GAMES AND STRATEGIES 2022

Week 6: ESS and Correlated equilibria

Aim of the work:

• Check if a profile is a Correlated equilibria

• Check if a profile is an ESS

Exercise 1. We consider the following variant of the chicken game

C K
C 6,6 2,7
K 7,2 0,0

1. Find all mixed Nash equilibrium and the corresponding payoffs.

2. Justify why the following correlated strategy is a correlated equilibrium without computation

C K
C 0 1/2
K 1/2 0

3. Prove that the following correlated strategy is a correlated equilibrium

C K
C 1/3 1/3
K 1/3 0

(Hint: Check only deviation of Player 1 and admits that by symmetry this is also true for
Player 2.)

4. Compare the vector of payoff between the two correlated equilibrium and the NE where
both strategies are played.

Exercise 2. We consider the following game

L R
T 0,0 4,2
B 3,3 2,1
We want to check if the following correlated strategy is a correlated equilibrium
L R
T 1/8 3/8
B 2/8 2/8

1. Check if Player 1 has a profitable deviation after receiving the recommendation T .

2. Check if Player 1 has a profitable deviation after receiving the recommendation B.

3. Check if Player 2 has a profitable deviation after receiving the recommendation L.

4. Check if Player 2 has a profitable deviation after receiving the recommendation R.

5. Conclude.

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Exercise 3. We consider the following symmetric game variant non zero-sum games of Rock-
Paper-Scissors where ties are rewarded
R P S
R 0,0 1,4 4,1
P 4,1 0,0 1,4
S 1,4 4,1 0,0

1. What is the unique Nash equilibrium (no proof necessary) and its payoff vector.

2. By taking inspiration from the slides, propose a correlated strategy that could be a correlated
equilibrium.

3. Check if it is indeed.

Exercise 4. We consider the following symmetric game

A B
A -2,-2 4,0
B 0,4 1,1

1. Find all mixed symmetric Nash equilibrium.

2. Determine which among the mixed equilibrium are evolutionary stable.

Exercise 5. We consider the following symmetric game

A B
A 5,5 0,5
B 5,0 10,10

1. Find all mixed symmetric Nash equilibrium.

2. Determine which among the mixed equilibrium are evolutionary stable.

Exercise 6. We consider the following symmetric game variant non zero-sum games of Rock-
Paper-Scissors where ties are rewarded
R P S
R 1,1 2,-2 -2,2
P 2,-2 1,1 -2,2
S -2,2 2,-2 1,1

1. Check if there exist pure equilibrium.

2. Check that (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) is a Nash equilibrium.

3. Determine if (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) is evolutionary stable.

Exercise(*) 7. We consider the following symmetric game variant non zero-sum games of
Rock-Paper-Scissors where ties are rewarded
R P S
R x,x -1,1 1,-1
P 1,-1 x,x -1,1
S -1,1 1,-1 x,x

1. As a function of x, determine if there exists a pure equilibrium.

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2. Check that (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) is a Nash-equilibrium.

3. When there exists a pure equilibrium, determine if they are ESS (distinguish x = 1 and
x > 1).

4. Determine if (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) is evolutionary stable as a function of x.