The Tool Instinct 1st Edition Edition

François Osiurak
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The Tool Instinct
 Series Editor
Jean-Charles Pomerol

The Tool Instinct

François Osiurak
First published 2020 in Great Britain and the United States by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of research or private study, or criticism or review, as
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ISBN 978-1-78630-471-1
 Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Chapter 1. The Tool With a Capital T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

1.1. Defining the Tool: the behavioral reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2. Blinded by tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3. From analogy to specificities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.4. The select club of animal users . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.5. In-defining the Tool: cognitive reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.5.1. The absence of boundaries between tool use,
tool making and construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.5.2. Tool use: a fragile definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.6. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Chapter 2. Instinct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.1. Tools not necessary for survival. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.1.1. The necessity hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.1.2. An intrinsic and non-extrinsic pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.1.3. The Tool, useful but not necessary for survival . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2. Digging your own ditches to cross . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2.1. At the root of our own problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2.2. The illusion of technological progress. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2.3. Telefantasies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3. From appetence to instinct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3.1. On the instinct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3.2. The hand and the tool: the Baldwin effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.4. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
vi The Tool Instinct

Chapter 3. The Myth of Manual Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

3.1. Gestum ago, ergo instrumentis munio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.1.1. From popular beliefs to metatheories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.1.2. The manipulation-based approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2. The myth of motor programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2.1. Empirical data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2.2. Theoretical and epistemological reflection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.3. Instrumentis munio, ergo gestum ago . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.3.1. Tool incorporation and object-object manipulation . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.3.2. Primate prehension system: recycled mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.4. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Chapter 4. A World Without a Technical Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

4.1. The reason for the Tool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.1.1. Apraxia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.1.2. Tool use and mechanical problem solving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.2. The technical transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.2.1. Absence of transfer in animals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.2.2. No transfer after brain damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.3. Beyond manipulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.3.1. Simple versus complex tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.3.2. Counterintuition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.4. Mechanical knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.4.1. Inaccuracy and magic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.4.2. Understanding the unexplainable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.5. Technical reasoning and dialectics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.5.1. From essentialism to phenomenology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.5.2. First movement of dialectics: from problem to solution . . . . . . . 77
4.5.3. Second movement of dialectics: from solution to problem . . . . . 79
4.5.4. Analogy and causality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.6. Reasoning and dynamism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.6.1. Toward the ideomotor approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.6.2. Diagnosis, adjustment and fixing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.7. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Chapter 5. Reasoning versus Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

5.1. Executive functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.1.1. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.1.2. What about the role of executive functions? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.1.3. What can we do without executive functions? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.2. Reasoning versus planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
 Contents vii

5.2.1. The amalgam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

5.2.2. Planning and reasoning: two orthogonal capacities . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.2.3. Empirical evidence from neuropsychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.2.4. Action disorganization syndrome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.3. From routine schemas to recursivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.3.1. Generated schemas, not stored . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.3.2. Recursivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.4. Cognitive archaeology: new perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.4.1. The illusion of complexity as a subject of study . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.4.2. No technical planning without reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.4.3. Recycling of executive functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.5. Using one tool to create another . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.5.1. Sequential tool use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.5.2. Sequence versus recursivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.6. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

Chapter 6. Tool Disorganization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

6.1. Tools in stock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
6.1.1. Future planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
6.1.2. Episodic memory: recycled mechanism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
6.1.3. Semantic reasoning: rupture mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
6.2. From use to consumption. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
6.2.1. Accumulation behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
6.2.2. Excessive accumulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
6.3. Tool making: toward crafts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
6.3.1. Making, manufacture and crafting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
6.3.2. Motor simulation and decision making: recycled mechanisms . . . 127
6.4. Toolbox and uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
6.4.1. A well-defined repertoire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
6.4.2. Functional flexibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
6.4.3. Functional fixedness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
6.5. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

Chapter 7. Between Fascination and Shaping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

7.1. From instinct to technical stigmergy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
7.1.1. Technical stigmergy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
7.1.2. There’s always a price to pay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
7.2. The distance between the maker and the user . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
7.2.1. Cognitive step 1: mental making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
7.2.2. Cognitive step 2: use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
7.3. Cumulative technological culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
viii The Tool Instinct

7.3.1. From individual learning... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

7.3.2. ...to social learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
7.3.3. Forms of social learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
7.3.4. Culture and cumulative technological culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
7.3.5. The shared intentionality hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
7.3.6. Limitations of the shared intentionality hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . 152
7.3.7. Roles of technical reasoning and semantic reasoning . . . . . . . . . 153
7.3.8. Theory of the mind and symbolic language:
recycled mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
7.4. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
 Introduction

The Tool Instinct is an essay on the cognitive origins of human

materiality. The aim is to jointly address the question of why and how
mankind is constantly changing its physical environment, in particular
through tool making and tool use. If you are intrigued by this question, be
aware that the answer may seem confusing in the sense that the why certainly
has its source in the how. “What author did you come across?”, you may
think to yourself. In fact, this is a small nod to the readers who, among you,
may be familiar with Konrad Lorenz’s work. Perhaps this will be enough for
them to already have an idea of the answer proposed in this book. For the
others, I am sorry, but I do not have any more clues to give you right now.
Please have patience.

This introduction presents the purpose, subject, route and project of this
book1. To fully understand my thinking, it seemed essential to me to write
these few pages that make it possible to clearly delimit the field of research
studied here, namely what I mean by “the cognitive origins of human
materiality” (i.e. the purpose). I will also specify my positioning (i.e. the
subject) so that you know who is writing, but above all in what context what
the “writing” occurs. I will continue by specifying that disciplines are
concerned throughout this book and what was their trajectory (i.e. the route).
I will conclude by detailing the book’s project, which aims to answer the
central question mentioned above by conducting both a critical reflection on

1 These terms are borrowed from Jean Gagnepain, a linguist from Rennes, France at the
origin of mediation theory. This author had a significant impact on the development of my
thinking, especially during my thesis. The division I have chosen here does not really reflect
what he meant by each of these terms, but is a tribute to his work, which was a great source of
inspiration for me.
x The Tool Instinct

what is said in the literature on the subject and a theoretical elaboration to

provide new answers. Let us start with the purpose.

I.1. The purpose

I am passionate about humans. This passion is reflected in the smiles that

I sketch out daily as I scan my conspecifics. It could be a teenager proudly
wearing a hooded jacket, a woman laughing while listening to her
smartphone, or a bus driver stuck behind the wheel. How many times a day
do I sketch these smiles? Three and maybe four times. The reason behind
these smiles? Cynicism? Certainly not. I am not one of those who consider
these behaviors to be ridiculous or contemptuous, thinking that I am the only
one who realizes that we are nothing more than disguised primates2. I am
aware of that. So be it. But what fascinates me is the propensity that humans
have to handle clothing, tools, new technologies, etc., as if all this were
natural to us.

However, there is nothing natural about wearing a jacket, using a

smartphone or driving. There is nothing natural about pushing pedals to
move forward. There is nothing natural about talking to a person through a
device, when the person is hundreds of kilometers away, if not on the other
side of the world. There is nothing natural about wearing clothes to warm up.
And what about bridges, buildings, roads, cars, computers, rockets, all these
marks left by the human species and which reflect the profound change in
the environment brought about by this (these) species? Very often, I observe
these marks, without any esthetic judgment – I am sorely lacking in the latter
anyway – just because I wonder what cognitive processes specific to our
species have allowed us to get there. This question – the cognitive origins of
human materiality – accompanies me in my daily life, like a prism that
would be fixed on my gaze. Looking for answers to this question is what I
am passionate about. And this is precisely the purpose of cognitive3
anthropology (see Table I.1) and, a fortiori, of this book.

2 This first “negative” movement of thought clearly joins the Hegelian dialectic in the sense
that it is certainly necessary to extract oneself from our daily point of view to see the world
differently. However, there is little glory in maintaining oneself in this negative retreat on
things. The second movement of “positive” thinking, which consists of reinvesting this step
back to improve our understanding of the human species, remains, in my opinion, the only
movement that can be valued because it is constructive. In other words, if I was ever cynical,
it was only toward cynicism!
3 Table I.1 lists the definitions of the main concepts – in bold – discussed in this introduction.
 Introduction xi

A discipline aimed at establishing a finite number of

characteristics (e.g. morphological, see physical
Anthropology
anthropology; psychological, see psychological
anthropology) to define humans.

Subdiscipline of anthropology aimed at establishing a finite

Physical anthropology number of morphological, anatomical or biomechanical
characteristics characterizing humans.

Subdiscipline of anthropology aimed at establishing a finite

Social anthropology number of observable characteristics in social behaviors that
would be specific to humans.

Subdiscipline of anthropology to describe human

Behavioral/psychological
characteristics and particularities at the
anthropology
behavioral/psychological level.

Subdiscipline of anthropology aimed at clarifying the

Cognitive anthropology
cognitive characteristics specific to humans.

Psychology Behavioral science in animals or humans.

A subdiscipline of psychology that seeks to understand the

Comparative psychology differences and similarities between humans and other animal
species, or between non-human animal species.

Subdiscipline of psychology aimed at interpreting our

Cognitive psychology
behaviors through a cognitivist approach.

A current of thought assuming that our thinking is made up of

Cognition/cognitivism
a set of processes such as memory, reasoning and language.

A current of thought interested only in the formulation of

Behaviorism
behavioral laws.

A discipline that aims to understand how humans generate

Epistemology knowledge by studying the historical facts and scientific
prerequisites that underlie the way a problem is posed.

Influential theory that is considered as a paradigm in the

Metatheory sense that it serves as a framework for reflection by being
unrecognized for a long time.

A framework of thought that determines how researchers

Paradigm
approach a problem (see metatheory).

Answer given to a question, which corresponds to a possible

Theory variant of a metatheory, without questioning the very
foundations of this metatheory.
xii The Tool Instinct

Corresponds to a collection of data to support the predictions

Empirical evidence
of a theory.

Methodology that consists of supporting a theory on the basis

Science
of a collection of empirical evidence.

Reflection on an issue of interest, without necessarily seeking

Philosophy
to resolve it with empirical evidence.

Theory that considers that there is no difference in nature

Continuity
between humans and other animal species.

Thesis that suggests a difference in degree between

Discontinuity
humans and other animal species.

Cognitive mechanism considered as present only in the human

Rupture mechanism
species.

Cognitive mechanism pre-existing to the human species, but

Recycled mechanism whose use is modified due to the appearance of a rupture
mechanism.

Phylogenetics Corresponds to the evolution of a species over time.

Ontogenetics Corresponds to the development of an individual over time.

Table I.1. Definitions of the main concepts covered in the introduction

To be clear, I will not discuss how we moved through the history from
the first tools shaped by our ancestors to the latest space shuttle designed by
NASA. Whether the first representatives of the genus Homo mastered fire by
observing the effects of lightning or whether they developed the first silex
knives by cutting off their hands will not be discussed here. Unfortunately,
dear reader, if it is these answers that you are looking for, namely answers
on the historical evolution of human technology, then you are on the wrong
track with this book. Rather, I invite you to turn to works such as those
written by André Leroi-Gourhan, which describe the historical evolution of
techniques in prehistory, for example. However, if what intrigues you is to
understand the reasons underlying this historical evolution, and if your
interest is primarily directed toward the cognitive evolution of the human
species, then this book can provide you with answers, or at least potential
explanations, to this great question. To paraphrase Bachelard, the purpose
here is not “why are things the way they are?” but rather “why could things
have become what they are?” I would add to this “from a cognitive point of
 Introduction xiii

view”. After all, it is not only the Homininae4 who have been able to see the
damage caused by lightning or who have cut themselves off from body parts
when in contact with a sharp stone. Understanding what caused the
discoveries is fascinating for a historian. However, for a cognitive
anthropologist, the problem is not to describe the historical conditions,
whether natural or not, that led to the discovery of a given technique, but
rather to understand what cognitive processes are necessary to control and
reproduce these accidents in order to constitute what can be called a
technique. To paraphrase Emmanuel Kant this time, the purpose of this book
is the underlying cognitive structure and not the forms taken by its content5.

I.2. The subject

I am not a “pure scientist”. I concede that. Unlike most of my colleagues,

I have difficulty reconsidering certain theoretical positions, and I often have
the impression that I am sinking into my positioning, rather than opening up
to new horizons. As such, my work is necessarily ideological, and I am not
ashamed to say it. In fact, some time ago, I accepted the idea that my career
could be about defending a point of view by pushing it to its limits. Too bad
if I ever find that this point of view is wrong. At least I tried. In any case,
this part of subjectivity permeates my subject, because I am the subject of
this book. Therefore, it seems important to me to clarify some of my
assumptions, because I am aware that my remarks may be misunderstood,
and may lead to a process of intention toward me, because I have not been
able to qualify my position accurately and unequivocally. So I would like to
remedy this immediately.

On the one hand, although I am fascinated by Man, I do not admire him.

My point is neither philanthropic nor misanthropic. I do not attribute
exceptional qualities to the human species. Man is nothing extraordinary or

4 The Homininae correspond to the close relatives of Homo sapiens. They share a common
ancestor with the panins – the extinct close relatives of chimpanzees and bonobos – who
probably lived about 4–6 million years ago. Homininae include species of the genus Homo
(e.g. Homo habilis, Homo erectus, and Homo neanderthalensis), but also species of another
genus (e.g. Australopithecus and Paranthropus).
5 My discussion in this book focuses on the tool. However, the same logic can be applied to
other areas, such as politics. In this field, the question that a cognitive anthropologist asks
himself is not to understand how the French people managed to propose political parties as we
know them now, which corresponds to a historical questioning, but rather what are the
cognitive bases that allow humans to develop political organizations.
xiv The Tool Instinct

rather superior and – even if it means being shocking – it does not matter to
me whether our technical bulimia leads us one day to our loss or to leaving
the planet. No, what matters to me is to unravel the mystery of how Man is
able to get closer to his wildest fantasies. Let us take teleportation. Of
course, we are not there yet. But the use of trains, planes, cars, etc., already
allows us to move without moving, which is a definite step forward. We are
getting closer. And it is the cognitive mechanism that allows this permanent
convergence that puzzles me. Why is this happening among our species?

On the other hand, I also know that my position can be criticized as

reflecting a contemporary analysis of the problem, neglecting that the human
species is not characterized only by recent technological advances, since for
a long time there was talk of the use of stone tools and certainly also wooden
ones6. My answer to this criticism is as follows. Yes, I am fascinated by
current human productions. It often happens that when my plane is stopped
on the tarmac, I look out the window at the planes in front of me. And then
I am amazed by this ability that has allowed us to produce a flying object of
several tens or even hundreds of tons, thus realizing a real thumbnail to
gravity. So, yes, I often let myself be subjugated by contemporary visions of
human technology. But these visions are highly instructive, because they
reflect what Man – nowadays at the origin of our species – is able to
produce. In short, whether it is a question of producing a six-knife or an
aircraft; in both cases, the same reasoning could well be at work. The
question remains to understand what form this reasoning can take, whether
by focusing on what Man is capable of building, either now or a long time
ago7.

I.3. The route

The key discipline addressed in this book is cognitive anthropology.

However, I am aware that this discipline – and in particular its boundaries –
may seem somewhat obsolete to a novice. In this section, I will focus on this

6 This criticism was again addressed to me indirectly, recently, by a colleague coming for a
thesis follow-up committee of one of my doctoral students.
7 In fact, I find any technical production worthy of interest. I was also fascinated by the
pyramids, or by the architecture of cities like Rome, Tokyo, Dubai or Lisbon. I am not
making any value or esthetic judgments here. Once again, my interest is just in this ability to
change our environment, sometimes by building technological objects that greatly exceed our
natural capabilities.
 Introduction xv

notion by explaining the trajectory – the route – followed by it within the

social sciences and humanities. This will lead me to discuss the notions of
anthropology, psychology and cognition.

I.3.1. Physical anthropology and social anthropology

At a time when we plan to send the first settlers to Mars and the number
of exoplanets discovered is flourishing, it is becoming more and more
reasonable to consider that the long-awaited encounter with extra-terrestrial
life is imminent. No, you might say? Maybe I am a sweet dreamer, that is
true. Nevertheless, one day we will have to prepare for the eventuality of this
meeting by being able to answer the important question, which justifies the
very existence of the sciences that we call human, and that our kind aliens
could ask us very quickly, as soon as they have put a “foot” on Earth: what is
a human? How to recognize one? Imagine that you are the lucky one, the
very first one to whom this question was addressed. What would you say?
Take a few seconds, one or two minutes if necessary. But try to answer
correctly, because the future of humanity may well depend on it!

If you have done this exercise, you should have some snippets of answers
to this question, which, behind its apparent simplicity, masks a disconcerting
complexity. How can we ensure that an extra-terrestrial observer does not
confuse us with another species? What criteria can we set? This question,
that of the threshold of the human being, is the hallmark of anthropology.
Inventorying the criteria is the ultimate challenge, until we can characterize
humans by differentiating them from other species.

Let us start by looking at the type of answers you were able to provide. It
is very likely that some of you started your inventory by focusing on the
physical aspects that could be specific to humans. In this case, you have
practiced, perhaps unknowingly, physical anthropology, which aims to
produce a catalogue of human morphological, anatomical and biomechanical
characteristics. You may have noticed the bipedalism, which is a mode of
locomotion consisting of moving on its two hind legs. It is indeed a defining
feature of our species, Homo sapiens, even if we are not the only ones to
practice this mode of locomotion, since it is also the preserve of birds, for
example. The opposable thumb is another physical characteristic of humans,
allowing a fine grip, using the thumb and index finger – as when you handle
a pencil. Without an opposable thumb, the only possible grip is called a
xvi The Tool Instinct

power grip, and consists of gathering all the fingers toward the palm, as
when handling a hammer. Like bipedalism, this trait characterizes us,
although it is not specific to humans, as other primate species also have this
ability.

The referencing of these physical characteristics is not the only concern

of anthropology, which may reassure some readers who had opted for
another direction in order to carry out the proposed exercise, with a greater
emphasis on behavioral aspects. For example, only humans perform funeral
rites, which consist of commemorating the death of an individual through a
set of actions and words. Another example reported by the eminent French
anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss is the prohibition of incest, which is
found in all human civilizations. The repertoire of these traits could have
been the objective of behavioral anthropology, since it is indeed a question
of listing the supposedly species-specific behaviors. However, historically,
the term social anthropology has been used, for the simple reason that the
first anthropologists who officiated at the end of the 19th Century and the
beginning of the 20th Century sought above all to understand the invariants
present both in Western societies and in societies considered primitive at the
time, such as the Indigenous peoples of the Amazon. In other words, they
sought to understand the social traits shared by all human societies.

I.3.2. Social anthropology and behavioral anthropology

An epistemological limitation – I will come back to this notion later –

inherent in social anthropology is to naturally focus on social characteristics,
as if human beings defined themselves and distinguished themselves mainly
from other species by their social behaviors. You will tell me that this
remark is relatively tautological and not very informative, since this form of
anthropology would not be called “social” if it were not so. However, such a
presupposition presents significant risks to the understanding we can have of
our species at a psychological level.

To clarify my point, let us take an example that is at the heart of this

book, namely tool use. As I will discuss later, tool use is not unique to
humans, other species are also able to show this behavior, such as
chimpanzees or crows from New Caledonia. However, human tool use
differs in several respects from that reported in animals. Let us consider one
of these specificities, namely the cumulative technological culture, which
 Introduction xvii

consists of transmitting and improving a technique employed over

generations, leading us, among other things, to switch from the flint, to the
knife, then to the electric knife. If the assumption is that any difference
between our species and other species necessarily results from the emergence
of unique social skills – as implied by social anthropology – then the only
way to explain this cumulative cultural phenomenon is to suggest that it
appears because humans have developed specific social skills. This thesis is
the one defended by Michaël Tomasello, a renowned contemporary
psychologist, who is not considered to be developing work in social
anthropology. However, the same assumption exists in his research. For him,
this cumulative cultural phenomenon illustrates what distinguishes us from
other animal species, namely the ability to develop an effective pedagogy
based on active teaching that reveals the teacher’s ability to understand the
teacher’s intentions during learning. If I was convinced that all human
behavioral characteristics can be summed up in this thesis, then this book
should have been called “The Social Instinct”. However, as you will have
understood, I am not convinced that this thesis should be accepted in its
entirety, since a significant number of studies indicate that the human
threshold cannot be limited to unique social skills. The objective of this book
is precisely to develop an alternative thesis on the question of tool use.

Where does this critique of social anthropology lead us? First of all, it is
possible that when you read the idea that every human civilization practices
funeral rites or prohibits incest, the following question may not have escaped
your attention: why are we doing this? A number of theories have been
formulated in this regard by illustrious authors, such as Sigmund Freud, who
saw in these behavioral invariants the hallmark of psychological functioning
that was preoccupied, even tortured, by existential anxieties about death and
the prohibited. I will not develop here these theories that I have relatively
poor knowledge of, I must admit. Simply, I will insist on the psychological
dimension that Freud gave to these phenomena, by reminding everyone that
all behavior, social or not, necessarily rests on a psychological functioning
specific to each of the individuals of the species. In other words, for him,
social anthropology is above all a psychological anthropology. This point
of view is also the one I share.

In other words, if we remove the assumption that our species is only

socially singular, we gradually move toward the idea that Man could possess
a set of specific psychological characteristics, reflected in a number of
specific behaviors as well, which may or may not be social. Social
xviii The Tool Instinct

anthropology would then only be a special case of a behavioral

anthropology, which encompasses all the behaviors, social or not, that
characterize the human species. We carry out behaviors, some of which
characterize us as a species. The purpose of behavioral anthropology is to
understand them. In this respect, behavioral anthropology is at the crossroads
of two disciplines: anthropology (the human threshold) and psychology (the
behavioral dimension). This may require a little more detail on the term
psychology, which although it has become common, often refers to mistaken
beliefs, including that psychology is not a scientific discipline.

I.3.3. Psychology

The term psychology comes etymologically from psyche (soul) and logos
(discourse), literally meaning the discourse on the soul. This definition is
now obsolete since it corresponds to a leap made at the time by the ancient
Greeks, who had invented this notion. Why am I talking about leaps? The
reason is simple. At that time, the Greeks, under the influence of Platonic
thought, considered that our behavior was guided by the soul, an immaterial
substance, the fruit of divine creation. This anthropocentric perspective –
since Man was considered to be the only species to possess this privilege,
thus placing him at the center of creation – was for a long time the dominant,
classical approach to the philosophy of the mind, supported by illustrious
thinkers such as René Descartes. In fact, this Platonic approach is at the very
origin of creationist religions, such as Christianity, and is still largely
espoused by many of us. I will come back in a few paragraphs to the
scientific revolution that led to the formulation of an alternative thesis,
evolutionism. In short, according to this anthropocentric perspective, all
behavior is guided by the soul. In other words, studying our way of behaving
or even thinking is like studying the soul. In this sense, the term psychology
etymologically corresponds to a confusion between the subject of study and
the theoretical approach useful for its interpretation.

This bias is also very common among psychology students and their
university teachers. For example, if you ask a student about a possible
definition of psychology, he or she will most likely raise the idea that
psychology is the study of psychic processes. It is at this precise moment
that it is necessary to be intractable so that the student does not reproduce the
confusion inherent in the term. Psychology is the study of behavior.
Behavior is the only tangible data we need to study, whether it is an act or a
 Introduction xix

word produced by others. We do not access the thoughts of others. Of

course, you will tell me that we are accessing our own thoughts and that in
this case, introspection can be useful to understand them. This method was
precisely the one advocated by Plato to access the soul. However, these
thoughts cannot be studied as such. They can be a source of scientific
inspiration and I do not deny that we all experience them. But they do not
correspond to the subject of psychological study, namely behavior.

That being said, psychologists, like all scientists, have theories, that is,
models that aim to explain groups of data and predict others. It is known that
these theories are formulated on the basis of analogies. For example,
Sigmund Freud drew inspiration from the thermodynamic models of his time
to develop his theories on the interactions between the different
psychological processes. For some, this may be perceived as a discovery,
like Freud himself, who considered that his formulation of the unconscious
corresponded to the third greatest scientific revolution in history, after the
Copernian revolution – the transition from geocentrism to heliocentrism –
and the Darwinian revolution – the transition from anthropocentrism to
evolutionism. Unfortunately, the unconscious remains a theoretical concept,
not tangible, unlike the two revolutions mentioned above. Also, when a
student says that she/he studies psychic processes, this is not true. This is not
the subject of study, but a possible interpretation of the subject of study, i.e.
behavior. After all, no teacher will ever come with a jar in his hand, asking
the students to get closer to the desk, so that in a few moments she/he can
observe this famous Freudian unconscious locked in the jar. I would like to
inform the reader that I am not challenging Freudian theory here, far from it.
The same criticism can be leveled at colleagues who may believe that
psychology is the study of cognitive mechanisms. I say this because my
research laboratory is called that, like many others. However, again, at no
time do we study cognitive mechanisms. We study behaviors, which we
interpret through theories rooted in the cognitivist approach also called
cognitivism. In short, psychology is a neutral discipline, theoretically, even
if any researcher in psychology necessarily has a theoretical framework that
helps him/her to interpret the observed behaviors.

I.3.4. Psychologies

Just as there are many forms of anthropology, there are also many forms
of psychology. Here, I will not go into the details of what can be social
xx The Tool Instinct

psychology, clinical psychology, health psychology, developmental

psychology, or many others. I will simply focus on a distinction that is useful
for me, namely the distinction between human and animal psychology (also
called ethology); these two forms can be studied together and then give rise
to comparative psychology.

For many, psychology is necessarily human, which in a sense reinforces

its academic position within the human sciences. It is true that the majority
of university teaching focuses on the study of human behavior. However,
there is nothing redundant in qualifying psychology as human, since as a
behavioral science, its object can be either human or animal. At the origin of
scientific psychology, at the end of the 19th Century, this frontier was even
inoperative. The supporters of behaviorism had been keen to go beyond the
methodology used by philosophers to understand our mind, namely the
introspection introduced by Plato and the ancient Greeks perpetuated since
then by classical philosophy. The objective of the behaviorists was precisely
to break with this methodological tradition to develop an experimental
approach consisting of observing behavioral responses to environmental
stimuli. The focus was definitely on behavior, opening the door to the real
definition of psychology, the science of behavior.

However, historically, this development has been supported by Charles

Darwin’s evolutionary theory, leading to the erasing of any “mental”
difference between humans and animals. Since every individual produces
behaviors, the same psychological laws can be stated to understand the
origin of these behaviors. In this context, behaviorists have naturally turned
to animals – rats and pigeons being the most studied species – to model
human behavior as animals, the difference being only a matter of degree, not
nature. The first memory models were tested in rats and then mechanically
transferred to humans. Moreover, the main argument for the animal
behavioral study was that it is entirely possible to know the experiences
encountered by animals since birth, thus making it possible to fully control
past acquisitions, where such control appears ethically impossible in
humans. For example, some studies involved depriving rats of any solid
element from birth to their first year of life, in order to understand whether
their construction “instinct” operated from birth, or whether it was subject to
some form of learning, resulting from their interactions with the environment
from birth. Such a study obviously seems unthinkable in humans. In short,
the behaviorists practiced a psychology, which was intended to be both
animal and human.
 Introduction xxi

However, this conception has evolved with the emergence of the

cognitivist approach, which, although based on the experimental method of
behavioral study initiated by behaviorists, has broken with this trend by
focusing on “mental” processes, called cognitive. These processes are purely
theoretical, like theories on psychological functioning. At no time will a
teacher be able to show these processes to her/his students. They are another
way of interpreting behavior based on an analogy, which is based on the
functioning of the computer. An individual receives stimuli that are a source
of information, then processes them using several cognitive processes, and
finally emits a behavioral response. Understanding these different processes
is the objective of the cognitivist approach. When the interpretation is
limited to behavioral observation, it is referred to as cognitive psychology.
When it concerns the collection of data from the brain, it is called cognitive –
or behavioral – neuroscience, if a link is established with the behavior
without underlying cognitive interpretation.

I.3.5. Cognitive anthropology

In short, psychology is the study of behavior, whether human or animal.

To interpret it, several theoretical currents are possible, such as cognitivism.
If we are then interested in cognitive processes that are specific to humans, it
is possible to talk about cognitive anthropology. As indicated, this discipline
can draw its sources from several fields. This may involve comparing animal
and human behavior to identify fundamental differences. In this case,
comparative psychology provides some answers for cognitive anthropology.
It is also possible to search for invariants between different cultures or
societies, without necessarily focusing on social aspects, as social
anthropology does. In this case, we are talking about ethnology. It may also
involve studying humans through experimental procedures, such as in
cognitive psychology, for example. In any case, the project of cognitive
anthropology is to list all the cognitive processes – and therefore theoretical
processes – that can characterize the human species. Therefore, the purpose
of this book will be to focus on the use of tools and technology, detailing
human cognitive particularities in this regard.

I.4. The project

In this book, I will give considerable importance to epistemological

reflection, which will often be reflected in the titles of the different chapters.
xxii The Tool Instinct

In the following, I will detail what this notion refers to and how it relates to
theory and empirical evidence. Then, I will present the key concepts of
rupture mechanisms and recycled mechanisms, concepts that will form
the basis of the cognitive anthropological approach at the heart of the project
of this book.

I.4.1. Epistemology, theory and empirical evidence

No scientific theory is neutral. It always depends on a point of view and

on a way of posing the problem (i.e. the subject). The greatest challenge for
a researcher is to grasp the point of view developed by other researchers,
which inevitably leads to major scientific advances. This reflection on the
very origins of the reasons that drive researchers to move toward certain
theoretical models is the objective of epistemology, i.e. a discipline that is
globally interested in the way knowledge is generated, whether in an isolated
individual or a group of individuals, like scientists.

Let us take the case of the individual. Jean Piaget, an illustrious Swiss
psychologist, had, in his time, founded a genetic epistemology – in fact
ontogenetic – consisting of detailing how children, during their
development, acquire new knowledge about their physical and social
environment, through a dialectic of structure–destructuring–restructuring8.
The genetic aspect of his theory assumes that this dialectic takes place at
different stages of a child’s development, allowing the child to move from
one stage to another, the stages being understood here as periods of stability
in the structure. In other words, the evolution of knowledge in children is
undergoing revolutions, in the sense that it is not a progressive and
cumulative acquisition, but rather marked by significant breaks.

Like the isolated individual, the evolution of knowledge at the species

level also follows a nonlinear trajectory punctuated by significant breaks.

8 For example, Piaget explained that the child’s morals are originally constructed around the
question of the consequences attributed to a behavior, so that a child will be more upset by
another child who hurts her/him very much while playing, than another child who hurts
her/him little, regardless of the degree of intention of these behaviors. Later, the child will
disrupt this conception of morality, integrating intention as a factor of responsibility, certainly
at a time of development when the child becomes able to attribute intentions to others. When
this integration takes place, the child then becomes somewhat lost, in the sense that her/his
way of dealing with moral judgment becomes inoperative, the criterion of consequence no
longer being for a time the sufficient criterion for judging the actions of others – and her/his
own by extension. This period corresponds to the destructuring phase.
 Introduction xxiii

For example, as I mentioned earlier, the two greatest ruptures in the history
of science correspond to the Copernican and Darwinian revolutions. These
revolutions correspond to what epistemologists interested in the history of
science – such as Gaston Bachelard or Thomas Kuhn – call paradigm shifts,
understood as a change in thinking framework, in order to pose the problem.
Interestingly, it seems that these two revolutions consisted of challenging the
default paradigm that is: “We are the center of the universe”. This paradigm
is in itself intuitive, given the egocentric nature of our thinking. After all, the
only world perspective I have access to is my own phenomenological
experience. So when I sail from one place to another, this perspective moves
with me all the time, giving me the illusion of being at the center of
everything. This egocentrism is obviously very marked in children, as
education often consists of nothing more than teaching them to get out of
their own point of view. However, it is a daily struggle, because we
obviously remain self-centered by default. In this context, to conceive that it
is not the place where we live that is the center of the universe – that is,
geocentrism – or our species that is at the heart of everything – that is,
anthropocentrism – requires a considerable challenge to the default paradigm
built on egocentrism. The two major revolutions mentioned above therefore
consisted of challenging this paradigm, considerably changing the way we
think and raising the problem of our origins. Note that this paradigm shift
can only exist if another point of view exists. This other point of view
remains the greatest challenge for a scientist.

I hope you will understand the major interest of epistemological

reflection. If we want to move forward on a scientific issue, we must be able
to understand how the problem usually arises, what are the default
assumptions that authors accept, sometimes without even knowing it, simply
because they are rooted in a framework of thought, a paradigm. For this
reason, this book will present as soon as possible – it will in fact depend on
my thinking skills – an epistemological critique of current models in order to
understand their ins and outs. This will lead me to discuss what I call
metatheories, theories so powerful that they have shaped the way students
and researchers have thought for decades. An example that I will discuss at
length is the distinction between procedural and declarative memory. The
first form refers to skills that are often referred to as motor skills, useful for
implicitly learning how to ride a bike or type. The second form contains our
knowledge of the world and the support of language. This distinction is
taught in a massive way among psychology students, which is quite
xxiv The Tool Instinct

legitimate given its heuristic power, making it possible to understand our

behavior quite simply. So when I ask students – or even colleagues – which
memory allows us to use tools, the answer given is systematically the same:
procedural memory. And, this answer is produced by reasoning in this
context, in the sense that it may arise even though at no time did a teacher
explain to students that this was the case. In other words, this distinction is
an important paradigm in psychology, guiding students and researchers on
how to conceive human cognition and the use of tools. As you will see in
this book, one of my reflections will be to overcome this epistemological
obstacle by submitting the idea that this distinction is far from sufficient to
understand the cognitive bases of human tool use.

In this approach, the notion of theory is at a lower level than the paradigm
or metatheory, in the sense that it refers to the solutions provided within the
pre-established framework. For example, if the paradigm is the distinction
between procedural and declarative memory, then a theory that tool use is
based on motor memories is a possible solution based on this distinction,
since the latter ultimately allows little freedom. Three types of criticism can
therefore be made against a theory. The first type consists of questioning the
epistemological validity of the underlying paradigm. In this case, the theory
proposed in response necessarily goes beyond the paradigm and then
diverges diametrically from the theory being criticized. In reality, this level
refers more to epistemological reflection by asking whether the problem was
correctly posed in the beginning. Criticisms may be directed not only against
this theory, but also against the parent theories. The second type is not to
question the paradigm that serves as a framework, but rather the answers
provided by this theory within it (i.e. theoretical validity). For example,
it could be worth considering that tool use does not only come out of
procedural memory, but also from declarative memory – this is an example
and not my point, as you will see later. In this book, I will sometimes situate
myself at this level, but the criticisms will often be of an epistemological
nature, so that it will rarely be a single theory that I will question, but rather
a group of theories because they belong to the same paradigm. The third type
consists of reflecting on the empirical validity of the theory in question by
examining the arguments used. In the end, many researchers are only
interested in this aspect, considering that data collection is the very
foundation of research. However, if a theory is not conceptually valid, it may
be that the collection of data to support it is of little value, given the inability
 Introduction xxv

to accurately examine the predictions of that theory9. In other words,

although I will obviously discuss this form of validity to discuss current
theories on tool use, I remain convinced that this aspect remains relatively
minor, particularly with regard to epistemological validity.

This last aspect leads me to introduce the notion of empirical evidence,

which corresponds to the collection of data – in this case behavioral data –
since this is indeed a book of psychology, although I will also discuss neuro-
anatomical data and neuroimaging, which will sometimes divert this book
into the field of neuroscience. This evidence may or may not be based on
statistical analysis. I would like you to know that I do not consider, in any
case, that evidence is necessarily based on statistics. After all, the two great
scientific revolutions did not need that. However, in psychology, it is true that
the contribution of statistics is important to be able to conclude on the
generalization of the results obtained. Again, it is possible to criticize the
methodologies used to acquire the data. I will also discuss this experimental
aspect, although I consider it essential not to drown in these considerations, at
the risk of wasting time that would be much more useful for epistemological
reflection. Finally, I will address here the question of the distinction between
science and philosophy, which is essentially distinguished in this respect. If
philosophy consists of conducting epistemological and theoretical reflection
on concepts, science adds to this the need to support conclusions on the basis
of empirical evidence. A good balance between these two aspects seems to
me essential to the success of any research objective. Too much philosophy,
and the theories formulated may lack evidence. Too much science, and the
theories formulated may lack validity.

I.4.2. Continuity versus discontinuity

The Darwinian revolution had an unparalleled impact in the history of the

humanities. Before this one, the question of the criteria necessary to define

9 I recently had the opportunity to have a discussion on this subject with a researcher in the
field. According to her, her theory is clearly supported by the accumulation of empirical
evidence. It is true that her work on this issue is considerable. However, my main criticism of
her work is that she does not accumulate evidence, but empirical data in the sense that her
data do not rule out other alternative theories. In a way, this approach to scientific work
reflects what I call the researcher’s illusion, namely the idea that our job is to accumulate
data, not to reflect in depth on the value of any data collection in validating or invalidating a
specific theory.
xxvi The Tool Instinct

what a human is did not arise, the answers being in any case all found in the
sacred texts. As a result of this revolution, scientists began to grasp the
question of what distinguishes us from other species, seeing the emergence
of anthropology whose objective is precisely articulated around this
question.

The first answer was formulated by Darwin himself, who in his impetus
suggested that there is no qualitative or natural difference between humans
and other species, the differences being only quantitative or degree. This
argument followed a logic similar to what he demonstrated in terms of
morphological aspects, the wing of the birds being nothing more than a
progressive modification of the fin of the fish. He had the same reasoning at
the behavioral level, postulating that morals, attention, reasoning, etc.,
already existed in non-human animals, the difference being simply once
again that humans have more. This thesis can be characterized as
continuous due to the assumed continuum between humans and other
species.

This proposal was accepted at the time by the dominant current in

psychology, namely behaviorism, a paradigm according to which all
behavior is guided by learning that connects a stimulus and a response,
consolidated by reinforcing loops. In this context, the same process can be
applied to humans and non-human animals, the difference in complexity
being not a qualitative difference, but a quantitative one. For Watson, one of
the main proponents of behaviorism, the description of these relationships
between stimulus and response was simply easier to achieve in animals than
in humans. At present, this approach is still widely used, particularly in the
field of animal cognition, where many authors refuse to address the idea that
qualitative cognitive differences exist between humans and certain animal
species – except perhaps with regard to symbolic language.

During the 20th Century, and particularly with the emergence of

cognitivism, several authors questioned the thesis of continuity, suggesting
that at least some cognitive traits could be specifically human. This is the
thesis of a discontinuity. This was the case, for example, of Noam
Chomsky, who argued that only humans are capable of generative grammar,
and Michael Tomasello, who (as mentioned above) advocated the idea that
only humans are capable of understanding the intentions of their fellow
human beings, or of Daniel Povinelli, according to whom humans have the
particularity to understand their world through analogical reasoning. In a
 Introduction xxvii

way, this perspective finally joins traditional philosophy such as the

Cartesian approach, according to which humans possess mental skills
distinct from animals.

Importantly, the authors supporting the discontinuity thesis do not reject

the idea that, in humans, more archaic cognitive processes can be reused in
favor of more recent processes. For example, for Daniel Povinelli, human
analogical reasoning would partly recycle the natural capacity – and shared
with the animal – to carry out associative learning on concrete objects.
Simply put, this reasoning would correspond to a form of recycling of this
associative learning, thus making it possible to extract what is analogous in
different situations to obtain a relationship between abstract elements. Other
authors such as Michael Anderson have suggested that a large part of our
cortex, useful for more archaic cognitive processes, is being redeployed to
support certain more recent brain regions and destined for new functions
from a phylogenetic point of view.

It is within this epistemological framework that the reflection I will lead

in this book will take place. In other words, I will accept the idea common to
many supporters of the discontinuity thesis that certain cognitive
mechanisms do not characterize us as such, which I will call recycled
mechanisms. As you will see, this will be the case in particular with our
motor-control system for grasping. On the other hand, I postulate that certain
cognitive mechanisms are singular to us, redeploying themselves on the
basis of more archaic mechanisms, recycling them as a result. These
mechanisms will be called rupture mechanisms. This will include technical
reasoning, a process similar to Povinelli’s analogical reasoning. In other
words, I consider that the thesis of continuity does not allow us to grasp the
particularity of human cognition, which leads above all to minimize or mask
differences in order to support the idea that our cognition and animal
cognition are similar.

I.5. Towards instinct

In summary, this book focuses on the cognitive origins of human

materiality, not to explain the historical evolution of our technology, but to
understand the cognitive reasons for this evolution. This is indeed an attempt
at cognitive anthropology. The thesis I defend is that we have an instinct to
change our physical environment, what I call “Tool instinct”. This instinct is
xxviii The Tool Instinct

based on rupture mechanisms, one of which is certainly at the very origin of

this appetence for tools, namely technical reasoning. Although many
scientists – and non-scientists – can agree on this thesis, it remains largely
counterintuitive in the field, since for many tool use remains a problem of
manual dexterity, manipulation and motor programs. Through this book, I
wish to break this epistemological tradition, which will lead me to criticize
many of the assumptions widely spread and accepted by the scientific
community.

This book will be structured as follows. I will begin in Chapter 1 by

questioning the very definition of the tool, extending it to tool making and
construction behaviors. As I will detail, this will lead me to propose the term
Tool with a capital T, aiming to encompass all the manifestations of human
materiality. Chapter 2 will aim to present the notion of Tool instinct, an
instinct that characterizes us as humans. This instinct is necessarily based on
a specific cognitive structure, a rupture mechanism. In Chapter 3, I will
explain that the so-called motor programs containing information on how to
manipulate tools are not the right candidates to understand this rupture
mechanism. As discussed in Chapter 4, this rupture mechanism could be
related to a specific form of reasoning about our physical environment, what
I call technical reasoning. In Chapter 5, I will explain how the recycling of
planning skills through technical reasoning allows the development of
complex tool behaviors, such as the use of one tool to create another, a
behavior observed only in our species. Chapter 6 presents an opportunity to
open the discussion on an aspect generally ignored by scientists, namely our
ability to store tools for future use. This lack of interest is surprising,
considering the incredible amount of tools we store, gradually moving us
from use to consumption. Chapter 7 will provide some explanations as to the
impact of our socialization on the development of complex technologies.
Finally, I will conclude by opening with the most exciting questions that
should shape research on the cognitive Tool in the coming years.

Dear readers, enjoy this book.

 1

The Tool With a Capital T

Scientists in the field have an unparalleled fascination with tools1, you

know, those objects that we most often manipulate with our hands. It can be
a hammer, screwdriver, fork or branch, as long as it is used to interact with
the environment. It is true that tools reflect an important part of our
materiality. However, should we consider that such a fascination is justified?
I think you anticipate my answer to that question: no. No, the tools are not
the only reflection of our materiality, far from it. Worse, being so fascinated
by these tools that we consider them as the only subject of study of human
materiality can lead to a lack of understanding of the underlying cognitive
mechanisms.

Let us do a fairly simple exercise. Take a quick look around you. What
do you see? Certainly a pen, a computer, books, furniture, a desk, walls,
maybe even a road, if you are near a window, with cars and trucks driving on
it. Leave your house or apartment, and imagine yourself now on a plane,
near a window, looking at the ground – if you are not already there after all.
What do you see? Again, roads, buildings, bridges, even cities. Let us now
travel back in time. Think of the Middle Ages, Antiquity, or Ancient Egypt.

1 The observation of this fascination comes from my expertise in the field, where I rarely
meet researchers interested in tool making or construction behavior in humans. Nevertheless,
this observation reflects an objective view of what is really going on. For example, I had fun
searching with the “PsycINFO” search engine for the number of occurrences of articles in the
field of psychology published in international journals containing the terms Tool Use and
Cognition, Tool Making and Cognition and Construction Behavior and Cognition. I
deliberately added the term cognition to reduce the search, at the risk of reducing occurrences.
The result obtained is unequivocal. Tool Use appears in 550 articles, Tool Making in
36 articles and Construction Behavior in four articles.

The Tool Instinct, First Edition. François Osiurak.

© ISTE Ltd 2020. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
2 The Tool Instinct

What are you thinking about? Castles, carriages, arenas, pyramids, wooden
boats, etc. This is a trivial exercise, I admit. However, the answers provided
are irrevocable. We are not only tool users, we are also builders, and we
excel so much in this field that it is even possible to see some of our
constructions from space (the Great Wall of China for example). How can
scientists then justify the need to focus so much on tools while neglecting the
most important traces of our materiality? We are constantly changing our
physical environment. We are building, constructing, demolishing, only to
rebuild again. The result of this appetence is staggering. However, scientists
are not interested in this. They are interested in understanding how we
manipulate tools – usually with our hands – and rarely focus on our ability to
make them. For me, this excessive fascination is detrimental to
understanding what characterizes us as humans, precipitating generations of
researchers toward the quest for the famous motor programs useful for
manipulating tools, as if a human were only a tool manipulator, and not a
maker or a builder.

My positioning will be different, and you will have understood that. In

this book, I defend the idea that tool use, tool making and construction
behavior are the three sides of the same piece that I call the Tool with a
capital T. And it is only by understanding the cognitive bases of the origin of
these three behaviors that it is possible to develop a new field of research on
the Tool, thus escaping from this fascination for use or, rather, for
manipulation – or even for the hand. This first chapter is intended to expand
on this point. I will begin by defining the three behaviors mentioned above,
characteristics of our materiality. I will then discuss the epistemological
reasons behind scientists’ fascination with tools. I will continue by
discussing the implications of this fascination for the choice of useful animal
models, and for the idea that specific cognitive abilities could be associated
with each of these three behaviors.

1.1. Defining the Tool: the behavioral reality

Traditionally, the notion of tool refers to any manipulable physical object

that is used to cause changes in other objects in the environment. A nail is
not a tool, unlike the hammer used to drive it in. Similarly, a house is not a
tool, unlike the trowel used to build it. Table 1.1 summarizes the definitions
proposed by major authors in disciplines around anthropology, psychology
and neuroscience. As can be seen, all these definitions agree on a major
 The Tool With a Capital T 3

criterion, namely that the tool is what is manipulated during use. I will refer
to this criterion as the criterion of manipulation.

Field Author(s) Definition

(van Lawick- [Tool use is] the use of an external object as a functional
Primatology Goodall 1970, extension of mouth or beak, hand or claw, in the
p. 195) attainment of an immediate goal.

When in use, a tool is a sort of extension of the hand,

almost an attachment to it or a part of the user’s own
body, and thus is no longer a part of the environment of
(Gibson 1979,
Psychology the user. But when not in use, the tool is simply a
p. 41)
detached object of the environment, graspable and
portable, to be sure, but nevertheless external to the
observer.

Tool use is the external employment of an unattached

environmental object to alter more efficiently the form,
(Beck 1980, position, or condition of another object, another
Ethology
p. 10) organism, or the user itself when the user holds or carries
the tool during or just prior to use and is responsible for
the proper and effective orientation of the tool.

A tool was defined as an implement for performing or

(Ochipa et al. facilitating mechanical operations, such as a screwdriver.
Neuropsychology
1992, p. 1063) An object was defined as a thing to which mechanical
action is directed, such as a screw.

A tool is a physical object that is manipulated by users in

such a manner as to both affect change in some aspect of
(Baber 2003, the environment and also to represent an extension of the
Ergonomics
p. 8) users themselves. The manipulation is directed toward a
specific goal or purpose, and the associated activity
requires a degree of control and coordination.

Tools [are] manipulable objects that are used to transform

Cognitive (Frey 2007, an actor’s motor output into predictable mechanical
neuroscience p. 368) actions for purposes of attaining specific goals (i.e.,
motor-to-mechanical transformations).

Tool use is the exertion of control over a freely

manipulable external object (the tool) with the goal of (1)
altering the physical properties of another object,
(St Amant and
Computer substance, surface or medium (the target, which may be
Horton 2008,
science the tool user or another organism) via a dynamic
p. 1203)
mechanical interaction, or (2) mediating the flow of
information between the tool user and the environment or
other organisms in the environment.

Table 1.1. Major definitions of tool use

4 The Tool Instinct

If we follow this behavioral definition of the phenomenon, a number of

observations of animal behavior can be categorized as tool use (see Table
1.2), whether in non-human primates, non-primate mammals, or birds, and
even, more unexpectedly, in fish or insects. In some cases, the repertoire
may be relatively varied, such as in chimpanzees, in which nearly 40
behaviors may have been listed throughout the species (Whiten et al. 1999).
In other species, this may characterize a single behavior, sometimes
observed in an isolated individual, such as the observation of a gorilla using
a branch to probe a pond before entering it (Breuer et al. 2005).

Species Tool Function Activity

Insect, fish
Ant Sand To throw Projected with the head
Archerfish Water To throw Water sprayed on prey
Bird
Egyptian vulture Stone To pound Held in the beak
Galápagos finches Twig To probe Held in the beak
Seagull Rock To throw Released in flight
Non-primate mammal
Elephant Branch To whip Held by the trunk
Polar bear Rock To throw Held between the claws
Primate
Chimpanzee Twig To probe Held between the legs
Chimpanzee Branch To pound Held between the legs
Chimpanzee Branch To split Held between the legs

Table 1.2. Animal tool use

Tool use is to be differentiated at the behavioral level of tool making and

construction behavior. The definitions associated with each of these
behaviors are provided in Table 1.3 based on the categorization provided by
Shumaker et al. (2011), which lists all of these behaviors in the animal
kingdom. In short, construction consists of assembling objects in order to
build a semipermanent entity, without this entity being manipulated during
its use. Nest building is a prime example of this behavior and is frequently
observed in the wild. Tool making shares with construction the criterion of
assembling objects, although making may also refer to other modes (see
 The Tool With a Capital T 5

Table 1.3). However, unlike construction, the generated entity is

manipulated directly after its design, so that this behavior refers to a tool. It
should be noted that the criterion of manipulation is again central to classify
a behavior as tool-related or not. If there is no manipulation after the
making2 of an object, then it is a construction behavior. If there is
manipulation, then it is a tool-making behavior.

Label Definition

The external employment of an unattached or manipulable attached

environmental object to alter more efficiently the form, position, or
Tool use condition of another object, another organism, or the user itself, when the
user holds and directly manipulates the tool during or prior to use and is
responsible for the proper and effective orientation of the tool (p. 5).

Two or more tools and/or objects physically linked to make a functional,

semipermanent thing that, once completed, is not held or directly
Construction
manipulated in its entirety. A construction itself is therefore not a tool. Nor
is it tool manufacture, because the product is not a tool (p. 19).

Structural modification of an object or an existing tool by the user or a

Tool making conspecific so that the object/tool serves, or serves more effectively, as a
tool (p. 11).

Method of manufacture

Remove the eventual tool from a fixed connection to the substrate or

Detaching
another object (p. 14).

Remove and discard a portion of a tool or an eventual tool so the tool can
Subtracting
be used or used more efficiently (p. 14).

Adding/ Join or connect two or more objects to make one tool that is held or directly
Combining manipulated in its entirety during its eventual use (p. 14).

Fundamentally restructure material to make a tool. It may include detach,

Reshaping
substract and add/combine (p. 14).

Table 1.3. Definitions of tool use, tool making and construction according to
Shumaker et al. (2011)

Tool making can also be observed in non-human animals, sometimes

taking very complex forms. For example, in the case of New Caledonian

2 In Chapter 6, I will come back to a distinction I wish to make between making, manufacture
and crafting.
6 The Tool Instinct

crows, the making of a stem to reach insects in small cavities consists of a

sequential cutting of Pandanus leaves, the tip being tapered to allow better
insertion into the cavities, while the base is left wider for better spinning
(Hunt 1996). Similarly, chimpanzees can perform up to four or more making
steps, including extracting branches from a tree, removing small branches
from the main branch, and trimming one or both ends of the main branch
(Pruetz and Bertolani 2007).

1.2. Blinded by tools

As stated at the beginning of this chapter, human materiality is not

limited to tools alone, but also includes a set of entities including
constructions. In this context, the challenge for scientists should be to
understand the human cognitive bases that have enabled these manifestations
to emerge. Why, then, do researchers have this unfortunate tendency to focus
mainly on tool use, leading them to model how an individual manipulates a
hammer, not how she/he makes it – whether mentally before use or
physically by assembling material – or how she/he builds a wall with it?

This fascination has its origins in the fundamental discovery that the
oldest trace of human materiality involves tools and not construction. With
their minds tainted by this discovery, scientists seem to have sought the
challenge of understanding how the first Homininae were able to manipulate
tools and not build constructions. However, this approach to the question of
human materiality is not neutral, because it is not the same to model at a
cognitive level how humans manipulate a tool as it is to model how they can
use or make tools, or build structures, in order to solve physical problems in
the environment. In the first case, the theoretical model is likely to focus on
specific manipulation capabilities and, therefore, on the potential existence
of specific motor programs for this manipulation. This is the case with most
cognitive models of human materiality, an approach that I will criticize
throughout this book. In the second case, the model is predisposed to explain
how physical problems are solved, with the criterion of manipulation being
considered secondary and ancillary. This is the approach I will defend in this
book.

The oldest trace of tools on Earth dates back about 2.5 million years
(Ambrose 2001; but see Harmand et al. 2015 for a recent discovery of tools
 The Tool With a Capital T 7

dating back 3.3 million years). These tools were made by gradually
removing a succession of fragments using a hammerstone, making it
possible to obtain a tool with a specific shape, useful in particular for cutting
meat (see Figure 1.1). It should be noted that this technology is the oldest
form not only of tool use but also of tool making.

Figure 1.1. Making of stone tools (Oldowayan lithic industry, about 2.5 million years
BC). The method consisted in gradually removing a succession of fragments using a
hammerstone (source: Noël Cédric)

The important question is whether these stone tools correspond with

certainty to the very first form of physical modification of the environment
by the human species. There are several indications that this is unlikely,
although there is no clear evidence to support it. First, these tools were
already of a relatively complex design, suggesting some technical mastery
on the part of the maker, a technique that required several hours of intensive
practice (Bril et al. 2010). The corollary is that these tools are unlikely to be
the first form of use and making, but rather the result of a gradual evolution
of less complex designed tools. The fact is that if such tools may have
preceded those we know, they could remain invisible in the archaeological
collection because of our inability to distinguish them from stones
accidentally fractured by some natural phenomenon (see Box 1.1). Another
argument abounds that they were certainly not the first used by our
ancestors. More precisely, these tools do not simply correspond to making
8 The Tool Instinct

instances, but more precisely to instances of using one tool to create another,
a rare phenomenon attributed solely to the human species (Gibson 1993). In
this sense, they also reflect a certain form of complexity, consisting in
producing a recursive behavior (i.e. the use of stone A makes it possible to
create stone B, which can then be used with an object C). Similarly, it seems
unlikely that our ancestors would have started making and using tools
directly at this level, otherwise this phenomenon would also be easily found
in other animal users. Finally, it is commonly accepted that other tools may
have been previously made from consumable materials (e.g. wood).
However, once again these tools could not leave any trace in the
archaeological collection (Panger et al. 2002)3.

A recent study published in Nature reported that capuchins in Serra da

Capivara National Park, Brazil, were able to produce stone fragments with
characteristics relatively comparable to some of the tools of the Paleolithic
period (Proffitt et al. 2016). This production is done unintentionally, as the
capuchins break the stones so that they can lick the inside of the stones, which
are rich in silicone, an important nutritional element for the species. This study
has generated considerable interest, since it suggests that the interpretation of the
archaeological collection should be revised by perhaps seeking new criteria to
allow us to distinguish these accidentally cut stones from those produced
intentionally. Nevertheless, we must not be mistaken as to how to interpret this
study, which does not call into question the idea that the oldest traces of stone
tools were indeed the responsibility of our ancestors. There is also indirect
evidence, such as traces of cuts found on bones from the same period, which
confirms that these tools were used intentionally. It should also be noted that the
use of these tools to cut meat is difficult to interpret as belonging to another
species, since no animal has ever been observed performing such behavior (i.e.
cutting meat).

Box 1.1. The question of evidence in archaeology

In short, even if no direct evidence can be provided in this sense, it seems

very likely that the oldest stone tools we have in the archaeological
collection are not the oldest trace of human materiality. If we accept this idea –
again not proven, although highly probable – then it leads us to question more

3 This aspect applies not only to tools preceding the first stone tools but also to all tools used
or created afterwards, as long as they were made of consumable materials. In other words, we
must be vigilant about interpretations of technological change based only on the tools in the
archaeological record because they were made using time-resistant materials.
 The Tool With a Capital T 9

broadly the idea that the first traces of human technology were necessarily
tools and not constructions – or that at least the two forms of behavior could
have appeared together. In other words, the discovery of these tools does not
exclude that our ancestors may have produced useful constructions to
facilitate survival (for example, “couchettes” made of leaves or branches)
perhaps concomitantly with the use and making of tools (for example,
wooden poles to reach fruits too high in trees). It should be noted that
construction behaviors are relatively frequent in animals, much more so than
tool use, which, without providing direct evidence, presupposes that the
human species was also able to achieve construction behaviors at an early
stage.

Although the scenario I propose remains speculative, since we have no

trace of human materiality prior to the first stone tools, it cannot be
invalidated either. This scenario being possible, it leads us to question the
specificity of human materiality. After all, let us imagine that we discovered
that the first Homininae built bunks. In this case, the emphasis placed on the
manipulation inherent in tool use would become secondary, since Man
would then define himself as a builder. This would modify the cognitive
models of human materiality, since models might finally emerge on the
cognitive bases of construction. This would also change the issue of animal
models useful for understanding human technology, i.e. that builders would
then become the best animal models, not users (see section 1.4). In short, if
we abandon the idea that what characterizes a human is the manipulation of
tools, then it becomes possible to imagine another scenario for the human
species, in which the ability to use/make tools and build constructions
becomes central (i.e. the Tool), leading us to question the reasons that led us
to produce this behavior.

1.3. From analogy to specificities

As mentioned in the previous section, scientists are inclined to

overestimate the role of the use – and therefore manipulation – of tools to the
detriment of making and construction behavior. This perspective leads them
to neglect the appetence that humans have for changing their environment.
Focusing attention on use is not in itself detrimental to understanding the
cognitive specificities underlying human materiality. After all, it is possible
to study these specificities only by investing in how humans behave when
using tools, as tools here are only one way to approach the more general
10 The Tool Instinct

problem of materiality. Most of my research follows this path, since most of

my work is devoted to how humans use tools, rather than how they
make them or build constructions. However, any human cognitive specificity
tends to be erased when it is considered that tool use in humans does not
really differ from what is observed in animals. You understand the logic
well, and I think many of you agree with it. This logic is as follows: human
materiality is essentially reflected in tool use; however, tool use is not
specific to humans; therefore there is nothing really specific in human
materiality. In the following lines, I will present several arguments that
demonstrate that there are many human specificities in tool use –
specificities that can easily be transferred to tool making and construction
behaviors. In other words, my point of view is that the analogy often
advanced between tool use in humans and animals is fragile, and in reality
tends to feed a scientific bias, namely the thesis of continuity.

The thesis of continuity is based on the argument by analogy, an

argument initially developed by Darwin and Romanès, two authors
considered to be the founders of comparative psychology. This argument
suggests that if two behaviors are considered analogous, then the underlying
mental processes are analogous as well. This argument is based on a
principle of parsimony, also known as Occam’s razor. According to this
principle, it becomes logical that human tool use results from cognitive
processes that are relatively comparable to those involved when non-human
primates, for example, use tools. This thesis was recently supported by
Haidle (2010), who argues that the complexity of human tools in prehistoric
times was only due to an increase in working memory capacities4. However,
according to her, the basic cognitive skills needed to use tools should not be
distinguished from those employed by chimpanzees, for example, when
using tools. Here, we find the famous principle of continuity between
humans and non-human animals in the cognitive processes involved. In other
words, there would be no qualitative leap in cognition between humans and
other species of animal users.

The problem with this argument by analogy is that it does not clearly
specify which reading grid to use to design two behaviors as analogous. In
fact, it seems that authors inclined to support the thesis of continuity tend to

4 Working memory can be defined as the ability to maintain and manipulate information in the
short term. For Haidle (2010), this ability is essential to make tools whose sequence is
becoming more and more complex. I will come back to this hypothesis in Chapter 5.
 The Tool With a Capital T 11

minimize differences and focus on similarities, leading them to characterize

behavior on a very short time scale. Let us take the example of a chimpanzee
fishing for termites. It is true that this behavior is like that of a human using
a fishing rod. In both cases, a tool is introduced into another entity and then
removed to extract a possible target. If we focus our analysis on this brief
episode, it is true that the two behaviors appear to be highly similar.
However, we are not required to use this relatively short time scale.

Now imagine that we are observing the behavior since its initiation. At
this level, it is possible to see that only humans reuse a tool stored for this
purpose, which is not done by chimpanzees or any other animal (Mulcahy
and Call 2006). It will also be possible to observe that this human could use
another tool (for example, a useful clamp to tighten weights) to create
another (a phenomenon also called the use of a secondary tool; for example,
leaded fishing line), a behavior that is also absent in chimpanzees and other
animals. If we further increase the time scale by taking into consideration the
individual over her/his entire life, we will see that only humans frequently
engage in object–object manipulation (Gibson 1993), have a vast repertoire
of tools (Frey 2007), use tools that go beyond simply increasing the natural
biomechanical capabilities of the hand (e.g. use of a pole, i.e. simple tools),
but which also transform the action of the hand into another mechanical
action (e.g. the use of a knife, i.e. complex tools, Frey 2007), or store tools to
reshape them later. At this level, the analogy is beginning to become difficult
to support. Finally, if following the example of Wundt’s folk psychology, we
assume that what is visible at the species level reflects what each individual
of the species is able to do, then we can see that only humans are able to
transform and improve their techniques from generation to generation
(Tomasello et al. 1993). At this level, the analogy is no longer tenable.

At this point, you have two options. The first is to maintain an analysis
based on a relatively short time scale and, consequently, to perpetuate the
idea that tool use in animals is strongly analogous to that of humans, thus
assuming that cognitive processes are common between species. If you
follow this path, then you are a strong advocate of the thesis of continuity
and it is very likely that you will not fully accept the thesis I am defending in
this book. The second is to admit that the argument by analogy is fallacious
and tends to simplify the problem under the guise of being governed by a
principle of parsimony. In this case, the differences become more
pronounced than the similarities, and this may lead to starting to reflect on
the possible cognitive origins of these differences. If this idea appeals to you
12 The Tool Instinct

more, then it assumes that you are ready to debate around the thesis of
discontinuity. Table 1.4 lists the specific human characteristics that will be
discussed in more detail in this book.

Label Definition
The ability to transfer a mechanical action learned in one
Transfer
situation to another.

Using a tool to create

another one/secondary The ability to use one tool to create another.
tools
The ability to use a tool that does not simply extend the user’s
Use of complex tools
biomechanical capabilities (unlike the use of simple tools).

Tool storage The ability to set aside a tool for future use.

The making/improvement of a tool that is then stored for

Tool making
future use.

The ability to assign a specific function to a given tool,

Functional fixedness
gradually generating a tool repertoire.

Cumulative technological The accumulation and improvement of a tool or technique over

culture generations.

Table 1.4. Human-specific behaviors

1.4. The select club of animal users

Beck (1980; Shumaker et al. 2011) has made a significant contribution to

the referencing of tool behaviors in non-human animals. In fact, the second
edition of his book Animal Tool Behaviour in collaboration with Shumaker
and Walkup is the most comprehensive catalogue available to date on the
subject. To carry out this work, it is obvious that practical definitions must
be generated in order to organize the referencing. I am not criticizing this
aspect in any way, quite the contrary, since the work carried out by Beck and
his collaborators does not aim to interpret the cognitive bases of the
behaviors described, but rather to provide an encyclopedia of the phenomena
studied based on a clearly established and behavior-oriented lexicon. I
emphasize the behavioral aspect of Beck’s distinctions between tool use and
construction in particular because Beck himself warned readers not to
consider these definitions as part of a biological or psychological reality, but
as practical definitions. In a way, for Beck, it should not be considered that
 The Tool With a Capital T 13

the distinction between tool use and construction presumes the existence of
different cognitive levels.

However, as Hansell and Ruxton (2008) have mentioned, this warning

does not seem to have been well understood since, over the past two
decades, a certain enthusiasm has emerged for the desire to bring certain
animal species into the very select club of animal users5. For example, the
observation of a beaver using a booster seat allowed this species to enter the
club (Barnes 2005). Similarly, the gorilla was also admitted to this club
following the observation of a behavior consisting of manipulating a branch
to probe a pond before entering it (Breuer et al. 2005). The elephant also had
its right of entry following the observation in this species of the
manipulation of a branch using the trunk to whip the buttocks in order to
make the insects fly away (Hart et al. 2001). For Hansell and Ruxton (2008),
this desire to bring animals into this club is the result of an anthropocentric
perspective that sees tool use as a defining feature of the human species – the
famous parallel with the first stone tools (see section 1.2) – and therefore, to
lend these animals a form of intelligence common to them. However, the
construction of dams by beavers is more elaborate than the use of a booster,
so it seems surprising to focus on the latter to characterize the intelligence of
beavers. Similarly, tool use in birds is rare, involving only about 20 of
8,600 known species, and generally consists of observing behavior in an
isolated or captive individual (Chappell and Kacelnik 2002). On the other
hand, the vast majority of birds build nests, sometimes following complex
sequences of actions.

The existence of this select club of tool users is based on the idea that
Beck’s arbitrary behavioral distinction between tool use and construction can

5 If you have followed me correctly, there is a certain form of incoherence in the thinking of
some scientists in this regard. On the one hand, as mentioned above, there is a tendency to
minimize differences between humans and animals in the ability to use tools. This tends to
diminish the particularity of human materiality by criticizing any anthropocentric thinking
that would require human behavior to be distinct from that of animals. On the other hand,
human behavior remains the gold standard and is associated with a higher form of
intelligence, encouraging researchers to allocate animals using tools to higher classes on the
cognitive criterion. This way of proceeding is paradoxically based on an anthropocentric
vision, since Man is considered as the standard. In short, instead of perceiving what is
different between humans and animals without value judgment, these two movements tend to
erase the specificities of human cognition by assimilating other forms of cognition to it (i.e.
anthropomorphism).
14 The Tool Instinct

be considered as reflecting a cognitive bijection, i.e. that tool use is reflected

in one type of cognitive process, the construction in another. This hypothesis
has never been formulated as it stands in the literature. Nevertheless, the idea
seems to be commonly understood in the sense that researchers questioning
the cognitive bases of human tool use never integrate construction behavior
into the analysis, again because of the manipulation criterion that excludes it.

However, if we look at non-human animals, this bijection is hardly

tenable. For example, the proto-use of tools in ants (see Table 1.2) consists
of the projection of a grain of sand using the head. This behavior is highly
stereotypical and does not result from lifelong learning to improve this
technique. Similarly, the nest building of the Paralastor wasp is so
stereotypical that if a hole is made in the nest, the wasp does not try to plug
it, but reconstructs a nest around this hole to plug the hole. Conversely, web
construction in spiders follows a non-stereotypical sequence of adding or
removing certain wires (Hansell and Ruxton 2008). This flexibility is also
found in nest building in birds (Crook 1963). Similarly, tool use in non-
human primates may involve changing twigs if the one used is not
appropriate for the behavior achieved (Shumaker et al. 2011).

In short, both tool use and construction can be achieved on the basis of
stereotypical or flexible behaviors, suggesting that distinct cognitive levels
could be used regardless of the behavior. There is therefore no cognitive
bijection between these two behaviors. The corollary is that there is no
reason to consider tool use as a more complex phenomenon at the cognitive
level. This conclusion has two main implications. The first is that any tool
use, tool making or construction behavior can be based on distinct cognitive
processes between species, whether between non-human species themselves
or between non-human species and humans. The behaviors of construction
of a web by a spider, a nest by a bird or a wardrobe by a human have in
common only the objective description of the behavior, the construction.
However, this does not imply that similar cognitive bases are necessarily at
stake under the pretext that it is a behavior categorized as a construction. The
same reasoning must be applied to the use and making of tools. Just because
different species use and make tools does not necessarily mean that the same
cognitive processes are engaged. In other words, this principle calls into
question the principle of argument by analogy supported by Darwin. The
second conclusion is that, conversely, the same cognitive abilities can be
involved in tool use, tool making and construction behaviors, with the
 The Tool With a Capital T 15

objective breakdown of the behavior again being arbitrary and not reflecting
a common ability. For me, this second conclusion is a strong premise of the
thesis defended in this book, namely that in human tool use, tool making and
construction are possible through a common cognitive mechanism: the
ability to solve physical problems by using objects external to the body.

1.5. In-defining the Tool: cognitive reality

Defining concepts or behaviors is an essential step in knowing what you

are talking about. However, what is important to understand is that no
definition is epistemologically neutral, in the sense that defining already
corresponds to delimiting the question or rather the problem at hand. In other
words, if the criterion of manipulation is central to the definition of tool use,
then this irremediably leads researchers to propose theoretical models to
explain how this manipulation takes place at a cognitive level. It is precisely
this trend that we observe in psychology and neuroscience, where a massive
consensus is emerging around the existence of manipulation-specific motor
programs. Once again, I will come back to this proposal critically in Chapter
3. For the time being, the question is whether this manipulation-centered
definition is effective in understanding human tool use and, more generally,
human materiality.

1.5.1. The absence of boundaries between tool use, tool making

and construction

If there is no cognitive boundary between tool use and construction, it is

also because it is obvious that the referencing of behaviors often leads to an
increase in the trait, as if the individual’s behavior could be perfectly
dissected into sequences of sub-behaviors, one being attributed to use,
another to construction, etc. However, it is very likely that in the continuum
of behaviors performed, this division is really difficult to make, so that tool
use becomes tool making or construction, and vice versa.

To illustrate this aspect, let us consider a human individual who notices

that water is flowing from the ceiling. A first solution may be to grab a cup
and hold it to collect water. In this case, it is a matter of tool use, since there
is manipulation. The cup is then the tool. Imagine that this individual decides
to put the cup down, then it becomes a construction behavior in the sense
16 The Tool Instinct

that she/he no longer needs to hold what was just before a tool, the cup also
constituting a semi-permanent entity, an essential criterion for construction.
However, if the individual has no predefined object at hand to solve this
problem, and a plastic bottle is within reach, she/he can cut it into a
container with a fairly wide opening and hold it. This is an instance of tool
making since the object is modified just before its manipulation, but
nevertheless manipulated during use. If she/he decides to put this bottle cut
in half on the ground again this behavior becomes a construction behavior
once more.

Reasonably, it seems difficult to consider that each of these scenarios

refers to distinct cognitive processes, as if the individual were to move from
a useful cognitive process to tool use, then tool making, or construction6. It
is most likely that what matters here is the individual’s ability to produce a
solution that solves the physical problem of water dripping. For this reason, I
will now use, as explained at the beginning of this chapter, the term Tool to
refer to any behavior aimed at modifying one’s environment to solve a
physical problem using objects external to the individual’s body, regardless
of whether the behavior can be classified as tool use, tool making or
construction.

1.5.2. Tool use: a fragile definition

In reality, there is a fragility in the very definition of the tool, which

consists of seeing the tool as what is being manipulated. One way to
illustrate this fragility is to turn to the attempt to define the tool proposed by
St Amant and Horton (2008). These authors proposed that when a
chimpanzee wedges a stone under another stone to use it as an anvil, then
places the nut on the anvil and hits the nut with a hammer stone, the only
tool is the hammer. Similarly, when a carpenter attaches a piece of wood

6 The example of flowing water illustrates the idea that the division of these behaviors
remains purely arbitrary and dependent on the observer’s eye. Unfortunately, it is possible
that a certain reluctance to accept the idea that there are no cognitive boundaries between
these behaviors sometimes appears among researchers, as this would be tantamount to
accepting the idea that the criterion of manipulation is clearly secondary in the question of
tool use. More precisely, it would be tantamount to these researchers sawing off the branch on
which they are sitting, especially when the major idea of their cognitive theory lies in the
assumption that tool use requires specific motor memories for manipulation. I will come back
to this aspect in more detail in Chapter 3.
 The Tool With a Capital T 17

between two other pieces of wood, wraps the piece with sandpaper, and
starts sanding, the only tool is sandpaper. Now imagine that the carpenter
fixes the sandpaper to a table, grabs the piece of wood with both hands and
starts sanding. In this case, what is being manipulated is the piece of wood.
However, it would be surprising to consider it as the tool. The problem also
arises if the carpenter holds the piece of wood in one hand and the sandpaper
in the other, alternating movements with one while stabilizing the other and
vice versa. In this case, both objects are manipulated, so what is the tool?
This ambiguity also exists among animals. Egyptian vultures can use a stone
held in the beak to hammer or drop it on an egg. However, they can also
hold the egg and drop it on stones on the ground to break it (van Lawick-
Goodall 1970). In the same way, distinguishing what is the tool in this
example is tricky. One way to do this could be to remove the manipulation
criterion, focusing on the idea that what ultimately matters is the production
of mechanical action to solve a physical problem, regardless of the need to
identify what is being manipulated. To accept such a proposal, however, is to
exclude the main criterion for tool use, namely an object that is manipulated.
Moreover, if the focus is placed on carrying out a mechanical action, this
would gradually mean integrating construction into tool behaviors.

1.6. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have discussed the idea that, if we wish to understand

the cognitive origins of human materiality, we must stop the fascination that
scientists have with tool use, leading them indirectly to assume that this
behavior is based on specific cognitive processes that are distinct from
construction. Once again, I do not condemn the approach of studying tool
use to understand human materiality more generally. Rather, I criticize the
idea that human materiality could be summed up in this form of behavior. In
other words, I postulate that tool use, tool making and construction behavior
are manifestations of the same cognitive capacity in Man, thereby calling
into question the emphasis unfairly placed on manipulation: Man does not
manipulate tools, he solves physical problems in his environment leading
him, among other things, to manipulate tools, but also making them or
building constructions. In the same vein, I propose that there is no reason to
consider animal tool use as part of cognitive processes at a higher level than
construction. Some animals may perform stereotypical behaviors to use tools
or build nests and other more flexible procedures to perform both forms of
behavior. There is no cognitive bijection for tool use or construction.
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