Case Digest: Ulep vs Legal Clinic, Inc.

223 SCRA 378

(1993), Bar Matter No. 553

FACTS:
- Mauricio C. Ulep, a lawyer, filed a petition with the
Supreme Court of the Philippines against The Legal Clinic,
Inc., a non-lawyer entity that was advertising legal services.

- Ulep alleged that the Legal Clinic's advertisements were

champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and
destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity
of the members of the bar.

- Atty. Ulep, alleged that the Legal Clinic's advertisements

were champertous because they solicited clients by promising
to obtain favorable results in their cases. The Legal Clinic's
advertisements were unethical because they implied that the
Legal Clinic was staffed by lawyers, when in fact it was not.
Respondents even announced in their own advertisement a
certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law
belies its pretense.

- The Legal Clinic's advertisements were demeaning of the

law profession because they made it appear that anyone
could practice law, regardless of their training or
qualifications.
- The Legal Clinic's advertisements were destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members
of the bar because they created the impression that lawyers
were no longer necessary to obtain legal representation.

- The respondents admit the fact of the publication of said

advertisements at its instance.

- But claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but

in the rendering of “legal support services” through paralegals
with the use of modern computers and electronic machines.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Legal Clinic Inc. is engaged in

the practice of law.

RULING: YES. The services that Legal Clinic Inc. offered as

advertised by it constitute practice of law. According to the
SC, Practice of law means any activity, in or our of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedures,
knowledge, training and experience. Wherein, it is not just
limited to the conduct cases in court. The Court agree with the
perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar
associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised,
constitute "practice of law."

Under Rule 2.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

states that “A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business” The Code of
Professional responsibility provides that a lawyer in making
known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair,
dignified, and objective information or statement of facts. It is
highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or
skills.

. The Supreme Court noted which forms of

advertisement are allowed. The canon of the
profession tells us that the best advertisement
possible for a lawyer is a well merited reputation for
a professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which
must be earned as the outcome of character and
conduct.
In this case, the advertisement in question was a
flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of
the profession.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and
ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc.,
from issuing or causing the publication or
dissemination of any advertisement in any form which
is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as
Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from
conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity,
operation or transaction proscribed by law or the
Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein.
EN BANC

Resolution March 18, 1954

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to

the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to
1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.

Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo,

and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for
respondent.

DIOKNO, J.:

FACTS:
- Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is
known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title
of the law was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks
for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and
including 1955.”

- The Supreme Court changed the passing average

since 1946 in consideration of the varying difficulties
and the varying degree of strictness with which the
papers were graded: 72% in 1946, 69% in 1947,
70% in 1948, 74% in 1949, and 75% in 1950 to
1953.
- On June 21, 1953, Republic Act. No. 972 (Bar
Flunkers Act of 1953) was enacted without Executive
approval.
- Many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed
petitions for admission to the bar invoking the new
law’s provisions, while others who had pending
motions for revision of their examination papers also
invoked the law as grounds for admission. There are
also others who simply sought reconsideration of their
grades without invoking the new law.

- Of the 9,675 candidates who took the

examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed.
And now it is claimed that in addition 604
candidates be admitted (which in reality total
1,094), because they suffered from "insufficiency
of reading materials" and of "inadequacy of
preparation."

- To avoid injustice to individual petitioners,

the court first reviewed the motions for
reconsideration, irrespective of whether or
not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.
ISSUE: Whether the Republic Act. No. 972 (Bar
Flunkers Act of 1953)

RULING:

RULINGS: No. The Court found Republic Act No. 972

unconstitutional. The law is a manifest encroachment
on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme
Court to render the ultimate decision on who may be
admitted and may continue in the practice of law
according to existing rules. It is, in effect, a judgment
revoking the resolution of the Supreme Court on the
petitions which only the Court may revise or alter,
directly violating the Constitution.

Conclusion:
Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal,
alter and supplement the rules on admission to the
Bar by the disputed law. Article 2 of Republic Act No.
972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to
what the Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable
from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.
CANON 1 Bongalonta, petitioner vs. Castillo,
respondent 240 SCRA 310 MEJO, J:

FACTS:

- Dated February 15, 1995, complainant Sally

Bongalonta charged Pablito M. Castillo and
Alfonso M. Martija, members of the Philippine Bar,
with unjust and unethical conduct.
- The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Criminal
Case No. 7635-55, for estafa, against the Sps.
Luisa and Solomer Abuel. She also filed, a
separate civil action Civil Case No. 56934, where
she was able to obtain a writ of preliminary
attachment and by virtue thereof, a piece of real
property situated in Pasig, Rizal and registered in
the name of the Sps. Abuel under TCT No. 38374
was attached. Atty. Pablito Castillo was the
counsel of the Sps. Abuel in the aforesaid criminal
and civil cases.
- During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio
Lantin filed civil Case No. 58650 for collection of a
sum of money based on a promissory note, also
with the Pasig Regional Trial Court, against the
Sps. Abuel. In the said case Gregorio Lantin was
represented by Atty. Alfonso Martija. In this case,
 the Sps. Abuel were declared in default for their
failure to file the necessary responsive pleading
and evidence ex-parte was received against them
followed by a judgment by default rendered in
favor of Gregorio Lantin. A writ of execution was,
in due time, issued and the same property
previously attached by complainant was levied
upon.
- It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed
in these three (3) aforementioned cases, Atty.
Pablito Castillo and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed
the same address, the same PTR and the same
IBP receipt number to wit" Permanent Light
Center, No. 7, 21st Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City,
PTR No. 629411 dated 11-5-89 IBP No. 246722
dated 1-12-88.
- Thus, complainant concluded that civil Case No.
58650 filed by Gregorio Lantin was merely a part
of the scheme of the Sps. Abuel to frustrate the
satisfaction of the money judgment which
complainant might obtain in Civil Case No. 56934.

ISSUE: Is the respondent guilty of committing

falsehood in violation of his lawyers oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility?
RULING:
- YES. The respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo
guilty of committing a falsehood in violation of his
lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND him
from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months, with a warning that commission of the same
or similar offense in the future will result in the
imposition of a more severe penalty.
- The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and
recommendations. It is well to stress again that the
practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed
by the State on those who show that they possess,
and continue to possess, the qualifications required by
law for the conferment of such privilege. One of these
requirements is the observance of honesty and
candor. Courts are entitled to expect only complete
candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and
pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand,
has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation.
For this reason, he is required to swear to do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.
NARCISO MELENDREZ and ERLINDA DALMAN,
complainants,
vs.
ATTY. REYNERIO I. DECENA, respondent.

FACTS:
- On 25 September 1979, the spouses Erlinda
Dalman and Narciso Melendrez sworn a complaint
against the respondent Atty. Reynario I. Decena, a
member of the Philippine Bar, with malpractice and
breach trust.
- The complainants spouses alleged, among others,
that responded had, by means of fraud and deceit,
taken advantage of their precarious financial
situation.
- His knowledge of the law of their prejudice,
succeeded in divesting them of their only residential
lot of Pagadian City; that respondent, who was their
counsel in an estafa case against one Reynaldo
Pineda, has compromised that case without their
authority.
- In his answer dated 18 March 1980, respondent
denied all the charges levelled against him and prayed
for the dismissal of the complaint.
- There are two charged filed against Atty. Decena.
First is about the 4k load obtained by the spouses
secured by a real estate mortgage. However, it
appeared on the real a 4K. He said that the signing of
the documents was just for formality. So, they did it.
- The spouses religiously paid 10% or 500 as
interest for only 3 months because of financial
reverses.
- Consequently, Atty, Decena made a second real
estate mortgage document and the loan extended to
complainants had escalated to 10,000. Again, on the
assurance that it was for formality, the spouses
signed the new REM document.
- After 3 years, they learned that their lot was
already sold to someone. So they tried to raise the
10k and went to Atty. Decena’s house but the latter
did not accept the money and instead gave them a
sheet of paper indicating that the total indebtedness
had soared to 20,400.
- The second charged against respondent relates to
acts done in his professional capacity, that is, done at
the time when he was counsel for the complainants in
a criminal case for estafa against accused. It was
alleged that Atty. Decena effected a compromise
agreement concerning the civil liability of accused
without the consent and approval of the complainants
and that he received the amount of 500.00 as an
advance payment and he did not inform the spouses
about this. And even after he confronted, he still did
not turn over the money.
 - The respondent denies all the allegations of
complainants.

ISSUE: Whether Decena violated the Code of

Professional Responsibility?

Rulings:
YES. He clearly violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility under Canon II Propriety rule 1.01 that
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
The SC held that Atty. Decena was disbarred. Indeed
deceived the spouses.
Provision:

CANON II
PROPRIETY
A lawyer shall, at all times, act with propriety and
maintain the appearance of propriety in personal and
professional dealings, observe honesty, respect and
courtesy, and uphold the dignity of the legal
profession consistent with the highest standards of
ethical behavior. (n)

SECTION 1. Proper conduct. — A lawyer shall not

engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct. (1.01)
BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE
PHILIPPINE BAR, Vs. VICENTE D. CHING,
applicant.

FACTS:

- In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at

the Saint Louis University in Baguio City. After he
finished his degree, he filed an application to take
the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of
this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was
allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to
the condition that he must submit to the Court
proof of his Philippine citizenship.

- Apparently, Ching’s father was a Chinese

citizen but his mother was a Filipino citizen.
He was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union
on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has
resided in the Philippines.

- In compliance with the resolution, Ching

submitted the following documents;
A. Certification issued of the Board of
Accountancy of the Professional Regulations
 Commission showing that Ching is a certified
public accountant;
B. Voters Certification issued by the Election
Officer of the COMELEC in Tubao La Union (Ching
is a registered voter of the said place.
C. Certification that Ching was elected as a
member of Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La
Union.

- He eventually passed the bar but because of

the questionable status of Ching's citizenship,
he was not allowed to take his oath.

- Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated

20 April 1999, he was required to submit
further proof of his citizenship.

- The Solicitor-General averred that as a legitimate

child of a Chinese and a Filipino, Ching should
have elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority; that under prevailing
jurisprudence, “upon reaching the age of
majority” is construed as within 7 years after
reaching the age of majority (in his case 21 years
old because he was born in 1964 while the 1935
Constitution was in place).
 - Ching did elect Filipino citizenship but he only did
so when he was preparing for the bar in 1998 or
14 years after reaching the age of majority.
Nevertheless, the Solicitor-General recommended
that the rule be relaxed due to the special
circumstance of Ching.
- Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he
delayed his election of Philippine citizenship.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take the
lawyer’s oath.

RULING:
- NO, The Court is sympathetic with the plight of
Ching. However, even if we consider the special
circumstances in the life of Ching like his having
lived in the Philippines all his life and his
consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling
statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to
disagree with the recommendation of the OSG.
- Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly
elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen
(14) years that lapsed from the time he reached
the age of majority until he finally expressed his
intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly
 way beyond the contemplation of the requirement
of electing "upon reaching the age of majority."
- The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine
citizenship is certainly not a tedious and
painstaking process. All that is required of the
elector is to execute an affidavit of election
of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file
the same with the nearest civil registry.
Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in
making his election cannot be simply glossed
over.

- Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a

commodity that can be claimed when needed and
suppressed when convenient. 20 One who is
privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only
an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he
should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm
and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept
on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship
and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped
away from his grasp.

- IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves

to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for
admission to the Philippine Bar.
 Citizenship under the 1935 Constitution, which
was in effect when Ching was born, was treated
as follows:
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at
the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign
parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution,
had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority,
elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Ching maintained that he has always considered
himself as a Filipino; that he is a certified public
accountant – a profession reserved for Filipinos; that
he even served as a councilor in a municipality in La
Union.
CORDOVA vs. CORDOVA, A.C. No. 3249. August 9,
2004

FACTS:
- Salvacion Delizo-Cordova filed a complaint
against the respondent, her husband for immoral
conduct.
- In the resolution of November 29, 1989, the
Court indefinitely suspended Atty. Lawrence D.
Cordova from the practice of law after finding him
guilty of immorality.
- The Court likewise resolved to consider lifting the
suspension upon submission by respondent of
proof satisfactory to the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD), Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), that he has and continues to provide for
the support of his legitimate family and that he
has given up his immoral course of conduct.
- On January 15, 1992 and February 12, 1992,
respondent and complainant, respectively, filed
separate petitions with this Court praying that the
suspension of respondent be lifted. In his petition,
respondent explained that the allegations of
maltreatment and failure to provide support were
products of complainant's imagination and were
unsubstantiated.
- Respondent also submitted the affidavit of
desistance executed by complainant on December
27, 1991, attesting that he has reformed, living in
the conjugal home and provides love and paternal
affection to his family. On the other hand,
complainant contended in her petition that she
and respondent have reconciled, and that
respondent has given up his immoral conduct and
is supporting his legitimate family.
- However, on March 17, 1992, complainant wrote
separate letters to Chief Justice Andres R.
Narvasa and the IBP negating her earlier petition
to lift respondent's suspension. Complainant
claimed that respondent still goes home to his
live-in partner, Cita Magallanes; does not support
his family, and made it appear that he had
changed his ways so she would sign an affidavit
of desistance.
- In the months following, complainant sent two
other letters of a similar tenor. At about the same
time, Lorraine Salve Cordova wrote the Court in
support of her father's petition.
- On January 30, 1998, the CBD received a
Manifestation/Motion from respondent reiterating
his plea that his suspension be lifted. The court
On May 29, 2000, the IBP Board of Governors
passed Resolution No. XIV-000-318, adopting and
 approving the report and recommendation of
Commissioner Elamparo, lifting the suspension of
respondent, copy of which was furnished this
Court.
- In a letter dated January 18, 2002, complainant
expressed disappointment over the move of
the Surigao del Sur Chapter in extending
assistance to respondent. She contended that
the Surigao del Sur Chapter is not in a
position to know that respondent has already
reformed, and claimed that respondent is
cohabiting with his mistress, Isabelita Cinciro,
with whom he has a seven-year old son. She also
opined that all the allegations in respondent's
motion for early resolution were lies, and that in
1992, respondent tried to reconcile with her so
that his suspension would be lifted. Complainant
thought that respondent had turned in a new leaf
but later discovered that this was not so. She also
recounted the hardships that she endured with
respondent.
- The Court referred this matter to the Office of the
Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and
recommendation. In its Report dated January 13,
2003, the OBC submitted that the Court is neither
bound by the findings of the IBP nor obliged to
accept the same as a matter of course. It
 also considered the protestation of respondent
that the length of his suspension is more
than sufficient punishment and his insistence that
he has fully reformed are not fully meritorious
since respondent has not submitted proof
satisfactory to the Court that he has met the
standards imposed in the Resolution of November
29, 1989.
- On January 27, 2003, upon the
recommendation of the OBC, the Court
required respondent to comment on the letter
dated January 18, 2002 of complainant and to
submit satisfactory proof that he has continuously
provided for the support of his family and that he
has given up his immoral conduct. Respondent
received a copy of said resolution on March 21,
2003 but failed to comply therewith.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Lawrence D. Cordova’s
suspension be lifted on the basis that he has
morally reformed.

RULING:
NO. The SC held that considering that up to this
late date, respondent has neither commented on
the letter dated January 18, 2002 of complainant
by way of opposition to his motion to lift
suspension nor submitted satisfactory proof that
he has continuously provided for the support of
his legitimate family and given up his immoral
conduct.
Therefore, the Court Resolves to DENY the mot
ion of respondent that his indefinite suspension
from the practice of law be lifted.