TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

BUSTAMANTE VS AREVALO 2
CUEVAS VS CUEVAS
MOLO VS MOLO
GAGO VS MAMUYAC
IN RE ESTATE OF SUNTAY
AUSTRIA VS REYES
MANALO VS PAREDES
MERCADO VS SANTOS
RABADILLA VS CA
NEPOMUCENO VS CA
FERNANDEZ VS DIMAGIBA
TEOTICO VS DEL VAL
GUEVARRA VS GUEVARRA
PASTOR VS COURT OF APPEALS
AGAPAY VS PALANG
MALOLES VS PHILIPS
NUGUID VS NUGUID
JIMENEZ VS IAC
DE LA CERNA VS POTOT
GALLANOSA VS ARCANGHEL
DOROTHEO VS CA
VENTURA VS VENTURA
TRILLANO VS CRISOSTOMO
SUMILANG VS RAMAGOSA
PALACIOS VS PALACIOS
COSO VS FERNANDEZ DEZA
BUGNAO CASE
CUYUGAN VS BARON
SANCHO VS ABELLA
ICASIANO VS ICASIANO
PASCUAL VS CA

1
BUSTAMANTE VS. AREVALO

73 Phil 635

FACT:

The testatrix in this case executed two wills, one on January 9, 1936, and the other on October 2, 1937.
In the first will, the testatrix specifically referred to seven parcels of land of considerable value and to
certain personal properties. Three of these parcels of land and all the personal properties are given to
Amando Clemente, another three to Ariston Bustamante, and the seventh parcel to Petrona Arevalo and
Carmen Papa. In the second will, the testatrix particularly referred to only five parcels of land and
certain personal properties, all of which are given to Ariston Bustamante, as her universal heir. The
second will does not make mention of two of the three parcels given to Amando Clemente under the
first will.

ISSUE:

2
Whether or not the latter will whose probate is herein approved, has entirely revoked the earlier will.

HELD:

NO. The two wills can be reconciled, the first should be considered revoked only in so far as it is
inconsistent with the second. As the second will was executed only twenty-one months after the first,
the testatrix, who has been conclusively shown to be of sound mind at the time of the execution of the
later will, could not have forgotten that she owned two other parcels of land, especially if they are of
considerable value. Even the lawyer who drafted the second will was aware that the testatrix owned the
said two parcels, because they were included in the inventory made of her properties in connection with
the administration proceedings of the estate of her deceased husband. This omission could have been
made only on purpose, and, coupled with the circumstance that the section will does not expressly
revoke the first which has not been burned, torn, cancelled or obliterated, inevitably leads to the
inference that the testatrix in face intended to make the first will effective as to the two parcels of land
above referred to. Section 623 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: No will shall be revoked, except
by implication of law, otherwise than by some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case
of wills; or by burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the same with the intention of revoking it, by
the testator himself, or by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction. xxx xxx xxx If
partially conflicting, that of the latter date will operate to revoke the former so far as the provisions of
the two are conflicting or incompatible, and in such case both wills are entitled to probate. (68 Corpus
Juris 805.) Where there is no revocation in a later will of all former wills, two separate and distinct wills
may be probated, especially when the probating of one only of the instruments would leave intestacy as
to part of the estate. This rule applies even though the later instrument states that it is the last will and
testament of the testator, as the use of such words in a later instrument does not of itself revoke a prior
will.

3
ANTONINA CUEVAS v. CRISPULO CUEVAS
GR No. L-8327
1955-12-14

Facts:

Antonina Cuevas executed a notarized conveyance entitled "Donacion Montis Causa," ceding to her
nephew Crispulo Cuevas the northern half of a parcel of unregistered land in the same instrument
appears the acceptance of Crispulo Cuevas.Subsequently the donor executed another notarial
instrument purporting to set aside the preceding conveyance and she brought action in the Court of
First Instance to recover the land conveyed, on the ground (1) that the donation being mortis causa, it
had been lawfully revoked by the donor; and (2) even if it were a donation inter vivos, the same was
invalidated because (a) it was not properly accepted; (b) because the donor did not reserve sufficient
property for her own maintenance, and (c) because the donee was guilty of ingratitude, for having
refused to support the donor. The Court of First Instance denied the recovery sought, and Antonina
Cuevas thereupon appealed. The Court of Appeals forwarded the case to this Court

Issues:

Whether it embodies a donation inter vivos or a disposition of property mortis that causes revocable
freely by the transferor at any time before death.

HELD:

Neither the designation mortis causa, nor the provision that a donation is "to take effect at the death of
the donor", is a controlling criterion in defining the true nature of donations the donor reserves to
herself "the right of possession, cultivation, harvesting and other rights and attributes of ownership
while I am not deprived of life by the Almighty” but right after, the same donor states that she "will not
take away" (the property) "because I reserve it for him (the donee) when, I die."

The question to be decided 13 whether the donpr intended to part with the title to the property
immediately upon the execution of the deed, or only later, when she had died.

If the first, the donation is operative inter vivos; if the second, we would be confronted with a
disposition mortis causa, void from the beginning because the formalities of testaments were not
observed the decisive proof that the present donation is operative inter vivos lies in the final phrase to
the effect that the donor will not dispose or take away the land "because I am reserving it to him upon
my death."

By these words the donor expressly renounced the right to freely dispose of the property in. Favor of
another and manifested the irrevocability of the conveyance of the naked, title to the property in favor
of the donee. Such irrevocability is characteristic of donations inter vivos, because it is incompatible with
the idea of a disposition post mortem.

4
Molo vs. Molo
G.R. No. L-2538
September 21, 1951

Facts:

Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June 1939. The latter will contained a
revocation clause which expressly revoked the will in 1918. He died without any forced heirs but he was
survived by his wife, herein petitioner Juana. The oppositors to the probate were his nephews and
nieces.

Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for the probate of the 1939
will. It was admitted to probate but subsequently set aside on ground that the petitioner failed to prove
its due execution.

As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will this time. Again the
oppositors alleged that said will had already been revoked under the 1939 will. They contended that
despite the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid and thus effectively nullified the
1918 will.

Issue:

Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocation in the subsequent disallowed 1939
will

Held:

Yes. The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a subsequent will, containing a
clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it was not executed in
accordance with law cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as the said
revocatory clause is void.

There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the testator deliberately
destroyed the original 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will
executed in 1939.The earlier will can still be probated under the principle of dependent relative
revocation. The doctrine applies when a testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument
intended to revoke a will with the intention to make a new testamentary disposition as substitute for
the old, and the new disposition fails of effect for some reason.

5
Gago vs Mamuyac

Facts:

Miguel Mamuyac died on January 2, 1922, in the municipality of Agoo, La Union. On July 27, 1918,
Miguel Mamuyac executed a last will and testament (Exhibit A). In January 1922, Francisco Gago filed a
petition in the Court of First Instance of La Union for the probation of the will. The probation was
opposed by Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and Catalina Mamuyac. The petition
for the probation of the will was denied by the court on November 2, 1923, on the ground that Miguel
Mamuyac had executed a new will and testament on April 16, 1919.

Issue:

Whether the will of April 16, 1919, should be probated.

Held:

The court denied the probation of the will of April 16, 1919, on the ground that it had been cancelled
and revoked by Miguel Mamuyac in 1920. The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or
cancellation of a will to be preserved, making it difficult to prove the cancellation or revocation of wills.
If a will cannot be found and it was shown to have been in the possession of the testator when last seen,
the presumption is that it was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises if the testator had
ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. It is not presumed that the will was
destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator. In this case, since the
original will of 1919 could not be found after the death of Miguel Mamuyac and there was positive proof
that it had been cancelled, the court concluded that the will had been cancelled by the testator.

Therefore, the lower court's decision to deny the probation of the will was affirmed.

6
In Re Estate of Sutay
G.R. No. L-3087

FACTS
This is an appeal from a decree of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan disallowing the alleged will and
testament executed in Manila on November 1929, and the alleged last will and testament executed in
Kulangsu, Amoy, China, on 4 January 1931, by Jose B. Suntay. Value of the estate left by the deceased is
more than P50,000. Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines, died in the city of
Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of China, leaving real and personal properties in the Philippines and a
house in Amoy, Fookien province, China. Children by the first marriage had with the late Manuela T.
Cruz. Intestate proceedings were instituted in CFI of Bulacan and after hearing letters of administration
were issued to Apolonio Suntay. Surviving widow filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan for the probate of a last will and testament claimed to have been executed and signed in the
Philippines on November 1929 by the late Jose B. Suntay.

Petition was denied because of the loss of said will after the filing of the petition and before the hearing
thereof and of the insufficiency of the evidence to establish the loss of the said will. An appeal was taken
from said order denying the probate of the will

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner and his mother were estopped from asking for the probate of the lost will
or of the foreign will because of the transfer or assignment of their share right, title and interest in the
estate of the late Jose B. Suntay to Jose G. Gutierrez and the spouses Ricardo Gutierrez and Victoria
Goño and the subsequent assignment thereof by the assignees to Francisco Pascual and by the latter to
Federico C. Suntay?

HELD:
The decree appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

7
Austria v. Reyes Digest

Facts:

Basilia Austria executed a will wherein the bulk of her estate was given to the respondents, alll have
been declared by the former as her legally adopted children. During her lifetime, Basilia filed a petition
for the probate of her will. It was opposed by the petitioners who are the nephews and nieces. The
opposition was dismissed and the will was allowed. In 1954, the petitioners filed a petition for
intervention for partition alleging that they were the nearest kin of Basilia and that the respondent had
not been in fact adopted by the decedent in accordance with law, hence the latter were strangers with
no right to succeed as heirs. The lower court held that the validity or invalidity is not material to the
institution of heirs. It held that the testator was possessed of testamentary capacity and her last will was
executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence.

Issue:

Whether or not the institution of the heir is valid

Held:

Yes. The general rule is that the falsity of the stated cause for the testamentary institution does not
affect the validity or efficacy of the institution. An exception to the rule is that the falsity will set aide the
institution if certain factors are present. Before the institution of the heirs will be annulled under Art.
850 the following requisites must concur; 1) the cause must be stated in the will, 2) the cause is shown
to be false, and 3) it must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such
institution if he had known the falsity. Moreover, testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side
especially when the will shows a clear intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his
whole estate as in this case.

8
Manalo v. Paredes
GR 24168
Sept. 22, 1925

Facts:
In a probate proceeding, Justina Mendieta, for herself and in her capacity as guardian ad litem of her
minor children Lazaro Mendieta and Daria Mendieta, on one hand, and Laureana Hidalgo, on the other,
submitted to the court an agreement wherein Justina Mendieta stated that she withdrew her
application for the probate of the supposed will of the deceased Francisco Villegas on the ground that
the evidence was insufficient to justify the probate of said will, and consequently, she prayed that said
will be held not allowable to probate and that the deceased died intestate, without leaving any more
heirs than his legitimate wife, Laureana Hidalgo, and his two adulterous children, Lazaro and Daria
Mendieta, and that the property of the deceased be distributed in accordance with said agreement. The
court approved said stipulation and rendered judgement in its favor. Later, Florencio Manalo, as
guardian of the minors Lazaro and Daria Mendieta, filed for the issuance of a writ of mandamus,
ordering the publication of the petition for the probate of the will of the deceased Francisco Villegas,
and injunction to suspend the proceedings in a registration case of the Court of CFI, wherein the
Philippine Food Co. is the applicant and the minors Lazaro and Daria Mendieta opponents, until the
termination of the proceeding for the probate of the will of Francisco Villegas, in which said minors are
named legatees of the land involved in said registration case.

Issue:

Whether a writ of mandamus is the proper remedy?

Held:

No. The proceeding for the probate of a will is a proceeding in rem, and the court acquires jurisdiction
over all the persons interested through the publication of the notice prescribed by section 630 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, and any order that may be entered is binding against all of them. The court
having tried said application for probate, hearing all the testimony of the attesting witnesses of the said
supposed will, and having approved the

9
ATILANO G. MERCADO v. ALFONSO SANTOS
GR No. 45629
1938-09-22

Facts:

Petitioner herein filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a petition for the probate of the will of
his deceased wife, Ines Basa. Without any opposition, and upon the testimony of Benigno F. Gabino, one
of the attesting witnesses, the probate court, on June 27, 1931, admitted the will to probate.

Almost three years later, on April 11, 1934, the five interveners’ herein moved ex parte to reopen the
proceedings, alleging lack of jurisdiction of the court to probate the will and to close the proceedings.
Because filed ex parte, the motion was denied. The same motion was filed a second time, but with
notice to the adverse party. The motion was nevertheless denied by the probate court on May 24, 1934.
On appeal to this court, the order of denial was affirmed on

July 26, 1935. (Basa vs. Mercado, sixteen months after the probate of the will of Ines Basa, intervenor
Rosario Basa de Leon filed with the justice of the peace court of San Fernando, Pampanga, a complaint
against the petitioner herein, for falsification or forgery of the will probated petitioner was arrested.

Put up a bond in the sum of P4, 000 and engaged the services of an attorney to undertake his defense.

Complaint was finally dismissed, at the instance of the complainant herself, in an order dated December
8, 1932. Three months later, or on March 2, 1933, the same intervenor charged the petitioner for the
second time with the same offense, This second complaint, after investigation, was also dismissed, again
at the instance of the complainant herself nine months later, on February 2, 1934, to be exact, the same
intervenor accused the same petitioner for the third time of the same offense. Dismissed on April 24,
1934, after due investigation, on the ground that the will alleged to have been falsified had already been
probated and there was no evidence that the petitioner had forged the signature of the testatrix
appearing thereon, but that, on the contrary, the evidence satisfactorily established the authenticity of
the signature aforesaid. The provincial fiscal, on May 9, 1934, moved in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga for reinvestigation of the case. The motion was granted reinvestigation dragged on for almost
a year until February 18, 1934, when the Court of First Instance ordered that the case be tried on the
merits. The petitioner interposed a demurrer on November 25, 1935, on the ground that the will alleged
to have been forged had already been pro bated. Demurrer was overruled exception was taken and a
motion for reconsideration and notice of appeal were filed. Case proceeded to trial, and forthwith
petitioner moved to dismiss the case claiming again that the will alleged to have been forged had
already been probated and, further, that the order probating the will is conclusive as to the authenticity
and due execution thereof. The motion was overruled petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to enjoin the trial court from further proceedings in
the matter. The injunction was issued and thereafter, on June 19, 1937, the Court of Appeals dented the
petition for certiorari, and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction.

Issues:

That the probate of the will of his deceased wife is a bar to his criminal prosecution for the alleged
forgery of the said will.

10
Ruling:

No will shall pass either the real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed in the Court of First
instance, or by appeal to the Supreme Court; and the allowance by the court of a will of... real and
personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution.

11
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 113725
June 29, 2000

FACTS:

Testator Aleja Belleza appended a codicil to his last will and testament wherein he instituted Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla as a devisee of 511, 855 sq meters of Lot 1392 in Bacolod. The codicil was duly probated and
admitted before the CFI of Negros Occidental.

The codicil stated that should the devisee die ahead of the testator, the property and rights shall be
inherited by his children and spouse. The codicil also required Rabadilla to deliver 75 piculs of export
sugar and 25 piculs of domestic sugar to Maria Marlina Cosculuella y Belleza, and should he die, his heir
shall have the same obligation. Lastly, in the event that the devisee or his heir shall later sell, lease,
mortgage the said lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee shall also have the obligation to deliver the piculs.
Dr. Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife and children (pet).

In 1989, Maria Marlena brought a complaint against the heirs to enforce the provisions of the codicil (to
deliver piculs of sugar) and to revert the ownership to the heirs of the testator. A memorandum of
agreement to enforce the codicil was agreed but was only partially complied.

Thereafter, the RTC dismissed the complaint. The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court
ruling that Dr. Rabadilla is instituted through modal institution and ordered the reconveyance of lot
1392 to the estate of the testatrix. Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does not find application as
there was no modal institution and the testatrix intended a mere simple substitution (to deliver piculs of
sugar to private respondents).

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was substitution and not institucion sub modo?

HELD:

NO.

The contention is without merit. Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to
take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted. In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the
inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation. In the case
under consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix’s near descendants would substitute
him. What the par. 6 of the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfil the
conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the
testatrix’s near descendants.

Further, in a institucion sub modo or modal institution (Art. 882), the testator states the 1) object of the
institution; and 2) the purpose or application of the property left by the testator or the charge imposed
by the testator upon the heir. A “mode” imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not

12
affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary
disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the
testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend.
The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature
because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such
institution. To some extent, it is similar to a resolutory condition. In case of doubt, the institution should
be considered as modal and not conditional.

13
Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

Martin Hugo died on 1974 and he left a will wherein he instituted Sofia Nepomuceno as the sole and
only executor. It was also provided therein that he was married to Rufina Gomez with whom he had 3
children. Petitioner (Sofia) filed for the probate of the will but the legal wife and her children opposed
alleging that the will was procured through improper and undue influence and that there was an
admission of concubinage with the petitioner.

The lower court denied the probate on the ground of the testator's admission of cohabitation, hence
making the will invalid on its face. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that the will is valid except
the devise in favor of the petitioner which is null and void in violation of Art. 739 and 1028.

Issue:

Whether or not the court can pass on the intrinsic validity of a will

RULING:

Yes, as an exception. But the general rule is that the court's area of inquiry is limited to the an
examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. This general rule is however not inflexible
and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the
situation constrains it to do and may pass upon certain provisions of the will. The will itself admitted on
its face the relationship between the testator and the petitioner.

The will was validly executed in accordance with law but the court didn't find it to serve a practical
purpose to remand the nullified provision in a separate action for that purpose only since in the probate
of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.

The devisee is invalid by virtue of Art. 739 which void a donation made between persons guilty of
adultery/concubinage at the time of the donations. Under Art, 1028 it is also prohibited.

14
FERNANDEZ VS DIMAGIBA

FACTS:

The late Benedicta de los Reyes had left a will instituting Ismaela Dimagiba, now respondent, as the sole
heir of her estate. Later, Dimagiba petitioned for the probate of the will but Dionisio Fernandez, et. Al,
all claiming to be heirs intestate of the decedent, filed oppositions to the probate asked on the ground
of forgery, estoppel by laches of the proponent, and among others. After trial, the CFI found that the will
was genuine and properly executed and also overruled the claim that proponent was in estoppel to ask
for the probate of the will. The oppositors elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but said Court held
that the decree admitting the will to probate had become final for lack of opportune appeal. Oppositors
then appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the decree of the Court of First Instance allowing the will to probate had become final
for lack of appeal

HELD:

It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of
the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of
whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise. As such, the probate order is final and
appealable; and it is so recognized by express provisions of Section 1 of Rule 109, that specifically
prescribes that "any interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment
where such order or judgment: (a) allows or disallows a will. There being no controversy that the
probate decree of the Court below was not appealed on time, the same had become final and
conclusive. Hence, the appellate courts may no longer revoke said decree nor review the evidence upon
which it is made to rest. Thus, the appeal belatedly lodged against the decree was correctly dismissed.

15
Teotico vs. Del Val
G.R. No. L-18753
March 26, 1965

Facts:

Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. De Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila with no
ascendants or descendants. She left properties worth P600, 000.00 and a will written in Spanish which
she executed at her residence at No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, and Manila. She affixed her signature at the
bottom of the will and on the left margin of each and every page thereof in the presence of three
witnesses who in turn affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of
each and every page of the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. Said will was
acknowledged before a Notary Public by the testatrix and her witnesses.

In said will Maria stated among others that she was possessed of the full use of her mental faculties;
that she was free from illegal pressure or influence of any kind from the beneficiaries of the will and
from any influence of fear or threat and that she freely and spontaneously executed said will.

She left P20, 000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married to her niece named Josefina Mortera; and the usufruct
of her interest in the Calvo building to the said spouses. However, the naked ownership of the building
was left in equal parts to the legitimate children of said spouses. She also instituted Josefina Mortera as
her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will.

Thereafter, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the Court of First
Instance of Manila. However, Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a
deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased
brother of the same testatrix.

Issues:

Has oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in this proceeding?

Held:

Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate
either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the
will, because nowhere in the will was any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any
portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither
has she any claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof.

16
Guevara v Guevara

Facts:

Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he made various bequests t his wife, stepchildren,
wife in the 2nd marriage. He has a legitimate son Ernesto and a natural daughter Rosario. Therein, he
acknowledged Rosario as his natural daughter. In 1933, Victorino died but his last will was never
presented for probate nor was there any settlement proceeding initiated. It appeared that only his son
Ernest possessed the land which he adjudicated to himself. While Rosario who had the will in her
custody, did nothing to invoke the acknowledgment, as well as the devise given to her. Subsequently,
Rosario filed an action for the recovery of her legitime from Ernesto, a portion of a large parcel of land
invoking the acknowledgment contained in the will and based on the assumption that the decedent died
intestate because his will was not probated. She alleged that the disposition in favor of Ernesto should
be disregarded.

The lower court and the Court of Appeals sustained Rosario's theory.

Issue:

Whether or not the probate of a will can be dispensed with

Held:

No. Rosario's contention violates procedural law and considered an attempt to circumvent the last will
and testament of the decedent. The presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its
allowance is essential and indispensable to its efficacy.

Suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy for without probate, the right of a person to
dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory.

17
PASTOR VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Alvaro Pastor, Sr. (PASTOR, SR.), a Spanish subject, died in Cebu City on June 5, 1966, survived by his
Spanish wife Sofia Bossio (who also died on October 21, 1966), their two legitimate children Alvaro
Pastor, Jr. (PASTOR, JR.) and Sofia Pastor de Midgely (SOFIA), and an illegitimate child, not natural, by
the name of Lewellyn Barlito Quemada (QUEMADA). PASTOR, JR. is a Philippine citizen, having been
naturalized in 1936. SOFIA is a Spanish subject. QUEMADA is a Filipino by his mother’s citizenship. On
November 13, 1970, QUEMADA filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged holographic
will of PASTOR, SR. with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I (PROBATE COURT), docketed as SP
No. 3128-R. The will contained only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of QUEMADA
consisting. On August 20, 1980, while the reconveyance suit was still being litigated in Branch IX of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, the PROBATE COURT issued the now assailed Order of Execution and
Garnishment, resolving the question of ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect
that the legacy to QUEMADA was not inofficious. The order being “immediately executory”, QUEMADA
succeeded in obtaining a Writ of Execution and Garnishment on September 4, 1980, and in serving the
same on ATLAS on the same day. Notified of the Order on September 6, 1980, the oppositors sought
reconsideration thereof on the same date primarily on the ground that the PROBATE COURT gravely
abused its discretion when it resolved the question of ownership of the royalties and ordered the
payment of QUEMADA’s legacy after prematurely passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will. In the
meantime, the PROBATE COURT ordered suspension of payment of all royalties due PASTOR, JR. and/or
his assignees until after resolution of oppositors’ motion for reconsideration. Even before the Motion for
Reconsideration could be resolved, Pastor Jr. and his wife field with the CA a Petition for Certiorari which
was later on denied on the ground that its filing was premature because there was still a pending motion
for reconsideration pending before the probate court – The spouse still moved for reconsideration.

ISSUES:

WON, The Probate Order resolved with finality the questions of ownership and intrinsic validity of the
will?

HELD:

No, Contrary to the position taken by the probate court, these two issues have not yet been resolved.
Therefore, the probate order could not have resolved and actually did not decide Quemada’s
entitlement to the legacy. This being so, the orders of payment of the legacy in the alleged
implementation of the Probate Order of 1972 are unwarranted and lack of legal basis.

The question of ownership is as a rule, an extraneous matter in a probate proceeding. In a special

18
Proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the
will, whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law.

Erlinda Agapay vs Carlina Palang

19
G.R. No. 116668

July 28 1997

FACTS:

Miguel Palang married Calina Vellesterol with whom he had 1 child. He then contracted his second
marriage with Erlinda Agapay, with whom he had a son. The couple purchased a parcel of agricultural
land and the transfer certificate was issued in their names. She also purchased a house and lot in
Binalonan, where the property was later issued in her name. Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of
Donation, wherein they agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their
only child, Herminia. Carlina filed a complaint against Miguel and Erlinda for bigamy.

Miguel died, and Carlina and Herminia instituted an action for recovery of ownership and possession
with damages against Erlinda. They sought to get back the riceland and house and lot allegedly bought
by Miguel during his cohabitation with Erlinda. RTC dismissed the complaint and ordered the
respondents to provide for the intestate shares of the parties, particularly of Erlinda's son. CA reversed
the trial court's decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the properties from Miguel's second marriage be granted to Erlinda.

RULING:

No. SC held that the agricultural land and house and land cannot be granted to Erlinda.

The sale of the riceland was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law applicable here is
Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman who
are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. The marriage of Miguel and Erlinda was null and void
because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the latter's de
facto separation.

Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in
contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and
household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no

20
salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be
no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy
and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade SC that she actually contributed money to buy
the subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance, when she was only
around 20 of age and Miguel Palang was already 64 and a pensioner of the U.S. Government.
Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that she contributed P3, 750.00 as her share in
the purchase price of subject property, there being no proof of the same.

With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20, 000.00 when she was only
22 years old. The testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property
testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for the purchase price and directed that Erlinda’s name
alone be placed as the vendee.

Since Erlinda failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland, we find
no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Consequently, the riceland should, as
correctly hold by the CA, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and Carlina
Palang.

The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda was void. Article 87 of the Family
Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to
donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise,
the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.

As regards to the donation of their conjugal property executed by Miguel and Carlina in favor of their
daughter, was also void. Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take
place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the
marriage settlements. The judgment which resulted from the parties’ compromise was not specifically
and expressly for separation of property and should not be so inferred

21
MALOLES VS PHILIPS
G.R. No. 129505
January 31, 2000

FACTS:

Dr. Santos filed a petition for the probate of his will. He has no compulsory heir and designated as an
heir the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Incorporated with an approximated value of less than 2M Peso
property. He designated Phillips as his executrix. The RTC granted the petition and allowing the will.
Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. Santos died. Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention
claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testators sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he

was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a
creditor of the testator. Judge Abad Santos granted Maloles’ motion for intervention. Phillips moved for
reconsideration but her motion was denied by the trial court. She then filed a petition for certiorari in
the Court of Appeals which rendered a decision setting aside the trial courts order on the ground that
petitioner had not shown any right or interest to intervene.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, has a right to intervene.

RULING:

No. In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court is limited to
ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely
executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. Thus, after the allowance of the
will of Dr. De Santos there was nothing else for RTC to do except to issue a certificate of allowance of the
will pursuant to Rule 73, of the Rules of Court.

22
NUGUID VS NUGUID

Facts:

Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents –
Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters.

Remedios, one of the sisters filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario instituting the
former as the sole, universal heir of all her properties. She prayed that said will be admitted to probate
and that letter of administration be issued to her.

Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground that by the institution of Remedios as
universal heir of the deceased, oppositors – who are compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line –
were illegally preterited and that in consequence, the institution is void.

Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir.

Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of
preterition drawing the conclusion that Article 854 does not apply in the case at bar.

Issue:

WON the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole, universal heir preterited the
compulsory heirs.

Held:

Yes. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left forced heirs in the
direct ascending line – her parents, and her holographic will does not explicitly disinherit them but
simply omits their names altogether, the case is one of preterition of the parents, not a case of
ineffective disinheritance.

Preterition “consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, through mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor
are expressly disinherited”. Disinheritance, in turn, “is a testamentary disposition depriving any
compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law”.

Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal heir and preterits the parents
of the testatrix, and it contains no specific legacies or bequests, such universal institution of petitioner,
by itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues.

23
TOMAS JIMENEZ v. IAC
G.R.NO. 75773
1990-04-17

Facts:

All that the said court could do as regards said properties is determine whether they should or should
not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is
a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and... the administrator have to resort to an
ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court
cannot do so.[

The provisional character of the inclusion in the inventory of a contested property was again reiterated
in the following cases: Pio Barreto Realty Development, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,[14] Junquera vs.
Borromeo,[15] Borromeo vs. Canonoy,[16] Recto vs. de la Rosa.[17] It has also been held that in a
special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which
the probate court... cannot resolve with finality..

Issues:

The issue in this case is whether in a settlement proceeding (testate or intestate) the lower court has
jurisdiction to settle questions of ownership and whether res judicata exists as to bar petitioners'
present action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the... five (5) parcels of land. In the
negative, is the present action for re-conveyance barred by prescription and/or laches?

Ruling:

Petitioners' present action for recovery of possession and ownership is appropriately filed because as a
general rule, a probate court can only pass upon questions of title provisionally.

24
Dela Cerna vs. Potot

Facts:

The spouses Bernabe Dela Serna and Gerasisa Rebabca executed a joint will where they gave two (2)
parcels of land to manuela Rebaca, a niece, as they didn't have their own child. When Bernabe died, the
said will was probated in 1939.

Another petition for probate of the same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed in 1952 but
due to the failure of the petitioner (Manuela) to appears, the same was dismissed in 1954.

The CFI held the petition (Bernabe probate) to be null and void as it is contrary to law. While the Court
of Appeals reversed and held that the decree of probate in 1939 was issued by a court of probate
jurisdiction and conclusive as to the due execution of the will. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the will is valid

Ruling:

The Supreme Court affirmed the CA decision and held that once a decree of probate becomes final in
accordance with the rules of procedure, it is res judicata. The final decree of probate entered in 1939 in
the CFI of Cebu is conclusive as to the last will of Bernabe despite the fact that even then the Civil Code
already decreed the invalidity of joint wills. (There was an error on the court but the decree has now
become final.)

The probate court committed an error of law which should have been corrected on appeals but which
did not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its final decision. A
decision which is binding upon the whole world.

Nevertheless, the probate in 1939 only affected the share of Bernabe and could not include the
disposition of the share of his wife which was still alive then; her properties were still not within the
jurisdiction of the court. Hence, the validity of the will with respect to her, must be on her death, be re-
examined and adjudicated de novo -- since a joint will is considered a separate will of each testator.

25
Gallanosa v. Arcangel

Facts:

Florentino Gallanosa executed a will in 1938 when he was 80 years old. He owned 61 parcels of and at
that time. He died in 1939 childless and survived by his brother Leon. In his will, he bequeathed his 1/2
share of the conjugal estate to his second wife Tecla and if she predecease him (as what occurred), the
said share shall be assigned to the spouses Gallanosa (Pedro & Corazon). Pedro is Tecla's son by her 1st
marriage. He also gave 3 parcels of land to Adolfo, his protégé.

The said will was admitted to probate with Gallanosa as executor. In 1952, thjhe legal heirs filed an
action for the recovery of said 61 parcels of land. The action was dismissed on the ground of res
judicata. Then, 28 years after probate, another action against Gallanosa for annulment of the will,
recovery of the lands alleging fraud and deceit, was filed. As a result, the lower court set aside the 1939
decree of probate.

Issue:

Whether or not a will which has been probated may still be annulled

Ruling:

No. A final decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution of the will. Due execution means that
the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution and that he was not acting
under duress, menace, fraud or undue influence. Finally, that it was executed in accordance with the
formalities provided by law.

The period for seeking relief under Rule 38 has already expired, hence the judgment may only be set
aside on the grounds of, 1) lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law, and 2) the judgment was
obtained by means of extrinsic collateral fraud (which must be filed within 4 years from the discovery).
Finally, Art. 1410 cannot apply to wills and testament.

26
LOURDES L. DOROTHEO v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 108581
1999-12-08

Facts:

Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The latter
died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime in 1977, after
Alejandro's death, petitioner filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latter's last will and
testament. In 1981, the court issued an order admitting Alejandro's will to probate. Private respondents
did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a "Motion to Declare the Will Intrinsically Void." The
trial court granted the motion and issued an order, Petitioner moved for reconsideration

Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the
same was dismissed. This dismissal became final and executory and a corresponding entry of judgment
was forthwith a writ of execution was issued by the lower court to implement the final and executory
Order.

An Order was issued on November 29, 1990 by Judge Zain B. Angas setting aside the final and executory
Order dated January 30, 1986, as well as the Order directing the issuance of the writ of execution, on
the ground that the order was merely "interlocutory", hence not final in character. Thus, private
respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals, which nullified the two assailed Orders
Petitioner posits that the January 30, 1986 Order is merely interlocutory, hence it can still be set aside by
the trial court. In support thereof, petitioner argues that "an order merely declaring who are heirs and
the shares to which set of heirs is entitled cannot be the basis of execution to require delivery of shares
from one person to another particularly when no project of partition has been filed."

Issues:

May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an order that has
become final and executory still be given effect?

Ruling:

A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how
erroneous it may be.

The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after
the will has been authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will
and testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides
for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance
according to the laws on succession, the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect.
This is specially so when the courts had already determined in a final and executory decision that the will
is intrinsically void. Such determination having attained that character of finality is binding on this Court
which will no longer be disturbed.

27
Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic invalidity of the will, as she
precisely appealed from an unfavorable order therefrom. Although the final and executory Order of
January 30, 1986 wherein private respondents were declared as the only heirs do not bind those who
are not parties thereto such as the alleged illegitimate son of the testator, the same constitutes res
judicata with respect to those who were parties to the probate proceedings. Petitioner cannot again
raise those matters anew for relitigation otherwise that would amount to forum-shopping.

The trial court declared in the January 30, 1986 Order that petitioner is not the legal wife of Alejandro,
whose only heirs are his three legitimate children (petitioners herein), and at the same time it nullified
the will. But it should be noted that in the same Order, the trial court also said that the estate of the late
spouses be distributed according to the laws of intestacy. Accordingly, it has no option but to implement
that order of intestate distribution and not to reopen and again re-examine the intrinsic provisions of
the same will.

It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of successional rights that testacy
is preferred to intestacy.[20] But before there could be testate distribution, the will must pass the
scrutinizing test and safeguards provided by law considering that the deceased testator is no longer
available to prove the voluntariness of his actions, aside from the fact that the transfer of the estate is
usually onerous in nature and that no one is presumed to give. In this case, the court had ruled that the
will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of
intestacy apply as correctly held by the trial court.

28
Ventura vs. Ventura

Facts:

The case involves the removal of Maria Ventura as executrix and administratrix of the estate of the late
Gregorio Ventura. Maria Ventura is the illegitimate daughter of Gregorio Ventura, while Mercedes and
Gregoria Ventura are his legitimate children with his former wife.

In Gregorio Ventura's will, Maria Ventura was named as the executrix and administratrix of his estate.

The paternity of Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura was denied by Gregorio Ventura in his will.

Maria Ventura was appointed as executrix, but there were oppositions to her accounts of
administration, alleging mismanagement of funds and incompetence.

Issue:

Whether the removal of Maria Ventura as executrix and the appointment of Mercedes and Gregoria
Ventura as joint administratrices is legally justified.

Ruling:

The removal of Maria Ventura as executrix is legally justified.

The appointment of Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as joint administratrices is valid.

The institution of heirs in the will is annulled due to the preterition or omission of compulsory heirs,
leading to intestacy.

29
Trillano vs. Crisostomo

Facts:

Testate Estate of Damasa Crisostomo

Administrator of the estate, Nazario Trillana, filed a petition to allow the will of Damasa Crisostomo
executed on October 19, 1948. Lower court granted the petition and admitted the will to probate on
January 5, 1949

Appellants, Consorcia P. Crisostomo and others filed a petition for relief from the judgment. Alleged
fraud and failure of the lower court to set a date for proving a previous will executed on August 16,
1948.

Issue:

Whether the judgment allowing the will of October 19, 1948, was obtained through fraud.

Ruling:

The court denied the appellants' petition for relief from the judgment allowing the will of October 19,
1948.

The court held that the appellants failed to show that the judgment was obtained through fraud.

The court ruled that the lower court did not commit any error in denying the petition for relief.

The court stated that if two wills are presented for allowance but one of them expressly and absolutely
revokes the other, the revoked will cannot be included in the probate of the subsequent will.

The court concluded that the revoked will may be probated and allowed only if the subsequent revoking
will is disallowed.

30
Sumilang vs. Ramagosa

Facts:

Mariano Sumilang filed a petition for probate in the Court of First Instance of Quezon, claiming to be the
sole heir of the testator, Hilarion Ramagosa. The petition was opposed by Saturnina Ramagosa, Santiago
Ramagosa, Enrique Pabella, Liceria Pabella, and Andrea Ravalo. The oppositors questioned the due
execution of the will and claimed their entitlement to inherit the estate.

The oppositors alleged that the will had been impliedly revoked by the testator's sale of the properties
mentioned in the will. They argued that since the titles to the lands were no longer in the testator's
name at the time of his death, the petition for probate should be dismissed.

The court denied the oppositors' motion to dismiss and issued an order striking out their opposition and
all other pleadings.

The court found that the oppositors had no legal standing and were strangers to the deceased.

Issue:

Whether the oppositors have legal standing to question the due execution of the will and claim their
entitlement to inherit the estate.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision to deny the opposition of the appellants in the
probate of Hilarion Ramagosa's will.

31
PALACIOS VS PALACIOS

Facts:

Juan Palacios executed his last will and testament on June 25, 1946 and filed a petition for its approval in
the Court of First Instance of Batangas on May 23, 1956. In his will, he named his natural children
Antonio C. Palacios and Andrea C. Palacios as his sole heirs.

Maria Catimbang, who claimed to be the acknowledged natural daughter of Juan Palacios, filed an
opposition to the probate of the will on June 21, 1956. Maria Catimbang alleged that she was
completely ignored in the will, thereby impairing her legitime.

The court admitted the will to probate but set a date for the hearing of the opposition regarding the
intrinsic validity of the will. After the hearing, the court declared Maria Catimbang as the natural child of
Juan Palacios and annulled the will insofar as it impairs her legitime.

Issue:

Whether the opposition to the intrinsic validity of the will can be entertained in the probate proceeding.

Ruling:

The opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in
the probate proceeding.

The issue of whether the oppositor is an acknowledged natural child who has been ignored in the will
should be raised in a separate action.

This is especially true when the testator is still alive and has only filed a petition for the allowance of his
will, leaving the effects thereof after his death.

The court held that the opposition cannot be entertained in the probate proceeding and should be
raised in a separate action.

32
COSO VS FERNANDEZ DEZA

Facts:

The testator, a married man and resident of the Philippine Islands, became acquainted with Rosario
Lopez in Spain in 1898 and that he had illicit relations with her for many years thereafter. After his
return to the Philippines she followed him, arriving in Manila in February, 1918, and remained in close
communication with him until his death in February, 1919. There is no doubt that she exercised some
influence over him.

Issue:

Whether this influence was of such a character as to vitiate the will.

Ruling:

The English and American rule in regard to undue influence is thus stated in 40 Cyc, 1144-1149. "Mere
general or reasonable influence over a testator is not sufficient to invalidate a will; to have that effect
the influence must be 'undue.' The rule as to what constitutes 'undue influence' has been variously
stated, but the substance of the different statements is that, to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence
exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his
free agency and make him express the will of another, rather than his own. Such influence must be
actually exerted on the mind of the testator in regard to the execution of the will in question, either at
the time of the execution of the will, or so near thereto as to be still operative, with the object of
procuring a will in favor of particular parties, and it must result in the making of testamentary
dispositions which the testator would not otherwise have made, while it is shown that the testator
entertained strong affections for Rosario Lopez, it does not appear that her influence so overpowered
and subjugated his mind as to "destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another rather
than his own." He was an intelligent man, a lawyer by profession, appears to have known his own mind,
and may well have been actuated only by a legitimate sense of duty in making provisions for the welfare
of his illegitimate son and by a proper feeling of gratitude in repaying Rosario Lopez for the sacrifices she
had made for him. Mere affection, even if illegitimate, is not undue influence and does not invalidate a
will. No imposition or fraud has been shown in the present case. "Influence gained by kindness and
affection will not be regarded as 'undue,' if no imposition or fraud be practiced, even though it induces
the testator to make an unequal and unjust disposition of his property in favor of those who have
contributed to his comfort and ministered to his wants, if such disposition is voluntarily made."

33
BUGNAO CASE

Facts:

The case involves the probate of the last will and testament of Domingo Ubag, deceased. The Court of
First Instance of Oriental Negros admitted the document as the last will and testament of Ubag.

The will was contested by the appellants, who would be entitled to share in the distribution of the
estate if probate were denied. The appellants argued that the evidence was not sufficient to establish
the execution of the will and that the testator was not of sound mind and memory at the time of
execution. The instrument was signed by Ubag in the presence of three subscribing witnesses and
appeared to have been executed in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Two of the subscribing witnesses testified in support of the will, stating that Ubag was of sound mind
and memory at the time of execution. The third subscribing witness was not called, but it was inferred
that there was a good reason for his absence. The appellants presented witnesses who claimed that
they were present at the time of execution and that Ubag was physically and mentally incapable of
making a will.

The court found contradictions in the testimony of the subscribing witnesses regarding a specific
incident that occurred at the time of execution, but considered them minor and not casting doubt on
the overall veracity of the witnesses' testimony.

The court found that the testimony of the appellants' witnesses was not credible, particularly that of
one witness who had a clear bias against the will and made false statements regarding the authenticity
of Ubag's signature.

The court addressed the argument that the will's provision leaving all of Ubag's property to his widow,
with no provision for his brothers and sisters, indicated a lack of testamentary capacity and undue
influence.

The court found that the absence of provision for the siblings was likely due to a bitter family quarrel
and did not indicate a lack of testamentary capacity.

The court adopted a definition of testamentary capacity that required the testator to comprehend the
nature of the transaction, recollect the property to be disposed of and the persons who would have
claims upon the testator, and understand how the instrument would distribute the property among the
beneficiaries.

The court found that Ubag met these requirements and had testamentary capacity at the time of
execution.

Based on the evidence presented, the court affirmed the probate of the will, finding that it was executed
in accordance with the law and that Ubag had testamentary capacity at the time of execution.

34
The court ordered the costs of the case to be paid by the appellants.

Issue:

Whether the evidence is sufficient to establish the execution of the will.

Ruling:

The court affirmed the probate of the will, finding that it was executed in accordance with the law and
that the testator had testamentary capacity at the time of execution.

The court ordered the costs of the case to be paid by the appellants.

35
Cuyugan vs. Baron y Guillermo Baron

Facts:

Silvestra Baron, an octogenarian from Magalang, Pampanga, was assaulted and robbed of P7,000 in
cash. Silvestra called lawyer Quirino Abad Santos to her house and asked him to draft her will in secret.

On December 17, 1932, Abad Santos, along with Vivencio Cuyugan, Vicente T. David, Valeriano Silva, and
police chief Zacarias Nuguid, went to Silvestra's house.

Abad Santos showed her the draft will, and after confirming her agreement, it was typed and signed by
Silvestra and the witnesses.

Issue:

Did Silvestra Baron have the mental capacity to execute the will?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the proponent, Vivencio Cuyugan, and ordered the legalization of
the contested will.

36
Sancho vs. Abella

Facts:

Matea Abella, an 88-year-old woman suffering from physical ailments, left her home in Sinait, Ilocos Sur
to consult a physician in San Fernando, La Union.

During her stay in the convent of the parish church in San Fernando, she consulted with Attorney
Teodoro R. Reinoso to draft her will.

The will was read to her in her dialect, Ilocano, and she approved it.

On April 29, 1932, Matea Abella signed the will in the presence of witnesses, including Father Cordero.

Matea Abella passed away on July 3, 1932.

Issue:

Whether Matea Abella was in the full enjoyment of her mental faculties and executed the will as a true
expression of her last will.

Ruling:

The Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur ruled in favor of the applicant-appellee, Mons. Santiago Sancho,
and granted the probate of the will.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower courts.

37
Icasiano v. Icasiano
G.R. No. L-18979
June 30, 1964

Facts:

Celso Icasiano, filed a petition for the probate of the will of Josefa Villacorte and for his appointment as
executor thereof. It appears from the evidence that the testatrix died on September 12, 1958. She
executed a will in Tagalog, and through the help of her lawyer, it was prepared in duplicates, an original
and a carbon copy.

On the day that it was subscribed and attested, the lawyer only brought the original copy of the will
while the carbon duplicate (unsigned) was left in Bulacan. One of the witnesses failed to sign one of the
pages in the original copy but admitted he may have lifted 2 pages simultaneously instead when he
signed the will. Nevertheless, he affirmed that the will was signed by the testator and other witnesses in
his presence.

Issue:

Whether or not the failure of one of the subscribing witnesses to affix his signature to a page is sufficient
to deny probate of the will

Ruling:

No, the failure to sign was entirely through pure oversight or mere inadvertence. Since the duplicated
bore the required signatures, this proves that the omission was not intentional. Even if the original is in
existence, a duplicate may still be admitted to probate since the original is deemed to be defective, then
in law, there is no other will bu the duly signed carbon duplicate and the same can be probated.

The law should not be strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the
inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she has no control of. Where the purpose of the
law is to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages, and there is no intentional or
deliberate deviation existed.

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Pascual vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

Dr. Olivia Pascual seeks to annul a final judgment awarding attorney's fees to Atty. Jesus Santos.

Dr. Pascual claims lack of jurisdiction, denial of due process, and unreasonableness of the fees.

Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973, leaving behind his widow, Doña Adela Soldevilla
Pascual, and various heirs.

Doña Adela filed a petition for letters of administration over the estate of her husband, and Atty. Jesus
Santos was hired as her counsel.

After Doña Adela's death in 1987, Dr. Olivia Pascual, one of the heirs, filed a petition for the probate of
her will.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) awarded attorney's fees to Atty. Santos in its January 19, 1994 decision.

The decision became final and executory, and a writ of execution was issued.

Issue:

Did the trial court have jurisdiction to make the award of attorney's fees?

Ruling:

The trial court had jurisdiction to make the award of attorney's fees.

The heirs of Doña Adela were not deprived of due process.

There were factual and legal bases for the award of attorney's fees.

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