Theological Language of Saint Thomas Aquinas

The theological language
of Saint Thomas Aquinas.

Sources, historical context, analysis
and some later reference
PONTIFICIA UNIVERSITÀ GREGORIANA
FACOLTÀ DI TEOLOGIA
DIPARTIMENTO DI TEOLOGIA DOGMATICA
———————————————————————
THE THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE

OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS.
SOURCES, HISTORICAL CONTEXT, ANALYSIS
AND SOME LATER REFERENCE
Tesi di licenza presentata da

JAN WOJCIECHOWSKI
Sotto la direzione del

Professore ANTONIO NITROLA
Roma 2014
SOME QUESTIONS
Should we talk about language? Some time ago I would answer that
question negatively. Talking about language seemed to me the subsequent
step in the process of decay of the western thought. A process that began
with the skepticism of the XIV and XV centuries, when philosophers
abandoned methaphysics, attempts of the real description of reality, and
retired to the analysis of the subject and its conscience. Instead of talking
about reality they discussed the subject that perceived that reality. The
possibilities of human intellect became restricted drastically. If the
objective reality was uncertain, the mind that perceived it seemed to be
something fundamental. In that context the rising significance of the
philosophy of language in the XX century was nothing else to me but the
next step in the direction of agnosticism (already signed by another
restriction oh human mind performed by the positivists in the XIX
century): we can’t talk about reality, talking about subject is marked with
apories, so let’s talk about words.
Is any discussion about Truth possible any more? Are we bound to
relativism and purely formal analyses which have nothing to do with what
is real, and thus really important? The question about the objective truth is
becoming ever bolder in the world signed by globalisation and pluralism.
How many narratives can a human being nowadays live in! Scientific
narration: description of the physical, mathematical etc. properties of the
world, of the man. Esoteric narration describing the same reality but in a
totally incompatible way – or better – totally unprovable, unverificable
way, but having its long tradition and certain vigour. It was on the
occasion, when explaining the anthropology of the Far East to my pupils of
J. Słowacki high school in Warsaw, the question about language occured to
me: what yoghi were talking about? How they understood their talking?
Energy, chakra – are they understood in a proper or maybe methaporical
sense? Are they objective things or maybe just symbols of certain
experiences? Among these narrations we can find also our domestic one,
6 THE THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
the theological narration (categories such as soul, sin, Trinity...), thrown

down from the throne of supremacy, and forced to share the mere existence
of simple citizen in the pluralistic society. Do all these and other narrations
meet in some place? Do they can? Are they translatable? Or are we bound
to choose between totally separated worlds without any kind of link,
analogy between them? Do they necessary falsify each other? These and
similar questions I brought with me to Rome.
I would have never suspected, that they would return with all their force
during the first semester seminar led by Professor M. Tenace (winter
semester of 2012/13) dedicated to the anthropological questions raised by
the Second Nicean Ecumenical Council from 787 1 . This ecclesiastical
session was looking into the nature of human cognition and the role of the
senses in the human encounter with Transcendence, that is located beyond
the sensual. Synod Fathers were reflecting also about the nature of image
and the nature of the act of its adoration. As we know the heresy of
iconoclasm was the immediate cause of that gathering.
What struck me was the conviction of the Ecumenical Fathers of the
close link between an image and its model: «who offends the figure of
anyone, he offends the one the figure is of»2. Even more interesting is the
nature of that link – «The image partecipates in the prototype only
according to name, not according to essence»3. But we wouldn’t find any
explication of the question regarding the problem of identity between
image and model. For the Fathers it is obvious that the condition for this
link is the conserved resemblance.4 It would be L. Wittgenstein who looked
into this problem more precisely, and established, that that which makes
this image to be of that thing or person is the intention of the painter, (a
notion already present in the field of logic and called impositio).5
But already among the Fathers there is a great awareness of the
parallelism between an image and a word. The two senses: sight and
hearing are two complementary but different channels of communication.
1
P.G. DI DOMENICO, – al., ed., Atti del Concilio Niceno secondo.
«allo stesso modo chi disprezza la figura di chicchesia, reca offesa a
2
quello stesso di cui e l’immagine.» P.G. DI DOMENICO, – al., Atti del

Concilio Niceno secondo, 317.
3
«immagine é unita all’archetipo secondo il solo nome e non secondo l’essenza»,
P.G. DI DOMENICO, – al., Atti del Concilio Niceno secondo, 304.
4
P.G. DI DOMENICO, – al., Atti del Concilio Niceno secondo, 176.196.197.211.
5
L. WITTGENSTEIN, – R. RHEES, Philosophical grammar, I, section V, 62, 102
INTRODUCTION 7
The readings that we receive with our ears by means of the sense of hearing
we transmit to our mind; in the same way watching the forms of the images
with our eyes, we discern them with our mind. Thus by the means of these two
operations interdependent one from another, that is: the reading and the
pictorial rapresentation, we gain the knowledge and we are reminded of the
facts that occured6.
We come to the most interesting point when we consider the fact of the
interdependecy of these two faculties. Fathers made comparisions between
them two showing in an evident way the irreducibility of one to another
and vice versa.7 «All that we have believed by the means of hearing, we
capture by the image of representation to obtain a stronger certitude. Since
we are compound of flesh and blood, we need to confirm the certainty of
our soul by the means of vision»8.
The sense of vision since antiquity was understood as having the
strongest impact on man’s psyche, and for that reason played the main role
in the ancient art of artificial memory.9
As beings bound to senses we have no other way to be elevated to the spiritual
reality but by the mediation of the sensual signs – the meditation of Scripture
and the images. [...] Scripture we perceive by the means of hearing; but
images we contemplate by sight. The characteristics of them do not contradict
each other; Scripture is clarified by images and both have the same dignity10
6
«La lettura che riceviamo nelle orecchie attraverso l’ascolto, la trasmettiamo alla
mente; ugualmente, guardando con gli occhi le forme delle immagini, le distinguiamo
con la mente. Per mezzo di due operazioni tra loro interdipendenti, cioé la lettura e la
rappresentazione pittorica, prendiamo conoscenza e veniamo al ricordo di fatti
accaduti», P.G. DI DOMENICO – al., Atti del Concilio Niceno secondo, 286.
7
Image presented as more touching than verbal relation. cf P.G. DI DOMENICO, – al.,
Atti del Concilio Niceno secondo, 161, 163, 168.
8
«Tutto quello che abbiamo creduto vero per mezzo dell’ascolto, lo fissiamo per
mezzo della rappresentazione pittorica per acquisire una più salda certezza. Poiché
siamo composti di carne e sangue, siamo portati a confermare la certezza della nostra
anima anche attraverso la vista», P.G. DI DOMENICO, – al., Atti del Concilio Niceno
secondo, 214.
9
F.A. YATES, – al., L’arte della memoria, Torino 2007, p 5.
10
«Essendo legati ai sensi, infatti, non abbiamo altro mezzo per elevarci alle realtà
spirituali fuori dei segni sensibili, la meditazione della Scrittura e la rappresentazoine
delle immagini, [...] La Scritura la percepiamo attraverso l’ascolto; l’immagine la
contempliamo attraverso la vista. Le caratteristiche di una e dell’altra non si
contraddicono; la Scrittura si chiarisce con l’immagine e tutte e due godono dello stesso
onore.», P.G. DI DOMENICO, – al., Atti del Concilio Niceno secondo, 466.
By these meditations we can individuate two problems which have to do

with the human cognitive process and the role of the image and the word in
this process. First, and from our point of viev the most important, is the
problem of identity of the sign and the thing signified, and the sources of
that identity. But in the case of a word and an image we have to do with
different types of identity or, to put it in another words, with different
aspects of that identity. And so we get to the second problem – let’s say –
of the richness, kind, or even sharpness of knowledge granted by those two
types of signs and of the mutual irreducibility of them.
Very illuminating is the history of the reception of that Council in the
West and generally the western attitude to the figurative art, which is quite
defferent from that of the East. It is described by A. Bisogno in his book
dedicated to the Carolingian era. 11 Setting aside the fact of the terrible
translation that made impossible the comprehension of the content of the
Second Nicean Council’s Acts to their western readers, and made the abyss
separating those two ecclesiastic areas even deeper, what emerged from
these pages became obvious: theologians gathered in Frankfurt to discuss
the eastern solution of the iconoclastic heresy, weren’t so sensitive to the
importance of the holy images and icons, because they already had an
another image before their eyes: the world as an expression of an order laid
down by God.
If there is any relationship between the human and divine it is to be found in
God’s will to found the order of the world on the certain ‘regulae’ which make
possible the general understanding of creation. Images are products of man,
modifications of the materials already existing. Sanctity cannot be the property
of an object, for there is an ontological distance between God and the world.
God has given gold and silver to man, i.e. the ‘dignitas spiritalis
intelligentiae’ and the ‘velustas eloquii’ to understand better Truth and to
spread it12.
Moderate iconoclasm of the theologians from Charlemagne’s court,
while admitting that images are useful for beginners who are not ready for
11
A. BISOGNO, Il metodo carolingio.
12
«se esiste una relazione tra divino ed umano, essa é rintracciabile nella volontà di
Dio di fondare l’ordine del mondo su alcune ‘regulae’ che permettono una generale
intelligibilità di tutto il creato. Le immagini sono creazioni umane, modificazioni
imposte a materiali già esistenti. Non é possibile che la ‘sanctitas’ sia proprietà di un
oggetto per la distanza tra Dio e mondo. Dio ha concesso agli uomini oro e argento, vale
a dire la ‘dignitas spiritalis intelligentiae’ e la ‘velustas eloquii’ per comprendere al
meglio la verità e per diffonderla», cf. A. BISOGNO, Il metodo carolingio, 184-5.
INTRODUCTION 9
the spiritual contemplation, declared that they are not to be destroyed nor
adored.13 At the same time they made clear that true art is contained in
Scriptures, the works of the Fathers and in the liberal arts that make them
intelligible.14
To my astonishment the new beginning of Western Civilisation after the
earthquake of the Migration Period was set out in the atmosphere of the
enthusiastic rediscovery of the ancient heritage of so called Liberal Arts. At
the beginning of the IX century, Alcuin, with a circle of his disciples, laid
down the first layer of the foundation that determined the shape of the
whole cathedral. They thought according to the ancient texts they studied
but their ideas were not bound by these sources. Alcuin and the followers
not passively assimilated, but understood and transformed the ancient
intellectual heritage. 15 One of these modifications was the specific
approach to language. For Porphyry, for example, the Aristotelian
Categories were about language properties and not on the metaphysical
qualities. Logic studied the forms of communication - not reality. So for
him it was irrelevant whether language affairs have any connection to
ontology. But for medievals it would be the most important question. 16
Minds of medieval thinkers sensed the close link between the order found
in the sciences of language and the belief that the universe was created and
ordered by God by means of the spoken word.
It is not my intention – although it would be very interesting - to describe
here in details how and in which form the whole ancient heritage was
introduced in the new cultural project: what was conserved and what
distorted; and to examine the consequences of these modes of reception.
What I intended to do is to make it evident, that the reflection concerning
languge, its nature, its rules, and its limits are fundamental for European
thought. The reflection which, after the fall of scolastic thought in XIV
century, remained neglected for centuries. And the revival of interest for
this matter in XX century, and which continues today, is nothing but a
return to the sources, ad fontes, of our civilisation – and as such cannot
remain unnoticed by those who use this instrument to talk about God. God,
Who on the one hand transcends limits of any human language, and
13
cf A. BISOGNO, Il metodo carolingio, Turnhout 2008, p 190.
14
A. BISOGNO, Il metodo carolingio, Turnhout 2008, p 191.
15
cf J. MARENBON, From the Circle of Alcuin to the School of Auxerre, 8-9
16
cf KRETZMANN, N. – al., The Cambridge history of later medieval philosophy from
the rediscovery of Aristotle to the disintegration of scholasticism 1100-1600, Cambridge
(UK) [etc.] 1982, p 119.
experience and on the another – is given to us by means of an linguistic

fact: the Scripturistic Revelation.
And thus we have reached the aim of this work. Curious for the
properties of this interesting and delicate instrument, which language is, I’d
like to analyze how one of the masters in this matter – St. Thomas Aquinas
– understood its relation to the sensual and transcendental reality. But to do
so, it is impossible not to look into the tradition to which he adhered, and
the intellectual context in which he lived. I’ll also try to introduce some
remarks regarding modern and contemporary views on given problems. It
is a very ambitious claim – especially for someone who is a complete
beginner in that matter. But why not try?
Chapter I
LANGUAGE AS A SPECIFIC HUMAN PHENOMENON

AND ITS PHILOSOPHICAL INTERPRETATIONS
That animals do communicate with each other is a fact. Just like the fact,
that a man can, to some degree, understand an animal and vice versa (it’s
clear to persons who have pets in their homes). Sometimes one can be
astonished how complex that animal communication can be – for example
let’s think about the waggle dance of honeybees which, with a series of
special moves, gives precise indications to the other members of the colony
where to find the source of food or water. Aristotle himself noticed the
peculiarity of the social life of these animals, nevertheless he understood
that phenomenon as not on par to that of the human society organised by
the means of speech: «Now, that man is more of a political animal than
bees or any other gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often say,
makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal whom she has endowed
with the gift of speech»1. In his De anima he makes explicit the difference
between the articulated voice and the non-articulated natural sound: «Not
every sound, as we said, made by an animal is voice [...]; for voice is a
sound with a meaning, and is not the result of any impact of the breath as in
coughing»2. Thus the word, logos, and the theory of signification which
1
ARISTOTLE, Politics I, 2 (1253a7-15)
2
ARISTOTLE, On the soul II, 8 (420b29-421a1) This distinction led to very intersting
considerations in the Middle Ages concerning the cryteria for distinguishing human
interjections from sounds emitted by animals. see: SIRRIDGE, M., The wailing of
orphans, 99-116.
describes «the correspondence of notion and thing [...] is the precondition

of the interpretation of reality [...] in a proposition that is true»3.
As we have observed, language, communication in general, is rooted in
the social nature of man and animals as well.4 It is interesting, however,
how the process of the formation of language was interpreted by two of the
greatest fathers of western philosophy – Plato and his pupil, Aristotle. It is
important, because the response to the question about the origins of spoken
language affects the way in which it is used to understand, describe, and
explore reality.
1.1 Plato's account for the origin of names and definition that of science
To understand better the thought of Plato (and of Aristotle as well), we
should consider it in the context of the relativism of his epoch5 and regard it
as a philosophical defence of the existence of an unchangeable structure of
reality. It is that very existence of such a structure to be the condition sine
qua non of the possibility of any meaningful discourse. 6 But for the
Founder of the Academia, who followed the Heraclitean theory of flux7, the
space-temporal objects can not be bearers of that structure. It was the
mistake of sophists to take this contingent unstable and always changing
reality, as a true object of knowledge. For Plato sophists are similar to men,
who remain in the darkness of a cave.8 A true philosopher is the one, who
knows that the true meanings of names are not the contingent, material
objects, but Forms9, and who focuses his efforts to liberate his mind from
sensual deceptions, contemplating the intelligible Forms and their
interrelations. This effort and its fruits he calls Dialectic – the true
3
H. ARENS, Aristotle’s theory of language, 31.
4
If I could add one remark regarding this possibility of ‘understanding’ between man
and animals: I think that there’s no better place for man to experience his being part of
nature, and at the same time his being beyond it.
5
M.-K. LEE, Epistemology after Protagoras, 46.
6
cf Plato Parmenides (135b-c), 927.
7
«Aristotle (Metaphysics A 6, 987a32–b7) is quite explicit that an even earlier
influence on Plato was Cratylus, along with his Heraclitean doctrine of flux.» D.N.
SEDLEY, Plato’s Cratylus, 16.
8
cf. PLATO, Sophist, 253c-254b
9
A. GRAESER, On Language, Thought, and Reality in Ancient Greek Philosophy,
369.
CHAP. I: LANGUAGE 13
science. 10 We should notice, then, that truth as a normative criterion of

human predication stands in the focal centre of the Plato’s thought.11
In that context, briefly sketched above, let’s look now into the
understanding of the phenomenon of the human language, that emerges
from Plato’s works. Among them the dialog Cratylus treats this problem in
a most explicit and extended way. We will look for Plato’s answers to the
questions: what is the nature of the language; in which way is it connnected
with reality; what epistemological possibilities does it provide for a
philosopher and what degree of credibility is to be accredited to that
instrument? Before considering these questions, we should dedicate some
lines to the Dialogues themselves as sources for our inquiry.
1.1.1 Dialogical form of Plato’s writings

One of the biggest problems with interpretation of the works of Plato is
that «his dialogues defy traditional explication because we cannot subject
them to a literal interpretation as we can treatises» 12 . Plato had never
introduced his own name into the texts, never speaks explicitly with his
own voice. Furthermore Dialogues seem to illustrate a process of inquiry
which proceeds by means of the formulation of precise philosophical
questions. And thus «one cannot choose to arbitrarily assign universale to
situations occurring in the dialogues»13.
In this way the method of writing chosen by Plato can be undestood as
an expression of his general attitude towards the inquiry that has taken the
form of dialectical proceeding – that itself was never defined explicitly.14 In
that context it is interesting to consider the aggergation of terms aletheia
(truth), pseudos (falsehood), on (being), onoma (name), analysed together
in Cratylus. 15 Etymologies are respectively: aletheia-divine motion of
existence; pseudos - opposite of motion - stagnation and forced inaction,
compared to sleep (eudein); on - moving and ion (not being) – not-going;
10
cfr. PLATO, Sophist, 253C-254B
11
D.N. SEDLEY, , Plato’s Cratylus, 171.
12
P. VASSALLO, Notes on the methods of inquiry of Plato and Aristotle, 373.
13
P. VASSALLO, Notes on the methods of inquiry of Plato and Aristotle, 373. .
14
P. VASSALLO, Notes on the methods of inquiry of Plato and Aristotle, 373. But to
this fact one can raise objection, that the dialogical form and the absence of Plato in the
Dialogs, «most of his readers over two and half millennia have found it hard not to
speak of, think of, and criticise the ideas and arguments defended in the dialogues as
Plato's own.» D.N. SEDLEY, Plato’s Cratylus, 1.
15
PLATO, Cratylus, 421a-c, 456.
onoma - that for which there is a seeking (on ou masma); Being, truth
indicate movement. Name indicates the aim. Falsehood is linked with
inaction, passivity, rest. Would it be hidden indication, that there’s truth as
long as it has been looked for, and falsehood consists in forgetting the
asymptotic character of philosophical research? Rachel Barney put it into
following words: «Cratylus may be, among other things, the repudiation of
a version of Platonism (...) which, misunderstanding the Socratic method of
logoi, would fetishize definitions as disclosures of knowledge»16. It seems
as if Plato aimed rather to evoke in reader or hearer a certain impression,
make him loose his intellectual balance and make him think over things he
was certain of till now, than to give him precise answers.
1.1.2 The nature of language in Plato’s Cratylus – immediate relation word

– object.
According to Socrates, in his dialog with Hermogenes, saying things is a
kind of doing – an art, techne – similar to any other art – for example
cutting.17 And «as you will succeed at cutting things only if you do it in the
natural way»18 and using adequate instruments,19 the same rules are valid
for the act of naming. The controversy about language, and precisely, about
the nature of names, which is the main subject of the dialog under
consideration, is for D. Sedley the very dilemma of Plato himself who tried
to work out his own position between two extremes: strong etymologism
and pure conventionalism.20
The first position is an expression of the common conviction for the
Greek culture of that era that names used in language were created in
ancient times by men, who having known the nature of things they named,
had encoded those very natures in their names. Thus the name could be
considered as an image of the thing named. Etymological analysis would
lead to disclosure of the nature of a thing – so etymology was considered a
real source of the true knowledge about reality. 21 Mimetic function of
16
R. BARNEY, , Names and nature in Plato’s Cratylus, 148.
17
cfr. J.L. ACKRILL, Essays on Plato and Aristotle, 38.
18
PLATO, Cratylus, 387a, 425
19
J.L. ACKRILL, Essays on Plato and Aristotle, 38.
20
«the two main points of view that, as the dialogue proceeds, come increasingly
into conflict, represent two main elements of Plato's own intellectual background.»
D.N. SEDLEY, Plato’s Cratylus, 2.
21
cfr. D.N. SEDLEY, Plato’s Cratylus, 28
names was based on the mimetic function of the single vocals – as is

clearly illustrated for example by the analysis of the word sklerotes 22
contained in the dialog. So at the beginning of any language, according to
adherents of the strong etymologism, there should be a perfect knowledge
of the nature of a thing as well as the knowledge of the nature of the letters
and syllables and a ability to “translate” the nature of the things into names,
just like a painter creates an image of an object.23
According to the second opinion, much closer to so called common
sense, names are not images, encoded resemblences of named natures, but
merely the effect of social agreement: this name stands for that nature.
Question about the correctness of a name can not be raised in this context –
as it could be considered as a crucial one for the opinion reviewed
previously. But this is the conventional explanation, against which Socrates
raises objection at first.24
Using metaphors (like the one mentioned at the opening of this section)
and etymological analyses (that occupies the biggest part of the whole
dialog), Socrates confirmed that he believed names to be made according to
the nature of things (that are stable and independent from man), and
convinced Hermogenes also to think so. Names were created and set off in
circulation by skilled legislators under the supervision of dialecticians as
“laws of speaking”.25 But at the same time we have to notice also hints of
critics addressed to blind trusting in the etymological analyses. The spirit of
name-givers became dizzy when focused on the contingent reality that
remains in perpetual motion. 26 In effect also the names assigned to
knowledge, wisdom, good and justice (as we have seen just above) – all of
them bear the connotation of flux and movement.27 From the other hand
etymological analysis of their synonyms shows something quite the
22
Very illuminating is the passage when Socrates asks: «Suppose that we had no
voice or tongue, and wanted to communicate with one another, should we not, like the
deaf and dumb, make signs with the hands and head and the rest of the body?» 427d–
440e. – suggesting that in the same way our vocals imitate and indicate natures of
things.
23
PLATO, Cratylus, 424d-e,
24
In this work I am not going to provide any kind of outline of the whole diaolog,
but only summ up general conclusions reguarding the problem of the nature of the
language. A sintetical overview is to be found for examle in D.N. SEDLEY, Plato’s
Cratylus, 3-5.
25
PLATO, Cratylus, 388e, 427
26
PLATO, Cratylus, 411b-c, 447.
27
PLATO, Cratylus, 411d-412c, 448.
opposite28 – to which part should one give ones consent? There seems to be
a bit of contradiction in the production of legislators – and thus its
credibility is undermined. Furthermore, the analysis of the name of justice
itself, though giving some indications, fails to give a clear account on the
nature of that realm.29 The deep well of etymological prehistory seems to
have a leaky bucket. Names themselves are no more like their originals:
the original forms of words may have been lost in the lapse of ages; names
have been so twisted in all manner of ways, that I should not be surprised if
the old language when compared with that now in use would appear to us to
be a barbarous tongue30.
Finally Socrates rejects names and language in general as a reliable
source of the knowledge about reality (though they can give some
illuminating indications) and indicates the study of things themselves as the
only plausible form of science. 31 Language is to be understood as an
imperfect instrument, made by men, which is used to divide the reality
according to the natures it contains.
What is important, as we could see, that both approaches to language
discussed in Cratylus presuppose an immediate link between word in its
expressed form and the object signified32. We can sense this immediacy
easier in the etymological account, where the object’s nature is encoded in
the ‘matter of sound’, but Plato rejected this point of view. But also
language taken in conventional approach turns out to be useless for the
philosophical inquiry just because it lacks that immediate, natural link
between word and object. The very object of knowledge, and the only one
that interested Plato – an Idea – can be only sensed in a oblique way33, and
thus also a word, (and language in general), can do nothing but allude to
what is its true meaning.
So even if language in some way resembles the structure of the
intelligible world (that is the very condition for any meaningful discourse)
and many illuminating truths are to be found in the etymological analysis, it
reflects only the contingent and fluctual reflexion of Forms. Plato’s
mimetic account of language makes the profound suggestion that
28
PLATO, Cratylus, 439b-d, 473
29
PLATO, Cratylus, 413c-d, 449
30
PLATO, Cratylus, 421d, 456
31
cf PLATO, Cratylus, 436
32
cf B.J.F. LONERGAN, Verbum, 15.
33
PLATO, Cratylus, 439c, 473
correctness and truth are to be understood in terms of a matching between

descriptive content and object. What is wrong with false logos is that two
very different things, that is its content and the object it is used for, are mis-
matched.34 In this way, Plato develops, and then sets out to demolish, the
sophist's thesis that everyone is an equal measure of Truth, and that error is
impossible.35 But Plato would not accept Aristotelian theory that syntactical
categories reflect somehow ontological distinctions (division of the
categories into substantial and accidental names) that have a fundamentum
in re.36
1.1.3 Science according to Plato

As we have seen, the scientific project of the Founder’s of Academy is to
study things themselves. It is clear that the mentioned things are not
spacially-temporal objects, but Forms. But since the Forms themselves are
not easily accessible for man, material objects play an important role in that
proceeding. They serve as stimuli for our memory «since we do judge
sensible particulars, and find them wanting, in relation to the Forms, we
must already be independently acquainted with the originals»37.
The man, then, who looks for knowledge about certain thing, finds
himself in a very particular situation called Socrates’ fallacy: from the one
hand to know it he should aggregate instances of the Thing (for example
the Form of Justice) he pursues and in the base of the common features of
them determines the very nature of it; from the other he should analyse the
properties of the Thing to determinate that Thing in base of these
properties.38 We can say – one has to look for something and he does not
really know what is he looking for at the same time. The external thing
touches something in one’s memory, what one has forgotten already,
pushing him in this inquiry.
Not leaving the conviction of the existence of objective truth apart, at the
same time Plato states, that it could be only sensed vaguely. He often uses a
metaphore of a dream39 to describe this kind of comprehension:
34
R. BARNEY, Names and nature in Plato’s Cratylus, 183
35
cfr. M.-K. LEE, Epistemology after Protagoras,46.
36
cfr. A. GRAESER, On Language, Thought, and Reality,371.
37
R. BARNEY, Names and nature in Plato’s Cratylus, 146
38
D. WOLFSDORF, Trials of reason, 146
39
PLATO, Cratylus, 439c, 473
incomplete apprehensions of the Forms can be fairly characterized as

‘dreaming’ relative to a higher state, even if they represent a great advance
over our customary condition... It is difficult for us to attain to more than a
fleeting, incompletely grasped glimpse of the Forms: so for us, waking
(dealing with real beings) can be dreaming (confusion); and dreaming (dealing
with images) can be waking (orderly experience).40
And again we can see how that conviction finds its reflexion in the very
form in which his scientific inquiry is expressed. He uses suggestions and
evokes impressions rather than express himself in concise definitions; he
hints images rather than extensive and plainly disposed descriptions.
In the subsequent development of platonic thought expressed in the
Seventh Letter41 the role of philosopher – dialectician is to purify language
and get rid of confuseness in naming. «Once the Dictionary had been
completed, it could subsequently be replaced by a deeply un-Platonic
programme of authoritative teaching, and rote learning of the magic
formulae»42. But even the purified language is not in grade to grasp the
reality. Here we can see two general characteristics of Platonic method:
retaining the convintion of immediate link between reality and words it is
oriented towards realm which remains far beyond human abilities -
Transcendence.
1.2 Aristotle's account for the origin of names and definition of science
Aristotle was the most famous student of Plato and he was a critical one.
In his essay, Peri ideōn he explains his master’s theory of Ideas and
provides argumentation against its validity. According to the Philosopher,
his teacher in order to reconcile his Heraclitean heritage of flux-theory with
Socratean moral interests he manufactured Ideal world.43 In Metaphisic he
40
R. BARNEY, Names and nature in Plato’s Cratylus, 149-50; «hypothetical
reasoning about real objects which the Republic calls ‘dreaming about being’», 151.
41
Although the authenticy of this text is controversial it can be seeen as the
expression of true mature platonism: «I am far from certain that the Letter is authentic,
and make no attempt to argue the question here. What I would claim—and the reading I
offer here should go some way towards making this good—is that the ‘philosophical
digression’ is plausible as an expression of mature Platonism, containing no
philosophical ideas that could not be Plato’s.» R. BARNEY, Names and nature in Plato’s
Cratylus, 164.
42
R. BARNEY, Names and nature in Plato’s Cratylus, 174.
43
G. FINE,, On Ideas,45.
explained that the Plato’s gravest fault was distorting the teaching of
Socrates, who in fact looked for a stable structure of incostant reality. but
Socrates motivated this (view), as we were saying before, through definitions;
but he did not separate (universals) from particulars. And he was right not to
separate them. This is clear from the results. For it is not possible to acquire
knowledge without the universal; but separating is the cause of the difficulties
arising about the ideas.44
Aristotle argues that «presented arguments shows clearly that forms are
different from both sensible particulars and sensible properties. But it does
not show that forms are separate» 45 . He advocates the study of nature,
arguing that it deserves no less attention than some people devote to more
abstract studies such as mathematics; in this way he is intending to
sinthesize presocratical naturalistic philosophy with dialectical thought of
his illustrous precedessors. 46 Although taking over much of his master’s
interests and problematics, he worked out a quite different account of
science inquiry and of language as well. In the following paragraphs I
would like to discuss these two doctrines (i.e. of Plato and those of
Aristotle) in a way to point out also certain familiarities and divergences.
1.2.1 Aristotle’s account for language.

I will begin by discussing language, because this consideration can serve
as an intruduction for the further material i.e. science. In this way we will
also follow the traditional order of study of Organon which led a student of
the philosophy from knowledge of categories, through the study of
semantic, to more complex issues of logics and metephysics.47 First of all,
unlike Plato, Aristotle doesn’t evade explicit formulation of his thought. As
an effect we have on our disposal treatises – texts logically disposed,
concise – but it doesn’t mean easy and uncontroversial. Aristotle’s Peri
hermeneias, in which he treats the problem of signification of words, can
be contained in one sheet of machine text. But its size is not comparable to
its popularity and importance.48
44
ARISTOTLE, Metaphisics, 13. 9 (1086a32-b13)
45
G. FINE, On Ideas, 60. (see also translation of the Book I of Peri ideon, 13-19.)
46
cf T. IRWIN, , Classical Thought
47
J. MAGEE, Boethius on Signification and Mind, 15.
48
H. Arens in his book Aristotle’s Theory of Language , reports its extraordinary fate
in the culture latin Europe. This is one of most commented texts of Aristotle. In this
paragraph I would like to restric myself to most general conclusions about that issue.
Aristotle makes it clear that «no word is by nature, but only when it
becomes a symbol»49. And not a name itself is an image (likeness) of a
nature of a thing (as it was by Plato) but the «mental impression»50. These
expressions would become more clear when we look now into the
Aristotelian theory of cognition.
According to the Philosopher words are significative of things, but
through the mediation of passio animae.51 This account of the origin of
names was baptized as the Three Stage Theory. Generally it holds that
spoken word (language) originates from the sensual experience, which is
completely passive with respect to the external, objective reality. 52 The
sensual faculty of man spontaneously apprehends the form or nature of
perceived objects and causes a mental image of it.53 Perceived nature is the
same for everyone’s perception. In this way, in the mind, is begotten a
concept, which can be expressed with a word, and eventually in letters –
which are different for different nations. And that’s why while the passio
animae is a likeness of a thing, an utterance or written word is only a sign
of that menatal impression.54
For many readers and commentators of this brief treatise, it is the
interpretation of the notions of likeness, mental impression, and concept
and relation between them, that evokes the main controversy. Which of
them is the likeness of a thing? The concept? Imagination? Are they all
distinct realities?55 It is something quite different to say that a completely
defined concept is the likeness of a thing and to assert this about an
impression contained in imagination, for a concept (as something defined)
differs from imagination (in which essential and non-essential properties
are not fully distinguished). Aristotle himself didn’t solve this problem,
leaving it open to further interpretations.
49
ARISTOTLE, Peri hermeneias, 13 .
50
ARISTOTLE, Peri hermeneias, 2.4
51
cf J. MAGEE, Boethius on Signification and Mind, 16.
52
ARISTOTLE, De anima, II,5. 12; III,4. 8.
«If thinking is like perceiving, it should consist in being acted upon by what is
thought about or in something elsa of this kind. So, it must be impassive, and receptive
of the form, and potentially of the same type, but not identical with it, and be related to
the objects of thought as the faculty of cense is to sensible objects.» De anima Γ4,
429a13-18
53
cf H. ARENS, Aristotle’s Theory of Language, 29.
54
cf ARISTOTLE, Peri hermeneias, 2.4
55
interesting analysis of this problem in: J. MAGEE, Boethius on Signification and
Mind, 97-141.
J. Magee argues, with reference to De anima 432a10-14, that mentioned

likenesses are to be «identified with isolated concepts or impressions in the
soul which are neither true nor false»56. It seems that what Aristotle could
have in mind, when talking about the likeness, is the notion of some kind of
intuitive apprehension not fully penetrated by the intellect. This lack of
complete intellectual penetration means that they have not been already
analysed and set into the general framework of knowledge57. There is one
kind of apprehension which just receive an impression, and another one
which elaborates it in order to obtain a concept or definition.58 In this way,
isolated names and verbs which in themselves are neither true nor false
unless put into a categorical proposition, can serve as a likeness of these
first thoughts which non-confronted with the knowledge already structured
remain ambiguous and confused. For Aristotle himself says «just as there
are in the mind concepts which are neither true nor false, as well as such as
are necessarily the one or the other, so there are likewise in speech, because
in composition and division lies falsity or truth» 59 . What we can
paraphrase: words or thoughts taken separately are prived of Truth-value;
but Truth and falsity necessarily exist. It exisys in combinations or
distinctions of terms. And only such statements obtain qualification of truth
or falsity. In this way words put into a sentence (that can be judged with
respect to Truth-value) and impressions intellectualy analysed (into
essential and individual properties)60 represent final stage of cognitive act,
while an impression and an isolated word the initial one. The former
necessarily requires the latter.
Although Aristotle’s language is explicitly conventional it is more
closely related to the structure of reality than the Platonic one. It is so
because it reflects not the contingent reality immediately or it’s ideal,
unaccessibile paradigmatic realm, but rather the understanding of the world
apprehended by the human mind thanks to the spontaneous and infallible
grasping of natures, its – let’s say - logical structure. «Language, which he
takes to consist of symbols of mental events that in turn are approximations
to and likenesses of real entities (pragmata), supposedly mirrors this basic
56
J. MAGEE, Boethius on Signification and Mind, 111.
57
cf B.J.F. LONERGAN, Verbum, 98.
58
«There is one kind of intellect, which is such as to become all things. And there is
intellect of another kind, such as to make all things. This type of positive state like
light; for in a way light makes potential colours actual.» 430a14-17
59
ARISTOTLE, Peri hermeneias, 6-7
60
cfr. C.J. MARTIN, Imposition and Essence: Abaelard’s Theory of Meaning, 182.
structure»61. Aristotle was the first philosopher to take language as a tool

for philosophical inquiry.62
1.2.2. Aristotle’s account for science and knowledge.

It seems that to understand Aristotle’s account for science we have to
begin with a distinction between definition and demonstration and their
interconnection. On the one hand
there cannot be definition and demonstration of the same thing. For definition
is of substance and what a thing is whereas demonstration assumes what a
thing is and from it demonstrates that this thing is or is not of that. The
definition cannot be demonstratively derived but it is acquired through
induction.63
This induction is described by Aristotle as follows:
the memories, though numerically many, constitute a single experience. And
experience, that is the universal when established as a whole in the soul--the
One that corresponds to the Many, the unity that is identically present in them
all--provides the starting-point of art and science.64
This «unity present in all» he calls also a «first principle»65 and it is to be
identified with an universal nature like «triangle» or «man». In this passage
Aristotle is also giving a response to the question about the sources of
universals (forms) that we find in our souls – they are fruit of repeated
sensual experience that becomes one (for the same things) from many
(acts). The faculty able to perform this operation he calls intuition. It acts
spontaneously and must be distinguished from reason, which proceeds
demonstratively and which depend on it.
But on the other hand the complete definition can be derived from
knowledge expressed in demonstrative syllogism.66 Then, as we can see, a
definition can be of three kinds: «in one sensec definition is an
indemonstrable account of the essence; in another it is a logical inference
of the essence, differing from demonstration in grammatical form; and in a
third it is the conclusion of the syllogism which demonstrates the
61
A. GRAESER, On Language, Thought, and Reality, 374.
62
A. GRAESER, On Language, Thought, and Reality, 372.
63
T.P. KIERNAN, Aristotle Dictionary, 46.
64
ARISTOTLE – al., Posterior analytics, 259.
65
cf ARISTOTLE – al., Posterior analytics, 53.
66
cf J.L. ACKRILL, Essays on Plato and Aristotle, 120.
essence.» 67 Before we put forward these consideration, I would like to

notice an important link between this aporia and the theory of recollection,
presented by Plato68 - called also Socratic fallacy69, and the role he ascribed
to sensual experience in the cognitive process. We can see, that Aristotle
takes the same problem into consideration, aiming to show however, that
what allow us to proceed in the scientific inquiry are not the innate forms
residing in our hidden memory, but the initial knowledge. This initial
knowledge can be of two kinds: it can be an inferential definition, a first
principle, or merely an opinion. Only the former one, in which an essential
feature of a thing is known, enables one to produce a complete definition of
a thing.70
An another remark can be given with respect to the Philosopher’s
semantic theory: in the context of inductively obtained definition, the
theory of signification and the justification of science are meeting together.
For Aristotle apprehension of first principles does not require any
justification. It is obvious and necessary. And so also scientific
demonstration based on these principles. The question how to distinguish a
first principle from an illusion or appearance does not arise. A demostrated
definition, based on first principles, is the final and perfect form of
knowledge71.
This is why Aristotle asserts that the question whether p is true or whether X
exists is the question whether there is an explanation, a middle term (αἰτία,
μέσον): the question whether S is P is the question whether there is a term M
such that S is P because it is M, and the question whether there is such a thing
as Y in Z is the question whether there is a term M such that Y is in Z because
of M. [...] For within scientific discourse it is only non-accidental propositions
or concomitances that are of interest.72
The middle term is then common to many things, essential property
recognized by man spontaneously. And even if we cannot state, that one is
able to grasp that essential content fully and clearly, this intuitional
apprehension makes him know that a nature apprehended is different from
67
ARISTOTLE – al., Posterior analytics, 209.
68
for example: in Meno, when he describes a case of a slave, who succeeds in
solving a geometrical problem, without being instructed in that matter.
69
D. WOLFSDORF, Trials of reason, 185.
70
cf J.L. ACKRILL, Essays on Plato and Aristotle, 121.
71
B.J.F. LONERGAN, Verbum, 83.
72
J.L. ACKRILL, Essays on Plato and Aristotle,125.
other natures. In this way on the one hand this first cognitional step remains
infallible, from the other is open to scientific elucidation. And only on this
stage, stage of demonstration as depending on human reasoning, an error
can occur.
Having discussed the difference between definition and demonstration
we should now look into another distinction: between science and dialectic
– which are two different proceedings present in Aristotle’s workshop.
Dialectic for Aristotle is a way to reach first principles. Its aim is not to
prove anything, because first principles are obvious and non-demonstrable,
but to reject false beliefs.73 It is connected with clarifying definitions by
means of discussing common beliefs: «It examines commonly held beliefs
(endoxa), and if it is successful, it reaches a more coherent version of the
beliefs we began with, solving the puzzles revealed by our examination of
the initial beliefs.» 74 Science instead «involves a syllogistic conclusion
derived necessarily in virtue of formal structure (Prior Analytics) and
involving necessary matter (Posterior Analytics)»75 It is then the premise,
not the syllogistic method that differentiates these two: dialectic proceeds
from probable and science from necessary premises.76
1.2.3 Language as the necessary tool of science.

From accounts briefly exposed above emerges the importance of
language in Aristotle’s thought.
Language is conventional in its phonology, vocabulary, and surface structure,
natural in content and form (deep structure). If one is careful in investigating
the deep structure of the grammar, one can discern the underlying ontological
ties, for language is isomorphic with reality. Language exhibits logical
properties which justify inference in the form of arguments having premisses
and conclusions. Arguments are analysable into 'syllogisms'—series of
propositions having two premisses and a conclusion [...] Although Aristotle's
syllogistic can be defended as a logical system independent of any particular
metaphysics, Aristotle interprets his syllogistic as a calculus of universals
which can be used to investigate the structure of reality.77
73
T. IRWIN, Aristotle’s First Principles, 51.
74
T. IRWIN, Aristotle’s First Principles, 8.
75
76
77
D.W. GRAHAM, Aristotle’s two systems, 54-5.
But Aristotelian thought had not gained an authoritative position during

antiquity.78 «For 200 years after his death (322 B.C.) his works were lost
and unknown. Their revival [...] began with their publication by
Andronicus of Rhodes about 50 B.C.»79. But for antiquity the Founder of
the Peripathetic School remained merely a teacher of logic.80
Porphyry held that the Categories is about simple expressions qua
significative, i.e., about the structure of reality our language presupposes,
which may not be the structure we would posit as metaphisicians. Language is
fundamentally a tool for communication about the world of ecperience, logic
studies the way this communication functions amd it would by wrong to blame
Aristotelian logic for being bad metaphysics as it was never intended to be
metaphysics at all. [...] It is irrelevant whether or not there are metaphysical
realities corresponding to the universals.81
Can we consider this attitude towards language as an intrinsic heritage of
the prevalent Platonic tradition? The importance of language and logic for
the scientific inquiry was to be rediscovered in the Middle Ages.
1.3 Conclusive remarks about Plato and Aristotle.

Despite all the differences regarding the status of the Forms and the
understanding of language that distinguish Aristotle from his master, he can
be still seen as one who continues Plato’s thought. D. Graham argues that it
can also be traced in his revised account of science in which the rejection
of the general science of being qua being has been abandoned.82 But the
continuation is to be sought above all in an effort to confirm the existence
of the unchanging, intelligible structure of reality, and thus of Truth. What
is particularily interesting is that this rejection of relativistic position does
not go hand to hand with claim, that this Truth is circumscribed with
78
T. IRWIN, Classical Thought, 142.
79
H. ARENS, Aristotle’s Theory of Language and its Tradition, 6.
80
St. Augustin testimonied to know only the Cathegories (Confessiones IV 16,31);
81
S. EBBESEN, Ancient scholastic logic, 119.
82
«Owen portrays Aristotle as taking an early stand against Plato in his rejection of
the unity of science. Plato views dialectic as a master science which holds the principles
of all the sciences. Aristotle, by contrast, argues in his earlier works that there is no
single sense of being; there are as many senses of being as there are categories, and
hence there can be no science of being. Later, however, Aristotle develops the notion of
ν equivocity, or focal meaning, as Owen calls it, by which he is able to overcome
his early scruples against a general science of being.» D.W. GRAHAM, Aristotle’s two
systems, 329.
mathematical precision. On the contrary: both Plato, who is talking about

dreaming about Forms, and Aristotle, who based his science on, although
error-free, but unclear intuitional cognition of the first principles, admit that
there’s still something essential, what remains beyond our capacity of
demonstration or clear description; something received from outside and
believed to be true. The Form in se, spontaneously grasped natural kind and
expressed as a name cannot be put under the microscope’s lens. There’s a
gap, though justified, but still a gap. And the true science has to do nothing
but accept this fact. And this is the point I want to underline particularily.
This «mystery» does not make these accounts valueless.
1.4 The contribution of the Stoa to the discussion on the nature of

language.83
After Aristotle the ancient reflection concerning the nature of language
experienced subsequent developments and permutations. Let’s signalize
only one of them – the Stoic theory of the epistemological act, and their
explanation of the semantic relation between word and object, for this
account acted an important role in the medieval period.
Not entering in details we can say that according to Stoic materialistic
point of viev, the spoken word is composed of two elements: material part
logos, that is the utterance (the part of air), which functions as a signum of
the named object. A word is natural signum of res. And a second one –
lekta – immaterial intentions, which have only intramental existence, and
which are dealt by logic. Logic is a set of rules governing lekta, but these
rules have nothing to do with the order of material world.
The Stoa school elaborated also a materialistic account of the cognitive
act. It was understood as an interaction between pneuma contained in
object and pneuma contained in human senses. Act of cognition was
nothing but an act of transfering the material image of a thing to the mind
by means of acting pneuma. When the image has arrived in human mind, it
is judged by human logos. This judgement was undesrtood as a non-
determinated act of human free action. Echo of this theory, as we will see,
can be sensed in the system of Roger Bacon, and thus to great extent
influenced the whole medieval discussion about the nature of universals in
XIII century.
83
This paragraph is a summary of: M.L. Colish, The Mirror of Language, 11-13.
Chapter II
LANGUAGE AS EMPLOYED BY THE THEOLOGICAL

DISCOURSE.
In the first chapter we have looked into the nature of language as an

instrument of science. As our guides to this inquiry we have taken Plato
and Aristotle. We were looking for answers to the questions like: what the
nature of language is?, Where it originates from?, How it is related with
man who uses it and with the world which is described by means of it?,
And finally what kind of knowledge, if any, about the world can be
provided by language itself?
Now, approaching step by step to the thought of Saint Thomas Aquinas,
we have to confront ourselves with the question about the nature of
theology and its relation to the human language.
2.1 Theology as natural and revealed.

Theology means giving a systematic account for the reality of God. But
in this context we have to make precise one thing: Is there any difference
between Plato’s talking about the Form of Good, Aristotle’s descriptions of
the Unmoved Mover, Greek Myths which deal with the stories of gods, on
the one hand and Christian Revelation and works of Christian theology on
the other? In fact, it is a question about the nature of Transcendence. I
mean this Absolute Being beyond not only sensual experience, but also the
order and laws of the existing cosmos, and the limits of definition. Is the
Unmoved Mover or Supreme Good transcendent in the same way as the
Trinity is? 1 This question we can consider in a double way: either as a

statement about the object – and compare the relation of the ‘divine’ to the
‘non-divine’ in both models, or – as an epistemological problem: the
existence of ‘divine’ considered in se and the fact of its being three in one.
Are these notions (i.e of Unmoved Mover and of Trinity) accessible to
human mind in the same way? And while the ontological question is rather
secondary, the importance of the epistemological one for theology, from
the methodological point of view, cannot be ommited.
A short scrutiny of Book X of Laws and Metaphysics will show that their
authors remain in the frames of so called natural theology, where the divine
is described in terms of goodness and rationality, and is seen as an
explanation of the ontological and moral order of the world and its
movement. 2 There are some of them who had noticed «God’s invisible
qualities—his eternal power and divine nature[...], being understood from
what has been made» (Romans 1,20). These theological conclusions are
fruit of the observation of the world based on some philosophical
presuppositions, and some moral intuitions.
Something different we encounter in Christian theology 3 . Terms of
general rationality – Logos – open to human interpretation are now to be
changed into Verbum – a Word.
In the beginning was the Word:

the Word was with God and the Word was God.
He was with God in the beginning.
Through him all things came into being,
not one thing came into being except through him.
[...]
The Word became flesh,

he lived among us,
and we saw his glory,
the glory that he has from the Father
1
It is exactly this problem which is set by Karl Rahner as opening question of his
project of the general treatise of the theology see: K. RAHNER, Theological
investigations, I, 19.
2
S. MENN, Aristotle and Plato on God, 546.
3
In this reflection I will restrict myself to considering only the significance of the
event of Jesus, leaving apart the whole Jewish theological tradition. It is not my aim to
discuss generally the theology based on Revelation, but to look into its nature and the
central role performed in it by the spoken word.
CHAP. II: THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE 29
as only Son of the Father, full of grace and truth. (John 1,1-2. 14)
These words St. John addressed to a Person whom he had encountered,

whose words he had listened to, and whom he had recognized to be God
himself. From this time on, the starting point of theology was the Person of
Jesus from Nazareth, His life and His words. At the same time, new
problems entered into the scope of theological issues: plurality coexisting
with unity in God and unity of two totally different realities in one
contingent man – to point out the most important of them. It was no more a
fruit of one’s reflection. Rather a particular case, a paradox received from
outside which had challenged the whole existing intellectual system, and as
a consequence, the possibilities of human language4.
The word of God which became human faith was now destined to enter also in
all human destinies, had to be constantly upheld by the power of the human
spirit and through them; its preservation and its transmission was linked to the
human way. [...] Many controversial issues, it was necessary to give a
response to, and therefore committed human reflection, demanded the
formation of concepts, judgments and conclusions, all of which it was not
possible to do without resorting to reason and intellect.5
Despite the high level of sophistication which philosophical reflection
reached by that moment, it had at hand no means appropriate to treat these
problems in a non confounding way. Very quickly after the events of
Christ’s Pascha, controversies arose that urged the community to reflect
over it and express the contents of faith in less ambiguous ways but without
changing its contents.
That is why J. Ratzinger describing the nature of Christian theology and
dogmatic theology, underlines such aspects of it as priority of the word to
4
It is interesting whether it would be such a challenge in the same way for other
logical and philosophical systems, for example the hinduistic one. And so, we can see
how the context in which the Revelation appeared for the first time became necessary
determination of the development of the dogma, and thus a part of it– as J. Ratzinger
describes it in: J. RATZINGER,, Elementi di teologia fondamentale, 47.
5
«La parola divina diventata fede umana era ora destinata as entrare anche in tutti i
destini umani, Doveva essere ininterrottamente accolta dalle energie dello spirito umano
e per mezzo di esse; la sua conservazione e la sua trasmissione era legata al modo
umano. [...] innumerevoli questioni controverse, cui fu necessario dare una risposta e
che impegnarono perciò la riflessione umana, richiesero la formazione di concetto,
guidizi e conclusioni, tutte cose che non era possibile compiere senza ricorrere alla
ragione e all’intelletto», J.A.MÖHLER, Simbolica, 302-3.
the thought, community to individual 6 , and the importance of precise

linguistic formulations. In this kind of theology, what emerges in the first
place is the linguistic formulation as a condition sine qua non of the unity
of the believer’s community. The work of patristic period theologians
could not determine more than a ring around the exact linguistic structure of
theological discourse. The early Christian councils, in the final analysis, they
are nothing else but subsequent stages in working out a grammar of faith, a
regola loquendi, in which alone faith could become accessible. In contrast, the
early Christian heresies are nothing more than the resistence of language and
human thought to the received contents of faith.7
But we have to ask: to what depth can human intellect and its fruit –
linguistic description that arises around words and facts received in
Revelation – penetrate the transcendent reality of God? In which way and
what kind of description can be properly formed out of this contingent data:
precise affirmative definition, ambiguous symbolic expressions, or only
negation of false statements? How are these contingent data related to the
realm they reveal? What are the conditions for a man to produce such
statements? Is the natural account of language (described by now) enough
to deal with this new situation or must it be changed? Let’s look, then, how
St. Augustine, prominent theologian of late antiquity and supreme authority
for the whole medieval West, answered these and similar questions.
2.2 Saint Augustine’s account for theological language.

2.2.1 Augustine’s signum-res dynamism.
Augustine knew a wide spectrum of theories and opinions that circulated
among educated man of his epoch. 8 Though it seems that the biggest
influence on his approach to language (his theory of signs) was Platonism
6
see: J. RATZINGER,, Elementi di teologia fondamentale, 43.
It would be very interesting to compare the function of a word or dogma in the
Christian community and the community of theurgic mysteries.
7
«non poteva determinare altro che un anello intorno all’esatta struttura linguistica
del discorso teologico. I primi concili cristiani, in ultima analisi, non sono che le singole
tappe dell’elaborazoine di una grammatica della fede, di una regola loquendi, nella
quale soltanto la fede potesse diventare accessibile. Viceversa le prime eresie cristiane
non sono nient’altro che la resistenza del linguaggio e del pendsiero umano ai contenuti
che lo impegnavano», J. RATZINGER,, Elementi di teologia fondamentale, 44.
8
M.L. COLISH, The Mirror of Language, 45.
and the experience of his own conversion.9 The very moment of this mental
change is presented in Confessions 8,12 but it is rather to be understood as
a fulfillment of a long process which led him from spiritual darkness to the
light.10
In fact Augustine describes human spirit as naturally directed towards
God, as he wrote «for Thou hast made us for Thyself and restless is our
heart until it comes to rest in Thee.»11 But because of sin one is looking
for Him a bit as if he didn’t know what is he looking for:
Too late loved I Thee, O Thou Beauty of ancient days, yet ever new! too late I
loved Thee! And behold, Thou wert within, and I abroad, and there I searched
for Thee; deformed I, plunging amid those fair forms which Thou hadst made.
Thou wert with me, but I was not with Thee. Things held me far from Thee,
which, unless they were in Thee, were not at all. Thou calledst, and shoutedst,
and burstest my deafness. Thou flashedst, shonest, and scatteredst my
blindness. Thou breathedst odours, and I drew in breath and panted for Thee. I
tasted, and hunger and thirst. Thou touchedst me, and I burned for Thy
peace.12
The fulfilment of this thirst of the soul, as we can see in this passsage, is
not possible for a man by means of his own forces alone. He needs some
kind of aid. And the explanation of how it does happen, that one meets this
God, that one becomes introduced in relation with Him, is the context of
Augustine’s theory of signs (language), and of illumination. 13 In this
context he is reflecting not only on his own experience, but also on the
experience of other persons.14 In the focal centre of this approach there’s
question about efficacy of external signs in causing the understanding,
though not as a general theory of language, but in the restricted area of
statements regarding intelligible reality.15
Augustine, trained orator and teacher of the art of speaking, convincing,
explaining and amusing by the means of a spoken word, was struck by a
word – and it was the word of Revelation.16 The Author of Confessions
9
10
cf. Confessions X, 27.
11
Confessions I,1
12
Confessions X, 27
13
O.H. PESCH, Grazia, 427.
14
For expample description of the struggle for spiritual freedom of one of his
disciples – Alipius – contained in Confessions VI
15
cf. M.L. COLISH, The Mirror of Language, 46.
16
cf. M.L. COLISH, The Mirror of Language, 7-54.
noted particular dichotomy of this event. After reading a passage from Paul
he stated: «No further would I read; nor needed I: for instantly at the end of
this sentence, by a light as it were of serenity infused into my heart, all the
darkness of doubt vanished away.»17 To the external stimulus, which was
the text of the Apostle, corresponded an inner experience of enlightment. In
this enlightment a particular message became obvious and plain for him.
He received an answer to a question which pervaded deep in his heart. He
observes also that this dynamism takes place not only when one enters in
contact with words of Scripture, but in any other situation – famous tolle et
lege 18 event is a classical example of this. In this way every human
experience can be potentially transformed into an act of communication
between God and man.
When communication between God and man takes place by means of what
Augustine regards as words, as in prayer, meditation, intellectual intuition,
Christian conversation, the writing and reading of theology, and the reception
of the Gospel through preaching, he describes this communication as taking
place literally. When the knowledge of God is expressed through things,
persons, and actions, such as the mirror of the Trinity in the human soul, the
sacraments, confessions of faith, and the witness of Christian example,
Augustine regards it as operating figuratively. Whether literal or figurative, he
holds, the verbal knowledge of God is correlative to the believer's moral
transformation in Christ.19
Communication takes place thanks to two elements as we have said:
external sign and internal enlightment in which moral insight and certainty
are reached (as in the case described in Confessions 8,12). This certainty is
for Augustine the access not to a sign, but to the object itself. 20 In De
magistro, written shortly after his conversion, Augustine provides a
detailed description of this dynamism. He identifies that enlightment with
the action of God Himself within the human spirit.21 But already in that
early work, what could seem to be merely a matter of discernment of moral
dilemmas, is set out as a general epistemological theory of enlightment.
Augustine focused his attention to the epistemological process which
leads from a sign (a word) to understanding (knowing the object signified)
17
Confessions 8,12
18
Confessions 8,12
19
20
De magistro 10,33
21
12,40
– a situation typical for the process of learning. Only when this process is
completed, a real communication, real understanding takes place.22 And his
main question is not where the words and concepts come from, how they
originate, but the problem of how one gets understanding of them. The
Author of Confessions divides this process in two areas: learning about
contingent reality (science of objects) and about the intelligible one
(wisdom).23 He defends the thesis that in the case of contingent reality it is
the object itself that provides the fulfillment of cognitive act:
But, after frequent repetitions of the word "head," I discovered, by paying
careful attention at the time it was used, that this was the word for something
that was well known to me by sight. Before discovering it, the word was only
a sound so far as I was concerned. I came to know it as a sign when I
discovered the reality of which it is a sign. And I learned what this reality was,
not, as I have said, by any sign, but by looking at it. Hence, it is more of a
matter of the sign being learned from the thing we know, than it is of knowing
the thing itself from the manifestation of its sign.24
So far, the most I can say for words is that they merely intimate that we should
look for realities; they do not present them to us for our knowledge. But the
man who teaches me is one who presents to my eyes or to any bodily sense, or
even to the mind itself, something that I wish to know.25
And if anyone is talking about a certain thing, to understand, what he is
talking about, signifies to have the ability to associate perceived sign with
the known object’s impression stored in the memory. 26 So nothing is in the
memory unless it was first known and understood.27 But when we are to
consider the reality beyond sensual experience, such as mathematical rules,
truths regarding the nature of a human soul, etc. Augustine introduces a
category of the interior light:
But as for all those things which we "understand," it is not the outward sound
of the speaker's words that we consult, but Truth which presides over the mind
itself from within, though we may have been led to consult it because of the
words. Now He who is consulted and who is said to "dwell in the inner man,"
22
De Magistro 11,36
23
cf. De Trinitate XIII, xix, 24.
24
De magistro 10,33
25
De Magistro 11,36
26
De Magistro 12,39
27
In this way Augustine rejects Platonic conception of innate ideas. cf. De Trinitate
XII, xv, 24.
He it is who teaches us, namely, Christ, that is to say, "the unchangeable

Power of God and everlasting wisdom." This is the Wisdom which every
rational soul does indeed consult, but it reveals itself to each according to his
capacity to grasp it by reason of the good or evil dispositions of his will.[...].28
This interior light functions as an intrinsic criterion which allows man to
judge truth and falsity in an intuitional29 way:
Books also serve the same purpose, since they are written about things which
the reader, under the guidance of reason, has found to be true; not those which
he believes to be true on the testimony of him who wrote them, as when
history is read, but those which he himself has also found to be true either in
himself, or in Truth itself, the light of the mind.30
This criterion, although dwelling in man, is something extrinsic to him,
and is to be identified with the person of divine Logos31 - also by those who
do not even know that He has manifested Himself as the Son of Man.32
Intelligible objects are contained in Him.33 But a man, though looking on
the object itself in the inner light, can not know the intelligible object fully
and immediately, but only fragmentarily – according to weakness of his
nature. Is, then, possible to know God and to talk oabut Him in a valid
way?
2.2.2 Augustine and the human word in reference to God.

At first we have to hold on for a while and consider the tension that
emerges from the epistemological theory described above.
We have to notice the tension which exists between the intrinsic
intuitional criterion of truth and the necessity of the external data. From the
methodological point of view the most interesting question with respect to
Augustine’s account of cognitive act is, whether the Logos dwelling in
28
De Magistro 11,38
29
De Magistro 12,40
30
De Trinitate XIV, vii, 9
31
cf De Magistro 11, 38
32
J. RATZINGER Volk und Haus Gotttes, 37-8. The difference between believer and
non-believer is such that the first can be reminded by a signs (words of preaching,
createt world or any other kind of sign), when the latter not. cf. M.L. COLISH, The
Mirror of Language, 40.
33
Le idee sono infatti forme primarie o ragioni stabili e immutabili delle cose: non
essendo state formate, sono perciò eterne e sempre uguali a se stesse e sono contenute
nell’intelligenza divina. De Div.83 46,2
man’s soul, can reveal Truth about God immediately without any hint from
outside being given? First we have to ask whether the existence of God can
be gained in this way. An interesting indication can be found in De libero
arbitrio 34 where the existence of God is proved from the modes of
proceeding of the human mind alone (precisely from its ability to judge
statements as being true or the false –an argument of strong Platonic tint).
So now we can ask whether the Triune God can be known in the same way
as an intellectual object can be grasped by someone through the means of
self-dialogue as it is explained in the De Magistro35 For if any cognitive act
with respect to the intelligible objects is in fact directed towards God
Himself, and is fulfilled in seeing things in God Himself, are we to consider
Revelation necessary any more? Is the Incarnation required?
The opening chapter of Confessions leaves no space for doubts, that the
external teaching is indeed necessary:
Grant me, Lord, to know and understand which is first, to call on Thee or to
praise Thee? and, again, to know Thee or to call on Thee? for who can call on
Thee, not knowing Thee? for he that knoweth Thee not, may call on Thee as
other than Thou art. Or, is it rather, that we call on Thee that we may know
Thee? but how shall they call on Him in whom they have not believed? or how
shall they believe without a preacher? [...]. My faith, Lord, shall call on Thee,
which Thou hast given me, wherewith Thou hast inspired me, through the
Incarnation of Thy Son, through the ministry of the Preacher.36
Again, in this late work of Bishop of Hippo, he confirms the pivotal role
of a sign-word in knowing God-Truth and the insufficience of the
autonomous ratiocination. At first the role of a word addressed to one who
does not know the object is to indicate direction and send him to look for
understending of Truth transmitted. «You set Jesus as the Mediator
between us and Yourself. Through Him You sought us, since we were not
seeking You. You sought us so that we may begin to seek You.»37 And
neither the predication of Jesus Himself gave the knowledge to those who
listened to Him, but rather it was intended to conceive the faith in the
listeners.38 Faith, that in turn urges a man to look for Truth within own
spirit and to grasp the object, in the light of Truth which is speaking in the
34
15,39
35
12,40.
36
Confessions 1,1.
37
Confessions 11,2
38
cf. Confessions 11, 3 – this same statement referred to Scripture.
profundity of the heart. 39 The life and words of Jesus, as external,

contingent reality, belong to science and act as signs.40 But, at the same
time, Jesus in His being eternal and of divine nature belongs to the reality
of the intelligible, immutable realm, and thus His words and deeds are
identical with wisdom.41 In Him science and wisdom, signum and res, sign
and object are identical. In this way the Incarnate Word entered in the
circulation of human speech as the criterion and condition for any true
speech regarding God.
From this time on language, as human artefact, contains wisdom and
reliable knowledge about God, not merely in its logical structure, beliefs of
common sense, or etymological relations, but in these concrete expressions
and descriptions of facts which we call Revelation, in which the sign is
identical with the object it refers to – though under the form of enigma.42
So we have to notice, that Revelation results in the tranformation of human
language itself.
This transformation regards, certainly, human speech concerning
intelligible reality, not the contingent one. But, for the one who had
encountered Truth, also this sensible reality obtains a new semantic
effectiveness. 43 So the christian theology embraces two modes of
proceeding: ‘philosophical’, starting from the rational analysis of the world,
and a specific ‘theological’ one, that, although employing logical
instruments, is founded on the novelty of the positive linguistic
formulations which must be firstly understood, and then respected. In this
39
cf. Confessions 11, 8. In De Ioannis 77, 2,2 this external-internal teaching is
interpreted as expression of trinitarian character of Revelation: «Can it be that the Son
speaks and the Holy Spirit teaches, so that , as the Son speaks, we take in the words, but
as the Holy Spirit teaches, we understand these same words? As if the Son would speak
without the Holy Spirit or the Holy Spirit would teach without the Son, or indeed, it
were not that the Son also teaches and the Spirit Speaks, and when God speaks and
teaches anythingm the Trinity itself speaks and teaches! But because the Trinity does
exist, it was necessary for its individual Persons to be made known, and for us to listen
[to them] so as to distinguish one from the other, to understand them without
separation.», AUGUSTINE, S., Tractates on the Gospel of John, 102.
40
A. TRAP , – F. MONTEVERDE, Introduzione generale a sant’Agostino, 156f.
41
De Trinitatre XIII, xix, 24 Then Augustine goes on to identify science with grace,
as pertainig to temporal events, and wisdom with eternal truth provided by intrinsec
activity of Logos..
42
See the following paragraph.
43
cf. M.L. COLISH, The Mirror of Language, 49.
way we can raise the question how the propositions of Revelation, these
signs, are related to the reality they are conveying.
2.2.3 Augustine’s enigma.

Given Augustne’s conviction of the necessity of external sign on the one
hand, and the necessity of the grasp of the object itself (if we want to be
allowed to talk about having any knowledge at all) on the other, we have to
ask, how do we know God. What I have in mind here is the question
whether knowledge with respect to God is of the same kind as the one of
mathematical axioms, or any other contingent reality? Does it have the
same immediacy and precision?
Augustine responds negatively to that question. Although there’s one
faculty of knowing in man, differences between the objects of cognitive
acts determine different modes in which they can be known.44
In looking for the understanding of God, one has to turn not to
demonstrations and definitions, but rather to allegories and to a special kind
of such – to the enigma.45
there are very many species of this trope or allegory, and among them is that
which is also called an enigma. [...] just as every horse is an animal, but not
every animal is a horse, so every enigma is an allegory, but not every allegory
is an enigma. What, then, is an allegory except a trope in which one thing is
understood from another, as when he writes to the Thessalonians: 'Therefore,
let us not sleep as do the rest, but let us be wakeful and sober. For they who
sleep, sleep at night, and they who are drunk are drunk at night. But let us,
who are of the day, be sober'? This allegory, however, is not an enigma, for
unless one is very slow of comprehension, its meaning is clear. But, to explain
it briefly, an enigma is an obscure allegory [...].46
Enigma is then an allegory which, to be understood, requires explanation
and is not intelligible immediately. In Augustine’s theory (based on 1 Cor
44
Soliloquia II, 5,11
45
cf De Trinitate XV, ix, 16. Enigma is the Cicero’s term adoperated by Augustine:
«In the standard list of metaphors and rhetorical tropes which Cicero includes in the De
oratore we find the term aenigma. He defines it as a species of metaphor: "Something
resembling the real thing is taken, and the words that properly belong to it are then ...
applied metaphorically to the other thing. This is a valuable stylistic ornament; but care
must be taken to avoid obscurity—and in fact it is usually the way in which what are
called riddles (aenigmata) are constructed."» M.L. COLISH, The Mirror of Language,
15.
46
De Trinitate XV, ix, 15.
13,12), enigma acts as intermediary between human thought and the object
– God – and is the only way to see Him in this life. For it is not the fact of
knowing words which is called knowledge of God, but the vision of Him,
an inner insight in His mystery.47
In this way our knowledge of God in this life, as Augustine reaffirms, is
partial and shadowy.
It is the knowledge of faith, per speculum in aenigmate, and it is acquired and
expressed through speech. [...] But their very obscurity may also enable them
to function as accurate signs. For Augustine, verbal signs, whether literal or
figurative, truly, if partially, represent really existing things.48
In this light we should consider either the Scripturistic or theological
expressions only as aenigmate:
The Sacred Scriptures, it is true, also speak about the thoughts of God, but do
so according to that manner of speech in which they also speak about the
forgetfulness of God, and certainly such expressions do not apply in the strict
sense to God. [...] there is now so great an unlikeness in this enigma both to
God and to the Son of God, in which, however, some likeness has been found,
[...]49
But, although the dissimilarity is always greater than the similarity, what
is most important, is the fact, that these words-signs are properly
corresponding to the objet they refer to – that they are able to indicate the
object, which itself remains beyond immediate vision. And it is the only
way in which they are to be considered as true.
It is interesting, that again the affirmation of the semantical effectiveness
of a language goes along with the admission of the existence of a certain
gap that separates the subject from the object described. And if the gap is
more obvious, as regarding the relation between contingent and
transcendent reality, the affirmation of mentioned semantical effectiveness
is all the more indicative.
47
De magistro 11,36
48
49
De Trinitate XV, xvi, 25 – 26.
2.2.4. Conclusive remarks

Augustine was the auctoritas per excellence for the whole Middle Ages,
and he transmitted a certain vision of theology to his followers. The
description of this influence itself is an object of very extensive study itself,
and goes far beyond the abilities and aims of the author of this work. What
I would like to do is to point out some of issues of particular relevance to
the general outset of the Medieval Thought:
- Platonic inclinations
- appreciation of the linguistic arts
- God understood as essentia50
- the unsolved problem of the term ‘person’ in the Trinity
- account of human mind as penetrated by action of divine Logos and
the lack of clear distinction between natural and super-natural
theology
- exegetical approach in theology and the theory of signs along with
rhetoric style of doing theology employing enigmas and wide range
of them.
- close link between theology and praxis.
I would like to make some comments on two last points.
The sensibility towards interior light is conditioned by the moral
condition of adept 51 - so by the state of his will. 52 That’s why in the
beginning chapters of the De doctrina christiana, a work dedicated to the
exposition of the rules of exegesis, Augustine raises the issue of the
community of Church, and of love and its true form. So the doctrine from
the title of this treatise is to be understood not merely as a matter of
teaching, but rather in terms of Greek paideia – a certain project of
pedagogy and social formation of a man competitive to the pagan one.53 In
this context, looking at the aims of the work, we can consider this theory
50
E. GILSON, La filosofia nel Medioevo, 145.
51
52
De doctrina cristiana I, 10,10; De libero arbitrio II, 14,37. III, 25,76
53
«Es handelt sich nicht nur darum, eine Form giestigen Lebens zu uebernehmen, die
den Forderungen des Christentums nicht wiedersprichtt, die mit vielmehr harmoniert
und die der Moeglichkeit eines christlichen Lebens Raum gibt. Augustinus verlangt
weitaus mehr, denn er will eine Bildung, die engstens und direkt dem Christentum
dient.», H.I. MARROU, Augustinus und das Ende der antiken Bildung, 287. See also
chapter 303-326.
rather as an ontology of spiritual life54 than as a speculative epistemological

system.
From his conversion, Augustine sees Christ as mediator of salvation. Not only
is divine incarnation possible; it has taken place for the salvation of human
beings (c. Acad. 3.19.42). The human person is not only Odysseus (enn.
1.6.8), he is also prodigal son (Luke 15:11-32). Augustine's major
disagreement with these Platonists concerned the means, not the end. In
integrating the ascent of the soul to God with Christian teaching, Augustine
significantly influenced the direction of Western thought and Christian
mysticism.55
So the model of theology transmitted by Augustine to following period
has as its main objective an immediate contact with God obtained through a
vision by means of enigmas.
54
cf É. ZUM BRUNN, Le dilemme, 90.
55
A. FITZGERALD, ed., Augustine Through the Ages, 67.
Chapter III
FROM VISION TO EXPRESSION –

THE MEDIEVAL CONTEXT OF THOMAS’ THEOLOGICAL
LANGUAGE.
Magister Petrus in libris suis profanas vocum novitates inducit et sensuum:

disputans de fide contra fidem, verbis legis legem impugnat. Nihil videt per
speculum et in aenigmate; sed facie ad faciem omnia intuetur, ambulans in
magnis et in miribilibus super se.1
With these very words St. Bernard warned Guido di Castello, future
pope Celestine II, against his former teacher, Peter Abelard. He criticized
Abelard’s theological method, as he had understood it, for an illegitimate
broadening of the scope of rationally reachable issues:
ponit in coelum os suum, et scrutatur alta Dei, rediensque ad nos refert verba
ineffabilia, quae non licet homini loqui et dum paratus est de omnibus reddere
rationem, etiam quae sunt supra rationem, et contra rationem praesumit, et
contra fidem. Quid enim magis contra rationem, quam ratione rationem
contrari transcendere? Et quid magis contra fidem, quam credere nolle,
quidquid non possit ratione attingere?2
He calls him a ‘new theologian’ (which was one of the worst insults in
the conservative world of medieval theology, and meant as much as
‘heretic’), and this novelty consists in de omnibus reddere rationem, also at
things that transcend human intelligence. His way of explaining the matters
of faith is, as Bernard sees it, contrary to the faith itself. He is guilty, in the
1
BERNARD OF CLAIRVAUX, Epist. CXCII, PL 182, 0358C
2
BERNARD OF CLAIRVAUX, S. Bernardi Abbatis Contra Quaedam Capitula Errorum
PL 182, 1055A-B
eyes of the Founder of the Cistercian Order, of violation of God’s

Transcendence, accessible to the human mind only by the means of
aenigmata, and explaining them using new, profane vocum, and of a refusal
to accept by faith alone Truths of catholic doctrine demanding their rational
explanation.
Peter Abelard in fact marks a certain demarcation line in medieval
theology. To understand it better, let’s look shortly into the history of the
theological method from Charlemagne’s epoch to the times of Aquinas.
Every generalisation is in some way forced and hardly gives justice to
the very complexity of reality in its concreteness. But at the same time it is
our mode of understanding – trying to grasp the essential symptoms that
make the whole intelligible to us, not to remain in an agnostic position. The
Middle Ages is a historical period very rich and fascinating, and the interest
of researchers seems to be growing ever wider. One specific factor which
makes this period so atttractive for them is the recent revival of the
linguistic and semantic studies to which the Middle Ages present a rich
source of material to be examined.
In this short presentation of the medieval history of the use of language I
will generally, but not thoroughly, follow the excellent work of M. Colish3
who succeeded in providing a general outline of the main currents in
medieval linguistic thought, together with the original and penetrating
examination of the works of the most representative authors.
3.1 Lectio divina and grammar

Medieval theology is unthinkable without Benedictine monasteries.
«Monastic orders from the sixth through the twelfth centuries were the
wealthiest, most venerated, and most learned part of the church.» 4 «Monks
kept learning alive [...] Learning was a by-product of monasticism; still,
without the monks there would have been very little learning in Latin
Christendom down, at least, into the twelfth century.»5 The main features
of Benedictine study were the copying of books and exegesis of Scripture.
These two were strictly related because in the books the monks found rich
material of Patristic commentaries, and ancient knowledge of linguistic
sciences which turned out to be a useful instruments for the explanation of
the holy pages. Employment of liberal arts was even more obvious
3
The Mirror of Language.
4
F.B. ARTZ, The Mind of the Middle Ages, 186.
5
CHAP. III: MEDIEVAL CONTEXT 43
because of the reccommendation of Saint Augustine, whose domination

over the souls of medieval thinkers is hard to be exaggerated:
And yet the validity of logical sequences is not a thing devised by men, but is
observed and noted by them that they may be able to learn and teach it; for it
exists eternally in the reason of things, and has its origin with God. For as
theman who narrates the order of events does not himself create that order;
and as he who describes the situations of places, or the natures of animals, or
roots, or minerals, does not describe arrangements of man6.
We can see how this affirmation, from the very begining, has oriented
the direction of the whole of medieval thought:
Nam philosophi non fuerunt conditores harum artium, sed inventores. Nam
creator omnium rerum condidit eas in naturis, sicut voluit; illi vero, qui
sapientiores erant in mundo, inventores erant harum artium in naturis rerum;
sicut de sole et luna et stellis facile potes intellegere. Quid aliud in sole et luna
et sideribus consideramus et miramur nisi sapientiam creatoris et cursus
illorum naturales?7
At the beginning the most employed art was grammar. In the mid-XI
century most eminent theologians (for example Willhelm of Conches), still
called themselves ‘grammaticus.’ M. Colish argues that even the mode of
proceeding of St. Anselm of Canterbury is still essentialy based on
grammatical properties of words. 8 But from that time on their position
would be gradually eclipsed by logicians (thanks to the rediscovery of the
Aristotelian-Boethian tradition), and the tension between these two
different approaches to language would emerge.9
The science of grammar «included not merely the knowledge of the
Latin language but also the techniques of the gloss, the concordance, and
the allegorical method, and thus was the necessary introduction to the
science of Holy Scripture.»10 One of the most important tasks of grammar
was to discern among the different senses of inspired text.11 The Middle
Ages inherited from antiquity four senses in which Scripture can be read:
«The literal sense is identified with the "historical" sense; allegory is the
"Christological" sense; the moral sense is "tropological" (a term used by
6
AUGUSTINE, De doctrina christiana, II, 32, 50.
7
ALCUIN, Epistola 148 – ad Carolum regem, 239.
8
M.L. COLISH, The Mirror of Language, 63.96.
9
D.P. HENRY, Predicables and categories, 133.
10
11
cf. RABANUS MAURUS, De clericorum institutione, 3, 18, PL 107.
John Cassian as well as by Saint Jerome himself); the anagogic is

designated at times as the "eschatological" sense.»12 Discernment between
these four was the necessary condition for avoiding misunderstandings. But
it does not mean that one had to separate verses that have an exclusively
literal sense from those of a moral or allegorical one. On the contrary:
history and allegory are the essential elements for the comprehension of the
Holy Text and they presuppose themselves mutually.13 But the final aim of
correct scriptural exegesis is not the temporal things quae videtur but those
eternal quae non videtur. 14 For such armed monks, Scripture was true
aenigma – the mirror in which one was to contemplate the mystery of God.
3.2. Signum and aenigma, signification of things.

While in Antiquity Christian apologists had to defend and justify their
faith in front of highly developed culture and fight for primacy with
different traditional schools of thought, at the beginning of the Middle
Ages, it was Christianity which offered the higher culture to barbarian
masses. It was culture marked boldly with Augustine’s theory of sign, and
oriented towards Transcendence, Christian Transcendece. A very
interesting expression of this intellectual atmosphere we can find in De
rerum naturis of Rabanus Maurus (788-856). It is an example of medieval
encyclopedia linked boldly with the work of Isidorus of Sevilla. What is
interesting is that the author of this work, in explaining different terms like
light, stars, Sun etc., immediately provides us with an explanation of the
allegorical sense which these objects obtain in Scripture and the quotation
where they appear. 15 Thus a reader obtains the guide to deeper
understanding of both the Holy Text and the created world. A deeper
understanding, in the case of creation, means both: description of its
properties and its relation to the invisible world. Here we can touch the
very characteristic Middle Ages conception –deeply rooted in Augustine –
the signification of things.16
12
E. SYNAN, The Four «Senses», 225.
13
cf A. BISOGNO, Il metodo carolingio, 107.
14
15
cf. RABANUS MAURUS, De rerum naturae, 9, 8-12, PL 111, 0009 - 0614B.
16
Signification of things as important heritage of exegetical approach of medieval
thought retaines its supremacy during whole XII century and became eclipsed only in
XIII thanks to the development and rising importance of the logic. cf C. MARMO,
Inferential signs, 63.
3.2.1 Light and vision.

Therefore we can say that vision can be considered as a central notion to
theology at this stage. It is a thing seen which communicates to me,
reminds me of something else, but something essential – itself invisible. It
could be an external object, or an object, person or event described in
Scripture. The exegesis, sustained by grammar, forms in the person that
exercises it, the growing ability to see, by means of these aenigmata, the
proper, hidden sense of Biblical verses. This approach can be beautifully
summarized with the words of Richard of St. Victor: the Fathers confirmed
«that nothing that the Holy Spirit has written, even in the greatest possible
absurdity of the letter, is useless.» 17 Richard himself in Benjamin minor
gives an excellent example of such a profound ability to see through the
veil of contingent to the depth of hidden spiritual content, when
commenting on Jacob’s family personal relations, number, names and the
order of his children being born, he depicts the whole process of the
purification of human spirit.18
But the ability to see God through aenigmata is not as immediate as one
might think. Rabanus Maurus begins his letter De Videndo Deum from an
irony addressed to these who are ready to discuss eternal mysteries, but
find it difficult to hold on for a while to meditate God’s Word. What
emerges from that text can be described as a great sensibility to the
necessary link between word and vision (understood as the act of
Augustine’s internal illumination)19. It is the vision by means of which one
is legitimized to talk.
This conclusion we can derive legitimately from what Rabanus Maurus
says. I don’t know whether this link between vision and speech has been
17
cf RICHARD OF ST. VICTOR, On Ezekiel’s Vision, 321.
18
cf G. ZINN, Personification Allegory and Visions.
19
One interesting example can help us to touch the immediacy and omnipresence of
the conception of illumination in medieval set of mind. In the prologue to the early XIII
century tale The history of Holy Grail, anonymous author describes how he wakes up in
the night summoned by a strange voice. When he openes his eyes he «saw such
brightness that nothing so great could issue from any earthly light» then the one who
had waken him up introduces himself: «the fountain of all certainty is here before you,
[...] I am He through whom all good knowledge is learned, for I am Great Master
through whom all earthly masters know all the god they have learned.», N.J. LACY, ed.,
The Lancelot-Grail reader, 5. It is hardly difficult to find more evident proof of the
predominance of Augustinian thought in this period seeng almost exact quotations from
De magistro in the knight's tale.
explicated and formed in a concise theory in works of that period. But to

explore this connection in a more detailed way, I’ll turn to two recent
works that treat this problem, though from another side. In the case of
exegesis we can understand ‘vision’ or ‘illumination’ as a certain mental
experience by means of which, in a given image or situation, one perceives
affinities between this image or situation and some realities themselves
invisible as God, virtue, the human soul and its dispositions. And by means
of these affinities these invisible realities become to some extent
intelligible. In this way one, thanks to the given image as normative
element, obtains a mediated vision of the object itself. Looking from
another side, from the side of man who creates, and not receives an image,
as is the case in exegesis, G. Lakoff and M. Johnson argue that an image
taken by a man to serve as a metaphor of something has a strong impact on
the whole knowledge already possesed in a given area. J.M. Soskice also
states: «the purpose of metaphor is both to cast up and organise a network
of associations. A good metaphor may not simply be an oblique refference
to predetermined subject but a new vision, [...]»20 In both statements we
can hear the echo of Heidegger’s Ort, an intuitional insight which functions
as a precise, though itself ineffable, criterion which organizes a poem and
causes its internal coherence. An invisible point of convergence21.
At this point, extending this digression further, we can turn to what has
been said about Augustine’s account for the theological language. We have
to notice the double mediation between subject and object. The Object –
God, is to be reached by the means of external sign, which in turn provokes
an internal comprehension described in terms of vision, but not as
immediate. And only this internal vision, which we can call ‘activated
aenigma’, acts as a proper mediation between knowing subject and God.
We will turn to this problem later.
As we have seen the ability to see through aenigmata is obtained by
means of practiced exegesis. But it is not separated from moral
development and thus must be considered in the context of one’s ascent
towards personal union with God. The vision presupposes the internal
purification. A returning refrain in Rabanus’ letter mentioned above are the
words of the Sermon from the mountain: «Blessed are the pure in heart,
they will see God.» (Matt. 5,8) One has to purify one’s mind from
tumultus rerum, and be inclined rather towards meditating and praying and
20
J.M. SOSKICE, Metaphor and religious language, 57.
21
M. HEIDEGGER, drodze do ezyka, 28. 66.
looking for the humility of Jesus’ heart than to leading agitated and empty
disputations.22 God is invisible. And if He is to be seen, it is not in any
particular place where it ought to happen, but a purified heart. And only on
these conditions, an invisible vision can be obtained by means of the Lord’s
grace. 23 The exegete is then the researcher of the light. Ambrosius
Autpertus (730-784) in his sermon on the Lord’s Transfiguration24 said that
the light that emanated from Christ is the one, which human eyes are not in
grade to perceive unless God concedes it, because nobody can see God. At
the same time it is the same light that makes shine everything that shines
externally: the Sun, Moon, stars, or internally: angels, the human soul. But
the fullness of that light can be reached only in the future glory of the world
to come.
3.2.2 Artistic testimony

Let’s us also report how the theory of signs worked in the area of
decorative arts. In Libri Carolini, real importance is attributed only to
spiritual vision and veneration; the outer piece of art is only useful as
signum which evokes and reminds reality. 25 If it tries to reppresent
something non-existing, the piece of art becomes an idol.26
An interesting testimony can be found in Liber De Rebus In
Administratione Sua Gestis of Suger Abbot (1081-1152), the ‘inventor’, or
rather first performer of the gothic style. In his description of the works on
the cathedral of St. Denis, he reported some inscriptions placed in different
places of the newly constructed church. These inscriptions served as
interpretations of different significative parts and masterpieces. We can
learn much from them about the spiritual attitude of those who made and
watched them. The inscription on the main door stated:
Portarum quisquis attollere quaeris honorem,

Aurum nec sumptus, operis mirare laborem.
Nobile claret opus, sed opus quod nobile claret,
Clarificet mentes un cant per lumina vera
Ad verum lumen, ubi Christus janue vera.
22
cf RABANUS MAURUS, De Videndo Deum, PL 112, 1263A-B
23
cf RABANUS MAURUS, De Videndo Deum, PL 112, 1274D
24
PL 89, 1309C-D
25
cf Opus Caroli regis contra synodum, IV, 2, PL 98, 1185-6.
26
cf M.T. GIBSON, – al., ed., Intellectual life in the Middle Ages, 32.
Quale sit intus in his determinat aurea porta.

Mens hebes ad verum per materialia surgit,bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb
aaEt semersa prius hac visa luce resurgit.27
One who enters through it should not focus on the estetical qualities of
this masterpiece, but by means of it be reminded of Christ Who is the true
Door. Human mind thanks to material sign is elevated to contemplation of
primordial light.
3.2.3 Spiritual testimony

From the very beginning, already in St. Gregory’s doctrine, the central
notion of medieval spirituality is contemplation. It is understood as a mode
of vision of God, accessible to man in this life, though very obscure and
imperfect. For Gregory this vision is obtained by means of desire or love,28
but later authors describe it by means of «vision through the window of
faith.»29 Nevertheless the mode of access to this kind of vision is ascetism
and meditation of Scripture (the Passion of Christ above all.) 30
Contemplation in itself as a notion is very ambiguous and receives different
explanations by different authors. It can be taken in the terms of
imagination, but also as the passive experience of mystical grace. A
detailed description of the wide scope of proposals I leave aside. However
the identification of contemplation with some kind of vision is what unites
them all. Contemplation through this period was identified with true
theology.
3.2.4. Liber sacrum, liber mundi and artes – medieval realism.

In the 10th century John Eriugena would compare Nature and Scripture
to veste Christi:
therefore it is no small step but a great and indeed profitable one from the
knowledge of the sensibles to the understanding, so through the creature we
return to God. For we ought not like irrational animals look only on the
surface of visible things but also give a rational account of the things which
we perceive by the corporeal sense. [...] [even after the fall] there remain in
27
SUGERIUS SANCTI DIONYSII ABBAS, Liber De Rebus, PL 186, 1229A-B
28
J. LECLERCQ, The love of learning, 32.
29
HILDEGARD OF BINGEN, Liber vitae meritorum II, 35
30
J. LECLERCQ, The love of learning, 32.
man an impulse of reason to seek the knowledge [...] And if Christ at the time
of His Transfiguration were two vestures white as snow, namely the letter of
Divine Oracles and the sensible appearance of visible things, why should be
encouraged diligently to touch one in order to be worthy to find Him Whose
vesture it is, and forbidden to inquire about the other [...].31
Candidus Fuldensis, one century before him, compares creation to letters
by means of which man acquires knowledge or to torches which give him
light necessary to see in the darkness. But if one could know everything
without letters, if one were in the light of midday – that is – if one were
able to know God immediately, creation would be superfluous. But that is
not the case.32
It is hard to omit the secondary character of thought and argumentation
of early medieval scholars. Most problems and their solutions are
simplified versions of the patristic ones. The early Middle Ages is rather
the epoch of repetition and assimilation though not without zeal and
enthusiasm. But, as J. Marenbon notices, not attributing any originality to
this period would not do it justice. «Alcuin and the followers […] not
passively asimilated, but understood and transformed the ancient
intellectual heritage.»33 M. Colish argues that this originality can be seen in
the shift, that occured in this period of passage, from rhetoric to
thegrammatical approach to Augustine’s theory of signs – from expression
to definition.34 But, at this stage, the definition must not be understood as
an exact description of quidditive formal properties, rather as a rectum
nomen or nominal phrase35, much closer to the etymological than logical
approach. From this, resulted much greater attention attributed to the
correspondence between words in their gramatical forms to reality. 36 Let us
consider for example Fredegisus’ letter De nihilo et tenebris, where he
argues
Omne itaque nomen finitum aliquid significat, ut homo, lapis, lignum. Haec
enim ubi dicta fuerint, simul res quas fuerint significant intelligimus. Quippe
hominis nomen praeter differentiam aliquam positum universalitatem
hominum designat. Lapis et lignum suam similiter generalitatem
31
ERIUGENA, Periphyseon III, 723C-D.
32
CANDIDUS FULDENSIS, Epistola, IV, PL 106, 105A-B.
33
J. MARENBON, From the Circle of Alcuin to the School of Auxerre, 9.
34
35
cf M.L. COLISH, The Mirror of Language, 136.
36
cf S. EBBESEN, Ancient scholastic logic,119
complecuntur. Igitur nihil ad id quod significat referetur. Ex hoc etiam

probatur non posse aliquid non esse. Item aliud. Omnis significatio est quod
est. Nihil autem aliquid significat. Igitur nihil ejus significatio est quid est, id
est, rei existentis.37
We can observe here the overlap between different intellectual currents
which formed Fregedisus’ approach: Augustine’s theory of signs according
to which nothing can be a sign but a flautus vocis 38 , unless there’s
something that is signified by it. This account interfered with a conviction,
that in Scripture there can be no word without signification39 – and it is the
description of creation, where the word nihil occurs. Finally the conviction
of perfect convergence between Scripture, created world and language.
Convergence results from tahat which is the common origin to all of them:
God40. In this simplified account of language, the word stays in immediate
relation to the extralinguistic thing signified.41 We can sense here the strong
affiliation of these scholars to the Platonic account of language. But their
confidence towards language is rooted even more in the thoroughly
Christian belief, that the word is the very instrument with which this world
has been brought into existence. Thinkers of this epoch were aware of this
fact and admired the harmony between these different but convergent
sources of man’s knowledge. This spiritual attitude we can touch reading
Alcuin’s introduction to pseudo-Augustine anonymous medieval adaptation
of Aristotle’s Categoriae
Continet iste decem naturae verba libellus
quae jam verba tenet rerum, ratione stupenda,
omne quod in nostrum poterit decurrere sensum,
qui legat ingenium veterum mirabile laudet;
atque suum studeat tali exercere labore,
exornans titulis vitae data tempora honestis.
Hunc Augustino placuit transferre magistro,
de veterum gazis Greecorum clave latina.
Quem tibi, Rex magnus, sophiae sextator, amator.
Munere qui tali gaudesm modo mitto legendum.42
37
FREDEGISUS, De nihilo et tenebris, PL105, 752C
38
AUGUSTINE, De Magisto 8, 23.
39
FREDEGISUS, De nihilo et tenebris, PL105, 753C
40
41
42
PL 32, 1419
According to the authors of Opus Caroli regis contra synodum, also

called Libri Carolini, the convergence between artes, Scripture, Fathers
and truths of faith expressed in dogmatic formulations is of such kind, that
it is impossible to invent any novelty in the area of profanes vocis, or to put
it in other words – any novelty invented by grammarians or dialecticians,
with respect of Truths of Christian faith, is itself a certain sign of mistake,
and the proper use of the linguistic skills must be characterized by the
faithful adherence to sacred tradition. Truths which belong to the catholic
tradition lacks any novelty in the way of expression.43
This approach to language has been classified as linguistic realism. In
treating the nature of names, it presupposed the existence of eternal,
incorporeal forms. The forms, realized in concrete bodies, are merely their
similitudes.44 Names refer, first of all, to those eternal, immutable ideas in
which the existing things participate, and this reference is straightforward.
The more developed semantical considerations were already to come. By
the mid XII century the signification of things, interpretations of nature’s
hidden interconnections 45 , and a taste for eloquence, flourished in the
school of Chartres with authors like John of Salisbury or William of
Conches.
3.3 Towards expression, signification of words.

The emergence of the new kind of logical science tahnks to the
rediscovery of the Aristotelian texts, unknown to medieval scholars until
the mid-XIth century, marked boldly the subsequent development of
Western thought.46 One of its fruits would be the filling of the important
gap in the theological account for the Trinitarian mystery – the definition of
a person which would dialectically fuse the notion of being-something-in-
se with that of relativeness. A gap left by Augustine and filled by Thomas
eight centuries later. Of course it was not a period deprived of serious
attempts at configuring logical-linguistic schemes for this problem, nor did
the inquiry stop with Aquinas’ achievement as well.47 Nevertheless it was
43
«omne igitur quod ecclesiasticum est, profanis vocum novitatibus caret» cf Opus
Caroli regis contra synodum, IV, 28, PL 98, 1246 D-1247A.
44
cf J. MARENBON, From the Circle of Alcuin to the School of Auxerre, 130.
45
cf W. OTTEN, From paradise to paradigm, 79.
46
47
Very interesting analysis of that vide range of logical models for Trinity developed
from Augustine to Ockham is to be find in: THOM, P., The logic of the Trinity.
his solution that became the classical one. This was possible thanks to the
increasing sophistication of terminology available to theologians provided
by the development of logic. The Mysterium was no more intuited with
images, but described with a set of technical words. But how are they to be
understood?
3.3.1. First signs of change.

It seems, that already Alcuin knew both the Platonic and Aristotelian
theories of language.48 But there’s no sign of the latter’s influence on the
immediate subsequent tradition. The first signs of affinities with the so
called ‘3-stage-theory’ can be traced to the glosses of Categoriae Decem.49
Also in Anselm’s works we can see some signs of a new approach to
language, as for example taking seriously into account the discrepancy
between grammatical form and the meaning which seem to be independent
of it. In this way the old problem of signification of nihil can be treated in a
new way
licet, supraposita ratione, malum et nihil significent aliquidm tamen quod
significatur non est malum aut nihil: sed est alia ratio qua significant aliquid,
et quod significatur est aliquid.Multa quippe esse dicuntur secundum formam,
quae non sunt secundum rem: ut, timere, secundum formam vocis, dicitur
activum, cum sit passivum, secundum rem.50
Anselm dedicated the whole treatise De Grammatico to evidentiate this
discrepancy between the Truth (the real state of things) and apparent form
of utterance. 51 Despite this sensitivity to the problem of the relation
between spoken language and reality, he was not yet interested in providing
a general semantical theory. «In using language as a tool, Anselm treats it
less as a universal criterion than as a means of solving the particular
problems that interest him, whether in the liberal arts, philosophy, or
theology. He is not concerned with developing a linguistic theory as an end
in itself.»52
48
A. BISOGNO, Il metodo carolingio, 201.
49
see J. MARENBON, From the Circle of Alcuin to the School of Auxerre, 134-5.
50
ANSELM, De Casu Diaboli, X, PL 158, 340C.
51
cf D.P. HENRY, The logic of Saint Anselm, 18.
52
3.3.2 Abelard’s account for language and signification.

When we look at the development of medieval linguistic and logical
thought, there can be no doubts that the time of Abelard marks a certain
turning point. We can see clearly how his own ideas, for example the
separation of categorical syllogism from Topical inferences 53, influenced
late XII century logical treatises.54 Though it is not clear how much is owed
to his personal achievements and how much subsequent development rests
rather on translations of Aristotle which arrived in the Latin West at this
time. 55 Nevertheless the shift of concern can be illustrated by the slow
eclipse of the Chartres school by the Paris that occured not long after
Abelard’s death in 1142.56
In this paragraph I will focus on the Abelard’s works as the first
medieval, explicit expressions of adherence to Aristotelian theory of
language, on the difficulties faced by this theory when talking about
Mystery, and subsequent changes resulting from this confrontation. In
treating these problems I’m going to follow generally J. Marenbon.57
Let us start with a quick reminder of the background in which Abelard
moved himself in his logical inquiries. I would like to point out only two
essential elements. Firstly: his early contact with protovocalism, which
challenged the prevailing realism of the epoch, by claiming that universals
are merely words. 58 Protovocalists were accused of removing the link
between language and reality. It was this position from which young
Abelard set off in his intellectual adventure, but which would be revised
towards the recognition of the correspondence of reality and words.
Secondly - the general lack of a clear distinction between the natural and
supernatural orders in predication. Therefore he is convinced that «the tools
of logic, used properly, can give adequate (though necessarily limited)
account of how God can be both three and one.»59 This conviction accords
with his general belief «that not only the persons of Trinity but their
53
E. STUMP, Logic in the early twelfth century, 45.
54
E. STUMP, Logic in the early twelfth century, 49.
55
cf M.M. TWEEDALE, Abelard and the culmination of the old logic, 157.
56
cf P. WOLFF, Storia e cultura nel Medioevo, 292.
57
J. MARENBON, The philosophy of Peter Abelard.
58
The evolution of Abelard’s thought in the context of protovocalism, in discussion
with William of Champeaux, and his discovery of sermo as non-phisical, purely logical
and signifying reality, is presented exhaustively in: Y. IVAKUMA, “Vocales” revisited.
59
J. MARENBON, The philosophy of Peter Abelard, 57-8.
interrelations are, to some extent at least, discoverable through reason.»60

So it is no wonder that he recognizes pagan authorities as «Christians
before the coming of Christ.»61
Abelard was first of all, but not exclusively, a teacher of logic. After his
forced enrollment into the Benedictine order, his main interest shifted to
theology. 62 His approach to Mystery was very original. Let’s permit
ourselves, encouraged by the cirtiques expressed by St. Bernard, to
consider this approach in the light of what has been stated about the nature
of theological language until now. I would like to dwell upon one pivotal
aspect of his theology – namely God’s atrributes treated interchangeably
with personal names. I am referring here to Power, Wisdom and
Benignity 63 understood respectively as names of Father, Son and Holy
Spirit. If we accept he peculiarity of theological language, as founded on
words of Revelation, we should judge this move of Abelard as simply
illicit. For Revealed names contain notions of discreteness and of relation
intrinsicly, while the attributes do not. We can see then, how the awareness
of the nature of theological language turns out to be useful for the
discernment in matters of theological inquiry.
But leaving aside the theological aspect of his work, let’s look into the
interaction between language and the problems described by it which
occured in Abelard’s thought. A new interest influenced his
epistemological and logical reflection, and thus we can talk about two
stages of his mature thought. The comparison of these two can be very
illuminating for the better understanding of the problem of the relation
between language and reality in theological discourse, even if we will
observe it in a premature phase.
a) First Abelard
In his commentary on Perihermeneias contained in Logica
ingredientibus, where he elaborates the most consistent formulation of his
first position, Abelard generally follows Aristotle and Boethius. He
recognizes three grades of cognition: first, purely sensual, which occurs
without any attention attributed to perceived sense data. The conscious
60
J. MARENBON, The philosophy of Peter Abelard, 58; ABAELARDUS, Teologia
scholarium II, 111.
61
J. MARENBON, The philosophy of Peter Abelard, 58.
62
cf J. MARENBON, The philosophy of Peter Abelard, 54.
63
cf ABAELARDUS, Teologia scholarium 1, 40
cognition is divided in two subsequent grades: a first, confused one, called

imagination «Cum enim ad intelligendum primum se animus applicat, ipsa
applicatio atque inchoatio cogitandi, antequam distinguat naturam
aliquam rei vel proprietatem, imaginatio dicitur.» 64 And a second one,
which distinguishes certain precise properties of the perceived thing «Ubi
vero attendit naturam aliquam rei vel in eo quod res est vel ens vel
substantia vel corpus vel alba vel Socrates, intellectus dicitur, cum quidem
de confusione quae imaginationis erat, ad intellectum per rationem
ducitur.»65
An image in itself is nothing: «Has autem similitudines sive imagines
rerum, quae figmenta quaedam sunt animi et non existentiae verae».66 Of
course its role is to be an object of thought in the absence of the real object,
however Abelard describes it rather in relation to the mind that produces it,
than to the things of which it is to be a representation.67 It is so, because he
is focused rather on the notion, as we will see below. But it is not so clear
cut, because, as he says, already imagination touches a thing, though
slightly, so in some way must it be linked to the thing.68
He also elaborates his account of the relation between image, likeness
and notion, filling thus a gap left by Aristotle in his treatise. «imaginatio
confuse et quasi infirme capit, superveniens intellectus per rationem
formae et quasi quodammodo depingat, aliquam scilicet eius naturam vel
proprietatem attendens, ut dictum est.» 69 Athough imagination is a
confused and imperfect way of the apprehension of a thing, it is necessary
for every act of cognition: «Intellectus itaque sine imaginatione non est,
quia ut perfectum sit, imperfectum aliquid oportet esse, quia <si> dimidia
domus <non> fuerit, domus esse non potest.»70 But generally imagination,
definition, and relation to intellectus remained a bit ambiguous. The
64
ABAELARDUS, Peter Abaelards Philosophische Schriften, 317.
65
66
67
68
«Per imaginationem rem simpliciter accipimus, nondum aliquam eius naturam vel
proprietatem attendendo», ABAELARDUS, Peter Abaelards Philosophische Schriften,
317; «Nam sensus vel imaginatio leviter rem attingere videntur, dum nil ex ratione
deliberant, intellectu vero quoddammodo utimur, ut naturam aliquam vel proprietatem
discernamus.» ABAELARDUS, Peter Abaelards Philosophische Schriften, 319. From
these two quotations we can see, that Abelard is rather not keen on admitting any
apprehension of universal to senses or imagination.
69
70
operation of the intellect he calls abstraction. While imagining is focused

on a thing, abstraction is directed towards its nature or property, but by
means of the image formed in the mind. The intellect focuses on the nature
by attending to various aspects of a thing: its being a substance, body, man,
its colour etc, thanks to the mental image.71 Abelard employs the image of
wooden block held by one hand (imagination) and carved with another
(intellect) to express what he has in mind.72 An image is necessary also for
the apprehension of beyond-sensual realities, without it, as it has been said
above, no intellectus is possible. In the case of non-sensual things,
everyone has to form an image on his own. Although the difference of
images, the truth of the object is retained, because this image serves as an
indicator for the content signified, and is construed acording to it. 73
Passing from epistemology to semantics, Abelard states, that it is not a
sensation or an image that is signified by a word, but a notion, intellectus –
a fruit of intellectual elaboration «non propter sensus sive imaginationes
voces esse inventas, sed propter intellectus».74 And the notions are to be
identified with passio animae – the true likenesses of things. 75 Abelard
rejected thus any kind of theory which recognized the existence of
universals as things to be partecipated by the instances falling under
universal terms and introduced notion of status, as true cause of imposition
of names. Universals were merely voces.76
With the notion of status we enter into Abelard’s account for ontology.
This ontology was developed under the influence of both the discussion
about universals (from the vocalist position) and Trinitarian theology (in
the context of distinction between the oneness of an object and its being
different at the same time according to propriety or definition). But the
problem of ontology does not enter directly in the problem discussed in this
work, so we’ll leave it apart. We should only note two characteristic issues
of the status: it is inherent to things in a way that many things can come
together under one status, without status being any reality separated from
them,77 and that it is not thoroughly known by men, but only to God. In
other words, although an impositor gives a name to a thing according to
71
72
73
74
75
76
Y. IVAKUMA, “Vocales” revisited, 85.
77
status found in it, he does so without full knowledge of all properties of the
thing named. 78 These properties are discovered later by means of
abstraction, as it was described above. But it is not a status (as unknown
completely) what is signfied by universal words, but human notions. 79
What is not known conceptually ina a complete way, cannot be signified.
We can judge this approach in two ways: either as an ingenious insight
in fact, that even the contingent reality is much richer and complex than we
can know. In this way Abelard could be considered as precursor of
scientific inquiry. Or, from another point of view, this approach can be
judged as a first step to agnosticism: to the assumption that the nature of a
thing cannot be known. What seems be lacking in this theory is the
admission that what is essential for one thing to be itself can be grasped
sufficiently even when we do not have the complete knowledge of its
accidental properties. It seems as if Abelard were trying to fill the very gap,
which Aristotle consciously had left behind without hesitation.
b) Second Abelard
To perceive the change that occured in Abelard’s theory of cognition and
signification, we have to consult his Tractatus de intelligibus. Abelard sets
his attention to the same terminology, employed in former works: sensus,
imaginatio, ratio and intellectus, but he redefines their interrelations. A
main difference is to be noticed in the role of imagination in the cognitive
process.80 We should notice also the importance of intellectus, which now
is to be identified with true science,81 and which is reachable for man only
through divine illumination. We can consider then, that his thought, during
his theological inquiry takes boldly the Platonic turn. 82 Sense data, and
imagination, though they retained their necessity as the starting point for
the cognitional act, in subsequent stages are seen as obstacles, and
contamination of thought: «dum in aliqua re per intellectum aliquam eius
naturam aut proprietatem deliberare [...] attendere curamus, ipsa sensus
consuetudo, a quo omnis humana notitia surgit, [...] per imaginationem
ingerit animo, que nullo modo attendimus.» 83 Intellectual cognition is
78
79
80
81
ABAELARDUS, Tractatus de intellectibus, 22.
82
83
compared to a shell, that put in an stinking liquid, retains its smell long
after being extracted from it.84 Abelard decides to remove ambiguity from
the notion of passio animae which in some context could be identified also
with imaginatio. While
in the Logica thinking about things involved joining together images [...] in
the De intellectibus there is no more mention of putting together images in
order to put together thoughts. Instead Abelard speaks in the terms of a
succession of acts of thinking. The word concipio takes on a new meaning.
Rather than being linked to the formation of mental images it is used as a way
of talking about the contents of an act of thought. [...] in De interpretatione
commentary Abelard used the same term to refer to conjoined images, but in
De intellectibus when Abelard talks in term of things being conceived, there is
no suggestion that he means anything but the way something is thought
about.85
The positive role of imagination is considered as conserving images of
things perceived, and thus providing material for ratio, which in turn
produces intellectum as its effect.86 Now sense data and imagination are
clearly put in the position resembling rather that of an Augustinian sign,
provoking inner illumination, than a very object of thought and cognition
characteristic for the Aristotelian tradition.
This Platonic influence we can trace also in the way he defines science.
Science is something existing independently from the human mind:
«scientia autem neque intellectus est neque existimatio, sed est ipsa animi
certitudo que non minus, absente uel existimatione uel intellectu, permanet.
Alioquin dormientes scientiam amitterent [...]» 87 because it has divine
character.88
84
85
86
ABAELARDUS,. Tractatus de intellectibus, 10.
87
ABAELARDUS, Tractatus de intellectibus, 27. One should ask in this point whether
the mentioned dream has not something to do with the Stranger’s dream from Cratylus.
The moment in which Abelard evoked this notion, though in slightly distorted context,
seems suggesting so.
88
We can sense in this definition an echo of discussion concerning the nature of the
articles of faith (in the context of the divine science of events): whether they are to be
identified with the events or with the so called enuntiabiles. Abelard here defends
vocalist-nominalist position, which holded that articles of faith are to be identified not
with the events themselves but with enuntiabiles whech are verified by events.
cf S. EBBESEN, Abelard and the culmination of the old logic, 157.
Although the change occured in epistemology, the semantic remained

the same i.e with truth relation holding between composition or division of
intellecta and the status of the things signified.89 Single intellectus can be
sanus only in the case when there’s something in reality that corresponds to
it, or cassus in an opposite case. «Sanos quidem dicimus intellectus per
quoscumque ita ut sese res habet attendimus, siue illi quidem sint
simplices, siue compositi.» 90 «Veros autem uel falsos intellectus dicimus
eos solummodo qui compositi sunt.»91
Intellectus, in Abelard’s vocabulary, signifies the concept, deliberation
and a word as well. And thus intellectus-concept secundum quem
deliberatur aliquid is a part of deliberantis intellectus. 92 In this way a
thought in fact lacks any external object and is identified with its content,
and as such apprehends reality without any intermediary.93 The intellectus
deliberantis has logical (syllogistic) structure, and its conclusions are
necessary, if the righteous structure of syllogistic reasoning has been
respected.94 In this way the distinction ratio-intellectus seems to be blurred.
But there can be traced also another interrelation: intellectus deliberantis
can be identified with definition or description of a particular property of a
thing which intellectus secundum quem deliberatur grasps by means of a
single word. Here again emerges the lack of distinction within the cognitive
process between stages of intellectual elaboration of a concept. Both types
of intellectus inhere to the some faculty: the grasp of a nature of a thing and
the inquiry into its proprieties. What in Aristotle’s account was distinct,
here is posited on the same level.
How then can an insensible thing be thought of? Can the human mind
grasp anything directly of the Trinitarian Mystery? One explicit answer has
been reported above – there are few who receive such a grace from God.
But there is another, implicit one. In paragraph 76 Abelard asks whether an
intellectus which grasps an object in a way in which it is not must be
necessarily empty. In number 77 he describes human custom to think about
incorporeal realities employing imagination, and judges this way as
inadequate to the state of affairs, so consequently, intellectus so formed
must be necessarily empty. Finally in number 94 he says: «quod, si recte
89
cf ABAELARDUS, Tractatus de intellectibus, 56.
90
91
92
93
94
M.M. TWEEDALE, Abelard and the culmination of the old logic, 151.
ratiocinari uolumus, oportet significatorum enuntiatorum sensus diligenter

attendere, ut secundum hec, vim complexionis diligenter queamus
discernere.» There is no direct reference to noncorporeal reality, but it is
hard to reject the sensation, that the whole proceeding was meant to justify
a method of theological inquiry based thoroughly on the syllogistic
proceeding from premises to consequences. It is a categorical proposition,
its structure and the relation to another propositions, which provide the
criterion for discernment of truth. Of course it was not a pure formalism,
because even affirmative categorical propositions can not be necessarily
true when referred to the contingent reality, because of their dependence on
status of non necessary objects. But God is quite another case. 95 What
flagrantly lacks in this account is the lack of justification of the knowledge
about God other than the formal correctness of logical proceeding.
c) Conclusive remarks
What can bother us when reading works of such authors as Anselm or
Abelard is the impression that they treated Trinitarian issues as belonging
to the scope of natural-reason truths. Is it not bothering when we read that
Anselm is going to give an account of the Trinity without Revelation’s
supply? Or when he notices that the Word of Supreme Substance must be
necessarily consubstantial with it96, while what all pre-christian philosphy
was in grade to do, was to explain it in categories of emanation (the whole
arian crisis arose around this issue in the first centuries of Church). Are we
not dismayed with the serene admission of Abelard that Trinitarian
relations are to some extent available to natural reason without
Revelation’s supply? At this point, very illuminating should be the notion
of apriority which comes a posteriori employed by K. Rahner:
But just in so far as Christ is the freest and in this sense (but also only in this
sense) the most 'contingent' fact in all reality, so it is true that he is also at the
same time the most decisive and important, [...] His subjective knowability
cannot tacitly be thought of as simply subsumed under the conclusions of a
general metaphysics and critique of knowledge. He is too unique for that, too
mysterious and existentially significant. [...]. An a priori sketch of the 'Idea of
Christ' as the correlative object of the transcendental structure of man and his
knowledge, even if it came to anything purely a priori, could never decide the
question as to where and in whom this 'Idea' is reality [...]. It is only from the
95
cf M.M. TWEEDALE, Abelard and the culmination of the old logic, 151.
96
cf ANSELM, Monologion XII.
message of 'fides ex auditu' that this question could ever be answered. If and in
so far as such an abstractly formal, a priori Christology were to offer a kind of
formal schema of Christ to the Christology which hears the message a
posteriori, we should reflect that such an a priori Christology is wholly
capable of taking shape in the illuminating light of the grace of the real Christ
[...] the a priori schema can owe its existence to the real object a posteriori,[...]
A deduction of this kind must aim at showing that man is at once a concretely
corporeal and historical entity on earth and an absolutely transcendent one.
Accordingly he looks out--and looks out in the course of his history--to see
whether the supreme fulfilment (however free it may remain) of his being and
his expectation is not on its way to meet him: a fulfilment in which his
(otherwise so empty) concept of the Absolute is wholly fulfilled and his
(otherwise so blind) gaze can 'see through' to the absolute God himself. Thus
man is he who has to await God's free Epiphany in his history. Jesus Christ is
this Epiphany. It can, therefore, remain a completely open question whether
the content of the a posteriori dogma simply 'coincides' with the Idea of Christ,
which is the correlative object of this transcendental deduction, or whether this
correlative only 'corresponds' to the real Christ declared to the hearing of faith
and is essentially surpassed by him, although in its own axis.97
It would be very interesting to see how the development of Abelard’s
epistemological and semantical accounts is related to his ontology and over
all to his theological efforts. Another interesting point would be to compare
Abelard’s theological method with those of Anselm. Unfortunately these
issues go far beyond the scope of this work, and first of all beyond the
possibilities of its author. Let us touch only one important issue.
The theological matter forced Abelard to reject imagination as the
necessary object of intellectual cognition, because God cannot be imagined
directly. Having left aside the image as intermediary between object and
thought, Abelard was forced to admit a direct intellectual cognition of
individuals. I would like to claim that one of the most important
consequences of such a move is the restriction of the account of what can
be called knowledge to an understanding as expressed in complete notion
or definition. It could be plausible with respect to the material reality. But it
results more troublesome as regarding the non-sensible, and over all God.98
97
K. RAHNER, Theological investigations, I, 186-7.
98
Abelard employs in his Theologia scholarium the similitudine of bronze seal (II,
110-115). But it works as an illustration to how Aristotelian categories of matter, from
and act can be seen as vestigia personarum Trinitatis, with a clausula of translatio
(metaphorical mode of signifying): «cum ad singularem diuinitatis naturam
quascumque dictiones transferimus, eas inde quandam singularem significationem seu
Let us consider this. An image of aenigma can grasp or reflect something

that goes beyond the possibility of definition. It expresses a certain issue of
reality without claiming to any kind of detailed accuracy. It functions rather
as an indication for understanidng retaining its ambiguity and non-
univocity. In this way it makes reality accessible, but as needy of further
explanation. Such explanation remains implicit. This ‘implicitness’ and
ambiguity can be taken as imperfection of knowledge on the one hand, but
also as ‘richness’ on the another. Compared to it, a purely logical
description results much more semantically impoverished. I don’t mean
that we are only losing something with expression – on the contrary: it is an
important stage of apprehension. What is dangerous however is that one
can forget, that every conceptualization is only partial and falls short to the
conceptualized reality. In fact it is a kind of reduction of the cognitive act
to its final stage. The conceptualization is necessary; but the rejection of
image, not turning to it as a criterion for our conceptualizations, can leave
us without the contact with reality which transcendends our conceptual
mind. To be honest I am not in grade to judge whether Abelard was the
case. It is very possible that not. What I intended to do was, using this
example of development of a theological thought, or better, of an
understanding of language as instrument for the theological inquiry, to
point out this danger, which, as it seems, was sensed so profoundly by St.
Bernard.
The doctrine of Abelard is one of the first examples of a new, logical
description of Mystery. An effort to describe by means of words that until
now was expressed with images. An effort to obtain new insight by means
of logical precision. But what emerged here, was the fact that in this
translation, the image, as an intermediary stage between the object and
word, got lost. In this way Abelard can be seen as a representative thinker
for the age of scholasticism, and forerunner of future problems.
A new logical approach was closely linked to the issue of universal
terms. As we could see Magister Petrus remained faithful to the conviction
that things are named according to their natures, although these natures are
not known thoroughly.99 It was in fact a common belief among medieval
scholars, and was a presupposition that allowed the metaphysical reflection
from Plato to Aquinas. But what became problematic from him on was the
etiam constructionem contrahere, atque per hoc quod omnia excedit, necessario
propriam institutionem excedere.» Theologia scholarium II, 85.
99
cf C.J., MARTIN, Imposition and Essence, 207.
ontological qualification of species and genus which played a pivotal role

in semantics. The rejection of the traditional realistic interpretation, based
on the theory of participation, 100 opened the door for many different
accounts, which remained not without influence on the epistemology and
metaphysics.
3.4 Light, vision, species and knowledge – Problems with intelligible

species
By considering the XIIIth century discussion concerning the nature of
intelligible species I would like provide a last element of the context in
which I would like to reflect upon the theological language of Saint
Thomas, but also point out the cause of the decline of metaphysics not long
after Thomas’ death. Or rather to make evident the pivotal role of
epistemology and semantics as the very foundations of any philosophical
and theological discourse.
In the notion of universal term or intelligible species, culminate or knot
together all problems and questions of epistemology, metaphysics,
science.101 Questions like «can we know something?» «what we know?»
and «how we know it?» are all turning around the species. And thus the
account given of it necessarily determines the whole philosophical or
theological system. But this account is at the same time an expression
regarding the nature of language.
A short glimpse at this discussion, makes us recognize almost all the old
friends, though a bit disguised: Augustine’s interior light, but now shining
also at external objects, and refracting in optical instruments and curved
mirrors, whose lines and angles could be calculated by means of the
mathematical equations. There would be also an act of vision. Though not
as an interior glimpse starring at the unveiled mirror of aenigmata
illuminated by rays of grace, but as a window receiving a mysterious entity
which had travelled the whole way from a distant object to reach our sense
organ. Also images, liknesses, notions, propositions and anyone else still
remained alive – all put together in an all-covering theory, which would
knot together all essential threads of this multiform drama of thought. K.H.
Tachau notices in her excellent and illuminating work dedicated to the
interconnections between epistemology, semantics, metaphysics and optics
in Middle Ages: «from mid XIII medieval intellectuals sought what might
100
101
seem a unified field theory of light, vision, cognition and our expression of
what we know to be true.»102
3.4.1. Grossateste’s metaphysic of light

The so called metaphysic of light «designates a whole circle of themes, a
current of philosophical and religious thought that runs right through
European culture from ancient times down to the Renaissance. This current
includes the idea that the physical universe is made up of light, so that all
its features, including space, time, non living and living things, spheres,
and stars, are different forms taken by a single fundamental energy.»103 But
in the writings of Robert Grossateste (1175-1253), first of all in De luce
and Hexaemeron, it gained a very particular and influential form.
Grossateste was one of the first latin scholars who became acquainted with
Arab natural sciences (like mathematics, optics, astronomy), and who made
of them an important element of his reflection. 104 I mention him here,
because he would exercise an immense influence on Roger Bacon and thus
on the whole interpretation of species in the framework of epistemology in
XIII and XIV century debate.
For Grossateste light had had these connotations: God was light – Lumen
de lumine. God created the universe by creating one point – light - which
propagated itself in all directions. 105 He identified the light as the very
substance of which everything is made of, and as such the cause of
resemblence between creation and its Author. Also the human intellect is a
created, sipritual light. Most important for subsequent inheritors of this
theory, would be the account of how light propagates itself: it occurs by
means of subsequent generation. Light propagation proceeds through its
replication at subsequent points lying along straight lines. Light is then also
seen as a model of any kind of generation in which both identity and
diversity are dialectically related.106
In this framework the intelligible species contained in sensible things,
without which there could be no science at all, and which is to be known
only by means of sense perception, derives from the divine mind through
102
K.H. TACHAU, Vision and certitude, XVI.
103
J.J. MCEVOY, Robert Grosseteste, 87.
104
cf J.J. MCEVOY, Robert Grosseteste, 77.
105
106
the process of emanation, which embraces different stages, and as such is a

trace of eternal creative light.107
3.4.2. Roger Bacon and his legacy

Roger Bacon, though we do not even know whether he met Grossateste
in person, took over his reflection as the constructing point of his theory.
«Bacon [...] synthesized the optical knowledge of the middle ages, saw in
the study of vision 'the flower of all philosophy' and 'the peculiar delight of
man' [...] the mechanism of corporeal vision corresponds to spiritual
enlightment.» 108 He directed his efforts to «unite optics, psychology,
epistemology and logic within his doctrine of the multiplication of
species.»109 Adapting Grossateste’s ideas, he claimed, that
Omne enim efficiens agit per suam virtutem quam facit in materiam
subjectam, ut lux solis facit suam virtutem in eare [...] Et haec virtus vocatur
similitudo, et imago, et species et multis nominibus, et hanc facit tam
substantia quam accidens, et spiritalisquam corporalis [...] Et haec species facit
omnem operationem hujus mundi; nam operatur in sensum, in intellectum, et
in totam mundi materiam per rerum generationem.110
Bacon identified species with efficient cause, replicated in the mode of
Grosseteste’s light in following media, and, what is important, receives
evidently physical interpretation. Species as a physical object reaches the
perceptive powers of a man, and initiates replication in the psychological
process, which finishes in the intellect as concept or intentio. But as such it
is not a product of the human mind. It would exist even if there were no
one to perceive it.111 (This account seems tho have something in common
with Stoic epistemology.) Though it is not a res itself but its similitude, it
conserves the identity according to the nature of the object which emitted
107
108
C. ERICKSON, The Medieval Vision, 51.
109
K.H. TACHAU, Vision and certitude, 6.
110
BACON Opus maius, pt.4, d2. c1 [I:111], «every efficient cause acts throught its
own power, which it excersises on the adjacent matter, as the light of the sun excersises
its power on the air [...] And this power is called LIKENESS, IMAGE and SPECIES
and is designated by many other names, and it is produced both by substance and by
accident, spiritual and corporeal [...] This species produces every action in the world, for
it acts on sense, on the intellect, and on all matter of the world for the generation of
things.», translation contained in: K.H. TACHAU, Vision and certitude, 7.
111
cf K.H. TACHAU, Vision and certitude, 12.
it. 112 On this basis Bacon evidentiated the natural connection between
reality and concepts, and claimed species to be natural sign of the
objects.113 In the inverse order, the uttered word had a power to generate
species and to make it replicate through the sense of hearing, inner senses
and so on. Thus a word signified indirectly but naturally.114
I would not enter much in details of this theory, and difficulties it
caused, and the whole dicussion it provoked. One thing is evident, that
from this account what results most problematic is the nature of species. Is
it material or not?; if so, is it material also of incorporeal things? And in
fact species, its nature, its relation with existent things and the mode we
perceive it, would became even more problematic. Henry of Ghent (1217-
1293) objected to the natural link between species and object pointing out
the case of dreams and illusions. What one receives is a phantasm, which in
turn forms an intellectual habit. Since species can occur to us even without
there being an object which emitted it, a new formulation of truth-question
regarded now the relation of a singular species to the reality, not the
combination of them, as Perihermeneias stated it.
Duns Scotus (1266-1308) responding to these objections must, on the
one hand prove that species are necessary for the intellectual cognition, and
on the other that one can distinguish between true and false species. He
defended species and their multiplication in medio not as objects, but as an
image, esse diminutum belonging to the category of quality. Since for an
object to be known by cognitive faculties it must be present to them in an
adequate way. Senses receive their object in the sense organs, but the
intellect, which does not have any organ must receive a species reproduced
in senses; a phantasm as material, cannot be analysed by the intellect which
is immaterial. Intellect is in potencz not with respect to a phantasm, but to a
species.115 In this Scotus follows Bacon’s account of cognitive process as
entirely passive – also at the intellectual level.
But even Scotus didn’t completely get rid of species seen as real object,
though of diminished being, when he introduces the distinction between
112
113
cf K.H. TACHAU, Vision and certitude, 18. Something similar we can find in the
idea developed by K. Rahner in his notion of «real symbol». A concrete thing is symbol
of its own form, and as concrete and material is ‘species’ – a means by which it
communicates itself to knower. cf K. RAHNER, The theology of the symbol, 232f.
114
115
cf K.H. TACHAU, Vision and certitude, 60, note 20.
species as object informing senses, and species as a sign.116 The problem

arose from the discrepancy between diminished being and the real
existence represented by it. A quality could not provide certainty about the
existence. Scotus had to introduce then an additional faculty, which would
supplement cognition by means of species which regarded only the formal
aspect of a thing without any hint of its existence or non-existence. This
faculty he called intuition and its task was to provide to one an immediate
contact with object known (both material and immaterial) as to assure him
of the real existence of it.117
One of the most important consequences of introducing this cognitional
dichotomy, which became commonly shared almost immediately,
especially given the thoroughly passive character of cognition via species,
was the distrust with respect to the validity of abstractive knowledge i.e
knowledge regarding basic structure of reality. I mean the structure of
natural kinds, their knowability on which the science was founded, as
knowledge of causes (among them formal causes). While for Aristotle
formal causes belonged to the first principles, known spontaneously,
though in a confused way – let’s say intuitively and they require further
analysis to put them ina general scheme of kinds and genres, now the order
seemed to be reversed: a natural kind seem to be given at once, but what is
problematic is the source of its origin. Intuition is called upon for help not
to grasp the content of species, but to assure the knower, that its source –
the object –exists. The position of this immediate cognition has moved
from before- to after-abstraction. We can see how the Aristotelian account
of semantics and cognition, piece by piece became distorted: first the
nature of species, then the account of cognitive act.
As a result, the primordial cognitive confidence, so characteristic for
Aristotle, has been replaced by skepticism of late scholastic period. It
seems that this change was caused by the coincidence of two elements: the
account of the cognition as entirely passive, based on the Bacon’s theory of
the multiplication of species seen as real objects, natural likenesses of
things on the one hand, and the awareness of the existence of sense
illusions together with a demand for absolute certainty of knowledge, on
the other. It is clear that such coincidence necessarily leads to skepticism
(as it in fact did), unless another account of the cognitive process and the
116
117
nature of species would be given. A purely notional account of human

knowledge, as reductional, must cause problems.
It is significant, that when William Ockham (1285-1347) argues against
the existence of species, he understands them still in Bacon’s manner, when
he says that «if species really exist, we should have intuitive cognitions of
them. But species are not known experimentally [...] we are not aware of
anything passing from object to our eyes.»118 It was also the motive of his
critique addressed to Thomas, that he employed species in his doctrine.119
Ockham has given an account of vision more approximated to the modern
one, and with his famous razor, rejected the theory of species. Yet what he
in fact rejected, was not a theory of natural kinds, but the medieval
distortion of it. Together with species also language was expatriated as a
reliable instrument of philosophical inquiry, while the door remained open
to arrival of new ruler: empirical experience.
Intuitional cognition won its primacy, but not so long after, it turned out
that the only thing of which it could give any certainty of was the Cartesian
cogito ergo sum. Western philosophy had set off on a long juorney in the
search for truth and certainty fighting with the demons of skepticism. A
journey on which names as Schelling (1775-1854), with his rejection of
pure idealism, and notion of the intuition of existence, 120 Frege (1848-
1925) and his conception of truth independent from human mind 121 ,
together with Wittgenstein’s 122 (1889-1951) and Heidegger’s 123 (1889-
1976) accounts on language –seen from different angles as the window to
the structure of reality –would leave an important imprint.
118
119
120
F.W.J. von SCHELLING, Filosofia della rivelazione.
121
G. FREGE, Senso, funzione e concetto.
122
L. WITTGENSTEIN, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
123
M. HEIDEGGER, drodze do ezyka.
Chapter IV
THOMAS’ LANGUAGE:
THROUGH PROPOSITION
TOWARDS PARTICULAR.
When Pope Leo XIII wrote his encyclical Aeterni patris in 1879 to
encourage scholars to study Thomas’ works as source texts, the Italian
Jesuit, Carlo Pasaglia, in his commentary on this document, expressed both
his thankfulness and preoccupation. The latter regarded many difficulties
arising around the direct study of Aquinas’ oeuvre. Among them he
enumerated the vastness of his production, development of his thought, and
context of the epoch in which he worked, so distant and different from our
times.1 In preceding chapters I tried to get through, though in a sketchy and
selective way, the immediate and further context of Aquinas’ doctrine. In
the first chapter of this work I have outlined two ancient accounts of
language which in some way influenced subsequent thinkers. Then, after
discussing the peculiarity of theological language, as derived from
Revelation we looked into medieval use and understanding of this
instrument of human knowing and communication. My attention was
directed above all to the mode in which theologians employed the
Aristotelian account expressed in the treatise Peri hermeneias, and to see
how it influenced both their theological methods and the understanding of
the nature of language as a tool of theological inquiry. Now, what will
interest us, is the manner in which Thomas Aquinas employed this account
for language in his own theological workmanship. How did he understood
the nature of language? How is it related to reality? And what are the
1
cf C. PASSAGLIA, Sulla dottrina, 258-266.
consequences of the answers to these two questions for the mode of

theological treatment? To look for answers to these questions I would use
the support of the Lonergan’s thought.
4.1 Natural language

4.1.1 Contemplative approach – centrality of particular.
Since the very beginning of his intellectual activity, Thomas has a clear
vision of the nature of universal terms, their origin and their relation to
external reality. In fact the treatise De ente et essentia is a reflection
regarding the nature of the first level of language, the natural one, and, by
showing its limits with respect to the First Cause (which is too simple to be
put into the genus-species terms matrix, and thus beyond any definition)2,
prepares the ground for the second level, the theological one. This
distinction between natural and supernatural (as based on the Revelation) is
one of Thomas’ main achievements, and is reflected in his whole
productive output.3
In the understanding of natural language that emerges from the pages of
De ente et essentia, there’s a striking centrality of the individual. Although
discussing such abstractive terms as ens and essence, a reader can sense
that Thomas is still revolving around a particular thing, and in subsequent
acts of its contemplation4, apprehends different aspects of this individual.
Let us give some examples.
Proceeding from the beginning we come across a distinction between
two significations of ens: as something existing externally to the mind, and
as a logical structure of reality reflected by language, expressed in true
propositions. And if anything is to be analysed in its essence, it must be ens
considered in the first mode.5 Philosophical analysis regards this particular
thing, not human concepts and their interrelations – even if, as we will see
later, this thing is known only by means of concept or better its quiddity.
Thomas is looking at something existing, when proceeding with his
argumentation.
2
THOMAS, On being and essence, §113. (numeration of paragraphs according to
BOBIK, J., Aquinas on being and essence.)
3
4
Thomas himself calls ‘contemplative’ the intellect which grasps the quidditas of a
thing. cf H. ARENS, Aristotle’s Theory of Language and its Tradition, 409.
5
THOMAS, On being and essence, §5.
CHAP. IV: THOMAS’ LANGUAGE 71
Also the order in which different kinds of beings are discussed is

significative: at first the composite (sensible) ones, «since we ought to
acquire knowledge of simple things from composite ones and come to
know the prior from the posterior.» 6 And further he adds: «because the
essences of these [simple] substances are more hidden from us, we ought to
begin with the essences of composite substances [...]»7 Thomas would start
from composite to arrive at simple, from visible to invisible, from this
concrete thing to the First Cause.
Moving to the second chapter we learn that a thing is to be known only
through its essence, which is composed from matter and form. But after
discussing the notions of matter, form (both in wider, and restricted sense)
genus, species, and differentia, and their relation to essence, it turns out that
all the time he was looking at different aspects of a given particular, when
he states that what is signified by these terms is merely this concrete
individual, though taken in different aspects. Genus, species, and
differentia are different modes of apprehending the same thing. This
centrality of particular can be seen clearly in the following quotation:
the genus signifies indeterminately the whole that is in the species and does
not signify matter alone. Similarily, the difference also signifies the whole and
does not signify the form alone, and the definition, or even the species,
signifies the whole. But these nevertheless signify the same thing in different
ways. For genus signifies the whole as certain denomination determining that
which is material in the thing without determinatin of its proper form [...].8
But this centrality of the particular thing emerges even more strongly
when the nature of universal terms is considered. «If man is said in some
sense to be composed of the animal and the rational, it will not be as a third
thing composed from these two, but as a third concept composed from
these two concepts.»9 The genus and differentia that, fused together form
species (a third term), are not things at all, but merely our way of
apprehending the object in front of us.
And again at the beginning of the third chapter we read: «that to which
the intentions of genus or species or diference is approprioate is predicated
of this signate singular [...]»10 And a bit further he adds that these intentions
6
7
8
THOMAS, On being and essence, §88.§92.
9
10
«are appropriate to the essence, as the essence is signified as a whole, as

the term man or animal implicitly and indistinctly contains the whole that is
in the individual.»11
There are many other examples contained in this text which testify to
that specific approach to philosophical inquiry which at the beginning and
in the center posits this concrete individual as an object of contemplative
analysis. In this contemplation the two main elements of reality, which are
apprehended at first are ens and essentia, as Thomas explained in the
prologue.12 The essentia simply is the answer to the question «WHAT x is»
and it is the proper object of human intellect. 13 Thus the detailed
distinctions between genus, species etc. are notions by means of which the
human mind manages the «whatness» in order to apprehend different
things as distinct on the one hand, and essentially similar as sharing the
same kind or species on the other. Essentia can be considered on different
levels of abstraction, but we will turn back to this problem later. In turn, the
ens is the most generic term, which designates anything actually existing
(positing something in reality). It is interesting, that although the treatise is
entitled De ente et essentia, it is almost thoroughly dedicated to the
essence, while ens is only mentioned a few times. For example, when there
is mentioned a distinction between its two meanings and when Thomas
says that «being [...] signifies the essence of a thing» 14 and that through
essence «being is placed in various genera and species.» 15 But this
dominance of essence becomes obvious, when we keep in mind the fact,
that for Thomas a thing is known only through its essence. In this way we
can trace again the presence of an object, a real existing thing, of which we
know THAT it is, when we call it ens. But when we want to know WHAT
this object is, we have to look into it as an essence. Existence and the
particular way of existing; existence and the determination of that existence
as the existence of something lies in focal center of Aquinas’ system.16 In
this way Thomas rejects an interpretation of the Aristotelian notion of
11
12
13
see for example: STh Ia, q. 85, a. 6, but it is a returning in Thomas works. His
insistence on this point thorough his oeuvre is striking.
14
15
16
J. OWENS, Aristotle and Aquinas, 48.
substance as genus generalissimus which dominated throughout the Middle

Ages,17 and decides to take it in its concrete and particular meaning.
4.1.2. Thomas’ account of human cognition and the nature of language.

It could seem contrary to common sense or at least strange, that when
Aristotle considers the way in which one knows something, the first
question to be answered in the cognitive process, according to him, is
‘What x is?’ and the question «Whether x is?» is asked subsequently.
Together with Abelard, Bacon, Scotus and all his disciples (among them
we can place also Husserl and Heidegger)18 we can ask whether this order
is not the reverse. We can wonder, given the centrality of the particular in
Thomas’ thought, whether he does not contradict himself, when he states:
«a thing is not intelligible except through its definition and essence.»19 But
in fact this account is rooted in his understanding of truth as the conformity
of the intellect and thing, as we will see below.
According to B. Lonergan, either in the claim of centrality of existing
particular mentioned above and in the claim of knowability of this
particular exclusively by means of universal as well, a very particular
understanding of the nature of human cognition is expressed, though not
explicitly, rather as hitting off its implications. 20 This account he calls
intellectual conversion21, and it can be explicated in two aspects.
a) Complexity and integrality of human cognition.

Although in his commentary on De interpretatione Thomas at first
identifies passio animae with the mind’s concept, he immediately claims,
that it cannot be separated from the whole cognitive process initiated in the
senses, which led to its production.
we must understand the passiones animae as mental conceptions (intellectus
conceptiones) which the nouns and verbs and sentences signify directly, in
Aristotle’s opinion. [...] But in the 1st book of De Anima he clearly calls all
mental operations passiones animae. So a mental conception can be called
17
18
see: S.J. MCGRATH, Heidegger and Duns Scotus on Truth and Language, where
the legacy of Augustine’s account of inner word to franciscan school and through them
to modern philosophers is discussed.
19
THOMAS, On being and essence, §9, p. 45
20
21
B.J.F. LONERGAN, Cognitive structure, 219.
passio, either because our mental conception can be called passio, or because
our understanding (intelligere) is not without imagination [...] which, in turn,
is not without a corporal passio [...].22
In this short passage Thomas solved, or rather justified, the provoking
ambiguity of Aristotle’s expression from Perihermeneias 2-7, and
explained how the universal meets with the particular. The particular has to
be known as something; somethingness expressed with universal concept
cannot be separated from its origin in senses (i.e. from the individual). We
will look into it in detail in section ‘b’ of this paragraph. The same
consciousness of the integrality of the process of cognition is expressed
also in the very structure of the De ente et essentia treatise, in which
Aquinas proceeds gradually through subsequent levels of understanding:
Thomas is advancing gradually from particular to phantasm; then from the
grasp of the universal in particular, which yet lacks the universality23; to
universals feigned by intellect, abstracted from here and now, and thus
predicable of many24; and arrives at the culmination point of the expression
(judgment).25 What is significative is that no actual knowledge, even the
one regarding immaterial realities, is possible without so called conversio
ad phantasm.26 This act is necessary to perform a judgment and thus to
obtain actual knowledge:
by a certain reflection our intellect also returns to a knowledge of the
phantasm itself when it considers the nature of its act, the nature of the species
by which it knows, and, finally, the nature of that from which it has abstracted
the species, namely, the phantasm.27
Only by an integral cognitive act is true understanding. There is always
the danger of the reduction of knowledge either to combination of concepts
only28, or exclusively to the sense experience; Lonergan argues, that rather
than metaphysical, this account can be treated as a psychological
description of the cognitive act, and from this claim, gives a revolutionary
22
cf H. ARENS, Aristotle’s Theory of Language and its Tradition, 404.
23
THOMAS, On being and essence, §56-58.
24
THOMAS, On being and essence, §59-60.; § 60-62.
25
THOMAS, De veritate, q. 1, a. 1.
26
STh Ia, q. 84, a.7.
27
28
cf paragraph 4.2.1. B. Lonergan points this problem out when talking of difference
between concept and and insight. B.J.F. LONERGAN, Insight, 45.
explanation of the nature of human intellect and its link with the notion of
being.
b) Intellect as mirror of existence – between nominalism and realism.
When Aquinas keeps insisting on the necessity of knowledge of the
universal in order to know an individual - the necessity of knowledge of
essentia in order to arrive at ens, according to Lonergan, he is making a
claim on what the ens, the being signifies. «I think much less ink would be
spilt on the concept of ens were more attention paid to its origin in the act
of understanding.»29 Let’s explore what Lonergan is alluding to here.
The individuation of existence as separate ‘element’ of ens, distinct from
essentia and determined by it, forced Aquinas to develop also the
Aristotelian account of cognitive process, by adding the moment of
judgement at its end in which Truth is affirmed. 30 The notion of truth,
however, is no longer reserved only for composed notions, compositions of
verb and noun, but also to simple ones:
a thing is said to be true insofar as it has its proper form [...] Thus ens and
verum can be exchanged because every natural thing through its form
resembles (conformatur) the divine art. [...] perceiving the conformity is
nothing but judging that something is real or not; and that is compose and
divide.31
In this way Aquinas widened the Aristotelian notion of composition and
division, focusing on the judgment of existence, to which Aristotle, as it
seems, didn’t pay more specific attention. 32 Aristotle tried to save the
distinction between a thing and its apprehension by differentiation between
notions of form and essence.33
When we turn back then to the human understanding (intelligere) at first
glance it would seem obvious, that its operation, which can be
characterised as the self-conscious knowing what is relevant and what is
not relevant to the understanding of an object,34 tends to leave apart any
kind of existence. 35 And so human understanding, not as different
understandings however, but different stages of the same process, can have
29
30
31
32
J. OWENS, Aristotle and Aquinas, 48.
33
B.J.F. LONERGAN, Verbum, 30. 38.
34
35
THOMAS, On being and essence, §56, p. 123
its conditions in the empirical, in imaginable or, as a finally abstracted

conceptualization, in itself.36 But as Lonergan argues, the notion of being
(ens) does not disappear at the ultimate level. On the contrary – it is
conceived just here. For if ultimate concepts are inventions, as invention is
a discovery of some objective possibility posited in reality, and an
invention necessarily proceeds only from an understanding, the most
generally objective possibility found in reality is the possibility of being.
When I understand something, when I get to know about something,
there’s one, most general alternative, most general possibility: either it is
so, or it is not. So when «intellect from intelligibility, through possibility,
reaches being, it means that it is the preconceptual act of intelligence that
utters itself in the concept ‘being’.»37 I can say ‘it is being’ in the extent to
which I had understood something. «One can form propositions only of
beings, for that about which a proposition is formed must be apprehended
by the intellect. Consequently, it is clear that everything true is being in
some way.38
But it would be wrong to judge, that for Thomas, understanding is
sufficient proof of the existence of the apprehended thing. It is only the
initial step. A question to be answered: is it so? Definition regards the
essence - whatness,39 but as such it can be mistaken, i.e. involve a wrong
judgement.40
The understanding of something appeals to our intellect as needy of
judgement. To know signifies to know being. The desire to know
presupposes being as its source, product, and satisfaction.41It turns out that
being is the definition of a second order: it does not determine what is
meant, but how it is meant.42 The mode of knowing at issue is knowledge
of something as something understood and judged to be so, i.e. to be true.
The cognitive process passes from being as looked for and desired, to being
as grasped. In this way «the concept of being [...] is the conceptualization
of intelligibility as such [...]. it is indeterminate, for it is conceived from
any act of understanding [...] and is the very object of intellect: for intellect
would not be intellect were it not at least potens omnia fieri, in potency to
36
37
38
THOMAS, De veritate, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1.
39
40
STh Ia, q. 81, a. 6.
41
cf B.J.F. LONERGAN, Cognitive structure, 212.
42
B.J.F. LONERGAN, Insight, 374.
any intelligibility.»43 This is why Thomas stated that «everything true is

being in some way.»44
Thus the notion of ens, but also all other universal terms like species
should rather not be treated as real things in themselves, as Bacon, Scotus
and others thought. When we arrive at the conceptual level, we are moving
in the area of secondary signification of ens - «that which signifies Truth of
propositions» 45 - they are products 46 of the human mind which are
conditions sine qua non of any knowing, and have existence only within
it.47 Quiddities formed in senses and elaborated along the cognitive process
of understanding are like sets of digitalized data taken from ‘analog
inputs’48 without which no intellectual operation can be done. In this way
Thomas clearly departs from the Baconian interpretation of species as an
object perceived thoroughly passively. But does it mean that he takes the
nominalistic position or should be considered as forerunner of purely
formal logic that leaves apart the problem of relation between language and
reality, occupying itself only with validity of formulation?
It does not. For the very fact of knowing implies knowing something in a
way as real: «logic aims at gaining cognition of the things»49. But at the
same time we have to leave aside the conviction that what terms like form,
species, genus, etc. are referring to, are some really existing things beyond
particulars, or any kind of real parts of which a thing is composed. For,
again, what remains in the centre of Thomas’ attention is this existing
thing, or as we can put it in other words – a concrete existence determined
somehow.50 And this concretely existing nature is contemplated as true, i.e.
as posited between two cognitions: the creative cognition of God and the
receptive cognition of creatures. A nature existing properly in a given
particular has existence in the intellect of God as proper model, and in in
43
44
45
46
«Product» in a sense that it is content of human apprehension; an intention
following an external stimulus which is the mode in which human mind apprehends for
itself this what stimulated it.
47
THOMAS, On being and essence, §60-61.
48
From the beginning of XXI century it is observed a dinamic development of so
called neuroscience. One of the issues under inquiry of this sceince is the analysis of
how sense data are elaborated after being perceived by sense organs by human brain.
See for example: C. KAERNBACH, Psychophysics Beyond Sensation, 419-423.
49
50
cf THOMAS, On being and essence, §6.
human intellect as its likeness. The relation of truth regards both directions:
towards the model and towards the likeness.51 We can say that the very fact
that one gives a name to something reveals his potency of contemplation,
since a name is given according to some understanding.52
Thus Truth in predication about things is reached through a proceeding
of a somehow circular character. From sense perception, by means of
quiddity, grasping the possible existence and then back to experience
(phantasm) in order to exercise the act of judgement.53
As we can see, Thomas’ account for human cognitive act and its fruit –
predication to which the value of truth or falsity can be applied – betrays
great awareness of its complexity, its possibilities and limitations. The
material world of concrete, existing things plays in this process a pivotal
role and functions as medium between the human mind and transcendent
reality, and the only source of its concepts. This complex process has its
stages of infallible apprehension of the whatness of a thing, efforts to
articulate it, and moments that depend on the human fallible ability to judge
and think over what he apprehended, by return to the beginning.54 In all this
Thomas follows Aristotle, adding, however, one element: starting with a
concrete thing, the human intellect must turn back to it (to its phantasm) in
order to complete the cognitive act in judgment. What are, according to
Aquinas, the possibilities of such un understood language with respect to
the mystery of God?
4.1.3 Natural language and God

When we compare this account of human cognition with the tradition
preceding it, it seems as if Thomas had taken a step backwards reducing its
possibilities. He rejected the account of the human intellect involving
illumination. The first object of the human intellect is the quiddity of
material singulars. Secondly it can arrive at awareness of proper acts. But
the «knowledge, whereby we know the nature of the soul as derivation of
the light of our intellect from divine truth [...] needs a diligent, subtle
inquiry. Many, for this reason, are simply ignorant of the soul’s nature and
51
cf THOMAS, De veritate, q. 1, a. 2; THOMAS, On being and essence, §50-65;
52
cf STh II-II, q. 180, a. 4, ad 3.
53
STh Ia, q. 84, a.7.
54
THOMAS, De veritate, q. 3.
many are positively mistaken about it.»55 But at the same time it expresses
a lot of confidence with respect to the natural power of human intellect. It
has «the ability to know the profound elements of a thing; for to understand
means to read what is inside a thing»56 even if it does it by attending to
external accidents. And in this way «we arrive at knowledge of God by
way of creatures»57 i.e. mediation of existing creatures allows us to arrive
at Truth regarding the Origin of all existence. Human intellect, then, is able
to contemplate Truth.
But how striking is the fact, that in this case this contemplation is the
apprehension of the existence of an impassable boundary. Lonergan
expressed this kind of apprehension by the notion of an inverse insight in
which the whole theoretic system allows one to discover the lack of
intelligibility where it was expected.58 It is something similar to the claim
expressed in the point 6.54 of Tractatus logico-philosophicus, where
Wittgenstein declares, that the aim of his whole work was to lead us to
have a short glimpse in the right apprehension of reality, of the Mystical
that arrives properly beyond that which can be expressed with human
language.59 This is why the last word of the treatise De ente et essentia is
«Amen». Like Wittgenstein, Aquinas in this treatise, climbed the ladder
just in order to show the point where it ends:
We have thus made clear how essence is found in substances and in accidents,
and how in composite substances and in simple ones, and in what way the
universal intentions of logic are found in all of these, except for the First
Being, which is the extreme of simplicity and to which, because of its
simplicity, the notions of genus, species, and this definition do not apply; and
having said this we may make proper end to this discourse. Amen.60
The mentioned boundary regards knowledge in a proper meaning, as
expressed in definition. And so generally the most proper predication of
God is the apophatic one. 61 But as such it remains in the framework
exposed in Peri hermeneias:
55
STh Ia, q. 87, a. 1.
56
57
STh Ia, q. 88, a. 3.
58
cf B.J.F. LONERGAN, Insight, 45.
59
cf L. WITTGENSTEIN, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 109; see also point 6.44, on
page 108.
60
61
STh Ia, q. 88, a. 3, ad 2.
God is in no genus, since his essence is not distinct from his being; [...] Instead
of knowing the genus of these substances, we know them by negations; for
example, by understanding that they are immaterial, incorporeal, without
shapes, and so on. The more negations we know of them the less vaguely we
understand them, for subsequent negations limit and determine a previous
negation as differences do a remote genus.62
But there’s also another way of predication with respect to God available
to man. It also has as its foundation and starting point at a concrete material
individual and regards not the very essence of Him, but His perfections,
since as the Fullness of Being He has all perfections of what can be
perceived as perfection in the creature.63 Some of them can be predicated
metaphorically, when He is compared to something material (for example
Sun, or lion) and some properly, when the immaterial perfections and
qualities are applied to Him.64
In the case of God, Who is beyond direct sense perception, analogy takes
place of quiddity or phantasm.65 «Incorporeal things, of which there are no
phantasms, are known to us by comparison with sensible bodies of which
there are phantasms. Thus we understand truth by considering a thing of
which we possess Truth; and God, [...], we know as cause, by way of
excess and by way of remotion.»66 Analogy as opposed to metaphore is
primarly focused on logical proportion between two realities than on a new
meaning (though also metaphore contains this structural isomorphism), 67
and grasps a certain relation between a model and a thing represented. And
as intellect proceeded from imperfect actuality of confused knowledge to
an explicated one, (being either of them true and actual)68 passing from
knowledge already had to knowledge explicated, so analogy expresses a
grasp of some quality of God, but only as referring to His essence, by
comparision to creature as a model. Though «the analogies, which would
allude to the internal life of God as community of Persons, do not appear in
the natural theology section.»69 In this way analogy can be in a more adapt
62
THOMAS, In Boethii de Trinitate, q. 6. a. 3.
63
THOMAS, On being and essence, §91, p. 214.
64
65
66
STh Ia, q. 84, a. 7, ad 3.
67
cf J.M. SOSKICE, Metaphor and religious language, 42.66.
68
STh Ia, q. 85, a. 3.
69
cf M.L. COLISH, The Mirror of Language, 148. Natural theology section regarding
God’s existence and His perfections embraces most of first 26 questio of the Summa.
way situated in the properly theological area and should be seen as enabled
by Revelation and as an explication of it.
4.2. Theological language

It is significnt that, while Thomas discusses the problem whether God
has life, he appeals to the notion of autonomous motion as an act of a living
subject70, or when talking about the love of God, he is appealing to the
notion of love as an act of the appetitive faculty71. When he is talking about
the procession of Persons in God, however, he says: «Divine Scripture
uses, in relation to God, names which signify procession.»72 In this way he
takes a clear position against the possibility of a speculative apprehension
of the Trinity not based directly on the data of Revelation. Thus theology is
a science whose first principles are not self-evident, but proceed from a
higher science, i.e. the science of God and of the blessed.73
Given the account of theology as a science whose first principles are
derived from Revelation and the teaching of saints we should ask a few
questions: what exactly is understood as a first principle: as a proposition
immedaitely expressed as logical structure in itself or as a sign of
something beyond it? If we take the first solution, theology would be the
science of the formal analysis of propositions contained in Scripture and
other authorative writings. It would purely be an application of the logical
toolkit to a set of propositions and we remain at the notional level, hoping
that the things are just as we have analysed the propositions. If we take the
second, the formal analysis would not be sufficient, for there’s an Object to
be contemplated by means of this proposition, which rules the mode of
predication. In this case one has to employ a different method in order to
arrive at the desired aim: not the logical analysis alone, but also conversio
ad phantasma. How then are a proposition and its Object related? We can
also ask a question connected with the preceding one: which are the
conditions of theological efficiency? Does the moral disposition of
theologian play any role, as it did in the case of Scriptural exegesis?
From a chronological analysis of Thomas’ works 74 , there emerges a
certain double tendency: on the one hand he passes «from the traditional
70
STh Ia. q. 18, a.1.
71
STh Ia. q. 20, a. 1.
72
STh Ia. q. 27, a. 1.
73
STh Ia. q. 1, a. 2.
74
cf W.G.B.M. VALKENBERG, Words of the living God.
spiritual genre of expositio toward the more rigidly scientific genre of

quaestio; from the ‘monastic’ stress on the spiritual sense towards the
‘Aristotelian’ stress on the literal sense of Scripture.»75 On the other, there
could be noted the rising importance of quotations from Scripture with
respect to philosophical ones in his later works.76 M. Corbin argues that
such turn in Thomas’ thought can be an effect of his adherence to
Aristotelian understanding of science as demonstration based on first
principles. 77 In the case of theology, the only secure souorce of such
principles can be only Revelation.
The necessity of Scripturistic Revelation, in the Aristotelian framework,
is founded on a particular mode of human cognition.78 As human cognition
from sensible object, through phantasm, apprehension of quiddity, and
definition proceeds towards judgment of affirmation or negation of a thing
known, so in the case of non-sensible substances and God, of whom the
human mind has no material object to be perceived, to know not only that
but also what they are, it must rest on the testimony of Scripture. This lack
of an object to be perceived directly, Thomas expresses in terms of a lack
of the mind’s vision.79 On this occasion he speaks about the senses of mind.
These can be identified with imagination80 which in turn is indispensable
for any operation of the human mind, even for those regarding God 81 .
Without the supply of Revelation, the only thing that the human mind can
get knowledge of with respect to God is merely the fact of His existence,
and of some of His perfections, as we could see in the paragraph dedicated
to natural language. Proper truths of faith
exceed the intellectual capacity of all men who exist in this life, for instance,
that there is trinity and unity in God, and so on. Now, it is impossible for any
man to have scientific knowledge of these. Rather, every believer assents to
such doctrines because of the testimony of God to whom these things are
present and by whom they are known.82
75
B. SMALLEY, The Study of the Bible, 300.
76
W.G.B.M. VALKENBERG, Words of the living God, 202.
77
CORBIN, M., Le chemin de la théologie, 720.
78
79
80
Sth Ia, q. 78, a. 4.; N. KRETZMANN, Philosophy of mind, 138.
81
THOMAS, In Boethii de Trinitate, q. 6. a. 2, ad 6.
82
From this passage it apparently results that science as the description of

theology should be taken in parenthesis. But it is not Thomas’ thesis. To
understand the nature of theology and of theological language let’s proceed
with the following reasoning.
4.2.1 Understanding as vision.

Association between these two notions, i.e. understanding and vision, is
by Thomas, frequent, explicit, has Augustinian roots, and, as we could see
in chapter three, was a common truth for thinkers at that time.
[...] Whatever things we know with scientific knowledge properly so called we
know by reducing them to first principles which are naturally present to the
understanding. In this way, all scientific knowledge terminates in the sight of a
thing which is present.83
«Knowledge can have two meanings: sight or assent.» 84 Understanding
is also compared to light85.
Reduction to first principles signifies that one apprehends a meaning of
that which has been said only when he understands all terms of an
expression:
Augustine, in his definition of comprehension, says the whole is
comprehended when it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from
the seer, or when its boundaries can be completely viewed or traced; for the
boundaries of a thing are said to be completely surveyed when the end of the
knowledge of it is attained.86
It is hard to omit the metaphorical character of these expressions. But I
suppose that a vision at issue can be indentified with having an adequate
phantasm by means of which one grasps all essential properties of a thing
known, and consequently is able to proceed with subsequent acts of joining
and dividing i.e. knows how it is related to all other things he knows.87 And
that’s why the metaphor of vision is the most adequate. Among all human
senses, the sense of sight is most synthetic. Understanding compared to
seeing expresses the fact, that a complete understanding of a thing gives a
man the ability to go beyond explicit knowledge of it and to arrive at the
83
84
85
86
STh Ia, q. 12, a. 7.
87
issues that remain implicit and not known immediately. The thing in this
way is grasped as, to some extent, transparent for the human intellect.
Understanding as knowledge takes the form of putting something in its
place in the genre-species scheme88 and of an affirmative judgment of this
thing to be as it has been situated89.
In other places, Thomas explains understanding as vision in terms of
demonstration: one knows something, when he is able to demonstrate it90
i.e. knows its causes.
It is very significant that when he takes into consideration a problem of
teaching, Thomas speaks about visio docentis as a source of teaching, and
claims that teaching itself consists in the communication of the things seen
(rerum visarum).91
This identification of understanding and vision is rooted in a certain
account of human cognition. The act of cognition seen as an integral
process rooted in sense-experience and dependong on it92, elaborated by
human intelligence, as we could see it in the paragraph dedicated to
Thomas’ understanding of the nature of natural language. Understanding is
properly exercised in an act of judging, which finds its expression in a
categorical proposition. 93 That’s why Thomas is talking about seeing
something by means of propositions.94
4.2.2 Proposition and vision.

Proposition is connected with the act of joining together terms and
judging such a composition to be true or false. «Proposition can be
understood either as an act of judging or as product of such act – a
sentence.»95 «Only proposition can be a bearer of the truth to be adhered to,
because it expresses a judgment and thus a composition.»96 In such a way
proposition or judgment allows one to grasp different objects at once. Thus
they can be seen as united under some common characteristics. What
causes the rest of the intellect is exactly the final distinction, individuation
88
THOMAS, De veritate, q. 11, a. 1, ad 3. q. 2, a. 7. STh Ia, q. 13, a.12.
89
90
91
92
THOMAS, In Boethii de Trinitate, q. 6. a2. ad 6
93
THOMAS, De veritate, q. 1, a. 1, ad 6. ad 7. STh II-II, q. 1, a. 2.
94
STh II-II, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3.
95
cf J. OWENS, St. Thomas Aquinas on the existence of God, 47.
96
STh II-II, q. 1, a. 2.
of one thing, or one issue, one essential aspect and overcoming

confusedness in which some different things have not already been
distinguished clearly.
when our intellect considers a proposition, it considers many things as one.
[...]they cannot be understood simultaneously in so far as a relation of
distinctness exists between them, but they can be understood simultaneously
in so far as they are united in one proposition.97
But we have to remember that proposition is nothing but a product of the
mind, as it was said above, and is the only means by which one can obtain
knowledge about reality
affirmative and negative propositions are, in a sense, products of the intellect,
but products of such a kind that through them the intellect arrives at the
knowledge of an exterior thing. Hence, this product is, in a fashion, a second
means by which understanding takes place.98
So man understands something only when he apprehends ‘what is it
made of’, which are its ‘parts’, and how are they put together. To put it in
Thomas’ words – when it is analysed to first principles. And every
proposition expresses such a discovery. Each proposition as composition
gives one access to a thing, makes him see it. A true proposition reflects
composition which is to be found in an external object by means of
composition of subject and predicate.99
Thomas is aware of the distinction between a claim to know the object
itself, and a claim to know that a proposition regarding this object is true. It
is a distinction between direct and indirect knowledge about a given object,
since such knowledge can be provided either by object itself, or by its
effects, or other sources (authority). 100 In the second case an object is
known, but only to some extent. It is not known according to its own
totality, nor is it «perfectly known as it is capable of being known.»101 In
other words we can say that it does not provide a knower a perfect vision of
an object, as in a situation in which one knows that a triangle has three
angles that put together are equal to two right angles, but does not know a
demonstration of this fact.
97
98
99
STh Ia, q. 3, a.4, ad 2.
100
STh Ia, q. 3, a. 4, ad 2.
101
STh Ia, q. 12, a. 7.
Such a person does not comprehend the proposition, not because he is ignorant
of one part of it and knows another, but because that conclusion can be known
by a demonstration which he does not yet know. Consequently, he does not
comprehend the proposition simply because he has not grasped it perfectly.102
In such cases the problem is not the understanding of terms employed in
a proposition, but the lack of vision of the interrelation between a
conclusion and its cause. Such a proposition can be judged to be true but
such a judgement must rely on some external argument: authority of a
teacher, probable appearance, etc. Only vision, seeing - only that
understanding which rests on direct insight into an object provides us with
scientific knowledge of it. To which category of these the theological
proposition belongs?
4.2.3 Propositions of theology.

In Thomas’ account of propositions of the theology, there’s a certain
dialectical tension between denial of any possibility of scientific knowledge
with respect to non-sensible objects, and of God per excellence 103 , and
claims that theology is to be considered a science 104 , and that such
knowledge, even vision105, is possible in this life.
To understand the very nature of theological expressions, we have to
consider a few issues: firstly, the nature of faith as a certain epistemological
structure: as knowledge without seeing on the one hand and as a certain
sort of vision on the other; secondly, to consider the relation between the
simplicity of God and proposition as a means of ‘seeing’ Him; and finally
to understand the ‘negative character’ of such vision.
a) Faith as assent to not-seen.

In the case of reality, accessible to human sense experience,
understanding is described in terms of vision, or assent to one of a pair of
contradictory propositions based on satisfactory reason106. In such vision,
or sufficient reason, understanding arrives at a resting point. No further
inquiry is required. The human mind can cease its work and remain calm in
102
103
104
STh Ia, q.1, a. 2.
105
STh II-II, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3. THOMAS, De veritate, q. 14, a. 2, ad 15.
106
THOMAS, De veritate, q. 14, a.1.
a simple gaze directed to obtained truth.107 This reaction is spontaneous and

as such manifests that the desire to know has been sufficiently satisfied
through a true judgment.108
those things are said to be present to the understanding which do not exceed its
capacity, so that the gaze of understanding may be fixed on them. For a person
gives assent to such things because of the witness of his own understanding
and not because of someone else’s testimony.109
In this context, in an act of faith, the human cognitive structure proceeds
in another way (with respect to proper articles of faith i.e. those which do
not pertain to the scope of natural theology, such as the existence of
God)110. Since the Object of faith lies beyond human cognitive capacity, the
assent is not caused by understanding, a satisfactory explanation, but by an
act of the will, accepting some promised good.111 In this way the cognitive
process is brought to judgment not according to its proper mode of
proceeding but resting upon an external evidence112.
In this way within an act of faith, or better within this attitude, remains a
certain tension between assent, or judgment already performed, on the one
hand, and the lack of understanding on the other: «in faith, the assent and
the discursive thought are more or less parallel.»113 It is so, because God
would never be known by the human mind as to become thoroughly
intelligible to it. «Faith, however, is said to surpass reason, not because
there is no act of reason in faith, but because reasoning about faith cannot
lead to the sight of those things which are matters of faith.»114
That’s why theology can be described as a certain kind of asceticism of
the mind. This ascetism consists in one’s agreement to remain in a
profound cognitive crisis caused by tension between words which express
some truth, and darkness of lack of apprehension of their very sense. It is
also a first condition of receiving the grace of understanding, for we read:
«I thank you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that you have hidden these
things from the wise and understanding and revealed them to little
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
children» (Matt 11, 25). And in another place: «whoever does not receive
the kingdom of God like a child shall not enter it.» (Luke 18, 17).
This parallelism of assent and inquiry or better, primacy of assent to
inquiry shapes the general framework of theology as science. From this it
results also quite clear that theology as such has a secondary role in life of
Christian, as preparatory or explanatory stage, and, on the one hand, is in
service of the existential act of personal entrustment to the word of
predication, presupposing it on the other. Theology presupposes then an act
of acceptance of Revelation as authoritative testimony of God about
Himself. This attitude is evident in Thomas’ account of theology. Scriptuire
serves there not only as a source of examples in argumentation, but as a
general background of quaestio: those most problems discussed are shown
to have a Scriptural origin; in the replies, Scripture is quoted to solve the
problems posed in arguments; but first of all, it is the main guiding line for
the response.115
b) Faith as knowledge and vision – «light of faith»

From what has been said above it is clear that the assent of faith does not
proceed from an understanding. It rather remains needy of it. This,
however, does not preclude theology from beeing considered as a
knowledge and science, and the possibility of formulating affirmative
propositions regarding God,116 and consequently of some kind of vision of
Him.117
in so far as there is certainty of assent, faith is knowledge, and as such can be
called certain knowledge and sight. This appears in the first Epistle to the
Corinthians (13:12): "We see now through a glass in a dark manner." And this
is what Augustine says: "If it is not unfitting to say that we know that also
which we believe to be most certain, it follows from this that it is correct to
say that we see with our minds the things which we believe, even though they
are not present to our senses."118
This certainty is based on principles taken from Revelation. And even if
the principles themselves can remain incomprehensible to the human mind,
i.e. they are neither demonstrable nor verifiable by comparison with its
115
116
STh Ia, q. 13, a. 12.
117
118
Object, which lies beyond human apprehension, the consequences

following from them retain their validity.
the one who knows on the lower level is not said to have scientific knowledge
about those things which he presupposes, but about the necessary conclusions
which are drawn from the presupposed principles. In this sense, also, one who
believes can be said to have scientific knowledge about those things which he
concludes from the articles of faith.119
Theological propositions, on the one hand belong to different kind of
language. This language which takes its first principles not from common-
sense experiences and self-evidence, but from a heterogenical source of
positive Scripturistic Revelation. On the other, however, theological
language is subject to the rules of scientific inquiry common for all
sciences i.e. proceed from undemonstrable first principles and tend toward
conclusions by means of demonstrations 120 : «sacred doctrine makes use
even of human reason, not, indeed, to prove faith [...], but to make clear
other things that are put forward in this doctrine, [...] since grace does not
destroy nature but perfects it.»121
But theology cannot be reduced to purely formal analysis of a set of
propositions according to rules of logic, etc.
sacred doctrine makes use also of the authority of philosophers in those
questions in which they were able to know the truth by natural reason, [...]
sacred doctrine, however, makes use of these authorities as extrinsic and
probable arguments; but properly uses the authority of the canonical Scriptures
as an incontrovertible proof, and the authority of the doctors of the Church as
one that may properly be used, yet merely as probable.122
Theology presupposes faith understood as an assent to revealed truth
contained in Scripture (Fathers are regarded as merely probable authority).
This acceptance, however cannot be reduced merely to the employment of
a certain text as external source of normative propositions, but intrinsicly
contains reference to a certain criterion or principle added to natural human
intellectual equipment – the light of faith as a necessary condition for
‘vision’.
119
120
STh II-II, q. 1, a. 5, ad 2.
121
STh Ia, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2.
122
STh Ia, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2.
From different occurences in Thomas’ writings we can draw the

following description of this phenomenon: it is specifically the same for
everyone and binds them to certain solutions 123 ; it surpasses limits of
human cognition, i.e. is participated in an imperfect way due to human
weakness 124 ; once received, it implicitly bestows man with all truths
regarding God 125 though passively –as an ability to give assent to true
propositions and to reject false ones126; and thus is said to make one see
what he believes to the likeness of other virtues which enables one to act
and discern more swiftly127; the light of faith makes the believer see that he
ought to believe truths of faith128; it affects both will and intellect and is
identified with grace129 added to nature130.
Theology presupposes then not only a new language, but also a new
mind – a mind illuminated by the light of faith. But what is it exactly?
From what has been said just above we can infer a notion of a non-
explicated, confused apprehension or ‘vision’ of God131, whose presence to
the human mind functions as a principle for the true judgement in the
matters of faith within the human mind. Its function in theology could be
compared to principles such as the principle of the excluded middle on the
level of natural reason. In this way we can see, that Thomas in fact has not
departed greatly from the Augustinian tradition. He rather has explicated
the a posteriority of the ‘theological mind.’132
123
THOMAS, De veritate, q. 14, a. 12, contr 6.
124
125
THOMAS, De veritate, q. 12, a. 1, contr 4.
126
127
STh II-II, q. 1, a. 4, ad 3.
128
STh II-II, q. 1, a. 5, ad 1.
129
130
STh I-II, q. 109, a. 1.
131
132
It would be interesting to look more closely to the nature and
character of this light of faith, above all to analyse the link between the
grace of baptism, and to see whether this gift is understood as participation
of faithful in the knowledge of Christ in force of the sacramental link
between Head and Body. More accurate reflection upon this issue can
contribute important insights with respect to ‘hot problems’ of
contemporary Christology such as divine self-consciousness of Christ, faith
of Christ, etc.
The light of faith can be understood then as a particular way of the self
manifestation of God in the human mind following from assent of faith. In
this way also at the theological level of cognition, we discover the
centrality of the individual, of the Object, as it was on the preceeding level
of natural cognition and predication, and as proposition of natural language
is formed in an act of judgment involving conversio ad phantasmata,
theological propositions tend toward the gaze of contemplation.
According to Richard of St. Victor "cogitation" would seem to regard the
consideration of the many things from which a person intends to gather one
simple truth. Hence cogitation may comprise not only the perceptions of the
senses in taking cognizance of certain effects, but also the imaginations, and
again the reason's discussion of the various signs or of anything that conduces
to Truth in view: [...] But "contemplation" regards the simple act of gazing on
Truth; wherefore Richard says again [...] that "contemplation is the soul's clear
and free dwelling upon the object of its gaze; meditation is the survey of the
mind while occupied in searching for Truth: and cogitation is the mind's
glance which is prone to wander."133
Theological inquiry meant as the organizing and rational elaboration of
revealed data should be regarded as a necessary but preparational stage
which tends towards a simple gaze in which occurs final understanding.
Many and multiform propositions and articles of faith and theology are the
means by which to obtain the simple gaze of contemplation. Here the
simplicity of the First Essence, lying far beyond human predication, and the
richness of theological production meet – in the very Object, Mysterious
Existing God.
After these preliminary clarifications, let’s look now into the peculiarity
of theological propositions and their relation to their Object.
c) Seeing God through theological propositions.134

Knowlege regards something as existing, as real135, but man arrives at
knowledge only by means of proposition. «Even the affirmative and
negative propositions are, in a sense, products of the intellect, but products
of such a kind that through them the intellect arrives at the knowledge of an
exterior thing.»136 So the direct object of faith are propositions. Proposition
133
STh II-II, q. 180, a. 2, ad 1.
134
STh II-II, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3.
135
THOMAS, De veritate, q. 2, a. 10, ad dif 4.
136
can be the direct object of the intellect just like quiddity, but in both cases
the proper object of human intellect is being and thus Truth. In the case of
faith, it is the First Truth, i.e. God. Proposition is a mediation between the
Object and the human mind:
since belief is called assent, it can only be about a proposition, in which truth
or falsity is found. Thus, When I say: "I believe in the resurrection," I must
understand some union [of subject and predicate].137
In the quotatoin reported above, there emerges an awareness in Thomas
that divine science, to be known to man, must be expressed in a human
way, according to the human mode of predication, which requires joining
and dividing. And it is exactly this point in which the discrepancy between
the mode of being of the Object and the means of its mediation can be
grasped in most evident way.
vision through propositions means, that the simplicity of God, due to human
mode of knowing through joining subject and predicate needs to posit
substance and something inhering in it, which does not reflect God’s
simplicity138
Here we can touch the difference between propositions of theology and
of philosophy. While in philosophy and natural sciences, human
predication reflects composition of things – and thus we can talk of
something like the mirroring of reality through language, with respect to
God, such mirroring is indirect, and corresponds not to the nature of the
Object, but of the subject perceiving it. This mode of seeing Him is called
seeing in speculum et aenigmate, following the expression of st. Paul. In
this way also a Revelation is given to us: it is knowledge of God about
Himself139, but expressed not according to His mode of being and knowing,
but to ours:
the human mind in order to know the inherence of one of accidents, joins one
species with the other, and, in a certain manner, unites them. In this way, the
intellect forms propositions in itself. But by one reality, namely, its own
essence, the divine intellect knows all substances and all accidents.
Consequently, it neither passes from substance to accident nor joins one with
the other; but instead of the joining of species which takes place in our
137
THOMAS, De veritate, q. 14, a.12.
138
STh Ia, q. 13, a. 12, ad 2.
139
STh Ia, q. 1, a. 6.
intellect, there is, in the divine intellect, complete unity; because of this, God,
without complexity, knows what is complex,140
Thus God, providing us with knowledge of Himself, He provides us with
it according to our mode of knowing.141
But it does not signify that propositions not reflecting God’s simplicity
are necessarily false, «because our intellect, when forming a proposition
about God, does not affirm that He is composite, but that He is simple.» 142
A rightly formed proposition, as it was by Augustine, is a trustworthy sign
of God.
the first truth, which is in itself simple, is the object of faith. But our
understanding receives it in its own manner by means of the composition [of
judgment]. Thus, our understanding, by giving assent as true to the
composition which is made in judgment, tends toward first truth as toward its
object. Thus, nothing prevents the first truth from being the object of faith,
although faith treats of propositions. 143
In Thomas’ account for theology we can see two elements coming
together. On the one hand we have the simplicity of God and His
mysterious and ineffable presence to the human mind, and on the other the
human mind can grasp Him only in a limited way by means of
propositions. In this account, however, Thomas remains in the framework
of human cognition as it was described in Peri hermeneias: apprehension
of God, as it holds for apprehension of any other object, requires sensual
data (here provided by means of Scripture and the light of faith) and passio
animae following from it as necesary elements.
d) Vision of God as a vision of boundary

A few words have to be written of the ‘negative’ character of vision
provided by theological propositions. Thomas distinguishes two modes of
seeing God:
One is perfect, whereby God's Essence is seen: the other is imperfect,
whereby, though we see not what God is, yet we see what He is not; and
140
141
STh Ia, q. 1, a. 9.
142
STh Ia, q. 13, a. 12, ad 3.
143
whereby, the more perfectly do we know God in this life, the more we
understand that He surpasses all that the mind comprehends.144
From this we can infer, that the highest acquisition of theology is not
saying as many things concerning God as possible. It is rather the ability to
show where the limit of Mystery begins, what shape the otherness of God
has.
The lack of perfect vision in theology has its consequences: we have to
acknowledge certain limits of the precision in theological positive
expressions. Proceeding from first principles – the data of Revelation, and
tending towards specific solutions in particular issues, we have to admit
that some of them cannot be described, that there remain some ambiguity
and subtleties which tend to escape from our attempts to grasp them firmly.
For Revelation has been given to us not to satisfy our curiosity, but to give
us instructions regarding our salvation.
4.2.4 Workshop of theologian

From what has been said above, it results quite clearly that the first and
basic instrument for a theologian is Scripture. It must be known and
understood. Understood in a twofold way: literally and spiritually.
a) Literal understanding of Scripture.

Thomas underlines the function of Scripture as providing theological
principles. Thus he is always attentive to the proper theological meaning of
Scripture and the events related in it.145 The literal sense he understands as
«quod ex ipsa verborum significatione recte accipitur.» 146 According to
Thomas it is the literal sense that can serve as a proper source of
theological principles. Only a literal sense can be employed as an argument
in theological inquiry. It is true that «sacred doctrine makes use of
metaphors as both necessary and useful.»147 but «from such expressions no
argument is to be drawn, as the Master says. Dionysius also says that
symbolical theology is not argumentative.» 148 This exclusion of the
144
145
W.G.B.M. VALKENBERG, Words of the living God, 205f.
146
«this what could be properly understod from the proper meanig of words
employed.» THOMAS, Quodl. VII, q. 6, a. 2.
147
STh Ia, q. 1, a. 9, ad 1.
148
spiritual sense from argumentation is based not on the lack of authority, but
on the equivocity of symbolical signification – one and the same thing can
signify many different things.149
I would like to report one example of such use of Scripture in theological
argumentation. When discussing the problem of the equality of Father and
Son Thomas states: «It is also a rule of Holy Scripture that whatever is said
of the Father, applies to the Son, although there be added an exclusive
term; except only as regards what belongs to the opposite relations,
whereby the Father and the Son are distinguished from each other.» 150
Analysis of Scripture and discernment of the proper literal sense is the
proper source of theological solutions.
An objection could be raised with respect, particularly, to the language
of Thomas, and generally, to medieval theology, which is filled with
notions, concepts, and distinctions which do not occur in Scripture. Thomas
was aware of such a difficulty: «It would seem that in God there are no
notions. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We must not dare to say
anything of God but what is taught to us by the Holy Scripture." But Holy
Scripture does not say anything concerning notions. Therefore there are
none in God.»151 To this objection he would answer that the ‘novelties’ in
fact are only explications: «although the notions are not mentioned in Holy
Scripture, yet the persons are mentioned, comprising the idea of notions, as
the abstract is contained in the concrete.»152
Valkenberg argues that the approach to Scripture varies according to the
literal genre adopted by Thomas. While in expositio (biblical works) it is
mostly ‘exegetical’ and oriented to the discovering of the proper
theological sense by means of linguistic analysis of text, etymologies and
juxtaposition of different significations, in quaestio (mostly theological
works) the univocal theological understanding is already given.153
149
cf THOMAS, Quodl. VII, q. 6, a. 1, ad 4. It should be noted, however, that Thomas
appeals to the spiritual meaning of Psalms and Prophets in Summa Theologiae.It shows,
how much his later theological works were rooted in exegesis. cf W.G.B.M.
VALKENBERG, Words of the living God, 130. Spiritual interpretation is understood not as
demonstration, but diclosure of convenience. STh II-II, q. 1, a. 5, ad 2; ddddddddddd
STh II-II, q. 2, a. 10, ad 2.
150
STh Ia, q. 36, a. 2.
151
STh Ia, q. 32, a. 2, obj. 1.
152
STh Ia, q. 32, a. 2, ad 1.
153
cf W.G.B.M. VALKENBERG, Words of the living God, 187f.
b) Spiritual understanding of Scripture

The spiritual meaning, based on the literal one, tends towards the
disclosure of the central position of Christ in the whole of Scripture. «The
general difference between the literal sense and the mystical (spiritual)
sense, matters more to Thomas Aquinas that the specific distinction
between allegorical, tropological and anagogical sense.» 154 The spiritual
sense according to Thomas is based on the signification of things:
The author of Holy Writ is God, in whose power it is to signify His meaning,
not by words only (as man also can do), but also by things themselves. So,
whereas in every other science things are signified by words, this science has
the property, that the things signified by the words have themselves also a
signification. Therefore that first signification whereby words signify things
belongs to the first sense, the historical or literal. That signification whereby
things signified by words have themselves also a signification is called the
spiritual sense, which is based on the literal, and presupposes it.155
The spiritual meaning is peculiar to Scripture (does not occur in other
texts) and is based on fact, that the events and things described in it, are
ordained by God so to have also such additional significance.156 But the
spiritual interpretation has its limits: «Nothing necessary to faith is
contained under the spiritual sense which is not elsewhere put forward by
Scripture in its literal sense.» 157 In this way spiritual interpretation
manifests the all embracing convergence of Scripture as a whole composed
from different parts. This convergence is the effect of the primary divine
authorship of both: the Scripture and the created world (man included).
From this follows, that «in uno verbo sacrae Scripturae intellexit multo
plura quam per expositores sacrae Scripturae exponantur, vel
discernantur.» 158 Spiritual interpretation presupposes both human
acquaintance with the content of Scripture and illumination by God’s
grace.159
154
155
STh Ia, q. 1,a. 10.
156
THOMAS, Quodl. VII, q. 6, a. 1.
157
STh Ia, q. 1,a. 10, ad 1.
158
«In one word it could be understood much more that the expositors of Scripture
are able to understand or discern» THOMAS, Quodl. VII, q. 6, a. 1, ad 5.
159
cf q. STh I-II, q. 51, a. 4.
An interesting example of such an approach we find in the Summa,

where Thomas gives an explanation of a spiritual meaning of the ritual
precepts of the Old Testament regarding pure and impure animals:
The animal that chews the cud and has a divided hoof, is clean in signification.
Because division of the hoof is a figure of the two Testaments: or of the Father
and Son: or of the two natures in Christ: of the distinction of good and evil.
While chewing the cud signifies meditation on the Scriptures and a sound
understanding thereof; and whoever lacks either of these is spiritually unclean.
In like manner those fish that have scales and fins are clean in signification.
Because fins signify the heavenly or contemplative life; while scales signify a
life of trials, each of which is required for spiritual cleanness.
then follows a long list of birds which are forbidden whose spiritual
signification is explained. The whole exposition is summed up: «whereas
those were forbidden which cling rather to the earth: because those who
abuse the doctrine of the four Evangelists, so that they are not lifted up
thereby, are reputed unclean.»160
In the quotation reported above we can trace out a hint of how Thomas
understood a proper approach towards Scripture – it must be chewed by
means of meditation and discussion as a bread
bread is converted into aliment by breaking and masticating it, just as the
Scriptures feed the soul by being opened up and made the subject of discourse;
but drink, when prepared, passes as it is into the body: so that at present the
truth is bread, when it is called daily bread; but then it will be drink, when
there will be no need of the labour of discussing and discoursing, as it were of
breaking and masticating, but merely of drinking unmingled and transparent
truth.161
In the context which has been said, a relation between God and a way of
knowing him by means of proposition emerges anew. Single propositions,
single events and things contained in Scripture have a mysterious point of
convergence – often difficult to trace out – such as that of a broken mirror
reflecting one thing in many ‘copies’.162 Every valid spiritual interpretation
of Scripture is an act of grasping this convergence.
160
STh I-II, q.102, a. 6, ad 2.
161
AUGUSTINE, De sermone Domini in monte, II, x, 37.
162
cf THOMAS, De veritate, q. 10, a.11, ad 12.
Spiritual interpretation is oriented more towards nourishing the life of

prayer of the faithful and towards giving indications for moral conduct
rather than to exploring the content of articles of faith.163
c) Logical and grammatical toolkit.

Since knowledge of God is had by a man by means of propositions, a
theologian, besides the acquaintance of Scripture, must have an ability to
judge meanings of these in a very attentive way. A proposition must be
judged according to its precise grammatical complexity and as a part of
logical argumentation. Many times Thomas puts the theological inquiry in
terms of an analysis of grammatical or logical validity of proposition. 164
But more frequently he employs a wide range of specialistic terms to
distinguish and clarify different meanings and possible interpretations of
Scripturistic or theological propositions. This attention gives to Thomas’
theological works their specific appearance and was the object of most
fierce critics and misunderstandings after the end of the Medieval period.
An eminent example of such rejection we can find in the sermon of
Lorenzo Valla exhibited in the church of Santa Maria Sopra Minerva in
7.03.1457.
I’m not impressed by such things, metaphysics, modi significandi et., which
modern theologians treat with so great esteem [...] but I would quote the
ancient theologians: [...] Hilary, Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, who neither
treat of such things in their books, nor even nominate them. Because of their
ignorance maybe? [...] works of these Fathers are latin in supreme way, while
of those modern almost barbarous.165
In the eyes of humanists, modern (scholastic) theology compared with
the patristic one seems empty and futile:
163
L. ELDERS, Aquinas on Holy Scripture, 147.
164
see titles of some articles: «Whether this proposition is false: "Christ as man was
predestinated to be the Son of God"?» STh III, q. 24, a. 2.; «Whether this proposition is
false: "The body of Christ is made out of bread"?» STh III, q. 75, a 8.
165
«Ma io non ammiro tanto queste cose, la cosidetta metafisica, e i modi di
significare e altre cose del genere, che i recenti teologi considerano come una nona sfera
or ora scoperta [...] ma citero gli antich teologi: [...] Ilario, Ambrogio, Gerolamo,
Agostino, i quali non hanno trattato di queste cose nei loro libri, ma non le hanno
nemmeno nominate. Per ignoranza forse?[...] gli scritti fi quei padri sono latinissimi,
mentre i moderni tutti sono quasi dei barbari» L. VALLA, Scritti filosofici e religiosi,
465.
let’s compare those ancient theologians--Origen, Basil, Chrysostom, Jerome--

with these modern ones. There he will see a golden river flowing, here some
shallow rivulets which are neither very pure nor faithful to their source. There
the oracles of eternal truth thunder forth, here you hear the little inventions of
men which vanish like dreams the more closely you examine them. There an
edifice rises on high supported on the solid foundations of Scripture, here a
hollow and monstrous scaffold built on the worthless quibbles of men or even
on low flattery rises to an enormous height. There you will be completely
delighted and satisfied as in the most fruitful gardens, here you will be
lacerated and tormented among barren thornbushes. There everything is full of
grandeur, here nothing is splendid but is for the most part unclean and little in
keeping with the dignity of theology.166
4.2.5 Personal conditions of theologian –light of faith as virtue

Thomas keeps insisting on the fact that «knowledge of faith presupposes
natural knowledge, just as grace presupposes nature.» 167 Thus the
efficiency of theologian is conditioned in twofold way: by his natural
abilities such as intelligence, education etc, and by his openess to grace –
light of faith.
Thomas compares light of faith to a virtue.168 And as a certain habit it
can be increased or decreased by means of repeated actions 169 and even
lost.170 How efficient would the theologian be without the light of faith? Is
he capable of understanding divine things? I leave this question open.
Working out the openess to grace belongs to ascetics, which tends
towards the ordination of human affective faculties. This ordination is also
called purifaction of heart.171
The act of contemplation, wherein the contemplative life essentially consists,
is hindered both by the impetuosity of the passions which withdraw the soul's
intention from intelligible to sensible things, and by outward disturbances.
Now the moral virtues curb the impetuosity of the passions, and quell the
disturbance of outward occupations.172
166
ERASMUS, Ratio verae theologiae, 34.
167
168
STh II-II, q. 1, a. 4, ad 3
169
STh I-II, q. 51, a. 3.
170
STh I-II, q. 71, a. 4.
171
172
STh II-II, q. 180, a. 2.
Among moral virtues, humility seems the most important one, since
Thomas notes an intrinsic link of this virtue with the cognitive abilities of
theologian:
Knowledge of truth is twofold. One is purely speculative, and pride hinders
this indirectly by removing its cause. For the proud man subjects not his
intellect to God, that he may receive the knowledge of truth from Him,
according to Mt. 11:25, "Thou hast hid these things from the wise and the
prudent," i.e. from the proud, who are wise and prudent in their own eyes,
"and hast revealed them to little ones," i.e. to the humble. [...] The other
knowledge of truth is affective, and this is directly hindered by pride, because
the proud, through delighting in their own excellence, disdain the excellence
of truth; thus Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 17) that "the proud, although certain
hidden truths be conveyed to their understanding, cannot realize their
sweetness: and if they know of them they cannot relish them." Hence it is
written (Prov. 11:2): "Where humility is there also is wisdom."173
Moral condition, however, is relevant to the final stage of theological
inquiry – contemplation obtained by means of light of faith. But it seems
irrelevant to the preparational stage, that is, the rational organization and
analysis of revealed data.
A man may judge in one way by inclination, as whoever has the habit of a
virtue judges rightly of what concerns that virtue by his very inclination
towards it. Hence it is the virtuous man, as we read, who is the measure and
rule of human acts. In another way, by knowledge, just as a man learned in
moral science might be able to judge rightly about virtuous acts, though he had
not the virtue. The first manner of judging divine things belongs to that
wisdom which is set down among the gifts of the Holy Ghost: "The spiritual
man judgeth all things" (1 Cor. 2:15). And Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii):
"Hierotheus is taught not by mere learning, but by experience of divine
things." The second manner of judging belongs to this doctrine (theology)
which is acquired by study, though its principles are obtained by revelation.174
4.2.6 Conclusive remarks
Thomas, instead of including the revelation data as implicitly inhering to
Truths known by the human mind, made a step backwards. He began with
natural cognition and its limits and showed how it is supplemented by
supernatural aid in the form of divine Revelation. On both levels of
173
STh II-II, q. 162, a. 3, ad 1.
174
STh Ia, q. 1, a. 6, ad 3.
cognition and language, the natural character of this process is retained, not
exluding, however, the possible aid of grace.
Against, as it seems, the dominant tendency in accounting for the human
cognition of divine truths, Aquinas restored the link between understanding
and vision, departing from the purely propositional and conceptual
character of theology, and his whole output bears a bold mark of a
contemplative approach. We can risk a claim that according to Thomas
there’s no predication where there is no vision. There would be no
Christian theology without Revelation.
The nature and character of such vision, needs subsequent analysis. This
task, however, goes beyond the scope of this work. In the following chapter
I would like to restrict myself to one aspect of that analysis: to look into the
problem of imagination and the role which it plays in theological inquiry.
CHAPTER V
TRIUMPH OF INTELLECTUAL ICONOCLASM IN THE WEST
In this chapter I would like to look into the mode in which Thomas treats
imagination as an element of human cognitional acts with respect to God.
A question about imagination rises from the tension between claims of its
necesity on the one hand and its inadequacy on the other. In the preceding
chapter we have seen that Thomas, holding to the Aristotelian account of
human cognition (with some modifications regarding the final stage) and of
nature of the human language, retained it unchanged on the level of
theological predication. So what enters now in question is the
understanding of the passio animae, phantasm, or the likeness of an object
necessary for the cognitional act. After discussing Thomas’ work we would
go beyond, to consider, in a summary way, how imagination is conceived
of in subsequent stages of development of Western thought.
5.1. Imagination with respect to God by Thomas Aquinas

5.1.1 Dialectical tension between necessity and inadequacy of imagination
in theological judgment
An excellent passage regarding the role of imagination in Thomas’
vision of theology we find in his Exposition on Boethius’ de Trinitate.
Thomas confirms that there’s no human knowing without some image and
not only as a mere starting point which can be left behind as unnecessary
when the intellectual process begin.
This is because images are related to the intellect as objects in which it sees
whatever it sees, either through a perfect representation or through a negation.
Consequently, when our knowledge of images is impeded, we must be
completely incapable of knowing anything with our intellect even about divine
things.
But it is clear, that no created species or phantasm of any created thing
can represent God in a perfect way «for He transcends every genus and is
outside every genus. As a result, it is impossible to find any created species
which is adequate to represent God’s essence.»1 Thus Thomas argues that:
we cannot know that God causes bodies, or transcends all bodies, or is not a
body, if we do not form an image of bodies; but our judgment of what is
divine is not made according to the imagination. Consequently, even though in
our present state of life the imagination is necessary in all our knowledge of
the divine, with regard to such matters we must never terminate in it.2
The role of imagination in theological apprehension is purely negative.
The only conclusion from such a type of cognition is: «He is other than
this.» So in the apprehension of God, one is bound to begin with some
accessible data. Also the reasoning requires a phantasm:
either in a mode of causality, as an effect proceeds from its cause, but in a way that it
is notwithstanding with it, and effect falls short to its case; or in a mode of excelence
and remoteness in a way that all what is apprehended by senses or imagination, must
be separated from such things.3
But the act of judgment is an exclusion: «apprehension by means of
judgment must neither terminate in senses nor in imagination.»4
To understand it better we can compare the judgment in theological
proposition to the mathematical one. While mathematical judgment
requires an abstraction from concrete material objects (we cannot think of a
point as something occupying a certain amount of space) but not from
imagination, theological judgment cannot appeal to neither sense nor to
imagination.5 Imagination is not an adequate criterion to make a positive
judgment about Who and how God is. What is then?
1
2
THOMAS, In Boethii de Trinitate, q. 6, a. 2, ad 6
3
«vel per viam causalitatis, sicut ex effectu causa perpenditur, quae non est effectui
commensurata, sed excellens, vel per excessum vel per remotionem, quando omnia,
quae sensus vel imaginatio apprehendit, a rebus huiusmodi separamus», THOMAS, In
Boethii de Trinitate, q. 6, a. 2.
4
«cognitio secundum iudicium neque debet terminari ad imaginationem neque ad
sensum» THOMAS, In Boethii de Trinitate, q. 6, a. 2.
5
cf THOMAS, In Boethii de Trinitate, q. 6, a. 2.
CHAP. V: INTELLECTUAL ICONOCLASM 105
Thomas speaks about an intellectual vision «not effected by means of

bodily and individual images, but by an intelligible image.» It can be
imprinted immediately by God, in prophetic revelation, sometimes it results
from pictures in the imagination, by the aid of the prophetic light, since a
deeper truth is gathered from these pictures in the imagination by means of the
enlightenment of the higher light.6
And even if «man is able by his natural powers to form all kinds of
pictures in the imagination, by simply considering these pictures» he is not
able to work out «representation of intelligible truths that surpass his
intellect, since for this purpose he needs the assistance of a supernatural
light.»7
So in theological judgment (regarding God in se) there are two elements:
a negative judgment based on phantasm, and some intellectual
understanding or ‘vision’ caused by supernatural light (the light of faith).
Can we say that both elements are necessary?
This question is relevant and was raised by theologians like John Henry
Newman in An essay in aid of a grammar of assent8, and, as we could see,
by Lonergan (his insistence on the integrality of the act of human
cognition).
5.1.2 Imagination and Scripture

Biblical expositions are an important part of the whole of Thomas’
production, not only with respect to their quantity, but also as influencing
his mode of theological inquiry.
The theme of vision of God occurs frequently in the Gospel of John. One
of the eminent passages is the famous dialogue held during the Last
Supper: «Philip said to him, “Lord, show us the Father, and it is enough for
us.” Jesus said to him, “Have I been with you so long, and you still do not
know me, Philip? Whoever has seen me has seen the Father. How can you
say, ‘Show us the Father’?» (J 14, 8-9) This passage is the subject of
extensive commentary in the Exposition of the Gospel of John which can
6
STh II-II, q. 173, a. 2, ad 2.
7
cf STh II-II, q. 173, a. 2, ad 3.
8
J.H. Newman, An essay in aid of a grammar of assent. See his distinction between
notional explanation and real apprehension involving necessarily an act of imagination
on page 120, and claims that pevery proposition of catholic dogms must be
accompanied by an act of immagination. (page 125).
help us to understand the role of imagination in knowing God in Thomas’

account of it.
Firstly, we have to note a link of participation and likeness between
Jesus, «naturale Dei verbum» and «omne autem verbum a Deo
inspiratum». In force of this link, «omne verbum inspiratum a Deo ducit ad
Christum.»9 So the whole of Scripture leads us to knowing Christ. Such
knowledge by means of Scripture is an initial (seminal) stage of the proper
knowledge of God: visio beatifica.
For Christ's words are true; For this reason we ought to observe it, first of all,
through faith, and continual meditation; [...] He promises the liberation from death;
[...] In fact, the eternal life consists especially in the vision of God; J 17, 3: This is
eternal life that they may know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom
thou hast sent. This vision of a kind of seed and the beginning of life, however, takes
place in us through the word of Christ; Lk. 8, 11: The seed is the word of God.10
Christ is the only One Who has the perfect vision of God, and has had it
when He was among us in his human, historical mode, in force of His
being generated by God. And all our knowledge of the Father we derive
from His knowledge by knowing Him as the One Who manifests God.11
The Father is manifested through the manifestation of the divinity of
Christ. This manifestation occurs through words and deeds (miracles)
performed by Jesus.12
Despite, however, claiming that it is fitting that God manifests Himself
in a visible manner through Incarnation 13 , Thomas makes no explicit
reference to imagination (neither positive nor negative) as a mode of
knowing Christ by means of Scripture. Furthermore, from the different
occurences in which he talks about imagination we can trace his distrusting
approach towards this faculty in theology.
9
«every word inspirated by God leads to Christ» THOMAS, Super Evangelium
Johannis, 127
10
«Nam sermo Christi veritas est; ideo debemus ipsum servare, primo quidem per
fidem, et iugem meditationem; [...] Promittit autem mortis liberationem; [...] Nam vita
aeterna praecipue in divina visione consistit; infra XVII, 3: haec est vita aeterna ut
cognoscant te solum verum Deum, et quem misisti Jesum Christum. Huius autem
visionis quoddam seminarium et principium in nobis fit per verbum Christi; Lc. VIII,
11: semen est verbum Dei.» THOMAS, Super Evangelium Johannis,192
11
cf THOMAS, Super Evangelium Johannis, 146
12
cf THOMAS, Super Evangelium Johannis, 286
13
STH III, q. 1, a. 1.
Imagination can be a cause of heresy14 (when it is taken as a criterion for

judgment as it was in the case of the Manicheans 15 ), blasphemy 16 , etc.;
contrary to the intellect, imagination may be the subject of demonic
manipulation.17
5.1.3 Iconoclastic drive in accounting for contemplation

Distrust with respect to imagination in the area of theological inquiry is
rather obvious. Thomas, for example, while explaining the dictum «Anyone
who has seen me has seen the Father» (J 14, 9), is concerned only with
theological consequences following from it regarding the equality of Son
and Father.18 He does not raise any epistemological questions (how does
one now know Christ by means of Scripture) on this occasion. But the lack
of explicit reference to imagination based on Scripture in the context of
contemplation is a bit strange. When Thomas considers the modes of vision
available to man in this life he enumerates:
1. "Through a creature, subordinate to the bodily sight; as Abraham is
believed to have seen God, when he saw three and adored one "; 2.
"Represented by means of the imagination; and thus Isaiah saw the Lord
sitting upon a throne high and lifted up "; 3. "By means of some intelligible
species abstracted from sensible beings, from them that by considering the size
of creatures, they look upon the understanding of the greatness of the Creator,
as it is said [...] Rom. 1, 20: the invisible things of God [...]"; 4. "Through a
certain spiritual light from God infused into the minds in the contemplation of
spiritual things; and in this way Jacob saw God face to face, in Gn. 32, 30 the
vision of which, according to Gregory, were achieved by a high level of
contemplation.19
14
STh II-II, q. 11, a. 1, ad 3.
15
THOMAS, Super Evangelium Johannis, 174
16
STh II-II, q. 13, a. 2, ad 3.
17
STh II-II, q. 172, a. 5, ad 2.
18
THOMAS, Super Evangelium Johannis, 284
19
«1. “per subiectam creaturam, visui corporali propositam; sicut creditur Abraham
vidisse Deum, quando tres vidit, et unum adoravit;” 2. “per repraesentatam
imaginationem; et sic Isaias vidit Dominum sedentem super solium excelsum et
elevatum”; 3.”per aliquam speciem intelligibilem a sensibilibus abstractam, ab his qui
per considerationem magnitudinis creaturarum, intellectu intuentur magnitudinem
creatoris, ut dicitur [...] Rom. I, 20: invisibilia Dei [...]”; 4. “per aliquod spirituale
lumen a Deo infusum spiritualibus mentibus in contemplatione; et hoc modo vidit Iacob
The only reference to imagination is given in the prophetic vision, which

is a special grace.What is interesting, however, is the fact, that the only
kind of knowledge of God Thomas seems to be interested in, is a perfect
vision of God’s essence. And this can be had only «per privationem
omnium creaturarum, et intellectorum a nobis.»20
A slight ‘iconoclastic drive’ contained in this treatment of contemplation
can be understood more clearly when we compare this claim of Aquinas
with that of Teresa of Avila, who wrote:
In some books written on prayer it is sad that when, though the soul cannot
reach this state of prayer by itself, [...] it will be able to help itself by lifting
the spirit above all creatures [...] they give strong advice to rob oneself of all
corporeal images and to approach the contemplation of Divinity. They say that
in the case of those who are advancing, these corporeal images, even when
referring to the humanity of Christ, are an obstacle or impediment to the most
perfect contemplation. In support of this theory they quote what the Lord said
to the Apostles about the coming of the Holy Spirit – I mean the time of His
ascension. They think that since this work is entirely spiritual, any corporeal
thing can hinder or impede it [...].21
This practice of turning aside from corporeal things must be good, certainly,
since such spiritual persons advise it. But, in my opinion, the soul should be
very advanced because until then it is clear that the Creator must be sought
through creatures22
that we should skillfully and carefully accustom ourselves to avoid striving
with all our strength to keep this most sacred humanity always present [...],
this, I say, is what I don’t think is good. The soul is left floating in the air, as
they say; it seems it has no support no matter how much it may think it is full
of God.23
Ordinarily, thought needs to have some support. If at times the soul goes out
of itself or goes about so full of God that it has no need of any created thing to
become recollected, this isn’t so usual.24
Deum facie ad faciem, Gen. XXXII, 30 quae visio, secundum Gregorium, facta est per
altam contemplationem.”» ,THOMAS, Super Evangelium Johannis, 36
20
«by taking away all of the creatures, and all things understood by us» THOMAS,
Super Evangelium Johannis, 36
21
TERESA, The book of her life, XXII,1, 144
22
TERESA, The book of her life, XXII, 8, 147
23
24
In the quotations reported above we can recognize the same

understanding of human cognition, as Thomas had, but also an explication
of the necessary role of imagination in contemplating God, which seems
lacking to him.
On this occasion we can make one remark with respect to the relation
between christology and theology, that emerges from accounts of Thomas.
In his commentary on the Gospel of John Thomas explicitly states that
«Jesus declared himself to be the way to the knowledge of Father». 25 He
also claims that His Cross and Resurrection are the apax of revelation of
the Father.26 But this revelation of the Father must not be taken in terms of
Rahner’s Grundaxiom 27 –at least not explicitly. This link is not so
immediate. What is revealed by means of the Death and Resurrection is
Jesus’ divine dignity28 –He confirmed to be equal to the Father and thus has
given glory to Him and His power.29 This is, according to Aquinate, the
meaning of the dictum: «Who has seen Me has seen the Father» (J 14, 9).30
Christ’s miracles, the Resurrection above all, reveal his divine dignity,
and in consequence the existence of multiplicity of Persons in God –not
any specific character of a dynamic of divine life.
What is revealed by the Paschal mystery must be articulated with the aid of
philosophical precisions. Christ’s Paschal mystery reveals that His claim to be
the Son of God [...] is indeed the very truth manifested by the incarnate
Word’s sufering, death and resurrection31
The humanity of the Son is seen rather as an object of deification than as
a particular means by which one can attain any knowledge with respect to
the inner life of God. Such knowledge is to be attained from Jesus’
25
«Viam autem perveniendi ad cognitionem patris dicit se esse.», THOMAS, Super
Evangelium Johannis, cap. 8, lect. 3.
26
THOMAS, Super Evangelium Johannis, cap. 13, lect. 6; STh III, q. 53, a. 1.
27
M. LEVERING, Does the Paschal Mystery reveal the Trinity?, 91.
28
«hanc gloriam incepit habere in resurrectione et in passione, in quibus homines
cognoscere coeperunt suam virtutem et suam divinitatem.» THOMAS, Super Evangelium
Johannis, cap. 13, lect. 6.
29
«quando humana natura, deposita infirmitate per mortem crucis, accepit gloriam
immortalitatis in resurrectione. Inde ipsa resurrectio fuit principium quo inchoata est
ista gloria. Ideo dicit et continuo clarificabit eum [Deum], in resurrectione.», THOMAS,
Super Evangelium Johannis, cap. 13, lect. 6.
30
THOMAS, Super Evangelium Johannis, cap. 13, lect. 6.
31
M. LEVERING, Does the Paschal Mystery reveal the Trinity?, 91.
sayings.32 Thus when Thomas says that if one wants to know the secrets of
God, has to imitate the Beloved Disciple who was resting upon Lord’s
chest33 , i.e. remain in intimate, loving relationship with God, no further
explicit reference to the humanity of the Son as the source of such
knowledge is made in this context. It is put rather in the framework of
distinction and interrelation holding between contemplative and active
lives.
But we have to be very cautious in judging Thomas’ attitude on this
issue. In fact it is hard to judge whether he really adhered to this
‘iconoclastic drive’ only because we lack an explicit statement that the
Humanity of Christ is the only way to contemplation of God. For this lack
of an explicit statement could be caused by the fact, that in his times it was
not a problem. A. Yates observed that the production of Aquinas occured in
the times when sophistication of logical proceeding was accompanied with
a flourishing of figurative art,34 and manuals of theology were accompanied
by manuals containing a wide range of exempla to be employed in
predication.35
5.1.4 Thomas’ intellectualism

There’s some kind of ambiguity when Thomas tries to decide the true
character of contemplative life. Is it intellectual or practical? On the one
hand it begins with the assent of the will which turns to some good
promised by God to be reached.36 On the other it is rather an intellectual
activity.37 And again it must somehow be under the form of charity and
thus «it is not in the speculative understanding absolutely, but only in so far
as it is subject to the will.» 38 It seems as if in this case the scientific
32
«In illis enim clarificatur Deus qui quaerunt facere voluntatem eius, non suam;
talis autem erat Christus; supra VI, 38: non veni facere voluntatem meam, sed eius qui
misit me. Et ideo Deus clarificatus est in eo.» THOMAS, Super Evangelium Johannis,
cap. 13, lect. 6.
33
«quanto magis homo vult divinae sapientiae secreta capere, tanto magis conari
debet ut propinquior fiat Iesu, secundum illud ps. 33, 6: accedite ad eum, et
illuminamini. Nam divinae sapientiae secreta illis praecipue revelantur qui Deo iuncti
sunt per amorem», THOMAS, Super Evangelium Johannis, cap. 13, lect. 4.
34
cf F.A. YATES, L’arte della memoria, 72.
35
cf F.A. YATES, L’arte della memoria, 78.
36
cf THOMAS, De veritate, q. 14, a. 3.
37
cf THOMAS, De veritate, q. 14, a. 4.
38
proceeding seems to choke in tension between different principles that

result, to some extent, as divergent: that one act cannot belong to two
powers;39 of the decisive role of will in the beginning of the contemplation;
of contemplation seen as an action of the intellect, as regarding Truth.
Further considerations suggest that Thomas decided to understand the act
of contemplation as thoroughly intellectual,
the contemplative life is simply more excellent than the active: and the
Philosopher proves this by eight reasons (Ethic. x, 7,8). The first is, because
the contemplative life becomes man according to that which is best in him,
namely the intellect, and according to its proper objects, namely things
intelligible; whereas the active life is occupied with externals.40
Then he posits explicitly the activity, not as resulting from
contemplation, but as preparation to it.
the active life may be considered as quieting and directing the internal
passions of the soul; and from this point of view the active life is a help to the
contemplative, since the latter is hindered by the inordinateness of the internal
passions. [...] Hence the work of the active life conduces to the contemplative,
by quelling the interior passions which give rise to the phantasms whereby
contemplation is hindered.41
But reported hesitations give us some hint that what he intended, or at
least, what he was aware of, was the fact that contemplation as such must
employ a person as he is, not only the intellect. And in fact contemplation
as an intellectual act directed towards God, formed by love towards Him,
contains implicitly the active love towards neighbour.42
We can see, then, that it is not the doctrine itself, rather the distribution
of emphases (that could simply depend on the context of the times in which
Thomas worked), which could result to some extent misleadingly.
Nevertheless this concrete distribution of emphases could influence the
whole interpretation of the doctrine. The same misleading character can be
attributed to the form in which Thomas expressed his thought.
39
40
STh II-II, q. 180, a. 1.
41
STh II-II, q. 182, a. 3.
42
STh II-II, q. 25, a. 1.
5.2 Misleading character of Thomas’ linguistic expression. Its advantages

and limitations.
One has not to be very educated man, while confronting the pages of
Thomas’ and Augustine’s works, to grasp, that the two spoke totally
different languages. We can argue that this fact could be to some extent
caused by the type of audience they were directed to. But also the
background of different methodological approaches is not without
relevance. While reading Augustine’s De trinitate or De magistro we
accompany the process of reasoning which tends towards the
understanding, Thomas provides us a set of concepts and solutions already
prepared and put into a coherent and sophisticated system. Of course the
links between these theologians and relevant ancient philosophers are
somehow clear.
M. Colish in the titles of chapters of her book quoted above has enclosed
an allusion to the possible key of reading the general development of
theological thought within the Western context. The problem whether this
point of view give justice or not to the real occurences I will leave aside.
What, however, is obvious is that Thomas took over some of Augustine’s
problems, which in those remote times remained unsolved. One of them is
the problem of the dialectical relation between objectivity and relativity,
oneness and multiplicity in God. What Thomas had at his disposal, and
what was lacked by Augustine, is the sophisticated system of concepts.
There was a notable progress in the development of theological language,
similar to the one holding between opinion or reasoning in need of
explanation on the one hand, and definition or science from the other. What
in fact is different, is not the Truth of tri-unity itself, which for both
theologians was the same, but its mode of expression or better precision
with which they could express this truth.
And while the link between the Object and language seems to be more
obvious by Hipponate, the central position of the Mystery of Simple
Existence beyond human predication as a point of convergence of the
whole theological system can be more easily overlooked by Thomas. The
scientific paradigm forced him to present truth in a well-divided and
organised, and thus, at first glance, fragmented mode. In this aspect the
Summa resembles somehow a stained-glass window of a gothic cathedral.
Although all the different small pieces are separated by little metal frames,
nevertheless it is one light that shines through it, making of them a unique
composition expressing the intent of its author.
Already the carolingian theologians, however, were aware of the

temptation which notions and definition present to the human mind. Taken
in se, without the understanding of how they are related to God, can give
one an illusion of the complete knowledge of God, and, as a consequence
encourage him to abandon the obedience to revealed sources relying only
on his intellectual inquiries.43 Also with respect to Aquinas’ oeuvre there
was a risk (and as history showed, not a small one), that its explicit form
could lead to purely notional precisions of terms and divisions without any
reference to the very Object of theology. (We should also not forget, that in
fact many of the discussions already in course at these times were of this
character.) I think, as it was already mentioned on the occasion of
discussing Abelard, that forgetting the contemplative character of theology,
i.e. losing sight of both: the centrality of God as He is, or better as He is
not; and forgetting the peculiarity of our mode of knowing Him, is the
greatest danger of any theological reflection.
And that it can happen, even among the followers of Thomas, has been
made evident by B. Lonergan, when he reported an article from the
Catholic Encyclopedia whose author explicitly identified the accounts of
cognition of Thomas and Scotus.44 The same attention to this problem is
shown in his distinction between understanding and concept, which was
reported above. There can be individuated a second danger, in some way
connected to the first – I mean the tendency of theological language to
degenerate into hermetic set of notions accessible only to experts.
One could say that Thomas’ language looks simply like that. And here
we turn back to the problem of method. While Augustine’s method is
rethoric and thus explicitly directed towards a hearer, Thomas employs a
logical and dialectical one and furthermore, is working within a framework
of quaestio of a theological handbook. We have to notice then a certain
tension between Thomas’ understanding and the form in which he presents
it.45 The former starts and terminates in an individual, the latter puts the
universal, the notion, on the first plan. The form in which this thought is
put into, is a complex system of notions formed along the slow assimilation
of the logical works of Aristotle within the course of medieval semantical
reflection. (Though it conserved its link with the immediate experience,
even if not grasped immediately.) It can be misleading and incite hostility.
43
cf A. BISOGNO, Il metodo carolingio, 115-16.
44
B.J.F. LONERGAN, Verbum, 39 note 126.
45
This hostility is to some extent plausible since a purely formal approach

to reality seems reductive i.e. it does not exhaust its meaning, for as it
became even more clear to the modern thinkers, 46 not only a form of a
thing, the notional content is cognitively relevant, but also the way in
which it is given. Of course it depends on the kind of knowledge we are
concerned with: science and poetry would give different accounts of a
sunset. One would describe essentially the astronomical phenomenon
while the other would pay more attention to accidental issues. Wittgenstein
claimed explicitly, that perfect scientific language wouldn’t even touch the
problems really relevant for man as a man.47 This accusal, however, as we
have seen above, can be addressed to the form rather than to the very
content of Thomas’ thought.
5.3 Triumph of intellectual iconoclasm in the West

In preceeding chapters we have seen how image or vision and language
are related to one another. We have seen also how this relation was
understood by different thinkers and how it resulted in different accounts
for epistemology and science. Generally, looking at the medieval period,
we can distinguish two main approaches. The first, the Baconian-Scotist in
which the perception of quiddity of a thing occurs thoroughly passively and
a notion resulting from this apprehension immediately is the very object of
human knowing. The second, the Thomist one, in which the notion
proceeds from the act of understanding of the quiddity of the particular
thing, but as a product of a complex process involving an image as its
necessary element. But even by him, as it was shown above, we can trace
some hints of reductionism regarding that cognitive process – at least in the
distribution of emphases. A short overview of the subsequent development
of epistemological tendencies betrays a rising ‘iconoclastic’ drive.
The first half of the XIV century was a testimony to the development of
a new epistemology and theory of science. So called ockhamists held that
certain knowledge is only of terms. Science is about propositions. A
46
Let’s remind only two examples: the sensitivity of Heiddegger for the differnece
between scientific and poetical approach to reality. Also the awareness of irreducubility
of the human thought as a process to its product; cf. L. WITTGENSTEIN, Philosophical
grammar, 102-106.
47
L. WITTGENSTEIN, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, §6.52, 108.
relation to things outside the mind is only accidental.48 This approach was
too new and too divergent from the traditional approach, so in 1340 it
provoked an official reaction from several officals of Paris University.
Two hundred years later, however, the educational method of Peter
Ramus (1515 –1572), in which the proper stimulus for memorization is no
longer an image, but an abstractive logical order, gains great popularity.49
There’s a strong Platonic impact underlying this approach, 50 and it was
explicitly hostile to any use of imagination: either in thinking of God or of
anything else. 51 Another question is how the misuse of images and
imagination in the times of the end of the Middle Ages and in the
Renaissance provoked this hostility.
It is not my intention to describe in details this process, but only to point
out a certain tendency. It can be confirmed by the presence of many voices
in defending imagination and metaphor occurring from the second half of
the XIX century52 and multiplying further in the XX century.
Alex Stock describes this same process in the context of the wider
problem of ‘iconoclasm’ rooted in the Old Testament abolition of images,
which eventually influenced also the very mode of ‘scientific’ thinking in
such areas as philosophy and theology,53 and modern piety as well.
It seems then, that we need to rediscover anew the role and place of
image and imagination in epistemology and semantics, to go beyond the
traditional prejudice towards them, and thus to overcome the reductive
approach.54 In the case of theology it would result in more attention paid to
biblical contemplation and lumen fidei as important, if not necessary,
context of scientific theological inquiry.
48
J.M.M.H. THIJSSEN, The crisis over ockhamist hermeneutic, 382.
49
F.A. YATES, L’arte della memoria, 217.
50
F.A. YATES, L’arte della memoria, 222.
51
YATES, F.A. – al., L’arte della memoria, 258.
52
for example mentioned work of J.H. Newman
53
STOCK, A., Poetische Dogmatik. Gotteslehre, I, 34.
54
In this reflection a confrontation with the orthodox tradition can be very fruitful.
One can ask: If a material image (icon) can have so great theological importance, is it
possible to look at the imagination araising from contemplative approach towards
inspered text of Revelation in a similar way?
SOME ANSWERS
After this short overview I think that it results quite clearly that it is
worthwhile discussing language generally, and theological language even
more so. This consideration leads us to reflect upon the human mode of
cognition, and by means of it, to the Reality we are interested in.
Surprisingly by reflecting upon language, we arrive at the problem of
ontological transformation of a man performed by means of grace (lumen
fidei). Awareness of how our cognition works, and how it arrives at
linguistic formulation, and what is the object signified directly by the
words we use, can deliver us from many misunderstandings and apparent
controversies arising from divergence between these expressions.
But by now, I am not ready to discuss the concrete relations between the
language of Christian theology, natural science, philosophy, and of the
tradition of the Far East. Such a discussion requires more profound scrutiny
of relevant languages than performed on these preceding few pages.
Nevertheless what I succeeded to do is to show the peculiarity of
theological language with respect to the natural one, as it emerges from the
awareness of St Thomas.
The theological language, according to Thomas is based on propositions
of divine Revelation as on its first principles. It takes the teaching of
Fathers, and Philosophers, as useful but only probable principles. As
accompanied by the light of faith theological propositions can be
considered a means of seeing God.
In his account for theological language Thomas retained the general
structure of natural language as it is described in Peri hermeneias. And thus
neither the propositions of theology nor the propositions of Revelation are
the immediate signs of Reality, but the passio animae proceeding from
them. Propositions of Revelation and the proper propositions of theology
proceeding from them are instruments which, with an aid of Holy Spirit
(light of faith), provides us of the possibility of production of such passio
animae, which in turn is the very likeness of Reality. We have to
distinguish then three levels in the theological predication: the first consists
from propositions which are the material for the logical analysis; the
second, which consists from some kind of intuitional vision or experience,
which is produced by human mind aided by light of faith in an act of
contemplation based on these propositins of Revelation and theology; and
the third level – the level of Reality, which remains beyond the direct
access of human cognition, and which is indicated by the fruit of the
second-level passio.
There are some conclusions folowing from that, what has been said
above: the true-value (not the logical validity) of theological expressions
can be recognized only by those who recognize the validity of Revelation. 1
In the discussion with those who do not recognize this validity, it remains
however some area of potential agreement, here I mean the possible
recognition of the plausibility of conclusions following from principles
unacknowledged by them. And so it seems to be methodologically
mistaken to treat this kind of discussion (I mean the discussion with those
who do not embrace the Chruistian Revelation) as proper for theology or,
to put in other words, an author of theological works has to be aware of this
distinction to evade both, the reduction of the Mystery of faith to rationally
accessible truths on the one hand, and the unauthorized extension of human
possibilities with respect to God on the other. In this way we can say that
dogmatic theology precedes apologetics or fundamental theology, as source
and vision precede river and expression. And in turn dogmatic theology
cannot be perfect without an act of contemplation conditionated by the
supernatural habit of faith.
From these we can take some methodological conclusions:
1. Proper theological inquiry presupposes acceptance of Scripture as
inspired source of knowledge of God, and possibly wide acqaintqance with
it.
2. Proper theological inquiry presupposes the awareness of theologian of
the nature of human cognition, and respecting it in course of such inquiry.
3. Proper theological inquiry as conditionated by the supernatural light of
faith to some extent depends on moral state of theologian and on his
appealing to the aid of grace.
1
cf STh Ia, q. 1, a. 8.
SIGLES AND ABBREVIATIONS
a. article
ad answer to the objection
ad dif answer to difficulity of a quaestio
al. alii (i.e. «others»)
cap. capitulus
cf confront
contr sed contra, argument against introductory objection of the
quaestio.
De Div. 83 AUGUSTINE, De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII Liber Unus,
PL 40
f. following page
1 Jn. The First Letter of John
lect. lectio
Matt. The Gospel of St. Matthew
MGH Monumenta Germaniae Historica
obj. introductory objection of a queastio
PL J.-P. MIGNE, ed., Patrologiae Cursus Completus. Series latina
(Patrologia Latina), Petit – Montrouge, Paris 1844-
q. quaestio
Quodl. THOMAS AQUINAS, Quaestiones Quodlibetales; Le questioni
disputate: testo latino di S. Tommaso e traduzione italiana,
Bologna 1992.
St. Saint
STh THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae
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New York 2012.
THOMAS AQUINAS, On being and essence, in: BOBIK, J., Aquinas on being and
essence: a translation and interpretation, Notre Dame 1965.
———, De veritate, english translation, MULLIGAN R., ed., De veritate, Chicago
1952.
———, In Boethii de Trinitate, in CALCATERRA, M., ed., Opuscula theologica,
Vol. II, Rome 1954; english translation in: HALL, D.C., The Trinity:
An Analysis of St. Thomas Aquinas’ «Expositio» of the «De Trinitate»
of Boethius, 1992.
———, Summa theologiae, edited in GILBY, T., ed., Summa theologiæ: Latin
text and English translation, introductions, notes, appendices and
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———, «Super Evangelium Johannis»,in THOMAS AQUINAS, Sancti Thomae
Aquinatis opera omnia, Vol 10, New York 1949, 279-656.
BIBLOGRAPHY 127
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2006.
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VALKENBERG, W.G.B.M., Words of the living God: place and function of Holy
Scripture in the theology of St. Thomas Aquinas, Leuven 2000.
VASSALLO, PHILIP, «Notes on the methods of inquiry of Plato and Aristotle.», A
Review of General Semantics 61(3) (2004), 373–380.
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Victor’s Teaching on Contemplation», University of Toronto
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premiers dialogues aux «Confessions», Paris 1969.
INDICE GENERALE
SOME QUESTIONS ........................................................................................... 5

CHAPTER I Language as a specific human phenomenonand its
philosophical interpretations ................................................. 11
1.1 Plato's account for the origin of names and definition that of
science ..................................................................................................... 12
1.1.1 Dialogical form of Plato’s writings ........................................................ 13
1.1.2 The nature of language in Plato’s Cratylus – immediate relation
word – object. ............................................................................................ 14
1.1.3 Science according to Plato ..................................................................... 17
1.2 Aristotle's account for the origin of names and definition of
science ..................................................................................................... 18
1.2.1 Aristotle’s account for language. ............................................................ 19
1.2.2. Aristotle’s account for science and knowledge...................................... 22
1.2.3 Language as the necessary tool of science. ............................................. 24
1.3 Conclusive remarks about Plato and Aristotle. ..................................... 25
1.4 The contribution of the Stoa to the discussion on the nature of
language. ................................................................................................. 26
CHAPTER II Language as employed by the theological discourse............. 27
2.1 Theology as natural and revealed......................................................... 27

2.2 Saint Augustine’s account for theological language. ........................... 30
2.2.1 Augustine’s signum-res dynamism. ....................................................... 30
2.2.2 Augustine and the human word in reference to God. ............................ 34
2.2.3 Augustine’s enigma. ............................................................................... 37
2.2.4. Conclusive remarks ................................................................................ 39
INDICE GENERALE 129
CHAPTER III From vision to expression –The medieval context of

Thomas’ theological language. .............................................. 41
3.1 Lectio divina and grammar .................................................................. 42

3.2. Signum and aenigma, signification of things. ...................................... 44
3.2.1 Light and vision...................................................................................... 45
3.2.2 Artistic testimony ................................................................................... 47
3.2.3 Spiritual testimony .................................................................................. 48
3.2.4. Liber sacrum, liber mundi and artes – medieval realism. ...................... 48
3.3 Towards expression, signification of words. ....................................... 51
3.3.1. First signs of change............................................................................... 52
3.3.2 Abelard’s account for language and signification................................... 53
3.4 Light, vision, species and knowledge – Problems with intelligible
species ..................................................................................................... 63
3.4.1. Grossateste’s metaphysic of light .......................................................... 64
3.4.2. Roger Bacon and his legacy ................................................................... 65
CHAPTER IV Thomas’ language: through proposition towards

particular................................................................................ 69
4.1 Natural language ................................................................................... 70
4.1.1 Contemplative approach – centrality of particular. ................................. 70
4.1.2. Thomas’ account of human cognition and the nature of language. ....... 73
4.1.3 Natural language and God ....................................................................... 78
4.2. Theological language ........................................................................... 81
4.2.1 Understanding as vision. ......................................................................... 83
4.2.2 Proposition and vision. ........................................................................... 84
4.2.3 Propositions of theology. ....................................................................... 86
4.2.4 Workshop of theologian ......................................................................... 94
4.2.5 Personal conditions of theologian –light of faith as virtue ..................... 99
4.2.6 Conclusive remarks ............................................................................... 100
CHAPTER V Triumph of intellectual iconoclasm in the West ................... 103
5.1. Imagination with respect to God by Thomas Aquinas....................... 103

5.1.1 Dialectical tension between necessity and inadequacy of
imagination in theological judgment ....................................................... 103
5.1.2 Imagination and Scripture .................................................................... 105
5.1.3 Iconoclastic drive in accounting for contemplation ............................. 107
5.1.4 Thomas’ intellectualism ....................................................................... 110
5.2. Misleading character of Thomas’ linguistic expression. Its

advantages and limitations. ................................................................... 112
5.3 Triumph of intellectual iconoclasm in the West ................................. 114
SOME ANSWERS .......................................................................................... 117
SIGLES AND ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................................... 119
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................... 121
INDICE GENERALE....................................................................................... 128
Dichiarazione di originalità del testo
Io sottoscritto Jan Wojciechowski
matricola n° 161279 iscritto al 2° anno presso la Facoltà di Teologia
della Pontificia Università Gregoriana, nel consegnare la Tesi1 per la Licenza
dal titolo: The theological languageof Saint Thomas Aquinas.Sources, historical

context, analysis, and some later reference
Dichiaro di essere l’autore dell’intero testo finale e che tale testo non è stato consegnato, né in toto né in
parte, per il conseguimento di un altro Titolo accademico o Diploma in qualsiasi Università o Istituto
universitario.
Dichiaro inoltre espressamente di non aver trasgredito alcuna delle Norme di etica universitaria della
Pontificia Università Gregoriana nella stesura del suddetto testo, specialmente le norme relative al
plagio (Art 1, §6), che sono da me conosciute.
Dichiaro infine di essere a conoscenza delle sanzioni previste in caso di plagio e di falsa dichiarazione.
In fede
__________________________________________
Firma dell’impiegato di segreteria che riceve il testo
__________________________________________
1Indicare Elaborato se si è iscritti al Baccellierato o al Diploma, Tesi se si è iscritti alla Licenza o al

Master, Dissertazione se si è iscritti al Dottorato.

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The theological language

of Saint Thomas Aquinas.

THE THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE

Tesi di licenza presentata da

Sotto la direzione del

the theological narration (categories such as soul, sin, Trinity...), thrown

quello stesso di cui e l’immagine.» P.G. DI DOMENICO, – al., Atti del

By these meditations we can individuate two problems which have to do

experience and on the another – is given to us by means of an linguistic

LANGUAGE AS A SPECIFIC HUMAN PHENOMENON

describes «the correspondence of notion and thing [...] is the precondition

science. 10 We should notice, then, that truth as a normative criterion of

1.1.1 Dialogical form of Plato’s writings

1.1.2 The nature of language in Plato’s Cratylus – immediate relation word

names was based on the mimetic function of the single vocals – as is

correctness and truth are to be understood in terms of a matching between

1.1.3 Science according to Plato

incomplete apprehensions of the Forms can be fairly characterized as

1.2.1 Aristotle’s account for language.

J. Magee argues, with reference to De anima 432a10-14, that mentioned

structure»61. Aristotle was the first philosopher to take language as a tool

1.2.2. Aristotle’s account for science and knowledge.

essence.» 67 Before we put forward these consideration, I would like to

1.2.3 Language as the necessary tool of science.

But Aristotelian thought had not gained an authoritative position during

1.3 Conclusive remarks about Plato and Aristotle.

mathematical precision. On the contrary: both Plato, who is talking about

1.4 The contribution of the Stoa to the discussion on the nature of

LANGUAGE AS EMPLOYED BY THE THEOLOGICAL

In the first chapter we have looked into the nature of language as an

2.1 Theology as natural and revealed.

Trinity is? 1 This question we can consider in a double way: either as a

In the beginning was the Word:

The Word became flesh,

These words St. John addressed to a Person whom he had encountered,

the thought, community to individual 6 , and the importance of precise

2.2 Saint Augustine’s account for theological language.

He it is who teaches us, namely, Christ, that is to say, "the unchangeable

2.2.2 Augustine and the human word in reference to God.

profundity of the heart. 39 The life and words of Jesus, as external,

2.2.3 Augustine’s enigma.

2.2.4. Conclusive remarks

rather as an ontology of spiritual life54 than as a speculative epistemological

FROM VISION TO EXPRESSION –

Magister Petrus in libris suis profanas vocum novitates inducit et sensuum:

eyes of the Founder of the Cistercian Order, of violation of God’s

3.1 Lectio divina and grammar

because of the reccommendation of Saint Augustine, whose domination

John Cassian as well as by Saint Jerome himself); the anagogic is

3.2. Signum and aenigma, signification of things.

3.2.1 Light and vision.

explicated and formed in a concise theory in works of that period. But to

3.2.2 Artistic testimony

Portarum quisquis attollere quaeris honorem,

Quale sit intus in his determinat aurea porta.

3.2.3 Spiritual testimony

3.2.4. Liber sacrum, liber mundi and artes – medieval realism.

complecuntur. Igitur nihil ad id quod significat referetur. Ex hoc etiam