Freud's Psychoanalysis: Interpretation and Property

Author(s): PAUL ENDO

Source: American Imago , Winter 1998, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Winter 1998), pp. 459-482
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26304601

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 PAUL ENDO

Freud's Psychoanalysis:
Interpretation and Property
Psychoanalysis, writes Freud (1923), is "an art of interpre
tion" (239). In his major contributions to the history o
psychoanalysis, On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Moveme
(1914) and An Autobiographical Study (1925), Freud revis
those defining moments when he first claims a knowled
unavailable to others, a knowledge that allows him to dis
guish himself as psychoanalysis. In these critical encounter
property is allocated, identities are shaped, meaning is
tested—the proper, in all senses, is distributed. Such scenes
interpretative election double as rites of initiation, passage
into maturity that prove (both test and confirm) Freu
responsibility for psychoanalysis. Claiming responsibility rat
than originality, Freud can assert a moral right to psychoan
sis without arguing for genetic ownership. He can advance
alternate origin story less indebted to the essentialist narrat
of a decisive break between pre-psychoanalysis and psyc
analysis "proper."1 Freud approaches ownership from t
outside; he assumes responsibility for psychoanalysis, an
sumption ("taking upon oneself') that identifies him wi
psychoanalysis and, the one supporting and propping up th
other, effectively creates both himself and Psychoanalysis i
single act. His paternity—which has more to do with affiliat
than filiation—involves adopting contingent, local, even no
existent properties and, through what amounts to an insti
ing act, contracting them into service as "psychoanalysis."
In On the History, Freud recalls the silence with which h
early researches were greeted by an unresponsive and ev
hostile scientific community.2 He is careful to add that th
isolation is not without its compensations: in a familiar aut
biographical topos, ascetic withdrawal generates mystical c
version. "I learnt to restrain speculative tendencies and
follow the unforgotten advice of my master, Charcot: to look a

American Imago, Vol. 55, No. 4, 459-482. © 1998 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

459

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460 Freud's Psychoanalysis

the same things again and again until they themselves begin to
speak" (Freud 1914, 22). He is liberated from external influ
ences and the politics of professional competition and jeal
ousy. Publications "could be postponed as long as I pleased,
since there was no doubtful 'priority' to be defended" (Freud
1914, 22). Property and ownership have no place in this
Edenic "splendid isolation." Indeed, according to Ernestjones
(1957), "Freud was never interested in questions of priority,
which he found merely boring [. . .]" (100). But Freud's
anxieties about priority have been well-documented.3 Even in
what Michel de Certeau has called the "Freudian Novel," a
kind of hybrid historiography open to the impropriety or
"non-topos" of poetry, Freud never completely abandons his
pretensions to a proper, authoritative voice. De Certeau (1986)
writes: "He needs to assure a surplus of institutional force in
the place where it is lacking in his discourse so that it might be
supposed to have knowledge" (33).4 Freud is aware that
property is contested and, moreover, that "splendid isola
tion"—taking oneself and one's property out of circulation—is
tantamount to abrogating one's rights. Priority must be de
fended, counter-claims answered, one's own position advanced
and aggressively publicized. Throughout his career Freud is
concerned with commemorating originary acts and celebrat
ing discoveries.5
Despite his epochal decentring of the subject, Freud's
authority depends upon a faith in ownership indebted to a
liberal construction of the subject and its property.6 If for
Locke (1980) labor removes raw materials from a nature held
in common, converting them into personal property (see 18
30), then for Freud and his hermeneutic economics, posses
sion passes to the speculator able to extricate meaning from
the meaningless through the addition of interpretive labour.
This production of property is not modelled on self-expres
sion, on the reproduction of the self from within. Instead, the
subject claims responsibility by making an ethico-legal commit
ment to stand behind its property and accept—be fully conscious
of—its liabilities. Freud's faith in informed, responsible agency
therefore allows him to acknowledge the alterity of self
formation without sacrificing the proper.

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 Paul Endo 461

The discovered "fact" may pre-exist Freud, then, but if he

arrives upon this information independently and, more impor
tant, through the proper kind of work (scientific methodol
ogy), he is justified in claiming discovery. Freud (1914) delib
erately stunts his reading in order, as Byron would say, to
"manage never to discover" precedents:

In later years I have denied myself the very great

pleasure of reading the works of Nietzsche, with the
deliberate object of not being hampered in working out
the impressions received in psycho-analysis by any sort of
anticipatory ideas. I had therefore to be prepared—and
I am so, gladly—to forgo all claims to priority in the
many instances in which laborious psycho-analytic inves
tigation can merely confirm the truths which the phi
losopher recognized by intuition. (15-16)

Freud ostensibly concedes priority to the intuition of the

philosopher, but the rhetorical weight of his statement—
"laborious psycho-analytic investigation" versus "recognized by
intuition"—clearly favours his own claim. Not all discoveries
are created equal. It is not enough to get there first; one must
follow a protocol based upon careful investigation rather than
the visitations of intuition. Because the proper depends on
conscious agency, artistic discoveries are easily discounted.
From the beginning, Freud invests heavily in a certain style of
interpreting. He borrows the rhetoric of science to ward off
competition from adjacent fields. This explains why he can
respond graciously to philosophical precursors, nominally
conceding priority, while internal, scientific ownership disputes
can draw him into messy and unflattering exchanges.7
For Freud (1933a), legitimate, scientific knowledge is
opposed to "knowledge derived from revelation, intuition or
divination" (159). Unlike the daydreaming of creative writers
and the intuitions of the philosopher, psychoanalysis renounces
the instinctual and reaches out to test reality. Freud (1925a) is
always at pains to distance his nascent science from philoso
phy: "my opponents regarded psycho-analysis as a product of
my speculative imagination and were unwilling to believe in

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462 Freud's Psychoanalysis

the long, patient and unbiased work which had gone to its
making" (50). This self-representation is also a way of distanc
ing himself from the apostates, Jung and Adler. As a scientist,
Freud has something they do not—the discipline to decline
the temptations of speculation and the anticipatory idea.
Unlike Jung, Freud (1914) boasts that "I have held fast to the
habit of always studying things themselves before looking for
information about them in books [. . .]" (19). Adler is also
charged with "a particularly speculative disposition" (Freud
1914, 50) that lapses into metaphysics.8 Even in his later,
admittedly more speculative works, Freud (1925a) insists "I
should not like to create an impression that during this last
period of my work I have turned my back upon patient
observation and have abandoned myself entirely to specula
tion" (59). Through a kind of self-promotion, Freud elects
himself a member of the scientific community. Freud's desire
to establish the credentials of psychoanalysis commits him to
the ideology of science, to the differentiating gestures through
which science defines itself as science. Demoting the insights
of non-science (especially literature and speculative thought)
belongs to this disciplinary self-image. Psychoanalysis "begins"
(in Edward Said's [1975] sense) without a principle of self
origination: it constructs itself through "paragenesis"—that is,
by moving laterally, grafting onto adjacencies and comple
mentarities—rather than advancing along vertical, "dynastic"
lineages (66). There is a kind of retroactive stabilizing of the
subject; what Freud borrows from science is not added to an
already formed identity, but becomes an indivisible part of this
identity.
Freud's identity is generated within a triangulated, three
part formula: to identify with science enables him to legitimize
himself by marginalizing a third, non-scientific party. These
differentiating gestures were especially crucial, as Jean
Starobinski (1989) argues, insofar as "Freud knew that he was
quite vulnerable to the charge that he was nothing more than
a man of letters, a 'poet.' He wished to mark his distance from
the artist, and there was no better way to do this than by
adopting a condescending stance toward the poet" (140).
Although he could admit that psychoanalysis occupied the
same subordinated relationship to science as literature and

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 Paul Endo 463

philosophy, Freud failed to pursue his countertransference

onto artists.9 "I have always felt it as a gross injustice that
people have refused to treat psycho-analysis like any other
science" (Freud 1925a, 58).
Nietzsche and Schopenhauer may have anticipated some
of Freud's discoveries, but chronological priority does not in
itself warrant a claim to ownership. On the History's account of
psychoanalysis' birth rescues Freud's responsibility by correct
ing linear notions of property. Early in On the History Freud
proposes that psychoanalysis originates with either Josef Breuer
and his cathartic method or with his own formulation of the

sexual aetiology of the neuroses. But Freud (1914) is not

concerned with quantifying contributions or disentangling
overlapping property; it is not the production but the reception
of psychoanalysis that betrays its ownership:

It is of no great importance in any case whether the

history of psycho-analysis is reckoned as beginning with
the cathartic method or with my modification of it; I
refer to this uninteresting point merely because certain
opponents of psycho-analysis have a habit of occasionally
recollecting that after all the art of psycho-analysis was
not invented by me, but by Breuer. This only happens, of
course, if their views allow them to find something in it
deserving attention; if they set no such limits to their
rejection of it, psycho-analysis is always without question
my work alone. (8)

Psychoanalysis belongs to Breuer if it is endorsed, Freud if it is

condemned. According to this logic, Freud secures his claim
by agreeing to rejection; rejection is like a pre-existing slot that
he consents to occupy. Freud does not inherit rejection,
rejection inherits Freud. It would be a mistake to presuppose
that psychoanalysis was already Freud's; he admits that there
were dissenting voices. But the very conditions under which he
accedes to ownership silence those who would dispute his
ownership. This is one of those instances, discussed by Bruno
Latour and Steve Woolgar (1986), in which the creation of a
"fact" (Freud's Psychoanalysis) effaces the contingencies un
der which it first emerges (239 and 174-183).

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464 Freud's Psychoanalysis

Charged with the excesses of psychoanalysis, Freud (1914)

accepts responsibility: "As I have long recognized that to stir
up contradiction and arouse bitterness is the inevitable fate of
psycho-analysis, I have come to the conclusion that I must be
the true originator of all that is particularly characteristic in it"
(8). As Althusser would say, antagonism "interpellates" Freud
into an identity; Freud is "hailed" and located in the social.
There is no misrecognition involved, however; he willingly and
consciously assumes this identity. Through a kind of feedback
loop, a local and historically specific hostility is drawn back
into the self-understanding of psychoanalysis and becomes
essential to its very definition. The identity of psychoanalysis
does not emerge from within psychoanalysis "itself." There is
no seamless continuum linking subject, labour, and property.
But if property is always contracted, this is not to suggest that
all contracts are equally valid or invalid. The more
overdetermined an agreement—and Freud's claim to responsi
bility is supported by an array of ethical, personal, scientific,
even racial "convergences"—the more natural and indisput
able this contract will seem. In a milieu peopled by figures
(Charcot, Breuer, Bernheim, Janet) who all contributed to
Freud's thought, any claim to priority—like all such claims—
must be rhetorical: ownership clears itself a place in a crowded
field by exaggerating circumstantial, contingent differences
and representing them as essential and constitutive.
The celebrity of psychoanalysis is inseparable from contro
versy; indeed, the credibility and legitimacy of psychoanalysis,
through what Freud would diagnose as a "gain from illness," is
reinforced by the intensity of the antagonism. Hostility is
dutifully accepted: it might be said that Freud exists through
this antagonism. "I made up my mind to believe that it had
been my fortune to discover some particularly important facts
and connections, and I was prepared to accept the fate that
sometimes accompanies such discoveries" (Freud 1914, 22). By
assuming its liabilities, Freud not only earns the rights to
psychoanalysis, but takes his place alongside other persecuted
scientific geniuses. He can now count psychoanalysis, along
with the Darwinian and Copernican discoveries, as one of the
"three severe blows" to "the universal narcissism of men, their

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 Paul Endo 465

self-love" (Freud 1917, 139). To be spoken of, even (or

especially) in condemnation, consolidates his identity.
Freud has not so much fathered psychoanalysis, then, as
he has been blamed for it. Folded into this sense of persecution
is Freud's Jewish heritage. Addressing his early experiences
with prejudice, Freud (1925a) writes that "at an early age I was
made familiar with the fate of being in the Opposition and of
being put under the ban of the 'compact majority.' The
foundations were thus laid for a certain degree of indepen
dence of judgement" (9).10 When Freud decides to "liberate"
psychoanalysis from its 'Jewish ghetto" and transfer the centre
of psychoanalysis to Zurich—where he hoped Jung, Bleuler,
and the Burghölzli clinic would raise the credibility of his
movement (Freud 1914, 42-43)—he is met with objections
from his Viennese followers and the further embittering of
internecine divisions. It is as if Freud must be punished for his
hubris. His attempt to court Jung (despite his anti-semitic
sentiments) is chastened as an opportunistic and irresponsible
renunciation of his and psychoanalysis' racial identity.
In On the History Freud's sense of responsibility approaches
a kind of masochistic resolution; he defends his provocative
sexual aetiology for the neuroses in a tone mixing pride,
defiance, and a stubborn fidelity.11 Although conceding that
he has extended the concept of "sexuality,"12 he refuses to
adopt a more accommodating nomenclature. As Jung quite
reasonably inquired: "Is it not conceivable, in view of the
limited conception of sexuality that prevails nowadays, that the
sexual terminology should be reserved only for the most
extreme forms of your 'libido,' and that a less offensive
collective term should be established for all the libidinal
manifestations?" (Freud 1974, 25). It is of course 'just" a
term,13 but invested in this term is Freud's very entry into
society, in fact, his emergence as a public subject. "Sexuality" is
for Freud both a point of honour and what Lacan calls a point
de capiton—a signifier concentrated enough to stabilize and
constellate meaning around it. "Sexuality" galvanizes and
shocks, maximizing the visibility of Freud and psychoanalysis.
Jung's attempt to qualify the role of sexuality dilutes psycho
analysis by yielding to moral squeamishness; indeed, he would

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466
Freud's Psychoanalysis

so realign its priorities that it would no longer be recognizable

as "psychoanalysis." As Freud (1914) complains: "the more he
sacrificed of the hard-won truths of psycho-analysis the more
would he see resistances vanishing" (58). Psychoanalysis =
hostility; this is the formula of Freud's ownership. Freud is
recognized so long as he behaves and conducts himself respon
sibly, acts according to stable, predictable patterns.14
There is nonetheless a moment in On the History when
Freud seems to find the burden of condemnation too onerous,
and he comes close to surrendering his claim to originality.
'The idea for which I was being made responsible had by no
means originated with me," he writes. "It had been imparted to
me by three people whose opinion had commanded my
deepest respect [. . .]" (Freud 1914, 13). He appears willing to
concede some of his ownership to relieve the antagonism.
Freud's account (1914) deserves to be quoted at length:

One day, when I was a young house-physician, I was

walking across the town with Breuer, when a man came
up who evidendy wanted to speak to him urgenüy. I fell
behind. As soon as Breuer was free, he told me in his
friendly, instructive way that this man was the husband of
a patient of his and had brought him some news of her.
The wife, he added, was behaving in such a peculiar way
in society that she had been brought to him for treat
ment as a nervous case. He concluded: "These things are
always secrets d'alcôve!" I asked him in astonishment what
he meant, and he answered by explaining the word
alcôve ("marriage-bed") to me, for he failed to realize
how extraordinary the matter of his statement seemed to
me.

Some years later, at one of Charcot's evening rec

tions, I happened to be standing near the great teac
at a moment when he appeared to be telling Brouar
a very interesting story about something that had
pened during his day's work. I hardly heard the beg
ning, but gradually my attention was seized by what
was talking of: a young married couple from a dist
country in the East—the woman a severe sufferer,
man either impotent or exceedingly awkward. "Tâch

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 Paul Endo 467

donc," I heard Charcot repeating, "je vous assure, vous y

arriverez." Brouardel, who spoke less loudly, must have
expressed his astonishment that symptoms like the wife's
could have been produced by such circumstances. For
Charcot suddenly broke out with great animation: "Mais,
dans des cas pareils c'est toujours la chose génitale, toujours . . .
toujours . . . toujoursand he crossed his arms over his
stomach, hugging himself and jumping up and down on
his toes several times in his own characteristically lively
way. I know that for a moment I was almost paralyzed
with amazement and said to myself: "Well, but if he
knows that, why does he never say so?" [. . .]
One day I had a friendly message from Chrobak,
asking me to take a woman patient of his to whom he
could not give enough time, owing to his new appoint
ment as a University teacher. I arrived at the patient's
house before he did and found that she was suffering
from attacks of meaningless anxiety, and could only be
soothed by the most precise information about where
her doctor was at every moment of the day. When
Chrobak arrived he took me aside and told me that the

patient's anxiety was due to the fact that although she

had been married for eighteen years she was still virgo
intacta. The husband was absolutely impotent. In such
cases, he said, there was nothing for a medical man to do
but to shield this domestic misfortune with his own

reputation, and put up with it if people shrugged their

shoulders and said of him: "He's no good if he can't cure
her after so many years." The sole prescription for such
a malady, he added, is familiar enough to us, but we
cannot order it. It runs:
"R Penis normalis
dosim
repetatur!"
I had never heard of such a prescription, and felt
inclined to shake my head over my kind friend's cyni
cism. (13—15)

Breuer, Charcot, and Chrobak all remark on the sexual aetiol

ogy of their patients' neuroses. Charcot and Chrobak seem to

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468 Freud's Psychoanalysis

derive an almost adolescent delight (Charcot "crossed his arms

over his stomach, hugging himself and jumping up and down
on his toes") from the unlocking of secrets—particularly
sexual secrets, secrets even their owners aren't privy to. All
three doctors possess a knowledge that their patients do not—
knowledge about their patients. For Chrobak and Charcot, this
knowledge carries precisely that virile, potent charge missing
in the dysfunctional couples (and especially the impotent
husbands). The dynamics resembles that of the obscene joke:15
the doctors and their confidants join together in an act of
sexual aggression that exposes a third, feminized party. And
yet, unwilling or unable to pursue this knowledge, these
doctors are despite all their sophistication just as helpless and
impotent as their patients.
By the very nature of this secret, private knowledge,
Breuer, Charcot, and Chrobak cannot be held responsible for
psychoanalysis. Nor, as Freud (1914) points out, would they
have wanted to (13). It would be irresponsible to blame them
for psychoanalysis; Freud (1914) enters to reclaim ownership:

I have not of course disclosed the illustrious parent

age of this scandalous idea in order to saddle other
people with the responsibility for it. I am well aware that
it is one thing to give utterance to an idea once or twice
in the form of a passing aperçu, and quite another to
mean it seriously—to take it literally and pursue it in the
face of every contradictory detail, and to win it a place
among accepted truths. It is the difference between a
casual flirtation and a legal marriage with all its duties
and difficulties. "Épouser les idées de. . ."is no uncommon
figure of speech, at any rate in French. (15)

Freud's discovery of psychoanalysis—of the sexual aetiology of

the neuroses—is couched in metaphors of courtship: his
contribution, his defining contribution, is an act of espousal
that legitimizes sexuality by placing it with the proper institu
tion ("legal marriage with all its duties and difficulties"). He
has enough respect for sexuality to treat it not as a "passing
aperçu," but openly and publicly. Possession pivots on this

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 Paul Endo 469

difference between entertaining or courting an idea and

committing to it responsibly. As Freud (1914) notes: "These
three men had all communicated to me a piece of knowledge
which, strictly speaking, they themselves did not possess" (13).
Like the artist's and philosopher's, their knowledge floats in a
still un theorized and untested state; it lacks what Freud (1933a)
calls science's "intellectual working-over of carefully scruti
nized observations [. . .]" (159). Freud however brings his
commitment into the open. Strictly speaking, he possesses this
knowledge. As a young, unburdened "free agent," Freud alone
seems willing to assume the "duties and difficulties" dismissed
by older colleagues who have time for only casual, secret trysts.
"Breuer, Charcot, and Chrobak have their flirtations with the
sexual etiology of the neuroses," Neil Hertz (1985) writes, "but
Freud has made an honest woman of her, by his persistence,
his intellectual mastery, the stolid virility of his pursuit" (142).16
It is interesting to note the trajectory of this passage: Freud
begins by ostensibly yielding priority, but in the end he
recovers possession—through metaphors of marriage and le
gality—by asserting his responsibility and publicly standing
pledge for all psychoanalysis' future debts and liabilities.
Freud's entire project can be explained, of course, as an
attempt to render sexuality "respectable."17 Sexuality matures
beyond the obscene joke, the scene of empty adolescent
boasting. Freud makes public what was private, violating the
tacit code of silence according to which "there was nothing for
a medical man to do but to shield this domestic misfortune
with his own reputation." Freud is invited to join the circle of
male homosociality, but he rejects the offer, exposing his
colleagues. This does not mean that he sides with the
marginalized, feminized couple; his actions are still securely
within what Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (1985) has called the
dynamics of male homosocial desire.18 These episodes remain
triangulated, interpretative rivalries in which Freud goes through
the couples to emerge as victor, his prestige enhanced. If by
virtue of their knowledge the doctors possess a potency that
the impotent husbands do not, then Freud, through his
knowledge, wields a potency even greater than that of Breuer,
Charcot, and Chrobak. Freud completes the act they could

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470 Freud's Psychoanalysis

only secretly joke about. They "possess" a knowledge they

cannot consummate; Freud goes public with this knowledge,
pursuing it in "the face of every contradictory detail."
With his metaphors of espousal and courtship, Freud
often recalls a suitor warding off a series of persistent rivals. In
An Autobiographical Study, he recounts Breuer's apprehensive
support for his new theories—a support that never quite goes far
enough. Freud's discovery takes on the accents of erotic rivalry:

Breuer did what he could for some time longer to throw

the great weight of his personal influence into the scales
in my favour, but he effected nothing and it was easy to
see that he too shrank from recognizing the sexual
aetiology of the neuroses. He might have crushed me or
at least disconcerted me by pointing to his own first
patient ["Anna O."], in whose case sexual factors had
ostensibly played no part whatever. But he never did so,
and I could not understand why this was, until I came to
interpret the case correctly and to reconstruct, from
some remarks which he had made, the conclusion of his
treatment of it. After the work of catharsis had seemed

to be completed, the girl had suddenly developed a

condition of "transference love"; he had not connected
this with her illness, and had therefore retired in dismay.
It was obviously painful to him to be reminded of this
apparent contretemps. (Freud 1925a, 26)

Freud's discovery cannot help but redound unfavourably upon

Breuer: if Breuer shrinks from "sexual factors," Freud's virility
is confirmed. The desire is not for knowledge, or at least not
solely for knowledge; it is also to gain something that belongs
in part to another. If for Freud intellectual activity is a
sublimation of the sexual instincts, it is not surprising that a
discovery about sexuality slides into the sexualization of discov
ery itself.19 Freud (1960) writes to Stefan Zweig on Breuer's
irresponsibility: "At this moment he held in his hand the key
that would have opened the 'doors to the Mothers', but he let
it drop. With all his great intellectual gifts there was nothing
Faustian in his nature. Seized by conventional horror he took
flight and abandoned the patient to a colleague" (413).20

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 Paul Endo 471

Breuer's lack of Faustian aspiration reveals a timidity that is as

much sexual as it is cerebral. As in the Dora study, a failure to
consummate the case discloses an "incapacity" that is coded as
impotence (see Sprengnether 1990, 51-2). Breuer concedes
defeat, lacking nerve; Freud takes over where Breuer retires in
dismay.21
Freud's discovery is like a proof of his young science: his
victory demonstrates the superiority of his new psychoanalytic
optic. Psychoanalysis becomes the very model of scientific
empiricism, uncovering those subterranean facts that compel
other, less masterful suitors to flee. If Freud (1974) can accuse
Bleuler of practising "surface psychology" rather than
metapsychology (80), his own refusal to be duped by surfaces
confirms his interpretative authority.22 As founder of psycho
analysis, the art of interpretation, Freud's genius lies in his
ability to discriminate literal from figurative—that is, to recog
nize proper meanings and bestow proper titles. Unlike Pierre
Janet, for instance, who had hypothesized avant la lettre an
"unconscious" which, when pressed, he withdrew as a "façon de
parler* (Freud 1925a, 31), Freud's achievement is to regard the
figurative "unconscious" literally, to espouse the passing aperçu.
Reconstituting the scientific object, Freud redefines what
counts as a fact carrying meaning and requiring interpretative
attention. Parapraxes, dreams, jokes become respectable ob
jects of study It is by recognizing when to open, so to speak,
the aperture of his interpretative frame23 that Freud is able to
identify and name a phenomenon ("transference love") before
which Breuer flees, a phenomenon Breuer does not even
recognize as warranting scientific attention. Indeed, Breuer's
response becomes part of Freud's study: Breuer's behavior
enacts the very resistance to sexuality postulated by Freud's
theory. His interpretation creates an entirely new scientific
object—an object his rivals could not see, because they were
themselves this new object. Breuer's very responsibility is in
danger: he did not, despite himself, really do what he thought
he did. Freud understands something that Breuer does not:
namely, he understands Breuer. Even more: he understands
why Breuer doesn't understand. The very "right" to interpret
becomes a mark of discrimination (in both senses): Freud
distinguishes himself by noting distinctions.

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472 Freud's Psychoanalysis

Freud objectifies his rivals as well as the already objectified

object. Breuer is, as much as his famous patient, an object of
Freud's knowledge. To fail to interpet—to not pursue one's
ideas—is to risk surrendering the field to another and becom
ing oneself an object of knowledge, feminized and passive
before a more male, more scientific gaze. Interpretation is not
the source of meaning but is itself an already gendered act. To
remain alert, critical faculties raised, becomes a measure of
masculinity. Freud (1925a) recounts a lecture he delivered
during his early interest in organic diseases of the nervous
system: "About the neuroses I understood nothing. On one
occasion I introduced to my audience a neurotic suffering
from a persistent headache as a case of neurotic localized
meningitis; they all quite rightly rose in revolt and deserted
me, and my premature activities as a teacher came to an end"
(12). In the diagnostic professions, misinterpretation can be
the ultimate humiliation. To be gullible is to surrender science's
commitment to reality-testing and lapse into subjectivity and
the instinctual desires of the pleasure principle. As Freud
(1914) explains: "Anyone who sets a high value on scientific
thought will rather seek every possible means and method of
circumscribing the factor of fanciful personal predilections as
far as possible wherever it still plays too great a part" (59).
Freud is wary of suggesting or predetermining his findings;
throughout his career, especially after the professional embar
rassment of his seduction theory, he protests against accusa
tions of having infected his clinical findings with his own
"fanciful personal predilections."24
In An Autobiographical Study, there is an account of scien
tific contest in which this time it is Freud who "held in his hand
the key" but "let it drop." He laments his failure to pursue his
early research on the anaesthetic properties of coca leaves, a
failure that deprives him of early fame. The constellation of
themes is a familiar one; the concerns are property, competi
tion, courtship:

I may here go back a little and explain how it was the

fault of my fiancée that I was not already famous at that
youthful age [30]. A side interest, though it was a deep

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 Paul Endo 473

one, had led me in 1884 to obtain from Merck some of

what was then the little-known alkaloid cocaine and to

study its physiological action. While I was in the middle

of this work, an opportunity arose for making a journey
to visit my fiancée, from whom I had been parted for two
years. I hastily wound up my investigation of cocaine and
contented myself in my monograph on the subject with
prophesying that further uses for it would soon be
found. I suggested, however, to my friend Königstein,
the ophthalmologist, that he should investigate the
question of how far the anaesthetizing properties of
cocaine were applicable in diseases of the eye. When I
returned from my holiday I found that not he, but
another of my friends, Carl Koller (now in New York),
whom I had also spoken to about cocaine, had made the
decisive experiments upon animals' eyes [. . .]. Koller is
therefore rightly regarded as the discoverer of local
anaesthesia by cocaine, which has become so important
in minor surgery; but I bore my fiancée no grudge for the
interruption. (Freud 1925a, 14-15)

Freud's fiancée, Martha Bernays, features prominently in this

anecdote—she opens and closes it—without really being "in"
the story at all. She is not, for instance, the object of desire, the
"point" of a rivalrous triangle that finds Freud and Koller/
Königstein competing for her affections. She seems situated in
an alternate economy outside male rivalry. Bernays functions
as an asymmetrical (desired by Freud and not Koller/
Königstein) fourth member that, by disrupting the cocaine
Freud-Koller/Königstein triangle, absolves Freud of the dis
grace of dispossession. Despite his closing protestations, Bernays
is clearly an excuse for Freud's "defeat." Because his desire was
elsewhere, occupied by a previous commitment, there can be
no question of a competition with Koller. The sexualization of
discovery and loss is defused, and Freud can exit the scene
without being objectified and feminized. Bernays "breaks" the
rivalrous triangle, saving Freud from a loss of prestige. Freud is
clearly trafficking in his fiancée, introducing her as a counter to
stabilize male relationships (see Rubin 1975). She is, as Irigaray

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474 Freud's Psychoanalysis

(1985) writes of woman, "unnecessary in and of herself, but

essential as the non-subjective sub-jectum[ ]" (165). Like Dora,
whom her father tacitly grants to Herr R in exchange for Frau
KL, Bernays functions as a form of currency that cancels
Roller's victory with one of Freud's own. Koller wins cocaine as
a local anaesthesia, Freud wins a wife.
Triangulating his encounters with Breuer, Charcot, and
Chrobak, Freud reduces psychoanalysis' history to a series of
dramatic interpretative crises. The logic is oppositional, the
triangle tendentiously distributes its players into winners and
losers. The winner is more rational, more committed—in
other words, more responsible—than the loser. Because of
psychoanalysis' displacement of the vertical, observer-observed
axis of science, it is not surprising that the search for truth
should assume a lateral, interpersonal rhetoric of agon and
contest. But if in the earlier anecdotes Freud is the interloper,
the young son who arrives to steal the father's property, here it
is Koller who appropriates what is Freud's. The triangle can
always be broken or reconfigured. New players can arrive and
rearrange the lines of force. Charcot and Chrobak know more
than their impotent patients, but then Freud knows more than
Charcot and Chrobak. If Breuer's blindness leads to Freud's

insight, Freud's own blindnesses can generate insight in turn.

There is always someone coming after. Required is some way of
pre-empting or warding off rivals. Freud therefore formulates
"rules of engagement" that reorganize competition along lines
bearing a remarkable resemblance to the Oedipal triangle.
Because the triangle is not a site of level competition but a
technology for socializing the son to the father's authority,25
Freud, father of psychoanalysis, inherits a position already
weighted towards victory. To engage Freud is to enter a field in
which rivalries are slanted in his favour.
Throughout On the History and An Autobiographical Study,
Freud resorts to psychoanalysis to explicate its own history.
Psychoanalysis' hostile reception can be consoled by placing
this hostility in the proper, psychoanalytical frame:

I was saved from becoming embittered, however, by a

circumstance which is not always present to help lonely

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 Paul Endo 475

discoverers. Such people are as a rule tormented by the

need to account for the lack of sympathy or the aversion
of their contemporaries, and feel this attitude as a
distressing contradiction of the security of their own
sense of conviction. There was no need for me to feel so;
for psycho-analytic theory enabled me to understand
this attitude in my contemporaries and to see it as a
necessary consequence of fundamental analytic pre
misses. (Freud 1914, 23)

As long as he remains within psychoanalysis, he is safe from the

torment suffered by other "lonely discoverers." Although Freud
believes psychoanalysis can explain the resistances it activates,
he is unable to gain a hearing from his contemporaries. Freud
(1925b) speaks of psychoanalysis taking "the whole human
race as one's patient" (221), but he knows that he has not
acceded to an authoritative position: "The only difference was
that with patients one was in a position to bring pressure to
bear on them so as to induce them to get insight into their
resistances and overcome them, whereas one had to do with
out this advantage in dealing with people who were ostensibly
healthy" (Freud 1914, 24). These people have no desire to
cross the threshold and become patients. They refuse to
recognize Freud as "the subject who is supposed to know"
(Lacan 1978, 232). But if Freud can entice them into the
controlled conditions of his consulting room, the optic of
power can be reversed. Psychoanalysis' truth, as Bruno Latour
(1988) would say, does not exist outside its "laboratory," the
psychoanalyst's couch.26 Psychoanalysis works only under cer
tain conditions: the conditions, namely, under which it exists,
under which the analyst's superiority is recognized. The circu
larity of authority—authority can only be granted by an audi
ence already willing to cite one as an authority—is in fact a
triangular configuration: the parties become commensurable,
can be included in the same calculus (doctor-patient, winner
loser, etc.) only through a common third term or relay that
mediates their relationship. To believe in Freud's authority is
to share his belief in psychoanalysis; without this shared object,
no pressure can be exerted or brought to bear. By refusing to
believe, Freud's contemporaries refuse to be triangulated.

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476 Freud's Psychoanalysis

In analysis, Freud can interpret without being interpreted.

Not surprisingly, this unilateral "right" survives the move from
hypnosis, part of psychoanalysis' pre-history, to psychoanalysis
proper: "So I abandoned hypnotism, only retaining my prac
tice of requiring the patient to lie upon a sofa while I sat
behind him, seeing him, but not seen myself' (Freud 1925a,
28). In the consulting room, the triangle duplicates the
Oedipal arrangement in which Freud, as father, is "superior":

Analysis is not suited [. . .] for polemical use; it presup

poses the consent of the person who is being analysed
and a situation in which there is a superior and a
subordinate. Anyone, therefore, who undertakes an
analysis for polemical purposes must expect the person
analysed to use analysis against him in turn, so that the
discussion will reach a state which entirely excludes the
possibility of convincing any impartial third person.
(Freud 1914, 49)

The analyst must not abuse his or her position. Freud is

tempted to analyze Adler and Jung, whose secessions provoked
the writing of On the History, but the polemical use of psycho
analysis would void the analytical contract and encourage
retaliation. Open rivalry is inimical to Freud. It is to forfeit the
privileges of his authority. Freud wrote in a 8 May 1913 letter to
Ferenczi: "I have never taken part in polemics. My habit is to
repudiate in silence and go my own way" (quoted in Weber
1982, 5). But if silence protects psychoanalysis from demean
ing controversies, if it denies legitimacy to rivals by withhold
ing Freud's official condemnation, it at the same time endan
gers psychoanalysis by allowing foreign incursions, inviting the
misappropriation of Freud's property. Even the securest of
identities cannot be allowed to "drift"; it must be maintained
by activating, enforcing, and reinforcing patterns of exclusion
and alliance. The splendid isolation of Freud's youth would
amount to withdrawing one's subjectivity from public view:
that is, to disappearing as a subject. That is why Freud (1914),
despite his reservations, cannot quite refrain from analyzing
Adler and Jung: "So I shall avail myself of analysis only in order

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 Paul Endo 477

to explain how these divergences from it could arise among

analysts" (50). Freud needs interpretation to distinguish himself
from others and reassert his responsibility. By treating dissent
ers like patients, Freud is able to convert opposition into his
own psychoanalytic currency.
Freud's anxieties are especially exercised by the fear of
contamination, of a reciprocal abuse in which the parties
merge together, undermining his priority.27 Because Adler and
Jung no longer recognize his authority, Freud becomes simply
another contestant battling for property returned to the com
mon. Freud (1914) calls Jung "a person who was incapable of
tolerating the authority of another [. . .]" (43). Adler also
disputes his findings, accusing Freud of gullibility. Freud (1914)
complains that Adler's work "was intended to prove that
psycho-analysis was wrong in everything and that it had only
attributed so much importance to sexual motive forces be
cause of its credulity in accepting the assertions of neurotics"
(51). Freud's discomfort before his "sons" indicates that the
father's position is not without insecurity. Freud is reluctant to
be placed in a passive, analysand position; an earlier agree
ment with Jung to interpret each other's dreams terminates,
Jung reminds him, "with your remark that you 'could not
submit to analysis -without losing your authority"' (Freud 1974,
526). To be analysed is to be appropriated, told what is proper
to oneself. It is to cede control of one's identity. If Breuer,
Charcot, and Chrobak cannot be dispossessed of something
that they strictly speaking never owned, they are dispossessed of
the illusion of self-possession.
On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement and An
Autobiographical Study mine many of the themes familiar to
autobiography and history: a concern with intellectual owner
ship, genesis, paternity, priority. These concerns are elabo
rated, however, within a narrative that is genealogical rather
than historical. Priority and property emerge through con
tracted relationships that function to naturalize the mediated
as immediate and mystify the improper as proper. Freud
appropriates site-specific properties of psychoanalysis and, by
acting responsibly, espousing them in the face of all hardships
and difficulties, successfully creates stable, recognizable identi

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478 Freud's Psychoanalysis

ties for both himself and psychoanalysis. Freud (1914) writes

that "psycho-analysis is my creation" (7); it is equally true that
he is psychoanalysis' creation. Freud's interpretations and
discoveries are never just epistemological: they are woven into
the very process of self-definition. Interpretation becomes an
individuating and differentiating act: to make an interpretative
discovery is to distance oneself from those who failed to make
this discovery and at the same time announce oneself as the
one who did.

Department of English
University of British Columbia

Notes

1. Even in On the History and An Autobiographical Study, Freud does not always
surrender his belief in a qualitative transformation from hypnosis and Breuer's
cathartic method into psychoanalysis. Freud (1925a) often locates the emer
gence of psychoanalysis in its reformulation of the therapeutic task: "A different
view had now to be taken of the task of therapy. Its aim was no longer to
'abreact' an affect which had got on to the wrong lines but to uncover
repressions and replace them by acts of judgement which might result either in
the accepting or in the condemning of what had formerly been repudiated"
(30).
2. Frank J. Sulloway (1979) demystifies some of the self-representations that have
contributed to Freud's mythical standing (445-495 and passim.).
3. "It is known that Freud was particularly sensitive to plagiarism," comments
François Roustang (1982). "He himself had been accused of it by Pierre Marie
Janet, Fliess, and others [. . .]" (92). Paul Roazen (1969) writes: "The theme of
plagiarism can be found almost everywhere one turns in Freud's career. Since
Freud's ambition was world fame, he was bound to worry lest a discovery of his
own be snatched away by someone else" (88). See also Hertz (1985,97-121) and
Meitzer (1994, 9-44).
4. De Certeau's (1988) better known study of Moses and Monotheism pays much less
attention to Freud's reluctance to surrender institutional authority (308-54).
Compare, for instance, the very different treatments of the same Schiller
citation (De Certeau 1986, 30; 1988, 328).
5. "Do you suppose," Freud (1985) writes to Wilhelm Fliess on 12 June 1900, "that
someday one will read on a marble tablet on this house:
Here, on July 24, 1895,
the secret of the dream
revealed itself to Dr. Sigm. Freud" (417).
6. The dispersion of the subject is easier theorized than practised—especially
when it is one's own identity that is at stake. See Samuel Weber's (1991) account
of the legal battles over the copyright of Lacan's writings (writings that of course
challenge the foundation of ownership itself) (168-182). We may well smile at
the expediency with which the most ardent Lacanian (his "testamentary
executor" and son-in-law, Jacques-Alain Miller) is willing to abandon Lacan's
teachings in the very claim to represent him, but it is of course integrity "itself"
(moral, metaphysical, intellectual) that is at issue.
7. For Freud's cavalier treatment of Wilhelm Fliess' work on bisexuality and Albert
Moll's writings on infantile sexuality, see Sulloway (1979, 217-232; 469-474).

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 Paul Endo 479

8. According to Roazen (1969), Freud

analogies between psychosis, narciss
Borch-Jacobsen (1988, 100-101) and
9. See his apprehensive, almost apologet
open letter to Einstein: "It may perha
a kind of mythology and, in the pre
does not every science come in the end
1933b, 211).
10. Freud (1925b) writes in "The Resistances to Psycho-Analysis": "Nor is it perhaps
entirely a matter of chance that the first advocate of psycho-analysis was a Jew.
To profess belief in this new theory called for a certain degree of readiness to
accept a situation of solitary opposition—a situation with which no one is more
familiar than a Jew" (222). The analogical structure of this argument is
consistent with the way Freud's title to psychoanalysis remains primarily a lateral
and metonymical one. Such analogies multiply to generate the identity-effect:
Freud = Psychoanalysis.
11. Freud was not without discomfort when addressing sexual subject-matter,
however: witness the anxious disclaimers early in the Dora study. His tendency
to resort to foreign epithets during sensitive discussions has also been noted.
See Swan (1974, 17) and Gallop (1982, 140-141).
12. On Freud's expansion of "sexuality," see Laplanche (1976, 25-29).
13. Control over the meanings of words can be highly-charged contests. To define
and redefine names, terms, and symbols is to preselect the field of discussion by
activating some connotations while silencing others. See Bourdieu (1990).
14. As Nietzsche (1956) explains, the ability to make and keep promises—in a word,
responsibility—involves "the preparatory task of rendering man up to a certain
point regular, uniform, equal among equals, calculable" (190).
15. See Freud (1905, 97-102). The similarity is also noted by Hertz (1985, 141).
16. Hertz's reading of this passage agrees on a number of points with my own. He
does however organize the scene according to different vectors of force: the
doctors conspire xvith the husbands to guard the secret of their impotence while
Freud is the marginalized figure. The sexual and interpretative rivalry between
the impotent husbands, the doctors, and Freud is therefore muted.
17. This legitimation of sexuality seems not to extend beyond legitimate sexuality.
Largely confining his discussions of sexuality to the domestic family, Freud has
difficulty thinking of female sexuality outside of its reproductive function. See,
for instance, Jacobus (1995, 30-33).
18. Sedgwick argues that traditional erotic rivalries must be examined not only as
heterosexual contests, but as male homosocial encounters as well.
19. In the "Rat Man" case history, Freud (1909) writes that the "epistemophilic
instinct" can result in the "thought-process itself becom[ing] sexualized" (245;
see also Freud 1910, 80-81).
20. Borch-Jacobsen (1996) demonstrates that Freud's version of the Breuer-Anna
O. story "rests on sheer psychoanalytic interpretation (not to mention gossip),
and it can in no way stand as a factual account [...]" (38-39).
21. There is another instance in Freud of retiring in dismay: "A Case of Homosexu
ality in a Woman." Here Freud (1920) himself, remarking the patient's
"sweeping repudiation of men," advises "her parents that if they set store by the
therapeutic procedure it should be continued by a woman doctor" ( 164). In this
instance, retirement is not so much a repudiation of Freud as a repudiation of
all men. The responsibility for failure lies not with Freud but with his patient.
Rather than being humbled before other men, he in fact reaffirms male
solidarity at the expense of a woman.
22. Freud's (1925a) early harbouring of the seduction theory is described as a
succumbing to the superficial and literal: "my mistake was of the same kind as
would be made by someone who believed that the legendary story of the early
kings of Rome (as told by Livy) was historical truth instead of what it is in fact—

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 480 Freud's Psychoanalysis
a reaction against the memory of times and circumstances that were insignifi
cant and occasionally, perhaps, inglorious" (35).
23. What should be a question of intuition and tact seems often motivated by mere
expedience. Freud (1914) writes in response to Jung's reservations about the
Oedipus complex:

When Jung tells us that the incest-complex is merely "symbolic", that after all
it has no "real" existence, that after all a savage feels no desire towards an old
hag but prefers a young and pretty woman, we are tempted to conclude that
"symbolic" and "without real existence" simply mean something which, in
virtue of its manifestations and pathogenic effects, is described by psycho
analysis as "existing unconsciously"—a description that disposes of the
apparent contradiction. (64)

Objections and oppositions can always be included in more comprehensive

interpretations. Psychoanalysis here approaches metaphysics: there seems no
counterargument that would constitute falsification. Freud is able to contain
and defuse all apparent challenges simply by calling them symptomatic.
Controlling the distinction between the meaningful and the meaningless, he is
in effect able to command and define reality.
24. Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson (1984) insists that Freud's abandonment of the
seduction theory is the "fanciful personal predilection."
25. For a wide-ranging attack on Oedipus, see Deleuze and Guattari (1983).
26. Latour writes: "The difference made by the laboratory is small yet crucial. In i
the power ratio is reversed; phenomena, whatever their size—infinitely great or
infinitely small—are retranslated and simplified in such a way that a group of
men can always control them" (74).
27. Roazen (1969) maintains that it was this fear that motivated Freud's perfunc
tory, even ruthless treatment of Victor Tausk.

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