Legal Mobilization: The Neglected Role of the Law in the Political System

Author(s): Frances Kahn Zemans

Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 77, No. 3 (Sep., 1983), pp. 690-703
Published by: American Political Science Association
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 Legal Mobilization:
The NeglectedRole of theLaw in thePoliticalSystem
FRANCESKAHNZEMANS
American Judicature Society

This articleargues that the role of the law in thepolitical systemhas been construedmuch too
narrowly.A reviewof thepoliticalscienceliterature demonstrates an interestin thelaw thatis largely
confined to the making of new laws, social change, and social control. That view implies an
acceptanceof thelegalprofession'sdistinctionbetweenpublic and privatelaw as a reasonableguide
for politicalscientistsin thestudyof law.
A more interactiveview of the law is presented,characterizing legal mobilization(invokinglegal
norms)as a form of political activityby whichthecitizenryusespublic authorityon its own behalf.
Further,thelegal system,structuredto considercases and controversies on an individualbasis,pro-
videsaccess to governmentauthorityunencumberedby the limitsof collectiveaction. Thisform of
public power, althoughcontingent,is widelydispersed.
Considerationof thefactors that influencelegal mobilizationis importantnot only to under-
standing who uses the law, but also as predictorsto the implementationof public policy; with
veryfew exceptions,the enforcementof the laws depends upon individualcitizensto initiatethe
legalprocess. By virtueof thisdependence,an aggregationof individualcitizensactinglargelyin their
own interestsstronglyinfluencestheform and extentof the implementation of public policy and
therebytheallocation of power and authority.

PoliticalScienceViewstheLegalSystem Fromdoctrinal analysisofdecisions (Cushman,

1960)to examination of judicialdecisionmakers
Descriptions of Americangovernment tradi- (Pritchett, 1948;Schmidhauser, 1979),theproc-
tionallyincludea discussionof the role of the essesbywhichtheyareselected(Abraham,1974;
judicial system,and its politicalimportance is Chase, 1972;Grossman,1965),and therelation-
typically acknowledged byreferences to Tocque- ship betweentheirpersonalcharacteristics and
ville's observation that "Scarcelyany political decisions (Goldman,1964;Nagel,1962;Schubert,
questionarisesin the UnitedStatesthatis not 1965),thefocusof politicalscienceattention to
resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial thelegalsystemhas beenon policymaking and
question."Yet the studyof law and the legal case outcomes.Althoughinterestin judicial
system hasbeenperipheral tothestudyofgovern- behaviorhas wanedsubstantially, theparallelin-
ment,withspecialarguments deemednecessary to terest inpolicymaking through thecourtshasnot
justifytheirconsideration as politicalinstitutions.(Horowitz, 1977).Specialattention hasbeengiven
Thus, demonstrated interesthas untilrecently to therole,potential, and limitsof thejudicial
beenconfined largely to thedirectpolicymakingbranchinbreaking newgroundinpubliclawand,
roleof thecourtsin a commonlaw system that morebroadly,in promoting, if not generating,
has both a writtenconstitution and a well- broadsocialchange(Casper,1976;Dahl, 1957;
established traditionof judicialreview.Thisvir- Scheingold, 1974).1 Around this interest has
tuallyexclusive orientation towardlawmakingas grownan entireliterature on theimpactof court
thesolepolitical roleofthecourtsworthy ofstudy decisions(Becker& Feeley,1973;Milner,1971;
is clearfromevena cursory reviewofthepolitical Muir, 1967; Rodgers& Bullock,1972;Wasby,
scienceliterature. 1970).
More recently politicalscientists have turned
theirattentionto the criminaljustice system
Thisis a revisedversionofa paperpresented at the
1980Annual Meeting oftheAmerican PoliticalScience 'There has also been a substantialnormativelitera-
Association. tureon the policymakingrole of the courts,most of it
Theauthor wishestothank Thomas Davies,Herbertwrittenby lawyers.For conflictingviewsof the appro-
Jacob,Michael Lipsky,andStuart Scheingold fortheir priate role of the judiciary in the American govern-
comments onearlierdraftsandMarkPetracca formost mentalscheme,see Bickel (1970), Cox (1976), Green-
ableresearch assistance. berg(1974), Wechsler(1959), and Wright(1971).

690

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1983 LegalMobilization 691
(Casper, 1972; Eisenstein& Jacob, 1977; Feeley, state),has essentially ignoredthe legal system
1979; Heumann, 1978; Wilson, 1975). Although altogether. Thisfactreflects boththeancestry of
thisarea of researchmay appear to be far afield the politicalparticipation literature (in voting
fromthe law-makinginterestexhibitedin earlier studies)and the traditional distinctionbetween
work, thereis an underlyingtheoreticalconnec- law and politics.Participation research has been
tion. First, criminaljustice clearly falls on the oriented to "public"policyand outcomes; itim-
public side of the traditionalpublic-privatelaw plicitlyrequiresa politicalconsciousness, an
dichotomy;like public law generally,it is in- awareness of entry intothepoliticalarenaand a
timatelyconcernedwiththe relationshipbetween desireforan effectbeyondone's personallife
thecitizenand thestate.Further,whethertheter- space.
minologyis "social change" or "social control," A definition of politicalactivitywhichrelies
thepoliticalscienceperspectiveon thelaw has re- uponthepublicmotivation of theactormaybe
mained the same-the action is unidirectional, attractive by virtueof its clarityand simplicity,
emanatingfromstate actors and imposed upon butitwouldexcludemuchofwhatwetraditional-
the citizenry. ly thinkof as politicalactivity. Attempts to use
Even criticsof thepublic-private law distinction thepoliticalsystem to gainpersonalor groupad-
justifya broader considerationof the political vantagemaybe criticized forfailureto consider
role of thejudicial branchin termsof rulemaking thegeneralgood,buttheseattempts arecertainly
(Shapiro, 1972); i.e., it is appropriateforpolitical not dismissedas private or apolitical and
scientiststo studythe legal systemonlyto the ex- therefore beyondthelegitimate concerns ofthose
tentthatthe legal systemperformsessentiallythe attempting to explaintheauthoritative distribu-
same role, although constrained by different tionofsocialvaluables.Indeeda central question
structural apparatus, as the more clearly in American politicalthoughthasbeenthemain-
acknowledgedpoliticalbranchesof government. tenanceof a publicspirit(Arendt,1959;Tocque-
The pervasiveness of thisviewis perhapsmostevi- ville, 1963). The dominantAmericanideology
dent outside the field of public law, where the responds to thisconcern withan underlying faith
most consistentreferencesto the politicalrole of thatthepublicgood willmostlikelybe achieved
the courtsin the mainstreamof politicalscience through an aggregation of theassertion of nar-
are found in the interest-group literature(Key, rowerinterests (Hirschman, 1979).
1958; Truman,1951). But even there,thejudicial Theverynatureofthejudicialprocessblursthe
branchis seen as a last resortin the effortto in- public-private distinctionthat pervades the
fluence the making of public policy.2 Whatever politicalscienceliterature. In a commonlaw
else the law may do has been consideredbeyond systemin whichtherulesare said to emergein
the scope of inquiryby those interestedin the largemeasureout of an aggregation of cases
politicalrole of thelegal systemor in thepolitical broughtforconsideration, the initiation of in-
systemmoregenerally.The core workof thelegal dividualdemands(and not merelyoutcomes)is
system,whichdeals withindividualcases and con- centralto the development of the law. In this
troversies,is by and large left to the so-called common lawsystem, withitscommitment tostare
privatelaw arena,whichis beyondtheboundaries decisis,eachcasehasthepotential to influence all
of politicalconcernand thereforebest left(with subsequent similarcases. This processhas been
theirconcurrence)to the legal academyand pro- described as
fession.3
onein which theclassification
changesas the
PoliticalBehaviorand the is made.Theruleschange
classification as the
Public-PrivateDichotomy areapplied.
rules Moreimportant, arise
therules
outof a process which,whilecomparing fact
creates
situations, therulesand thenapplies
The study of individual participationin the them (Levi,1948,pp.3-4).
polity(thatis, action directedfromcitizento the
in-
reactive
The pointis thatcourtsareessentially
so rules"changeas theyare applied"
stitutions,
2Therehas been some recognitionof interestgroup in responseto claimsmade.Withinthelimitsof
activityto maximizeor minimizetheimplementation of jurisdictionalrulesthatstructureparticipation,
court decisionsas anotherstrategyof group influence individual actuallysettheagendaof the
litigants
(Peltason, 1955). This activitycomes closestto thelegal judicialbranchof government.
mobilizationthat is the topic of this article, but is
limitedby its exclusivefocus on the conscious policy
motivationof recognizedpoliticalgroups. 41tis true that some appellate courts, particularly
3An exceptionis Jacob's (1969) work on delinquent courtsof finalreview,exercisesubstantialdiscretionin
debtors. both the selectionof cases to be heard and issues to be

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692 TheAmerican
PoliticalScienceReview Vol. 77
In addition, of course, there are the more narrowspace whichhis own legal rightsoccupy.
unusualcases thatbeginas privatemattersof per- ... The generalgood whichresultstherefrom is
sonal interestto the claimantand that,by virtue not onlythe ideal interestthatthe authorityand
majesty of the law are protected, but...
of the court's responseto them,are transformed that the establishedorder of social relationsis
into significant new policy.A prominentexample defendedand assured(Ihering,1879,pp. 68-69).
is the case of Clarence Gideon, the ne'er-do-well
Florida convictsentencedto prison withoutthe The unity of public and private law has been
benefitof counselin his felonydefense(Gideon v. suggested more recently in an inquiry into ad-
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 1963). Withina few ministrativelaw that questions the validity of the
shortyearsof thatdecision,theextentof criminal distinction between private dispute-settling and
defenseand the role and financialburdenof the administrative law. "To what extent," it is asked,
statein providingit had been revolutionized. "does private dispute settlement consist of
The moregeneralpointis thatindividualchoice anything other than the disposition of challenges
and demands on public authorityby invoking to decisions about the use of state power?" (Vin-
legal rightsare closelyinterwoven withthemaking ing, 1978, p. 179). Study of the use of state power
of publicpolicywithoutanyrequisiteinvolvement is, of course, at the core of the political scientist's
by a collectivityor any necessityfora publiccon- task; its direct use by the citzenry as in mobiliza-
sciousness.However,even recognitionof the im- tion of the law, therefore, ought to be of par-
portanceof privatelymotivatedindividualcases ticular concern in a democratic political system.
to the developmentof the law ties theirpolitical
role to a requisitecontributionto rulemaking.A Legal Mobilizationas PoliticalParticipation
muchbroaderconceptualizationis necessaryifthe
fullmagnitudeof thepoliticalrole of thelaw is to Political participation is implied in the very no-
be appreciated. tion of democracy. Whether characterized as serv-
The traditionalpublic law-privatelaw dichot- ing the protection or maximization of interest,
omy, relyingas it does upon the differencebe- providing for self-rule, or as a means of self-
tweentherelationships controlled(i.e., stateto in- realization of one's humanity, political participa-
dividualand individualto individual,respectively) tion has been and continues to be central to demo-
is, like the public motivationaltest of political cratic theory (Arendt, 1959; Bachrach, 1967;
participation,an easybutconceptuallymisleading Dahl, 1961; Fanon, 1965). Although these various
distinctionthatdoes not well servesocial science roles are surely not mutually exclusive, neither are
analysis of the legal system.As Durkheimlong they necessarily mutually dependent. More impor-
ago noted, tant to the concerns expressed here, each of these
goals is potentially available through legal activity
a lawisprivateinthesensethatitisalwaysabout and, it might be argued, more so than from tradi-
individualswhoare present and acting;butso,
tionally acknowledged modes of political partici-
too,alllawispublic,inthesensethatitisa social
function and thatall individuals
are, whatever pation. For unlike other governmental structures,
theirvaryingtitles,functionaries of society. the legal system is structuredprecisely to promote
(Durkheim, 1964,p. 68) individual rather than collective action. Although
that surely limits the precipitousness of change
To takeDurkheim'scharacterization one stepfur- that is likely to occur, it also means that the in-
ther, the individual in realitybecomes a func- dividual citizen does not require the imprimatur
tionaryof the state, who is employinghis legiti- of an annointed group to have access to govern-
mate authorityby usingthe law; thisincludesthe ment authority. The legal system, limited as it is to
so-called private law, which is itselfwrittento real cases or controversies involving directly in-
reflectpublic norms and achieve public goals. jured or interested parties, provides a uniquely
Iheringgoes further and arguesthatthe assertion democratic (as opposed to republican) mechanism
of one's legal rightsis not only an obligationto for individual citizens to invoke public authority
oneself,but a dutyowed to society: on their own and for their benefit. The bulk of
this activity takes place among private citizens
In defending asserts
[theindividual]
legalrights who, in the process of involving legal norms,
and defendsthewholebodyof law,withinthe employ the power of the state and so become state
actors themselves.5

considered.To stressthisproactivebehaviorof the

courts,however,is to committhecommonerrorof 'The state is not dormantin thisprocess. Individual
overemphasis uponuppercourts,whenin mostcasesit participationin the legal systemis highlystructuredby
of the complexjurisdictionalrulesand thecontentof thesub-
is courtsof firstinstancethatare theterminus
legalprocess. stantivelaws thatbenefitsome at theexpenseof others.

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1983 LegalMobilization
In thisway the legal systemcan be considered
quintessentially democratic, although not
necessarilyegalitarianif the competenceand the
meansto make use of thisaccess to governmental
authority is not equally distributed. Despite
neglectby political science, the fact is that the
shareof theoutputof thepoliticalsystemthatin-
dividualsreceiveis in part determinedby the ex-
tentto whichtheymobilizethe law on theirown
behalf.The relianceof some of thedistribution of
social valuables upon individual assertions of
public authorityis ultimatelydemocratic,for it
mitigatessome of the problemsinherentin repre-
sentativegovernment, includingthe limitsof col-
lectiveaction and the difficultyof measuringin-
tensityof subjectiveinterest.If the dispersionof
powerprovidesprotectionfromtyranny, thenthe
potential for every individual to mobilize the
law can play an importantrole in democratic
governance."
Withoutdiminishing eithertherule-making role
of the courtsor the importanceof collectiveac-
tionin politics,scholarlyneglectof thecitizenry's
mobilizationof thelaw has contributedto a wide-
spread failure to recognize the centralityof
individualdemands to the very implementation
process that determinesthe benefitsthat citizens
actuallyreceivefromtheirgovernment.
As early as 1971 Pound noted that all law is
limitedby thenecessityof appeal to individualsto
set it in motion.Thus he concludedthat
Last and mostof all (law makers)muststudy
howto insurethatsomeonewillhavea motive
forinvoking themachinery his
oflawto enforce
ruleinthefaceofopposinginterests in
ofothers
it. (Pound,1917,p. 167)
infringing
Despite this and other briefreferencesin the
literatureto theobvious importanceof therole of
litigantsin the legal process,neithertheynor the
factorsthatinfluencetheirlegalactivityhave been
accorded much serious scholarly attention.
Black's (1973) work,"The Mobilizationof Law,"
is an important exception. Black, however,
defineslaw as the equivalent of "governmental
social control,"and itsmobilizationas "the proc-
These limitationsimposedin the state'sexerciseof
socialcontrol,however, do notdiminish theindepen-
denceof theindividual to actalone.
"Theexistenceof a legalstructurethatallowsforin-
dividualmobilizationof thelawis surelynotsufficient
todefinea democratic society.Yettheextenttowhicha
toemploy
isentitled
citizen ofgovernment 7Thisis not to arguethatthelaw playsno rolein
theauthority
by mobilizingthelaw adds to thediffusion of power socialcontrol,
and therebyto thedemocratic
natureof thepolitical viewthatfocusesexclusively
system.
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693
ess by which a legal systemacquires its cases."
These definitionsare at once too broad and too
narrow.The firstis too broad because it does not
distinguishlaw fromgovernmentpower; thus it
would, forexample,includeas an act of law the
burglaryof a psychiatrist'sofficeto obtainDaniel
Ellsberg's case file. Although that perspective
may be highly recommendedby virtue of its
avoidanceof manyof themostcomplexquestions
that have historicallyplagued jurisprudential
thought,it is a conceptualizationthatdistortsthe
common understandingof law as a framework
within which governmentalactors can operate
legitimately,setting limits on governmental
power.7The definitionis too narrowbecause it is
unidirectionaland fails to recognizethe interac-
tivenatureof thelaw. Finally,althoughBlack has
done more than anyone to call attentionto legal
mobilizationas a meaningfularea of study,he
definesmobilizationfartoo formalistically and so
fails to encompass the breadthof its role in the
distributionof governmentalpower among the
citizenry.
Althoughdefiningmobilizationas "the process
by whicha legal systemacquires its cases" seems
ratherall-encompassing,Black goes on to make
the directinvolvementof public actors a prere-
quisite to the transformation of an incidentor
situationinto a "case." In the criminalsystem
thismeans involvementby the police, in the civil
systemtheactual filingof a case in court.The at-
tractiveness of thisdefinitionis its relativeease of
operationalization.Yet an understanding of cases
even so defined is itself necessarilydependent
upon knowledge about those potential cases
which do not enterthe formalsystemand why
theydo not. Further,and morecloselyrelatedto
the role of the legal systemas a mechanismfor
participatorydemocracy,an individualthat in-
vokes the law on his or her own behalf without
direct assistance from the formal mechanism
assumes the role of governmentalactor. This
form of mobilizingpublic authorityis indeed
worthyof inquiry.In addition,it can be argued
thatsuccessfullegal mobilizationmaybe substan-
tially more efficientthan the interpositionof
police,prosecutors,and courtsin theimplementa-
tion of the law.
A more useful formulationof legal mobiliza-
tionis providedbyLempert(1976) as "the process
by which legal norms are invoked to regulate
behavior" (p. 173). This definitionincludesthe
earlieststages of the mobilizationprocesswhen,
to thedominant
butto offera corrective
on lawas a mechanism
of
socialcontrol.
 694 The AmericanPoliticalScienceReview Vol. 77
in Eastonian terms,desires or wants are trans- initiatedcontacts"would seem to incorporate
formedinto demands,when the public authority legalcontacts.Yet whenit comesto theirdata
inherentin legal norms is firstassertedby the analysis,they,like others,are particularly in-
citizenin thisparticipatory act. Fromthisperspec- terested in attempts to influence governmental
tivelegal mobilizationis not dependentupon the policydecisionsand in collectively oriented out-
use of particularformalstructures.Most impor- comes.In reporting thecorrelations amongcam-
tant,it does not excludeindividualactionand im- paignactivity, communal activity,andvoting they
plicitly recognizes the central role that mere assert:
knowledgeand assertionof legal normshave in
the distributionof public policy. The individual Whatmayholdtheselmodesofactivity to-
citizen can be a true participantin the govern- gether isthatallinvolve somepoliticalconscious-
mentalschemeas an enforcerof the law without ness,someawareness of and concern about
representative or professionalintermediaries. issuesthattranscend theindividual'smostnar-
The model of politicalparticipationthatunder- rowlifespace.Butparochial participationcan
takeplaceintheabsence ofsuchgeneral concern
lies thisconceptualizationincludesan activerole with politicalmatters (Verba & Nie,1972,p. 71).
forthe citizenryin both the makingand the im-
plementationof public policy. In contrast,the Althoughsuch a characterization mightrea-
more traditionalperspectiveon citizenparticipa- sonablyexcludethebulkoflegalactivity fromthe
tion in governancehas been orientedalmost ex- mainarenaof politicalparticipation, it is inap-
clusivelyto policymaking.Verba and Nie (1972, propriateon two different counts. First, it
p. 3) for example, are interestedin democratic substantially narrows thepurview ofpolitical par-
participationas "processesof influencing govern- ticipation as it has beenvariously conceptualized
mentalpolicies,not carryingthemout." Consist- inthetheoretical literature;second,itfailstotake
ent with that view, the crucial question with cotmnizance of the particular difficultyin char-
respectto therelationshipbetweenthecitizenand acterizing publicversusprivateissuesin a legal
the state has been how the preferencesof the system thatis structured to generate rulesoutof
citizensof a societyare aggregatedinto a social an incremental aggregation of individual (largely
choice. Further,accordingto Verba and Nie, it is "private") cases, and throughwhichthe im-
"through participation[that] the goals of the plementation of publicpolicyoftenproceeds.As
societyare set in a way thatis assumed to maxi- a resultit failsto acknowledge theimportance of
mize the allocation of benefitsin a society to citizen-initiated demandsto theactualdistribu-
matchthe needs and desiresof the populace" (p. tionof socialvaluables.
4). However, no such assumptionis warranted.
For althoughtheyclaimthat"the relevantconse- Law as Potential-Rights as Contingent:
quence of participationfor the individualcitizen TheCitizen'sRoleinEnforcement
is what he gets from the government"(p. 9),
along withotherstudentsof participation theyfail "Law," according to SamuelJohnson, "sup-
to acknowledgethatwhatone getsis notthesame plies the weak with adventitiousstrength"
as allocation,forthe latteris onlythe apportion- (Boswell,1791,1969,p. 498).In otherwords,law
mentor designationof government benefits,and conferspower.8In Dahl's (1961) words,the
not theiractual distribution.Althoughwhat one "mantleoflegality" conferred on private citizens
gets is most certainlyrelated to governmental provides themwithpowerpreviously unavailable
allocativedecisions,to a substantialdegreewhat to them.Any new authoritative rule,whether
citizensreceivefromthegovernment is dependent statute, judge-made commonlaw,or administra-
upon the demands they make for theirentitle- tiveregulation, merely provides opportunities. As
ments and upon participationin the policy- an essentially reactive process, thelegalsystem fits
implementation as wellas thepolicy-making proc- an Entrepreneurial market mode;9it is structured
ess. In particular,what the populace actually
receives from governmentis to a large extent
dependentupon theirwillingnessand abilityto
'This is not to deny that the laws stronglyreflect
assertand use the law on theirown behalf. Yet relativepowerpositionsin society,but herethefocusis
legal mobilizationas political demand has been on low as a resourceavailable to the citizenry.
virtuallyignoredby theliterature thatpurportsto
9Recognitionof the relevanceof a marketmodel as
be concernedwithwho getswhat. explanatoryof the actual operationof the legal system
Verba and Nie's definitionof politicalpartici- does not constitutea normativeendorsementof an
pation ("activitiesby privatecitizensaimed at in- idealized view thatan invisibleforceoperatesto form
fluencingactionsof government personnel")does individualjudicial decisions into an optimal body of
not necessarilyexclude legal activity,and the commonlaw precedents(Engel & Steele, 1979,p. 333).
mode of participationthey denote as "citizen- All thatis claimedis thecentralrole in thedistribution

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1983 LegalMobilization 695
so thatbyinvoking thelawprivate citizens playa formsof politicalparticipation, theycan provide
criticalrolein its enforcement. Whatever rights the resourcesto supportthe assertionof in-
areconferred arethuscontingent uponthefactors dividualclaims.For example,Nonetfoundthat
thatpromoteor inhibit decisionsto mobilizethe theunionplayedthisimportant roleinfacilitating
law. theclaimsof theirmembers forworkmen's com-
Ironically it has been sociologists ratherthan pensation (Nonet,p. 9), eventhoughsucha role
politicalscientists who haverecognized thatthe lay outsidethe union contract.Thereis also
legalprocessmakestheindividual a participant in evidencefromothercontexts thatsimilar support
governance ratherthanan objectof governmentforthe assertionof individualclaimsis forth-
(Nonet,1969;Selznick,1969).Selznick'sstudyof comingfrommoreinformal networks. Friends,
thelaw of employment and Nonet'sstudyof the relatives, employers, co-workers, and neighbors
administration ofthestateworkmen's compensa- all playa partinincreasing awareness ofthelegal
tionlawsbytheIndustrial Accident Commission natureof problemsand thustheavailability of
in Californiabothdocument thelegalization of legalremedies (Jacob,1969).In addition theypro-
the administrative process; i.e., enforcementvideguidancein thesearchforand selection of
agenciesprogressively becomepassiverecipientslegalassistance (Curran,1977).
of privately initiatedclaimswithan increasing Suchcitizenparticipation inthelegalprocessis
orientation to the settlement of disputes.Al- typically assumedto be central to private butnot
thoughon one handthatdevelopment mayhave publiclaw; however, thatdistinction is clearerin
theeffect ofdiverting publicpolicygoalsinherent theorythanin practice.Although it is truethat
intheenabling legislation, ithastheadvantage of thestateis authorized to enforce publiclawon its
makinglegalizedpolicyresponsive to individual owninitiative, andthatinprivate lawthatright is
circumstances (Selznick, 1969).1o grantedexclusively to privatecitizens(Black,
Nonetfoundthatthesocialwelfaremodel,in 1973,p. 128),theevidence indicates thatthestate
whichgovernment is activelyto provideservice only rarelyexercisesthatauthority becausein
and distribute benefits, is byitselfunableto ac- general thelegalsystem is structured torespond to
complish theintended ends;in theagencyhe ex- citizen-initiated complaints." Boththegrowth of
amined, legalizationactually facilitatedthe thecriminal law and thecreationof specialized
transformation ofwelfare policyintosecurerights administrative structures have an impactupon
(Nonet,1969,p. 263). In the process,private legalmobilization, butitis largely byvirtue ofthe
citizensbecomeactiveagentsofthegrowth ofthe shifting ofa substantial proportion ofthecoststo
law; insteadof a passiveobjectof thestate,the thepolity.Although thishastheeffect ofmaking
citizenis the demanderof rightsand status. it cheaperand lesscomplicated foran individual
Nonet's conclusion thatthelaw was liberating,to makea claim,thecasespursued bygovernment
freeingthe injuredemployeefromdependence stilldependlargely uponcomplaints fromoutside,
uponagencyandindustry notionsofhisinterests,thatis, on activeparticipation bythecitizenry.
soundscuriously likeFanon's arguments about Anillustrationofjusthowimportant individual
theliberation andself-realization thatcomefrom complainants areinthelegalprocesscanbe found
participation in politics.In both cases citizens in a briefpamphletwritten and circulatedby
transform themselves fromobjects to willful PEER, theProjectonEqualEducationRights, of
participants. theNOW LegalDefenseandEducationFund(to
Participation and thedistribution of demands "monitor enforcement progress underfederal law
in any entrepreneurial schemedepend upon forbidding sexdiscrimination ineducation").The
resources, skill,aggressiveness, and rightscon- pamphlet isaptlytitled"Anyone'sGuidetoFiling
sciousness, noneof whichis evenlydistributed in a TitleIX Complaint."Afterfirstpointing out
society.Becausevirtually all legalrightsin the thedependence ofHEW's civilrights office onin-
UnitedStatesdependuponthecitizento initiate dividualcomplaints, the pamphletgoes on to
the legal process, the distribution of such
resources andaccessto themarecritical. It is here
thatorganizedgroupsplaya centralrole in an
otherwise individualized system, foras withother "For evidenceof the influenceof privatecitizensat
various stages in the criminaljustice system(the most
obviously "public" area of law), see Hagan (1982).
Studies of antidiscrimination statutes, also virtually
universallyattest to the critical role of citizen com-
of legalityplayed by individualdecisionmakersassert- plaints(Berger,1967; Mayhew, 1968). In those excep-
ing theirrightsunderthe law. tional areas in whichgovernmentenforcement is very
'Lowi (1979) similarlydocumentsthe centralrole of proactive,suchas victimlesscrimeand InternalRevenue
citizen-complainantsin thedevelopmentof administra- Serviceregulations,thereis substantialdependenceon
tiveregulationsat the federallevel. informersin lieu of complainants.

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696 TheAmerican
PoliticalScienceReview Vol. 77
describe,step by step, the process involved,in- aberrations.However,a systemthatis dependent
cludinga sample letterfor filinga Title IX com- upon individualcomplainantscannot easily dis-
plaintand informationabout whereto send it. It criminate
- among these cases. Legal mobilization
carefullyarguesthatthe costs to the complainant and the initiation of complaints with public
are minimaland informsthe readerabout avail- authoritiesis thus dependent on complainant-
able supportgroupsto help preventpossibleanti- related variables rather than offender-related
cipatedharassment.Further,it stressestheimpor- variables.To theextentthatthe bulk of the com-
tance of persistence."DON'T GIVE UP! HEW plaints are individualized, the agency's work
will get around to your case . . [they]probably becomes substantiallyparticularized.'3
won't go ahead unless you say so." Finally,the The importanceof citizenmobilizationof the
directionsstressthe public policy importof an law to its enforcement is furtherreflectedin the
individualcomplaint: continuingdebateoverCongressionaland judicial
authorization of private causes of action. A
HEW's estimation of thepublicdemandforan citizen'srightto filea privatelawsuitin thecourts
endtosexdiscrimination ineducation is basedin eitherto secure compliance directlyor to seek
largeparton thenumber ofTitleIX complaints damages for injuriessufferedby virtueof non-
filed.The morecomplaints HEW receives, the compliance.Proponentsof a strongenforcement
morelikelyit is thatHEW willdevotegreater effort oftendo notwantto relyon suitsby private
energy to enforcing
and resources TitleIX.
citizens as the only mechanismto force com.
The same phenomenon is found, and often pliance. Indeed it has been noted that "the very
criticized,in the enforcementof housing codes origins of administrative agencies lay in
(Mileski, 1971), the criminallaw (Reiss and Bor- dissatisfaction with private litigation as an
dua, 1967), and the work of the Federal Trade undemocraticmechanismfor social choice and
Commission(Cox et al., 1969). Yet thereseemsto control" (Stewart & Sunstein, 1982, p. 1294).
be some reevaluation of its implications.Ten Despite the documented pervasive reliance of
yearsaftertheNader Reporton theFederalTrade regulatory agencies on citizen-complainants
Commissionattackedadministrative agenciesfor (Kagan, 1978), the authorizationto bring com-
actingonlywhenpeople sendlettersof complaint, plaints (and suits if necessary)against violators
Nader himselfseems to have changed his mind constitutesa grantof substantialcontrolto the
about the efficacy,and possiblythe democracy, agency, at least insofar as there is virtually
of reliance upon individual complainants. His unlimiteddiscretionnot to pursuea case. The op-
proposal for the enactment of a Corporate tion of a privatecause of action thus limitsan
Democracy Act (needed "to keep up with the agency'senforcement monopoly.The continuing
economicand politicalevolutionof giantcorpora- debate and the criticisms of private rightsof
tions") places theburdenof enforcement squarely action as usurpationsof legislativeauthoritythat
and solely on individualcitizens. "Rather than "may engenderoverenforcement of regulatory
dependingon a new bureaucracyto police itspro- statutes"(Fein, 1981,p. 23) reflecthow seriously
visions,the ACT would be largelyself-executing. mobilizationof thelaw is takenas a tool of policy
So citizensinjuredby the non-performance of a implementation."4
standard could go to court, not Washington"
(Nader & Green, 1979).12 Understanding Legal Mobilization
Reliance upon citizen-initiatedcomplaints
underminesthe abilityof government agenciesto Having argued the political relevanceof legal
set theirown agendas as authorizedby theirena- mobilizationto boththeindividualcitizenand the
blinglegislation.Althoughtheycan and do select
among cases forparticularattention,agenciesare
bound to respondto complaints.As a result,any "Steele's studyof the consumerfraudsectionof the
enforcementagenda-settingattemptedby a gov- Illinois attorneygeneral's office suggests that little
aggregationof cases In the officestudiedthere
ernmentalagency depends upon the affected was even a change inoccurs. public posturefromone of "rid-
citizenry'sdemandsforimplementation. Agencies ding the State of merchantswho habituallyemploy
would oftenlike to concentratetheireffortson fraud" to "rightingthe wrong and recoveringthe
exposingand pursuingseriousand continuousof- individual'smoneywheneverpossible" (Steele, 1975,p.
fenders, being less concerned with individual 1180).
14Inrecentyearstherightsof citizensto bringlegal ac.
tionto forcecompliancewithstatutesthatare subjectto
"Reliance upon complainantsgoingto courtto imple- agency enforcementhas been the subject of a sub-
mentpublic policymakesjurisdictionalrulesextremely stantialbody of law. See Fein (1981) fora discussionof
important.See, for example, Cannon v. Universityof recentU.S. Supreme Court action; for a more theo-
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677. reticaldiscussionsee Stewartand Sunstein(1982).

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1983 LegalMobilization 697
itis nownecessary
society,
larger toexamine some (Grumet,1970).Theserequirements are botha
thatinfluence
of thefactors theinvoking oflegal resultand partof thegrowing recognition that
norms.Although an in-depthevaluation ofall the childabuseis a socialproblem appropriate forin-
variablesthat influencelegal mobilizationis tervention by the criminallaw. Batteredwives
beyondthe scope of this article,thereare a providea similar example.Although longviewed
number offactors attention
thatmerit andwillbe as a privatematter,with the police actively
consideredin turn;generating legal demands, discouraged frominvolving themselves in intra-
socioeconomicstatus,and theissuespecificity of familialdisputes,a new consciousnesshas
legalmobilization. changedboth the reporting of offensesto the
policeandtheirresponse, insomecasesas a direct
Generating LegalDemands resultof court-endorsed consentagreements.
The complexity of theperception of interests
Therelationship between thelawas written and and theirtransformation intolegaldemandsis il-
thenatureoftheclaimsmadeis nota simpleone. lustrated bytherecent Chicagostrip-search cases.
The traditional view,mostclearlyarticulated by Overa periodofmanyyears,theIllinoisDivision
Pound (1942), holds that conflicting interests of theAmericanCivilLibertiesUnionreceived
(demandsor desires)existwherever a "plurality complaints fromwomenthattheyhadbeenstrip-
of humanbeings. . . come intocontact" (p. 66), searched,in some cases including body-cavity
and thata legal systemstrivesfor order"by searches,afterbeingarrested forminoroffenses
recognizing certainof theseinterests, bydefining bytheChicagoPoliceDepartment. Withonlyin-
the limitswithinwhichthoseinterests shallbe frequent complaints, itwasassumedthatthecases
recognizedand given effect throughlegal wereaberrations, and theywerehandledas in-
precepts"(Pound, 1942,p. 65). Conceptualized dividualabuses.The investigative reporting unit
thisway,thelaw,muchlikethestandard scheme of a local television stationrevealednumerous
of politicalparticipation,responds to and orders incidents, insomecasesinvolving womenstopped
pre-existentinterests,grantinglegalrecognition to forminortraffic violations andtakentothepolice
someand providing a mechanism through which stationbecausetheyhad leftdriver'slicensesat
theycan be secured.Pound statesquite em- home.By priorarrangement, eachof thereports
phaticallythatinterests wouldexistirrespective of broadcastthe telephonenumberof the local
a legalorder(Pound,1942,p. 66). Although that ACLU office, whichhadagreedtosetup a special
conceptualization oflawas an ordering ofexisting hotlineeachevening to provideassistance to vic-
social interestsaccurately describespartof the tims.Hundredsof complaints werereceived.
relationship of law to the largersociety,it is Eventually theIllinoislegislature passeda strip-
misleading becauseit presents as unidirectionalsearchbill thatbarspolicefromstrip-searching
whatis a highly interactiveprocess. personsarrestedfor misdemeanors or traffic
Thereis ampleevidencethatperceptions of violationsunlesstheoffense involves weaponsor
desires,wants, and interestsare themselvesdrugs.The lawsuitfiledbytheACLU on behalf
strongly influenced bythenatureand content of ofthewomenresulted inan injunction againstthe
legalnormsand evolving socialdefinitions of the ChicagoPoliceDepartment and thepayment of
circumstances inwhichthelawisappropriately in- damagesto manyof thewomenplaintiffs (other
voked.Indeedthisis partoftheeducative roleof casesarestillpending). Although thiscaseis also
thelaw(Andenaes,1966).Thus,forexample, the an exampleofindividual incidents generating new
growth ofconsumer protection lawshasgenerated law,interms oflegalmobilization itis mostinter-
demandson publicauthority by changingthe estingas an illustration ofsomeoftheinhibitions
public'sviewof thecircumstances underwhich uponthetransformation of interests or wantsto
theycanreasonably feelwronged andentitled toa demands.The plaintiffs werenotpredominantly
legal remedy.Put anotherway,it changesthe poor nor membersof racial minorities whose
citizenry'sperceptions of theirinterests. failureto use thelawmayhavebeenattributable
In many instances legal mobilizationis to a status-related lack of legal competence
generated notbythewriting of newlaws,butby (Carlin& Howard,1965).One was the former
changingsocial perceptions of the natureof a wifeofa judge.Shame,fear,assumptions thatthe
problem and theappropriateness of theinterven-policeandthelawareoneandthesame,failure to
tionof stateauthority. Assaultand battery, for getanyresponsefromtheinternal investigative
example,are violationsof the criminallaw in divisionof theChicagoPoliceDepartment, and
every state, but only recently has there been a the perception that the legal expense was not
substantial effortto enforcetheselaws in child worththepossiblegain-thesefactors, singlyor
abusecases.Publicandprivate organizations now in combination, keptthewomenfrompursuing
promote thereporting ofsuchcases,withdoctors thesecases. The revelation thatsuch practices
and teachersincreasingly requiredto do so werenot acceptable,thatcomplaints wouldbe

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698 PoliticalScienceReview
TheAmerican
heard and pursuedby a legitimateorganization,
generateda totallyunexpecteddemand.
The foregoingexamples provide an introduc-
tionto legal mobilizationas an interactive process
thatis quite differentfromPound's conceptuali-
zation of the relationshipbetweeninterestsand
law. The viewthatlaw and changingsocial norms
as well as individualcircumstancesare centralto
the criticalstep of perceivingand definingsitua-
tions or incidentsas legallyactionable also con-
trastssharplywithmuch of the recentliterature
on legal services.As Brakel(1979, p. 883) notedin
a recentreviewof a book representative of that
genre," 'Legal needs' of a populationare talked
about as if theyweresome objective,measurable,
meetable entity." That view pervades the legal
servicesliteratureand can be tracedto the influ-
ence of Carlin and Howard (1965) and Carlin,
Howard, and Messinger (1966). Without dis-
countingits substantialmerit,Carlin's work and
muchof thesubsequentpush forlegal servicesfor
the poor implythatknowledgeof the law and its
protections,and thecost and distribution of legal
counsel are sufficientto explain the observable
patternof legalmobilization.Althoughthereis no
doubt thatthecost of legal advice is a criticalfac-
tor in mobilizingthe law, it is onlyone of many,
and not alwaysthe most important.
SocioeconomicStatus and Legal Mobilization
Both the political participationand the legal
servicesliteraturesemphasize the importanceof
socioeconomic status as a predictorof citizens'
activitiesin seeking influenceupon or benefits
fromthe state. Milbrath,forexample,speaks of
"persons whose energiesare absorbedin personal
problems as likelyto place littlevalue on par-
ticipationin politics" (Milbrath, 1965, p. 70).
Indeed most studies of political participation
show thatthosewithhigherincome,moreeduca-
tion, and higherstatus occupations participate
more(Verba & Nie, 1972,p. 12). Thus Verba and
Nie conclude that "the relationshipbetween
socioeconomicstatusand overall participationis
linearand fairlystrong"(p. 130).
A disaggregation of theVerba-Niedata demon-
stratesthat the relationshipthey find between
socioeconomic status and political participation
does nothold acrossall themodesof participation
that emergedfromtheirfactoranalysis of par-
ticipatorybehavior. "Particularizedcontact," a
citizen-initiatedcontact (with a governmental
official)takenforhis or herown benefitdoes not
correlate highly with socioeconomic status
(r= .07; forothermodes of participationr ranges
from.27 to .33). As a noncollectiveaction taken
on behalf of the individual,this mode of par-
ticipation is most closely analogous to legal
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Vol. 77
mobilization. Unlike campaign or communal
activities,both of whichmay requirea relatively
large investmentfor a long-term,highriskgain,
particularizedcontact (and legal mobilization)
may be less costlyin relationto potentialgain.
Furthermore,the benefits,if forthcoming,are
moreimmediate.Thus Milbrath'sconclusionthat
personswhose energiesare absorbed in personal
problems are less likely to value political par-
ticipationmay say littlemore than thateveryone
has only a given quantum of time, energy,and
resources,and that rationalactorsmustevaluate
the potential benefits and burdens of action
beforecommitting theirscarce resources.This is
relevantto anycitizenand not onlythoseof lower
socioeconomicstatusforwhom prioritiesmay be
set, in part,by theireconomicsituation.Indeed a
reviewof availabledata indicatesthatthereis sub.
stantial rationalityto decisions to mobilize the
law.
In contrastto theconclusionthatthereis a sim-
ple inverse relationshipbetween socioeconomic
status and use of the legal system (Carlin &
Howard, 1965), data thatare more issue specific
show a substantiallymore complex pattern.For
example,whereasa studyof New York accident
victims found that those with higher socio-
economic statuswere more likelyto take action,
socioeconomicstatus had the opposite effecton
the likelihoodof retaininga lawyer(Hunting&
Neuwirth, 1962, p. 68). The reason for this
apparentinconsistency is thataccidentvictimsof
higherstatus were more likelyto use self-help.
That, of course, does not mean that legal
mobilizationdid notoccur,onlythatlawyerswere
not employed.
In anotherissue-specificstudy, of debtors in
four Wisconsin cities, Jacob (1969) similarly
found that socioeconomicstatuswas not a very
powerful predictor of legal mobilization.
Although respondents with more education,
higher income, and higher-statusoccupations
were more likely to score highlyon a judicial
efficacyscale (Jacob, 1969, p. 121), when it
actuallycame to usingthelaw to theirown advan-
tage,thesevariableswerenotverypredictive.Not
surprisingly, although social characteristics
helped to distinguishdelinquent debtors from
more responsiblecreditusers, theydid not dis-
tinguishusers of court services(i.e., bankrupts)
fromabstainers(i.e., garnishees)(Jacob, 1969,p.
54). Since goingto a lawyerwas thebestpredictor
of active(filingforbankruptcy)vs. passive(being
the subject of a garnishment proceeding)
behavior, these data raise questions about the
validity of generalizing,across differentissue
areas, about the relationshipbetweenlawyeruse
(or access to the potentialadvantagesofferedby
the law) and socioeconomicstatus.
 1983 LegalMobilization
The most fruitfuldata set for examiningthe
importanceof issue specificity to the determina-
tion of who mobilizesthe law is reportedin The
Legal Needs of the Public (Curran, 1977). This
national survey, covering twenty-nineproblem
areas (each with a potentialfor legal mobiliza-
tion),foundthatlawyeruse variesmostbytypeof
problem.Althoughtheoverallmean of lawyeruse
does not vary by income, when the data are
analyzedby problemarea, substantialdifferences
emerge. For example, high income respondents
are less likelythanlow incomerespondentsto use
lawyersin tortsand juvenilematters(p. 153), yet
highincomeadultsare morelikelyto use lawyers
in a numberof other problem areas. Similarly,
overall lawyeruse does not varywiththe educa-
tion of the respondent,but when lawyeruse is
analyzed issue by issue, many differencesare
observed(p. 158). It is beyond the scope of this
articleto tryto explainthesedifferences.The cen-
tral point of thesedata for an approach to legal
mobilizationas a formof politicalparticipationis
thatinvokingthelaw may occur witha varietyof
goals in mind and that the individual citizen-
actor's decisionto mobilizethelaw is not dictated
merelyby demographicvariables. Minimallyit
meansthatlegal mobilization(and perhapspoliti-
cal participationmore generally) needs to be
evaluated withgreaterspecificitythan has here-
toforeoccurred.
of Legal Mobilization
Issue Specificity
The circumstancesunder which the law is
mobilizedand by whom are subject to limitsim-
posed by theabilityof thelegal systemto provide
the desired result. There are at least two issue-
relatedfactorsthatweighheavilyon thedecision-
making process involved in legal mobilization.
The firstis theextentto whichthegoal soughtre-
quires the use of the state legal apparatus. The
second, related factor, is the availability of
specialized structures,legal and extralegal, to
facilitatethe pursuitof particulargoals. Before
consideringthese in detail, it is appropriateto
note thatthisdoes not implythatlegal mobiliza-
tion is merely a mode of dispute resolution.
Although disputes may provide the classic or
ideal-typicalwork of the courts,legal mobiliza-
tion, and much of the work of the public courts,
oftenoccurswithouta clear disputein the classic
sense. Thus an examinationof thepoliticalroleof
the law mustnecessarilyinclude the entirerange
of issuesoverwhichcitizensmobilizethepowerof
the state on theirown behalfand should not be
limitedto disputesper se.
As discussed previously,legal mobilizationis diminishthe necessityto invokethe public law.
also not limitedto directuse of statelegal struc-
tures; it is preciselythat kind of narrowingof legalizationof numerousareas of social behavior,
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699
focus that has substantiallyrestrictedunder-
standingof the law as a formof political par-
ticipationand of itsrolein thepolity.Still,it must
be recognizedthat issues vary in the extentto
whichit is likelyor in some cases necessarythat
the public legal apparatusbe employed.
Table 1 presentsa typologyof issues along a
legal mobilization continuum,encompassinga
wide varietyof issues in which the law has a
potential role to play. Movement from left to
righton the continuumis increasingly into areas
that are more generallyconceptualizedas legal
issues and thereforemore likelyto be subject to
legal mobilization.
Farthestto therightis themandatorycolumn,a
selectgroup of issues whichby theirverynature
requirenot onlythe invokingof legal norms,but
entryintotheformallegal systemand pursuitof a
case to judicial disposition.15
In theseexamples,a
citizenexplicitly seekstheimprimatur of thestate.
To take a case in point,althoughmarriagesmay
dissolveexperientially in a numberof ways,part-
nersoftenseek directbenefitsfromauthoritative-
ly endinga relationshipin a divorceproceeding.
These benefitscome mostlyin the formof state
protectionof post-marriagebenefits,including,
for example, welfarepayments,the transferof
property,and the status necessaryto obtain the
imprimaturof the state in a new marriage,yet
anotherlegal relationship.As currentlywritten,
the law providesthat this status can be accom-
plished only throughjudicial dissolutionof the
maritalrelationship.A similarpointcan be made
withrespectto all of the otheritemsin the man-
datorycolumn in Table 1. Althougheach might
be considered instrumentalto obtaining some
othergoal (e.g., settlingdebtsor seekingrevenge),
in everycase it is the authoritativerulingby the
courtthatis the immediateobject.
The issueslistedin theothercolumnsin Table I
are different;for these, the legal systemis only
one of a numberof possiblemeansof obtaininga
desired end. Although the emergenceof these
interestsand goals are themselvesinfluencedby
thelaw, thelegal apparatusneed not be employed
in theirpursuit;indeed,theyusuallyare notunless
otherapproaches fail to achieve the desiredout-
come. Yet the breadthof issues over which the
law can be mobilizedis a reflectionof the extent
to which modernAmerican societyhas become
legalized, with even the most intimateof social
relationshipshavingbecome subject to definition
and influenceby the state.16
"5Thatmany of these proceedingsare highlyroutin-
ized and thereforenoncontentiousdoes not in any way
"See Abel (1979) for a discussionof the progressive
700 The AmericanPoliticalScience Review
Table 1LFrequencyof Legal Mobilization:The Span of Issues
Never Rarely Sometimes
Social snubs* Intrafamily Consumer
Juvenile Contractdisputes
Job discrimination Landlord-tenant
Small claims
*Social snubsmay well be themotivationbehindlegal mobilization,but some otherlegallyrecognizedrightmust
be asserted.
Issues thatare typicallylegal includethose for
whichthereis broad social understanding thatthe
law plays a potentialrole and provides certain
rightsand duties.Includedheretoo are issuesfor
whichspecializedstructures have developedwhich
minimizethe need for directappeal to the court
system.Personal injuriesresultingfromautomo-
bile accidents,for example, are now controlled
largely by insurance companies and personal-
injurylawyers.This does not mean thatthelaw is
not mobilized, because where specialized struc-
tures and professionalpersonneldominate,the
law is knownand playsa sub rosa partin negotia-
tions and settlements(Mnookin & Kornhauser,
1979; Ross, 1980). Indeedit is formattersthatfall
intothe "typically"and "mandatory" categories
that lawyersare most likelyto be used in this
country(Curran,1977),and in some cases abroad
as well (Schuyt, Groenendijk, & Sloot, 1976;
Users' Survey,1979).
However, specialized structuresand lawyers'
specializationare not restrictedto thoseparticular
areas; for example,a currentstudyof consumer
grievancesand disputesin Milwaukee has iden-
tifiedno less than nine different forumsforpro-
cessingthiskindof dispute(Ladinsky,Macauley,
& Anderson, 1979), althoughnot all forumsare
specialized exclusivelyto consumerissues. The
emergenceof these institutionsas well as con-
sumeraffairsorganizationsand specializedlegal
expertisein thisarea is, like the law itself,both a
resultof and contributorto the demand forcon-
sumer rights.Such organizationsalso increase
knowledge and use of legal rights, thereby
facilitatinglegal mobilization. In other words,
theyincreasethisformof politicalparticipationin
much the same way thatmoreobviouslypolitical
organizations have been characterized as
generatingand facilitating moretraditionalforms
of political participation (Almond & Verba,
1965).
There are of course numerousothervariables
thatare important,indeedcentral,to the mobili-
zation of law. Judicialrules,for example,struc-
ture and therebylimitparticipationin the legal
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Vol. 77
Frequently Mandatory
Personalinjury(Auto) Divorce
Willsand estates Bankruptcy
Sale of house Garnishment
Probate
Make newlaw
Adoption
system.' Experiencewiththe law, the inter-
personalrelationships amongactors,and net-
worksaffecting accessto legaladviceareamong
othervariablesthatwouldrequireconsideration
in thedevelopment of a modelof legalmobiliza-
tion.Thattaskis, however, beyondthescopeof
thisessay.'8Herewe mustsettleformakingthe
generalcase thatlegalmobilization is an impor-
tantalbeituniqueformofcitizenparticipation in
thepolityand thatit is worthy of substantially
moreseriousscholarly attentionthanit has been
accorded.
Conclusion
Defining as theactofinvok-
legalmobilization
inglegalnormstoregulate behavior is purposively
broadenoughto includetheearliest stageoflegal
inthesimplest
activity; case,a particularbehavior
is demanded byverbalappealto thelaw.Thelaw
is thusmobilized whena desireor wantis trans-
lated into a demandas an assertionof one's
rights.At thesametimethatthelegitimacy of
one's claimis groundedin rulesof law, thede-
mandcontains threat
an implicit to usethepower
of thestateon one's own behalf.This is most
definitelynotto arguethata legalmobilization
framework providesa completeanalyticscheme
forunderstanding the law and its place in the
polity;thatwouldbe bothpresumptuous and in-
accurate,forsurelyitis notthecasethatthelaw
affectsactualbehavioronlyvia citizendemands.
Muchoftheimpactofthelawresults fromvolun-
tarycompliance thatstemsfrombothan obliga-
tionto obeyand a fearof sanction;i.e., a great
"'In particular,jurisdictionalrulescontrollingstand-
ing,class action rules,and theAmericanruleregarding
attorneys'fees(makingeach participantin a legal action
responsibleforhis or herown legal fees)play a signifi-
cant role in structuringlegal mobilization.
"8I have consideredelsewhere(Zemans, 1982) therole
of many of these factorsin decisions to assert rights
underlaw.
1983 LegalMobilization 701
dealofcitizenbehavior is self-regulated, withlaw has a peculiarly democratic nature.Itssuitability
providing a backdropof state-imposed parame- to absorbthedemandsof numerous claimants of
ters.Bycontrast, actuallegalmobilization occurs courselimitsits potentialto promotecentrally
onlywhenthereis an activedemandbased on plannedchange."Moreover, atthesametimethat
legalnorms.Although it mustbe precededbya the legal structure minimizesthe role of the
preceptual stageinwhicha givenincident orsitua- official actor,itassumesand so encourages com-
tion is conceptualizedfirstas calling for a petenceamongthecitizenry at large.
response, andsecondas actionable inthelaw,itis The selective focusherehas beenon thesorely
notuntilthelawisactually invoked thatparticipa- neglectedinteractive natureof the law. More
tionoccurs. specifically, it has beenarguedthatthegovern-
Thisarticlehas concentrated on theindividual mentalpowerinherent in thelaw is usedby the
caseintheso-calledprivate lawarenanotbecause citizenactively and individually to participate in
itis theonlycaseforwhichthisperspective is rele- thepoliticalsystem inorderto receivepartofthe
vant(as documented, bothprosecutors and regu- authoritative distribution of valuables.Law is of
latoryagenciesalso dependheavilyon complain- coursenotthepanaceaofthepowerless, butbyits
antsto initiatecases),butbecausethatis where verynatureit does lend its legitimacy and the
theargument needsto be mademoststrongly. In powerofthestatetowhomever hastheability and
additionto theso-calledprivate lawbeingwritten willingness to use it (Thompson,1975).
to reflectpublicnormsand to achievepublic An interactive viewof thelaw thatacknowl-
goals,itis in thisarenawhereimplementation of edges the universalavailability of government
thelawis mostheavily dependent upontheactive powerto thecitizenry hasimportant implications
participation of theindividual citizen,wherethe forsocialization in a democratic society.Neglect
citizenis mostlikelyto becomeeffectively a func- of legalmobilization as a formof politicalpar-
tionary of thestateby invoking thestate'slegal ticipation is botha result anda partoftheskewin
authority. socialization
political towardtheobligation ofthe
Thereis no question thatbetter mechanisms for citizento obeythelaw.Suchan orientation to the
aggregating claimswould increasethe benefits law is unidirectional (fromstateto citizen),and
received fromthelaw.Butto baseanalyses ofthe presents thelawas merely a mechanism forsocial
relationship betweenlaw and politicsexclusivelycontrol.It doesnotinanywayendorsean active,
on theroleofgroupsorgroupactionwouldbe to assertive participatory citizenry thatis central to a
neglect thepotential fortheindividual citizento democratic society.An interactive approachto
use thelawto hisor herownbenefit without the thelawdictates thepromotion ofa legally compe-
intervention ofa grouporrepresentative. Itwould tentcitizenry as essential ifpublicaimsareto be
also be to ignoretheuniqueroleofthelawinthe realizedin a system in whichtheimplementation
diffusion of publicpoweramongthepopulace.19 of publicpolicyis highly dependent uponmobili-
The bifurcation of researchbetweenpolicy- zationof thelawbyindividual citizens.It is time
makingand policy implementation has left forresearchers to broadentheirscopeand notto
unexplored theroleof citizenparticipation as a be bound by respondents'awarenessof the
linkagebetween them.Further, thisapproachhas "political"natureof theiracts.To do otherwise
resultedin an insufficient understanding of the causesus to remain victims ofthetraditional view
factors important totheimplementation ofpublic thatseparateslaw and politicsand leavesun-
policy.Becauseofthecontingent natureofpublic explored an important areaofinteraction between
policies,whoactually getswhatfromgovernmentcitizens and thestate.
is insignificantpartdetermined bythewillingness
and abilityto invokeexisting lawsand to usethe
powerof the stateto demandcomplianceto References
benefit oneself.20 Structured as itis to providean
individualized mechanism bywhichpowermaybe Abel, R. L. Delegalization: A critical review of its
diffused throughout thesociety, thelegalsystem ideology, manifestationsand social consequences.
Jahrbuchftir Rechtssoziologieand Rechtstheorie,
1979, 6, 27-47.
Abraham, H. J. Justicesand presidents:a political
"9Itmatterslittlethatelitesmay be morelikelyto use historyof appointmentsto theSupremeCourt. New
thelaw thanthemasses.Whatmattersis thatin mobiliz- York: OxfordUniversityPress, 1974.
ingthelaw, as comparedto otherformsof politicalpar-
ticipation,the ordinarycitizen,as an individual,has a
greaterpotentialto receiveauthoritativebenefits. 2"Thisstructurallimiton plannedchangesin thelegal
20Thisfactis recognizedby interestgroupsthatactive- systemalso accounts for a very differentprocess of
ly use the courtsas a forumforthe implementation of policydiffusionfromthatfoundin thelegislativearena.
legal rules. See Gendlin(1980). See Canon and Baum (1981).

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