Risk Analysis Based in ALARP Concept in Tailings

Dams
Pablo Ossa
División El Teniente, Codelco, Chile

ABSTRACT
Due the current rate of failures in tailings dams in recent years, regulations and standards have
currently been generated that require regular reviews of the safety of operations to anticipate, prevent
and mitigate potential failures that could occur. In this context, the author has developed a
methodology that allows the integration of the ALARP concept into the risk analysis associated with
the potential failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) detected in the operation.
This analysis is based on three major stages. The first stage consists of an exhaustive review of the
design and construction of the deposit, detecting potential deviations from and/or defects in the
original design to analyse and rule out potential failure modes (credibility of the mechanism, based
on background information). In a second stage, a FMEA is developed for three scenarios related to
risk assessment without control measures, with current controls and subsequently with controls and
proposed mitigation measures (SQRA). This second stage makes it possible to verify deviations and
corrective measures that must be taken to mitigate risks and introduce the subsequent analysis of the
ALARP methodology. The third and final stage considers the subsequent evaluation of the remaining
risk when implementing the controls and corrective measures, understanding that these must tend
to reduce the risk and therefore their results must be verified and quantifiable based on a quantitative
risk assessment (QRA).
The implementation of this methodology enables development of safer operation of a tailings dam,
also complying with the new requirements demanded by international standards that the industry
requires as set out in the Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management (GISTM).

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INTRODUCTION
During the last few years, some catastrophic tailings dam failures have occurred. This has changed
the way in which the mining industry manages its deposits including new regulations and guides
that aim to avoid these events. Consequently, the new standards and regulations that have been
generated demand a series of requirements to guarantee the stability of these works. Among them is
what is indicated in requirement 4.7 of the GISTM: “Implementation of measures to reduce the
probability and the consequences of a tailings facility failure in order to reduce the risk to a level as
low as reasonably practicable (ALARP)”. This concept has been utilized for decades in the medical
field, but in the mining industry it presents a great challenge. However, the GISTM does not indicate
a methodology. This paper presents a methodology and useful tools that may be used to demonstrate
that ALARP can be achieved through a rigorous risk analysis.

FIRST STAGE: REVIEW THE DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE TSF

The first step in conducting a risk analysis is to review the design and construction of the TSF. This
first analysis makes it possible in the next stage to detect credible failure modes that could potentially
develop, deviations from the original design, and the intrinsic risk that the deposit presents given the
conditions in which it was built. This information must be used to adapt the design basis and, for the
Engineer of Record, to update the Design Basis Report (DBR). This report must include at least the
aspects indicated in Table 1.

Table 1: Design Basis Report content

Document Relevant information

Design Engineering A summary that includes construction method (upstream, centerline,

Report downstream, combination), type of deposition material (hydraulic fill
construction, spigotting, cycloning with direct deposition, cell
construction, combination), geology, tailings characteristics and soil
foundation, construction materials, seepage control and drainage system,
geometry of facility, stabilization measures, instrumentation,
environmental factors and closure plan.

Geotechnical studies Campaigns of the different stages of the deposit, including the first stages
of engineering carried out to the most recent. This information should
provide answers on the type of behaviour that the material develops and
potential deficits that exist with respect to parameters for which there is
(uncertainty) such as the potential development of a brittle behaviour
(abrupt loss of resistance at low levels of deformation).

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 Seismic hazard Type of seismic hazard study considered (DSHA or PSHA), Maximum
Credible Earthquake (MCE), PGA, spectral, energy parameters and
attenuation laws considered.

Deformation analysis Levels of deformation developed according to the type of analysis

elaborated (static or dynamic). Details of the constitutive model and
parameters used, considerations and main results obtained.

Climate*and Type of weather and water influences in the TSF. Extreme hydrological
hydrology events are important points, the Maximum Probable Precipitation (PMP)
and the Probable Maximum Flood (PMF).

Hydrogeologic Degree of hydrogeologic complexity, permeability characteristic of the

studies TSF foundation, potential problems related to increases in pore pressures
in the foundation soil that generate significant hydraulic gradients.

Infiltration models Flow conditions within the dam, expected infiltration rates and projected
system outflows.

Geology Regional geology, geological faults, geomorphology of the site and

potentials landslides.

Instrumentations Monitoring of the behaviour of the TSF. Information related to different

geotechnical parameters how pore pressure, horizontal displacement,
vertical displacement, seismic accelerations and stresses with respective
associated instrumentation.

Dam breach studies Type of failure modelled, volume of mobilized tailings, rate of breach
development, breach geometry, rheological properties considered and
downstream inundation extents.

Operations, Roles, responsibilities and levels of authority in the TSF. Plans,

maintenance, and procedures, processes, surveillance methods and activities,
surveillance manual instrumentation – Trigger action response plan (TARP) and emergency
preparedness and response plan (EPRP).

The DBR must finally present a summary of the comparison between the original design and the
current situation of the TSF. It is important to highlight the engineering deviations or potential
uncertainties to later evaluate the risk that these mean with respect to the original design.

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Potential Failures Modes (PFM)

After the DBR has been finalized, a list of potential failure modes (PMF) that are possible to develop
should be identified. This list must be proposed in the first instance by the Engineer of Record, and
later it must be presented to a multidisciplinary panel to be evaluated and expanded if appropriate.
For this purpose, the framework set out in Table 2 is proposed. The table includes definitions and the
detailed description and two fundamental aspects, if it is credible and if it has the potential to be
catastrophic in accordance with the GISTM definitions.

Table 2: Potential Failure Modes description

Catastrophic *
Credible *
PFM Type Component Initial event Load Project stage

ID -_Slope stability -_Dam -_Poor compaction of sands - Static -_Construction Yes Yes

-_Drainage system -_Slip_surface_through - Seismic -_Operation No No

-_Overtopping -_Dam-soil a weak plane -_Independent -_Closure

foundation
-_Poor drainage -_Post Closure
-_Filter_system
-_Piping -_Liquefaction of granular -_Independent
-_Other… material or strain softening
of cohesive material under
the action of a seismic load

-_Other…

*: Definition according to GISTM

Each PFM must include a description of the mechanism which is credible, as well as relevant
parameters and controls for that would be required to anticipate the development of the failure mode.

SECOND STAGE: FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA)

In this second stage a Failure Mode & Effects Analysis (FMEA) must be done. This methodology
quantifies the risk of a failure. The first step is establishing a risk matrix for the TSF failure. This type
of analysis is different from operational risk and for this reason the matrix of the FMEA must be
special. The main requirements are:
• Development of consequence chart: this point must reflect the corporation’s perspective
about different aspect of risk (potential population at risk, potential loss of life, environment,
health, economics or others) and must be defined by the most senior levels of the
organization.
• Development of likelihood chart: this point is easier than the previous one, but it must
subdivide ranges of probabilities according to well-founded criteria. Good judgment is

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 required at this point to define sensible probabilities. The engineering team need to be
especially careful in defining the lower range of probabilities.

The organization must have a guideline consistently defining the consequences which potentially
have the same meaning. For example, in the GISTM consequence matrix illustrated in Table 3, the
severity of extreme in potential loss of life more than 100 must be equivalent to an extreme economic
impact such as 1 billion of dollars or an environmental impact over an area of more than 20 km2.

Table 3: Consequence matrix in the GISTM

Aspect / Consequences Extreme *

Potential loss of life > 100

Environment Catastrophic loss of critical habitat or rare and endangered species. Process
water highly toxic. Very high potential for acid rock drainage or metal leaching
effects from released tailings. Potential area of impact > 20 km2. Restoration or
compensation in kind impossible or requires a very long time (> 20 years).

Infrastructure - economics Extreme economic losses affecting critical infrastructure or services, (e.g.,
hospital, major industrial complex, major storage facilities for dangerous
substances) or employment. Very high relocation/compensation to
communities and very high social readjustment costs. >US$1B.

*: Each column has the same consequences classification

An example of a risk matrix is presented in Figure 1. The matrix contains 7 levels of probability
(adapted from SME) and 5 consequence levels as per the GISTM. Additionally, the meaning of risk
must be indicated for each definition. An example is shown in Table 4.

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 Figure 1 Example of risk matrix (7x5)

Table 4: Risk meaning descriptors

Risk Description

Extreme Must be mitigated immediately and communicate to the President of the

company

High Mitigate between 1 – 2 years, communicate to the local directors

Medium Implement, complement to monitoring plan, communicate to the site manager

Low Monitor

Risk evaluation

At this stage, the risk is evaluated in three cases with a semi-quantitative risk analysis (SQRA). For
this purpose, the matrix described above is used together with the detailed description of each PFM.
Control measures that reduce risk must be effective in their application in order to reduce the
probability and consequence of each PFM. An application scheme is presented in the Table 5 and
show how the risk decreases in the three cases. Particular attention should be paid when the current
risk is equal to the risk without controls. With the results of this analysis, it is possible to cover a large
part of the phenomenon with a lower degree of risk, and in the next stage move on a more detailed
quantitative risk analysis (QRA).

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Table 5: risk analysis in three stages

PFM Description Risk without Risk with current Risk with additional
controls controls controls (residual risk)

ID Causes of High Medium Low

PFM

THIRD STAGE: RISK ANALYSIS IN ALARP CONDITION

Finally, in this last stage, the risk must be quantified by probabilities associated with triggers that
generate the failure of the deposit using more precisely defined fault trees. In this way, by quantifying
the cost of additional controls carried out with cost/benefit curves it can be established if the
mitigation measures are justifiable and if the level of mitigation can be defined as being as low as
reasonably practicable. As an example, analyses have been carried out incorporating the definitions
of annual exceedance probabilities against potential loss of life associated with a dam failure with
ANCOLD limits (Guidelines on risk assessment, 2022). The PFM are initially in an unacceptable zone,
but with the A controls the risk reduced in terms of probabilities and in the B case the risk reduces in
terms of consequences to an acceptable zone. A combination which reduces the probability and
consequences is the C case. This evaluation takes as a reference a point of the analysis of consequences
(potential loss of life), but potentially other environmental, social, economic aspects can be evaluated
in the same way. The ultimate decision to adopt the mitigation measures must be made by the
company.

Figure 2 Number of fatalities vs annual probability of failure

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CONCLUSION
The presented risk assessment methodology has three stages that identify, analyse and evaluate risk.
The first stage identifies the risks using the Design Basis Report to develop a list of Potential Failure
Modes. In the second stage, by conducting a risk analysis using a semi quantitative FMEA
deficiencies can be identified, and improvements made for three different scenarios (without
controls, current controls and with additional controls). Finally, mitigations are selected that satisfy
ALARP using a QRA. The follow-up of the control measures adopted, their implementation and
results must be constantly reviewed until they can be shown to have achieved an effectiveness that
allows the companies to justify that they have reduced the risk to as low as reasonably practicable.
It is necessary that a panel of experts, especially the Engineer of Record, be involved in the risk
assessment and ALARP process to ensure success. This guides the discussion and filters the risk and
the Potential Failure Modes that are realistic. Good judgment is paramount. Engineers responsible
for design, construction and operation of mine waste facilities must read and understand the reports
documenting the causes of dam failures because reports are the basis of our regulations, standards
and guidelines (Eldridge, 2019). For this reason, it is essential to learn from experience and review
the different reports that show the reasons for the great disasters that we have suffered.
Another fundamental aspect is that our society currently shows less risk tolerance with respect to the
mining industry. Companies must be able to anticipate potential conflicts with communities and this
only will be achieved to the extent that they make informed decisions through regular reviews, risk
management updates and appropriate treatment plans throughout the life cycle of a TSF, including
closure and post closure stages.

REFERENCES
ICMM, UNEP, PRI. (2020) “Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management” (GISTM)

SME (2022) “Tailings Management Handbook a life cycle approach” (SME)

ANCOLD (2022) “Guidelines on risk assessment” (ANCOLD)

Eldridge T., Keynote Lecture at TMW 2019 (Lessons Yet to be Learned – Terry Eldridge - YouTube)

Blight, G. (2010) “Geotechnical Engineering for mine waste storage facilities” CRC Press