Engineering & Technology, Europe

An alternative approach to Criticality in

'production resource' FMECAs
André Marcon – 6th November 2001

Contents

1. Introduction...............................................................................................................................2
2. The concept of the mathematical expectation of non-availability.....................................2
3. The concept of criticality........................................................................................................2
4. Seriousness and probability scales......................................................................................3
5. Criticality scale........................................................................................................................4
6. An advanced approach to Criticality.....................................................................................5
7. Introduction of the anticipation index...................................................................................6
8. Practical limitations to Criticality-related actions...............................................................7
 An alternative approach to Criticality in 'production resource' FMECAs - Rhodia/André MARCON – 05/11/01- page 2/7

1. Introduction
It is customary, in FMECAs, to calculate the Criticality index C of a failure mode using the
formula C  S  P  D where S, P and D index the severity of the effects, the probability of
occurrence and the probability that the mode will not be detected respectively.
This formula is often applied without a second thought. But what is the real meaning of these
indices? Why are they multiplied? etc.
In the light of the experience gained from numerous 'production resource' FMECAs
conducted within Rhodia, the current document dares to express certain reservations
concerning the habitual application of the technique and makes a number of propositions.

2. The concept of the mathematical expectation of non-availability

Given a failure such that
 time of non-availability per occurrence: MTTR 1
 probable frequency of occurrence per year:  1/MTBF 2
then the mathematical expectation of annual non-availability is MTTR  
Example 1:
 MTTR  10 hours per occurrence
 MTBF  0.5 year, i.e.   2 occurrences per year
 MTTR    20 hours per year
Example 2:
 MTTR  10 hours per occurrence
 MTBF  2 years, i.e.   0.5 occurrence per year
 MTTR    5 hours per year

3. The concept of criticality

MIL-STD-1629A, which is considered to represent the origin of the FMECA approach,
provides the following definition: "Criticality: a relative measure of the consequences of a
failure mode and its frequency of occurrence".
In the case of a 'production resources' FMECA, the primary aim of which is to reduce non-
availability, the product MTTR   which combines the effects of failures with their probable
frequency of occurrence might therefore be thought to provide a good reflection of Criticality.
However, Criticality accepted in these terms would require the manipulation of numbers
containing several significant digits which are susceptible to vary in a ratio of 1 to 104, thus
making the procedure painstaking and inducing the risk of error. Furthermore, the
practitioners of FMECAs risk being blinded by the absolute pretensions and apparent
precision of such orders of magnitude.
Indeed, the broad range of possible estimates of MTTR and  would seem to justify a relative
approach. More modestly, the aim is to categorise the failures and come to an agreement
concerning the prioritised corrective actions and the problem situations.
1
MTTR is understood here in the sense specified in ISO/IEC 2382-14: "Mean time to recovery" (or
"Mean time to restoration"), and should not be confused with "Mean time to repair". The unit of
measurement may be the time or the additional quantity that would have been produced had there not
been a stoppage or deceleration due to the fault.
2
MTBF is understood here in the sense specified in ISO/IEC 2382-14: "Mean operating time between
failures", and should not be confused with "Mean time between failures".
 An alternative approach to Criticality in 'production resource' FMECAs - Rhodia/André MARCON – 05/11/01- page 3/7

4. Severity and probability scales

As in other scales such as the Beaufort scale (wind strength) or Richter scale (magnitude of
seismic activity), the MTTR and  values are subdivided into broad classes which generally
follow a geometric progression3 with each class being represented by a single-digit (or, in
some cases, double-digit) index.
This approach also makes it possible to reveal other, more qualitative concerns such as
quality, safety etc. in parallel to the MTTR values. By convention, it is the most negative
index that is applied.
By way of an example, the scales below are those generally used in Rhodia's continuous
production plants.
The columns containing values in italics correspond to the geometric means of the class
limits. These values are not present in the rating tables used by FMECA analysts. They are
simply used later in this article in support of the proposed argumentation.

MTTR (h) Nonconformity

MTTR classes Hygiene and safety
observed by... S
0.33 < ½ hour 1
1.1 ½ hour to 2 hours First aid 2
4.0 2 hours to 8 hours Operator 3
14 8 hours to 24 hours Accident without stoppage 4
48 24 hours to 4 days Client internal to site 5
170 4 days to 2 weeks Accident with stoppage 6
580 2 weeks to 2 months Client external to site 7
2000 > 2 months 4 Irreversible consequences 8

3
In a geometric progression, the ratio of each term to the preceding term is a constant known as the
common ratio.
4
To take account of the lack of spare parts with long supply dates.
 An alternative approach to Criticality in 'production resource' FMECAs - Rhodia/André MARCON – 05/11/01- page 4/7

Mean 
(year -1)
MTBF classes P
0.048 > 10 years 5 1
0.17 3 years to 10 years 2
6
0.58 1 year to 3 years 3
2.0 1 quarter to 1 year 4
6.9 1 month to 1 quarter 7 5
24 1 week to 1 month 6
83 2 days to 1 week 7
290 < 2 days 8

It should be noted that:

 the size of the classes corresponds to a reasonable confidence interval for this type of
estimate,
 the mean common ratio is 3.46 and varies between 3 and 4 in order to coincide with
values that are meaningful to operators (hour, shift, day, week, month etc.,
 the common ratio is the same for S and P.
These scales have been designed and validated on the basis of experience of both
"manufacturing" and "continuous process" type installations. In practice, only 4 or 5 of the
levels are actually used in any given installation.
In passing, we should point out a recurrent error made by beginners when assigning the P
index: this is not the probability that the cause of the failure will occur but the probability that
the cause will occur and cause the failure mode.

5. Criticality scale
The question that needs to be asked is therefore "is there an easy way to determine a
Criticality index C if we know the indices S and P?".
Let us verify experimentally the results of each of the two simplest conceivable formulae:
C  S  P and C  S  P
Each cell in the table below contains 3 values :
 bold/italic, top-left: CS+P
 bold, top-right CSP
 italic, bottom-centre: MTTR  calculated using the geometric means of the
class limits (values in italics from the tables above)

5
Or mechanical breakages excluding wear and tear or normal ageing.
6
Or new technology or operating conditions for which all preventative measures have theoretically
been implemented.
7
Or new technology or operating conditions for which all preventative measures have not been
implemented.
 An alternative approach to Criticality in 'production resource' FMECAs - Rhodia/André MARCON – 05/11/01- page 5/7

S 2 3 4 5 6 7
P
2 4 4 5 6 6 8 7 10 8 12 9 14
0.19 0.67 2.3 8 28 96

3 5 6 6 9 7 12 8 15 9 18 10 21
0.67 2.3 8 28 96 330

4 6 8 7 12 8 16 9 20 10 24 11 28
2.3 8 28 96 330 1150

5 7 10 8 15 9 20 10 25 11 30
8 28 96 330 1150

6 8 12 9 18 10 24 11 30
28 96 330 1150
9 14 10 21 11 28
7 96 330 1150

It can be seen that a given MTTR  value is associated with

 several values of C  S  P ; for example MTTR    96 is associated with several
values of C  S  P between 14 and 20
 one and only one value of C  S + P whatever the pair considered (S, P); for example
MTTR    96 is associated with C  S  P  9, irrespective of whether 9 is the result of
8+1, 7+2, 6+3…or 1+8.8
Conclusions:
Provided that we take the precaution of constructing seriousness and frequency rating scales
which follow a quasi-geometric progression using the same common ratio then the formula
C  S  P is a faithful reflection of the mathematical expectation of annual non-
availability.

6. An advanced approach to Criticality

Since the MTTR and  progressions are geometric and share the same common ratio (mean
value 3.46 in the current example), the indices of severity (S) and probability (P) can be
considered as logarithms. Given these conditions, it follows that:
 MTTR   3.46 S
    3.46 P
 MTTR      3.46 S+P
We may therefore justifiably postulate that C  S + P, thus corroborating the analysis set out
above.
If we use the geometric means of the MTTR and  class limits and substitute the
corresponding values:
 MTTR  0.096  3.46 S (in hours of failure)
   0.014  3.46 P
(in failures per year)
 MTTR    0.00134  3.46 S+P
(in hours per year)
Caution! the correlation between Criticality and unavailability for production is always very
approximate and must therefore be regarded as indicative only. The primary objective is to
establish a hierarchy of failures and the corresponding preventive actions.

8
It should be noted that this rule of uniqueness is not generally observed in conventional rating scales.
 An alternative approach to Criticality in 'production resource' FMECAs - Rhodia/André MARCON – 05/11/01- page 6/7

However, calculating total MTTR  does give us an idea, if only an approximate one, of
overall non-availability. This is useful in the design phase since it allows us to ensure that
non-availability will remain within the non-availability limits that are tolerated in the
specifications.

7. Introduction of the anticipation index

As it is traditionally understood, the index D is associated with the probability of the non-
detection of a failure and is combined with the other indices to give C  S  P  D.
Experience has shown that it is often somewhat difficult to assess P and D independently of
one another. In effect, the detection of warning signs of a failure results in action being taken
before the failure occurs and thus reduces the index P.
Another interpretation was proposed by Jean-Luc Thomé, at the time acting as a consultant
with SNPE Ingénierie and used by Rhodia since 1994. According to him, the longer the
period that elapses between the time of detection of the warning signs and the time that
maintenance is performed, the less the negative impact of this action:
 implementation of measures to satisfy customers
 possibility of grouping together maintenance actions and thus achieving an overall
reduction in the number and time of stoppages
The index D has therefore been replaced by an index A, or Anticipation index, which is
thought to attenuate Criticality as specified in the formula and the rating scale below:
CSPA

Following detection of the mode or its warning signs, the acceptable

period for the conduct of corrective maintenance actions is... A
nil
immediate corrective maintenance action since the warning signs do not
0
indicate the required remedy and continued, downgraded operation is
unacceptable

short (by way of example, a few days)

the corrective maintenance action is the direct cause of a stoppage (or slow-
1
down), however, it is possible to schedule other pending maintenance
actions which can then be performed "invisibly"

average (by way of example, 1 to 3 months)

the corrective maintenance action can probably await an unscheduled
2
stoppage (or slow-down) due to a different cause and therefore be
performed "invisibly"

long (by way of example, 1 year)

the corrective maintenance action can almost certainly await the next 3
scheduled stoppage

This approach may seem somewhat arbitrary. It is nevertheless practical and encourages the
mobilisation of conditional maintenance. Implicitly, it amounts to accepting that by reducing
the anticipation scale rating by one, the mathematical expectation of loss is also reduced by
a factor equal to the common ratio of the geometric progression of S and P (i.e. 3.46 in our
case).
 An alternative approach to Criticality in 'production resource' FMECAs - Rhodia/André MARCON – 05/11/01- page 7/7

8. Practical limitations to Criticality-related actions

The experience gathered by Rhodia using these rating scales has given the following results:
 C  8, preventive action is imperative
 C  6 or 7, preventive action may be implemented depending on the cost and the
difficulties associated with its accomplishment
 C  5, preventive action is not usually justified
The use of such values has the following advantages
 if a rapid rating of a failure mode yields a value C  5 then there is no point filling in the
"Causes" column of the FMECA table (which is always the most time-consuming) thus
resulting in considerable time savings during the analysis phase,
 if C  8, the working group can immediately suggest preventive actions for
implementation before the end of the analysis phase (which may take several weeks if a
large-scale investigation is required), thus making it possible to:
- sustain the motivation of those concerned by eliminating the painstaking, monotonous
nature of the analysis
- benefit more rapidly from the advantages of the FMECA and thus increase the
motivation of participants and management alike.