, March 29, 1995 (246 SCRA 52)
HELD: The very text of the present Section 11 of Article VIII clearly shows that there are actually two
situations envisaged therein. The first clause which states that "the Supreme Court en banc shall have the
power to discipline judges of lower courts," is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and the
determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. it was not therein intended that
all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole Court since it would result in an
absurdity, as will hereafter be explained.
The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is intentionally separated
from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that the Court en banc can "order their dismissal by a
vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted therein." Evidently, in this instance, the administrative case must be deliberated upon decided by the
full Court itself.
Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to the Court en banc, on February
9, 1993 a Court En Banc resolution was adopted, entitled "Bar Matter No. 209. — In the Matter of the
Amendment and/or Clarification of various Supreme Courts Rules and Resolutions," and providing inter alia:
For said purpose, the following are considered en banc cases:

xxx xxx xxx
6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or
employee of the Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for
a period of more than one (1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00, or both.
xxx xxx xxx
This resolution was amended on March 16, 1993 and November 23, 1993, but the aforequoted provision was
maintained.
Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matters or cases
regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the
adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in administrative matters, since even cases involving the penalty
of reprimand would require action by the Court en banc. This would subvert the constitutional injunction for
the Court to adopt a systematic plan to expedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the
Supreme Court of the lower courts, and the very purpose of authorizing the Court to sit en banc or in divisions
of three, five or seven members.
Yet, although as thus demonstrated, only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower courts are specifically
required to be decided by the Court en banc, in cognizance of the need for a thorough and judicious
evaluation of serious charges against members of the judiciary, it is only when the penalty imposed does not
exceed suspension of more than one year or a fine of P10,000.00, or both, that the administrative matter may
be decided in division.
(5) Appointment of officials and employees of entire judiciary
Art. VIII, Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the xxx power (to)
xxx
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in
accordance with the Civil Service Law.
Page 33 of 52
J. RULE MAKING
Art. VIII, Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar,
and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rights of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court.
Power of Congress to repeal Rules of Court -
Article XVIII, Sec. 10. All courts existing at the time of the
ratification of this Constitution shall continue to exercise their
jurisdiction, until otherwise provided by law. The provisions of the
existing Rules of Court, judiciary acts, and procedural laws not
inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative unless
amended or repealed by the Supreme Court or the Congress.
Co-Judicial powers
Aside from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court mentioned above the following are its
other powers related to, though not exactly constituting, its judicial function:
1. Order a change of venue or place of trial, in order to avoid a miscarriage of

justice. [Art. VIII, Sec. 5(4)]
2. Rule making - Promulgate rules concerning (a) the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, (b) pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, (c) the
administration to the practice of law, (d) the Integrated Bar, and (e) legal
assistance to the underprivileged.
 Limitations to this power: Such rules shall (i) provide simplified and inexpensive
procedure, for the speedy disposition of cases, (ii) be uniform for all courts of the
same grade, and (iii) not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
 Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain

effective unless disapproved by the SC. [Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5)]
 It is on the basis of this power, that the Rules of Court, the Bar, IBP, Legal Aid
Office were adopted.
 In 1935, as affirmed in the case of In re Cunanan,41 the Congress was given the
power to alter, supplement or modify the Rules of Court. Thus, if the SC set the
passing grade in the bar at 75%, Congress could lower it to 70%, provided this
has no retroactive effect.
 This is no longer true in the 1987 Constitution. Rule-making power and the
corollary power of amending the rules are now lodged exclusively on the SC.
41
SC Resolution dated March 18, 1954
Page 34 of 52
Practice of Professions
Art. XII, Sec. 14. xxx

The practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to
Filipino citizens, save in cases prescribed by law.
Martial Law
Art. VII, Sec. 18. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the proclamation of Martial Law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate
its decision thereon within thirty days form its filing. (par. 3
thereof.)
K. NO QUASI-JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE WORK OF JUDGES
 Generally: No non-judicial work for judges; No quasi- judicial and administrative

work for judges.
 As a general rule, members of the judiciary shall only have judicial functions, in
line with the separation of powers principle of the Constitution. Thus:
Art. VIII, Sec. 12. The members of the Supreme Court and of
other courts established by law shall not be designated to
any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
function.
 Thus, in the case of Meralco vs. Pasay Transportation Co., the SC held that justices of
the SC could not be constituted into a Board of Arbitration to determine
reasonable compensation for the use of a bridge, for this is a non-judicial work.
Meralco vs. Pasay Transportation Co., G.R. No. L-37878, November 25, 1932 (57 Phil 600)
The issue concerns the legal right of the members of the SC, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a
majority of whom shall be final, to act in that capacity.
HELD: The SC and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any
trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected w/ the administering of judicial functions.
 In the case of Garcia vs. Macaraig,42 the SC said that it did not look with favor at the
practice of long standing of judges being detailed with the Department of Justice
to assist the Secretary, even if it were only in connection with his work of
exercising administrative authority over courts. The basis of this rule is the
separation of powers. In this case, respondent Macaraig was appointed to one of
the newly-created CFI branches with station at Calamba Laguna. At the time of
his appointment, respondent was the chief of Technical Staff of the DOJ and
concurrently member of the Board of Pardons and Parole.
In Re : Rodolfo Manzano, A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC, October 5, 1988 (166 SCRA 246)
FACTS: EO No. 856 created the Provincial/City Committees on Justice to insure the speedy disposition of
cases of detainees, particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and
improving local jail conditions. Among the functions of said committee are to receive complaints against any
apprehending officer, jail warden, fiscal or judge who may be found to have committed abuses in the
discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper authority for proper action, to recommend revision of any
law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to the proper administration of criminal justice.
42
A.M. No. 198-J, May 31, 1971 (39 SCRA 106)
Page 35 of 52
Judge Manzano, Executive Judge Of Ilocos Norte was appointed as member of said Committee. Before
accepting the appointment, it sought the opinion of the SC as to the propriety of such appointment.
HELD: Such committee performs administrative functions. Administrative functions are those which involve
the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the
promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved
upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence.
Under the Constitution, the members of the courts shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-
judicial or administrative functions. Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in such committee, will
violate the Constitution, the Supreme Court is constrained to deny his request that he be allowed to serve
therein. He can only render assistance to such committee to help promote the laudable purposes of said
committee, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of his judicial duties.
 Exceptions: Constitutionally appointed non-judicial functions of the Supreme

Court
a. Act as Presidential Electoral Tribunal
 While Congress acts as the National Board of Canvassers for the Presidential
election, the Supreme Court acts as the Electoral Tribunal for such election. The
Constitution provides: "The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose." (Art.
Art. VII, Sec. 4, last par.)
 This means that before the proclamation by the Congress of the winner,
Congress is the judge of any electoral issue, but the proclamation, when there is
an electoral contest already, then the SC becomes the sole judge.
 The 1935 Constitution did not provide this power. And so RA 1793 gave the SC
the power to act as judge in presidential electoral contests. It was challenged in
the case of Lopez vs. Roxas,43 but the SC upheld the law, reasoning that it did not
constitute the SC as a separate body but only added to its powers the power to
be the judge of election contests.
 With the express provision in Art. VII, Sec. 4, par. 7, this is no longer a problem.
b. Chief Justice as presiding officer in impeachment trial of the President. [Art. XI, Sec.
3(6)]
c. Chief Justice as Chairman of the Judicial and Bar Council.
L. REPORT ON THE JUDICIARY
Art. VIII, Sec. 16. The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from
the opening of each regular session of the Congress, submit to the
President and the Congress an annual report on the operations and
activities of the Judiciary.
M. MANNER OF SITTING AND VOTES REQUIRED
Art. VIII, Sec. 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a

Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc
or its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.
43
G.R. No. L-25716, July 28, 1966 (17 SCRA 756)
Page 36 of 52
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,

international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard
by the Supreme Court, en banc, including those involving the
constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other
regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of
the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted thereon.
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or

resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least
three of such Members. When the required number is not
obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no
doctrine or principle or principle of law laid down by the court in a
decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or
reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
 The Supreme Court may sit en banc or in its discretion, in divisions of 3, 5, or 7

members. [Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1)]
The following cases shall be heard by the SC en banc:
1. Cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive

agreement or law. [Id., Sec. 4(2)]
2. Cases involving the (a) constitutionality, (b) application, or (c) operation of

presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances and other
regulations. [Id., Sec. 4(2)]
3. All other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard by the SC
en banc. [Id., Sec. 4(2)]
4. Cases or matters heard by a division where the required number of votes to

decide or resolve (the majority of those who took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case less than 3 members) is not
met. [Id., Sec. 4(3)]
5. To modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a

decision rendered en banc or in division. [Id., Sec. 4(3)]
6. Administrative disciplinary cases involving judges of lower courts. (Id., Sec. 11.)
7. Actions instituted by citizen to test the validity of a proclamation of martial law or

suspension of the privilege of the writ. (Art. VII, Sec. 18.)
8. The court sitting as Presidential Electoral Tribunal. (Art. VII, Sec. 4, par. 7.)
Firestone Ceramics, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 127022, June 28, 2000 (334 SCRA 465)
HELD: Under Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, dated February 7, 1989, as amended by the Resolution of
November 18, 1993:
X x x [t]he following are considered en banc cases:
1) Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive

agreement, law, executive order, or presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question;
Page 37 of 52
2) Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty;
3) Cases raising novel questions of law;
4) Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;
5) Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the Civil Service Commission,
Commission on Elections, and Commission on Audit;
6) Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of
the judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period
of more than one (1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00 or both;
7) Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en banc or in division may be
modified or reversed;
8) Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least three (3) members thereof
merit the attention of the court en banc and are acceptable to a majority of the actual
membership of the court en banc; and
9) All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may deem of
sufficient importance to merit its attention.
Rule 56, Sec. 11
Sec. 11. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. - Where the court en

banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority
cannot be had, the case shall be re-heard, and if on rehearing no
decision is reached, the action shall be dismissed if originally
commenced in the court; in appealed cases, the judgement or
order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and on all incidental
matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.
Rule 125, Sec. 3
Sec. 3. Decision if opinion is equally divided. - When the court en

banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority
cannot be had, the case shall be re-heard, and if on rehearing no
decision is reached, the judgment of conviction of the lower court
shall be reversed and the accused acquitted.
N. REQUIREMENT AS TO DECISIONS
Deliberations
Art. VIII, Sec. 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case
submitted to it for decision en banc or in division shall be reached
in consultation before the case is assigned to a member for the
writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect
signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy thereof
attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties.
Any Member who took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a
decision or resolution must state the reason therefor. The same
requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate courts.
 The reason for the requirement that the decision must be reached "in consulta"
(i.e., after deliberations by the group) is to emphasize that the SC is one body,
albeit collegiate, so that the decision of the case is by the court itself and not the
ponente. The writer of the opinion is merely the spokesman of the body.
Consing vs. CA, G.R. No. 78272, August 29, 1989 (177 SCRA 14)
ISSUE: W/N absence of certification by the Court of Appeals renders that decision invalid.
HELD: NO. The certification requirement imposed by the 1987 constitution was meant to ensure the
implementation of the constitutional requirement that decisions of the Supreme Court and lower collegiate
courts, such as the CA, Sandiganbayan and CTA, are reached after consultation with the members of the court
sitting en banc or in a division before the case is assigned to a member thereof for decision writing.
Page 38 of 52
The absence would not necessarily mean that the case submitted for decision had not been reached in
consultation before being assigned to one member for the writing of the opinion of the court since the regular
performance of official duty is presumed. The lack of certification serves as an evidence of failure to observe
the certification requirement but it would not have the effect of invalidating the decision.
Prudential Bank vs. Castro, A.M. No. 2756, March 15, 1988 (158 SCRA 646)
HELD: The certification requirement refers to decisions in judicial, not administrative cases . From the very
beginning, resolutions/decisions of the Court in administrative cases have not been accompanied by any
formal certification. In fact, such a certification would be a superfluity in administrative cases, which by their
very nature, have to be deliberated upon considering the collegiate composition of this Court.
Art. VIII, Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court

without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision

of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating
the legal basis therefor.
Voting
Votes required to "render a decision or resolution"
A) En banc
 Concurrence of a majority of the members who (1) actually took part in the
deliberations (i.e., the consultation) on the issues in the case, and (2) voted
thereon. [Art. VIII, Sec. 4(2) and Sec. 11.]
a. The lowest possible votes needed to render a decision is 5, since quorum of 15

is 8, and majority of 8 is 5. This number may increase as the number of
justices present increase;
b. One who abstained is deemed to have voted for the purpose of computing the
majority vote needed. For an abstention is really a form of casting a vote
with its own repercussions on the outcome of the case.
c. One who was present but kept silent during the deliberations and did not vote
is still included in the counting for the purpose of determining the majority.
For it may happen that he has already made up his mind on how to decide
and influence the outcome of the case.
d. But one who expressly inhibited or is disqualified from taking part (for
instance because of conflict of interest) is not included.
e. There must be a quorum before a valid decision can be made. Without a

quorum, there can be no valid business to begin with.
f. In case, the necessary majority cannot be mustered, then there is no decision

rendered. (See effect of failure to reach a majority below.)
 This provision thus, overrules the requirement of (a) 10 votes (2/3) to declare a
law unconstitutional under 1973 (a constitutional requirement), and (b) 10 votes
to impose or affirm the death penalty (by internal rules of the SC, although
constitutionally 8 votes were enough). The presumption of constitutionality of
laws under the Judiciary Act of 1948, however, remains valid.
Page 39 of 52
B) In divisions
 Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved (a) with the
concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and (b) in no case
without the concurrence of at least 3 of such members. When the required
number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc. No doctrine or
principle of law laid by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division
may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc. [Art. VIII, Sec.
4(3)]
a. In a division of 7 members, the majority if all are present is 4. If only 6 are

present, 4. If only 5 or 4, 3. If only 3, no quorum.
b. In a division of 5 members, 3 votes are needed regardless of whether 5, 4, or

3 are present.
c. In division of 3 members, 3 votes are needed.
d. In any of these cases, when the votes cannot be mustered, the case must be
raised to the court en banc.
Effect of failure to muster the necessary majority:
 If the necessary majority cannot be had, the case is again reheard. If upon
rehearing, no majority is still had, the following are the effects:
a. If a case is on appeal, the judgment appealed from is deemed affirmed except:
(1) Criminal cases where the judgment is that of conviction: the conviction is
reversed, and the accused is acquitted.
(2) Cases where the lower court declared a law, etc. unconstitutional: the
judgment is reversed, and the validity of the law is deemed sustained, pursuant
to the presumption of constitutionality under Sec. 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
(If the lower court declared the law as not unconstitutional, this judgment is
deemed affirmed pursuant to the general rule above.)
 Thus, if 12 are present, 5 voted the law unconstitutional, 4 voted for its validity,
and 3 abstained, there is no decision and so the law remains valid.
b. If the case is an original petition, then the case is deemed dismissed.
Writing of the decision
 No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. (Art. VIII, Sec. 14.)
 In the case of the SC and lower collegiate court, this rule is addressed to the one
to whom the writing of the opinion was assigned after consultation, that is, the
ponente. In the case by other courts, this rule is addressed to the judge.
Decisions on the merit.
 The rule requiring statement of the relevant facts, the issues, the ruling, and the
reasoned opinion in support of the ruling, applies only to decisions on the merit
by a court of record, based on the following rulings of the SC:
Page 40 of 52
a. In the case of Valladolid vs. Inciong,44 it was held that the Order of the Deputy Minister
of Labor did not contain a statement of facts and conclusions of law is not covered
by the constitutional requirement because it is not a decision of a court of record,
the Ministry of Labor being an administrative agency with quasi-judicial functions,
with rules of procedure mandated to be non-litigious, summary and non-technical.
Section 14, Chapter 3, Book VII, Administrative Code of 1987
Section 14. Decision. - Every decision rendered by the agency in a

contested case shall be in writing and shall state clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. xxx
Air Manila vs. Balatbat, G.R. No. L-29064, April 29, 1971 (38 SCRA 489)
HELD: Administrative proceedings are not exempt from the operation of certain basic and fundamental
procedure principles, such as the due process requirements in investigations and trials. Administrative due
process includes:
(a) The right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a
person's legal rights;
(b) Reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights, introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his
favor;
(c) A tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of
competent jurisdiction; and
(d) A finding or decision by that tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the records or disclosed to the parties affected.
b. In the case of Bacolod Murcia Milling Co. vs. Henares,45 the SC ruled that orders of a court
on an incidental matter (in this case, the order imposing the payment of attorney's
fees) need not state the legal basis of the ruling.
Minute Resolution
 In justifying the so-called Minute Resolution, the SC said in the case of Borromeo
v. CA,46 that:
"The SC disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees
them as final and executory, as where a case is patently without merit,
where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed
from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord w/ the facts of
the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the
petitions were filed merely to forsetall the early execution of judgment and
for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course or
dismissing a petition always gives the legal basis.
The Court is not duty bound to render signed decisions all the time. It has
ample discretion to formulate decisions and/ or minute resolutions,
provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case."
 And neither does the rule apply to administrative cases decided by the SC itself,
as it held in the case of Prudential Bank vs. Castro, thus:
47
"No constitutional provision is disregarded in the SC's Minute Resolution

denying a motion for reconsideration 'for lack of merit, the issues raised
therein having been previously duly considered and passed upon. In an
administrative case, the constitutional mandate that 'no *** motion for
reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be *** denied without
44
G.R. No. L-52364, March 25, 1983 (121 SCRA 205)
45
G.R. No.L-13505, March 30, 1960 (107 Phil. 560)
46
G.R. No. 82273, 1 June 1990 (186 SCRA 1)
47
A.M. No. 2756, June 5, 1986 (158 SCRA 646)
Page 41 of 52
stating the legal basis therefor is inapplicable. And even if it were, said
resolution stated the legal basis for the denial, and, therefore, adhered
faithfully to the constitutional requirement. 'Lack of merit,' as a ground for
denial is legal basis.
Memorandum Decisions
Francisco vs. Permskul, G.R. No. 81006, May 12, 1989 (173 SCRA 324)
HELD: A MEMORANDUM DECISION is a “specie of succinctly written decisions by appellate courts in

accordance with the provisions of Section 40, B.P. Blg. 129 on the grounds of expediency, practicality,
convenience and docket status of our courts.”
The distinctive features of a memorandum decision are, first, it is rendered by an appellate court, second, it
incorporates by reference the findings of fact or the conclusions of law contained in the decision, order, or
ruling under review. Most likely, the purpose is to affirm the decision, although it is not impossible that the
approval of the findings of facts by the lower court may lead to a different conclusion of law by the higher
court. At any rate, the reason for allowing the incorporation by reference is evidently to avoid the
cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower court, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher
court. The idea is to avoid having to repeat in the body of the latter decision the findings or conclusions of
the lower court since they are being approved or adopted anyway.
Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. CA, G.R. No. 114323, July23, 1998 (293 SCRA 26)
HELD: The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does not preclude the validity of
“memorandum decisions” which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in
the decisions of inferior tribunals. X x x
Hence, even in this jurisdiction, incorporation by reference is allowed if only to avoid the cumbersome
reproduction of the decision of the lower courts, or portions thereof, in the decisions of the higher court. This
is particularly true when the decision sought to be incorporated is a lengthy and thorough discussion of the
facts and conclusions arrived at x x x.
Yao vs. CA, G.R. No. 132428, October 24, 2000 (344 SCRA 202)
HELD: We have sustained decisions of lower courts as having substantially or sufficiently complied with the
constitutional injunction notwithstanding the laconic and terse manner in which they were written and even if
“there [was left] much to be desired in terms of [their] clarity, coherence and comprehensibility” provided that
they eventually set out the facts and the law on which they were based, as when they stated the legal
qualifications of the offense constituted by the facts proved, the modifying circumstances, the participation of
the accused, the penalty imposed and the civil liability; or discussed the facts comprising the elements of the
offense that was charged in the information, and accordingly rendered a verdict and imposed the
corresponding penalty; or quoted the facts narrated in the prosecution’s memorandum but made their own
findings and assessment of evidence, before finally agreeing with the prosecution’s evaluation of the case .
We have also sanctioned the use of memorandum decisions x x x. We have also declared that memorandum
decisions comply with the constitutional mandate.
In Francisco v. Permskul, however, we laid the conditions for the validity of memorandum decisions, thus:
The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the
conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote reference, which is to say that the
challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the
memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for
direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in a statement
attached to the said decision. In other words, the memorandum decision authorized under
Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law
of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision.
It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was made of the
decision of the lower court and that its decision was merely affirmed without a prior
examination of the facts and the law on which it is based. The proximity at least of the
annexed statement should suggest that such examination has been undertaken. It is, of
Page 42 of 52
course, also understood that the decision being adopted should, to begin with, comply with
Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or adoption will rectify its violation.
The Court finds necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision should be sparingly
used lest it become an additive excuse for judicial sloth. It is an additional condition for the
validity of this kind of decision may be resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the
main accepted by both parties and easily determinable by the judge and there are no
doctrinal complications involved that will require an extended discussion of the laws involved.
The memorandum decision may be employed in simple litigations only, such as ordinary
collection cases, where the appeal is obviously groundless and deserves no more than the
time needed to dismiss it. X x x
Henceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply with the requirements herein set forth as
to the form prescribed and the occasions when they may be rendered. Any deviation will
summon the strict enforcement of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution and strike down
the flawed judgment as a lawless disobedience.
Tested against these standards, we find that the RTC decision at bar miserably failed to meet them and,
therefore, fell short of the constitutional injunction. The RTC decision is brief indeed, but it is starkly hallow,
otiosely written, vacuous in its content and trite in its form. It achieved nothing and attempted at nothing, not
even at a simple summation of facts which could easily be done. Its inadequacy speaks for itself.
We cannot even consider or affirm said RTC decision as a memorandum decision because it failed to comply
with the measures of validity laid down in Francisco v. Permskul. It merely affirmed in toto the MeTC decision
without saying more. A decision or resolution, especially one resolving an appeal, should directly meet the
issues for resolution; otherwise, the appeal would be pointless
We therefore reiterate our admonition in Nicos Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, in that while we
conceded that brevity in the writing of decisions is an admirable trait, it should not and cannot be substituted
for substance; and again in Francisco v. Permskul, where we cautioned that expediency alone, no matter how
compelling, cannot excuse non-compliance with the constitutional requirements.
This is not to discourage the lower courts to write abbreviated and concise decisions, but never at the expense
of scholarly analysis, and more significantly, of justice and fair play, lest the fears expressed by Justice Feria
as the ponente in Romero v. Court of Appeals come true, i.e., if an appellate court failed to provide the appeal
the attention it rightfully deserved, said court deprived the appellant of due process since he was accorded a
fair opportunity to be heard by a fair and responsible magistrate. This situation becomes more ominous in
criminal cases, as in this case, where not only property rights are at stake but also the liberty if not the life of
a human being.
Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a
paramount component of due process and fair play. It is likewise demanded by the due process clause of the
Constitution. The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the
factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment
is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its
action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted,
should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state
the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is
precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by
a higher tribunal. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment,
the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of
the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the
Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or
property of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public
confidence in the justness of his decision.
Thus the Court has struck down as void, decisions of lower courts and even of the Court of Appeals whose
careless disregard of the constitutional behest exposed their sometimes cavalier attitude not only to their
magisterial responsibilities but likewise to their avowed fealty to the Constitution.
Thus, we nullified or deemed to have failed to comply with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, a
decision, resolution or order which: contained no analysis of the evidence of the parties nor reference to any
legal basis in reaching its conclusions; contained nothing more than a summary of the testimonies of the
witnesses of both parties; convicted the accused of libel but failed to cite any legal authority or principle to
support conclusions that the letter in question was libelous; consisted merely of one (1) paragraph with mostly
Page 43 of 52
sweeping generalizations and failed to support its conclusion of parricide; consisted of five (5) pages, three (3)
pages of which were quotations from the labor arbiter’s decision including the dispositive portion and barely a
page (two [2] short paragraphs of two [2] sentences each) of its own discussion or reasonings; was merely
based on the findings of another court sans transcript of stenographic notes, or failed to explain the factual
and legal bases for the award of moral damages.
In the same vein do we strike down as a nullity the RTC decision in question.
Decisions regarding Petitions for Review and Motions for Reconsideration
 No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court

shall be refused due course or denied, without stating the legal basis therefor.
(Art. VIII, Sec. 14, par. 2.)
 This rule applies to a dismissal of a motion for reconsideration of a "decision on

the merits", said the SC in the case of Mendoza vs. CFI.48 It does not apply, as in
this case, to a dismissal of a motion for reconsideration of a previous dismissal of
a petition for habeas corpus. (The dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus is
not a decision on the merits, but is similar to a dismissal of a petition for review,
which is a decision not to give due course to the petition.)
 The past practice used to be that when the appellate court denied a petition for
review, or denied a MFR, it simply did so in a Minute Resolution, stating that the
case was dismissed for lack of basis. This aggrieved many a lawyer, specially
those who would spend days preparing pages of briefs, only to find out that all
their effort was answered by a one-liner "Dismissed for lack of basis".
 This prompted the framers of the 1987 Constitution to force the Court to at least
write down the legal basis for the denial. This means that while a fully detailed
decision is not required, neither is a skimpy one-liner is allowed. The legal
reason for the dismissal must be written.
Rule regarding Dissenters and Abstainers
 In the case of a decision on the merits, if a member (a) took no part, or (b)
dissented, or (c) abstained from a decision or resolution, he must state his
reason therefor. (Art. VIII, Sec. 13.)
 Before, only those who dissented were required to write an opinion. Now, even
those who took no part in the deliberations but were present, and those who
abstained are required to write their reasons for these are really forms of casting
their vote. Those who inhibited themselves are, of course, not required to vote,
since they did not really participate.
 Procedurally, the purpose is to enable the party to find out the reason for the
action taken. For courts lower than the SC, and even the SC itself, this is
important for appeal or motion for reconsideration purposes, as the basis for the
assignment of error.
 Theoretically, since the SC is not an elective branch it must explain the reason
being its ultimate source of authority. Congress need not explain its action since
it has been delegated the legislative power by the people.
O. MANDATORY PERIOD FOR DECIDING CASES
48
GR No. L-35612-14, June 27, 1973 (51 SCRA 369)
Page 44 of 52
Art. VIII, Sec. 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity
of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four
months from the date of submission for the Supreme Court, and,
unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower
collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or

resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief or
memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification

to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge
shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record
of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The
certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not been
rendered or issued within said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the

court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been
incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case
or matter submitted thereto for determination, without further
delay.

xxx
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed
by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.
xxx (par. 3 thereof.)
Art. XVIII, Sec. 12. The Supreme Court shall, within one year after
the ratification of this Constitution, adopt a systematic plan to
expedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in
the Supreme Court or the lower courts prior to the effectivity of
this Constitution. A similar plan shall be adopted for all special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies.
Id., Sec. 13. The legal effect of the lapse, before the ratification of
this Constitution, of the applicable period for the decision or
resolution of the cases or matters submitted for adjudication by
the courts, shall be determined by the Supreme Court as soon as
practicable.
Id., Sec. 14. The provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4), Section 15
of Article VIII of this Constitution shall apply to cases or matters
filed before the ratification of this Constitution, when the
applicable period lapses after such ratification.
A) Cases filed after February 2, 1987
 All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided
within twenty-four months counted from the date of submission." [Art. VIII, Sec.
15(1)]
Page 45 of 52
 A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of
the last pleading, brief or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the
court itself. [Art. VIII, Sec. 15(2)]
 Mandatory period in the Supreme Court: 24 months [Art. VIII, Sec. 15(1)]
 Except: A proper case questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege which must be decided
30 days from filing. (Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 1.)
Query: But what happens if the judge or court fails to meet the deadline anyway?
The Constitution provides:
Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this

effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding Judge shall forthwith
be issued, and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or
matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why
a decision or resolution has been rendered or issued within said period.
[Art. VIII, Sec. 15 (3)]
Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court,

without prejudice to such responsibility (administrative disciplinary
action against the judge or justices) shall decide or resolve the case or
matter submitted thereto for determination without further delay. [Art.
VIII, Sec. 15(4)]
In other words, failure to decide the case [for reasons other than the inability to
reach the necessary majority] has no consequence on the case. Thus, a certification
is required that the period has lapsed without any decision being made, stating the
reason for such inaction. Then the court must decide without any further delay.
The consequences are on the judge: (a) he could not draw out his salary, since he
would not be able to certify that he has resolved all cases submitted to him in 90
days and (b) he is subject to administrative sanctions.
B) Cases filed before February 2, 1987 but expire after this date
 The provisions of Art. VIII, Sec, 15(3) - (4) shall apply to cases or matters filed
before the ratification of this Constitution, when the applicable period lapses after
such ratification. (Art. XVIII, Sec. 14)
 In other words, it is as if these cases were filed after February 2, 1987.
C) Cases that expired before February 2, 1987
 The legal effect of the lapse, before the ratification of this Constitution, of the
applicable period for the decision or resolution of the cases or matters submitted
for adjudication by the courts, shall be determined by the SC as soon as
practicable. (Art. XVIII, Sec. 13.)
 The Supreme Court shall, within 1 year from February 2, 1987 adopt a
systematic plan to expedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters
pending in the SC or lower courts prior to the effectivity of this Constitution. A
similar plan shall be adopted for all special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. (Art.
XVIII, Sec. 12.)
Page 46 of 52
Re: Problem of Delays in Cases Before the Sandiganbayan, A.M. No. 00-8-05-SC, Nov. 28, 2001
ISSUE: Does the period for decision making under Section 15, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution, apply to the
Sandiganbayan?
HELD: The above provision does not apply to the Sandiganbayan. The provision refers to regular courts of
lower collegiate level that in the present hierarchy applies only to the Court of Appeals.
The Sandiganbayan is a special court of the same level as the Court of Appeals and possessing all the inherent
powers of a court of justice, with functions of a trial court.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan is not a regular court but a special one.
2. LOWER COURTS
A. QUALIFICATIONS AND APPOINTMENT
Art. VIII, Sec. 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the

Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines. A member of the Supreme Court
must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen
years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice
of law in the Philippines.
(2) the Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of

lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless
he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine
Bar.
Id., Sec. 8. (5) The (Judicial and Bar) Council shall have the
principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It
may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme
Court may assign to it.
Id., Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower
courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at list
three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointment
within ninety days from the submission of the list.
Composition
 The composition of lower courts shall be provided by law. The laws are the
Judiciary Act of 1948 and BP 129.
Qualifications
Lower Collegiate Court (Court of Appeals)
(1) No person shall be appointed member of any lower collegiate court unless he is a
natural-born citizen. [Art. VIII, Sec. 7(1)] and a member of Philippine Bar.
(2) The Congress shall prescribe qualifications of judges of lower courts. [Art. VIII, Sec.
7(2)]
Page 47 of 52
(3) A member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity,

probity, and independence. [Art. VIII, Sec. 7(3)]
Lower Courts
(1) The Congress shall prescribe qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person
may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a
member of the Philippine bar. [Art. VIII, Sec. 7(2)]
(2) He must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence.

[Art. VIII, Sec. 7(3)]
QUALIFICATIONS OF RTC JUDGES

1. Natural-born citizen of the Philippines;
2. At least 35 years of age;
3. For at least 10 years has been engaged in the practice of law in the Phil. or has
held public office in the Phil. requiring admission to the practice of law as an
indispensable requisite.
QUALIFICATIONS OF MTC JUDGES

1. Natural-born citizen of the Philippines;
2. At least 30 years of age;
3. For at least 5 years has been engaged in the practice of law in the Phil. or has
held public office in the Phil. requiring admission to the practice of law as an
indispensable requisite.
B. SALARY
Art. VIII, Sec. 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the
Associate Justices of the Supreme court and of judges of lower
courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office,
their salary shall not be decreased.
C. CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO REORGANIZE AND SECURITY OF TENURE
Id., Sec. 2. xxx

No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it
undermines the security of tenure of its Members.
 The power of Congress to reorganize lower courts has been upheld by the SC
prior to 1987.
 In the case of Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 49 the SC by failing to muster the 2/3
vote required then to declare a law unconstitutional in effect sustained the
validity of the law passed by Congress abolishing the offices of "judges-at-large"
and "cadastral judges" and the consequent removal of judges occupying these
posts. Noting that the purpose of the law was to promote the independence of
the judiciary (by avoiding forum-shopping), it held that an abolition of an office
made in good faith does not violate security of tenure. Security of tenure
presupposes the continued existence of the office from which one was removed
49
G.R. No. L-7910, January 18, 1955 (51 OG 147)
Page 48 of 52
not removal from an office that has been abolished in good faith and not merely
partisan political reasons.
 In the case of De La Llana vs. Alba,50 the SC again upheld the Reorganization Act of
1980 (BP 129), on the ground that the abolition of an office, is within the
competence of the legislature if done in good faith. That there was good faith
was shown by the fact that the Act was the product of careful study and
deliberation by the Batasan and the Presidential study committee, the
membership of which includes SC justices, and was the means to upgrade the
administration of justice in the Philippines. The SC reiterated that there can be
no claim for security of tenure where the office no longer exists, and that the
abolition of office is not removal, although their effects may be the same.
 It is doubtful whether these rulings remain valid in toto in view of the new
express provision prohibiting a reorganization law that undermines the security
of tenure of the Judiciary.
 One compromise view is that Congress has the power to pass a reorganization
law concerning the lower courts, but it can only take effect until the post has
been vacated by the incumbent judge.
D. REMOVAL
 Cruz: "Judges of lower court," as here used, includes justices of the

Sandiganbayan. This rule casts much doubt on the legality of the presidential
decree making them removable only by the legislature through the process of
impeachment.
E. JURISDICTION
Art. VIII, Sec. 1. Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme

Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle

actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
 As ruled in the case of J.M. Tuason & Co. v. CA and in Ynot v. IAC, supra, there is in
effect a "constitutional conferment of original jurisdiction on the lower courts in
those five cases for which the Supreme Court is granted appellate jurisdiction in
5(2)."
 Under the provision granting the SC jurisdiction "to review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or Rules of Court may provide,
judgments of lower courts," lower courts can pass upon the validity of a statute
in the first instance.
50
G.R. No. L-57883, March 12, 1982 (112 SCRA 294)
Page 49 of 52
F. REQUIREMENTS AS TO PREPARATION OF DECISIONS
Art. VIII, Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court

without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision

of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating
the legal basis therefor.
Manner of sitting
 The Court of Appeals sits in divisions when it hears cases; the only time it
convenes as one body is to take up matters of administration.
 The trial and inferior courts, of course, do not have this problem since there is
only one judge.
Deliberations
 The same requirements (for consulta) shall be observed by all lower collegiate
courts. (Art. VIII, Sec. 13)
 For obvious reasons, this requirement does not apply to the trial and inferior
courts.
Voting
 For collegiate courts, like the Court of Appeals, the law provides that it sits only
in divisions when deciding cases.
 For trial and inferior courts, no problem arises since only one judge is involved.
Effect of failure to muster the necessary majority
 Court of Appeals -- The same rules apply, except that the decision can now be
appealed to the SC.
 Inferior Courts -- Failure to decide has no consequence on the decision of the

court. The Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction, but the judge suffers
administrative consequences.
G. MANDATORY PERIOD FOR DECIDING
Art. VIII, Sec. 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity
of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four
months from the date of submission for the Supreme Court, and,
unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower
collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or

resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief or
memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification

to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge
shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record
Page 50 of 52
of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The

certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not been
rendered or issued within said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the

court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been
incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case
or matter submitted thereto for determination, without further
delay.
Mandatory Period
Lower collegiate courts: 12 months, unless reduced by the SC
Other lower courts: 3 months, unless reduced by the SC
 The Constitution now explicitly provides in Sec. 15 (1) that the periods are
mandatory, aside from using the word "must" (not "shall" as in 1973) in Sec. 15
(1). The case of Marcelino vd. Cruz, which held that the periods in the 1973
Constitution were only directory, is thus now, overruled.
 Cruz: It should be noted that, although decision within the maximum period is
now mandatory, failure to arrive at the same will not divest the court of
jurisdiction, without prejudice to any responsibility that may attach to the judge.
The court must still resolve the case w/o further delay, unlike the old rule when
the decision appealed was deemed automatically affirmed and the petition was
deemed automatically dismissed as a result of the inaction of the court.
Marcelino vs. Cruz, G.R. No. L-42428, March 18, 1983 (121 SCRA 51)
FACTS: Judgement in a criminal case was rendered before the clerk of court within 85 days after the case
was concluded. But judgement was promulgated after lapse of 90 days from the day the case was submitted
for decision.
ISSUE: W/N trial court lost jurisdiction over the case for failure to decide the same within 90 days from
submission thereof.
W/N constitutional provision is mandatory.
HELD: No to both. The constitutional provision refers to rendition of judgement which refers to the filing of
the signed decision with the clerk of court.
By the phrase "unless reduced by the Supreme Court," it is evident that the period prescribed is subject to
modification by the SC under its prerogative power to promulgate rules concerning procedure in all courts.
Constitutional provisions are directory, where they refer to matters merely procedural. But failure to decide a
case within 90 days constitute a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting judge.
De Roma vs. CA, G.R. No. L-46903, July 23, 1987 (152 SCRA 205)
The CA decided the case beyond the 12 month period prescribed by the 1973 Constitution. Said provision in
the Constitution was merely directory and failure to decide on time would not deprive the corresponding
courts of jurisdiction or render their decisions invalid.
Gonzales-Decano v. Siapno, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1279, March 1, 2001
HELD: The Court has consistently emphasized the need for judges to decide cases within the mandated
periods. The failure of a judge to render a decision within such time constitutes a violation of Rule 3.05 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires that a judge dispose of the court's business promptly and decide
cases within the required periods. It amounts to gross inefficiency and warrants administrative sanction.
Page 51 of 52
That the transcript of stenographic notes in cases already deemed submitted for decision has not yet been
completed does not excuse such failure. This Court has directed judges to take down notes of salient portions
of the hearing and proceed in the preparation of decisions without waiting for the transcribed stenographic
notes. The argument that such notes are not "official" would not relieve judges of their duty to render a
decision within the required periods. The solution is not to await the transcription of the stenographic notes
but for the judge to pay careful attention to the proceedings and take accurate notes.
Sanchez vs. Vestil, AM No. RTJ-98-1419, October 13, 1998
HELD: Justice delayed is justice denied. This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of
disputes. Hence, judges are mandated to decide cases seasonably. Judges who cannot comply with such
mandate should ask for additional time, explaining in their request the reasons for the delay.
The rule is that the ninety-day period for deciding cases should be observed by all judges, unless they have
been granted additional time. Failure of a judge to resolve a case within the prescribed period constitutes
gross dereliction of duty. For this, respondent judge must be sanctioned.
We reiterate that judges, when burdened by heavy caseloads which prevent them from disposing their cases
within the reglementary period, may ask for additional time.
3. THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
Art. VIII, Sec. 8. A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under
the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief
Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector.
(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the

President for a term of four years with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the
representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the
professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years,
and the representative of the private sector for one year.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex

officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.
(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such

emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the
appropriations for the Council.
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending

appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other function
and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
Ex-officio members [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(1)]

(1) Chief Justice as ex-officio Chairman
(2) Secretary of Justice
(3) Representative of Congress
Regular members [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(1)]

(4) Representative of the Integrated Bar
(5) Professor of Law
(6) Retired member of the SC
(7) Representative of private sector
Page 52 of 52
Secretary ex-officio [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(3)]

> Clerk of the SC, who shall keep a record of its proceedings
Appointment, Tenure, Salary
Ex-officio members
> For obvious reasons this does not apply since the position in the Council is good only
while the person is the occupant of the office.
Regular members [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(2)]

> The regular members shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments.
> The term of the regular members is 4 years.
> But the term of those initially appointed shall be staggered in the following way so as
to create continuity in the council:
IBP representative - 4 years
Law professor - 3 years
Retired justice - 2 years
Private sector - 1 year
 Regular members shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the

SC. The SC shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council.
[Art. VIII, Sec. 8(4)]
Functions
1. Recommend appointees to the Judiciary [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(5)]
2. Recommend appointees to the Office of the Ombudsman and his 5 deputies. (Art. XI,
Sec. 9)
3. Such other functions and duties as the SC may assign [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(5)]
4. AUTOMATIC RELEASE OF APPROPRIATION FOR THE JUDICIARY
Art. VIII, Sec. 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.

Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the
legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year
and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.

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HAND OUT No.

C. The Judicial Department

(1) The SC is a constitutional body. It cannot be abolished nor may its

1. THE SUPREME COURT

Art. VIII, Sec. 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a

 The Supreme Court is a constitutional body. As such it cannot be abolished by

 The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and 14 Associate

 It may sit en banc, or in its discretion, in divisions of 3, 5 or 7 members (or 5, 3

One Supreme Court

B. APPOINTMENT AND QUALIFICATIONS

Art. VIII, Sec. 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the

Judicial and Bar Council

Responding to this, Congress passed a law providing that the constitutional

Compare the 1973 Constitution, Art. XV, Sec. 6

Art., Sec. 6. No salary or any form of emolument of any public

thereby avoiding a SC contrary, self-defensive ruling.

Not exempt from income tax

Nitafan vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-78780, July 23, 1987

Id., Sec. 2. xxx

* See procedure for impeachment under Other Powers of Congress.

 Members of the SC cannot be removed except by impeachment. Thus, a SC

In Re: Raul Gonzales, A.M. Nos. 88-4-5433, April 15, 1988

Art. VIII, Sec. 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.

(1) The Power of Judicial Review

Art. VIII, Sec. 5. xxx

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,

Scope of the Judicial Power

1. Settle actual controversies, involving rights which are legally demandable

2. Determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion

Tocao vs. CA, GR No. 127405, September 20, 2001

a. Conditions for the Exercise of Judicial Review

 Justiciable Question - A justiciable question is one which is inherently

David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006

Such contention lacks merit.

HELD: We are not persuaded.

EXCEPTION: When the purpose is to solicit from the court a declaratory

 Locus standi is defined as “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In

David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006

(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;

Now, the application of the above principles to the present petitions.

Liberal attitude on locus standi:

b. ALL COURTS CAN EXERCISE JUDICIAL REVIEW

it speaks of appellate review of the final judgment of inferior courts, in cases

(2) Judicial Review and Political Questions.

Art. VIII, Sec. 1. Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle

on the validity of the proclamation of martial law is beyond judicial review, so

 Indeed, as already noted in the Commander-in-Chief power of the President

Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001

The Court must deny respondents‘ submission.

(3) Jurisdiction over criminal cases where penalty imposed is reclusion

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion

 The phrase "entering judgment" is not to be equated with an "entry of judgment"

Rule 124, Sec. 13. xxx

(4) Article VII, Sec. 18, par. 3

Art. VII, Sec. 18. xxx

(5) Article VII, Sec. 4, par. 7

Art. VII, Sec. 4. xxx

ISSUE: Whether R.A. 1793 is unconstitutional