Property Law Casebook by Sarah Minhas

Property Law – Booklet for
Case Law and Statutes
Compiled by:
Sarah Asif Minhas
INTRODUCTION; BUILDING BLOCKS OF PROPERTY LAW
Bernstein v Skyviews and Property owner does not have aerial rights.
General Ltd
Botham v TSB Bank plc To be considered a fixture, there must be some
degree of permanence. Rest will be considered
‘chattels’.
City of London Building Interests of beneficiaries in a trust of land are
Society v Flegg overreached if the transaction is entered into by two or
more trustees.
LAW OF PROPERTY Process of overreaching; any equitable interest can be
ACT 1925, Section 2(2) overreached (regardless of notice); in order to achieve
this, you must pay money to two or more individuals
approved by court.
Law of Property Act List of interests where S2(2) cannot apply; not
1925, Section 3 overreachable.
LAW OF PROPERTY Land is whatever is the land itself, what is on it, and in
ACT 1925, Section it, as well as the rights it accompanies for different
205(1)(ix) parties.
Newham LBC v Kibata MUMMERY LJ; impact of HRA was new rights in
property. Art 8 inapplicable as defense in possession
proceedings; right to privacy, not property.
UNREGISTERED LAND
Hunt v Luck A purchaser will have constructive notice of any rights

reasonably discoverable by inspection of the property,
and, in particular, from enquiry of any occupier as to
his interests. This does not, however, extend to the
rights of a landlord, there being no obligation to
enquire as to the existence of interests beyond those
of the tenant in occupation.
Kingsnorth Finance Co For physical presence to be actual occupation, does
Ltd v Tizard not have to be exclusive and continuous. Inspection
not reasonable.
Land Charges Act 1925 Act to consolidate registration of any charges
associated with the land.
Land Charges Act 1972 This gave a list of equitable interests which had to be
registered in order to be binding. If such an interest is
not registered, the subsequent purchaser is able to
kick out the interest holder. If the interest is registered,
then the subsequent purchases is bound. The problem
with this statute was, it required an interest to be
registered while the land itself was unregistered. In
such cases, registration required a lot of effort and
could be problematic.
Law of Property Act If a right is capable of registration but is not, purchaser
1925, Section 199(1)(i) is not bound by it.
Law of Property Act This outlines the procedure for overreaching as; a
1925, Section 2(1) subsequent purchaser can overreach an interest
holder’s interest by paying money to two or more
owners of the land who then become trustees for the
interest holder.
Lloyds Bank v Carrick Unregistered estate contract bound purchaser by way
of trust and estoppel.
Re Sabharwal, The house was in the name of two brothers, and the
Birmingham Midshires v mother lived with them. The house was sold to a
Sabharwal subsequent purchaser. It was held that all conditions
for overreaching were satisfied; her rights were
converted to money. WALKER LJ stated overreaching
such an interest was possible only in family cases.
REGISTERED LAND
Abbey National Building Appeal of mother dismissed. Actual occupation of

Society v Cann interest holder must be from the date the sale starts
until it ends. There must be some element of
permanence; however, temporary absence is not a
problem. To bind a purchaser, there must be
occupation at time of purchase and transfer.
AIB Group PLC v Turner ANTHONY ELLERAY, Paragraph 88: the woman
and Ors failed to establish her occupation, as there was no
substance of residence involved, nor was there any
real connection with the property. (Paragraph 62,
quoting LAND REGISTRATION ACT 2002 Sections
29 and 30, as well as Schedule 3, Paragraph 2)
Chhoker v Chhoker The house was in the name of the husband who sold it
to a subsequent purchaser. The wife left the house
prior to the sale after a fight with the husband or
hospital detention (temporary absence); she did not
take her belongings with her. When she returned, the
subsequent purchases asked her to leave. She did
have proprietary interests. It was held that the
presence of belongings in this case was sufficient to
establish occupation; if she had intended to never
return, she would have taken her belongings with her.
Therefore, she had an overriding interest, capable of
binding third parties. Both parties became tenants in
common in equity.
City of London Building Overriding interest can be overreached.
Society v Flegg
Ferrishurst Ltd v Wallcite Occupier doesn’t have to possess the entirety of the
Ltd land; reversed by LAND REGISTRATION ACT 2002,
Schedule 3, Paragraph 2.
Hypo Mortgage Services A child cannot be in actual occupation.
Ltd v Robinson
Land Registration Act The first act to introduce the system of registration, so
1925 it was similar to a constitution of any country, laying
down all details regarding registration of land. This is a
very unique act, as it gave 3 guiding principles: mirror
principle, curtain principle, and insurance principle.
While it was monumental, LAND REGISTRATION
ACT 2002 has largely diminished its significance.
Land Registration Act Provided a system of registration of titles, not title to
1925 land.
Land Registration Act This outlines a list of overriding interests.
1925, Section 70(1)
Land Registration Act This states that if a person is in actual occupation of
1925, Section 70(1)(g) land, with a proprietary interest, or rents and profits,
then it can be said that they have an overriding
interest which is capable of binding third parties
without registration. This is only if rights are not
disclosed upon enquiry.
Land Registration Act This act reformed the land registration system,
2002 replacing its predecessor. The Law Commission
considered the possibility of abolishing overriding
interests; however, at the time of the legislation, they
only decided to restrict this category.
Land Registration Act The subsequent purchases will be bound by an
2002, Schedule 3 interest holder if they have: 1. Actual occupation,
2. Proprietary interest, and 3. Doctrine of notice.
LAND REGISTRATION Legal leases not exceeding seven years are overriding
ACT 2002, Schedule 3, interests.
Paragraph 1
LAND REGISTRATION If interest was present by person in actual occupation,
ACT 2002, Schedule 3, it may be binding; unless there was failure to disclose
Paragraph 2 right or the occupation was not reasonably found on
inspection or subsequent purchaser did not have
actual knowledge.
LAND REGISTRATION Registration can be altered by way of statute under
ACT 2002, Schedule 4, this section.
Section 65
LAND REGISTRATION If registration is altered, damages can be paid to those
ACT 2002, Schedule 8, affected.
Section 103
LAND REGISTRATION Lord Chancellor can reduce lease registration period,
ACT 2002, Section possibly to three years.
118(1)
Land Registration Act This state that valuable consideration does not mean
2002, Section 132 marriage or nominal consideration in money.
LAND REGISTRATION Some dispositions/activities/rights are not valid until
ACT 2002, Section 27(1) registered: a. transfer of registered estate; b. lease; c.
mortgage; d. easements. These necessitate
registration.
Land Registration Act This gives the basic priority rule that is, if the
2002, Section 28 transferee is not a purchaser, they take the land
subject to all prior interests (even if unregistered).
LAND REGISTRATION Priority of interests on registered land depends on
ACT 2002, Section 28 date they were created.
Land Registration Act This gives the special priority rule that is, if the
2002, Section 29 transferee had given valuable consideration, they take
land subject to all prior registered interests; they will
not be bound by any unregistered interest. (Given they
fall under the guise of Schedule 3).
LAND REGISTRATION Interests providing some form of valuable
ACT 2002, Section 29 consideration take priority of all other rights, whether
unregistered or overriding. Interests not overriding or
registered will not be binding on subsequent
purchaser.
LAND REGISTRATION Affirmed AINSWORTH; proprietary interest has
ACT 2002, Section 29(1) overriding status.
LAND REGISTRATION Interest can be protected by notice of restriction.
ACT 2002, Section 29(3)
LAND REGISTRATION Registered interest has priority over others; does not
ACT 2002, Section 32(3) mean it is recognized as valid under law.
LAND REGISTRATION Certain interests cannot be protected by the entry of a
ACT 2002, Section 33 notice.
Land Registration Act This states any unregistered interest will be void.
2002, Section 7
Land Registration Act This places an obligation on the paper owner to
2002, Section 71(b) disclose all known interests to the subsequent
purchaser.
Llyod’s Bank v Rossett LORD OLIVER stated that the claimant should be
in actual occupation either themselves or through
a representative, and the occupation should be
somewhat permanent so as to rule out a mere
fleeting presence.
National Provincial Bank Legal or equitable proprietary interest in land qualifies
v Ainsworth for overriding status.
Paddington Building Occupier may have consented to sale.
Society v Mendelsohn
2021, Rock Ferry Appellant claimed to be in actual occupation under
Waterfront Trust v PARAGRAPH 2, SCHEDULE 1, LRA 2002. Did C
Pennistone Holdings have equitable interest before or during respondent’s
registration process? Abandoned land, had items of
physical presence; digger and shipping containers.
Claim rejected at first. COA upheld. LEWISON LJ
(COULSON and DINGEMANS LJJ agreeing) said
there was sort of permanence of element of
physicality; intermittent visits not actual occupation.
Royal Bank of Scotland If a lender follows a procedure, loan will not be
plc v Ethridge (No 2) impacted by others; this protects lenders.
Strand Securities v The house was in the name of paper owner, who sold
Caswell it to a subsequent purchaser. A girl lived there who
hadn’t invested on the land; all the money spent on the
land belonged to her father. The subsequent
purchaser asked the girl to leave; she argued
overriding interest, so did her father. The father never
visited, but his belongings were there. It was held that
neither the father nor the stepdaughter was able to
establish an overriding interest. The presence of
belonging alone is not sufficient to give rights of
overriding interest.
TOLATA 1996, Section Apply to the court to become a trustee.
14(1)
Williams v Glyn’s Bank v Equitable interest of wife (who contributed to purchase
Boland price) had an overriding interest.
CO-OWNERSHIP
Administration of Severance cannot occur by will. (ELABORATE.)

Estates Act 1925,
Section 3(4)
AG Securities v Vaughan Separate agreements of tenants means that they have
licenses, not joint tenancy.
Bank of Baroda v Dhillon Sale granted as children were grown up. Despite
overriding interest (under LRA 2002, Sch 3, Para 2),
sale granted. Children were grown up and wife would
have enough money to find accommodation after sale.
Bank of Ireland Home Sale may be approved if creditor is giving powerful
Mortgages v Bell consideration without sufficient compensation.
2005, Barca v Mears Owner went bankrupt; he urged the court to consider
delaying the sale until his child with special needs had
achieved his education in a school that pertained to the
requirements he had. HC did not postpone. DEPUTY
JUDGE STRAUSS legitimized the notion of the rights of
creditors being prioritized over the interests of ordinary
citizens. After assessing the child’s condition, it was
concluded that this family would not be eligible to delay
a sale due to the absence of ‘exceptional
circumstances’.
Bull v Bull Tenancy in common; the tenants in common have a
right to enjoy the land. Unequal contributions mean
equity will presume TIC.
Burgess v Rawnsley (Mutual agreement) Severance in writing must show
sufficient intention for immediate effect. Discussions of
mutual severance imply and apply severance. SIR
JOHN PENNYCUICK: negotiations where joint tenants
agree to terminate their joint tenancy, even if nothing
was in writing or formality, it is still enforceable if
decided orally, as there was a common intention to
sever thus it is valid severance. Must include all JTs, not
some.
1990, Corin v Patton AUSTRALIA (PERSUASIVE): Was there severance if
transfer agreement not signed? No. Intention not
sufficient for unilateral severance; all necessary steps
must be fulfilled.
Cowan v Scargill MEGARRY VC: Interest of beneficiaries comes first for
trustees.
2004, Cox v Jones
Edward v Lloyds Sale postponed for five years to protect the interests of
minors.
EON UK PLC v ARNOLD J was of the opinion that emails are not a valid
Gilesports form of notice (obiter).
1992, Evans v Hayward
2001, Gillett v Holt PROPRIETARY ESTOPPEL????
1986, Goodman v Gallant D tried to sever to get larger share. Severance allowed
but 50/50 division as there was agreement of it. Trusts
don’t apply if such a declaration is made, unless
dissolved.
1990, Gore and Snell v Upon dissolution of marriage, couple was in the process
Carpenter of drafting a separation agreement to sever their joint
tenancy, when the husband committed suicide. Had
their agreement managed to terminate the joint
tenancy? For severance to be successful, WILLIAMS V
HENSMAN dictates that mutual agreement or conduct
must be present; what the couple was intending to
agree upon would be considered as a mere prelude,
resulting in anticipation for the actually finalized
contract. The lack of clarity and certainty occurring as a
consequence of an unaccomplished agreement
prevents the joint tenancy from being eradicated, thus
entitling the wife to solely claim the property by
application of the right to survivorship.
Gould v Kemp Survivorship takes precedence over directions of a will.
Harrington v Bennet Sale was not delayed as there were no exceptional
circumstances.
1983, Harris v Goddard JT was not terminated at time of the husband’s death as
a prayer/pleading in a petition would not suffice as there
was no apparent intention to sever, effective
immediately.
Hickman v Peacey Deaths in a bomb blast; younger the survivor.
Holman v Howes The applicant was estopped from attaining a sale order
because of his own conduct.
Hopkins 2009
Hunter v Babbage If JT severance agreement made but not implemented,
survivor has equal shares with deceased’s estate;
sufficient intention to sever but in future (LPA S36).
However, equal shares as agreement of unequal shares
not finalized.
Ian v Nicholls One of the owners was schizophrenic, yet the sale was
delayed only for 16 months.
Insolvency Act 1986, This states that where one of the owners is declared
Section 335A bankrupt, the sale can be delayed for a maximum period
of one year (favorable to creditors).
2002, Jennings v Rice PROPRIETARY ESTOPPEL!!!
1999, Kinch v Bullard NEUBERGER J: severance still valid, even if a party
destroys the statutory notice to prevent others from
reading it; party destroying it can’t rely abolishing
evidence to their advantage if other tenants die.
Husband and wife were joint tenants; wife was ill and
sent notice to husband to sever. Before the notice
arrived, husband’s health became critical; the wife
received the letter of severance and tore it. It was held
that the severance did take place as the only
requirement of severance is an intention to immediately
sever; there is no requirement that the other joint
tenants have to read or accept that notice. As soon as
the letter arrives, severance takes place.
Lake v Gibson In case of unequal shares, equity presumes TIC; JTs
turn to TICs.
Land Registration Act
2002, Schedule 3,
Paragraph 2
Law of Property Act 1925 Statutory tool that attempted to modernize the law of
property in the UK.
Law of Property Act Severance in when equitable JT turns to TIC; legal title
1925, Section 36 not legally terminated.
Law of Property Act Equitable JT severance; severance can be affected
1925, Section 36(2) through statutory notice if there is an intention to
immediately sever BUT IT MUST BE WRITTEN. This
section does not give any formality requirements for this
stance. Give notice of intention to all other JTs.
Law of Property Act A trust of land automatically comes into existence
1925, Section 36(1) whenever the legal title to land is held by joint tenants.
Law of Property Act Only first four mentioned joint tenants are registered as
1925, Section 34(2) legal owners; all others equitable owners. However, all
have same rights.
Law of Property Act If trustees do not exercise powers, interested parties
1925, Section 30 apply to court, who has discretion to direct sale.
Law of Property Act Postage- Address to tenants at last known address if
1925, Section 196(4) not undelivered; where registered post is used,
severance will take place when the latter is deemed to
arrive. (CASEBOOK: Where registered post is used,
severance will take place when the letter is deemed to
arrive.
Law of Property Act Giving notice = serving notice. (CASEBOOK: This
1925, Section 196(3) states that where ordinary post is used, severance will
take place when the letter is actually delivered.)
Law of Property Act This states that all the tenants do not have to be names,
1925, Section 196(2) if mentioning parties interested (sent to all). (THIS
CONTRADICTS CASEBOOK WHICH SAYS, ‘Rules of
postage; this states that all tenants must be names in
the notice, and it should be addressed/sent to all’…
WHICH IS TRUE???)
Law of Property Act Any notice must be in writing.
1925, Section 196(1)
Law of Property Act Severance in writing must express clear intention to
1925, Section 196 other JTs; does not have to be read, but effective the
moment it arrives.
Law of Property Act When deaths occur simultaneously, younger will be the
1925, Section 184 survivor.
Law of Property Act No interest to be made or dissolved without written,
1925, Section 53(1)(a) signed statement.
Law of Property Act FULFILL REQUIREMENTS???
1925, Section 53(1)(b)
Law of Property Act REQUIREMENTS???
1925, Section 53(1)(c)
Law of Property
(Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act 1989,
Section 2
Lewen v Dodd Words of severance; equal shares, ‘equally’.
Morley v Bird JTs do not become TICs if words of severance are not
said, so estates/beneficiaries would not get a share;
individual, undivided shares remain amongst living
tenants.
2001, Mortgage NEUBERGER J: Parliament now favors family more
Corporation v Shaire than creditors.
Payne v Webb ‘In equal shares’ = severance.
Peat v Chapman ‘To be divided between’ = severance.
Re 88 Berkeley Road Statutory notice does not have to be signed, take
special form, or be bound by any formalities. Posting
sufficient evidence of notice; severance through post
valid, even if not received (as long as successfully sent).
Noticed served = given (i.e., informed of intention).
1986, Re Basham PROPRIETARY ESTOPPEL!!! Unconscionability on its
own cannot result in a successful claim of proprietary
estoppel.
Re Buchanan – Land bought by co-owners to prevent building. One
Wollaston’s Conveyance wanted sale. Refused as purpose was intact.
Re Bremner Check WestLaw?
Re Caines Severance through will is not operative.
Re Citro NOURSE LJ; the exceptional circumstances must be
truly exceptional.
1969, Re Draper’s Same facts as above, except in the notice it was stated
Conveyance that ‘I sever’’ it was held that the notice reflected an
intention to immediately sever. ????
1980, Re Evers’ Trust
Re Fuller TIC assumed in equity if business relationship i.e., the
purpose of purchased property was not residential, but
commercial. JUSTICE VINELOTT: threat of serious
violence can grant forfeiture
1985, Re K Woman shot her husband during a domestic violence
episode and was convicted of manslaughter.
2009, Stallion v Albert SARAH ASPLIN:
Stallion
2009, Thorner v Major HOL: PROPRIETARY ESTOPPEL!!!
Trustee Act 1925 Maximum of four legal joint owners.
Trusts of Land and
Appointment of
Trustees Act 1996,
Section 1
Trusts of Land and Trust of land is any trust being or including property.
Appointment of Trustees
Act 1996, Section 1(1)(a)
Trusts of Land and Trust can be created formally or informally, being
Appointment of Trustees resulting, express, or constructive.
Trusts of Land and Trustees don’t have to sell land, but they have power to
Appointment of Trustees sell or retain it.
Act 1996, Section 4 and 5
Trusts of Land and Powers of trustees; purchase land by investment for
Appointment of Trustees beneficiary’s occupation, and transfer land to
Act 1996, Section 6 beneficiaries when of full age.
Trusts of Land and Trustees have all powers of an absolute owner of land;
Appointment of Trustees still bound by fiduciary duties. Can convey land to
Act 1996, Section 6(1) beneficiaries.
and 6(2)
Trusts of Land and Settler can exclude provisions of TLATA Section 6.
Act 1996, Section 8(1)
Trusts of Land and
Appointment of
Trustees Act 1996,
Sections 8 and 10
Trusts of Land and Trustees, by power of attorney, can delegate powers to
Appointment of Trustees beneficiaries of age who have interest in land. If not,
Act 1996, Section 9 beneficiary apply to court under Section 14 to be
delegated suck duties.
Trusts of Land and Consult beneficiaries as much as possible, and
Appointment of Trustees consider/apply their desires and interests.
Trusts of Land and Beneficiaries have right of occupation, unless land
Appointment of Trustees unavailable or unsuitable.
Act 1996, Section 12
Trusts of Land and Trustees can exclude or restrict right to occupy
Appointment of Trustees (reasonably). S13(5); comply with obligations. S13(4);
Act 1996, Section 13 exclude/restrict if contradicting settlor intentions,
purpose of trust, beneficiaries’ wishes/circumstances,
etc. S13(7); occupiers cannot be evicted unless court
permits. S13(8); court must consider S13(4) before
eviction.
Trusts of Land and All the co-owners have the right to occupy the house;
Appointment of Trustees only the court can restrict this right. (Affirmed by
Act 1996, Sections 12 HENDERSON V EASON)
and 13
Trusts of Land and Any party (creditors, trustees, beneficiaries) interested
Appointment of Trustees in trust (e.g., for sale) can apply to the court for it.
Trusts of Land and While deciding whether to order sale of land, the court
Appointment of Trustees will have to pay regard to the interests of any minors,
Act 1996, Section 15 purpose for purchase of property, etc.
Trusts of Land and When settling disputes, especially to sell, courts
Appointment of Trustees consider: a. intention; b. purpose of land; c. minor
Act 1996, Section 15(1) welfare; and, d. interests of creditor.
White v White There was an oral agreement between the joint tenants
to never sever; still, one of the joint tenants sent a
statutory notice. It was held that the notice was
ineffective and there was not severance. This is a
criticized case as it defeats the purpose of severance.
Williams v Hensman PAGE-WOOD VC: This gives three further modes of
severance in equity: a. tenant acting on own share; b.
mutual agreement; and, c. mutual conduct (DENNING:
course of dealing that clears party wants common, not
joint, shares.).
Wiseman v Simpson Unity of possession. The court can restrict the
possession of a joint tenant, if it thinks it is necessary to
do so; however, the evicted tenants will be entitled to
rent from the tenant who is allowed to stay on the
property.
TRUSTS
Abbott v Abbott D said gift only his; C said it was for both. ROSSET
overruled; whole course of dealings to determine
beneficial interests. 50/50.
Law of Property Act Exempts implied trusts from express trust formalities;
1925, Section 53(2) co-ownership can be informally established even by
unconscious conduct.
2012, Pankhania v Express trust trumps JONES’ Judge incorrectly
Chandegra dismissed deed of equal shares in trust. Such
agreements only dismissed if vitiating factors like
undue influence or fraud are present.
1970, Pettitt v Pettitt Husband claimed beneficial interest as compensation
for his investments to enhance the house ($1000).
Yet, the expenditure and renovations were insufficient
to grant him an equitable interest.
Rahneman v Rahban Legal owner cannot compel beneficial owner to sell
the land.
Trusts of Land and Trusts for sale now trusts of land. Addresses disputed
Appointment of Trustees distribution of proportions during severance; courts to
Act 1996 determine the extent of parties’ interests and sale
allowance. JT split means 50/50 shares, unless written
agreement rebuts. Considers trusts and sale of family
homes.
Trusts of Land and Trusts for sale now trusts of land. Addresses disputed
Appointment of Trustees distribution of proportions during severance; courts to
Act 1996 determine the extent of parties’ interests and sale
allowance. JT split means 50/50 shares, unless written
agreement rebuts. Considers trusts and sale of family
homes.
Hussey v Palmer (Exceptional case for resulting trust) The house was in
the name of the husband; his mother-in-law came to
live with him and paid to get and annex built.
Ultimately, the husband asked her to leave and she
argued a resulting trust. It was held a resulting trust
did arise in her favor as the construction for which she
had paid for contributed to the overall value of the
house. The increase in the value of the house could
be considered as contribution to the purchase (bad
authority).
Trusts of Land and Trust of land is any trust being or including property.
Trusts of Land and Trust can be created formally or informally, being
Appointment of Trustees resulting, express, or constructive.
Springette v Defoe ‘Balance sheet’ approach; rights according to
purchase price contribution, not non-financial
contributions.
Stack v Dowden Quantifications of joint tenancy; LADY BARONNESS
HALE states that there is presumption of equal
division when the joint tenancy is severed. This
presumption can be rebutted through any evidence to
the contrary, such as: a. unequal payments; b.
business relationships; and, c. beneficial joint tenancy
or tenancy in trust.
Stack v Dowden HOUSE OF LORDS: Quantifications of a resulting
trust; the share will be in direct proportion to the
contribution. BARONESS HALE: LLOYDS outdated.
????
Stack v Dowden (New styled constructive trust) This case widened the
ambit of constructive trust by adding a third limb to
common intention; this is called ‘inferred through
conduct’. It means that common intention can be
inferred through the conduct of the parties which
includes the overall living style. The distinction
between common intention and detriment has been
blurred by the introduction of this third limb, however;
widening of the fairer doctrine for those wives who
have not been promised by their husbands or have
made no payments towards the house.
Stack v Dowden (Quantifications of a constructive trust) The HOL
suggested that in cases of family homes, a
constructive trust is to be preferred over a resulting
trust. A resulting trust is to be restricted to business
relationships. LORD NEUBERGER dissented. The
Lords further held that in order to quantify the share of
a tenant in common, the whole course of dealings
between the parties will be taken into account.
Stack v Dowden COMPARISON OF JUDGEMENTS BY LADY HALE,
LORD HOFFMAN, LORD NEUBERGER
(DISSENTED)!!!!!!! ESSAY!!!!!
Stack v Dowden,
Paragraph 69
2014, O’Kelly v Davies Despite lack of binding authority, court adopted
STACK’s broader approach to establishing beneficial
interests. COA: two-stage test: show common
intention of having interest, and what that interest
would be.
2020, O’Neill v Holland COA, judicial endorsement; scope of detrimental
reliance to establish constructive trust. C argued
common intention for domestic use, first accepted. H
appealed; what detriment? HENDERSON LJ (DAVID
RICHARDS and NUGEE LJ agreeing); detriment
essential ‘legal ingredient’ for successful claim.
Determine objectively; while O’Neill did not suffer
financial detriment, she surrendered proprietary
interests over a misrepresentation.
2004, Oxley v Hiscock CHADWICK LJ: When determining the value of each
party’s respective share, rather than assessing the
purchase price when you got the house, take into
consideration the selling price it possesses present
day.
Shares are allocated as directly proportional to each
party’s contributions towards the household, and there
will also be thorough investigation and evaluation of
the parties, their relationships, how they contributed to
and invested in the house, etc. All these factors will
amalgamate and present themselves as a pragmatic,
impartial judgement.
2004, Oxley v Hiscock, JUSTICE CHADWICK: the court must exercise
Paragraph 69 impartiality to ensure that any and all investments
and/or contributions intended for the property, by
either party, must be taken into consideration before
the bench approaches a conclusive verdict.
Lefoe v Lefoe (Exceptional case for resulting trust) House was in the
name of the husband; the wife contributed to the
household expenses which enabled the husband to
pay the mortgage instalments. It was held a resulting
trust arose in the favor of the wife as she indirectly
contributed towards the mortgage instalments
(criticized case).
1971, Gissing v Gissing Wife fought for equitable interest after divorce. Majority
of COA bench believed she was entitled to it, while
LORD DENNING held that she should be conferred
with half an interest in the property due to their mutual
decision of acquiring the property as one unit; ergo,
irrespective of her individual contributions for the
house, their status as a couple, their choice to
purchase via a joint venture, shared intentions of
residing together – it indicates that the property is
classified as a family asset, thus necessitating equal
shares upon desolution.
Joint conduct establishes family asset, thus equal

shares; contribution and legal title irrelevant if joint
contributions. EDMUND DAVIES LJ dissented on
‘palm tree’ approach of the bench. HOL: no
contribution or common intention to establish
beneficial interest. LORD DIPLOCK???
2007, Abbott v Abbott (Constructive trusts) Couple divorced, property in
husband’s name who disputed percentage of share.
BARONESS HALE: COA exercised excessive
application of LLOYDS, not taking the conduct of the
parties into account, which could potentially provide
assistance when the beneficial interests are being
quantified. LLOYDS has been replaced by subsequent
precedents, which now contemplate the entirety of the
conduct exhibited by all parties involved in relation to
the property. LADY HALE reiterated LLOYDS was
outdated.
1991, Llyods Bank v (Old styled constructive trust) HOL, LORD BRIDGE: if
Rosset no common intention, only get interest if contributed to
purchase price or mortgage. This case gave the
requirement for constructive trust; the person will have
to prove: a. common intention (i. payments; ii. mutual
understanding); b. reliance; and, c. detriment.
??????????????
Midland Bank v Cooke Non-financial contributions to bills, maintenance,
family, give half of property’s equitable interest. Wife
got 50% share (6% at first; appealed). To determine
beneficial interest, observe whole course of dealings
and shared burdens. Inclusive evidence of conduct
means ‘equality of equity’ principle would apply.
Lasker v Lasker It overruled ‘Curley v Parkes’ and reinstated the
original position, that is; a resulting trust will arise if
there if contribution towards purchase price or
mortgage instalments.
Law Commission 307, 31 ROSSET’s restrictive approach does not take non-
July 2007, Cohabitation: financial contributions into account. Lordships’
Financial Consequences discretion causing legal grey area and uncertainty, a
of Relationship challenge for potential solicitors and litigants. HALE,
Breakdown former Law Commissioner, calls for reform; so does
Law Commission. Unjust for family homes. Does not
say unmarried couples should get the same remedies
as married couples, but cohabiting couples living
together for (undecided number of) years or having a
child. New principles of property allocation should
apply when relationship dissolved, if claimant can
show they suffered an economic disadvantage with
their contributions. Courts then have discretion of
appropriate and adequate financial compensation,
especially considering children.
Chun v Ho (Detrimental reliance) It is irrelevant that the detriment
was suffered because of other motives as well.
Clough v Killy (Quantifications of constructive trust) When there is an
expressed common intention, that will be honored
while quantifying the share.
Curley v Parkes It was held that mortgage instalments are irrelevant
and only contribution towards purchase price will give
rise to resulting trust.
Eves v Eves (Detrimental reliance) Detriment can be extraordinary
work in the house.
2012, Geary v Rankine COA rejected HALE’s comments on LLOYDS being
outdated. This affirmed the new styled constructive
trust. Clarify; how?????????
Grant v Edwards (Common intention) For common intention, even
‘excuses’ of the property being shared beneficially will
suffice.
Greasley v Cooke (Detrimental reliance) LORD DENNING stated that
wherever there is detriment, there is a presumption of
reliance. Detriment may be financial or non-financial;
for example, emotional loss, physical loss, etc.
2011, Jones v Kernott Husband and wife severed; husband left the house
and never bothered about the house or its payments.
Ultimately, he claimed 50% shares in property. It was
held 90:10 ratio would be distributed, since the
husband showed a lack of interest in the property once
he had left. SUPREME COURT, JOINT JUDGEMENT
BY LADY HALE AND LORD WALKER, PARAGRAPH
51: In family/couple cases where there is no
declaration; STEPS: 1. Registered owner one or
more? Equitable; 2. Rebut co-ownership if different
common intention, but is objectively inferred by
circumstances, words, conduct, even if unconscious
(can change over time but must be communicated, not
just acted upon); 3. If no clear intention or changed,
but no evidence of intention to divide shares, courts
divide fairly given whole course of dealing, which is to
be implemented broadly by lordships; 4. Expenditure
important, but other factors to be considered to decide
intended shares.
1961, Jones v Challenger In scenarios where a relationship has dissolved, thus
resulting in the abolishment of their mutual intention
and purpose, the courts will approve the proposition
requesting permission to order a sale for the property.
Bull v Bull C wanted possession of rooms mother lived in. LORD

DENNING: TICs and beneficiaries to enjoy property
benefits and constructive trust established until
property sold. Cannot kick another out or sell without
their consent for sale. Insufficient evidence of unequal
contributions.
1984, Burns v Burns (Beneficial entitlements for unmarried cohabitees;
resulting trust) LORD JUSTICE FOX: Carrying out
basic household activities does not entitle an individual
to obtain rights over the property. An absence of
willingness to assistance to your partner in obtaining.
The bench, consisting of LORD MICHAEL FOX,
LORD ANTHONY MAY, and LORD JUSTICE
WALKER, ultimately concluded that the girlfriend
would not be granted any beneficial interest or
entitlement due to her as her; due to the extortionate
reluctance you displaced when. As Mr Patrick Mr
Patrick has incurred every single expenditure that Was
associated with their house without reimbursement
from his partner.
Caunce v Caunce Overturned by WILLIAMS, then KINGSNORTH. Wife
can’t rely on doctrine of notice as husband consented
on her behalf.
1984, Chhokar v Chhokar Constructive trust; this case widened the formerly
conservative approach when interpreting ‘actual
occupation’. Wife’s had to be admitted into the hospital
for treatment, but upon her arrival, she discovered she
had been excluded from the property.by her husband
and a subsequent purchaser. The court held that not
sufficient temporary absence is m temporary; thus,
Mrs Chhokar was deemed to be in actual occupation.
Claughton v Sale delayed; wife terminally ill with special needs.
Charalambous
1992, Westminster CC v LEASE/LICENSE!!! You’ll be transferred to that
Clarke department soon. :)
1975, Eves v Eves (Use of constructive trusts in family home case.) KING
DENNING: The common intention can be express or
implied; if there are implications of shared interests,
they will suffice when attempting to INITIATE THE
PROCESS OF acquiring a beneficial interest.es to get
a 25% share due to the presence of common intension
between the two parties where as demonstrated by
their cooperation while executing the renovations.
LORD DENNING attempts to persuade to persuade
a[[eal judge the father’ blank. The judge sson;y only
inves
2008, Fowler v Barron Express declaration is conclusive unless ij
mad3fantthathe division qouldInvesttoons ade by
each party.. Girlfrifor a z acted by subsequent act (like
PE). The judge In cases where there is an absence.
In light, so you can employEmploy these yill
successfully successfully chachieve this.
1985, Goodman v ?????
Gallant
Harrington v Bennet IA 335A’s attributes: after over a year, creditor
interests have supremacy; only ignore creditor in
exceptional circumstances
Insolvency Act 1986
Insolvency Act 1986, Jurisdiction regarding bankruptcy????
Section 335A(1)
Insolvency Act 1986, Courts powers to order sale in case of bankruptcy:
Section 335A(2) creditor interests, dwelling house, conduct contributing
to bankruptcy, needs and finances, minors’ interests,
and all other factors besides bankrupt’s interests.
2007, James v Thomas Claimant was unable to succeed in any of her she
trustpursued (common intwntion\, construcary
estoppeltiivetrIt is urgex\d that legal join twe
2011, Jones v Kernott Ean married coupleSupreme Court: When ajoint
tenancy exists betwrthey umake
1986, Kingsnorth Overturned CAUNCE. Wife had constructive trust as
Finance v Tizard bank did not make inquiriesagreements that of
beneficial trusts. , and proprietUNREGISTERED
LAND??? INTERESTS UNDER TRUSTS
UNREGISTRAB du to her inability produce
Land Registration Act Actual occupatiinterest held unless not disclosed or
2002, Schedule 3, discovered after reasonable inspection. ????
Paragraph 22
Laskar v Laskar LORD NEUBERGER: Property bought as investment,
equal interest presumption invalid; each party entitled
to value of their own contribution. ???? ELAB ON
HISTORY WITH DOWDEN.
Law Commission Parties can claim on basis of economic advantage
Report No 307, (benefit from other’s contributions) and disadvantage
‘Cohabitation: Financial (loss during and after, e.g., caring for kids, quitting job,
Consequences of etc) during relationship. Implementation delayed in
Relationship 2008 to observe impact of Family Law Act 2006, which
Breakdown’ was similar; STACK reduced requirement of urgent
legislative development.
ELAB???????
Law of Property Act
1925, Section 26
Law of Property Act TOLATA gave broader powers for trustees than these
1925, Sections 28 and sections. HOW???
29
Law of Property Act Gave courts discretion of whether a sale can occur
1925, Section 30 despite objections from other parties; courts must find
a balance between competing interests. DOCTRINE
OF CONVERSION AND DUTY OF SALE???
Law of Property Act Declaring of trust must be written.
1925, Section 53(1)(b)
Law of Property Act LPA 53(1)(b) does not apply to resulting, implied, or
1925, Section 53(2) constructive trust.
1991, Lloyds Bank v Estoppel by imposition of constructive trust.
Rossett (ELABORATE?)
Nicholls v Lan Sale delayed; wife was schizophrenic.
2004, Oxley v Hiscock CHADWICK LJ: entitled according to contributions
to/for the property during whole course of dealings, in
a fair manner. Use of word ‘fair’ provides judicial
discretion.
1985, Paddington BS v
Mendelsohn
Re Acklom
1946, Re Ames
Re Citro Creditor interests take precedent over others. Sale
approved unless exceptional difficult circumstances.
NOURSE LJ: moving neighborhoods and kids’ schools
may evoke sympathy, but it is just an unfortunate and
‘melancholic’ consequence of debt unfulfillment, not an
exceptional circumstance
Re Gorman Sale delayed; house renovated to accommodate
special needs.
1981, Re Holliday First case where sale order delayed; debt owed was
small compared to house’s market value. HOW????
Settled Land Act 1925 Strict settlements (can’t be created now) involve a
trust; successive interests. HOW WAS IT AND HOW
DID 1997 CHANGE IT???
Settled Land Act 1925,
Section 9(2)
Section 13
Section 18
Sections 19 and 20
Settled Land Act 1925, Defines who trustees of settlement can be ???
Section 30
Sections 41 and 71
Section 73
Section 106
Settled Land Act 1925, Purchaser to comply with the Act and give best
Section 110(1) possible price.
Section 110(2)
2007, Stack v Dowden Leading
Approved OXLEY. Financial affairs were ‘rigidly

separate’; 65/35 split justified. LADY HALE: burden to
rebut 50/50 presumption on party who claims
beneficial interests were different from legal interests.
She laid non-exhaustive list of all intentions (actual,
implied, imputed) regarding property during course of
conduct: discussions, intentions, reasons for joint title,
why survivor must give receipt (?), purpose of
property, nature of parties’ relationship, children,
shared responsibility, initial and subsequent financial
contributions, how finances were arranged,
distributions of ho. usehold effort and expenditures,
etc. LORD WALKER: lordships should move past
LLYODS.
LORD NEUBERGER dissented.???

Trusts of Land and Renewed ‘trust for sale’ as ‘trust of land’. Before this
Appointment of Trustees Act, land was asset to earn profit; now it is more than
Act 1996 property for sale.
Trusts of Land and Trust of property is any express, implies, resulting or
Appointment of Trustees constructive trust consisting of or including the land;
Act 1996, Section 1 applies to trusts before and after act, except for
existing strict settlements.
Trusts of Land and No longer a duty to sell.
Appointment of
Trustees Act 1996,
Sections 2, 4, and 5
Trusts of Land and Doctrine of conversion is abolished. BITCH, WHAT???
Appointment of
Trustees Act 1996,
Section 3
Trusts of Land and Broadens trustee powers. ???
Appointment of
Trustees Act 1996,
Sections 6, 7, 8, and 9
Trusts of Land and Right to occupy.
Appointment of
Trustees Act 1996,
Section 12
Trusts of Land and
Appointment of
Trustees Act 1996,
Section 13
Trusts of Land and File a petition to court for permission to sell. APPLY
Appointment of FOR EXERCISE OF FUNCTIONS??
Trustees Act 1996,
Section 14 Insolvency needs, mortgage creditors, children rights.
Trusts of Land and Any interested party can apply for sale request.
Trusts of Land and Scope of sale order discretion: trustee function
Appointment of Trustees exercise, including obligations of obtaining consent;
Act 1996, Section 14(2) nature and extent of interest
Trusts of Land and APPLY FOR EXERCISE OF FUNCTIONS???
Appointment of
Trustees Act 1996, Insolvency needs, mortgage creditors, children rights.
Section 15
To allow sale, courts should evaluate: intentions,
purposes, minor welfare, creditors.
LICENSES AND PROPRIETRY ESTOPPEL
AG Hong Kong v If you misled someone relating to formality, there will

Humphrey be no unconscionability.
Arif v Anwar Assurance was enough under estoppel but not in
constructive trust.
1989, Ashburn Anstalt v DISMISSED ERRINGTON. Reinstated that contractual
Arnold licenses do not bind third parties, but in exceptional
circumstances, constructive trust may be granted.
Contractual licenses are not proprietary interests or
rights. FOX LJ: disapproved of making contractual
licenses binding on third parties. Criticized ‘Errington v
Errington’ for disrupting former clarity on this area of
law, not following previous authorities; law is free to
develop, but this caused problems. However, it ended
up strengthening it further. Held; contractual licenses
are incapable of binding third parties, however, in
cases where it is unquestionable, it may bind third
parties.
Banner Group v Luff
Developments
Binions v Evans KING DENNING contested CRTPA 1999. Use of
constructive trust to hold that license can bind
purchaser.
Briggs 1981 (Conv 212)
Briggs 1983 (Conv 285)
Burrows and Burrows v Compensation for expenditure appropriate remedy.
Sharpe
2001, Campbell v Griffin Remedy of damages granted.
Chan v Ho JONATHAN PARKER LJ: D’s ‘vague’ promise was
valid for estoppel; C to ‘establish they acted to their
detriment or significantly altered their
position/behaviour in reliance of the alleged promise’.
Chaudhary v Yavuz Right of access to property awarded.
2008, Cobbe v Yeoman’s Where claimant knows that an agreement should be
Row Management put in writing and nobody misled them, there will be no
claim in estoppel as there would be no
unconscionability because it was his own fault.
Cooke v Thomas Estoppel can arise from any form and nature of
assurance.
1986, Coombes v Smith
Cowell v Rosehill (Australia) LATHAM J criticized Hurst; can’t ignore
Racecourse difference between personal and proprietary rights.
Crabb v Arun District Right of access to property awarded.
Council
Dascoe v Turner
DHN Food Distributors LORD DENNING contested CRTPA 1999. ????
v Tower Hamlets
London Borough
Council
2016, Davies v Davies LEWISON LJ????
Dillwyn v Llewelyn
Dodsworth v Dodsworth D spent money on house thinking he could live there
despite absence of legal agreement. C wanted
possession, but died. Admin wanted to sell on trust for
sale. Only possess if D repaid for investments.
Granting occupation means they would receive greater
interest than intended.
Driffilthe v William
1952, Errington v Not surprisingly, LORD DENNING, who was not a fan
Errington and Woods of privity in contract, led the attack. He contested
CRTPA 1999 in ERRINGTON, BINIONS, and DHN
FOOD V TOWER. Contractual license binds third
parties. Legally, the stepmother could have asked the
son to leave as a contractual license is not binding on
third parties. However, LORD DENNING held that the
son was paying the property mortgage by way of rent,
which created his proprietary right on the premises
(constructive trust). Therefore, the mother couldn’t
have asked him to leave and was bound by their
interest. This is a criticized authority as it again blurs
the distinction between a license and lease. LORD
DENNING failed to take into account that there was no
common intention to share the property mutually
rather than the intention was only to collect rent.
Flowermix v Site Same principle as Cooke v Thomas.
Development
2018, Farrar v Miller KITCHIN LJ?????
Flowermix v Site The nature or form of assurance is irrelevant.
Developments
Ghazani v Rastan There will be a need to justify the exemption from
the formality requirements on grounds of
CASE NOT FOUND. unconscionability.
Ghazani v Roshan Claimant being misled can create exemption.
CASE NOT FOUND.

2001, Gillett v Holt Remedies???? (Promise to leave will be broken) COA
held that the claimant must prove the four TAYLOR
requirements of estoppel and they must beware that
these conditions impact on each other, whereby;
unconscionability is the heart of the doctrine, which is
established by proving assurance, detriment, and
reliance.
1986, Grant v Edwards SIR NICHOLAS BROWNE-WILKINSON: C’s conduct
would only have occurred if she had an interest;
detrimental reliance. Given half the interest in the
house. Constructive trust + PE = legal owner knows C
relied on potential in property. (?)
Greasley v Cooke LORD DENNING stated that wherever there is
detriment, there is presumption of reliance. Can be
rebutted by contrary evidence.
Griffiths v Williams Non-assignable lease for life granted as remedy.
2020, Guest v Guest JUDGE RUSSEN QC??? FLOYD LJ???? READ
MODULE GUIDE, PAGE 123!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2019, Habberfield v
Habberfield
Habermann v Koehler
Halifax v Curry Popeck Section 116 applied; bank’s interest arose by PE.
2010, Henry v Henry
Herbert v Doyle Held; usually the results of failed written agreement
are simply that there is no interest except for a
personal interest and there is no estoppel on the basis
of failure; in such case, estoppel can only arise
because of something in the relationship between the
parties in addition to the failure.
Holman v Howes
2021, Howe v Gossop LPMPA 1989 Section 2 requirement of written
contracts. Verbal agreement; trial judge said PE right
activated, granting ‘irrevocable license’. SNOWDEN J
upheld on appeal. C not enforcing agreement, just
preventing D’s possession claim. Observe
contradiction of PE and S2; possibility of PE to enforce
oral agreement if prove other unconscionability basis.
Hunt v Soady
Hurst v Picture Theatres Cinema ticket could grant interest in land (criticized).
Ltd
Inwards v Baker Son granted license for life through PE. The least
required to satisfy equity will be granted as a remedy.
Ives Investment Lts v
High
2018, James v James JUDGE PAUL MATTHEWS????
2001, James v Thomas
Jennings v Rice ROBERT WALKER LJ: despite claimant’s
contributions, lordships must be just to ensure
proportionality. Detriment; it can be monetary or
nonmonetary, and does not have to be related to the
land in dispute. He gave up pay for property transfer
through will, but did not receive it. Court awarded
compensation in proportion to contributions, not more.
Thus, PR enforceable. (????? Was it even actually
PE?)
Jones v Jones
Jones v Kernott
King v David Allen Held; a license is incapable of binding third parties as
it is a personal right and not a proprietary right.
Damages can be claimed from the contracting party.
Lease to third party ended license.
2005, Kinane v Mackie- PE; claimant can rely on D’s conduct to establish
Conteh unconscionability. Where one party misleads the other
about the consequences of a failed written agreement,
so proprietary right was rewarded.
Land Registration Act Equity by estoppel effective as soon as it is
2002, Section 116 established.
Law Commission
(Consultation Paper
186), Paragraphs 4.187
and 4.192
Land Registration Act PE effective as soon as granted. Any remedy granted
2002, Section 116 by way of estoppel, even if it’s a license, will be
binding on third parties. Equity in estoppel can be
registered and protected.
Land Registration Act If person claiming PE is in occupation, they may have
2002, Schedule 3, overriding interest under this statute. (HOW? + Is it
Paragraph 2 S116 Sch3 P2, or just Sch3 P2?)
Law of Property All interest dispositions regarding the property must
(Miscellaneous manifest as written contracts with properly
Provisions) Act 1989, incorporated terms, which is agreed by all involved,
Section 2(1) otherwise it will not be enforceable. Contract for sale
must be mutually agreed upon and signed by all
parties.
Law of Property Act In land, any proprietary right can only be created on
1925, Section 53(1) the basis of writing. Interests only dissolved if written
and signed. (CASEBOOK: Situations with formality
requirement; writing – give examples and explanation.)
Law of Property Act Trusts exempted from formality requirements under
1925, Section 53(2) this S53(1).
Lim Teng Huan v Ang
Swee Chuan
2003, Lissimore v
Downing
2001, Lloyd v Dugdale PE or constructive trust only granted if unconscionable
for C to exercise strict legal rights. Contractual license
does not get proprietary interest. Pre-existing
promises do not make trust. (WHAT THE FUCK IS
DERIVATIVE DETRIMENT???)
1991, Lloyds Bank v
Rosset
London Borough of
Hounslow v
Twickenham Garden
Developments
Macdonald v Frost Lack of assurance was fatal to claim.
2019, McDonald v Rose
Manchester Airport v Previously, licensees could not sue for trespass or
Dutton nuisance; this case contested. Dissenting COA
member was a property lawyer.
Matharu v Matharu
2018, Moore v Moore HENDERSON LJ???
Murphy v Burrows The assurance should be so generous that it invites
unconscionability.
Olly v Grundy Reliance was defined as claim in estoppel would fail if
claimant would have acted the same way regardless
of assurance.
Orgee Case (?) If it is cleared that the detriment could have been
suffered irrespective of the assurance, there will be no
claim of estoppel as there will be no reliance.
Orgee v Orgee There will be no claim in estoppel if claimant suffered
detriment irrespective of assurance.
Ottey v Grundy PE being awarded gives license to use and occupy
land. ????
Oxley v Hiscock Intention of joint ownership inferred through conduct;
proportions not decided. Court to distribute according
to fairness; equal shares unjust. 60/40.
Pascoe v Turner PE created if party spent money due to reliance.
Awarded freehold in fulfilment of promise.
Pascoe v Turner Living together, C left, did not transfer but said she
could have house; D spent on property, C did not stop;
tried to evict. CUMMING-BRUCE LJ: Proprietary
estoppel applied; C can stay. D must fulfill promise.
Paul v Constance
Pawlowski 2002,
‘Satisfying the
Estoppel’ (118 LQR 519)
Powell v Benney
Profentiobo Assurance v This is a major remedy concept and is a major step for
Waterloo Real Estate the courts to award proprietary rights over someone
else’s land.
Ramsden v Dyson LORD KINGSDOWN, DISSENTING: If there is verbal
agreement of landlord creating expectation of interest
in land and is aware of/does not stop expenditure,
promise must be enforceable.
Robson v Hallet Bare licenses; this is a permission given by the owner
who receives nothing in return. Such a permission can
be revoked at any time by giving a reasonable time
notice. This license can be written or unwritten, and it
confers no rights.
1986, Re Basham
2018, Shaw v Shaw
1996, Sledmore v Dalby Claimant may be denied remedies if their detriment
has been compensated for by the benefits they
enjoyed; detriment won’t apply if you’ve exhausted it,
thus being reimbursed.
2014, Southwell v TOMLINSON LJ: detriment not to be ‘narrow and
Blackburn technical’, in line with ROBERT WALKER LJ in
GILLET; review and evaluate course and nature of
entire relationship, as per LORD WALKER in
THORMER, RELATING TO LICENSE OR LEASE..
?????
2007, Stack v Dowden HOL criticized STACK??????
1985, Street v LORD TEMPLETON: Distinction between a lease and
Mountford a license (GIVE FACTS, JUDGEMENT, RULING,
LOGIC, ETC ETC ETC… ELABORATE!)
2012, Suggitt v Suggitt ARDEN LJ considered WALKER LJ’s JENNINGS
judgement on proportionality. Where C had
unreasonable expectations while suffering detriment,
only limited equitable remedy granted. ?????
1975, Tanner v Tanner Contractual licenses; this is a license granted in return
of consideration. Consideration had to be something of
value and not an emotional loss.
Taylor Fashions v Unconscionability is the essence of estoppel unless
Liverpool Victoria the court is satisfied that withdrawal of assurance will
Trustees result in unconscionability.
Taylor Fashions v Requirements of proprietary estoppel are: a.
Liverpool Victoria assurance; b. reliance; c. detriment; and, d.
Trustees unconscionability.
The Calgarth ‘When you invite a person into your house to use the
staircase, you do not invite them to slide down the
banisters’; won’t be sued for trespass, unless the
exceed bounds of license.
Thomas v Sorrell VAUGHAN CJ: Licenses are a simple permission to
do something on land which would otherwise be
unlawful. They do not alter the property.
Thompson 1983 (Conv
50)
Thompson 2003,
‘Flexibility of Estoppel’
(Conv 225)
Thomas v Sorrell VAUGHAN CJ: Licenses do not give interests to
transfer or alter the property.
2009, Thorner v Major LLOYD LJ, LEADING JUDGEMENT?????? HOLD
ENDORSED WAYLING. LORD NEUBERGER; no
clash with LPMPA S2 requirement of written contracts.
HOW DID PE APPLY????
Verrall v Great Yarmouth Equitable remedies granted. At times it would be
inappropriate and insufficient to grant damages; the
parties would prefer specific performance or injunction.
This is a criticized decision as it confuses the
differences between a license and a lease as
equitable remedies are restricted to the extent of
leases.
Winter Gardens Theatre Licenses can be revoked if given a reasonable notice.
v Millennium Productions Held; no remedy would be granted as there is no
breach of the term. One month’s notice is considered
as a reasonable notice. Breach of irrevocable license
contract can be injunction.
Wayling v Jones Person encouraging another to act to their detriment
over expectation of inheritance applies PE.
2020, Wills v Sowray
Wood v Leadbitter License can be revoked even in instances of payment,
without refunds. Only deeds enforceable to stay on
property. ESSAY???
Yaxley v Gotts
Yeo v Wilson Courts adopted a broad approach by looking at the
entire relationship between the parties and entire
conduct before determining unconscionability.
Yeoman’s Row Company has verbal agreement about construction;
Management v Cobbe court allowed as it was not unconscionable or specific
property right promised. LORD SCOTT disagreed,
believed constructive trust should apply as there was
no actual property promised; other judges applied PE.
????
LEASES
Addiscombe v Crabbe Labels don’t matter; a license agreement was held to

be a lease.
AG Securities v Vaughn LORD TEMPLEMAN: Four rooms, four different
(Joint Appeal in HOL with people; claimed exclusive possession. Held (by HOL),
ANTONIADES V it was a license as they did not have exclusive
VILLIERS) possession and signed independent contracts.
Antoniades v Villiers LORD TEMPLEMAN: Two separate licenses treated
(Joint Appeal in HOL with as a shared lease; rooms intended to occupy together.
AG SECURITIES V Title of agreement does not matter; court will examine
VAUGHN) agreement to determine nature.
Ashburn Anstalt v Arnold There is no absolute principle of no rent, no lease.
Ashworth Frazer v If landlord believed covenant would be breached,
Gloucester City Council refusal of consent is valid.
Aslan v Murphy No exclusive possession, but had term of 90 minute
property evacuation; ignored as unrealistic and not
consistent with their relationship. LORD DONALDSON
stated that simply having access to the keys by the
landlord will not negate exclusive possession. The
purpose of the possession of keys needs to be
assessed; if it is reserved for an emergency, it will not
negate exclusive possession. Furthermore, the courts
will rule out sham terms.
Barrett v Morgan This can be terminated by giving a notice by another
party.
Berrisfort v Maxfield This gave the courts a discretionary power to declare
any uncertain terms as a lease for 90 years (criticized
case).
Bruton v London and Upheld existence of contractual, non-proprietary
Quadrant Housing leases; tenant must be defined as one to get such
protection. Lease with personal rights between parties
binds landlord, but not superiors. Generally, a person
cannot grant what he himself does not possess, but in
this case. X was entitled to lease. LORD HOFFMAN
stated that it was a contractual license. Prior to this
case, a lease and term of years were two different
names for the same thing but LORD HOFFMAN in this
case drew a distinction. He stated that a term of years
was proprietary in nature, capable of binding third
parties, whereas a lease could be contractual in
nature, incapable of binding third parties. More often
than not, a lease will confer a proprietary interest, but
in a situation like BRUTTON, the distinction between a
term of years and lease will be activated. LORD
HOFFMAN was criticized for his decision as he was
arguable disturbing the concept of leases by drawing
an unnecessary distinction between a lease and term
of years. This has blurred distinction between lease
and license. Nonetheless, LORD HOFFMAN had his
own reasons for this distinction; he was bound by the
precedent of STREET, where it was stated that
wherever there is exclusive possession, there is a
presumption of a lease. Therefore, a lease had to be
granted because X exclusive possession, but to avoid
injustice to the paper owner, he changed the nature of
a lease to being contractual so that the paper owner
would not be bound by it.
Bruton v London and Initially term of years and lease was interchangeable,
Quadrant Housing Trust but in this case, LORD HOFFMAN said term of years
and years is different and the concept of a ‘contractual
lease’ was introduced i.e., a contractual lease isn’t a
proprietary right. This is a criticized case to cause
confusion and blur the line between a license and
lease. This was done because of STREET V
MOUNTFORD, and to protect the paper owner. When
contractual, it does not bind third parties, and in this
case. PO was the third party. So, this contractual
lease will not bind them, and it can be terminated and
evicted.
Caerphilly Concrete v A five-year lease was granted with an automatic
Owen renewal clause. Held; lease for 2000 years.
Cottage Holiday Property was let out for one week a year for 80 years.
Associates v Custom and This was a lease as the ultimate duration of 80 years
Excise was known.
Crawley v URE This can be terminated by giving a notice by another
party.
David v Lewisham Exclusive possess + duration + rent = presumption of
tenancy. But, can be rebutted in instances of family.
Daughter’s occupation was a license, not a license.
Being family does not mean you have a lease, despite
exclusive possession.
Expert Clothing Service v Landlord attempted to forfeit lease for breach of
Hillgate House covenant (reconstruction); judge said relief should not
be granted. COA allowed appeal as L waived right of
forfeiture under LPA 1925 S146 and had an invalid
notice. Courts granted T with remedy for L’s breach of
covenant.
2008, Fitzkriston LLP v
Panayi
Garland v Johnson Retaining keys to enter at own convenience was held
to be a license.
2017, Gilpin v Legg JUDGE PAUL MATHEWS:
1998, Gray v Taylor Trustee can’t grant lease. ????

Hammersmith and This has allowed continuing and subsisting
Fulham v Monk relationship between parties who wish to remain in a
leasehold relationship.
1974, Heslop v Burns Landlords granting licenses with/without rent
(particularly in the presence of a domestic relationship)
do not possess the intention to be excluded from their
own property by the tenants.
Hugler v Ruddy Keys retained to provide genuine cleaning services
held to be a license; however, if no services are
provided, it could be a lease.
International Drilling Landlord can protect property if occupied in
Fluids v Louisville undesirable way or by undesirable person; personal
Investments dislike is not valid.
1991, Javad v Aqil NICHOLLS LJ: There was a ‘tenancy at will’ in this
case, i.e., tenant can reside at the property during the
course of negotiations by paying rent. This was
intended to be an intended to be an interim
arrangement, classifying it as a license or tenancy at
will; ergo, the landlord can revoke this permission.
Jenkins v Jackson KEKEWICH LJ: covenant of no disturbance by noise is
not on landlord.
Kay v Lawbeth LORD SCOTT followed BRUTTON.
Kened Ltd and Den MILLET J: if no reasonable landlord would have
Norske Bank v Connie withheld consent.
Investments
Lace v Chantler Duration must be certain and definite. Property was let
out for the duration of the war. Duration was not
specified; hence, it was a license, not a lease.
Landlord and Tenant Landlord must not withhold consent unreasonably.
(Covenants) Act 1927,
Section 19(1)
Landlord and Tenant Both parties must agree on what circumstances would
(Covenants) Act 1927, lead to withholding consent.
Section 19(1A)
Landlord and Tenant Consent must be written as request of tenant in
(Covenants) Act 1988, reasonable time.
Section 1(3)
Landlord and Tenant Refusal of consent must be reasonably refused, in
(Covenants) Act 1988, reasonable time, with reasonable conditions.
Section 1(6)
Landlord and Tenant Applicable from January 1st, 1996.
(Covenants) Act 1995
Landlord and Tenant New tenancies from 1996.
Section 1(1)
Landlord and Tenant
Section 17
Landlord and Tenant Affirmed Section 19(1A) LTA 1927; circumstances of

(Covenants) Act 1995, withholding consent.
Section 22
Landlord and Tenant New tenancy act includes agreements and equitable
(Covenants) Act 1995, leases.
Section 28(1)
Landlord and Tenant
Section 3
Landlord and Tenant Landlord signing lease is released from covenants and
(Covenants) Act 1995, cannot benefit from landlord’s covenants.
Section 5
Landlord and Tenant Landlord may be free from covenants under Section 8.
Section 6
Land Registration Act Leases over three but under seven years are
2002, Schedule 3, overriding interests.
Paragraph 1
2002, Schedule 3,
Paragraph 2
Land Registration Act Leases before October 2003 are also overriding.
2002, Schedule 12,
Paragraph 12
2002, Sections 3(3) and
4(2)
Land Registration Act Lease over seven years must be registered and have
2002, Section 27 deed to be applicable.
2002, Section 27(2)
Land Registration Act Lease over three but under seven years is protected
2002, Sections 32 by entry of notice as it is on the land register.
Land Registration Act Lease under three years cannot be on land register.
2002, Section 33
Law Commission
Consultation Paper 174,
‘Termination of
Tenancies for Tenant
Default’
Law of Property Replaced LPA S40. Not a legal lease by deed or
(Miscellaneous equitable lease if S2 criteria not met. ???????
Provisions) Act 1989, (CASEBOOK: Agreement must be signed by both
Section 2 parties, otherwise it is not a legal lease as it does not
satisfy the LP(MP)A S2 criteria.
Law of Property
(Miscellaneous
Section 1
Law of Property Act
1925, Schedule 15
Law of Property Act This defines lease as an estate in land for a term of
1925, Section 1(1)(b) years absolute.
Law of Property Act
1925, Section 1(5)
Law of Property Act Legal title can only be co-owned by JTs; four unities
1925, Section 1(6) (possession, interest, time, title) required for legal JT
lease.
Law of Property Act This deals with perpetually renewable leases. This is a
1925, Section 145 lease which is capable of being renewed
automatically. This section states that such a lease will
take effect as a lease for 2000 years (deterrent effect).
Law of Property Act
1925, Section 146
Law of Property Act
1925, Section 149(3)
Law of Property Act This provides that any lease determinable with life or
1925, Section 149(6) marriage will take effect as a lease for 90 years
(deferent effect).
Law of Property Act Rent is not an essential characteristic of a lease, but
1925, Sections 205(x) almost every lease will involve payment.
and (xxvii) (CASEBOOK: S205(1)(xxvii) states ‘such tenancies’
(bitch what kind of fucking tenancies) are recognized.)
Law of Property Act
1925, Section 40
Law of Property Act Exemption from formality requirements.
1925, Section 52(2)(d)
Law of Property Act
1925, Section 52
Law of Property Act Exemption from formality requirements???? Lease not
1925, Section 54(2) exceeding three years, even without formalities or
written agreement, is legal if: 1. Of three years or less;
2. Commencement of possession on same day; 3.
Rent of prevailing market price. (CASEBOOK: a.
tenant in possession; b. commercial rent; c. no fine.)
?????
Limitation Act 1980, Breach of covenant secures a maximum of 6 years’
Section 19 arrears.
Law of Property Act The reversionary title holder will be bound by the
1925, Section 141 and benefit and burden of the covenant upon reversion
142 whether the lease is equitable or legal, the
reversionary will be bound.
Liverpool CC v Walton Lack of commencement date does not render a lease
Group void, especially if commercial or intended to be
enforceable.
Merchent v Charters Exclusive possess + duration + rent = presumption of
tenancy. But, can be rebutted in instances of cleaning
services.
Marcroft v Smith Exclusive possess + duration + rent = presumption of
tenancy. But, can be rebutted in instances of
friendship.
Marjorie Burnett Ltd v A lease was granted for a period of seven years with a
Barclays review and renewal clause. Held to be a lease for
seven years only as ‘possibility of review; saved it from
being a perpetually renewable lease.
1910, Matthews v
Smallwood
Mehta v RBS Right of occupation does not mean right of possession
if other significant factors present.
2012, Mexfield Housing Tenancy with monthly rent; landlord tried to remove
Co-operative v Berrisford tenants as term was ambiguous. COA: lease
agreement was void as the duration was not specified
(PRUDENTIAL). SUPREME COURT: lease was not
void and created a common law life tenancy under
LPA 1925 S149(6), lasting 90 years. While the parties’
rights to terminate the lease was restricted,
PRUDENTIAL was still retained as precedent.
Marchant v Charters Exclusive possess + duration + rent = presumption of
tenancy. But, can be rebutted in instances of cleaning
services. LORD DENNING stated, in order to
distinguish license and lease, look at nature and
quality of occupancy.
Mikeover v Brady Exclusive possess + duration + rent = presumption of
tenancy. But, can be rebutted in instances of each
paying their own rent; one defaulting doesn’t require
other to compensate. Separate licenses, not a lease.
New LAN (post LTCA The ‘LANDLORD AND TENANT’S COVENANTS ACT
1996) has simplified things to a greater extent. 1. All
covenants are assumed to touch and concern thew
land unless expressed to be personal; 2. The case of
RE KING has been done away with. It held that K
could sue for breached that occurred before his time.
Now, a party can only sue for breaches that occurred
during this time; 3. Under the old law, the original
lessee would always remain liable even after
assignment for the breaches. Now, under new law, the
original lessee would be excluded of liability
automatically upon assignment; 4. The original
landlord will not be exempted of liability automatically
and they will have to seek permission from the lessee
before such a release, such a permission cannot be
withheld unnecessarily; 5. Under the law, the
distinction between equitable and legal lease has been
lived out.
Norris v Checksfield Exclusive possess + duration + rent = presumption of
tenancy. But, can be rebutted in instances of
employer/employee relationship.
Payne v Haine Tenant repairing after lease will be at their expense.
Port v Griffith Landlord must not frustrate purpose of lease; covenant
of not derogating from grant.
Posner v Scott-Lewis Tenant’s remedy includes specific performance.
Protection from Eviction Disturbing tenant’s possession of property is breach of
Act 1977, Section 1(3) landlord’s covenant.
Prudential Assurance v HOL, LORD TEMPLEMAN: strict interpretation of
London Residuary Body lease duration. Lease must have certain term; length
of time cannot be vague such as ‘requiring it for other
purposes’. Lease clause of needing it for construction
was declared void; as tenants paid yearly rent, they
were granted a lease that would have to be legally
terminated.
Radaich v Smith Anything less than exclusive possession will only be a
license; it is the touchstone of a lease.
1971, Re Midland FOSTER J: requirement of specified duration of lease
Railway Co’s Agreement is not imperative to (for?) periodic tenancies.
Rugby School v Tannahill If property is used for immoral purposes, relief will not
be granted.
Savva v Hussain This case drew a distinction between negative and
positive covenants. A positive covenant is capable of
being remedied; hence, chances of relief are high. In
contract a negative covenant isn’t as easy to remedy,
hence, chances of being granted relief are somewhat
low.
Schwartz v Zamrl Tenant staying beyond lease expiry has no real
tenancy and can’t sue for trespass.
1993, Skipton Building Wife granted PE to prevent eviction; irrespective of
Society v Clayton titles on documents/contracts, if the tenants possess
the three hallmarks (exclusive possession,
fixed/periodic term, payment) that constitute as the
fundamentals of establishing a lease, it will be
declared a lease, not a license.
2015, Southward HILDYARD J: In cases where the duration of a
Housing Co-operative v tenancy is not specified, C cannot claim a 90-year
Walker lease under LPA 1925, S149(6); if clauses within the
agreement exhibit that D had contrary intentions, it will
be declared a contractual license. While MEXFIELD
transformed uncertain durations into tenancies for life,
the SC permitted divergence from this precedent in
situations where the contractual terms clearly indicate
the landlord’s unwillingness. This was a periodic
tenancy or contractual license.
Southwark LBC v Mills Covenant of no disturbance by noise is not on
landlord. (Soundproofing case).
Spencer’s Case The benefit and burden of the covenant would pass to
C if there is: 1. Privity of estate; 2. Covenant
touches/concerns the land.
Street v Mountford HOL: IGNORE SHAM TERMS! Title of license does
not mean it will be treated as such. Exclusive
possession is a very strong form of possession which
makes it a legal right. LORD TEMPLEMAN: lessee
entitled to exclude everyone, including owner/landlord.
Landlord may try to enter on some conditions, but if
lessee doesn’t permit, landlord has no property right.
Street v Mountford HOL: Lease must have 3 things: 1. Exclusive
possession; 2. Fixed or periodic term; and, 3. Rent.
LORD TEMPLEMAN stated that wherever there is
exclusive possession, there is presumption of lease.
Precedent, but criticized as presumption granted in
favor of lessee, which will have to be rebutted by the
PO. it is unfair to grant a presumption of legal right
over someone else’s and placing PO under burden of
rebuttal is unreasonable. Bad authority as it ignored
lodging and services arrangements where exclusive
possession granted but no ease.
Thomas v Hayward Nothing to be done on or to the land, thus covenant
not binding as it did not concern land itself.
Tower Hamlets LBC v A lease may be created by proprietary estoppel, but
Sherwood not valid until court recognition.
Venus Investment v No lease if the owner has reserved a power of
Stock Top intensive supervisory control.
1882, Walsh v Lonsdale LORD JESSEL MR: Lease was effective, even in the
absence of written documents or other formalities. If
both parties begin acting upon the ‘hypothetical’ lease,
an equitable lease is created, despite being
unregistered. This means both the landlord and tenant
are protected by the rights a legal lease would have
granted. Impact of case: Equity; doctrine of
anticipation; specific performance; transfer property
rights. (Must meet LP(MP)A S2 requirements???)
Warren v Keen DENNING LJ: Tenant has covenant to take care of
property.
Westminster v Clarke The owner had reserved unrestricted access to a room
and could compel the tenant to share it. Held; extent of
powers enjoyed by owner and restriction on tenant
negated exclusive possession, therefore, it was not a
lease.
Wigclarke Properties v Relief will not be granted if there has been a drop in
Dupre Properties Ltd the property value, or if the breach was very serious in
nature.
MORTGAGES
Abbey National
Building Society v Cann
Administration of ??? Court can suspend execution of possession if OR
Justice Act 1970, can pay debt in reasonable time. Dwelling houses.
Section 36 (AMENDED Protects mortgager against right of possession: i. only
BY AJA 1973 SECTION applies to domestic mortgages; ii. only possible
8) through court order; iii. only applies to occupied
property, not vacant land; and, iv. Mortgager can
request delay, but courts consider several factors
before granting postponement.
Administration of WHAT IS THE AMENDMENT???
Justice Act 1973,
Section 8
1985, Alec Lobb
(Garages) v Total Oil
Great Britain
Barclays Bank v HOW DID THIS DEVELOP LAW??? Undue influence
O’Brien and third parties significant after this case. HOL,
LORD BROWNE-WILKINSON: if not to wife’s
advantage and there is legal wrong, creditor not have
constructive notice. Lack of evidence of
misrepresentation/inducement initially dismissed wife’s
appeal, but COA & HOL allowed. ???
Biggs v Hoddinott Similar facts as NOAKES. Term was to provide beer
for 5 years after redemption. Held as commercial
advantage. 5 years was reasonable; CA allowed, C&F
not.
1962, Birmingham NEGATIVE EQUITY; EE can possess if there is a
Citizens Permanent default.
Building Society v Caunt
British General LPA 1925, S105???
Assurance v AG
Cheltenham and ??? No exhaustive list of factors, e.g.: a. mortgage
Gloucester BS v duration; b. how much mortgager can reasonably pay;
Norgan c. why there was default; d. chances of another
default; e. mortgager’s future prospects; etc.
Cheltenham and ??? NEGATIVE EQUITY. D defaulted, court allowed
Gloucester v Krausz EE’s possession suspension for the D’s opportunity to
sell; High Court allowed application under LPA 1925
S91(2). C appealed; allowed. EE can possess in case
of a default. AJA S36 not applicable if D has
insufficient funds.
Cityland and Property COMPARE TO MULTISERVICE???
(Holdings) v Dabrah
Consumer Credit Act
1974
Consumer Credit Act Common law doctrine of restraint of trade protects
2006 ORs.
Consumer Credit Act This states that if the agreement between the
1974, Section 137 mortgager and mortgagee is extortionate, then the
courts can open up the agreement and strike such
terms out.
Consumer Credit Act This defines ‘extortionate’ as being grossly unfair. The
1974, Section 138 factors that courts will consider as to determine what
would be extortionate are: age and experience of the
mortgager; need of mortgager at time of agreement;
exploitative behavior of the mortgagee; etc.
Consumer Credit Act Applies to domestic mortgages, removes cap of
1974, Section 140A and $25,000, extortionate replaced by unfair. ???
140B
Consumer Credit Act Courts have power where terms unfair to debtor;
2006, Sections 19 and replace CCA 140A and B. ???
20
Consumer Credit Act Replaces S137 to S140 of 1974 CCA.
2006, Section 140
2014, Co-operative LORD TEMPLEMAN, 324?????
Bank v Phillips
Criminal Law Act 1977,
Section 6(1)
1971, Cuckmere Brick v EE to prioritize own interests over OR’s. The
Mutual Finance mortgagee is under a duty to sell the property at best
possible market price at time of sale. The sale should
be concluded upon the mortgagee’s discretion and
choice. He is under no duty to wait for a better market
price, and has no obligation to wait for the property
value to increase, even if it is anticipated.
Cukurova Finance
International v Alfa
Telecom Turkey
Davies v Directloans High rates of interest are okay, if the borrower has a
poor credit history and the lender is taking a risk.
1828, Dearle v Hall Mortgagee of equitable notice should give notice to
trustees in order to secure priority?????
Dunbar Bank v Nadeem Set aside on condition that claimant accounted for
benefit she acquired. EXTENT OF DISSOLVING
MORTGAGE???
1968, Esso Petroleum v A restraint of trade would be a C&F; any interference
Harper’s Garage with a person’s freedom to trade can be struck down
(Stourport) by courts; 5 years v 21 years.
Royal Bank of Scotland LORD NICHOLLS: creditors to ensure both parties got
v Etridge (Ethridge?) legal advice if they are a couple and the loan only
benefits one. Watch out for misrepresentation or
undue influence, seeing both gave informed consent.
If yes, can repossess property. Lender put on inquiry if
surety of another. Steps: contact surety; ask them to
consult solicitor; inform of all loan details; solicitor to
educate on risks and determine consent to proceed;
written confirmation of consent.
1912, Fairclough v Swan Redemption close to lease expiry is not useless for
Brewery OR; redeem earlier. In a lease, delaying the date of
redemption can be considered as a C&F as a lease is
a depreciating asset. Where absolute ownership is
mortgaged, delaying the date can be commercial
interest as mortgagor does not have the property for a
fixed time, this would be unfair as mortgager is not
absolute owner of property.
Falco Finance v Gough CCA 1974 aimed to protect ORs with financial
constraints.
Farrar v Farrars The mortgagee cannot sell the property to himself or
his agent.
Financial Services and
Markets Act 2000
Four Maids Ltd v Dudley HARMAN J; right of possession activates ‘before the
Marshall Properties Ltd ink dries’ on signed agreement.
Habib Bank v Taylor Courts consider mortgager’s ability to pay remaining
amount (instalments). If unable, courts won’t delay
right of possession.
2008, Horsham
Properties Group v
Clark
2001, Jones v Morgan WAMBOROUGH LTD V GARMITE LTD and this case
state that a term can be termed as C&F even if there
are two different agreements, granted the mortgagor’s
position was exploited and mortgagee was abusing
their own. LORD PHILLIPS MR: Doctrine of clog on
equity of redemption is redundant. ??????
1939, Knightsbridge GREENE MR: Essential requirements of mortgage
Estates Trust v Byrne transaction are observed and oppressive or
unconscionable terms are removed. No absolute rule
that a mortgage cannot prevent early redemption.
1914, Kreglinger v New Collateral advantage upheld if land is returned in same
Patagonia Meat and Cold form as before mortgage. K ran a wool broker firm. He
Storage agreed to lend NP $10,000. One of the terms of
mortgage was that NP could not redeem before 5
years. Another term was that whatever sheepskin NP
had was to be sold only to K, at best possible price.
NP wanted to redeem after 2 years; K agreed but
stated they should still sell skin at best price for 3
years. NP refused and argued this was C&F. Held; not
C&F as term was fair and reasonable; 5 years and
‘best possible market price’. Courts tried to draw
distinction between CA & C&F. Anything fair or
reasonable and not beyond redemption is a CA. In
contrast, unfair, unconscionable or beyond redemption
is C&F.
Ladsky v TSB Bank Power of sale arises if some deed clause has been
breached.
Land Charges Act 1972 Registrable mortgages on unregistered land: puisine
(???), legal contract/estate contract, general equitable
charge. ?????
Land Registration Act You cannot create a mortgage with unregistered land
2002, Section 4(1) until you register the land on the Land Registry.
UNREGISTERED = NO MORTGAGE = REGISTER
TO BE ABLE TO.
Land Registration Act Granting mortgage of unregistered land will trigger
2002, Section 4(1)(g) process of property registration.
2002, Section 11
Land Registration Act Only way for mortgage to exist on REGISTERED
2002, Section 23(1) LAND is CHARGE by DEED by way of LEGAL
MORTGAGE, the demise of a leasehold
estate???????????????????
2002, Section 23(1)(a)
Land Registration Act Only registered proprietor can create legal mortgage.
2002, Section 24
Land Registration Act Charge becomes valid once registered; register
2002, Section 27 mortgage in land register.
Land Registration Act Registration of property in question is required to be
2002, Section 27(2) legally applicable.
2002, Section 27(2)(f)
2002, Section 32
2002, Section 48
Land Registration Act Any mortgage not on the charges register is not legal,
2002, Section 51 but equitable. Must be registered to be enforceable.
?????
1925, Section 66
Law Commission Paper
204, 1991, ‘Land
Mortgages’
Law of Property Legal mortgage is made by charge deed and
(Miscellaneous registration; only then will it be implemented????
Section 1
Law of Property Equitable mortgage can be created by agreement
(Miscellaneous complying this this section. ????????????????????
Section 2
Law of Property Act EE and OR have legal estates; OR has legal interest.
1925, Section 1(2)(c) ???
Law of Property Act
1925, Section 36
Law of Property Act Legal mortgage is made by charge deed and
1925, Section 52 registration; only then will it be implemented????
Legal mortgage in registered land must be created by
charge????????
Law of Property Act Equitable interests are either made by will or a
1925, Section 53(1) document WRITTEN and SIGNED by EE and OR.
Law of Property Act
1925, Section 53(1)(a)
Law of Property Act
1925, Section 53(1)(c)
Law of Property Act Mortgager can request courts for relief by selling
1925, Section 91 collateral themselves to pay off the debt and retain
surplus.
Law of Property Act
1925, Section 91(2)
Law of Property Act S88(2)????????
1925, Section 89(2)
Law of Property Act Mortgagee can go to court to have the collateral

1925, Section 88(2) foreclosed (i.e., to bar), if its price in (in?) equal, in
their name. Right exists, but rarely used.
Law of Property Act OR has same protections, powers, and remedies as
1925, Section 87 EE.
Law of Property Act
1925, Section 86(1)
Law of Property Act Legal mortgage implementable by express deed.???
1925, Section 85(1)
Law of Property Act
1925, Section 85
Law of Property Act
1925, Section 91
Law of Property Act OR can apply for court order to control sale.
1925, Section 91(2)
Law of Property Act Appointment of receiver; mortgagee can appoint
1925, Section 109 receiver to go into possession via court. Any rent
discrepancies give mortgager claim against receiver,
not mortgagee.
Law of Property Act This talks about the proceeds of sale. Once the
1925, Section 105 property is sold, the mortgagee becomes the trustee of
the proceeds of sale for the mortgager.
Law of Property Act Provides procedure before power to sell right can be
1925, Section 103 exercised: i. mortgagee must serve the mortgager a
notice, informing them of the default; ii. default must
be of at least two months; and, iii. there has to be a
breach of some provision (not financial).
Law of Property Act 101(1) applies when no expression of contrary
1925, Section 101(4) intention. ???
Law of Property Act The mortgagee’s power to sell depends on the
1925, Section 101(1)(i) mortgager. Power to sell is activated when the
mortgager does not pay off the loan. Right provided by
this section.
Law of Property Act Statutory power of sale activates by DEED when
1925, Section 101(1) redemption date has passed and there is payment
due.
Law of Property Act
1925, Section 101
Limitation Act 1980,
Section 20
Lord Waring v London
and Manchester
Assurance
Meftah v Lloyds TSB
Bank
Mobil Oil v Rawlinson
Multiservice Currency exchange rate case; commercial interest/bad
Bookbinding v Marden bargain is not C&F. COMPARE TO CITY V
DABRAH???
National Westminster Mortgagee may have induced mortgagor to enter
Bank v Morgan mortgage. ???
1902, Noakes v Rice Permanent fetters are invalid. One of the terms of the
mortgage agreement here was that mortgager, who
owned a brewery was to provide beer to the
mortgagee for the rest of his life. Held as C&F on right
of redemption, not commercial advantage. Did not
overrule SANTLEY.
Nordenfelt v Maxim Interference with trade goes against public policy; will
Nordenfelt Guns be struck out.
Palk v Mortgages NEGATIVE EQUITY; AJA S36 not applicable of
Services Funding insufficient funds to discharge mortgage debt. Section
91 gives courts discretion to prevent foreclosure.
NICHOLLS VC said to act judicially before allowing
foreclosure to prevent being unfair.
Palk v Mortgages Service EE’s objection to sale can be overridden.
Funding
2002, Paragon Finance v COA: term of interest rate variation is not oppressive
Nash as it was implied it wouldn’t be done unreasonably;
can still raise above competitors for commercial
purposes. Lender was already charging 2 to 4% above
market price and reserved power to increase interest
rate at any time. Bank acted reasonably, protected
interest. Not grossly exorbitant, nor unfair under UCTA
1977 (Section 3(2)(b)(i)) because part of the
contractual performance was the discretion of its
exercise could be expected.
Pawlett v AG Mortgagor has an ‘equitable interest’ in the property.
Polonski v Lloyds Bank
Mortgages
Quennel v Maltby Landlord took loan with house as security, wanted to
kick tenant out. Wife did some shit, but courts said
right of possession cannot be used to commit fraud,
illegalities or irregularities. Landlord and wife failed to
kick tenant out.
LORD DENNING, 322H????
Re Dabrah (Is this the Mortgage agreement; interest rate was 57%, market
correct name?) rate was 7%. Held as C&F. Court served(?) this term
and reduced interest rate to 7%.
Re Petrol Filling
Station, Vauxhall
Bridge Road
Re Tan Soon Gin If there is no guarantor or surety in the deal, it is up to
the mortgagee whether to sell the property to recover
the dues or to ask the guarantor to pay. Once the
guarantor has paid, money can be recovered from
mortgagee.
Re Wong Chif Sen The mortgagee conducted sale in bad faith. Property
sold at unreasonably low price. Mortgager brough in
claim of bad faith after 14 years. Unsuccessful due to
time bar.
Reeve v Lisle (1902) Jan 1st; a mortgage agreement was signed and
concluded between the mortgagor and mortgagee.
Jan 10th; separate partnership agreements were
signed between the two which involved a term that
whenever the mortgagee stated that they wanted to
enter into a partnership, the mortgagor could not
refuse. Mortgage was paid off. Mortgagee demanded
a partnership. Mortgagor argued that this was C&F in
his right to redeem. Held; partnership agreement a
separate and independent contract, thus not a C&F.
Mortgagor bound by this term. ???
Ropaigealach v Barclays Mortgagor can only rely on AJA S36 if seeking right of
Bank possession through court order.
Royal Bank of Scotland LORD NICHOLLS: Distinction between actual
(No 2) v Ethridge coercion and undue influence (relationship of trust OR
one party influenced other). Lender may be put on
enquiry. ESSAY???
1904, Samuel v Jarrah Term a separate agreement, thus upheld. ???
Timber
1899, Santley v Wilde A mortgage can be outlined as the conveyance of an
interest in property for the security of a debt or the
discharge of some other obligation.
LORD MACNAUGHTEN stated that the courts would
be more willing to put terms as being ‘clogs and
fetters’ in cases of domestic mortgages as opposed to
commercial mortgages. In cases of domestic
mortgages, the borrower is typically the weaker party
and is likely to have a lesser bargaining power.
Therefore, they may be left with no other option but to
accept the terms. In contrast, in cases of commercial
mortgages, the borrower is likely to have an equal
bargaining power, thus having commercial advantage,
so the courts would be less willing to strike out terms
as being clogs and fetters; besides, if the borrower
accepted the unwarranted terms of the mortgage, then
they should be bound by those terms, and these terms
would not be struck out as C&Fs. This is a criticized
authority, but a precedent authority nonetheless.
Academics argue that this is an outdated authority
because if one company is providing strict terms, there
are countless others that may be offering lenient
terms. It is the borrower’s fault that they went for the
company with strict terms, so they should be bound to
fulfill them.
One of the terms of a mortgage agreement required
that even after redemption, the borrower would
continue to pay one-third rent of the mortgage
property. Ideally, this should be C&F but was not held
as one. Court reasoned that this was purely a
commercial interest which was reserved by the
mortgagee. This is a criticized authority.
2003, Silven Properties
v Royal Bank of
Scotland
Target Homes v Clothier Court may delay possession if they believe that the
mortgager can get a higher price.
TOLATA 1996, Section
14
Toomes v Conset Mortgagee will become absolute owner (C&F).
TSB Bank v Camfield The whole mortgage was set aside. WHY????
EXTENT OF MORTGAGE DISSOLVING???
Tse Kwong Lam v
Wong Chit Sen
Unfair Terms in Oppressive terms challenged by this statutory
Consumer Contracts instrument.
Regulations Act
1999???
UCTA 1977??? Section
3(2)(b)(i)
1997, United Bank of
Kuwait v Sahib
Wamborough WHAT THE FUCK IS THIS CASE, IT MAKES NO
(Warnborough?) Ltd v SENSE TO ME??? JONES V MORGAN and this case
Garmite Ltd state that a term can be termed as C&F even if there
are two different agreements, granted the mortgagor’s
position was exploited and mortgagee was abusing
their own. (CASEBOOK: SAMUEL won’t apply as the
agreement was more complex and required sale and
purchase.)
Waring (Lord) v London The mortgager wanted to redeem property after it had
and Manchester been sold. Held; right of redemption exists only up till
Assurance time of sale and the mortgager cannot redeem once
the property has been sold. This is to protect third
parties.
Warnborough v Garmite Evaluate nature of parties’ bargain. SAMUEL won’t
apply as more complex agreement; required sale and
purchase. ???
2005, West Bromwich

Building Society v
Wilkinson
Western Bank v
Schindler
White v City of London The mortgagee took possession of the collateral and
Brewery leased it to a third party. Later on, the mortgager
intervened and argued the rental value was not as
much as it should be. Held; mortgagee to compensate
for the remaining amount that could have been
received.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
1998, Human Rights Act This applied ECHR and incorporated it in domestic
law.
2003, Qazi v Harrow LBC Possession proceedings brought by a local authority
against a former joint tenant who had no legal or
equitable right to remain in the relevant property did
not infringe that person's right to respect for home and
family life and, therefore, did not require justification
under the Human Rights Act 1998 Sch.1 Part I
Art.8(2).
2015, R v Chief Land Registered and unregistered land. LASPO S144 did
Registrar not prevent claim of AP under LRA 2002 Sch 6.
Squatting being criminalized still benefitted possessor;
he could still acquire property in light of public interest
and economic reason. This does not condone crime;
just takes S144 and LASPO as separate with no
influence on each other.
2019, Collingwood King v Failure of claimants to prove intention and factual
Incumbent of the possession failed their claim.
Benefice of Newburn in
the Diocese of Newcastle
2021, Amirtharaja v MICHAEL GREEN J: REQUIREMENT OF CLEAR
White PROOF OF INTENTION TO POSSESS. Even
enclosure may be insufficient if it supports D’s
interests; gate closing pathway not evidence.
Arther Case Factual possession is determined by how a
reasonable person in claimant’s position will be
possessed.
1865, Asher v Whitlock Aggregation of terms of adverse possession; the term
of adverse possession can be sold, gifted, and can be
passed through succession.
2001, Batt v Adams LADDIE J: Same facts as ‘Hounslow v Minchinton’; it
was held there was no intention on part of the squatter
as fencing was not done to exclude somebody out but
was rather done to prevent the escape of animals.
Hence, time did not begin to run against paper owner.
2002, Battersea Freehold Giving others access to the property negates
and Leasehold v squatter’s intention of exclusive possession;
Wandsworth London detrimental to squatter.
Borough Council
2005, Beaulane No breach of ECHR. (Discuss HRA)??? (CASEBOOK:
Properties v Palmer HC (High Court?) ruled that LRA 1925 went against
ECHR Protocol 1, Article 1; legislation shouldn’t allow
possession without the paper owner being
compensated. HRA Section 3 was applied in favour of
the PO.
1998, Bolton MBC v Objective assessment of squatter’s intention;
Musa Ali Qasmi beneficial or detrimental to squatter???????????
1987, BP Properties v Owner can stop AP by giving squatter license, even if
Buckler it is accepted or rejected.
1957, Bridge v Mees (Schedule 6, other means of entitlement) If, for
example, the squatter had given the purchase price of
the land, but because of some error, it was not
transferred to him, then he does not have to go under
adverse possession and should rather directly claim
the title.
1990, Buckinghamshire v Future intended use of the PO does not stop AP. PO’s
Moran intended use being same as AP’s use does not stop
possession. This case did away with the theory of
implied consent, and now it is irrelevant if the squatter
did what the paper owner had in mind, Time will run
against the paper owner if the squatter can show
factual possession and intention. Ultimately, the
decision of Buckinghamshire was given statutory
footing through LAND REGISTRATION ACT 2002.
There is a close connection between factual
possession and intention to possess. The acts of
possession themselves will prove an intention on part
of the squatter (pro-squatter).
1998, Central London Overriding interest under LRA 1925
Commercial Estates v S70(1)(f)??????????
Kato Kagaku
2011, Chambers v When a fence is erected on or around the property, it
Havering LBC must be examined what objective is meant to be
achieved by it. Despite the presence of such physical
custody, it was concluded that the fence was intended
to accommodate and restrain the farm animals, rather
than exclude the paper owner. The deficiency of an
intention to possess dissolved any potential claim of
adverse possession.
Chung Ping Kwan v Lam Same facts as ‘Fairweather Case’; it was held, upon
Island completion of 12 years, the original lessee will lose all
the rights and the new lessee will become entitled to it.
This case applies exclusively to registered land.
2007, Cobb and Fox, Land Registry’s notice gives owner a chance to
Living Outside the recover possession. ELABORATE???
System? Squatting
Under LRA
2005, Colin Dawson Depending on the circumstances, interactions and

Windows v King’s Lynn relationships between the parties involved, there is the
and West Norfolk potential of an implied license arising from any form of
consent or permission based on the conduct of the
parties.
Crossdil v Hoddes Same principle as Bridge v Mees.
2020, Dowse v Bradford Whole of land must be adjacent for boundary
Metropolitan District exception, not just one part of it; possession by
Council boundary dispute only granted in cases ‘true’
ambiguity and/or genuine belief; land must be
adjacent.
1952, European This states that every person has a right to peacefully
Convention of Human enjoy his land, unless public interest is something
Rights, Article 1, else. (CASEBOOK: In light of public interest, this
Protocol 1 deprives them??? Clarify.)
1963, Fairweather v St The lease between the landlord and the tenant
Marylbone Property Co reflected a term of option to terminate the lease
mutually. The squatter adversely possessed the land
and stepped into the shoes of the lessee; the question
was who had the right to exercise the option of
termination. It was held by LORD DENNING that the
option stayed with the original lessee (criticized case).
This criticized authority is applicable restricted to
unregistered land only.
Hayward v Chaloner A tenant can convert to being a squatter provided that
he stays beyond the stipulated duration of fails to pay
the rent.
2015, Heaney v Kirkby Gardening and pouring asphalt for parking is sufficient
possession, despite others occasionally using it;
fencing was not required for type of land in this
specifically.
2005, Hill v Transport for If the land is charitable or state-owned, the limitation
London period is 30 years.
1997, Hounslow LBC v MILLET LJ: The squatter occupied a land and fenced
Minchinton it in order to prevent his dogs from escaping. It was
held that the time did begin to run against the paper
owner as a liberal approach was taken towards
intention. This is a criticized case authority as the
intention was not in line with that stipulated in ‘Powell v
McFarlane’.
2012, IAM Group v Appeal dismissed by HOL, after COA. Applicant
Chowdrey should not be accredited with knowledge of agent.
Kerridge and Brierley ???
2007, ‘AP, HR, and Land
Registration’ (Conv
552-58)
2019, King v Incumbent AP never entered or excluded POs, but locked only
of Benefice of Newburn in entrance. UPPER TRIBUNAL: insufficient grounds to
Diocese of Newcastle establish possession or intention.
2002, Lambeth London Padlocking a front door is sufficient evidence of
Borough Council v possession.
Archangel
Land Registration Act Achieves Law Commission 271’s aim of not barring
2002, Part 9 PO’s registered title by AP????????????????
Land Registration Act Any rights during AP’s possession are still overriding,
2002, Schedule 3, given they were detectable after inspection.
Paragraph 2
Land Registration Act AP can apply for registered proprietorship after 10
2002, Schedule 6, years of possession.
Paragraphs 1(1) to 1(3)
Land Registration Act All parties with registered interests or titles in the land
2002, Schedule 6, will receive notice of squatter’s application, and have
Paragraph 2 the right to object.
Land Registration Act After receiving AP’s application, registrar will inform
2002, Schedule 6, PO who can object within three months.
Paragraph 3(2)
Land Registration Act If objection raised within three months, AP has three
2002, Schedule 6, alternative claims: PE, boundary dispute, independent
Paragraph 5(2) to 5(4) right to estate????
Land Registration Act If it is unconscionable to deny squatter possession, PE
2002, Schedule 6, would apply.
Paragraph 5(2)
Land Registration Act Independent right to estate????
2002, Schedule 6,
Paragraph 5(3)
Land Registration Act AP becomes registered proprietor if: adjacent land,
2002, Schedule 6, exact boundary ambiguous, held for 10 years with
Paragraph 5(4) belief it was theirs, owner not identifiable
Land Registration Act i. the squatter must complete 10 years on the land;
2002, Schedule 6 Limitation Act, Section 15 will not apply to registered
land; ii. upon completion of 10 years, the squatter will
send a notice to the land registrar informing them of
the possession. The registrar would then inform the
paper owner about the squatter; iii. the paper owner
must respond within a period of 3 months, if they wish
to object. In case they fail to do so, the property title
will be transferred in the name of the squatter; iv. if the
paper owner does not object within the time and the
squatter still managed to complete another 2 years
uninterrupted on the land, then the title will be
transferred in the name of the squatter; v. law provides
unsuccessful squatter with 3 alternative claims: 1.
Proprietary estoppel; 2. Mistaken boundary; and 3.
Entitlement to land through other means.
Land Registration Act Inherit/transfer period of possession. Possessor may
2002, Schedule 6, rely another’s period of possession i.e., you may
Paragraph 11 transfer years of possession to another.
Land Registration Act Mental disability cannot invoke application under
2002, Schedule 6, Schedule 6.
Paragraph 8(2)
Land Registration Act Adverse possessor takes land subject to all legal and
2002, Schedule 6, equitable interests, except registered charge; charger
Paragraphs 9(2) and 9(3) may object upon receiving notice.
Land Registration Act Person in possession under LRA 1925 S75(1) is
2002, Schedule 12, entitled to be registered proprietor.
Paragraph 18(1)
Land Registration Act Interests acquired under LA 1980 of which proprietor
2002, Section 11(4)(c) has notice are binding.
Land Registration Act ???
2002, Section 28
Land Registration Act ???
2002, Section 29
2002, Section 29(1)
2002, Section 96(2)
Land Registration Act AP doesn’t extinguish PO’s title???
2002, Section 96(3)
2002, Sections 62(4)
and 62(5)
LRA 1925, Section 75(2) This states that the squatter can then at any time ask
the paper owner to transfer the title in his name.
Land Registration Act (Old registered land law) This states that upon
1925, Section 75(1) completion of 12 years, a trust is created whereby the
paper owner becomes a trustee and the squatter
becomes the beneficiary.
Land Registration Act After 12 years, squatter can make application for
1925, Section 75 registration of title.
Legal Aid Sentencing and This makes an adverse possession of any dwelling
Punishment of Offenders house a criminal offence.
2001, Law Commission
Paper 254, ‘Land
Registration for the 21st
Century’
271, 2001, ‘Land
Registration for the 21st
Century’
308, 2018, ‘Updating the
2002’ (17.33 to 17.44)
1879, Leigh v Jack (OVERRULED; theory of implied consent) It was held
that if the squatter’s occupation is not adverse to the
use of land that the paper owner had in his mind, then
time will not begin to run against the paper owner. The
time will only begin against the paper owner if the
squatter’s occupation is contrary to the future intended
use of land of the paper owner.
1900, Littledale v NOT OVERRULED BY HOL IN PYE V GRAHAM.
Liverpool College These types of cases show how previously the test of
intention had a higher threshold.
Limitation Act 1980,
Schedule 1, Paragraph
8(4)
Limitation Act 1980, UNREGISTERED LAND: This states that upon
Section 15 completion of 12 years of adverse possession. The
paper owner loses his right to sue on the land; this
section is not giving any right to the squatter, but is
only restricting the right of the paper owner.
Limitation Act 1980, 12-year period can be extended in cases of deceit &
Section 15 PO being a minor or disabled.
Limitation Act 1980, UNREGISTERED LAND: PO’s title and right to sue
Section 17 extinguishes after 12 years; not a ‘parliamentary
conveyance’, just a restriction.
2019, Malik v Malik
2001, Markfield Courts indulged in consideration and evaluation to
Investments v Evans determine the type of measures that would have the
potential to terminate the squatter’s duration of
adverse possession; the bench concluded that
initiation of the litigation process would be insufficient
to cease the time, until it is fulfilled in its entirety.
Bringing an action for possession will not stop the time
from running; successful conclusion of trial will.
1988, Mount Carmel Aggregation; squatter can transfer years of possession
Investments v Peter to successor. Same principle as ‘Asher v Whitlock’.
Thurlow PO time barred after 12 years.
1969, Ocean Estates v LORD DIPLOCK. Sufficiency of AP by PO intention
Pinder (Norman) and S willing to pay. The time will only stop/run against
the paper owner if the paper owner takes active steps
by simply writing a letter; time won’t stop.
2009, Ofulue v Bossert COA followed PYE V UK; AP law compliant with
human rights.
2013, Parshall v Overruled by RASHID?????
Hackney
1979, Powell v Possession must show clear intention of PO exclusion
McFarlane and acquiring proprietary title/rights. Ruling accepted
by HOL in PYE. SLADE J: Factual possession is
degree of physical control. This states that: a. the
owner has the right to possess the house; b. the
squatter has to intention and factual possession; c. the
owner the squatter cannot be in possession at the
same time, however much depends on the nature of
the land; and, d. the intention required on part of the
squatter is an intention to exclude the world at large,
including the paper owner.
2003, Purbrick v Hackney NEUBERGER J: Endorsement of claimant’s
London Borough Council contention of being in possession of a part of the
building. Intention to own the property is not essential
for an AP claim, as long as there was an intention to
exclude members of general public (evidence in the
form of padlocks).
2002, JA Pye v Graham HOL
LORD BINGHAM????
Tenant can’t be in AP as they have PO’s consent; only
after expiry will time start to run.
‘animus possidendi’????
2002, JA Pye v Graham VERY IMPORTANT CASE!!!
Sufficient factual possession; HOW??? Very rarely
would PO’s same intention of land use prevent AP.
LORD BROWNE-WILKINSON: Possession is valid

until formal request for payment made by PO.
Elements to obtain legal possession: 1. Physical
control over the land (factual possession); 2. Intention
to acquire custody of the property (intention to
possess). Graham demonstrated presence of both
required ingredients for a successful claim in adverse
possession.
Intention to own not required, intention to possess and

exclude PO. HOL affirmed POWELL. Court of Appeal
held that there was no breach of convention because
the time period imposed is proportionate and fair. This
case went to the House of Lords, where there was
disparity amongst the Lords and therefore, this matter
was referred to the ECtHR for dissension. In the
ECtHR this case was called Pye v UK.
(DID NOT OVERRULE LITTLEDALE, regarding

enclosure by C who has right of way over land.)?????
LORD HUTTON: intention inferred from unambiguous
evidence of possession????
Does AP violate HR? Breach of ECHR Art 6, but time

requirements justified it.
To show animus possidendi, squatter must

demonstrate intentions to exclude the paper owner
and everyone else.
2007, Pye v UK At first, it was considered a breach of ECHR Protocol
1, Art 1 (enjoyment of land); UK government appealed.
ECtHR Grand Chamber: held UK law does not infringe
upon ECHR; AP justified, not deprivation – for public
interest, it was considered a reasonable proposition.
The grand chamber of ECtHR held that there was no
violation of the convention as there was no violation of
the convention as this law was necessary for public
policy and public interest.
2018, Rashid v Overruled PARSHALL???? Element of fraud and
Nasrullah criminal conduct???
2015, R (Best) v Chief Criminal possession does not dismiss AP claim. This
Land Registrar states that public policy, consideration justifying the
law of adverse possession ignores the policy,
consideration that a person committing a crime should
be punished.
2001, R v Lambert,
Jordan and Ali
2010, R v Land Registry In instances where the squatter has adversely
possessed property that is used by other citizens (in
this instance, a highway), proprietary rights will not be
granted to safeguard public interests; alternatively, the
AP may be granted the title of any surrounding land
that does not obstruct the roads. It must be noted,
however, attempts at adversely possessing property
generally belonging to and being utilized by the
community will result in criminal charges.
1877, Seddon v Smith Enclosure is the strongest form of possession.
2000, Simpson v Fergus Simple declaration of squatter’s intentions will not
suffice; their conduct must exclude PO too.
1975, Smirk v Lyndale If squatter possesses leased property, time runs
Developments against lessee, not PO; after lease expiry, runs against
PO. Presumption that if the tenant of the landlord
adversely possesses the neighboring property, that
would be for the benefit of the landlord. This
presumption can be rebutted by the tenant if he can
show that the house was adversely possessed for his
own benefit, and not the landlord.
1980, Spectrum Squatter became registered proprietor, after which the
Investment v Holmes previous tenant is deprived of their title and the rights
that accompany it; AP’s registration by way of S75
impedes on a legal lessee and freeholder’s right to
subsequently surrender.
1969, Techbild v Children playing on land is not sufficient for factual
Chamberlain possession.
2019, Thorpe v Frank COA: alteration of a small part of the land (leveling,
repaving entrance) is sufficient control, thus AP.
1976, Treloar v Nute Fencing or changing locks are all forms of possession.
1974, Wallis’s Cayton (OVERRULED) KING DENNING: evidence of modest
Bay Holiday Camp v possession of the property for 12 years will not suffice
Shell-Mex and BP for a substantial claim in adverse possession; the
squatter must prove their possession was adverse to
qualify for any proprietary claims (animus possidendi).
While C had factual possession as well as intention to
exclude, the bench contemplated whether a surveyor
had incidentally inferred she was granted consent,
thus resulting in an implied license; this would
eradicate her status as a trespasser or squatter, as
she was provided with permission. Ergo, irrespective
of how compelling and convincing her presence was
on the property, the PO’s title remained uninfluenced.
Land accompanied by objectives for alteration and
development are unlikely to legitimatize any attempts
at adverse possession, unless those aspirations have
been abandoned.
Contrastingly, PYE (HOL) and BUCKINGHAMSHIRE

(NOURSE LJ) diverged from LORD DENNING’s
approach, revising the law to enable a conservative
approach towards intended anticipations discrediting
factual possession, as well as dissolving the theory of
implied consent.
1966, West Bank Estates Occasional use of the land to obtain what it offers
v Arthur (Shakespeare (wood, grass, fruit, etc.) is insufficient as validation for
Cornelius) establishing possession. Consistent actions involving
the property, particularly those intending to exclude
the paper owner, are required; additionally, utilizing a
miniscule portion of the entirety of the land also
discredits the squatter’s attempts at possession.
1983, Williams v Land enclosed, cars parked, driveway made; sufficient
Usherwood factual possession.
2011, Zarb v Parry (Schedule 6, mistaken boundary) If the squatter was
under an honest mistake that a particular boundary
belonged to him, then that particular area will be given
to them.
ARDEN J: Reasonable belief of ownership need not
continue right up to the time of the squatter’s
application of registration, provided it existed until a
short time before the application was made.

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Property Law – Booklet for

Case Law and Statutes

Hunt v Luck A purchaser will have constructive notice of any rights

Abbey National Building Appeal of mother dismissed. Actual occupation of

Administration of Severance cannot occur by will. (ELABORATE.)

Joint conduct establishes family asset, thus equal

Bull v Bull C wanted possession of rooms mother lived in. LORD

Approved OXLEY. Financial affairs were ‘rigidly

LORD NEUBERGER dissented.???

AG Hong Kong v If you misled someone relating to formality, there will

CASE NOT FOUND.

Addiscombe v Crabbe Labels don’t matter; a license agreement was held to

1998, Gray v Taylor Trustee can’t grant lease. ????

Landlord and Tenant Affirmed Section 19(1A) LTA 1927; circumstances of

Law of Property Act Mortgagee can go to court to have the collateral

2005, West Bromwich

2005, Colin Dawson Depending on the circumstances, interactions and

LORD BROWNE-WILKINSON: Possession is valid

Intention to own not required, intention to possess and

(DID NOT OVERRULE LITTLEDALE, regarding

Does AP violate HR? Breach of ECHR Art 6, but time

To show animus possidendi, squatter must

Contrastingly, PYE (HOL) and BUCKINGHAMSHIRE

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