18. [ A.C. NO. 12209, FEBRUARY 18, 2020 ] RUBEN A. ANDAYA, COMPLAINANT, V. ATTY.

EMMANUEL ALADIN A. TUMANDA,1 RESPONDENT.

FACTS:
1. It is a Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment filed by Ruben Andaya before the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines against Atty. Emmanuel Aladin A.
Tumanda.
2. Atty. Emmanuel borrowed from Andaya the amount of 500,000.
3. In exchange for the said amount and in order to convince Andaya, Atty. Emmanuel issued a post-
dated check of the same amount.
4. However, when Andaya deposited the check in the bank, it was dishonored for the reason that the
account was closed.
5. Andaya through his counsel sent a Demand Letter, and in order to appease him Atty. Emmanuel
offered as payment his Mercedez Benz and executed a Deed of Absolute Sale.
6. However, Atty. Emmanuel failed to give Andaya the original copy of the Certificate of Registration
of the car on the pretext that he forgot. He did not also turn-over the physical possession of the car
because allegedly he still need it for business ventures.
7. Then, Andaya found out that the car was sold by Atty. Emmanuel. Consequently, he sent another
demand letter to respondent. Consequently, he filed a criminal complaint for Estafa and violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 22 against him.
8. Atty. Emmanuel failed to file an answer and to attend the mandatory conference before the IBP.
9. The Investigating Commissioner found out the Atty. Emmanuel violated Canon 1 of the CPR so
they recommended that respondent to be suspended for 1 year with a stern warning.
10. The BOG (Board of Governors) modified it into 3 years suspension.
11. Director of the CBD explained the increasing of the period of suspension in his Extended
Resolution, it stated that the repeated changing of his address to evade his obligation and of
failing to answer and participate in the proceedings are aggravating warranting the imposition of a
longer period of suspension.
12. Office of the Bar Confident (evaluation, report, and recommendation within 30 days)
recommended the adoption of the Resolution of the IBP.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Atty. Emmanuel violated the CPR for issuing a worthless check.
2. Whether or not the violation of Atty. Emmanuel of CPR was aggravated.
HELD:
1. YES, Atty. Emmanuel violated the CPR for issuing a worthless check.
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the CPR state:

CANON 1— A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 — A Lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

xxxx

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.

In this case, respondent obtained a loan from complainant in the amount of P500,000.00 and
in exchange thereof issued a worthless check to complainant. This fact alone is a ground for
disciplinary action as it constitutes gross misconduct. It indicates his unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed upon him and his lack of personal honesty and good moral character rendering
him unworthy of public confidence.
 Lawyers, as guardians of the law, are mandated to obey and respect the laws of the land and
to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. They should at all times, whether in their
public or private life, "conduct themselves in a manner that reflects the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility." Thus, they should not engage in
any unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.

2. YES, the violation of Atty. Emmanuel of CPR was aggravated.

Aside from issuing a worthless check, respondent has acted in utmost bad faith when (1) the
sold to another person the Mercedes Benz he previously sold to complainant as full payment
for the loan obligation. Such act is a clear violation of the CPR. It is a deceitful conduct that
shows his lack of honesty and good moral character.

Moreover, his deliberate failure to settle his obligation despite repeated demands is in itself a
gross misconduct for which he may be sanctioned with one-year suspension from the practice of law.
As pointed out by complainant in his Complaint-Affidavit and as aptly found by the IBP, respondent
has (2)been using several addresses to avoid being traced and to evade his obligation to
complainant. In fact, because of this, the IBP had to send copies of the Notice of Hearing to the
different addresses of respondent as he could not be located. Such aberrant behavior of respondent
lays bare his lack of integrity and moral soundness.

In addition, respondent even (3)refused to answer the accusations against him and to
appear in the mandatory conferences despite due notice, thereby causing undue delay in the
resolution of the instant case.

A penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of law is usually imposed upon a lawyer
who issues a worthless check. However, considering the attendant circumstances in the instant case,
the Court agrees with the IBP and the OBC that the penalty imposed should be increased to three
years.

THE COURT ADOPTS AND ACCEPTS THE RECOMMENDATION OF IBP - 3 YRS

SUSPENSION.
19. [ A.C. NO. 12829 [FORMERLY CBD CASE NO. 15-4821]. SEPTEMBER 16, 2020 ] MYRIAM
TAN-TE SENG, COMPLAINANT, V. ATTY. DENNIS C. PANGAN, RESPONDENT. MYRIAM TAN-TE
SENG, COMPLAINANT, V. ATTY. DENNIS C. PANGAN, RESPONDENT.
FACTS:
Complaints
1. Complainant, Myriam Tan-Te Sang’s son Patrick was married to Marie. Patrick confided to Myriam
that he was unhappy with his 9 years marriage, then he took his own life.
2. After his son’s death, she found out that April was married to Neil but their marriage was
subsequently annulled.
3. During April’s marriage to Neil, she gave birth to Patricia. However, Patricia was acknowledged by
Patrick when he executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgement and Affidavit for Delayed Registration
of Birth that was submitted to NSO.
4. Atty. Pangan, respondent was introduced to Myriam, complainant, by her sister’s best friend to
settle the estate of Patrick.
5. After engaging the services of Atty. Pangan, Atty. Pangan sent an email addressed to Myriam and
April, requesting documents that are relevant to the Extrajudicial Settlement and his legal service
fee amounting P25,000. Myriam also gave pomelos from Davao to Atty. Pangan during his visit.
6. When Atty. Pangan, Myriam, April, and Patricia had a meeting, Myriam informed April and
Patricia’s share will only be P100,000 only, and offered P500,000 to Patricia as full settlement of
her share for her kind gesture as it would pay for her college education. They also agreed that
April and Patricia’s interest in Quezon City Townhouse will be conveyed to Myriam.
7. When she requested for an update. To her surprise, the Extrajudicial Settlement drafted by Atty.
Pangan excluded her as a legal heir which was wrong based on her consultations on various
people, she and her husband should be entitled to one half of their son’s estate because Patrick
had no legitimate child on her own.
8. Consequently, Myriam engaged a new counsel who invited April for conference to settle the issue
amicably, but April declined forcing her to file Annulment/Rescission of Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate, Issuance of Letters of Administration before RTC.
9. Myriam alleged that;
a. Atty. Pangan’s draft of the Extrajudicial Settlement deliberately omitted Patricia’s status. If only he
disclosed that Patricia was Neil’s illegitimate daughter, it would have stripped Patricia of her
entitlement to Patrick’s estate.
b. Failed to state that Patricia was then only 13 years old and had no capacity to sign legal
documents.
c. Deliberately excluded Patrick’s 35% ownership of Sweetcraft Corporation from the Extrajudicial
Settlement. Atty. Pangan allegedly assisted April in transferring Patrick’s share to the newly
incorporated AMPB Sweetcraft Corporation for purposes of circumventing corporation law, tax
laws, and prevent her in acquiring Patrick’s share.
d. Myriam further alleged that April was represented by 2 lawyers in the cases pending between
them, and one her lawyers was Atty. Pangan. She alleged that Atty. Pangan and April must have
developed some liking to each other because according to her sources, the two left for HongKong
for 3 days. It was also confirmed in the PSA that Atty. Pangan married April.
10. Atty. Pangan on the other hand filed a complaint against Myriam for Falsification of Public
Document of the Deed of Sale that she handed before to him.
11. In Myriam’s Counter-Affidavit, she charged respondent with abusive, offensive, and improper
language because Atty. Pangan’s counter-affidavit described her “as overly persistent or atat na
ataf to sell the property of her deceased son barely a month after his death.” And “devil wearing a
devil's smile”
DEFENSES
12. In CBD 15-4821
a. Atty. Pangan respondent that there was no attorney-client relationship between him and Myriam.
He alleged that his long time client introduced them to each other for documentation of the sale of
a property located in Quezon City. When he learned that the property was registered in the name
of Myriam Tan and Patrick Te Seng married April, he informed Myriam that April should visit him
personally in his office.
b. In their meeting, they all agreed to sign the Extrajudicial Settlement and it took more than a month
before Patricia finally signed the Extrajudicial Settlement because she was mad at Myriam
because she offered P500,000 in exchange of her share.
c. The Extrajudicial Settlement was signed and published, so he was surprised when Myriam filed a
case of settlement of estate.
d. He alleged that Myriam was excluded from the Extrajudicial Settlement since Patricia was
Patrick’s legitimate daughter, and by law, excludes Patrick’s ascendants from inheriting ab
intestate. Per Patricia's Birth Certificate, there was no impediment for her parents to marry at the
time she was born. Thus, the subsequent marriage of April and Patrick made Patricia a legitimated
child with the same status as legitimate. He was not informed of April's previous marriage with Neil
and it was not his duty to investigate nor inquire with the Philippine Statistics Authority regarding
the matter.
e. There was no conflict of interests because complainant was never his client. At any rate, his
appearance in the Mediation Proceedings was not a violation of his oath because he merely
assisted April upon the latter's request since he was the one who drafted the Extrajudicial
Settlement upon complainant's instructions. He never represented April in any of the cases
between her and complainant.
f. Anent the alleged exclusion of Patrick's shares of stock in Sweetcraft Corporation, he was never
informed of such ownership.
13. In CBD 16-4966,
a. There was nothing wrong with describing complainant as a "devil" because at that time, while the
whole family was grieving, Myriam was trying to get everything she could.
b. There was nothing wrong with the use of the word "atat na atat because he had difficulty finding
the appropriate word in English. The word "persistent" was too light to describe complainant's
actuations in trying to amass everything she could shortly after her son's death, leaving nothing to
his son's immediate family.
14. Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP — CBD) – By its Consolidated Report and Recommendation, recommended Atty.
Pangan 1 year suspension.
15. IBP Governors Resolution affirmed the recommendation, CBD Case No. 15-4821 – 1 yr
suspension and for CBD Case No. 16-4966 – 6 months
16. IBP elevated the entire records for the Court’s final imprimatur since the IBP resolutions were
mere recommendatory nature.
17. No motion for reconsideration or petition for review was filed.

ISSUE:
a. Whether or not there existed a lawyer-client relationship between respondent and complainant
b. Whether or not Atty. Pangan’s abandonement of Myriam’s cause in favor of April is a violation of
CPR.
c. Whether or not Atty. Pangan violated the CPR when he disregarded the law on succession in
excluding Myruam as heir.
d. Whether or not Atty. Pangan is exonerated from the charge for dishonesty for lack of merit
e. Whether or not Atty. Pangan violated the CPR when he used the document entrusted to him in
confidence by Myriam to file a criminal complaint against her.
f. Whether or not Atty. Pangan violated the CPR when he used the words “devil”, “with a devil smile”,
and “atat na atat” to describe Myriam in his counter affidavit.

HELD:
a. YES, there existed a lawyer-client relationship between respondent and complainant

Respondent was bound to protect complainant's interest the moment the latter sought the
former's advice regarding the settlement of her deceased son's estate.
To constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client should have employed
the attorney professionally on any previous occasion.
 If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney
in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the
attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional employment
must be regarded as established.
Here, a lawyer-client relationship was established when complainant sought respondent's legal
services for the settlement of her son's estate. To be sure, complainant was introduced to respondent
to discuss the properties her deceased son Patrick left behind. Thereafter, they had several meetings
at respondent's law office for the preparation and drafting of the Extrajudicial Settlement. Respondent
even sent complainant and April the list of pertinent documents he would be needing. From
respondent's own actions, it is crystal clear that a lawyer-client relationship between him and
complainant had been forged.
DEFENSE: DID NOT RECEIVE A SINGLE CENTAVO FROM MYRIAM FOR HIS SERVICE.
The court did not agree.
The absence of retainer agreement and non-payment of fees do not negate the existence of lawyer-
client relationship. Atty. Pangan 's denial of lawyer-client relationship between him and complainant
was belied by his own statement when he said that he is the one who prepared the Extrajudicial
Settlement at the instruction of Myriam.

b. YES, Atty. Pangan’s abandonement of Myriam’s cause in favor of April is a violation of CPR.

Atty was duty bound to protect complainant's cause and refrain from representing interests in conflict
therewith in accordance with Canon 15, Rules 15.02 and 15.03, viz.:
CANON 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions
with his client.

x x x x

RULE 15.02 A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege communication in respect of matters
disclosed to him by a prospective client.

RULE 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person
whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. The rule covers not only cases in
which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has
been bestowed or will be used. The rule holds even if the inconsistency is remote, merely probable, or
the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests.

In this case, respondent abandoned complainant's cause and openly represented April as his
client during mediation conferences. The court not persuaded by respondent's defense that the two
(2) lawyers who assisted Myriam during the mediation never opposed his appearance as April's
representative. The lack of opposition did not cure respondent's violation of the prohibition on
representing conflicting interests.

c. YES, Atty. Pangan violated the CPR when he disregarded the law on succession in excluding
Myruam as heir.

Rule 1.02 of the CPR ordains:

RULE 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.

Respondent violated the afore cited rule when he disregarded the law on succession and excluded
complainant as heir to her son's estate. Pertinently, Article 985 of the Civil Code decrees:
 Article 985. In default of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his parents and
ascendants shall inherit from him, to the exclusion of collateral relatives.
Notably though, the Extrajudicial Settlement of Patrick's estate excluded complainant as heir despite
the fact that Patrick did not have a legitimate offspring.
As reflected in her birth record, Patricia was bom on February 24, 2001. At that time, April's marriage
to Neil was still subsisting. The nullity of April's marriage to Neil became final only on July 14, 2003.
For lack of evidence on the ground invoked for the nullity of April's marriage to Neil, the Court
presents two (2) scenarios:
First Scenario: Patricia is deemed the legitimate daughter of April and Neil. Patrick's acknowledgment
of Patricia as his daughter, by itself, could not have diminished Patricia's status into that of an
illegitimate child. For under Art. 170 of the Family Code, it was April's then husband Neil, not Patrick,
who could have impugned Patricia's legitimacy. (IBIGSABIHIN EXCLUDED SI PATRICIA BILANG
HEIR KASI HINDI SIYA ANAK NI PATRICK, THUS MAKING APRIL AND MYRIAM THE ONLY LEGAL
HEIRS OF PATRICK)
Second Scenario: Patricia would be considered an illegitimate child. To be sure, Article 177 of the
Family Code expressly precludes the legitimation of children conceived and born outside of wedlock
of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were disqualified by any impediment to
marry each other. Thus, neither Patrick and April's subsequent marriage on September 18, 2005, nor
his Affidavit of Acknowledgment could have raised Patricia's status to that of a legitimated child. For at
the time Patricia was conceived and born, there existed a legal impediment for Patrick to marry April;
April's marriage to Neil was still subsisting. (IBIGSABIHIN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD SI PATRICIA NI
PATRICK KAYA ANG LEGAL HEIRS; MYRIAM, APRIL, AND PATRICIA AS ILLEGITIMATE CHILD)
In either scenario, complainant and her husband would still inherit half of Patrick’s estate:
Article 997 – Widow/widower and legitimate parents or ascendants survives. ½ for surviving
spouse while ½ for parents. – first scenario is applicable.
Article 1000 – Legitimate ascendants, surviving spouse, and illegitimate children are left. ½ for
ascendants, ½ divided between surviving spouse and illegitimate children, so ¼ each. – 2nd scenario
is applicable.
DEFENSE: no one dared inform him of April's previous marriage to Neil; it was not his duty to
investigate and make inquiries at the NSO (now PSA); and he merely relied on the information as laid
down by the parties.
It was belied by the fact that Myriam’s incessantly insisted that she and her husband were heirs to
Patrick's estate. They made this clear from the time she first met respondent and reiterated it with
persistent follow ups with respondent. Respondent cannot now feign ignorance thereof.
In addition, records show that respondent eventually married. April's CENOMAR would have indicated
her previous marriages and their duration. Respondent would then have discovered that Patricia was
born during the subsistence of April's rnarriage to Neil and, hence, could not be considered as
Patrick's legitimated offspring. Yet, he did nothing to rectify the Extrajudicial Settlement and continued
to deny complainant and her husband their share in Patrick's estate.

d. YES, Atty. Pangan is exonerated from the charge for dishonesty for lack of merit.
Rule 1.01 of the CPR proscribes dishonesty and deceitful conduct, thus:cralawred
RULE 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Here, complainant claims that respondent committed falsehood when he declared in the
Extrajudicial Settlement that the deceased left no personal properties when in truth and in fact, Patrick
owned 33.65% of Sweetcraft Corporation's outstanding capital stock at the time of his death per the
Corporation's General Information Sheet.
The court disagreed because the provision could have meant that the Extrajudicial Settlement
did not cover Patrick's personal properties which could have been the subject of another settlement,
or in case of disagreement, be the subject of a separate proceeding for such purpose. What is clear is
that the Extrajudicial Settlement prepared by respondent did not include Patrick's personal properties,
nothing more.
While for allegation that Atty. Pangan assisted April in incorporating AMPB Sweetcraft
Corporation in fraud of the other stockholders of Sweetcraft Corporation including complainant. They
allegedly transferred Patrick's share to the new corporation a week before executing the Extrajudicial
Settlement.
However, the document presented by Myriam to substantiate her allegation did not paint a
picture of the anomalies which supposedly attended AMPB Sweetcraft's incorporation nor the alleged
fraudulent transfer of Patrick's shares.
Thus, respondent is exonerated from the charge of dishonesty.
e. YES, Atty. Pangan violated the CPR when he used the document entrusted to him in confidence
by Myriam to file a criminal complaint against her.

Rule 138, Sec. 20 (e)30 mandates the lawyer to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril
to himself, to preserve his client's secrets.

This duty is reiterated in Canon 21, Rules 21.01 and 21.02 of the CPR:
CANON 21 — A lawyer shall preserve the confidences or secrets of his client even after the attorney-
client relation is terminated.

RULE 21.01 A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except:

a) when authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the disclosure;

b) when required by law;

c) when necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates or by judicial
action.

RULE 21.02 A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the
course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person,
unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.

Here, respondent violated the CPR when he charged complainant with falsification using the
documents complainant herself entrusted to him in confidence, which is the Deed of Absolute Sale.

When Atty. Pangan obtained information and received document from the complainant, he was
already bound to protect her interest. Worst, respondent used the documents entrusted to him by
complainant to file a flimsy criminal case for falsification against her on the ground that she allegedly
put her status as "single" when she was still married, although separated de facto.

In so doing, respondent eroded the public's trust and confidence in the legal profession. For he gave
the impression that anything submitted to the lawyer engaged to protect the client's interest may be
used against him or her later on when the lawyer-client relationship shall have turned sour.

f. YES, Atty. Pangan violated the CPR when he used the words “devil”, “with a devil smile”, and “atat
na atat” to describe Myriam in his counter affidavit.

Atty. Pangan's descriptions of complainant in his Counter-Affidavit were offensive

Membership in the Bar imposes upon lawyer's certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of
the legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. Any violation of these
standards exposes them to administrative liability.36 Rule 8.01 of the CPR provides:

RULE 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive
or otherwise improper.

Atty. Pangan's use of the words "devil," "with a devil smile," and "atat na atat" to describe complainant
and her actuations during the meetings held for the preparation and drafting of the Extrajudicial
Settlement of her son's estate fell short of his sworn duty to act with dignity and civility. The use of
these distasteful words in his counter affidavit was uncalled for, to say the least.

A.C. No. 12829 – 1 YEAR SUSPENSION

A.C. No. 12830 - DMONISHED to refrain from using abusive and offensive language in his
pleadings and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.

ADDITION – copy of decision furnished to Office of the Bar Confidant, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and Office of the Court Administrattor

Upon receipt – inform the Office of the Bar Confidant – the receipt reckoning period of his suspension
from the practice of law.
Completion of suspension – submit to the Office of the Bar Confidant the Certifications from the Office
of the Executive Judge of the court where he principally practices his profession and from the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Local Chapter of his affiliation affirming that he had ceased and
desisted from the practice of law during his suspension.
Within 2 weeks from the submission of the certification – Office of Bar Confidant will submit to the
Court.
20. EN BANC Adm. Case No. 1424 October 15, 1991
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE MONTALVO, JR., respondent.

FACTS:
1. Prior to the probate – 1st case the annulment of the sale which was terminated - the same
property subject to probate
2. Complainant Dimagiba filed a case of Probate of Will with the CFI of Bulacan and
subsequently, the will was probated.
3. The oppositors, clients of respondent Atty. Montalvo, appealed the case but the decision of the
Lower court was affirmed.
4. The same parties also filed for annulment of will - dismissed
5. Partition of the same property – dismissed
6. Specific performance - dismissed
7. After the decision of the above-mentioned case was promulgated, the same parties filed
several cases against the complainant through Atty. Montalvo.
8. In view of the numerous cases filed against complainant by the same parties, through their
counsel, Atty. Montalvo, complainant filed a complaint against the latter for Malpractice, for
stretching to almost a half a century a litigation arising from the probate of a will of the late
Benedicta de Los Reyes which instituted complainant as the sole heir of all the properties.

ISSUE: WON respondent Atty. Montalvo should be held liable for Malpractice and violated
CPR?

RULING: YES.
Clearly, the respondent Montalvo, Jr. repetitively filed several complaints in various forms
involving the same parties and the same subject matter, persistently raising issues long laid to rest by
final judgment.

This misbehavior in facie curia consisting of a stubborn refusal to accept this Court's
pronouncements is in fact even summarily punishable under Rule 71, Suction 1 of the Rules of Court.

Any lawyer who assumes the responsibility for a client' cause has the duty to know the entire
history of a case, especially if any litigation has commenced. In the case at bar, even Atty. Montalvo
does not deny the fact that the probate of the will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes has been an
over-extended and contentious litigation between the heirs.

The Code of Professional Responsibility states that:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.03 — A lawyer shall not for any corrupt motive or interest encourage any suit or proceeding or
delay any man's cause.
On the basis of the foregoing, we find him guilty of malpractice as charged. He has violated his oath
not to delay any ma for money or malice, besmirched the name of an honorable profession, and has
proven himself unworthy of the trust repose in him by law as an officer of the Court. We have not
countenanced other less significant infractions among the ranks of our lawyers. He deserves the
severest punishment of DISBARMENT.
21. [ A.C. NO. 1928. AUGUST 03, 1978 ] IN THE MATTER OF THE IBP MEMBERSHIP DUES
DELINQUENCY OF ATTY. MARCIAL A. EDILLON (IBP ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. MDD-1);
CASTRO, C.J.:
Facts:
1. Atty. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. In 1975, the IBP Board of
Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In
the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to
the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn
refusal to pay his membership dues" notwithstanding due notice pursuant to Par. 2, Sec. 24,
Art. III of the By-Laws of the IBP.
2. The argument of respondent the provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in
the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer
in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is
admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions
of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
3. Questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending
that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an
"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."

Issue:
Whether or not a member of the Philippine Bar may be compelled to pay the required membership fee
in IBP.

Held: YES.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as
distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which
is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is
afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to
bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated
Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore,
subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment
of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar and adherence to a
code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason
for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member.
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of
public interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies
the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of
individual lawyers.

Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar
have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an
important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover
clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to
his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most
important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the court. 4 The
practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree
of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme
Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the
equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).

The Court sees nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional
power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the
respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to
pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they
belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise
funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. Such compulsion is justified as a
valid exercise of the police power of the State over an important profession.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.
1 The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to
become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is
unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to
associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of
his constitutional freedom to associate. 6

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a
member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration
actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member. 8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend
the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses.
The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in
order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services,
may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and
beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.9

2 The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a
deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of
a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under
the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its
existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a
matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure
is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and
as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's
public responsibilities.

3 Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a
lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are
indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding
such are legion.

ISSUES ABOUT JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a
lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are
indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding
such are legion.

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194) - "The power to regulate the conduct and
qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power
which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper
administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to
itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations
no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother
member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be
assumed only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and
to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that
the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."

THE RULE 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines – not unconstitutional
nor illegal

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent
Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from
the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
22. [A.C. No. 2614. June 29, 2000.]
MAXIMO DUMADAG, Complainant, v. ATTY. ERNESTO L. LUMAYA, Respondent.; YNARES-
SANTIAGO, J.:

Facts:
1. On the basis of an administrative complaint for Unethical Practices, Conflict of Interest and
Disloyalty to Clients dated December 22, 1983 1 filed by complainant against respondent
praying that the corresponding disciplinary action be imposed on the latter, the case was
referred to Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) by the Court 2 for investigation and report.
2. The OSG submitted a Report 3 finding respondent culpable for infidelity and disloyalty to his
client, negligence of duty, unethical practices and violation of his lawyer’s oath. As penalty, the
OSG recommended that after due hearing, ‘’respondent atty. Lumaya be suspended from the
practice of law for not less than five (5) years."
3. The court found respondent breach of the canons of professional responsibility – suspended
4. Filed a petition for reinvestigation and reconsideration - denied
5. The records show that thereafter, respondent sent a letter Stressing in the said letter that he
was not seeking a reconsideration of the denial of his petition for reinvestigation, respondent
averred in sum that he was a "not very healthy" sixty-two (62) year old who merely wanted to
know how long he would stay suspended and if he was disqualified to be issued a commission
as a notary public considering that his commission was not renewed.
6. Filed a Manifestation where he prayed that the Court issue a resolution or decision that he was
suspended for 1 year, for lack of practicing lawyers and notaries public in the Municipality of
Baganga, Davao Oriental he was constrained to file the manifestation, more than 50% of the
cases that he was handling was still pending and most of the litigants are poor and could not
afford to hire lawyers, advised to secure petitions to be signed by all Barangay Chairman, and
all NGOs to be submitted in SC to lift his indefinite suspension., and if the filling of petition was
necessary to lift the order of his indefinite suspension
7. On July 26, 1994, respondent filed a Petition For The Lifting Of Respondent’s Suspension
From The Practice Of Law which the Court referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for evaluation, report and recommendation in a Resolution dated March 13, 1995.
8. Report and recommendation - the investigating commissioner recommended the lifting of the
indefinite suspension - Board of Governors of the IBP passed resolution adopting such
recommendation.
9. In the letter addressed to the Chief Justice written by him who turned 71 years old – implored
and at the same timed chides the Court for slumbering on acting upon the IBP Resolution to lift
his indefinite suspension, although he still insists of his innocence

Issue: Whether or not the Petition for the lifting of respondents suspension from the practice of law
based from the resolution of IBP should be granted by the court.

Held:
No, the petition should be denied.

The insolence of respondent’s remonstrations that the Court has been sleeping on its job in acting
upon his case not only underscores his callous disregard of the myriad administrative and judicial
travails the Court has to contend with as the Tribunal of Last Resort, among them, the chronic
problem of an overflowing docket of which his case is but one additional aggravation; it also betrays
his absolute lack of appreciation and disrespect for the efforts and measures undertaken by the Court
to cope with these concerns. Needless to state, such presumptuousness is only too deserving of
rebuke.

Respondent must know that the Court is neither bound by the findings of the IBP nor, much less,
obliged to accept the same as a matter of course because as the Tribunal which has the final say on
the proper sanctions to be imposed on errant members of both bench and bar, the Court has the
prerogative of making its own findings and rendering judgment on the basis thereof rather than that of
the IBP, OSG, or any lower court to whom an administrative complaint has been referred to for
investigation and report. Indeed, Sections 1, 14, 15, 16 and 17 of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of
Court state that:

SECTION 1. How instituted. — Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys
may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts
complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts
therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.

The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a
Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges
against any erring attorneys including those in the government service; Provided, however, that all
charges against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, and Judges of the Court of
Tax Appeals and lower courts, even if lawyers are charged with them, shall be filed with the Supreme
Court; Provided, further, that charges filed against Justices and Judges before the IBP, including those
filed prior to their appointment in the Judiciary, shall immediately be forwarded to the Supreme Court
for disposition and adjudication.

Six (6) copies of the verified complaint shall be filed with the Secretary of the IBP or the Secretary of
any of its chapters who shall forthwith transmit the same to the IBP Board of Governors for
assignment to an investigator. 19

SECTION 14. Report of the Solicitor General or other Court designated Investigator. — Based upon
the evidence adduced at the investigation, the Solicitor General or other Investigator designated by
the Supreme Court shall submit to the Supreme Court a report containing his findings of fact and
recommendations together with the record and all the evidence presented in the investigation for the
final action of the Supreme Court.

SECTION 15. Suspension of attorney by Supreme Court. — After receipt of respondent’s answer or
lapse of the period therefor, the Supreme Court, motu proprio, or at the instance of the IBP Board of
Governors upon the recommendation of the Investigators, may suspend an attorney from the practice
of his profession for any of the causes specified in Rule 138, Section 27, during the pendency of the
investigation until such suspension is lifted by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied)

SECTION 16. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court. — The Court
of Appeals or Regional Trial Court may suspend an attorney from practice of any of the causes named
in Rule 138, Section 27, until further action of the Supreme Court in the case.

SECTION 17. Upon suspension by Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court, further proceedings in
Supreme Court. — Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court shall
forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full
statement of the facts upon which the same was based. Upon receipt of such certified copy and
statement, the Supreme Court shall make full investigation of the case and may revoke, shorten or
extend the suspension, or disbar the attorney as the facts may warrant. (Emphasis supplied)

For all respondent’s protestations to the contrary, the Court is hardly convinced of his innocence for
his culpability has been established and aptly adjudicated upon. While the harshness of an indefinite
suspension, more so when viewed in the light of the prevailing circumstances of this case, can not be
gainsaid, it must be stressed that —

The indefiniteness of respondent’s suspension, far from being "cruel" or "degrading" or "inhuman" has
the effect of placing, as it were, the key to the restoration of his rights and privileges as a lawyer in his
own hands. That sanction has the effect of giving respondent the chance to purge himself in his own
good time of his contempt and misconduct by acknowledging such misconduct, exhibiting appropriate
repentance and demonstrating his willingness and capacity to live up to the exacting standards of
conduct rightly demanded from every member of the bar and officer of the courts.

Respondent’s suspension for more than nine (9) years to date, for his professional indiscretion,
underscored by his insistent protestations of innocence, appears not to have fully reformed him and
opened his eyes to the error of his ways. Such an unrepentant attitude and unwillingness to
acknowledge his misconduct puts his fitness for re-admission to the practice of law under serious
inquiry. Respondent must always remember that —

[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of
mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of
the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar
and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession,
has ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority to discipline its members is not only a
right but a bounden duty as well . . . That is why respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its
members.

As has been stated earlier, the indefiniteness of respondent’s suspension puts in his hands the key for
the restoration of his rights and privileges as a lawyer. Until such time as he has purged himself of his
misconduct and acknowledged the same by exhibiting appropriate repentance and demonstrating his
willingness and capacity to live up to the exacting standards of conduct demanded from every
member of the bar and officer of the court, respondent’s suspension must deservingly be fixed at ten
(10) years. Consequently, the same may only be lifted after the expiration of the said period, counted
from the time when his suspension actually commenced.

- SUSPENDED FOR 10 YRS – PETITION DENIED

23. FERNANDO T. COLLANTES, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. VICENTE C. RENOMERON,
RESPONDENT.
FACTS:
1. On January 15, 1987, V & G had requested the respondent Register of Deeds to register
some 163 deeds of sale with assignment (in favor of the GSIS) of lots of the V & G mortgaged
to GSIS by the lot buyers. There was no action from the respondent.
2. Another request was made on February 16, 1987 for him to approve or deny registration of the
uniform deeds of absolute sale with assignment. Still no action, except to require V & G to
submit proof of real estate tax payment and to clarify certain details about the transactions.
3. Although V & G complied with the desired requirements, respondent Renomeron suspended
the registration of the documents pending compliance by V & G with a certain "special
arrangement" between them, which was that V & G should provide him with a weekly round
trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip, or, in lieu thereof,
the sale of respondent's Quezon City house and lot by V & G or GSIS representatives.
4. On May 19, 1987, respondent confided to the complainant that he would act favorably on the
163 registrable documents of V & G if the latter would execute clarificatory affidavits and send
money for a round trip plane ticket for him.
5. The plane fare amounting to P800 (without the pocket money of P2,000) was sent to
respondent through his niece.
6. Because of V & G's failure to give him pocket money in addition to plane fare, respondent
imposed additional registration requirements. Fed up with the respondent's extortionate
tactics, the complainant wrote him a letter on May 20, 1987 challenging him to act on all
pending applications for registration of V & G within twenty-four (24) hours.
7. The respondent formally denied registration of the transfer of 163 certificates of title to the
GSIS on the uniform ground that the deeds of absolute sale with assignment were ambiguous
as to parties and subject matter.
8. On May 26, 1987, Attorney Collantes moved for a reconsideration of said denial.
9. The respondent elevated the matter to the Administrator, National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration (NLTDRA) (now the Land Registration Authority [LRA]). In a
Resolution, the NLTDRA ruled that the questioned documents were registrable. Heedless of
the NLTDRA's opinion, respondent continued to sit on V & G's 163 deeds of sale with
assignment.
10. Exasperated by respondent’s conduct, the complainant filed with NLRDRA administrative
charges against respondent RD.
11. The administrator directed him to explain in writing why no administrative disciplinary action
should be taken against him.
12. Respondent denied the charges of extortion and of directly receiving pecuniary or material
benefit for himself in connection with the official transactions awaiting his action.
13. Secretary of Justice found him guilty of grave misconduct. - investigation found that
respondent unreasonably delayed action on the documents presented to him for registration,
Administrator then resolved in favor of the registrability of the said documents in question; and
that, such resolution of the Administrator notwithstanding, the respondent still refused the
registration In relation to the alleged 'special arrangement,' although the respondent claims
that he neither touched nor received the money sent to him on record remains uncontroverted
the circumstance that his niece, Ms. de la Cruz, retrieved from him the amount of P800.00
earlier sent to him as plane fare, not in the original denomination of P100.00 bills but in P50.00
bills. The respondent had ample opportunity to clarify or to countervail this related incident.

, the respondent's being new in office cannot serve to mitigate his liability. His being so should
have motivated him to be more aware of applicable laws, rules and regulations and should
have prompted him to do his best in the discharge of his duties.

14. Secretary recommended to dismiss him – Pres Aquino dismissed him.

ISSUE:
The issue in this disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent register of deeds, as a lawyer,
may also be disciplined by this Court for his malfeasances as a public official.

RULING:
The Court held yes, for his misconduct as a public official also constituted a violation of his oath as a
lawyer.

The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court: People vs. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968), imposes
upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his
obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action.

The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in the discharge of
their official tasks (Canon 6). Just as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials requires public officials and employees to process documents and papers expeditiously
(Sec. 5, subpars. [c] and [d] and prohibits them from directly or indirectly having a financial or material
interest in any transaction requiring the approval of their office, and likewise bars them from soliciting
gifts or anything of monetary value in the course of any transaction which may be affected by the
functions of their office (See. 7, subpars. [a] and [d]), the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids a
lawyer to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of
Professional Responsibility), or delay any man's cause "for any corrupt motive or interest" (Rule 103).

A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession. (Rule 7.03, Code of Professional Responsibility.)

The Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and reliable" may practice the
profession of law (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer must pursue "only the highest
standards in the practice of his calling"

The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron committed as a public official have
demonstrated his unfitness to practice the high and noble calling of the law (Bautista vs. Judge
Guevarra, 142 SCRA 632; Court Administrator vs. Rodolfo G. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269). He should
therefore be disbarred.

THEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron be disbarred from the
practice of law in the Philippines, and that his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
24. A.C. No. 4334 July 7, 2004
SUSAN CUIZON, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RODOLFO MACALINO, respondent.
FACTS:
1. This administrative case against respondent Atty. Rodolfo Macalino was initiated by a letter-
complaint dated October 27, 1994 filed by Susan Cuizon with the Office of the Court
Administrator charging the respondent with Grave Misconduct.
2. The legal services of the respondent was sought by the complainant in behalf of her husband
Antolin Cuizon who was convicted for Violation of Dangerous Drug Act of 1972. When the
spouses had no sufficient means to pay the legal fees, the respondent suggested that he be
given possession of complainant's Mistubishi car, which was delivered to the respondent.
3. Later respondent offered to buy the car for Eighty Five Thousand Pesos (P85,000.00) for
which he paid a down payment of Twenty Four Thousand Pesos (P24,000.00). After the sale
of the car, respondent failed to attend to the case of Antolin Cuizon, so complainant was
forced to engage the services of another lawyer.
4. The respondent was required to comment on the complaint and later was ordered to show
cause why he should not be meted with disciplinary action or declared in contempt for failure
to comply with the order of the court. However, he failed to comply and he was fined for five
hundred pesos.
5. He paid the fine, however he failed to fully comply with the order of the court.
6. The Supreme Court received a letter from Antolin Cuizon informing that the respondent
issued a check against a closed account.
7. The SC issued a resolution increasing the fine to P 1,000.00 and again the order requiring
the respondent to file his comment was reiterated. However, he failed again to comply.
8. The SC issued a warrant of arrest and the NBI rendered a report and return of the service
of warrant of arrest indicating that the respondent is no longer residing at his given
address.
9. The court requests for the correct and present address of the respondent and the complainant
reported that he had not changed his residence and the respondent comes home at midnight
and leaves at dawn.
10. The Court found the respondent guilty of contempt of court and ordered his imprisonment. The
Court likewise declared the respondent to have waived his right to file his comment on the
administrative complaint and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
11. The Investigating Commissioner finds the respondent unfit to remain a member of the Bar and
recommending that he be disbarred. The IBP adopted the report and recommendation
modifying that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for 3 years.
12. The Court resolved to return the case to the IPB and remanded further investigation. The
Investigating Commissioner still recommended the disbarment of the said lawyer and the IBP
modified it to suspension of 5 years from practice of law.
ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Rodolfo Macalinao can be disbarred from office?
RULING:
Yes.

It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may
wish to become his client. However, once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes
fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He
must serve his client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with whole-
hearted fidelity. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who
undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion.

In the instant case, after agreeing to represent the complainant's husband, taking possession of their
car and persuading the complainant to sell the same to him for a nominal amount, the respondent
refused to carry out his duties as counsel prompting the complainant to secure the services of another
lawyer to defend her husband. The respondent clearly breached his obligation under Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: A lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

The respondent's infraction is compounded by the fact that he issued a check in favor of the
complainant's husband which was later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account.
Such conduct indicates the respondent's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him,
shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public
confidence and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.

The fact that the respondent went into hiding in order to avoid service upon him of the warrant of
arrest issued by the Court exacerbates his offense. By his repeated cavalier conduct, the respondent
exhibited an unpardonable lack of respect for the authority of the Court.

As an officer of the court, it is a lawyer's duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court. The
highest form of respect for judicial authority is shown by a lawyer's obedience to court orders and
processes. A lawyer who willfully disobeys a court order requiring him to do something may not only
be cited and punished for contempt but may also be disciplined as an officer of the court.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that:

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct,
or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The foregoing acts of the respondent constitute gross misconduct which renders him unfit to
discharge the duties of his office and unworthy of the trust and confidence reposed on him as an
officer of the court.

WHEREFORE, respondent Rodolfo Macalino is hereby DISBARRED. Let a copy of this decision be
attached to the respondent's personal records and furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
all courts in the country.
25. EMILIO GRANDE, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA, Respondent.
A.C. No. 4838 July 29, 2003
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS:
1. Complainant Emilio Grande was the private offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1346
to 96-1353, filed with RTC Marikina, for Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22,
entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff versus Sergio Natividad, Accused."
2. During the proceedings, respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva, counsel for the accused,
tendered to complainant Check No. 0023638 in the amount of P144,768.00, drawn against
her account with the Philippine National Bank, as settlement of the civil aspect of the case
against her client.
3. Complainant refused to accept the check, but respondent assured him that the same will be
paid upon its presentment to her drawee bank. She manifested that as a lawyer, she would
not issue a check which is not sufficiently funded. Thus, respondent was prevailed upon by
complainant to accept the check. Consequently, he desisted from participating as a
complaining witness in the criminal case, which led to the dismissal of the same and the
release of the accused, Sergio Natividad.
4. When complainant deposited the check, the same was returned unpaid by the drawee bank
for the reason: "Account Closed.".
5. Complainant wrote a letter to respondent demanding that she pay the face value of the check.
However, his demand was ignored by respondent; hence, he instituted a criminal complaint
against her for Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
6. On November 10, 1997, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint for
disbarment of respondent for deceit and violation of the Lawyer’s Oath.
7. In a Resolution dated February 2, 1998 sent to respondent’s given address at Carmelo
Compound, Newton Avenue, Mayamot, Antipolo City, she was required to comment on the
complaint within ten (10) days from notice. However, it was returned unserved with the
notation "Moved". The Assistant National Secretary of the IBP submitted the latest address
of respondent as 274 M.H. Del Pilar Street, Pasig City.
8. Thereafter, another resolution requiring respondent to comment on the administrative
complaint filed against her was served at the aforesaid address. This was again returned
unserved with the notation: "Refused". Thus, the case was referred to the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) for investigation, report and recommendation.
9. Investigating Commissioner Florimond C. Rous found respondent guilty of deceit, gross
misconduct and violation of the Lawyer’s Oath. Thus, he recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.
10. The IBP Board of Governors adopted the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.

ISSUE:
1. Whether respondent’s act of issuing a bouncing check amounted to deceit and constituted a
violation of her oath
2. Whether respondent’s persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders directed at her with not
even an explanation for doing so violates Canon 1 of the CPR

RULING:

1. Yes. The record shows that respondent prevailed upon complainant to accept her personal check
by way of settlement for the civil liability of her client, Sergio Natividad, with the assurance that the
check will have sufficient funds when presented for payment. In doing so, she deceived complainant
into withdrawing his complaint against her client in exchange for a check which she drew
against a closed account.

It is clear that the breach of trust committed by respondent in issuing a bouncing check
amounted to deceit and constituted a violation of her oath, for which she should be accordingly
penalized.8 Such an act constitutes gross misconduct and the penalties for such malfeasance is
prescribed by Rule 138, Section 27of the Rules of Court, to wit:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore. – A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he
is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney
for a party without authority to do so.

The nature of the office of an attorney requires that a lawyer shall be a person of good moral
character. Since this qualification is a condition precedent to a license to enter upon the practice of
law, the maintenance thereof is equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the
exercise of the privilege. Gross misconduct which puts the lawyer’s moral character in serious
doubt may render her unfit to continue in the practice of law.

The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any reason whatsoever shall warrant her suspension or
disbarment because it is important that members of the legal brotherhood must conform to the
highest standards of morality. Any wrongdoing which indicates moral unfitness for the profession,
whether it be professional or non-professional, justifies disciplinary action. Thus, a lawyer may be
disciplined for evading payment of a debt validly incurred. Such conduct is unbecoming and does not
speak well of a member of the bar, for a lawyer’s professional and personal conduct must at all
times be kept beyond reproach and above suspicion.

2.Yes.

The attitude of respondent in deliberately refusing to accept the notices served on her betrays a
deplorably willful character or disposition which stains the nobility of the legal profession. Her
conduct not only underscores her utter lack of respect for authority; it also brings to the fore a
darker and more sinister character flaw in her psyche which renders highly questionable her moral
fitness to continue in the practice of law: a defiance for law and order which is at the very core of her
profession.

Such defiance is anathema to those who seek a career in the administration of justice because
obedience to the dictates of the law and justice is demanded of every lawyer. How else would
respondent even endeavor to serve justice and uphold the law when she disdains to follow even
simple directives? Indeed, the first and foremost command of the Code of Professional Responsibility
could not be any clearer:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.

Needless to state, respondent’s persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders directed at her with
not even an explanation for doing so is contumacious conduct which merits no compassion.
The duty of a lawyer is to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession at all times. She can
only do this by faithfully performing her duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to her clients.
We can not tolerate any misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair name of an honorable profession.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA is

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Two (2) Years, effective upon receipt
hereof.
26. MILAGROS N. ALDOVINO, VIRGILIO NICODEMUS, ANGELA N. DELA CRUZ, JULITA N.
SOCO, MAGDALENA N. TALENS and TEODORO S. NICODEMUS, complainants
vs.
ATTY. PEDRO C. PUJALTE, JR., respondent.
A.C. No. 5082 February 17, 2004
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

FACTS:
1. This is a complaint for disbarment and/or disciplinary action against Atty. Pedro C.
Pujalte, Jr. filed by Milagros Nicodemus-Aldovino, Virgilio Nicodemus, Angela Nicodemus-dela
Cruz, Julita Nicodemus-Soco, Magdalena Nicodemus-Talens and Teodoro S. Nicodemus for
violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
2. Complainants alleged in their complaint that they are brothers and sisters and heirs of
Arcadia Nicodemus.
3. Sometime in March, 1995, they hired the services of respondent Atty. Pujalte, Jr. as their
counsel in a suit for specific performance with damages to compel their sister, Loreto
Nicodemus Pulumbarit, to deliver to them their shares in the estate of their deceased
mother.
4. The trial court ruled in favor of Loreto Pulumbarit and accordingly ordered the dismissal of
the case and for the Branch Clerk of Court to withdraw from Savings Account No.
435-527745-9 at PNB and to deliver the proceeds to all the heirs of Arcadia Nicodemus
upon proper receipt. Both counsels are directed to oversee the distribution and for them to
jointly file their manifestation on the matter.
5. In the presence of defendant Mrs. Loreto N. Pulumbarit and respondent counsel, the
Branch Clerk of Court divided the withdrawn amount into eight shares of P166,888.71
each. He gave the defendant two shares. Then he handed the remaining amount of
P1,001,332.26, corresponding to six shares, to respondent upon his representation that he
is authorized to receive the money and to oversee the distribution to complainants of
their respective shares.
6. However, complainants did not receive their shares from respondent despite repeated
demands. Thus, they engaged the services of Atty. Francisco I. Chavez who, on
December 17, 1998, sent a letter to respondent demanding that the amount of P1,001,332.26
entrusted to him by the Branch Clerk of Court be turned over to complainants.
7. What respondent delivered to herein complainants was only P751,332.26, instead of
P1,001,332.26 because he deducted P250,000.00 therefrom. He claimed that this amount is
his attorney’s fees per his agreement with Milagros Aldovino, complainants’
representative.
8. On February 23, 1999, Atty. Chavez again wired respondent demanding that he return to
complainants the amount of P236,000.00. As explained by Atty. Chavez in his telegram,
respondent could retain only P14,000.00 (not P250,000.00), which amount is in addition to
the P86,000.00 initially paid to him by complainants as his attorney’s fees. According to
complainants, the sum of P100,000.00 (P86,000.00 plus P14,000.00) is more than the
amount of attorney’s fees agreed upon by the parties. Still, respondent failed to return to
complainants the amount of P236,000.00, which is the balance after deducting P14,000.00
from P250,000.00.
9. In his comment dated September 3, 1999, respondent admitted that he received from the
Branch Clerk of Court "P1,335,109.68" representing complainants’ shares. Thereafter, he
waited for complainants Virgilio and Teodoro Nicodemus and Engr. Isidro Aureada at the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Quezon where he had a hearing, but they did not come.
10. To disprove deceit on his part, he attached to his comment his letter dated December 2,
1998 to Engr. Isidro Aureada informing the latter that he waited for those complainants in
order to give them the money.
 11. Respondent claimed that there is a verbal agreement between him and Milagros Aldovino,
representative of complainants, that they will pay him P250,000.00 as his attorney’s fees.
Consequently, he deducted and retained this amount from the money delivered to him by the
Branch Clerk of Court. At any rate, he wrote to complainants regarding this matter.
12. The IBP Commissioner made the following findings and recommendation: In the case at bar,
after respondent got hold of the entire settlement amount, he did not immediately turn
over the said amount to the complainants who had to look and search for him. It was
only when respondent was threatened with a legal action (Estafa, docketed as Grim. Case No.
99-1017, RTC Br. 58, Lucena City) that he decided to return the balance of the settlement
amount but after deducting P250,000.00 which he claims to be his attorney’s fees. We find
respondent to have violated Canon 16 and 16.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommends that he be suspended for the period of one (1) year from the
practice of his profession as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar."
13. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report of IBP Commissioner.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent violated Canon 16 and 16.03 of the CPR

RULING:

Yes.
We sustain the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors finding that respondent violated Canon 16,
Code of Professional Responsibility and suspending him from the practice of law for one (1) year.

Canon 16 and its Rule 16.03 provide:

"CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

"x x x x x x x x x

"Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.
However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to
satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also
have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as
provided for in the Rules of Court."

Respondent should have complied with the above provisions. When complainants demanded that the
sum of P1,001,332.26 be delivered to them, he should have heeded promptly. Had they not hired a
lawyer and charged him with estafa, he would not have turned over the money to them. While it may
be true that he has "a lien over the funds," he should have notified complainants about it in due time.

Respondent has no right to retain or appropriate unilaterally as lawyer’s lien, the sum of
P250,000.00. As found by IBP Commissioner Maala, there was no agreement between him and
complainants that he could retain P250,000.00 as attorney’s fees. In fact, he did not adduce any proof
of such agreement. His mere allegation or claim is not proof. Obviously, his failure to return the money
to complainants upon demand gave rise to the presumption that he misappropriated it in violation of
the trust reposed on him. His act of holding on to their money without their acquiescence is conduct
indicative of lack of, integrity and propriety.9 He was clinging to something not his and to which he had
no right.
This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of members of the
Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in
the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Membership in the legal profession is a
privilege. And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and
confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him
one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.
Respondent, by his conduct, blemished not only his integrity as a member of the Bar, but also that of
the legal profession.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pedro C. Pujalte, Jr. is hereby declared guilty of violation of
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year effective immediately. He is ordered to return the sum of
P236,000.00 to complainants within five (5) days from notice.
27. [A.C. NO. 5315. AUGUST 23, 2000 ] MODESTO
CUNANAN, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. REX C. RIMORIN,
RESPONDENT
Facts:
1. Complainant Cunanan, a retired U.S. citizen, engaged the professional services of Atty.
Rimorin, respondent, as a lawyer in the matter of settling his “overstaying alien status” (in
the Philippines) with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID for brevity) so that he
could attend to the funeral and burial needs of his son, Andrew Phillip Cunanan, in the
United States. The complainant verbally agreed to pay the respondent a professional fee
of P40,000.00 out of the P200,000.00 commitment of the ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation
(ABS-CBN for brevity). Initially, however, complainant gave to the respondent the sum of
P2,500.00 for his expenses.
2. There was an agreement entered into between complainant Cunanan assisted by his counsel,
respondent herein, and ABS-CBN represented by Noli De Castro regarding the story of
his son who died in the US in which ABS-CBN agreed to pay to complainant a sum of money
in exchange of an exclusive interview with him.
3. For the 1st partial payment, NOLI acting in behalf of ABS-CBN, issued a check for
P100,000 payable to ATTY RIMORIN. To complete the payment, ABS-CBN deposited the
balance of P100,000 in the bank account of ATTY RIMORIN
4. According to the affidavit of NOLI, the two payments were intended for CUNANAN.
5. Complainant Cunanan testified that the balance of P200,000 was intended for the payment to
the BID of his penalty for overstaying, as an alien and for his plane ticket.
6. Counter-affidavit - the complainant assured him, prior to the said interview conducted by ABS-
CBN in his law office, that the amount to be given as consideration for the interview of
complainant would be split between the two of them. Admitted that Noli gave him 100,000 and
deposited another 100,000
7. ATTY RIMORIN sent a letter to CUNANAN stating “due to rains there is no way of checking
whether the check deposited by ABS-CBN has been cleared…I’ll try my very best to produce
the other P30,000 today” CUNANAN indeed received P30,000 but after that there was no
more communication from ATTY RIMORIN.
8. Hence, complainant Cunanan filed the present administrative case with the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline praying for the disbarment of the respondent for swindling him and for failing
to render any accounting of the P200,000.00 which respondent received, in trust for the
Complainant, from ABS-CBN represented by Noli de Castro.
9. In his answer, he stated that the Affidavit-Complaint which Cunanan filed with the IBP
Comission which Cunanan filed with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline is exactly the same
Affidavit-Complaint which he filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor wherein complainant
charged the respondent with Estafa. Hence, respondent prays that the present administrative
complaint against him be also dismissed.
10. In hearing of Administrative case before the IBP Commission, only complainant and his
counsel appeared.
Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Rimorin violated Canon 16 and Canon 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Ruling: Yes

We agree with the said finding of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline that there is a need for an
appropriate accounting. The highly fiduciary and confidential relation of attorney and client require that
respondent lawyer should promptly account for the said funds which he received and held for the
benefit of his client, the herein complainant. That is because those funds properly belong to the client.

The client has the right to know how the funds were applied, used or disbursed by his counsel. A
lawyer should always keep in mind the welfare and interest of his client.
From the time of the filing of the present administrative complaint on January 9, 1998 and up to the
present, complainant’s demand for an accounting has not been satisfied by Respondent. This case
has been set for hearing for over a year but respondent has not given any indication that he would
render the accounting of funds as demanded by the complainant. The Answer of the respondent does
not show how the P200,000.00 which was delivered to respondent, in trust for the complainant, by
Noli de Castro representing ABS-CBN, was used. Complainant claims that except for the P30,000.00
cash given to him, respondent "fraudulently embezzled the funds." However, there is nothing in the
record to show how the balance of P170,000.00 was applied or used, if it was used at all, by the
respondent for the benefit of the complainant.

It is established that those funds amounting to a total of P200,000.00 were received by respondent for
the benefit of and in trust for the complainant, as corroborated by Noli de Castro of ABS-CBN in his
Affidavit. Complainant is entitled to know how the funds were used and applied. In the case at bar,
there is no evidence to show how the funds were used and applied by respondent. It is clear,
therefore, that respondent has fallen short of his duty as a lawyer under Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Hence, respondent should be penalized accordingly.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for one (1) year. He is also hereby ordered to render, within twenty (20) days from notice hereof, an
accounting of the P170,000.00 representing the balance of the sum of P200,000.00 which he
received, in trust for complainant Modesto Cunanan, from ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation.
28. [ A.C. NO. 5359. MARCH 10, 2014 ] ERMELINDA LAD VDA.
DE DOMINGUEZ, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-INFACT, VICENTE A. PICHON,
COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ARNULFO M. AGLERON, SR., RESPONDENT. – Third Division
Facts:
1. Complainant Ermelinda Lad Vda. De Dominguez (complainant) was the widow of the late
Felipe Domiguez who died in a vehicular accident in Caraga, Davao Oriental involving a
dump truck owned by the Municipality of Caraga.
2. Aggrieved, complainant decided to file charges against the Municipality of Caraga and
engaged the services of respondent Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron, Sr. (Atty. Agleron).
3. On three (3) occasions, Atty. Agleron requested and received from complainant a sum
of money. After the lapse of four (4) years, however, no complaint was filed by Atty.
Agleron against the Municipality of Caraga.
4. Atty. Agleron admitted that complainant engaged his professional service and received the
amount of P10,050.00. He, however, explained that their agreement was that complainant
would pay the filing fees and other incidental expenses and as soon as the complaint
was prepared and ready for filing, complainant would pay 30% of the agreed attorney’s
fees of P100,000.00.
5. After the signing of the complaint, he advised complainant to pay in full the amount of the
filing fee and sheriff’s fees and the 30% of the attorney’s fee, but complainant failed to do
so. Atty. Agleron averred that since the complaint could not be filed in court, the amount of
P10,050.00 was deposited in a bank while awaiting the payment of the balance of the filing
fee and attorney’s fee.
6. Complainant denied that she did not give the full payment of the filing fee and asserted
that the filing fee at that time amounted only to P7,836.60.
7. In the Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Agleron to
have violated the Code of Professional Responsibility when he neglected a legal matter
entrusted to him, and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of four (4) months.
8. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner with modification that Atty. Agleron be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of only one (1) month.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Agleron violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Ruling: Yes
Atty. Agleron violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that: Rule
18.03—A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable. Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty bound to
serve his client with competence, and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion
regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.
As stated, every case that is entrusted to a lawyer deserves his full attention whether he
accepts this for a fee or free. Even assuming that complainant had not remitted the full payment of
the filing fee, he should have found a way to speak to his client and inform him about the
insufficiency of the filing fee so he could file the complaint. Atty. Agleron obviously lacked
professionalism in dealing with complainant and showed incompetence when he failed to file
the appropriate charges.
In a number of cases, the Court held that a lawyer should never neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, otherwise his negligence renders him liable for disciplinary action such as suspension
ranging from three months to two years. In this case, the Court finds the suspension of Atty.
Agleron from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months sufficient.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accordingly, respondent ATTY. ARNULFO M. AGLERON, SR. is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS, with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same or similar wrongdoing will be dealt with more severely.
29. [ A.C. NO. 5454. NOVEMBER 23, 2004 ] CARMELINA Y. RANGWANI, COMPLAINANT, VS.
ATTY. RAMON S. DIÑO, RESPONDENT. – Second Division

Facts:
1. Rangwani alleged that sometime in the years 1995 to 1996, Atty. Diño befriended her. Owing
to his status in the community as a good lawyer and businessman, respondent was able to
convince the complainant to part with her title to a parcel of land located in Dasmariñas, Cavite
2. After the lapse of 5 months, complainant demanded the return of her title from respondent who
promised to return the same but failed to do so.
3. After ten months, respondent was nowhere to be found.
4. Complainant, with the help of an informer, was able to locate respondent who turned out to
have transferred his residence to Makati City.
5. Upon confrontation, respondent retorted that he could not give back the title to the land.
Instead, he offered to buy the property. Thus, he issued the checks to complainant.
6. When deposited, all checks bounced for a reason “closed account”
7. Complainant filed Criminal Cases against the respondent.
8. The court issued a resolution requiring the respondent to comment thereon on the complaint.
9.

An admin complaint was filed against Atty. Diño for:

- borrowing Complainant’s title to the land
- his presumed use of the said title for his personal gain
- his failure to return the same despite repeated demands and
- his issuance of three checks in exchange for the said land title which bounced

Respondent:
Respondent filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to Admit Comment and for a Formal Hearing.
In this motion, he bared that the Court's resolution requiring him to comment was sent to his parents'
residence. He claimed he has been living for the past two years in a rented house at Signal Village,
Taguig, Metro Manila, and has been in the province for the last three weeks attending to business
concerns
Said he was not aware that a disbarment complaint has been filed against him. While he admitted that
there were cases previously filed by complainant against him, said cases had already been withdrawn
and the corresponding desistance, waiver and quitclaim had been signed by her and that complainant
had in fact "received (already) the monetary claims or their equivalent involving said cases.
Respondent was, therefore, under the belief that all those cases had been dismissed. Hence,
he said, he was unaware that warrants for his arrest were issued. He had been a lawyer for the past
twenty-three years and this is the first and only case filed against him before the Court and in the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). He was a working student who took various jobs at the early
age of seventeen. He took the 1977 bar exams and landed No. 13 with an average of 88.88%. He
said his title as a lawyer and his license to practice are the only legacies he can leave to his
children; hence, he prays that he be given the chance to be heard formally to be able to air his
side.

Complainant:
Filed her counter-affidavit disputing her alleged withdrawal of this complaint and the denial by the
respondent of the standing warrants of arrest against him arising out of the incident in question.

Later on, Complainant submitted a letter to the IBP withdrawing the complaint she filed against
respondent, stating that "after much reflection and recall of the antecedent facts that led to the
filing of the complaint, I have finally decided to withdraw the same as it arose purely out of
misunderstanding and miscommunication and definitely not warranting any disciplinary action
much less disbarment and apologize for whatever inconvenience the complaint had cause[d] the
office."

However, on October of 2002 complainant submitted to the IBP a motion to hold and to quash
withdrawal.
According to complainant, respondent begged her to dismiss the administrative complaint she filed
and promised to settle his obligations with her. It was only for this reason that she agreed to sign a
written withdrawal of her complaint. This was, however, a mere promise which remained
unfulfilled.

Not very long after, on 25 October 2002, complainant AGAIN filed before the IBP a Motion to Dismiss
Complaint. To convince the IBP that the case should be dismissed complainant likewise claimed that
respondent had no more obligation to her because the same had been offset by legal services
rendered by the latter after an accounting was taken

IBP:
Stated that because of complainant's failure to appear and affirm her Affidavit of Desistance
despite several hearings set by the Commission, it now considered the cases submitted for report
and recommendation and to be decided on the merits thereof.
IBP Recommended suspension for six months.

Issues:
1. Whether investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of complainant’s withdrawal?
2. Whether complainant violated CPR?

Ruling:
1. No, Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:
No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement,
compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same.

The withdrawal of a complaint for lack of interest of a complainant does not necessarily warrant the
dismissal of an administrative complaint (Dagsa-an v. Conag, 290 SCRA 12 [1998]). The Court
cannot be bound by the unilateral decision of a complainant to desist from prosecuting a case
involving the discipline of parties subject to its administrative supervision (Zamora v. Jumamoy,
238 SCRA 587 [1994]). The need to maintain the faith and confidence of our people in the
government and its agencies and instrumentalities demands that proceedings in administrative cases
against public officers and employees should not be made to depend on the whims and caprices
of complainants who are, in a real sense, only witnesses

2. Yes respondent violated Canon 7,15 and 16 (16.04)

Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a
client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter
he is handling for the client.

Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer should observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client

Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers at all times to uphold the
dignity and integrity of the legal profession.

As to Penalty:
The Court took into account that it was the lawyer’s first time to that a complaint of this nature has
been filed against the respondent.

Sanction:
Atty. Ramon S. Diño is found guilty of GROSS MISCONDUCT
and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely
30. [ A.C. NO. 5485. MARCH 16, 2005 ] ELMER CANOY, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JOSE MAX
ORTIZ, RESPONDENT. – Second Division

Facts:
A lawyer virtually abandoning the cause of the client in the midst of litigation without even informing
the client of the fact of desertion. That the lawyer forsook his legal practice on account of what might
be perceived as a higher calling, election to public office, does not mitigate the dereliction of
professional duty.
(2001) Complainant accused respondent of misconduct and malpractice for failing to submit
Complainant’s position paper for a case against his Employer.

Complainant
Canoy alleged that Atty. Ortiz had never communicated to him about the status of the case, much
less the fact that he failed to submit the position paper.
Complainant was shocked to learn that his complaint was actually dismissed way back in 1998, for
failure to prosecute, the parties not having submitted their position papers.

Canoy was among those low-income clients.

Respondent
Atty. Ortiz claims having prepared the position paper of Canoy, but before he could submit the
same, the Labor Arbiter had already issued the order dismissing the case

Atty. Ortiz admits though that the period within which to file the position paper had already lapsed. He
attributes this failure to timely file the position paper to the fact that after his election as
Councilor of Bacolod City, "he was frankly preoccupied with both his functions as a local
government official and as a practicing lawyer." Eventually, "his desire to help was beyond physical
limitations," and he withdrew from his other cases and his "free legal services."

He states that it was his policy to inform clients that they should be the ones to follow-up their
cases with his office, as it would be "too difficult and a financial burden to attend making
follow-ups with hundreds of clients, mostly indigents" with only two office personnel.

Canoy eventually submitted a motion withdrawing the complaint, but this was not favorably acted
upon by the IBP in view of the rule that the investigation of a case shall not be interrupted or
terminated by reason of withdrawal of the charges.

IBP: Recommended that complainant be reprimanded with stern warning

ISSUE: Did respondent violated CPR?

Ruling: YES

Sanction: SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month from notice, with the
warning that a repetition of the same negligence will be dealt with more severely

Violations:
CANON 17–A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18–A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03–A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04–A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client's request for information.

CANON 22–A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON
NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

SC:
Atty. Ortiz should have filed the position paper on time, owing to his duty as counsel of Canoy to
attend to this legal matter entrusted to him.

His failure to do so constitutes a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and
diligence and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion.

If indeed Atty. Ortiz's schedule, workload, or physical condition was such that he would not be able to
make a timely filing, he should have informed Canoy of such fact.
The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for the client
to be adequately and fully informed of the developments of the case and should not be left in the dark
as to the mode and manner in which his/her interests are being defended.

The Code of Professional Responsibility does allow a lawyer to withdraw his legal services if
the lawyer is elected or appointed to a public office.19 Statutes expressly prohibit the occupant of
particular public offices from engaging in the practice of law, such as governors and mayors,20 and in
such instance, the attorney-client relationship is terminated.21 However, city councilors are allowed to
practice their profession or engage in any occupation except during session hours, and in the case of
lawyers such as Atty. Ortiz, subject to certain prohibitions which are not relevant to this case.

In such case, the lawyer nevertheless has the choice to withdraw his/her services.23 Still, the
severance of the relation of attorney-client is not effective until a notice of discharge by the client or a
manifestation clearly indicating that purpose is filed with the court or tribunal, and a copy thereof
served upon the adverse party, and until then, the lawyer continues to be counsel in the case.

Assuming that Atty. Ortiz was justified in terminating his services, he, however, cannot just do
so and leave complainant in the cold unprotected. Indeed, Rule 22.02 requires that a lawyer who
withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a lien, immediately turn over all papers and property to
which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter.

Atty. Ortiz claims that the reason why he took no further action on the case was that he was
informed that Canoy had acquired the services of another counsel. Assuming that were true, there
was no apparent coordination between Atty. Ortiz and this new counsel.

In fact, it took nearly two years before Canoy had learned that the position paper had not been
filed and that the case had been dismissed. This was highly irresponsible of Atty. Ortiz, much more so
considering that Canoy was one of the indigent clients whom Atty. Ortiz proudly claims as his favored
clientele. It does not escape the Court's attention that Atty. Ortiz faults Canoy for not adequately
following up the case with his office. He cannot now shift the blame to complainant for failing to inquire
about the status of the case, since, as stated above, it was his duty as lawyer to inform his clients of
the status of cases entrusted to him.

SUSPENDED – 1 MONTH

31. Yu vs. Bondal A.C. No. 553417 January 2005

[A.C. NO. 5534. JANUARY 17, 2005 ] JAYNE Y. YU, COMPLAINANT, VS. RENATO LAZARO
BONDAL, RESPONDENT.

Facts:

1. Atty. Renato Lazaro Bondal was charged by Jayne Y. Yu for gross negligence and violation of
Canon16 and Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility because of his alleged
failure to attend to the five cases Yu referred to him and to return, despite demand, the
amount of P51,716.54 she has paid him.
2. On 30 March 2000, Yu engaged in the services of Bondal as her counsel in five (5)
cases and in the Retainer Agreement of the same date, complainant agreed to pay
respondent the amount of P200,000.00 as Acceptance Fee for the said cases, with an
Appearance Fee of P1,500.00 pesos per hearing; and in the event that damages are
recovered, she would pay respondent 10% thereof as success fee.
3. Complainant later issued two checks, dated 20 February 2001 and 5 April 2001 in the amount
of P30,000.00 and P21,716.54, respectively.
4. Despite receipt of above-said amounts, respondent failed to attend on the said cases due to
his negligence. Failed to file a case against Swire Realty and Development Corp, the case for
estafa against Lourdez was dismissed by the Office of Prosecutor, failed to inform
complainant, before she left for abroad, to leave the necessary documents for purposes
5. On 14 June 2001, complainant demanded from respondent for the return of all the records she
had entrusted him bearing on the subject cases.
6. Through her counsel, she sent a letter in which she demands for the return of the records
of the cases.
7. Respondent returned only two of the five records.
8. On 8 August 2001, she demanded the return of the rest of the files and in the same letter; she
also demanded the refund of the amounts covered by the two checks she issued.
9. Respondent failed and continues to refuse to comply with complainant’s valid demands.
Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether Atty. Bondal violated Canon 16 and Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibilty.

Held: No. Petition dismissed.

Ruling:

It is apparent that the issues being raised by complainant appears to be intra-corporate disputes
which could be very well settled in another forum.
Notably, a similar complaint for the same offense, docketed as I.S. No. 99-H-2780, had been
previously filed by complainant against Ms. Boon which case was dismissed for insufficiency
of evidence.30 As thus observed by the Office of the Bar Confidant, the filing of an appeal from the
prosecutor’s resolution would have been inutile since the facts and issues raised in the estafa
case had already been twice passed upon by the Office of the City Prosecutor, hence, it would
likely be dismissed.

No fault or negligence can also be attributed to respondent in the dismissal of I.S. No. 2000-
G-22087-88 against Julie Teh. By Resolution of August 14, 2000 of the Makati Prosecutor’s Office, it
is clear that it was dismissed, in the main, on the ground that the offense charged did not
actually exist and complainant failed to appear and present the original checks.

On the alleged failure of respondent to appear during the hearing of I.S. No. 2000-G-22087-88 and
his failure to present the original of the checks subject thereof, they being then in the possession of
complainant who was abroad at that time:33 Such failure to present the original of the checks
cannot solely be attributed to respondent, for she herself was guilty of neglect.

As for the alleged compulsion in the settlement of her two complaints for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in
accordance with the terms dictated by the therein respondents Mona Lisa San Juan and Elizabeth
Chan Ong, upon the promise of respondent that he would waive the 10% success fee in the
complaint to be filed against Swire Development: Assuming the truthfulness of her allegation that
 respondent compelled her to settle, what the terms were as alleged to have been dictated by Ms.
San Juan and Ms. Chan Ong, and the manner and/or extent of prejudice she suffered, complainant
did not establish. Moreover, she failed to show that the promise by respondent that he would
waive the 10% success fee was for the purpose of defrauding her or of such nature as to
constitute undue influence, thereby depriving her of reasonable freedom of choice.

Subsequent to the amicable settlement, it appears that complainant never raised any objection to
the terms of the compromise. As an accepted rule, when a client, upon becoming aware of the
compromise and the judgment thereon, fails to promptly repudiate the action of his attorney, he will
not afterwards be heard to complain about it.35

As for complainant’s claim that the amount of ₱51,716.54, which was the only amount on record that
complainant paid for respondent’s legal services, was intended for the filing fees in the complaint
against Swire Development Corporation, the same was not substantiated as in fact the retainer
agreement does not so confirm.

We would like to thank you for retaining our law firm in the handling and representation of your case.
In regard to the five cases you referred to us, our aggregate Acceptance fee is P200,000 Pesos with
an Appearance fee of P1,500.00 Pesos per hearing. As regards the damages to be recovered, we will
get 10% thereof by way of Success Fee.

The Court held that the complainant failed to establish the guilt of respondent by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof. In the present case, the fact that complainant was dissatisfied with
the outcome of the four cases does not render void the retainer agreement for respondent appears to
have represented the interest of complainant. Moreover, litigants need to be reminded that lawyers
are not demigods or magicians who can always win their cases for their clients no matter the utter lack
of merit of the same or how passionate the litigants may feel about their cause.
However, since respondent had been advised by complainant through her counsel that she
intended to terminate his services, he was obliged, under Rule 22.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to immediately turn over all papers and property which complainant entrusted to his
successor.

COMPLAINT DISMISSED

32. DALISAY vs MAURICIO

[A.C. NO. 5655. APRIL 22, 2005] VALERIANA U. DALISAY, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. MELANIO
MAURICIO, JR., RESPONDENT.

(January 23, 2006)

Rule 15.02 -- “A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege communication in respect of matters
disclosed to him by a prospective client.”
FACTS:
● October 13, 2001 -- Complainant Valeriana Dalisay engaged respondent Atty. Mauricio Jr’s
services in Civil Case No. 00-044. She paid Php 56,000 for his legal services, but respondent
never rendered legal services for her. She terminated their attorney-client relationship and
 demanded the return of her money. Respondent refused.
○ IBP investigated and found out that no action nor pleadings were made by the respondent except
his alleged conferences and opinions rendered when Dalisay frequented his law office.
Recommended refund of Php56,000 to Dalisay and to dismiss complaint.
○ April 22, 2005 -- Court rendered respondent guilty of malpractice and gross misconduct.
Suspended for six months.
● Upon learning decision, Atty. went to MTC and inquired about the status of the Civil Case. He
found out that the tax declarations and title submitted by complainant are not official records.
Thus, he filed a Sworn Affidavit Complaint against her charging her of falsification of documents.
○ Atty.’s MR stated the following arguments:
1. Dalisay did not engage his services as counsel for the Civil Case
2. He was hired on October 2001, two months after the decision for the Civil Case was rendered
(August 2001)
3. Dalisay refused to provide him with documents related to the case, preventing him from doing his
job
4. Dalisay tampered with evidence and falsified documents.
○ Complainant Dalisay filed her reply, saying:
1. Atty. violated principle of confidentiality when he filed falsification charges against her
2. Atty. should have returned the money
3. Atty. should have verified the authenticity of her documents
4. Atty’s refusal to return money constitutes contempt
ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Mauricio violated the principle of confidentiality between him and complainant? YES

RATIO:
1. Once a lawyer accepts money from a client, an attorney-client relationship is established, giving
rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. He is expected to be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him, and must serve client with competence and diligence. This did not
happen here, because Atty. Mauricio had been remiss in the performance of his duties by not
appearing as counsel despite acceptance of money.
2. Respondent’s assertion that complainant did not engage his services for the Civil Case is
obviously a last-ditch attempt to evade culpability. He categorically stated in his Affidavit-
Complaint that Dalisay engaged his services for that Case, and he cannot just change his version
because it will be contrary to rules of fair play, justice, and due process.
3. It bears reiterating that respondent did not take any action on the case despite having been paid
for his services. This is tantamount to abandonment of his duties as a lawyer and taking undue
advantage of his client.
4. Assuming that complainant indeed offered falsified documentary evidence in the Civil Case, it is
still not sufficient to exonerate respondent because of Rule 19.02 (He should have confronted
complainant and ask her to rectify her fraudulent representation, and if client refuses, the lawyer
shall terminate his relationship with client). First, he did not follow said canon. Second, the
pleadings show that he learned of the alleged falsification when their attorney-client relationship
has already been terminated and only after the “news of his suspension spread in the legal
community.” Clearly, respondent was motivated by vindictiveness in filing of charges against
complainant.

MR DENIED.
APRIL 22, 2005 DECISION IS UPHELD (RESPONDENT SUSPENDED 6 MONTHS).

(April 22, 2005)

FACTS:
 1. Instant case stemmed from a verified letter-complaint filed with this Court by Valeriana U.
Dalisay against Atty. Melanio "Batas" Mauricio, Jr. for demanding and receiving exorbitant
attorney's fees but did not take any action on her case.
2. In her complaint, Dalisay alleged that she was impressed by the pro-poor and pro-justice
advocacy of respondent, a media personality. So she engaged his services as her counsel in
Civil Case No. 00-44, wherein she is the defendant, pending before the Municipal Trial Court
of Binangonan, Rizal.
3. After consulting with respondent, she handed to him all the pertinent documents. In turn,
respondent demanded P25,000.00 as acceptance fee which she paid. Then respondent
asked her to pay P8,000.00 as filing fee.
4. After a month, complainant approached respondent to follow up her case. Respondent
demanded additional acceptance fee, or a total of P90,000.00, with the explanation that he
can give a discount should she pay in cash. Respondent also asked her to pay him
P3,000.00 as appearance fee.
5. Complainant raised an additional amount and paid respondent the total sum of P48,000.00
6. notwithstanding her payments, respondent never rendered any legal service for her in Civil
Case No. 00-044. As a result, she terminated their attorney-client relationship and
demanded the return of her money and documents. However, he refused to do so.
7. In his comment, respondent denied complainant's charge. He claimed that Atty. Oliver
Lozano referred her to him to defend her in Civil Case No. 00-044. He explained to her that
she is not covered by the free legal services being rendered by his office. Thus, she would
be treated as a regular client.
8. According to respondent, he rendered legal services to complainant by way of legal advice
and opinions on all her problems and those of her family. Consequently, he had every right
to collect attorney's fees from her. He prayed that the instant complaint be dismissed.
9. Integrated Bar of the Philippines – Report and Recommendation - espectfully recommended
that the complaint against Atty. Melanio 'Batas' Mauricio, Jr., be dismissed and the respondent
be required to refund the amount of Fifty Six Thousand Pesos (P56,000.00)
10. The IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-121 adopting and approving in
toto the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Navarro.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent liable for violation of CPR.
HELD:
YES.

When respondent accepted P56,000.00 from complainant, it was understood that he agreed to take
up the latter's case and that an attorney-client relationship between them was established. From
then on, it was expected of him to serve complainant with competence and attend to her case with
fidelity, care and devotion.

However, there is nothing in the records to show that respondent entered his appearance as counsel
of record for complainant in Civil Case No. 00-044. He did not even follow-up the case which
remained pending up to the time she terminated his services.

"there was no evidence nor any pleadings submitted to show that respondent filed any case
considering that the filing fee had to be paid simultaneously with the filing of a case."

Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the body of rules governing the conduct
of every member of the Bar in this jurisdiction, provides:
"CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE."

More specifically, Rule 18.03 states:

"A LAWYER SHALL NOT NEGLECT A LEGAL MATTER ENTRUSTED TO HIM, AND HIS
NEGLIGENCE IN CONNECTION THEREWITH SHALL RENDER HIM LIABLE."

Also, respondent's Attorney's Oath declares that respondent shall impose upon himself the sacred
duty, among others, that he will not delay any man for money or malice, and will conduct himself as a
lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to courts as well as
to his clients.

A member of the legal profession owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest and warm zeal
in the maintenance and defense of his rights. An attorney is expected to exert hisbest efforts
and ability to protect his client's case, for his unwavering loyalty to his client likewise serves the ends
of justice. Indeed, the entrusted privilege of every lawyer to practice law carries with it his
corresponding duties, not only to his client, but also to the court, to the bar and to the public.

Respondent insists that he is entitled to attorney's fees since he gave legal advice and opinions
to complainant on her problems and those of her family. Just like any other professional, a
lawyer is entitled to collect fees for his services. However, he should charge only a
reasonable amount of fees. Canon 20 of the Codeof Professional Responsibility mandates that "A
lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees." There is, however, no hard and fast rule which
will serve as guide in determining what is or what is not a reasonable fee. That must be
determined from the facts of each case.5 The power to determine the reasonableness or the
unconscionable character of a lawyer's fee is a matter falling within the regulatory prerogative
of the Court.6

It is now clear to us that since respondent did not take any step to assist complainant in her case,
charging P56,000.00 is improper. While giving legal advice and opinion on complainant's problems
and those of her family constitutes legal service, however, the attorney's fee must be reasonable.
Obviously, P56,000.00 is exorbitant. - SUSPENDED FOR 6 MONTHS
33: FRANCISCO LORENZANA v. ATTY. CESAR G. FAJARDO
Complaint: violation of the Civil Service Law and Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and seeks his disbarment from the practice of the law profession

FACTS:
● Complainant alleged that respondent, while employed as Legal Officer V at the Urban Settlement
Office in Manila was a member of the People's Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) of Quezon City
and also a member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Novaliches Proper, both receiving
a monthly allowance/ honorarium.
● The respondent was engaged in the private practice of law, receiving acceptance fees and he
lives in a house and lot owned by complainant's family without paying any rental and
refuses to leave the place despite the latter's demands.
● Respondent countered that his membership in the PLEB, was without fixed compensation. He
reported only once a week in the afternoon for which he received only per diems allowed under
Section 43 par. (c) of Republic Act No. 6975.
● As regards his designation as a member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa, the same is authorized
under Section 406 of the Local Government Code of 1991; and his monthly allowance/
honorarium is allowed under Section 393.
● While he received allowances, honoraria and other emoluments, even as he is in the government
service, the same is authorized by law. Hence, there was no double compensation. He admitted
having appeared as private counsel in several cases and emphasized that his services were
pro bono.
● Respondent denied that the lot on which his house is built belongs to complainant's family. In
fact, it is now the subject of an "Accion Publiciana".
● IBP Commissioner, who conducted the investigation, found that respondent's appointment as a
member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa, while concurrently employed as a legal officer of
the Manila Urban Settlements Office is not unlawful. Such appointment is in accordance with
the Local Government Code of 1991. Nor could respondent be found liable for receiving honoraria
as a Lupon member, since the Local Government Code of 1991 authorizes Lupon members to
receive honoraria, allowances, and other emoluments.
● With respect to respondent's appointment as PLEB member, IBP Commissioner stated that the
same is not an exception to the prohibition against dual appointments or employment of
government officials or employees.
● IBP Commissioner also found that respondent's court appearances as counsel for litigants do
not constitute private practice of law since complainant failed to show that he received
compensation. However, respondent should still be held liable for violation of Civil Service
Rules and Regulations since he failed to show that he was permitted by his Office to appear as
counsel for his clients.
● The IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2003-93 quoted as follows: RESOLVED
to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part
of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and in view of respondent's
accepting appointment as Board Member of the People's Law Enforcement Board of Quezon
City while he was still employed as Legal Officer V of the Manila Urban Settlement Office, Atty.
Cesar G. Fajardo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month and hereby
REPRIMANDED with stern WARNING for failing to obtain written permission from his superiors to
appear as counsel to certain relatives and friends as required by Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the
Revised Civil Service Rules.

ISSUES:
1. WON the respondent as a Legal Officer (government employee) is prohibited from holding any
other office or position in the government, such as being a PLEB member.
2. WON the respondent also violated the Canon1 of Code of Professional Responsibility and
the Attorney's Oath.
3. WON the respondent's appointment as a member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay
while serving as Legal Officer is being allowed by law.
4. WON the respondent's court appearances as counsel for litigants constitute private practice
of law.
RULING:
1. Yes.
● The prohibition against government officials and employees, whether elected or appointed, from
concurrently holding any other office or position in the government is contained in Section 7,
Article IX-B of the Constitution which provides: "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries."
● In trying to justify his appointment as PLEB member, respondent invoked Section 43 (c) of R.A.
No. 69755:
● "Section 43. People's Law Enforcement Board': (c) Compensation, Membership in the PLEB is
a civic duty. However, PLEB members may be paid per diem as may be determined by the
city or municipal council from city or municipal funds."
● It is clear that this provision pertains only to the compensation of PLEB members. It cannot be
construed as an exception to the Constitutional and statutory prohibition against dual or
multiple appointments of appointive public employees.
● Respondent also failed to establish that his primary functions as Legal Officer of the Manila
Urban Settlements Office allow his appointment as PLEB member, an exception to dual
appointment prohibited by the Constitution and the statutes. Indeed, respondent, in accepting
such appointment, has transgressed the Constitution, the Administrative Code of 1987, and the
Local Government Code of 1991. Being contra leges, respondent also violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Attorney's Oath.

2. Yes.
● Being contra leges, respondent also violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Attorney's Oath.
● Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states: A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES.
● The Attorney's Oath states in part that every lawyer "shall support the Constitution and obey the
laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities'"
● The lawyer's paramount duty to society is to obey the law. For of all classes and professions,
it is the lawyer who is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws, for he is their sworn servant.
Sadly, respondent failed to fulfill this exacting duty.

3. Yes.
● On respondent's appointment as a member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay
Novaliches Proper, while serving as Legal Officer V of the Manila Urban Settlements Office, we
agree with the IBP Investigating Commissioner that the same is in order, being allowed by law.
● Section 406. Character of Office and Service of Lupon Members': (b) The lupon or pangkat
members shall serve without compensation, except as provided for in Section 393 and without
prejudice to incentives as provided for in this Section and in Book IV of this Code. The Department
of Interior and Local Government shall provide for a system of granting economic or other
 incentives to the lupon or pangkat members who adequately demonstrate the ability to judiciously
and expeditiously resolve cases referred to them. While in the performance of their duties, the
lupon or pangkat members, whether in public or private employment, shall be deemed to be on
official time, and shall not suffer from any diminution in compensation or allowance from said
employment by reason thereof."
● The above provision allows government officials and employees to sit as lupon or pangkat
members.

4. Yes.
● Private practice of law contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or
customarily holding one's self to the public as a lawyer. Practice is more than an isolated
appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action a succession of acts of the same
kind. The practice of law by attorneys employed in the government, to fall within the prohibition of
statutes has been interpreted as customarily habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a
lawyer and demanding payment for such services.
● In the case at bar, respondent's appearance as counsel is not merely isolated. Evidence
presented by complainant shows that he had an extensive practice of law. While employed as a
Legal Officer he maintained a law office. The pleadings he signed as "counsel" for his clients
filed with the courts indicate his office address.
● Respondent cannot justify his practice of law by claiming that his office is "not really strict when
it comes to appearing in some private cases as they (employees) were sometimes called to
render service even on holidays without additional compensation." At most, he should have asked
written permission from his chief as required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service
Rules that "(n)o officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation or
profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking
without a written permission from the head of the Department."

(If ever matanong lang)

● As to respondent's alleged unlawful stay on complainant's property affecting his conduct as
a member of the Bar, suffice it to state that any discussion on this issue is premature since the
case is still pending in the RTC, Branch 100, Quezon City.

● WHEREFORE, for accepting employment as a member of the PLEB of Quezon City while
concurrently employed as Legal Officer V of the Manila Urban Settlement Office, in violation of the
Constitution and the statutes, which in turn contravene his Attorney's Oath and Code of
Professional Responsibility; and by engaging in the illegal practice of law, Atty. Cesar G. Fajardo is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective from
notice and is REPRIMANDED and WARNED that any repetition of similar acts would be dealt
with more severely.
CASE 34: RURAL BANK OF CALAPE, INC. (RBCI) BOHOL VS. ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT
FLORIDO
The Case: This is a complaint for disbarment filed by the members of the Board of Directors of the
Rural Bank of Calape, Inc. (RBCI) Bohol against respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido
(respondent) for "acts constituting grave coercion and threats when he, as counsel for the minority
stockholders of RBCI, led his clients in physically taking over the management and operation of the
bank through force, violence and intimidation.
FACTS:
● RBCI filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent. RBCI alleged that respondent
violated his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).
● They alleged that the respondent and his clients, Dr. Domeciano Nazareno, Dr. Remedios
Relampagos, Dr. Manuel Relampagos, and Felix Rengel (Nazareno-Relampagos group), through
force and intimidation, with the use of armed men, forcibly took over the management and
the premises of RBCI. They also forcibly evicted Cirilo A. Garay (Garay), the bank manager,
destroyed the bank's vault, and installed their own staff to run the bank.
● Respondent denied RBCI's allegations. Respondent explained that he acted in accordance with
the authority granted upon him by the Nazareno-Relampagos group, the lawfully and validly
elected Board of Directors of RBCI. Respondent said he was merely effecting a lawful and valid
change of management. Respondent alleged that a termination notice was sent to Garay but he
refused to comply.
● Respondent and the Nazareno-Relampagos group went to the bank to ask Garay to step
down. However, Garay reacted violently and grappled with the security guard's long
firearm. Respondent then directed the security guards to prevent entry into the bank premises of
individuals who had no transaction with the bank. Respondent, through the orders of the
Nazareno-Relampagos group, also changed the locks of the bank's vault.
● Respondent added that the criminal complaint for malicious mischief filed against him by
RBCI was already dismissed; while the complaint for grave coercion was ordered suspended
because of the existence of a prejudicial question. Respondent said that the disbarment
complaint was filed against him in retaliation for the administrative cases he filed against
RBCI's counsel and the trial court judges of Bohol.
● The Ruling of the IBP: The respondent failed to live up to the exacting standards expected of him
as vanguard of law and justice. Commissioner recommended the imposition on respondent of
a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six months to one year with a warning
that the repetition of similar conduct in the future will warrant a more severe penalty.
● respondent knew or ought to have known that his clients could not just forcibly take over the
management and premises of RBCI without a valid court order. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.
said that respondent had no legal basis to implement the take over of RBCI and that it was a
"naked power grab without any semblance of legality whatsoever."
● the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2006-120 which declared that respondent
dismally failed to live up to the exacting standards of the law profession and suspended
respondent from the practice of law for one year with a warning that repetition of similar conduct
will warrant a more severe penalty.
● Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and the IBP denied respondent's motion.

ISSUE: WON the respondent violated his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility for acts
constituting grave coercion and threats when he led his clients in physically taking over the
management and operation of the bank through force, violence and intimidation.
RULING:
● Yes. We affirm the IBP Board of Governors' resolution.
● The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Likewise, it is the lawyer's
duty to promote respect for the law and legal processes and to abstain from activities aimed at
defiance of the law or lessening confidence in the legal system.
● Canon 19 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds
of the law. For this reason, Rule 15.07 of the Code requires a lawyer to impress upon his client
compliance with the law and principles of fairness.
● A lawyer must employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his
client. It is his duty to counsel his clients to use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking
justice and refrain from doing an intentional wrong to their adversaries
● Lawyers are indispensable instruments of justice and peace. Upon taking their professional oath,
they become guardians of truth and the rule of law. Verily, when they appear before a tribunal,
they act not merely as representatives of a party but, first and foremost, as officers of the court.
Thus, their duty to protect their clients' interests is secondary to their obligation to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice.
● A lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice. To that end, his client's
success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant
of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the
lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his client's cause, is condemnable and unethical.
● WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido GUILTY of violating Canon 19
and Rules 1.02 and 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND
respondent from the practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this Decision.

The administrative complaint against respondent before the IBP is independent of the
dismissal and suspension of the criminal cases against respondent.
35. [ A.C. NO. 5798 JANUARY 20, 2005] ALEX B. CUETO VS. ATTY. JOSE B. JIMENEZ, JR
FACTS:
1. Engr. Alex Cueto alleged that sometime in October 1999 he engaged the services of
respondent as notary public, the latter being the father of the owner of the building subject
of the Construction Agreement to be notarized.
2. Then, respondent demanded ₱50,000 as notarial fee.
3. Despite his surprise as to the cost of the notarial service, complainant informed respondent that
he only had ₱30,000 in cash.
4. Respondent persuaded complainant to pay the ₱30,000 and to issue a check for the
remaining ₱20,000.
5. Being unfamiliar with the cost of notarial services, complainant paid all his cash and issued a
check dated December 28, 1999 for the balance.
6. Before the maturity date of the check, complainant requested respondent not to deposit
the same for lack of sufficient funds.
7. He also informed respondent that the latter’s son Jose Jimenez III had not yet paid his
services as general contractor.
8. Still, respondent deposited the check which was consequently dishonored for insufficient
funds.
9. Meanwhile, the ₱2,500,000 check issued by respondent’s son to complainant as initial payment
was itself dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account.
10. Subsequently, Atty. Jimenez lodged a complaint for violation of BP 22 against Cueto, the
criminal case was tried in the MTC of Angeles City, Branch I.
11. Cueto filed his own administrative complaint against Jimenez alleging that Jimenez violated
the Code of Professional Responsibility and Canons of Professional Ethics when he filed
the criminal case against Cueto so he could collect the balance of his notarial fee.
12. Despite notice, however, respondent failed to file his answer and to appear before the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline.
13. After hearing the case ex-parte, respondent found guilty of violating Canon 20, Rule 20.4 of the
CPR and recommended that Atty. Jose B. Jimenez, Jr. be reprimanded.

Issue:
Is respondent guilty of violating Canon 20, Rule 20.4 of the CPR?

Ruling:
Yes.
Complainant's claim that respondent's P50,000 notarial fee was exorbitant is debatable. As confirmed
by the IBP, it is a recognized legal practice in real estate transactions and construction projects to
base the amount of notarial fees on the contract price.

Based on the amount demanded by respondent, the fee represented only 1% of the contract price of
₱5,000,000. It cannot be said therefore that respondent notary demanded more than a reasonable
recompense for his service.

We are also convinced that the two contracting parties implicitly agreed on the cost of Jimenez’s
notarial service. It was Cueto’s responsibility to first inquire how much he was going to be charged
for notarization. And once informed, he was free to accept or reject it, or negotiate for a lower
amount.

In this case, complainant’s concern that the other party to the construction agreement was the son of
respondent notary and that his non-availment of respondent’s service might jeopardize the
agreement, was purely speculative. There was no compulsion to avail of respondent’s service.
Moreover, his failure to negotiate the amount of the fee was an implicit acquiescence to the terms
of the notarial service. His subsequent act of paying in cash and in check all the more proved it.
However, we agree with the IBP that respondent’s conduct in filing a criminal case for violation
of BP 22 against complainant was highly improper.
Canon 20, Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that "[a] lawyer shall avoid
controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action only
to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud."

Likewise, in Canon 14 of the Canons of Professional Ethics it states that, "controversies with clients
concerning compensation are to be avoided by the lawyer so far as shall be compatible with
his self-respect and with his right to receive reasonable recompense for his service; and
lawsuits with the clients should be resorted to only to prevent injustice, imposition or fraud."

There was clearly no imposition, injustice or fraud obtaining in this case to justify the legal
action taken by respondent. As borne out by the records, complainant Cueto had already paid
more than half of respondent’s fee. To resort to a suit to recover the balance reveals a certain
kind of shameful conduct and inconsiderate behavior that clearly undermines the tenet
embodied in Canon 15 that "A lawyer should observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings
and transactions with his client." And what can we say about the failure of respondent’s son Jose III to
pay his own obligation to complainant Cueto? It in all probability explains why Cueto ran short of
funds. Respondent therefore should have been more tolerant of the delay incurred by
complainant Cueto.

We cannot overstress the duty of a lawyer to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.9
He can do this by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.
He should always remind himself that the legal profession is imbued with public service.
Remuneration is a mere incident.
Although we acknowledge that every lawyer must be paid what is due to him, he must never resort to
judicial action to recover his fees, in a manner that detracts from the dignity of the profession.
Penalty: SEVERELY REPRIMANDED
36. [ A.C. NO. 5817. MAY 26, 2004] EMMA V. DE JUAN VS. ATTY. OSCAR R. BARIA III – Second
Division
Facts:
1. The complainant alleged that respondent Atty. Oscar R. Baria III, as her counsel in her Labor
Case, negligently failed to file motion for reconsideration of the decision dated September 24,
2001 of the NLRC in her behalf.
2. Complainant blamed respondent for the reversal. She said that she came to know of the
reversal of the Labor Arbiter’s decision when she called respondent in October 2001. When she
asked the respondent what they should do, respondent answered, "Paano iyan iha…eh…hindi
ako marunong gumawa ng Motion for Reconsideration."
3. Sometime in November 2001, her husband called respondent to ask if he did anything in
connection with the NLRC’s Decision and he was advised by respondent’s secretary that,
"Sabi ni Atty…huwag na kayong magpakita sa kanya dahil galit na galit sa inyo si Attorney at baka
kung ano pa ang magawa niya sa inyo."
4. The Court required respondent to comment and referred the case to the IBP for investigation,
report and recommendation.
5. Respondent explained that soon after passing the bar in 1999, he was employed as a broadcaster
in DWAN’s radio program offering free legal services to the poor. He gave free legal services to
indigent clients one of whom was complainant. As a practice, he said he forewarned his clients
that he was just a new lawyer and that they should not expect too much from him because
of his limited legal experience. According to respondent he tried to explain to complainant the
legal remedies available to her as well as the time her case may take. It appeared to him that
complainant did not fully grasp the usual delays that may be involved in her case. He recalled that
when he told complainant that the Labor Arbiter’s decision was in her favor, she was so jubilant at
the money judgment.
6. Later however, the complainant became furious when he told her that Triple AAA Antique had
appealed.
7. Respondent filed a Motion for Writ of Execution of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision but this Motion was
ruled premature.
8. Respondent then filed an opposition to the appeal filed by Triple AAA but the NLRC still gave due
course to the appeal. While Triple AAA’s appeal was pending resolution he told complainant to call
him every week so that she could be advised of any developments in her case. He generously
suggested that complainant call "collect" to lessen her expenses. He even allowed
complainant and her husband to stay in his home when they came to Manila from the
province. He said he even fed them when they were in Manila.
9. In October 2001, the NLRC rendered its decision reversing the Labor Arbiter. By this time,
according to respondent, he confronted complainant for lying to him about her employment
with Triple AAA and told her that because of her lies there was a possibility she could lose
the appeal. He advised complainant to get a more experienced lawyer for her appeal because
as a new lawyer he was not confident he could handle her appeal. Thereafter, complainant no
longer contacted him and at some time, he even had to ask her whereabouts from her relatives.
10. On December 2001, respondent received calls from the staff of Raffy Tulfo, a radio
commentator. In one of these calls, his wife talked to one of Tulfo’s employees and she was told
that complainant told Tulfo that the respondent received money from Triple AAA Antique. As a
result Tulfo lambasted him on his radio program. Respondent thereafter called Tulfo, explained his
side, and demanded that the latter apologize on air otherwise he would file a libel case against
Tulfo.
11. Sometime in January 2002, respondent’s secretary received a call from the complainant’s
husband. When respondent’s secretary confronted the husband regarding the Tulfo incident,
complainant’s husband retorted, "Sabihin mo sa kanya mag ingat siya at baka may mangyari sa
kanya." Shortly thereafter, respondent began receiving death threats over the phone and also
noticed armed men casing his office. He reported these calls and presence of suspicious
armed men to the police.
12. Respondent surmises that complainant believed Triple AAA paid him off and he pocketed
money supposedly for her. Respondent vehemently denied he did. He asks that Triple AAA be
 summoned to bear witness to his story. Respondent asserts that he has not committed any breach
of his oath and that he has vigorously pursued his client’s cause to the end. He avers that it was
his client’s own negligence and folly that caused her to lose her case. He asks that the complaint
be dismissed.
13. In turn, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline required complainant to reply. In her reply written
in Filipino, complainant denied that she accepted money from respondent during the
pendency of her labor case, except on one occasion when she borrowed P100 from
respondent’s secretary for travel fare back to the province. She reiterated that she filed her
Salaysay because of respondent’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration. She further insists
that she does not believe that respondent did not know how to file a motion for
reconsideration as he claims since she was aware that even a law student would know how to.
14. In its Resolution dated August 30, 2003, the IBP approved the recommendation of the
Commission on Bar Discipline. The IBP Board of Governors found respondent guilty of
negligence in handling the aforecited labor case and recommended that respondent be
suspended from practicing law for three months.

Issue:

whether the respondent committed culpable negligence, as would warrant disciplinary action, in failing
to file for the complainant a motion for reconsideration from the decision of the NLRC.

Ruling:

Yes. No lawyer is obliged to advocate for every person who may wish to become his client, but
once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and
must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.

Further, among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who
undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination, that is, until the case
becomes final and executory.

A lawyer is not at liberty to abandon his client and withdraw his services without reasonable
cause and only upon notice appropriate in the circumstances. Any dereliction of duty by a
counsel, affects the client. This means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every
remedy and defense that is authorized by the law and he may expect his lawyer to assert every
such remedy or defense.

The records reveal that indeed the respondent did not file a motion for reconsideration of the
NLRC such that the said decision eventually had become final and executory. Respondent
does not refute this. His excuse that he did not know how to file a motion for reconsideration
is lame and unacceptable. After complainant had expressed an interest to file a motion for
reconsideration, it was incumbent upon counsel to diligently return to his books and re-
familiarize himself with the procedural rules for a motion for reconsideration. Filing a motion
for reconsideration is not a complicated legal task.

We are however, not unaware that respondent had been forthright and candid with his client when he
warned her of his lack of experience as a new lawyer. We are also not unaware that he had advised
complainant to get a new lawyer. However, his candor cannot absolve him. As already stressed by
this Court:
A lawyer is expected to be familiar with these rudiments of law and procedure and anyone who
acquires his service is entitled to not just competent service but also whole-hearted devotion to his
client’s cause. It is the duty of a lawyer to serve his client with competence and diligence and he
should exert his best efforts to protect within the bounds of law the interest of his client. A lawyer
should never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, otherwise his negligence in fulfilling his duty will
render him liable for disciplinary action.
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that negligence of lawyers in
connection with legal matters entrusted to them for handling shall render them liable.

Without a proper revocation of his authority and withdrawal as counsel, respondent remains counsel
of record and whether or not he has a valid cause to withdraw from the case, he cannot just do so and
leave his client out in the cold. An attorney may only retire from the case either by a written consent of
his client or by permission of the court after due notice and hearing, in which event the attorney
should see to it that the name of the new attorney is recorded in the case. Respondent did not comply
with these obligations.

Penalty: FINED in the amount of ₱5,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of this or
similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
37. EN BANC
A.C. No. 5829 October 28, 2003 DANIEL LEMOINE, complainant,
vs. ATTY. AMADEO E. BALON, JR., respondent.

FACTS:
1. Complainant Lemoine, a French national, filed complaint against respondent Atty. Amadeo E.
Balon, Jr., for estafa and misconduct.
2. Respondent Atty. Balon acted as Lemoine’s attorney in an insurance claim against
Metropolitan Insurance regarding his lost vehicle. It was the complainant’s friend Garcia who
arraigned the meeting of Atty. Balon and Lemoine.
3. Respondent advised Lemoine that he was charging 25% of the actual amount being
recovered payable upon successful recovery. Lemoine never gave his consent as to the fee.
4. Since, he was leaving the country, Lemoine signed an undated SPA authorizing respondent
to bring an action against the Metropolitan Insurance for the satisfaction of Lemoine’s claim as
well to negotiate, sign, compromise, encash and receive payments.
5. Metropolitan Insurance offered to settle Lemoine’s claim and respondent confirmed his
acceptance of the offer.
6. In December 1998, the Metropolitan Insurance issued a check payable to Lemoine in the
amount of Php 525k which was received by the respondent.
7. In the meantime, Lemoine returned to the Philippines and inquire about the status of his
claim. Garcia echoed to Lemoine what respondent had written the former that the claim was still
pending and the insurance company offered to settle it for Php 350k, and suggested to accept
it to avoid litigation. However, when Lemoine visited the office of Metropolitan Insurance, he
learned that his case was long been settled via check given to respondent.
8. Respondent acknowledged having in his possession the proceeds of the encashed check
which he retained, however, as attorney’s lien pending complainant’s payment of his
attorney’s fee, equivalent to 50%) of entire amount collected. In his letter, he branded Lemoine
as barbaric and uncivilized and threatened that he will not hesitate to institute cases in the
Bureau of Immigration, DOLE, and BIR which he has a good network.
9. As despite written demands,13 respondent refused to turn over the proceeds of the insurance
claim and to acknowledge the unreasonableness of the attorney’s fees he was demanding,
complainant instituted the administrative action at bar
10. The Investigating Commissioner, by Report and Recommendation found respondent guilty of
misconduct and recommended that he be disbarred and directed to immediately turn over the
amount of insurance claim less the respondent’s professional fees.
11. The Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner with modification, considering respondent’s dishonesty which
amounted to grave misconduct and grossly unethical behavior which caused dishonor, not
merely to respondent but the noble profession to which he belongs. Respondent is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for 6 months with the directive to turn over the
amount Php 525k to the complainant without prejudice to respondent’s right to claim attorney’s
fees which he may collect in the proper forum.

ISSUE: WON the respondent Atty. Balon violated the CPR?

RULING: YES.
This Court is in full accord with the findings of the IBP Investigator that respondent violated the
following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
RULE 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions
with his clients.
RULE 15.06 - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or
legislative body.
CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession.
RULE 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.
RULE 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those
of others kept by him.
RULE 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.
However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to
satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also
have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as
provided for in the Rules of Court.
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence in him.
RULE 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within
a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.
RULE 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the
course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his advantage or that of a third person, unless
the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.

Specifically with respect to above-quoted provision of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility, the Filipino lawyer’s principal source of ethical rules, which Canon 16 bears on the
principal complaint of complainant, a lawyer must hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client
that he may come to possess. This commandment entails certain specific acts to be done by a lawyer
such as rendering an accounting of all money or property received for or from the client36 as well as
delivery of the funds or property to the client when due or upon demand.37

Respondent breached this Canon when after he received the proceeds of complainant’s
insurance claim, he did not report it to complainant, who had a given address in Makati, or to
his co-attorney-in-fact Garcia who was his contact with respect to complainant.

That respondent had a lien on complainant’s funds for his attorney’s fees did not relieve him of
his duty to account for it.40 The lawyer’s continuing exercise of his retaining lien presupposes
that the client agrees with the amount of attorney’s fees to be charged.

In case of disagreement or when the client contests that amount for being unconscionable,
however, the lawyer must not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the payment of his
fees.41 He can file, if he still deems it desirable, the necessary action or proper motion with the proper
court to fix the amount of such fees.42
It bears noting that for close to five long years respondent has been in possession of
complainant’s funds in the amount of over half a million pesos. The deceptions and lies that he
peddled to conceal, until its discovery by complainant after about a year, his receipt of the funds and
his tenacious custody thereof in a grossly oppressive manner point to his lack of good moral
character. Worse, by respondent’s turnaround in his Supplement to his Counter-Affidavit that he
already delivered to complainant’s friend Garcia the amount of P233,000.00 which, so respondent
claims, is all that complainant is entitled to, he in effect has declared that he has nothing more to turn
over to complainant. Such incredible position is tantamount to a refusal to remit complainant’s funds,
and gives rise to the conclusion that he has misappropriated them.45
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Amadeo E. Balon, Jr., is found GUILTY of malpractice, deceit and
gross misconduct in the practice of his profession as a lawyer and he is hereby DISBARRED.
38. A.C. No. 5859 November 23, 2010
(Formerly CBD Case No. 421)
ATTY. CARMEN LEONOR M. ALCANTARA, VICENTE P. MERCADO, SEVERINO P. MERCADO
AND SPOUSES JESUS AND ROSARIO MERCADO, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. EDUARDO C. DE VERA, Respondent. - ENBANC

Facts:
1. The respondent is a member of the Bar and was the former counsel of Rosario P.
Mercado in a civil case filed in 1984 with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and an
administrative case filed before the Securities and Exchange Commission, Davao City
Extension Office.3
2. Pursuant to a favorable decision, a writ of execution pending appeal was issued in
favor of Rosario P. Mercado.
3. Herein respondent, as her legal counsel, garnished the bank deposits of the defendant,
but did not turn over the proceeds to Rosario.
4. Rosario demanded that the respondent turn over the proceeds of the garnishment, but
the latter refused claiming that he had paid part of the money to the judge while the
balance was his, as attorney’s fees. Such refusal prompted Rosario to file an administrative
case for disbarment against the respondent.4
5. On March 23, 1993, the IBP Board of Governors promulgated a Resolution holding the
respondent guilty of infidelity in the custody and handling of client’s funds and recommending
to the Court his one-year suspension from the practice of law.5
6. Following the release of the aforesaid IBP Resolution, the respondent filed a series of
lawsuits against the Mercado family except George Mercado. The respondent also instituted
cases against the family corporation, the corporation’s accountant and the judge who ruled
against the reopening of the case where respondent tried to collect the balance of his alleged
fee from Rosario.
7. Later on, the respondent also filed cases against the chairman and members of the IBP
Board of Governors who voted to recommend his suspension from the practice of law for one
year. Complainants allege that the respondent committed barratry, forum shopping,
exploitation of family problems, and use of intemperate language when he filed several
frivolous and unwarranted lawsuits against the complainants and their family
members, their lawyers, and the family corporation.6 They maintain that the primary
purpose of the cases is to harass and to exact revenge for the one-year suspension
from the practice of law meted out by the IBP against the respondent. Thus, they pray that
the respondent be disbarred for malpractice and gross misconduct under Section 27,7 Rule
138 of the Rules of Court.
8. He denies he has committed barratry by instigating or stirring up George Mercado to
file lawsuits against the complainants. He insists that the lawsuits that he and George filed
against the complainants were not harassment suits but were in fact filed in good faith
and were based on strong facts.8
9. Also, the respondent denies that he has engaged in forum shopping. He argues that he
was merely exhausting the remedies allowed by law and that he was merely
constrained to seek relief elsewhere by reason of the denial of the trial court to reopen
the civil case so he could justify his attorney’s fees.
10. Further, he denies that he had exploited the problems of his client’s family. He argues
that the case that he and George Mercado filed against the complainants arose from their
perception of unlawful transgressions committed by the latter for which they must be held
accountable for the public interest.
11. Finally, the respondent denies using any intemperate, vulgar, or unprofessional
language. On the contrary, he asserts that it was the complainants who resorted to
intemperate and vulgar language in accusing him of "extorting from Rosario shocking
and unconscionable attorney’s fees.

Issue: Whether the recommendation of the IBP is proper.

Held:
It is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State
upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required
by law for the conferment of such privilege.10

Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to
practice law only during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and
declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. Without
invading any constitutional privilege or right, an attorney’s right to practice law may be resolved by a
proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to
exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be understood that the purpose of
suspending or disbarring an attorney is to remove from the profession a person whose
misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
belonging to an office of an attorney, and thus to protect the public and those charged with the
administration of justice, rather than to punish the attorney.11

In Maligsa v. Cabanting,12 we explained that the bar should maintain a high standard of legal
proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by
faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.

To this end a member of the legal profession should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in
any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the
legal profession. An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his
duties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court.

In the present case, the respondent committed professional malpractice and gross misconduct
particularly in his acts against his former clients after the issuance of the IBP Resolution
suspending him from the practice of law for one year.

In summary, the respondent filed against his former client, her family members, the family
corporation of his former client, the Chairman and members of the Board of Governors of the
IBP who issued the said Resolution, the Regional Trial Court Judge in the case where his
former client received a favorable judgment, and the present counsel of his former client, a total of
twelve (12) different cases in various fora which included the Securities and Exchange Commission;
the Provincial Prosecutors Office of Tagum, Davao; the Davao City Prosecutors Office; the IBP-
Commission on Bar Discipline; the Department of Agrarian Reform; and the Supreme Court.13

In addition to the twelve (12) cases filed, the respondent also re-filed cases which had
previously been dismissed. The respondent filed six criminal cases against members of the
Mercado family separately docketed as I.S. Nos. 97-135; 97-136; 97-137; 97-138; 97-139; and
97-140. With the exception of I.S. No. 97-139, all the aforementioned cases are re-filing of previously
dismissed cases.14
Now, there is nothing ethically remiss in a lawyer who files numerous cases in different fora, as long
as he does so in good faith, in accordance with the Rules, and without any ill-motive or purpose
other than to achieve justice and fairness. In the present case, however, we find that the barrage of
cases filed by the respondent against his former client and others close to her was meant to
overwhelm said client and to show her that the respondent does not fold easily after he was meted a
penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law.

The nature of the cases filed by the respondent, the fact of re-filing them after being dismissed, the
timing of the filing of cases, the fact that the respondent was in conspiracy with a renegade
member of the complainants’ family, the defendants named in the cases and the foul language
used in the pleadings and motions15 all indicate that the respondent was acting beyond the
desire for justice and fairness. His act of filing a barrage of cases appears to be an act of revenge
and hate driven by anger and frustration against his former client who filed the disciplinary complaint
against him for infidelity in the custody of a client’s funds.

Further, the respondent not only filed frivolous and unfounded lawsuits that violated his duties
as an officer of the court in aiding in the proper administration of justice, but he did so against
a former client to whom he owes loyalty and fidelity. Canon 21 and Rule 21.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility19 provides:

CANON 21 - A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even after the attorney-
client relation is terminated.
Rule 21.02 – A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the
course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person,
unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.

The cases filed by the respondent against his former client involved matters and information acquired
by the respondent during the time when he was still Rosario’s counsel. Information as to the structure
and operations of the family corporation, private documents, and other pertinent facts and figures
used as basis or in support of the cases filed by the respondent in pursuit of his malicious
motives were all acquired through the attorney-client relationship with herein complainants. Such
act is in direct violation of the Canons and will not be tolerated by the Court.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law
effective immediately upon his receipt of this Resolution.
39. A.C. No. 6086 January 26, 2005
NICANOR B. GATMAYTAN, JR., complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ISIDRO C. ILAO, respondent.
Facts:
1. Complainant Nicanor B. Gatmaytan, Jr., is a practicing lawyer who represented a certain
Teofista Payuran in Civil Case No. 4381-P before the Pasay City Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 109, for cancellation of title.5 Respondent Atty. Isidro Ilao, on the other hand, was
counsel for the respondents in the said case.
2. On 17 August 1995, complainant received the Decision6 rendered in Civil Case No. 4381-
P penned by Judge Lilia C. Lopez, the dispositive portion of which reads:
3. In view of all the foregoing, this Court hereby orders plaintiff Teofista Payuran to pay the
defendants and third-party plaintiff Chiu Chin Siong. (Note: I did not include yung
mismong recital.)
4. Thereafter, complainant, as counsel for Teofista Payuran, filed on 24 August 1995 a Motion
for Reconsideration of the aforesaid decision, the denial of which was received by Atty.
Gatmaytan on 24 October 1995.
5. On 07 November 1995, complainant filed a second Motion for Reconsideration8 which
was subsequently denied, the notice thereof received on 26 December 1995. Consequently,
6. on 08 January 1996, complainant, as counsel, filed a notice of appeal before the court a
quo. Said notice of appeal was however denied due course on the ground that the appeal
was already time-barred.
7. T h e r e u p o n , c o m p l a i n a n t , o n b e h a l f o f Te o f i s t a P a y u r a n , f i l e d a P e t i t i o n
for Certiorari and Mandamus9 before the Court of Appeals.
8. On 14 February 2002, during the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari, Atty. Ilao, as counsel
for Clifton Chiu,10 filed before this Court a Complaint for Disbarment11 against herein
complainant, Atty. Nicanor Gatmaytan, Jr., for violations of Canons 10, 12, 15, and 19 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. On 07 March 2002, Atty. Ilao, in his personal capacity and
as attorney-in-fact of his co-plaintiffs,12 filed a complaint for damages in the RTC of Nasugbu,
Batangas, Branch 14, against herein complainant, Teofista Payuran and Atty. Augusto
Gatmaytan.
9. On 05 August 2002, herein complainant Atty. Gatmaytan, filed his own Complaint for
Disbarment before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Ilao.
10. Atty. Gatmaytan claims that by filing the complaint for damages before the RTC of
Nasugbu, respondent is guilty of making false representations and advice to his clients, as
well as committing falsehood, misleading the court and misusing the Rules of Procedure.
11. Report and Recommendation recommending the dismissal of Atty. Gatmaytan’s complaint for
lack of merit.
12. Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the dismissal of the complaint
without the Commissioner conducting an investigation. The Board of Governors of the
IBP, having already endorsed the matter to the Supreme Court in accordance with Section
12(c) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, hence, no longer exercising jurisdiction over it,
denied said Motion for Reconsideration in a resolution
13. resolved to treat complainant's Motion for Reconsideration as an appeal to the Supreme
Court of the earlier resolution16 of the IBP. Hence, the instant appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the act of the Investigator is proper in dismissing the complaint without
conducting investigation.

Held:
Yes.
To properly address the issue raised by complainant, we must analyze Section 8 of Rule 139-B in
relation to the pertinent section contained in said Rule -- Section 5 of Rule 139-B. They provide, thus:

SEC. 5. Service or dismissal. – If the complaint appears to be meritorious, the Investigator shall direct
that a copy thereof be served upon the respondent, requiring him to answer the same within fifteen
(15) days from the date of service. If the complaint does not merit action, or if the answer shows
to the satisfaction of the Investigator that the complaint is not meritorious, the same may be
dismissed by the Board of Governors upon his recommendation. . . . [Emphasis ours]

SEC. 8. Investigation. – Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to answer, the
Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of the case. He shall
have the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The respondent shall be given full
opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on behalf, and be heard by himself and counsel.
However, if upon reasonable notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex
parte. . . .

Quite clearly, the above provisions plainly show two (2) modes of initiatory actions that the
Investigator is empowered to take upon the complaint – either dismiss the same without delay or
proceed with the investigation. Perforce:

A) The Investigator shall proceed with the investigation of the case:

1) if the complaint appears to be meritorious; or
2) upon joinder of the issues (upon submission of the answer by respondent within fifteen [15] days
from the date of service), when the answer shows that the complaint is indeed meritorious; or
3) if respondent fails to answer.

B) On the other hand, the investigator may recommend the dismissal of the same:
1) if the complaint lacks merit; or
2) if the answer shows, to the satisfaction of the Investigator, that the complaint is not meritorious.

Verily, it is within the sound discretion of the Investigator to determine whether or not the complaint is
meritorious and if an investigation must indeed ensue.

In the case at bar, Commissioner San Juan did not see the need to conduct an investigation
because, to her mind, the instances when an investigation shall push through did not arise.
Respondent Atty. Ilao did submit his answer to the complaint and after the exchange of pleadings
between the parties, the Commissioner made the determination that the complaint does not merit
action and must therefore be dismissed.
Evidently, complainant is belaboring under a misapprehension of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. To
the extent of being repetitive, it is only when the complaint bears merit, or when the answer fails to
show that the complaint indeed lacks merit, or when respondent fails to file an answer that an
investigation shall proceed. Otherwise, if the complaint is bereft of merit, either on its face or as
proven by respondent’s answer, it will be unjust to mandate the Investigator to conduct an
investigation.1awphi1.nét
For failure to establish that respondent Atty. Ilao made false representations and advice to his clients,
committed falsehood, misled the court, and misused the Rules of Procedure in violation of the Canons
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Resolution of the IBP dismissing the complaint must be
upheld.1a\^/phi1.net

A perusal of the Complaint for Damages (Civil Case No. 684) filed by herein respondent and his co-
plaintiffs against Teofista Payuran and Attys. Nicanor Gatmaytan, Jr. and Augusto Gatmaytan, will
readily show that said complaint was filed precisely because CA-G.R. SP No. 41717 was filed by
Teofista Payuran with the assistance of herein complainant Atty. Nicanor Gatmaytan, Jr.
Whether or not there is merit to respondent's and his co-plaintiffs' claim for damages in Civil Case No.
684 is not relevant to the instant case. As herein complainant himself pointed out, the right to
litigate is guaranteed by the Constitution and no less than the Supreme Court itself in "R&B Surety
and Insurance Co. v. IAC," 129 SCRA 736 stated that:

The adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor
to the payment of damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to
litigate. Sound principles of justice and public policy demand that the persons shall have free resort
to the courts of law for redress and vindication of their rights without fear of later on standing
trial for damages should their actions lose ground.
Regarding complainant's contention that the filing of Civil Case No. 684 with the Regional Trial Court
of Nasugbu, Batangas was intended to harass the defendants in said case because said case could
have been filed with the courts in Parañaque, Metro Manila, is likewise without merit. It was
expressly stated in said Complaint for Damages that one of the plaintiffs in said case, herein
respondent, was a resident of Nasugbu, Batangas. Since under the Rules of Court, venue may be
the residence of the defendants or of the plaintiffs, at the option of the plaintiffs, Civil Case No.
684 was properly filed in Batangas, the residence of herein respondent
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The Resolution of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated 26 April 2003 is hereby AFFIRMED.