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1) Mohori Bibee v.

Dhurniodas Ghose, (1902-03) 30 lA 114: ILR (1903) 30 Cal 539


(PC)-
Sir Lord North observed: "Looking at Section 11 their Lordships are satisfied that the Act
makes it essential that all contracting parties should be competent to contract and expressly
provides that a person who by reason of infancy is incompetent to contract cannot make a
contract within the meaning of the Act. The question whether a contract is void or voidable
presupposes the existence of a contract within the meaning of the Act, and cannot arise in the
case of an infant."

2) Nash v. Inmam, [1908] 2 KB 1


The court held that “Necessaries means goods or services suitable to the condition in life of
minor, or any other person incapable of forming contract for himself, and as to his actual
requirements at the time of sale and delivery”1. The defendant was already well-stocked with
apparel that was appropriate for his station in life, thus the clothing purchase could not be
considered a necessity and the action had to be dismissed.

3) Brohmo Dutt v. Dharmo Das Ghose, (1989) ILR 26 Cal 381(

It was held by a special bench in Brohmo Dutt v. Dharmo Das Ghose that Section 115 of the
Indian Evidence Act has no application to contracts by infants, but the term “person” in that
section applies only to a person of full age and competent to enter into contracts.

4) Gadigeppa Bhimappa Meti v Balangowda Bhimangowda, AIR 1931 Bom 561.(


justin)
In a case before the Bombay High Court, Beaumont CJ reviewed the earlier authorities and
concluded by saying: "The court is of opinion that where an infant represents fraudulently or
otherwise, that he is of age and thereby induces another to enter into a contract with him then
in an action founded on the contract the infant is not estopped from setting up infancy."

5) Padma Vithoba Chakkayya v Mohd Multani, AIR 1963 SC 70, 74; (1963) 3 SCR
229 (justin)
"A minor is in law incapable of giving consent, and, there being no consent, there could be no
change in the character" or status of the parties.

6) Johnson v. Pye, (1665) 1 Sid 258: 82 ER 1091.(Justin)


In England it was laid down as early as 1665 in Johnson v Pye that "an infant who obtains a
loan of money by falsely representing his age cannot be made to repay the amount of the loan
in the form of damages for deceit.”

1
Cornell law school
7) Sadiq Ali Khan v. Jai Kishore, A.LR. 1928. ( justin)
A later case settled the judicial controversy where the Privy Council observed that a contract
by a minor is a nullity and incapable of founding a plea of estoppel, even though, the minor
made a false representation as to age and induced the plaintiff to make the contract.
8) Leslie v. SheilL [1914] 3 K.B. (justin)
The principle underlying the decision is that there can be no estoppel against a statute and
section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act should read subject to section 11 of the Indian
Contract Act. There is difference on this position in English law.

9) Nazir Ahmad v Jiwan Das, AIR 1938 Lah 159. (Justin)


"The consideration which passed under the earlier contract cannot be implied into the
contract into which the minor enters on attaining majority.”

10) Suraj Narain v Sukhu Ahir, ILR (1928) 51 All 164. (justin)
In a case before the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court the facts were:
A minor borrowed a sum of money, executing a simple bond for it, and after attaining
majority executed a second bond in respect of the original loan plus interest. It was held by a
majority of two as against one that the suit upon the second bond was not maintainable, as
that bond was without consideration and did not come under Section 25(2) of the Contract
Act. Sulaiman CJ said: "Section 25, sub-clause (2), applies when there is a promise to
compensate wholly or in part a person who has already voluntarily done something for the
promisor. There is no question of ratification in such cases.+payment(restitution)

11) MC Nagalakshmi v. MA Farook, AIR 2007 Kant 105. ( jack and jones)
Some wind of change is reflected by the following decision. The defendant was minor at the
time when he executed a deed about his interest in the estate. The suit was filed at a time
when he had attained majority. He did not repudiate the agreement on attaining majority. He
rather admitted it. The contract became enforceable to the extent of the minor's interest in the
estate.

12) Valentini v. Canali, (1889) 24 Q.B.D. 166. (persuasive) USA (JACK AND
JONES)
In Valentini v. Canali, Lord Coleridge CJ observed that “When an infant has paid for
something and has consumed or used it, it is contrary to natural justice that he should recover
back the money which he has paid."

13) Kumar Ganganand Singh v. Maharaj Sir Rameshwar Singh Bahadur, (1927),
102 Ind Cas 449. Justin

The Patna High Court in Kumar Ganganand Singh v. Maharaj Sir Rameshwar Singh Bahadur
held that the rule of estoppel is a rule of evidence and must be taken subject to the Indian
Contract Act.
14) Mohmood Ali v. Chinki, A.l.R. 1930 All. 128.( jack and jones)
In all cases necessaries are variable in accordance with the state and condition of the infant
himself.

15) Nash v. Inmam, [1908] 2 KB 1.

Fletcher Moulton LJ in Nash v lnman, "An infant, like a lunatic, is incapable of making a
contract of purchase in strict sense of the word; but if a man satisfies the needs of the infant
or lunatic by supplying to him necessaries the law will imply an obligation to repay him for
the services so rendered, and will enforce that obligation against the estate of the infant or
lunatic. The consequence is that basis of the action is hardly contract. The real foundation is
an obligation which the law imposes on the infant to make a fair payment in respect of needs
satisfied. In other words, the obligation arises re and not consensus.”

"two conditions must be satisfied, namely: (1) the contract must be for goods reasonably
necessary for his support in his station in life, and (2) he must not have already a sufficient
supply of these necessaries".

16) Kundan Bibi v. Sree Narayan, 11 C.W.N. 135. (JACK AND JONES)

In the case of Kundan Bibi v. Sree Narayan, where Rs. 7000 was the price of goods supplied
during minority. While executing a new pronote besides Rs. 7000 another sum of Rs. 76,
advanced as necessaries, was mentioned and the creditor agreed to abstain from suing for a
year. As a resultant effect of this fact situation the court interpreted the pronote executed on
majority as a new one and binding.

17) Bhola Ram v Bhagat Ram, AIR 1927 Lah.


In the case of Bhola Ram v Bhagat Ram, AIR 1927 Lahore, Every transaction requires its
own consideration, and consideration from a previous contract cannot be transferred to the
contract that the minor joined upon reaching the majority. If an individual obtains a portion of
a benefit while still in his minority and another portion after reaching majority, a commitment
by the child to repay for all, if promised after reaching the majority, is legal and binding.

18) Chapple v. Cooper, (1844) 13 M&W 252, 258: 153 ER 105. (J AND J AND JUSTIN)
"Things necessary are those without which an individual cannot reasonably exist. In the first
place, food, raiment, lodging and the like. About these there is no doubt. Again, as the proper
cultivation of the mind is as expedient as the support of the body, instruction in art or trade,
or intellectual, moral and religious education may be necessary also Then the classes being
established, the subject and extent of the contract may vary according to the state and
condition of the infant himself. His clothes may be fine or coarse according to his rank; his
education may vary according to the station he is to fill; and the medicines will depend on the
illness with which he is afflicted, and the extent of his probable means when of full age.... But
in all these cases it must first be made out that the class itself is one in which the things
furnished are essential to the existence and of reasonable advantage and comfort of the infant
contractor. Thus, articles of mere luxury are always excluded, though luxurious articles of
utility are in some cases allowed."
19) CASE-INDRAN RAMASWAMI V/S ANTHIAPPA CHETTIAR (1906) MLJ
422. (justin)
The second promissory note is void as it is without consideration. However, on attaining the
age of majority the person can enter a fresh agreement, with fresh consideration and terms of
contract, but cannot carry on with the old agreement with some changes here and there.

Kundan Bibee v. Sree Narayan: S, while he was a minor received some goods from K in connection
with his business and was indebted to him, when he attained majority, he took some more money
and executed a bond for paying the total amount to K. In an action by K to recover the said amount,
it was contended by S that he was not liable to pay as they purported to be in his minority. However,
S was made liable to pay the whole amount since there was a new consideration attached. (J&J,
restitution- issue 3)

20) Kuwarlal v. Surajmal: Regarding necessities provided to minors it was held that the house
given to a minor on rent for living in it and to continue his studies is part of necessities, and
therefore he is entitled to payment of rent from minor’s property. (J&J, necessity &
restitution- issue 1 & 3)

21) Suraj Narayan v. Sukhu Aheer: In the concerned case, a person borrowed some money
during his minority and after attaining the age of majority, he made a fresh promise to pay
that sum and interest thereon, but this contract was not enforceable due to the reason that
consideration received during minority is not a good consideration. (Justin, issue 3)

22) Mir Sarwarjan V Fakhruddin Mahomed Chowdhury: In this case, the contract to purchase
some immovable property had been made by the guardian on behalf of the minor. Later,
that minor sued the other party for a decree of specific performance to recover possession.
His action was rejected by the court. The court, in its judgment, said that it was not possible
to bind the minor's property, both movable and immovable, by any contract. This is because
the minor is not competent to contract. (Justin, issue 1)

23) In this case, Johnson V Pye in 1965, it was said that if by falsely representing a minor
obtained load from someone, he cannot be made to repay the loans in the form of damages
for deceit. Hence, a minor cannot be held liable for anything which would directly or
indirectly enforce any agreement. (Justin, issue 3)
24) Leslie (R) Ltd V Sheil: According to the facts of this case, a minor succeeded in deceiving
some money lenders by misrepresenting their age and were successful in obtaining a sum of
4000 euros from them. Their attempt to recover the amount and subsequent damages
failed due to the principle explained above.

However, when a minor asks the aid of the court for the cancellation of a contract, the court may
grant relief with the condition that he shall restore all the benefits obtained by him under the
contract and also make suitable compensation to the other party. (J&J, restitution- issue 3)

25) Khan Gul V Lakha Singh. Here, a minor by fraudulently concealing his age, contracted to sell
a plot of land. After receiving the consideration of Rs. 17,500, he refused to fulfil his bargain
of the contract. However, according to the final verdict of this case, the minor was
compelled to refund the consideration. (J&J, restitution- issue 3)

26) Jagar Nath Singh V Laltha Prasad. The Allahabad High Court stated that if any underage
person induces another person to purchase property from them, he/she is liable to pay the
benefits received by them due to this transaction before recovering the possession of the
property sold. (J&J, restitution- issue 3)

27) Chapple V Cooper

Necessities refers to the things without which a person can't reasonably exist. This includes things
like food, place, lodging, etc. The clothes may be fine or coarse depending upon his rank, his
education may vary or the kind of medicines consumed may vary.

The articles of mere luxury are always excluded, though luxurious items may be necessary in some
cases. Thus, what is necessity is a relative fact to be determined with reference to the fortune and
circumstances of the particular minor. Articles that may be a necessity to one may be a luxury to
another. (J&J issue 1, necessity)

28) Peters V Fleming, the court said that prima facie, it was not unreasonable that an
undergraduate college student should have a watch and a watch chain supplied on credit as
such it was necessary to support him in his degree.

Two conditions must be satisfied to render a minor's estate liable for necessaries:

 The contract must be for the goods reasonably necessary for his reasonable existence

 He must not already have a sufficient supply of the necessities

(J&J issue 1, necessity)


29) T.R. Appaswami Aiyangar vs Narayanaswami Aiyar And Ors. on 28 March, 1930

Equivalent citations: (1931) 60 MLJ 117

If a minor were allowed to misrepresent his age to a purchaser, to sell property to the purchaser so
deceived, to deliver the property to him, to collect the purchase-money and then to come to Court at
once and recover the property without being made to give up the purchase-money, that would be
making the Court an instrument of very gross fraud, which we could never tolerate. In my opinion,
under the provisions of Section 65 of the Contract Act, under the provisions of Section 41 of the
Specific Relief Act and on the general principle which I have mentioned we cannot make the decree,
to which the plaintiffs are entitled for the recovery, of the property, except on condition that they
refund the purchase-money. (J&J issue 3)

In Calcutta, the view is taken that though there may be no estoppel, misrepresentation by a minor
may give a right to restitution. Golani Abdin Sarkar v. Hem Chandra Majumdar (1915) 20 C.W.N.
418. (J&J issue 3)

30) Harnath Kunwar v. Indar Bahadur Singh (1922) L.R. 50 I.A. 69: I.L.R. 45 A. 179: 44 M.L.J. 489
(P.C.), is a case where a transfer was void. from its inception and their Lordships of the Privy
Council deal with the various clauses of Section 65 of the Contract Act and make the buyer
get back the purchase money. That was a suit brought by a purchaser for possession of an
estate sold by a Hindu widow's reversioner before the reversion fell in or for the return of
the purchase-money. It was found that the sale was void; but it was also found that through
misapprehension the parties did not know that at the time of the sale but discovered it
afterwards. In that case the Privy Council decided that the vendor must give compensation
to the purchaser. They directed that he must pay the purchase-money with interest. They
arrived at that result by applying Section 65 of the Contract Act to the case. There it will be
seen the sale was void from its inception, but it was only discovered to be so subsequently.
(J&J issue 3)

31) Gadigeppabhimappa Meti v. Balangowda Bhimangowda, it was held that if an infant


fraudulently misrepresents himself as a major, then in an action the minor is not estoppled
from setting up infancy. (Justin, issue 1)

32) Mallacheruvu Raghavayya vs Mallacheruvu Subbayya And Ors. on 25 October, 1917

Equivalent citations: 43 Ind Cas 908

I think he must be compelled to refund his share of the purchase-money before a decree for
possession is given to him. I would, therefore, in reversal of the decree of the Courts below, give a
decree to the plaintiff for possession of his half share in the property in suit and would also direct
that he do pay within three months from this date to the 2nd defendant 150 rupees, being his share
of the consideration for the sale. If the money is not paid, there will be a charge upon the property
for this sum. I do not think that this is a case in which the plaintiff should be given any costs. (J&J
issue 3)

33) Mathai Mathai vs Joseph Mary


The case was to exert an enormous influence on subsequent case law, to the
extent that it came to be treated as an unquestionable axiom of Indian contract law—a
status that was confirmed recently by the Supreme Court of India in Mathai Mathai
v. Joseph Mary (2015).

34) Raja Narendra Lal Khan vs Hrishikesh Mukherjee –


It is now quite clear that under the Indian Contract Act a minor's agreement is void, and it
follows that, being void, it is not capable of ratification. If there were room for doubt on this
point, I think it would be sufficient to refer to Section 25 of the Contract Act. That section
does not include the renewal of an infant's promise apparently because an infant's promise
does not give rise to an imperfect obligation, but is ab initio void. Hrishi, therefore, could not
ratify the engagements made by him as a minor. Raja Narendra Lal Khan vs Hrishikesh
Mukherjee And Ors. on 31 May, 1918

35) In the case of Narain Singh v. Chiranji Lal A.I.R. 1924 All. 730, it was remarked that if a
minor, when of full age, takes it upon himself to pay a previous debt, there is no reason
either in law or equity why his agreement should be deemed to be "unlawful."
36) Ajudhir Prasad vs Chandanlal -Minor not to restore
37) 13th report law commission
38) Mahamed Arif v. Sarswato Debya (1891) 18 ILR Cal 259 (Calcutta High Court)
39) Hanmant Lakshman v. Jayarao Nasinha (1889) 13 ILR Bom 50 (Bombay High Court)
40) Chekka Adinarayana v. Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company (2005)
41)

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