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China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century

Global Geopolitics
China, Russia, and

Twenty-First Century
Global Geopolitics
Paul J. Bolt and Sharyl N. Cross
1
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for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials
contained in any third party website referenced in this work.
Paul Bolt dedicates this book to Betty Jo and his children, especially Abby,
whose enthusiasm for the book was inspirational
Sharyl Cross dedicates this book in memory of US Senate Majority Leader

Joe T. Robinson and in honor of the legacy of the Robinson family of Lonoke
Arkansas—to their dear son and nephew, her father, Jerry Cross—with
gratitude for those sacred and enduring values that he carries on in all
spheres—commitment, loyalty, integrity, faith, and love
Preface and Acknowledgments
China and Russia, as the world’s two leading authoritarian nations, will
undoubtedly be critical for managing the most pressing traditional and non-
traditional security challenges facing humanity, and can be expected to exert
significant influence in shaping the future development of the twenty-first
century geopolitical security order. China and Russia challenge United States
hegemony and the Western liberal order by seeking a multipolar global power
configuration more suited to their interests. Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin
enjoy a close association, and both are strong nationalistic leaders determined
to command respect on the world stage. Russia still maintains nuclear parity
with the United States, and China rivals the United States as the world’s
leading global economic power. China and Russia exercise considerable influ-
ence as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and
share a coincidence of positions on several significant international issues in
direct contradiction to the preferences and interests of Western democratic
nations. Beijing and Moscow understand that the Sino–Russian partnership
holds the potential to challenge the United States and its allies on global and
regional issues. At the same time, both countries place high priority on
relationships with Western democratic nations, but they insist that collabor-
ation be based on “mutual respect” and “equality.”
The motivation for undertaking this project on the Sino–Russian relation-
ship comes from the fact that, first of all, we recognize the importance of these
two major global powers, nations possessing rich historical and cultural tradi-
tions, for future peace and security in the twenty-first century international
community. As American scholars, we believe that the US academic and
policy communities have been so consumed over the past decade with issues
in the Middle East and countering terrorism that we have neglected to devote
sufficient attention to assessing the strategic significance, challenges, and
opportunities presented by the evolving Sino–Russian relationship. We hope
that this book, combining our respective expertise on China and Russia, fills
a critical gap in the existing literature by offering a study that will hold
significant relevance for both academics and policy practitioners interested
in gaining a deeper understanding of the factors influencing the dynamic
developments in the Sino–Russian strategic partnership.
This book provides a comprehensive analysis of the Chinese–Russian

bilateral relationship, grounded in a historical perspective, and discusses the
implications of the burgeoning “strategic partnership” between these two
major powers for world order and global geopolitics. The study concentrates
particular attention on evaluating the importance of Russia’s “pivot” toward
China and Asia in response to the consequences of the crisis in Ukraine. The
chapters compare the national worldviews, priorities, and strategic visions for
the leaderships of both China and Russia, examining several aspects of the
relationship in detail. The energy trade is the most important component of
economic ties, although both sides desire to broaden trade and investments.
In the military realm, Russia sells advanced arms to China, and the two
countries engage in regular joint exercises. Diplomatically, these two Eurasian
powers take similar approaches to conflicts in Ukraine and Syria, and also
cooperate on non-traditional security issues, including preventing “colored
revolutions”, cyber management, and terrorism.
The analysis suggests major themes regarding the evolving Sino–Russian
relationship. Russia and China have common interests that cement their
partnership, including security, protecting authoritarian institutions, and
reshaping aspects of the global order. They are key players not only influen-
cing regional issues, but also international norms and institutions. The com-
prehensive Sino–Russian partnership presents a potential counterbalance to
the United States and democratic nations in shaping the contemporary and
emerging geopolitical landscape. Nevertheless, the West is still an important
partner for China and Russia and both countries seek better relations with the
United States and its democratic allies, but on terms of equitable partnership.
The Sino–Russian bilateral partnership has gained considerable momentum,
particularly since 2014 as Moscow turned to Beijing in an attempt to offset
tensions with the West in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and
intervention in Ukraine. However, the two countries still have some frictions
in their relationship, and not all interests overlap. Therefore, China and Russia
describe their relationship as a comprehensive “strategic partnership,” but
they are not “allies.”
In terms of our approach, the book combines the expertise of one author
concentrating research and teaching on China and Chinese foreign policy and
the other specializing in Russian security and foreign policy. We would not
have been able to offer the depth and scope of analysis provided in this book
without the regional expertise that each co-author brought to the project. In
addition, we placed the highest priority on actively engaging in discussions
with our colleagues in China and Russia over the past several years to gain
deeper understanding of their varying perspectives and priorities with respect
to Chinese and Russian international behavior. We have made every effort to
incorporate interviews and statements from discussions with leading experts
viii
in China and Russia and to consult and document a wide range of original
primary Chinese and Russian sources in developing our assessments and
analysis presented in this book. This project reflects not only our daily immer-
sion in the American and European international relations academic and
defense communities, but also our efforts to maintain routine collaboration
and engagement with our colleagues in both China and Russia, who possess
substantial subject area expertise on politics and foreign policy and inter-
national security.
This book represents the culmination of collaborative research on the Sino–
Russian relationship spanning the past decade. We initiated our work on the
Chinese–Russian partnership in 2004 while serving together on the faculty of
the United States Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, and have continued
to collaborate in hosting professional gatherings with our Chinese and
Russian colleagues on contemporary international security and foreign policy
issues, traveling frequently to China and Russia to conduct research, lecture,
and contribute to major conferences, and co-authoring publications from
which this book is a product. Although they are not directly funding this
book, we would like to acknowledge the importance of prior valuable support
for our research on Chinese and Russian foreign policy and the Sino–Russian
relationship provided by the US Air Force’s Institute for National Security
Studies, Minerva Research Initiative, Marshall Center Director’s Sponsored
Research Program, and Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson Inter-
national Center for Scholars. The authors thank the Kozmetsky Center of
St. Edward’s University for funding research for this project in Russia during
Fall 2015, and hosting a conference session led by the authors in February
2016 to bring together leading experts from both China and Russia to discuss
the Sino–Russian relationship and implications for global politics and secur-
ity. These sessions provided excellent opportunities for holding working
meetings with colleagues from both nations to explore in depth the issues
discussed in this book.
We would also like to acknowledge institutions in China and Taiwan
and Russia for hosting and supporting conference gatherings and research
visits over the past two decades that were important for this project work,
including Fudan University, the School of International Studies at Peking
University, National Chengchi University, Shanghai International Studies
University, China Foreign Affairs University, China Institute of International
Studies, Institute of Russian, East European, and Central Asian Studies at
the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Moscow State Institute of International
Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
(MGIMO), Moscow State University, Institute of USA and Canada Studies of
the Russian Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg State University, School of
International Relations, Institute of World Economy and International
ix
Relations (IMEMO) of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Russian International

Affairs Council, and US Embassies in Beijing and Moscow. We also acknow-
ledge and appreciate the efforts of our colleagues in Europe, Eurasia, and
Asia for hosting regional conference gatherings that provided further oppor-
tunities for us to discuss our research and exchange perspectives on Chinese
and Russian foreign policy with colleagues from China and Russia, including
Strategy International and ELIAMEP (Greece), Atlantic Council in Monte-
negro and Croatia, Belgrade Security Forum, Konrad Adenauer Foundation,
International Political Science Association, New Policy Forum/Gorbachev
Foundation, Foreign Affairs Association Germany, SPECTRUM Center
for Strategic Analysis (Armenia), I. I. Mechnikov University in Odessa,
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, and Kazakhstan
National University.
China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics will be of interest
for academic experts on Chinese and Russian foreign and security policy, and
for those involved in broader study of international relations, geopolitics, and
security studies. The rich original primary source material contained in this
book should be useful for research scholars, but we would like to emphasize
that every effort was made to present the material throughout the chapters so
as to be clear, straightforward, and easily accessible for the wider non-expert
student and public audience. In our judgment, the stakes could not be greater
for the United States and its allies in productively managing relationships with
these two critical global powers, and we certainly hope that the research and
analysis featured in the chapters will provide insight on foundations of the
Sino–Russian evolving partnership that will serve as a valuable resource for the
United States and international policy communities.
A project such as this requires contributions and support from numerous
colleagues, friends, and our families. We would like to thank Alexei Voskres-
senski, Alexander Lukin, Artyom Lukin, Viktor Sumsky, Alexander Gabuev,
Victor Kremenyuk, Tatyana Shakleina, Pavel Palazchenko, Mikhail Margelov,
Raymond Truong, Scott Urbom, Wang Ning, Zhao Huasheng, Su Changhe,
Jennifer Davis-Paguada, Nina Diaz, Cam Torrens, Gao Fei, Su Xiaohui, Wang
Dong, Wu Hongwei, Arthur Ding, Shen Dingli, Wei Bai-Ku, Tsai Ming-Yen, Jim
Smith, and Patrick Besha for contributing to our understanding of Sino–Russian
relations. Cheryl Kearney, Joe Foster, Teresa Daniels, Fran Pilch, Paul Carrese,
Damon Coletta, David Sacko, John Riley, Christine Cross, Steve Balich, and
Brenda Vallance provided encouragement throughout the project. We thank
those who have discussed ideas with us at various stages of our work on Sino–
Russian relations or who commented on the manuscript, including Ruth
Melkonian-Hoover, Evan McKinney, Doyle Baker, Wang Wenfeng, Suisheng
Zhao, Matt Rojansky, Igor Zevelev, John Reppert, Despina Afentouli, Greg
Gleason, Deborah Palmieri, Elizabeth Prodromou, Craig Nation, Scott Roenicke,
x
Julian Lindley-French, Isabelle Facon, Igor Okunev, Sergei Oznobishchev, Vadim

Kozylin, Nadia Arbatova, Oleg Demidov, and Timur Makhmutov. Of course, any
errors that remain in this work are the responsibility of the authors.
Our students and seminar participants at the United States Air Force Acad-
emy, Marshall Center, Moscow State Institute of International Relations
(MGIMO), and St. Edward’s University have contributed to our work on
China and Russia by engaging in many discussions with us and asking excel-
lent questions as we have reviewed the literature and researched these issues.
Our work has no doubt benefited from these interactions and interventions,
and we will always be deeply grateful to those we have had the privilege to
work with in our courses and seminars.
We wish to express our gratitude for the support provided by Dominic Byatt
and Olivia Wells at Oxford University Press. A transatlantic residential reloca-
tion in 2013 combined with the unanticipated developments over the crisis in
Ukraine resulted in multiple extensions of our deadlines for completion of the
book, and we surely appreciate the abundant patience and flexibility on the
part of Dominic, Olivia, and their colleagues at Oxford in adjusting to our
schedule. We thank David Mowry of the Kozmetsky Center for providing
valuable editorial support. We thank each other for encouragement and sus-
taining commitment to a project that has required a tremendous dedication of
time, concentration, and hard work. Most of all we want to thank our families,
whose love and support throughout the extended periods of research and
writing really did make this possible.
Sharyl Cross, Austin and Paul Bolt,
Colorado Springs, 2016
Disclaimer: The ideas expressed in this book are those of the authors, and are
not a reflection of the views of the institutions where we are presently or have
been employed or affiliated.
xi
Contents
List of Abbreviations xv
About the Authors xix
1. Historical Foundations, Strategic Visions, and World Order 1
2. Energy and the Economic Foundations of the Sino–Russian

Relationship 67
3. The Sino–Russian Military–Security Relationship: Emerging

Trends and Challenges 108
4. Russia, China, and Contemporary International Conflicts:

Ukraine and Syria 151
5. Emerging Non-traditional Security Challenges: Color

Revolutions, Cyber and Information Security, Terrorism,
and Violent Extremism 216
Conclusion: The Sino–Russian Strategic Partnership:

Implications for Contemporary World Order and Geopolitics 290
Index 303
List of Abbreviations
AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APR Asia-Pacific region
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ASAT Anti-satellite
ASCM Anti-ship cruise missile
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BMD Ballistic missile defense
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CAC Cybersecurity Administration of China
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CICIR China Institute of Contemporary International Relations
CIIS China Institute of International Studies
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CMC Central Military Commission
CNOOC China National Offshore Oil Corporation
CNPC China National Petroleum Corporation
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSAC Cyber Security Association of China
CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization
CT Counterterrorism
CTC Counter-Terrorism Committee
CTED Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate
CVE Countering violent extremism
EAG Eurasian group on combating money laundering and financing
of terrorism
EEU Eurasian Economic Union
ESPO East Siberian–Pacific Ocean pipeline
ETIM East Turkestan Islamic Movement

EU European Union
FATF Financial Action Task Force
FSB Federal Security Service
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System
ICANN Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
ICT Information and communication technology
IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
INEW Integrated network electronic warfare
INF Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces
IS Islamic State
ISSG International Syria Support Group
LNG Liquid natural gas
MOFCOM Ministry of Commerce
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATCG National Anti-Terrorism Coordination Group
NDB New Development Bank
NDRC National Development and Reform Commission
NEA National Energy Administration
NGO Non-governmental organization
NOC National oil company
NRC NATO-Russia Council
OBOR One Belt, One Road
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PAP People’s Armed Police
PARNAS People’s Freedom Party
PKK Kurdistan Workers’ Party
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PLAAF People’s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy
PRC People’s Republic of China
PYD Democratic Union Party
RATS Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure
RFE Russian Far East
RMB Renminbi
xvi
SAM Surface-to-air missile

SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SPR Strategic petroleum reserve
SSF Strategic Support Force
THAAD Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense
TIP Turkistan Islamic Party
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNSCR United Nations Security Council resolutions
YPG People’s Protection Units
xvii
About the Authors
Paul J. Bolt Dr Paul Bolt is a Professor of Political Science at the United States Air Force
Academy in Colorado Springs, where he has taught since 1997. Dr Bolt served previ-
ously as Head of the Department of Political Science at the US Air Force Academy.
He received his BA from Hope College and his MA and PhD in Political Science from the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He has taught at Zhejiang University and
Baicheng Normal College in the People’s Republic of China, as well as the University of
Illinois. In 2009–10 he served as a Fulbright scholar at Nanyang Technological Univer-
sity in Singapore. Dr Bolt teaches courses in Asian Politics, Defense Policy, American
Government, American Grand Strategy, and Comparative Politics. He is the author
of China and Southeast Asia’s Ethnic Chinese: State and Diaspora in Contemporary Asia
(Praeger Publishers, 2000), and has published on Asia and security issues in the
Journal of Contemporary China, Issues and Studies, Asian Affairs, Asian Security, China:
An International Journal, Strategic Studies Quarterly, and various edited volumes. He has
also co-edited The United States, Russia and China: Confronting Global Terrorism and
Security Challenges in the 21st Century (Praeger Security International Series, 2008),
China’s Nuclear Future (Lynne Rienner, 2006), and American Defense Policy, 8th edition
(Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005).
Sharyl N. Cross Dr Sharyl Cross is Director of the Kozmetsky Center at St. Edward’s
University in Austin and Global Policy Scholar at the Kennan Institute Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington DC. Dr Cross was Professor
at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-
Partenkirchen Germany (2005–13) where she served as Director of Academics for
both the Program in Advanced Security Studies and the Senior Executive Seminar.
Prior to the Marshall Center, Dr Cross had been appointed Distinguished Professor of
Political Science at the United States Air Force Academy teaching courses on Russian
foreign policy, US–Russian relations, and global security. She was a resident Senior
Fulbright Scholar in Moscow in 1999, serving on the faculty of the Moscow State
Institute of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation (MGIMO) and as visiting research scholar at the Institute of USA and
Canada Studies in the Russian Academy of Sciences. She earned a PhD in Political
Science from the University of California, Los Angeles, and was a resident fellowship
scholar and consultant at the RAND Corporation, completing programs in Russian area
and policy studies. Dr Cross has published extensively on Russian foreign and security
policy in Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Asian
Security, Journal of Strategic Security, Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies,
About the Authors
Nationalities Papers, USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology (Russian Academy of Sciences), and
in several other journals and edited volumes. Her books include Shaping South East
Europe’s Security Community: Trust, Partnership, and Integration (Palgrave Macmillan, New
Security Challenges Series, 2013), The United States, Russia, and China: Confronting
Global Terrorism and Security Challenges in the 21st Century (Praeger Security International
Series, 2008), Global Security Beyond the Millennium: American and Russian Perspectives
(Macmillan, 1999), and The New Chapter in United States-Russian Relations: Opportunities
and Challenges (Praeger, 1994).
xx
Historical Foundations, Strategic Visions,

and World Order
The year 2016 marked the twentieth anniversary of the strategic partnership
between China and Russia, and the fifteenth anniversary of the Treaty of
Good-Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation. Over the past two dec-
ades, political relations between China and Russia have become increasingly
dynamic and close, with common views on most major world issues, frequent
summits, significant Russian arms sales to China, and joint military exercises.
China’s leader Xi Jinping made his first foreign visit to Moscow in 2013, and
he and President Putin have established a close personal bond.1 However, the
events of 2014 catalyzed even deeper relations between these two Eurasian
giants. Western attempts to influence the Maidan Revolution in Ukraine, the
Russian annexation of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine, followed
by Western sanctions against Russia and the deployment of NATO military
forces further east, broke what was left of the trust between Russia and the
West. As a result, Russia pivoted more sharply to the east, and especially
toward China. Although China did not endorse Russia’s actions in Ukraine,
it believed that Russia had been pushed into a corner as a result of Western
instigation of the uprising that led to the ouster of the government in Kiev in
2014. At the same time, relations between the United States and China were
deteriorating, due largely to intensified Chinese efforts to advance its mari-
time claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea at the expense of
American allies, raising fears in the United States that China would interfere
with freedom of navigation in vital sea lines of communication.
The closeness of Russia and China to each other and their distance from
other Western powers was illustrated in 2015 by festivities in Moscow in May,
and then in Beijing in September, celebrating the anniversary of the end of
World War II. While Xi went to Moscow and Putin traveled to Beijing,
President Obama and other Western leaders held commemorations elsewhere.
Since the events of early 2014, China and Russia have signed new agreements
on building gas pipelines (although the pipelines have not been built yet) and
China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics
increased their joint military exercises, with naval drills taking place in the South
China Sea in 2016. The two partners have cooperated diplomatically on Syria,
and Russia and China have worked together on non-traditional security issues
such as cyberspace, terrorism, and preventing “colored revolutions”, unified
by a shared vision that stable authoritarian government is legitimate. Since
2014, Russia and China have also intensified efforts to enhance economic
cooperation, and have begun working on integrating China’s One Belt, One
Road (OBOR) with the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). They characterize
their relationship as a comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination.
This is not to suggest that China and Russia have overcome all differences in
their outlooks and policies. While China has asserted its maritime interests, it
is relatively cautious in its foreign policy in order to preserve a stable environ-
ment for economic growth. Russia has been more willing to violate traditional
rules, norms, and expectations and defy US preferences if it believes it is in its
interests to do so. There are significant structural differences in the Russian
and Chinese economies that impede closer bilateral economic cooperation,
and these barriers will continue to present significant challenges even with
strong political will to overcome them. China does not want to become overly
entangled in Russia’s conflict in Ukraine, and Moscow strives to maintain
good relations with Hanoi in spite of Vietnam’s dispute with China in the
South China Sea.
Thus, China and Russia have a useful partnership with strong momentum
that shapes international politics. China and Russia seek to alter aspects of the
liberal world order which they had no hand in creating, although China in
particular has benefited from this order. What remains an open question is
how the power disparity between the two countries will play out over the
coming years. China treats Russia with respect. Nevertheless, the fact remains
that China is outpacing Russia in economic growth and military spending.
Leading Russian experts on China, Alexander Gabuev and Alexei Voskres-
senski, note that Russians have recently suggested the reference to “elder
sister” for Russia in the Sino–Russian relationship, or a woman of senior status,
that more powerful China should respect or even protect.2 While Russian
elites are determined to establish Russia as an independent pillar in the
world and insist that Russia will not serve as a junior partner to any country,
the long-term power differential is a fact that Russia must deal with.
The academic and policy debates on Sino–Russian ties cover two major issues.
The first is the question of how close and stable the relationship of these two
countries really is. In other words, what is the best way to characterize this
relationship? Answers in the literature have ranged from cynical cooperation
on a limited range of issues to an alliance that threatens the West. The second
(and related) debate is how the Sino–Russian relationship will shape the liberal
international order. How do Beijing and Moscow view the current order, and
2
Historical Foundations, Strategic Visions, World Order
how might their partnership alter aspects of this order? Within these broader
questions lie more specific issue areas where China and Russia both cooperate
and compete. These include economic and energy ties, security and arms sales,
regional conflicts, and approaches toward non-traditional security concerns.
In addressing these topics, this book has four major themes. First, Russia and
China have common interests that cement their partnership. One such inter-
est is maintenance of external and internal security. A secure joint border is
vital for both states, as well as cooperation against terrorism and internal
threats. While China and Russia have different forms of government, they
share a goal of legitimizing and protecting authoritarian institutions. More-
over, both countries are strengthening state institutions at the expense of civil
society and private business. An additional common interest is dissatisfaction
with elements of the existing liberal world order. While the West holds rules
for resolving disputes to be central to the order, China and Russia perceive
injustices that are difficult to remedy under the existing rules.
A second theme is that Russia and China are key players in shaping the
international order. Western triumphalism after the end of the Cold War is
past, and Russia and China will be influential in all major world issues,
affecting the balance of power, norms of both domestic and international
conduct, and global institutions. Russia and China can be a counterbalance to
the United States and the West, but the cooperation of these two giants will
also be critical in successfully managing a host of transnational security
challenges in the global environment.
A third theme is that the West is still an important partner for China and
Russia in the economic and political realms. Russia and China are not directly
opposing the West as in the Cold War, and desire a cooperative relationship
with the West, but one in which the West makes greater accommodation of
their interests.
The final theme is that Russia and China are partners but not allies. While
the pace of cooperation between the two states is quickening, there are limits
to the amount of support each will give the other, as well as elements of
distrust that, although perhaps not often publicly discussed, are rooted in
history and the fear of ongoing changes in relative power.
World Order
Since the end of the Cold War and the unexpected collapse of the bipolar
world order, scholars and policymakers have attempted to understand the
contours of an emerging order. As early as 1989, Francis Fukuyama, an Ameri-
can political scientist now at Stanford University, predicted the end of history,
a world where liberal democracy reigned supreme without serious ideological
3
challengers. In 1991, US President George H. W. Bush proclaimed a “new

world order where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to
achieve the universal aspirations of mankind: peace and security, freedom
and the rule of law.” However, Fukuyama’s onetime mentor Samuel Hunting-
ton foresaw a very different structure, a clash of civilizations where frequent
wars would be fought along civilizational fault lines.3 By the mid-1990s, many
observers noted a unipolar world structure dominated by the United States,
although debate revolved around how long unipolarity would last.4 For
instance, French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine described the United States
as a “hyperpower,” meaning “a country that is dominant or predominant
in all categories,” and thus a state whose unilateral tendencies, in his view,
needed to be balanced.5
This matters because major powers seek to advance their view of world
order. Henry Kissinger states that the American view of order sees democratic
principles as universal, necessary to legitimize governments. Seeing itself as
unique and having a mission, the American view is rooted in Wilsonianism.
Kissinger claims, “Whenever America has been tested by crisis or conflict . . . it
has returned in one way or another to Woodrow Wilson’s vision of a world
order that secures peace through democracy, open diplomacy, and the culti-
vation of shared rules and standards.” Unfortunately, according to Kissinger,
this Wilsonian impulse takes neither history nor geopolitics into account.6
Liberal Wilsonian values continue to affect the American worldview. As
described by the 2015 National Security Strategy, the American vision consists
of “a rules-based international order that works best through empowered
citizens, responsible states, and effective regional and international organiza-
tions.”7 It self-consciously strives to promote American values abroad, defin-
ing democracy, human rights, and the equality of minority groups around the
world as fundamental American interests.8 While critics point to numerous
instances of the US applying rules to others but not itself, the Wilsonian
principles themselves are not universally accepted.
Today the unipolar moment has passed: US failures in Iraq and Afghanistan;
Russian activism in Ukraine, Syria, and elsewhere; the emergence of the BRICS
(a grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa); the power of terrorist
organizations such as al Qaeda, ISIS, and their affiliates; and significant weak-
nesses in Western financial structures illustrated by the 2008 financial crisis,
continuing instability in the Eurozone, and Brexit have all posed challenges
to the liberal world order.9 Kissinger states: “Our age is insistently, at times
almost desperately, in pursuit of a concept of world order,” noting that order
consists of both legitimacy, or rules that are widely considered just, and power
relationships between states.10 He makes it clear that, regrettably, nuclear
proliferation, cyber technology, and the pressures brought on political leaders
by digital media make the framing of a global order more difficult.
4
Views of world order are inevitably tied to one’s theoretical perspective.

Realists see order as the prevailing power distribution among states. Because
the world is anarchic, “order” always has a conflictual element. Liberals
emphasize the importance of international institutions in shaping world
order. They also focus on the domestic characteristics of states, particularly
the extent to which states embrace values such as democracy and human
rights. Constructivists note that conceptions of order evolve in line with state
identities, conceptions of interest, and norms. The English School views
international order as “a pattern or arrangement that sustains the primary
goals of a society of states. It must involve limits on behaviour, the manage-
ment of conflict, and the accommodation of change without undermining
the common goals and values of society.”11
States too have differing views of world order. China and Russia have
demonstrated dissatisfaction with elements of the current liberal order. Both
countries publicly call for a multipolar world where the interests of all major
powers are taken into account. As early as 1997, the two sides submitted a
document to the United Nations entitled a “Russian-Chinese Joint Declar-
ation on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International
Order.”12 Both countries insist that major international issues be worked out
in the United Nations Security Council, where they have a veto. Russia and
China advocate for stronger state sovereignty, where human rights are not
issues of international concern. Russia and China both reject the notion that
democracy is necessary for government legitimacy. Russia insists on a sphere
of influence in the former Soviet states, while China wants the United States to
stop intervening in its maritime territorial disputes.
The way that China and Russia will shape the world order, and the influence
each will have, is still unfolding. China has greater resources than Russia,
although Moscow is more inclined to boldly challenge the status quo. This
book will explore Sino–Russian ties, with an emphasis on how this relation-
ship will affect the features and rules of world order in terms of both power
distribution and what constitutes legitimate rules, norms, or expectations of
behavior. The current chapter will look at the legacy of the history of Chinese–
Russian relations, noting major historical events and their effect on world
order, as well as providing an overview of how China and Russia view the
international rules of the game.13
The Legacy of History in Chinese–Russian Relations
Russia’s first experience with an Asian empire was invasion from Genghis
Khan’s grandson Batu Khan and his general Subutai from 1223–40. The
Mongol forces crushed Russian military opposition and burned fourteen
5
cities, including Moscow and Kiev. As a result, Russia lay under Mongol
subjugation for more than two hundred years. (The Mongols also ruled
China under the Yuan Dynasty.) Mongol rule left a legacy of both despotism
and positive administrative reforms.14 It also contributed to an abiding Rus-
sian sense of insecurity and fear of invasion.
Russian dealings with the Qing Dynasty began in the seventeenth century.
The Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689 established a border between Russia and the
Qing that recognized the Amur basin and the current Russian maritime
province as Chinese territory. It also established licensed border trade
between the two empires. However, even more significantly from a world
order perspective, the Treaty of Nerchinsk was China’s first treaty with a
European state. The agreement resembled treaties between Western states,
and the two sides negotiated as sovereign equals. Thus, in this pact the Qing
and its powerful emperor Kangxi recognized the czar as a sovereign outside
the traditional Chinese tribute system. Harvard historian Odd Arne Westad
notes, “Of all the European states, China’s first regular foreign relations were
with Russia. Indeed, it can be argued that China’s first foreign relations—in
anything approaching the Western sense—with any country were with that
other expanding empire moving into East Asia from the north.”15 In 1715,
the Qing permitted a Russian Orthodox mission in Beijing to serve the
spiritual needs of Russians. This mission essentially served as an embassy,
the only one in Beijing for more than one hundred years.16 The Kiakhta
Treaty of 1727 enabled two hundred Russian merchants to go to Beijing
every third year, in addition to permitting border trade. By the end of the
1700s, 10 percent of Russia’s trade was conducted with China. As Westad
argues, “While the Qing, at home, tried to pass its relations with the Russians
off as tribute, it was clearly very different from the exchanges China had with
any other country.”17
By the middle of the nineteenth century, Russia was becoming a threat to
China. Russia continued to expand eastward along the Amur, and Russian
officials had territorial designs on China. While the Qing Empire fought for
survival during the Taiping Rebellion and was concurrently engaged in the
Second Opium War against the French and British, Russia made territorial
demands. The Treaty of Aigun (1858) gave Russia 185,000 square miles of
territory along the northern bank of the Amur. In return, Russia promised to
mediate the Second Opium War, a promise it did not keep. In the Treaty of
Peking (1860), Russia gained an additional 130,000 square miles from China
along the coastline. These treaties were achieved in part through Russian local
officials exceeding their instructions, although Moscow was also attempting
to make up for losses in Crimea.18
Russia further sought territory along the western border. The Treaty of
Tarbagatai in 1864 gave Russia 350,000 square miles from Xinjiang, and
6
during the 1860s Russia encouraged Muslim separatists in Xinjiang in order to

enhance its influence there. Russian troops occupied the Ili Valley in 1871, but
the Qing regained control of Xinjiang by 1878 and thwarted further Russian
efforts to acquire territory there. The empire made Xinjiang a province and
tried to better incorporate it into the rest of China. In all this the Qing came to
see Russia as more dangerous than other European states due to its efforts to
permanently take Chinese territory.19 Later on, Mao would demand that
Russia return to China the territories gained through the “unequal treaties”
of the nineteenth century.20
In the late nineteenth century, the Qing began allowing Han Chinese to
settle in Manchuria, the traditional Manchu homeland, in order to solidify
Qing control over the region. Some of the new settlers moved to the north side
of the Amur River, causing fear in Russia that it would lose control of this
territory. As a result, Russians began expelling Chinese from the north bank in
1886. Moreover, Japan had designs on the area as well. Alarmed over Siberian
security and possessing expansionist ambitions of its own, Russia began build-
ing the Trans-Siberian Railroad in 1891, with plans to traverse Manchuria. The
Qing gave Russia a concession for the Manchurian section of the railroad as
part of a secret Russian–Chinese alliance against Japan in 1896. Russia again
intervened in Manchuria in 1898 by leasing the Liaodong Peninsula, includ-
ing Lüshun and Dalian. This provided Russia with warm-water harbor facilities
to defend its railroad.21
Russia further threatened Manchuria during the Boxer Rebellion when it
occupied the three northeastern provinces with approximately 100,000
troops. Moscow resisted withdrawing its forces after the uprising ended, lead-
ing to a strong reaction from China, Japan, and the other foreign powers
involved in China. Russia hoped to make Manchuria its exclusive sphere of
influence. However, Moscow’s dreams were shattered by the Russo–Japanese
War of 1904–5. Russia’s defeat forced it to recognize a Japanese sphere of
influence in Korea and turn over Lüshun, Dalian, and the Southern Manchu-
rian Railroad to Japan, as well as the southern half of Sakhalin Island.22
Less than five years later, however, Russia made gains in Mongolia. In 1911,
when the Qing was falling to Republican forces, Mongolian separatist leaders
declared independence from China. Russian support for Mongolia led to
political leverage and commercial privileges there. The 1915 Tripartite Treaty
between the Republic of China, Russia, and Mongolia affirmed the new status
quo. While legally China maintained suzerainty over Mongolia, it was forced
to grant the Mongolians autonomy, a major diplomatic victory for Russia.
After the Bolsheviks moved into Mongolia in 1921, Mongolia again declared
independence with the clear understanding that this was to be guarded by the
Soviet Union. Thus, in important ways Soviet policy was consistent with
czarist policy.23
7
The period from 1937–45 was especially complex, with constantly shifting
ties between the Republic of China, the Soviet Union, Japan, and the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP). At stake were world order-altering questions of who
would rule China and maintain dominant influence in Asia. China and the
Soviet Union agreed to the Sino-Soviet Nonaggression Treaty in August 1937,
creating an alliance against Japan. This pact was abrogated when the Soviet
Union aligned with Germany in 1939, leading to an improvement in ties
between Moscow and Tokyo. In 1941, while China was fighting for its life,
Japan and the Soviet Union signed a neutrality agreement, a major setback for
then head of state Chiang Kai-shek. Both sides adhered to neutrality almost
until the end of the war. However, after tortuous negotiations over Xinjiang,
Manchuria, and the CCP, the Soviet Union and Republic of China signed a
Treaty of Friendship and Alliance on August 14, 1945. At the same time, the
Moscow-directed Comintern worked to control the CCP and manipulate the
conflict between the CCP and Kuomintang (KMT) to foster Soviet interests.
During this period, Moscow’s goals included using China to enhance Soviet
security vis-à-vis Japan, Germany, and the West; controlling Xinjiang, Mon-
golia, and Manchuria; and managing the CCP. Chiang Kai-shek sought to
defeat Japan, maintain Chinese territorial integrity in light of Soviet designs,
demonstrate his nationalist credentials to his own population, defeat the CCP,
and use the Soviets to strengthen his government. Mao similarly strove to
demonstrate CCP nationalism, use the Soviets to strengthen the CCP while
simultaneously ridding the party of Soviet influence through various internal
struggles, and drive the KMT out of power.24 While in theory ideology created
a bond between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the
CCP, in practice the three-way struggle was based largely on realist consider-
ations of power and interest.
After the victory of the CCP in the Chinese revolution, China was eager to
learn from the Soviet Union. In 1949, Mao said that the Soviet Communist
Party “is our best teacher and we must learn from it.” Mao announced that
China would “lean to one side,” and on February 14, 1950, after hard bar-
gaining, Mao and Stalin signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and
Alliance and Mutual Assistance. Subsequently, the Soviets sent 10,000 advi-
sors to China. However, before too long the relationship began to sour. By
1956, Mao, referring to the Soviets and Eastern Europeans, said, “We mustn’t
copy everything indiscriminately and transplant mechanically. Naturally, we
mustn’t pick up their shortcomings and weak points . . . Some of our people
were not clear about this and even picked up their weaknesses.”25 Subse-
quently, the relationship deteriorated further, to the point that war seemed
likely by 1969.
Early after the CCP victory, China attempted to adapt major elements of the
Soviet economic model, believing it was suitable for China. Soviet experts
8
taught Chinese cadres how to produce five-year economic plans, and China’s
first plan relied heavily on Soviet loans and other assistance. In May 1953, the
two countries signed the Agreement on Assistance by the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and Allied Governments to the Central Government of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) for the Purpose of Developing China’s
National Economy, which provided assistance for 141 major projects. But by
1953 the Soviet Union, which was at a different stage of economic develop-
ment from China, began adjusting its own economic model. This was seen as
revisionist in Beijing, and was one factor leading to later clashes between
China and the Soviet Union.26
China also learned from the Soviet military in ways that still resonate today.
University of Macau political scientist You Ji notes that the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) made huge advances within five years of its victory in 1949 as it
acquired Soviet weaponry, including 800,000 guns, 11,000 artillery pieces,
and 5,000 aircraft. The PLA also learned from the Soviets how to transform a
guerrilla army into a conventional force by studying centralized regulations,
rank structure, training regimens, and command arrangements. In addition,
the Soviets helped China develop its defense industries. Nevertheless, PLA and
Soviet ways often clashed. The Soviet military was a conventional force that had
helped defeat Adolf Hitler. The PLA was primarily a guerrilla force with very
different traditions and viewpoints on how to fight. In particular, PLA political
commissars disliked the Soviet model because it emphasized professionalism
over ideology. PLA officers had major internal debates on whether they had
gone too far in adopting the Soviet model, and careers were ended for those on
the losing side.27 These arguments, of course, reflected broader debates in
Chinese politics on red versus expert and self-reliance versus integration.
By the late 1950s, less than ten years after the victory of Mao’s CCP, the
Sino–Soviet relationship was in trouble. The seeds of dissension had been
sown early. During the CCP’s wars against the KMT and Japan, Stalin and
Mao often had conflicting viewpoints and Mao regularly ignored Stalin’s
instructions.28 When Mao was in Moscow to negotiate the Sino-Soviet Treaty
of Friendship and Alliance and Mutual Assistance from December 1949 to
February 1950, Stalin treated him poorly. Stalin was suspicious of Mao, and
left Mao sitting in a dacha for weeks with nothing to do in order to humiliate
him. While the treaty they eventually negotiated provided economic benefits
for China, secret protocols gave the Soviet Union special rights in Xinjiang
and Northeast China that were a reminder of China’s past unequal treaties.29
Moreover, the Korean War deepened mutual suspicion between China and
the Soviet Union as each country tried to manipulate the other and China
paid a high price in lives and treasure defending North Korea.
Relations between Moscow and Beijing deteriorated further after Stalin died
in 1953 and Khrushchev became the Soviet leader. From an ideological
9
perspective, Mao believed that Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization campaign,

which began in 1956, was an assault on him. Further, Mao thought that he
should now become the leader of the world revolutionary movement rather
than Khrushchev, a position completely unacceptable to the Soviets. More-
over, Mao and Khrushchev personally clashed, and strategic differences
between Moscow and Beijing were very real. In 1957, when the Soviet
Union advocated peaceful coexistence with the West, Mao called for a struggle
against imperialism and asserted that the “east wind” was now prevailing over
the “west wind.” In the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958, Mao challenged
the Soviet Union and dragged it reluctantly into a confrontation it had sought
to avoid, further alienating Moscow.30 This was exemplified by the Soviet
withdrawal of aid to help China develop a nuclear weapon. The downward
spiral in relations continued when China launched the Great Leap Forward in
1958. Despite the recommendations of Soviet experts, the CCP undertook
mass collectivization and industrialization through means that Moscow con-
sidered absurd. As a result, in 1960 the Soviet Union withdrew its specialists
and their blueprints from China, embittering the Chinese for years to come.
The Soviet declaration of neutrality in the Sino–Indian War of 1962, and
subsequent economic and military aid to India, revealed the depths of the split.
In 1963, China demanded that the Soviets recognize the nineteenth-
century border treaties as unjust, and throughout the 1960s both sides built
up military forces along their common border. Mao proclaimed in 1964 that a
counterrevolution had occurred in the Soviet Union and capitalism had been
restored there, a damning ideological claim. In international relations, the two
states continued to compete for leadership of the third world and the com-
munist movement. Support for Vietnam, in particular, caused tension. Cir-
cumstances deteriorated with the onset of the Cultural Revolution when in
1967 Red Guards besieged the Soviet embassy in Beijing. By 1969, there were
armed clashes along the border and the two sides were preparing for war.31
Although war fears later eased, the relationship between China and the
Soviet Union remained tense in the 1970s. The Chinese invasion of Vietnam
in 1979 was a direct challenge to Vietnam’s Soviet patron, but Moscow did not
respond by supporting Vietnam in any meaningful way. China believed that
Vietnam sought hegemony in Southeast Asia and was unwilling to see this
realized. Ties slowly improved in the 1980s, especially as both states moved
away from strict ideological positions. Relations were finally normalized with
Mikhail Gorbachev’s trip to Beijing in 1989 after enough progress had been
made on the three issues that were particularly important to China: the Soviet
presence in Afghanistan, Soviet forces along the Chinese border, and the
Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea.32
Ironically, as China sought to learn from the Soviet Union in the 1950s, it
also later sought to assess lessons from the Gorbachev era. Before the collapse
10
of the Soviet Union, Chinese scholars looked at Soviet reforms to determine

how these policies might be applicable to China.33 More important, however,
were the debates that occurred within the CCP after the collapse of the Soviet
Union. Chinese leaders were shocked by this event. They desperately wanted
to know the primary factors that led to the collapse, and how to avoid such a
disaster in China. David Shambaugh, a leading scholar of Chinese politics at
George Washington University, notes that thirteen years after the fall of the
Soviet Union, the Decision of the CCP Central Committee on Enhancing
the Party’s Ruling Capacity was adopted at the Fourth Plenary Session of the
Sixteenth Congress of the CCP, summarizing lessons from the fall of com-
munism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. An eight-volume DVD set
entitled “Consider Danger in Times of Peace: Historical Lessons from the Fall
of the CPSU” was made in 2006, and all party organs were required to view it.
In general, Chinese analysts saw systematic problems in the CPSU in four
categories: economic, political and coercive, social and cultural, and inter-
national.34 A. Greer Meisels of the Wilson Center identifies three dominant
schools of thought in China regarding lessons from the collapse of the Soviet
Union: Some conservatives and leftists hold Gorbachev responsible; liberals
and reformers point to the system for an incorrect execution of the socialist
model; while other conservatives and leftists blame the West, the source of
bourgeois liberalization and peaceful evolution.35 Xi Jinping has argued that
the CPSU collapsed because “nobody was man enough to stand up and resist”
the attacks against it, and as a result he has led China in a much more
centralized and ideological direction.36
Boris Yeltsin visited China shortly after becoming the Russian president in
1992, and the leadership of Russia and China classified their relationship as a
“strategic partnership” in 1996 after progress on demarcating the border.
However, early in the Yeltsin period, the leadership of the Russian Federation
looked primarily to the United States and Europe, and Russia’s first foreign
minister, Andrei Kozyrev, spoke of developing a “strategic partnership and
alliance based on common values” with the United States.37 Russia’s first
Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, issued in 1993, referred
to Western countries as the “dynamic factor in the progress of world civiliza-
tion in the foreseeable future.”38 However, the expectations of the early 1990s
were not met, due in part to NATO expansion and the NATO air war over
Kosovo, resulting in a more sobering assessment of Russia’s relationship with
the West. Already by 1994, Boris Yeltsin warned of a “Cold Peace” falling over
Europe, asserting that “plans for expanding NATO” would “create new divi-
sions” and “sow seeds of distrust.”39
These tensions with the West led Russia to look increasingly to the East in
order to create a more balanced foreign policy. Yevgeny Primakov, Russian
Minister of Foreign Affairs (1996–8) and Prime Minister (1998–9), advocated
11
shifting foreign policy to prioritize Russia’s interests in Asia and the Middle
East. In doing so he argued for the formation of a Russia–India–China strategic
bloc as a counterweight to the United States. Alexander Yakovlev, senior
research scholar at the Institute of the Far East in the Russian Academy of
Sciences, wrote in 1997 that Russia, China, and perhaps India “can act as
inspirers and organizers of a new anti-hegemonic, anti-Western international
front.”40 In 2002, the Russian, Indian, and Chinese prime ministers met
informally in New York, and since 2007 have met at least annually, releasing
a joint communiqué in a sign of “RIC” cooperation. However, differing
national priorities and the Sino–Indian border dispute have prevented further
institutionalization of this trilateral relationship.41
Since Vladimir Putin’s first election as president in 2000, there have been
tensions and geostrategic conflicts in Russia’s relationship with the West.
A high point was achieved after unexpectedly strong Russian support for the
US-led War on Terror after the attacks of September 11. Low points include the
US invasion of Iraq, colored revolutions in the Commonwealth of Independ-
ent States (CIS), and Russia’s war with Georgia. The Russian annexation of
Crimea and intervention in Ukraine in 2014, followed by Western sanctions,
pushed Russia further toward China, although the Russian “pivot” to the East
had preceded the deterioration of Russia’s relationship with the West in 2014.
China, Russia, and the Liberal International World Order
China struggled to adapt to the Westphalian world order in the nineteenth

century as the Qing Empire declined. Beginning with the First Opium War
(1839–42), the major world powers forced China to adjust to the rules of
international (Western) diplomacy in which all states were theoretically
equal, diplomats resided in foreign capitals, and imperialism was a mark of
great powers. Thus, the Qing not only grappled with states that wanted
territorial concessions in China, but also with the necessity to reconceptualize
a hierarchical worldview that pictured China as culturally and politically
superior to other civilizations.
After the CCP victory in 1949, Mao strived to fundamentally change the
domestic and world order. Inspired by an ideology that predicted a proletarian
revolution would sweep aside existing political and economic structures
around the globe, China saw itself as a champion of the Third World. While
Chinese foreign policy under Mao could be pragmatic, it was also sometimes
ideologically driven, particularly during the Cultural Revolution when Red
Guards tried to take over the Foreign Ministry. After Mao died and China
began its reform period in the late 1970s, China achieved rapid economic
growth, along with commensurate political influence. Never had so many
12
people experienced such rapid change over so short a time. This growth was
enabled by the contemporary international order, an order in which China
had little to no say in creating. How much does China now want to change the
existing order?42
One area of debate is how to define China’s traditional view of world order,
and what perceptions of the traditional order mean for China’s preferences
today. The “Chinese World Order” is a phrase first used by John King Fair-
bank, the renowned Harvard historian.43 More recently, writers have referred
to the Chinese system as tianxia, meaning “all under heaven.” The traditional
Chinese world order refers to a hierarchical Asian system with the Chinese
emperor at the pinnacle due to China’s cultural superiority. Other states paid
tribute to China in recognition of their subservience, and in return were given
valuable gifts by the emperor. Enthusiasts of the Chinese world order claim
that it was benevolent and a better model than the Westphalian system, with
all states benefiting. For example, David Kang of the University of Southern
California states “East Asian regional relations have historically been hier-
archic, more peaceful, and more stable than those in the West.”44 Others
disagree, noting that there was frequent warfare in imperial China, the empire
was maintained by force, or the tributary system did not define all of China’s
foreign relations. For example, Georgia Tech professor Fei-Ling Wang argues
that there was a great deal of diversity in world order across the different
Chinese dynasties, and Chinese today debate their preferred world order.
June Teufel Dreyer of the University of Miami claims, “Supporters of the
revival of tianxia as a model for today’s world are essentially misrepresenting
the past to talk about the present, distorting it in order to advance an equally
distorted political agenda.”45
One supporter of using tianxia as a framework in the contemporary order is
Zhao Tingyang of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Zhao argues that
we live in a global society that requires global governance, not just nation-
state governance. Tianxia is a world theory that entails a benevolent empire
ruling the globe. While tianxia is a Chinese concept of order, Zhao holds that
any nation could rule under this model.46 Although Chinese leaders have not
embraced tianxia publicly because its hierarchical nature would suggest that
China is striving to replace the United States as the world’s leading power,
they have emphasized Confucian themes such as harmony while striving not
to appear to abandon Marxism in the process.
While imperial China defined the Asian order and Mao publicly advocated a
radical transformation of the world order, Deng Xiaoping adopted a more
modest position. Deng’s primary goal was to build China’s economy while
maintaining the power of the CCP. Such a strategy required a peaceful inter-
national environment and a concentration of China’s resources on economic
development. As a result, Deng laid down the principle of “hide your strength,
13
bide your time, never take the lead,” understanding that eventually China
would become more powerful and able to exercise greater influence. However,
Deng’s dictum left open the question of when China would be strong enough
to change its approach. While the strategy was designed to minimize anxiety
over the implications of China’s rise for the international community, con-
cerns were inevitable.47
There have been a variety of official pronouncements designed to reassure
the world about China’s rise and offer clues to China’s vision of world order.
For example, the Information Office of the State Council published a White
Paper entitled China’s Peaceful Development in 2011.48 This document asserts
that China “takes a path of peaceful development and is committed to
upholding world peace and promoting common development and prosperity
for all countries.” China’s development is scientific, independent, open,
peaceful, cooperative, and serves the interests of not only China, but also
the world. In seeking peaceful development, Chinese foreign policy endeavors
to “promote democracy in international relations.” China endorses the Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and rejects alliances in order to promote
“new thinking on security featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality
and coordination.” The White Paper asserts that this model of peaceful devel-
opment is consistent with China’s history and culture,49 although it seems to
fit better with a Westphalian rather than a hierarchical order.
Similarly, China’s 2013 Defense White Paper, The Diversified Employment of
China’s Armed Forces, tries to make the point that China’s military will only be
used in a defensive capacity. In uncompromising language, the document
asserts:
It is China’s unshakable national commitment and strategic choice to take the

road of peaceful development. China unswervingly pursues an independent for-
eign policy of peace and a national defense policy that is defensive in nature.
China opposes any form of hegemonism or power politics, and does not interfere
in the internal affairs of other countries. China will never seek hegemony or
behave in a hegemonic manner, nor will it engage in military expansion. China
advocates a new security concept featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality
and coordination, and pursues comprehensive security, common security and
cooperative security.
According to this viewpoint, China’s rise contributes to a peaceful inter-

national order.50
Official documents as well as scholars emphasize further aspects of Chinese
diplomacy that have world order implications. Xi Jinping has proposed that
relations with the United States and other major powers, including Russia, be
based on “A New Type of Great Power Relations,” an item on the agenda at the
summit with President Obama at Sunnylands in 2013. The essence of this model
14
is defined as “1) neither a confrontation nor a conflict; 2) mutual respect; and

3) win-win cooperation.” This proposal can be seen as a response to the US call
for China to become a responsible stakeholder. China does not want to just
join an order in which it had no say in creating, but seeks to shape that order.51
The call for A New Type of Great Power Relations can also be seen as an effort
to urge the United States to respect China’s core interests in order to avoid a
war caused by a power transition. However, from the perspective of the United
States, both China’s core interests and A New Type of Great Power Relations
are too vaguely defined and would undermine American alliances. Russia, on
the other hand, has been more accepting of this concept.52
One Chinese scholar close to the security community noted that while the
current order greatly favors the United States, which had a large hand in
creating it, China has benefited from it too. However, the world order needs
to be changed where it is not just. China will therefore strive to alter certain
aspects of the order, such as IMF voting rights, terms of trade in the economic
order, and rules governing intellectual property rights. While China will not
try to overturn the order or US leadership, it does need to assert itself to better
protect its rightful interests.53
Liselotte Odgaard of the Royal Danish Defence College describes China’s
version of international order as “coexistence.” This vision of order embodies
often-proclaimed concepts such as mutual respect for sovereignty and terri-
torial integrity, non-interference, mutual nonaggression, and peaceful coex-
istence. However, there are inconsistencies between China’s stated doctrines
and its actions, including contradictions between China’s desire for a peaceful
rise and other goals that must be accomplished through hard power. For
example, China seemingly desires regional primacy and raises tensions in
regional disputes while calling for a peaceful environment and swearing off
hegemony. China seeks a stable international and economic environment,
while aiming to undermine the United States in important ways. China wants
soft power at the same time as the CCP cracks down on perceived political
opponents and encourages Chinese nationalism. Odgaard believes this is
because the strategy of coexistence is not principled, but rather a means to
achieve great power status.54
Xi Jinping’s unique stamp on Chinese ideology and foreign policy has been
the concept of the “Chinese Dream,” summarized as “the rejuvenation of the
Chinese nation.” Thus, the dream links the CCP and contemporary commun-
ist rhetoric with the glories and contributions of China’s past. While it offi-
cially encapsulates previous elements of Chinese foreign policy doctrine, such
as a peaceful environment, peaceful development, and win-win cooperation
between states, there is more of a nationalistic edge to the dream. The concept
is also linked to two upcoming centenaries: the 2021 anniversary of the
establishment of the CCP, and the 2049 anniversary of the founding of the
15
PRC. Xi has set a goal of creating a “moderately well-off society” before 2021,
and a “modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, cul-
turally advanced, and harmonious” by 2049. Xi asserts that the Chinese
Dream links individuals to the state. He emphasizes the central role of the
CCP in achieving the dream, the necessity of hard work across generations,
the importance of innovation to achieving the dream, and even the partici-
pation in the dream of ethnic Chinese living abroad.55 Xi has also suggested
that China’s experience has lessons for the rest of the world. In a speech
celebrating the 95th anniversary of the CCP, Xi declared CCP “members and
the people of China are fully confident about adding the China solution to
mankind’s search for better social systems.”56
There are critics of Xi Jinping’s conception of the China Dream. For
example, William Callahan, professor at the London School of Economics,
documents many different dreams in China. Looking at twenty perspectives
on China’s future from officials, dissidents, and public intellectuals, Callahan
asserts that there are a variety of influential views about China’s future, not
just the official line.57 Notre Dame’s Victoria Hui argues that Xi’s China Dream
assumes a 5,000 year history of a powerful and peaceful China that is in fact a
myth. China was often divided, emperors sought military expansion, and
people were exploited. Instead of looking to the past, China needs to look to
the future.58
Xi has also expressed dissatisfaction with the current security architecture in
Asia. The existing structure is dominated by the US hub-and-spokes system,
with the US maintaining key bilateral alliances in the region. This is supple-
mented by ASEAN-led multilateral organizations that serve mainly as a venue
for meetings. Speaking at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-
building Measures in Asia in May 2014, Xi proposed that its members, not
the United States, play a bigger role in maintaining Asian security. According
to Xi, Asian countries should provide for Asian security. A month later Xi
reiterated his point, indirectly criticizing the United States for seeking to
dominate Asia.59 This new proposed security structure, while unlikely to
materialize anytime soon, points to Chinese dissatisfaction with the current
regional order.
China has undertaken several initiatives with implications for world order
and international institutions that indicate China is no longer hiding its
strength or biding its time. The first is leadership in founding the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO). In 1996, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Tajikistan established an organization known as the Shanghai Five.
Uzbekistan joined in 2001, and the group became the SCO. The SCO has
contributed to regional security (including military exercises), economic
cooperation, and cultural exchanges. While Russia has wanted the SCO to
play a larger political role, China has pushed it to focus on economics. The
16
SCO is not a formal military alliance with a binding defense commitment

(Article V) based on shared values like NATO, but the organization has pro-
vided a forum for Russia, China, and Central Asian states to discuss and
coordinate approaches on security and economic issues of shared concern.
The SCO decided to admit India and Pakistan as members in 2016, but Russian
efforts to bring Iran into the organization have so far been blocked.60
Second, China has played a key role in the BRICS. The BRICS is an avenue
for China to practice international leadership in a low-threat environment.
China uses its BRICS membership to enhance both its identity as a represen-
tative of developing countries in bringing about a more just world and its
position as a rising power. At a summit in July 2014, the BRICS leaders
announced they were establishing the New Development Bank (NDB) with a
$50 billion initial capitalization, as well as a $100 billion currency reserve fund
that members could draw on if they suffered from balance of payments
difficulties. The bank was launched one year later, headquartered in Shanghai.
Bank president Kundapur Vaman Kamath stated: “Our objective is not to
challenge the existing system as it is but to improve and complement the
system in our own way.”61 Nevertheless, the BRICS countries were clearly
unhappy with what they see as their subservient role in the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund, and view current international institutions as
inadequate to deal with global challenges. While weaknesses in the West
revealed by the 2008 financial crisis gave impetus to the BRICS, and Chinese
writers argue against the proposition that the BRICS will fade in importance,
by 2015 the BRICS economies themselves had slowed considerably and the
future influence of the BRICS as an organization was less certain.62
The creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is another
Beijing initiative with world order implications. First proposed by Beijing in
2013, the multilateral bank is designed to fund infrastructure projects in Asia.
The United States initially opposed the new institution, arguing that it would
lower lending standards and undermine the World Bank and Asian Develop-
ment Bank. In addition, the United States feared that the new bank would give
China added political leverage in the region. However, Beijing responded that
there is a need for greater financing of projects in Asia. Moreover, China makes
a strong case that it is not given power commensurate with its economic
influence in the World Bank, IMF, or Asian Development Bank (although
China’s voting share in the IMF finally increased from 3.8 percent to 6 percent
in 2016, a long overdue change). The Asian Development Bank, for example,
has always been led by a Japanese national. In the end, the United States could
not prevent many of its allies from becoming members of the new bank. The
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Australia, and South Korea all
signed on to become founding members, although Japan declined.63 In June
2016, the bank announced its first four loans, which financed road
17
improvements in Tajikistan and Pakistan, electric power in Bangladesh, and

improved living conditions in Indonesia. Three of the projects are being
co-financed with the ADB, World Bank, and the European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development.64
Surprisingly, Russia was one of the last states to sign on as a founding
member of the AIIB. Some Russian bureaucrats feared that Russia lacked the
resources to fund the bank. Perhaps Russian officials also worried that the AIIB
will compete with the Russian-led Eurasian Union. Reportedly Putin himself
was required to make the decision to join the AIIB, overcoming resistance in
the bureaucracy.65
Another major Chinese initiative with potential to shape world order is an
ambitious plan to alter the vast swathe of Eurasia’s landscape called One Belt,
One Road. While China has already invested heavily around the world, stra-
tegically expanding its global presence, the goal of OBOR is to economically
integrate Eurasia, a region with more than 60 percent of the world population,
under Chinese leadership. Xi Jinping first proposed the plan in 2013, and in
March 2015 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Development and
Reform Commission, and Ministry of Commerce publicly released an action
plan. OBOR has two components: the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt and
the Twenty-first Century Maritime Silk Road. The general outline of the plan
involves Chinese-funded infrastructure development throughout Eurasia,
lower tariffs in the region, streamlined customs procedures, greater financial
integration based on the renminbi (RMB) currency, and stronger diplomatic
coordination. More than 900 projects worth $890 billion are planned, and
Beijing has promised large sums of money to the initiative. This includes $50
billion to the AIIB, $10 billion to the NDB, $40 billion to a New Silk Road
Fund, and additional credits promised from the Bank of China. Most invest-
ments in OBOR are expected to come from Chinese development banks,
including the Export-Import Bank of China and the China Development
Bank. Foreign investors such as Singapore’s state-owned trade development
board are also partnering in projects. Implementation of the plan could stretch
out to 35 years.66
Chinese officials claim the initiative demonstrates that China is a benevo-
lent power that does not threaten its neighbors. OBOR is portrayed as a win-
win economic development for all who participate, but it is also a strategy
designed to enhance China’s economic power and global role. It can be seen as
a tangible manifestation of China moving from being what President Obama
once called a “free rider” to a leader that provides public goods.67 Thus, there is
an economic and a strategic rationale for OBOR. Investment in Eurasian
infrastructure projects enhances China’s energy security, improves prospects
for the long-term growth of China’s economy, fosters regional development
in areas of China that have struggled economically, and potentially can create
18
closer links between China and Europe. Economic growth in Central Asia is
expected to promote political stability in the region and increase China’s
influence. China has also demonstrated that as the United States pivots east,
it has options to the west.68
Although OBOR has the highest-level political support and Xi Jinping’s
political credibility is tied to the project, Chinese scholars have pointed out
potential pitfalls. One concern is that China may rush into projects without
proper consultations with host governments, damaging China’s relations
with regional actors. Moreover, analysts are worried about political risk in
the region, including violence or terrorism that could threaten projects, too
much state involvement at the expense of private firms, misallocation of
resources, too many Chinese provinces attempting to tap into the money
China has allocated, and what OBOR might mean for China’s much vaunted
non-interference policy. Further, scholars warn that some regional players,
such as India and Vietnam, have reservations.69 Indeed, India has strongly
objected to the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, a key component of
OBOR, because it crosses through a section of Indian-claimed Kashmir. The
$46 billion Corridor, which consists of energy pipelines, roads, and railways
connecting China with the port of Gwadar, also illustrates security risks in
OBOR projects. From 2014 to September 2016, militants killed 44 and
wounded more than 100 who were working on the project.70 Nevertheless,
earlier unease about Russian reactions may have been misplaced. While Russia
still has concerns about managing potential competition from China, it has
also become more willing to find ways to cooperate (or even make comprom-
ises) with China so that it too can benefit from OBOR.
OBOR also illustrates contradictions between the Chinese government’s
political goals and Chinese investors seeking profits. It is a grand vision that
can potentially reshape Eurasia. However, investing in OBOR countries, many
of which have poor credit ratings and political instability, is commercially
risky. Thus, in 2016 only 8.5 percent of Chinese outward direct investment
went to OBOR countries. At the end of the year China’s policy banks, the
China Development Bank and Export-Import Bank, reported that 15 percent
of their total overseas lending was OBOR-related. Hence, to date China has
actually spent approximately $50 billion on OBOR projects, a sizable sum but
less than the hype might suggest.71
Another area where China’s views on world order differ from the West is in
the cyber arena. Certainly China and the United States want to strengthen
cyber security to prevent crime. Both states also hope to secure their govern-
ments and corporations from cyber attack. Nonetheless, China takes a broader
view of Internet threats. Chinese writers talk about “cyber sovereignty” or
cyber “virtual territory” and the risks that the Internet poses to China’s social
and political system. In 2015, China’s legislature passed a security law
19
declaring that China’s sovereignty includes cyberspace. Moreover, the Chin-

ese government is concerned that the Internet is dominated by Western-
designed protocols and hardware. In order to mitigate what it sees as cyber
threats, the Chinese government takes a much more active role in regulating
the Internet and censoring content than Western states, leading to a system
where what is available on the Internet varies across countries. China seeks
norms and rules established by the United Nations that would legitimize
restrictions on the Internet. The Wall Street Journal comments that “China’s
determination to promote an alternative to the borderless Internet embraced
by Americans marks yet another way the country is challenging a US-led world
order under President Xi.”72
China has further sought to reshape the Asian order by employing more
aggressive means of asserting its territorial claims over disputed islands in the
South China Sea and East China Sea. In the East China Sea, Japan and China
claim the Diaoyu or Senkaku Islands. While Japan administratively controls
the islands, Beijing is seeking to force Tokyo to recognize that sovereignty is
disputed. In the South China Sea, China has overlapping claims with Viet-
nam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Brunei. China’s assertive strategy
is demonstrated by the 2013 establishment of an Air Defense Identification
Zone in the East China Sea that overlaps territory claimed by Japan and South
Korea, by increased military patrols, and the creation of islands in the South
China Sea. China also refused to participate in a case brought against it by the
Philippines at a United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
tribunal in The Hague, and has not accepted the tribunal’s verdict that rejects
much of China’s territorial claim.73
While China is trying to alter the world order through institutions such as
the SCO, BRICS, and the AIIB; initiatives such as OBOR; moves to regulate the
cyber order; and more aggressive steps to change the Asian order in the South
China Sea and East China Sea, it is ironically most satisfied with the United
Nations, in spite of the fact that the UN was created without input from the
PRC. There are several reasons why China prefers the institutional design of
the UN. First, the UN is by definition a multilateral organization where states
have legal equality. Moreover, the Security Council acts as a concert system. It
recognizes China as a great power, while the General Assembly enables China
to identify with developing countries. There are also common norms and
preferences shared by China and the UN in regard to peacekeeping. As a result,
of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, China is the
largest contributor to UN peacekeeping operations.74
The initiatives on the part of Beijing suggest two questions. The first is
whether China’s actions so far already challenge the global order. The second
question is what order China ultimately wants for the future, and what this
goal means for world politics. Ellen Frost of the East-West Center suggests that
20
China’s actions already challenge the world order. China’s use of force for
regional claims; institutional frameworks such as the NDB, the AIIB, the SCO,
and the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement; OBOR; Xi’s call for a “New Asian
security architecture”; and the Russian-led Eurasian Union are all challenges.
Frost says, “ ‘Rival regionalisms’—new or re-energized regional groupings ini-
tiated or heavily supported by China and Russia—are on the rise. Their goals
include providing alternatives to US-led institutions, thereby avoiding
Western-backed conditionality and reducing US influence. As a result, a slow
crisis both of regional and global order and of institutional legitimacy is
emerging.”75 However, Michael Swaine of the Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace argues that Chinese want to reform, not overthrow, the exist-
ing liberal international order. The goals of reform are to strengthen justice,
better protect the interests of developing countries, enhance the principle of
sovereignty, and promote open economic systems.76
In terms of China’s ultimate interests, analysts are divided on the direction
China will take in the future. However, few would disagree with Eric Li,
founder and managing director of Chengwei Capital, who states quite simply
“China has its own long-term strategic objective: to reclaim a pre-eminent
position in Asia.”77 As early as 1997, former US National Security Advisor
Zbigniew Brzezinski saw China as striving for regional dominance and then
major global influence. Brzezinski noted that China’s central objective is “to
dilute American regional power to the point that a diminished America will come to
need a regionally dominant China as its ally and eventually even a globally powerful
China as its partner.”78 For Martin Jacques, senior fellow at Cambridge Univer-
sity and author of the provocative and controversial When China Rules the
World, China will rise to immense power and shape world order more than the
United States ever did. Due to its identity as a “civilization-state,” its unique
form of governance, and its rapid economic growth, in the not-too-distant
future China will be the most influential power in history. Jacques predicts
world order will be hierarchical, with Beijing as the world capital. Asia will
return to the tributary system, the international financial system will be
dominated by the RMB, and Chinese culture will be a major source of soft
power.79 However, Johns Hopkins professor of Political Economy Ho-fung
Hung and long-time China analyst Jonathan Fenby both see various weak-
nesses within China that will prevent Chinese dominance, including an
unsustainable growth model and a rigid political system.80
Another school of thought sees China’s rise as dangerous and conflictual. For
example, University of Chicago political scientist John Mearsheimer views the
rise of China through the lens of offensive realism. If China’s economic growth
continues, Mearsheimer foresees China attempting to dominate Asia and
projecting its power outside the region as well. The United States, along with
most of China’s neighbors, will resist China’s efforts, resulting in a serious risk
21
of war.81 Similarly, military strategist Edward Luttwak asserts that China’s

efforts to grow economically, militarily, and in global influence are already
generating pushback. Because China is unlikely to change its policies to better
accommodate its neighbors, resistance to China from the United States and
regional powers will increase and China will be left with reduced relative
power.82 Fei-Ling Wang sees an aggressive China that attempts to dominate
Asia and challenge American power wherever possible to alter the world order
in a manner that is supportive of preserving Chinese autocracy, while former
US Department of Defense official Michael Pillsbury asserts that China has a
long-term strategy to overtake the United States and become the world’s
superpower.83
A third school of thought suggests that within China itself there is debate
and uncertainty on how China should shape the future. For example, China’s
peaceful-rise narrative contrasts sharply with the triumphalist narrative of
retired PLA colonel Liu Mingfu’s The China Dream and former naval officer
Song Xiaojun’s China is Unhappy.84 In two different volumes, William Call-
ahan looks at a variety of views within China on world order issues.85 David
Shambaugh and Ren Xiao classify seven schools of thought on China’s iden-
tity, foreign policy, and world order questions, and the University of Southern
California’s Daniel Lynch identifies various views on Chinese politics and
economics as well.86 In a recent Chatham House paper, Tim Summers makes
the case that “China’s global personality is complex and dynamic. It is cur-
rently in a period of flux, driven by debates within China that are magnified
by a global context that is also characterized by a period of shifts in traditional
economic balance and political power.”87 Renmin University’s Shi Yinhong
agrees, noting that China’s “complicated foreign policy” sends contradictory
messages of assertiveness and accommodation.88
Russia’s view of world order has both similarities to and differences from the
Chinese view. The primary factor uniting China and Russia’s visions of world
order is belief that the United States has been the dominant factor in shaping
the order for too long, and their own countries’ legitimate interests have not
been given adequate consideration. While Russia initially had been interested
in deeper integration with Europe and Western institutions during the period
of Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika reforms and for the first decade following
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Vladimir Putin and much of Russia’s foreign
policy community have become convinced that they must establish an alter-
native independent pillar or pole of influence reflecting Russia’s unique his-
tory and traditions with the capacity to challenge the United States and
Western allies. Russia sees the fundamental objectives and values of the
United States and the liberal international order as posing potential serious
threats to Russia’s state security, national interests, and sphere of influence.
China’s tremendous economic growth was made possible in the existing
22
liberal world order, and therefore Beijing has generally been more inclined to
work with the rules of the existing world order, supporting a gradual revision
that would not lead to serious disruption or unpredictable circumstances.
China and Russia also share important similarities in rejecting Western
attempts to impose universal values in shaping the world order. Moscow and
Beijing have found common ground in opposing the series of American-led
interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo, Iraq, and Libya, and in expressing resist-
ance to the export of colored revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and
elsewhere which they see as destabilizing these societies and leaving chaos
and disruption rather than enhanced quality of life for citizens. Although the
influence, accomplishments, freedom, and prosperity associated with the
United States and other Western nations based on democratic political
systems and free market economies holds appeal for much of the world’s
population, both China and Russia have developed unique identities based
on longstanding traditions and cultures which in many ways represent
sharp contrasts with the West. Martin Jacques suggests that the Western
“nation-state” cannot aptly describe China since China perceives itself as a
“civilization-state” with a history measured in terms of thousands of years
(rather than hundreds of years as for the United States and other Western
democracies) featuring Confucian values, primacy of family, and more.89 As
one illustration, Jacques argues that while the tendency in the West is to
constrain the state, legitimized by adhering to democratic practice, China
has an all-pervasive “patriarch state” deriving its legitimacy as the protector
and guardian of Chinese civilization.90 The richly distinct experiences
of both China and Russia suggest that Western assumptions and frames of
references regarding domestic and international order may not be adequate
for understanding and predicting the future direction or preferences of these
two major players.
Following a period of identity crisis spanning much of the first and second
decade after the collapse of the Soviet empire, President Putin and Russian
society have fully embraced a strong sense of nationalism with a priority
assigned to protecting Russia’s civilizational identity. This is accompanied by
a renewed emphasis on the state’s relationship to the Orthodox Church and
conservative values—values that differ sharply from what Russians perceive as
Western decadence and rejection of Christian morals. The Orthodox Church
has been closely affiliated with both Putin and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Putin specifically references the importance of a “state-civilization” experi-
ence in the development of the country based on the “Russian people, Russian
language, Russian culture, Russian Orthodox Church,” and at the same time
he is careful to acknowledge the importance of Russia’s multi-ethnic and
multi-cultural “historical consciousness,” and the importance of all faiths
that have been “an integral part of Russia’s identity”—Christianity, Islam,
23
Buddhism, Judaism, and others.91 The dismantling of the Soviet communist

empire legitimized on the basis of Marxist–Leninist ideology brought a resur-
gence of religious influence in post-communist societies in Russia and Eurasia
and resistance to Western secularism and perceived moral decline. China
remains a communist regime and Xi Jinping is attempting to reinvent com-
mitment to communist ideals, but Beijing’s leadership also supports a return
to and sense of reverence for age-old Chinese Confucian teachings that are
gaining greater appeal among a population no longer so gripped by Marxist–
Leninist ideology. Xi Jinping and the CCP enforce the nation’s identity of
what it means to be Chinese by encouraging selected Confucian teachings
and traditional values while clamping down on Western influence in univer-
sities, media, and popular culture. Although Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam,
also gaining increasing strength in Eurasia during the decades since the col-
lapse of the USSR, are quite different from Confucianism, each provides means
for reinforcing a contemporary national identity and consciousness estab-
lished in the past and quite distinct from Western influence.
Both Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping emphasize these traditional sources of
Russian and Chinese cultural, moral, and spiritual heritage, rejecting any
notion of supremacy coming from the West in terms of defining values for a
moral, just, and desirable domestic and international world order. The lead-
erships of both societies question the suitability of Western models and
prescriptions for development, governance, and moral standards. For
example, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov argues that a “second wave
of globalization” brought the “dispersal of economic might,” “political influ-
ence,” and “the emergence of new and large centers of power, primarily in the
Asia-Pacific Region” where “China’s rapid upsurge is the clearest example”
yielding new development models that depart from the “monotony of exist-
ence with the uniform, Western frame of reference.”92 As a result, Lavrov
contends that “there has been a relative reduction in the influence of the so-
called ‘historical West’ that was used to seeing itself as the master of the
human race’s destinies for almost five centuries.”93 China and Russia are
firmly united in the common call for “non-interference” on the part of the
United States and its allies seeking to promote Western democratic models
and value systems throughout the world.
Concerns are frequently expressed among the foreign policy communities
of both China and Russia that the United States seeks to “contain” the rise of
China and the resurgence of Russia. Russia’s President Putin directly addressed
the perceived continuation of George F. Kennan’s strategy for “containment”
of Soviet power during the era of the Cold War in his December 2014 Presi-
dential Address to the Federal Assembly: “The policy of containment was not
invented yesterday. It has been carried out against our country for many years,
always, for decades, if not centuries. In short, whenever someone thinks that
24
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—— with a Hawk (Northcote’s), ix. 55.
—— —— (Rembrandt’s), ix. 49.
—— in the Iron Mask, The, iii. 290.
—— was made to Mourn (Burns), v. 139.
—— of Mode, The (Etherege’s), viii. 68.
—— in Mourning for Himself, A (a play), viii. 323.
—— of Ten Thousand, The (Holcroft’s), ii. 159, 161, 201.
—— of the World, The (Macklin), viii. 318, 350;
also referred to in ii. 58; viii, 105, 166.
Manager in Distress, The (G. Colman, the elder), viii. 428.
Manchester, ii. 267; iv. 4; vi. 103, 203, 204 n., 346; vii. 28; ix. 290,
302; xii. 93.
—— Duke of, ii. 105.
Mandane (in Arne’s Artaxerxes), vi. 292; viii. 192, 194, 248, 320, 451,
453; xi. 304, 317.
Mandeville. See De Mandeville, Bernard.
—— (Godwin’s), iv. 209; viii. 131, 420; x. 399.
Mandrake (Farquhar’s Twin Rivals), viii. 22.
Manfred (Byron’s), iv. 258; viii. 421.
Manfrini, Signor, ix. 270.
Mangeon, Miss, viii. 372.
Manly (in Wycherley’s The Plain Dealer), viii. 14, 78.
Manner, On, i. 41.
Manners, Essay On, xi. 269.
Manners and Treatment of Animals, An Account of the
(D’Obsonville), ii. 107.
Mannheim (town), ix. 298, 299.
Manning, Thomas (M.), vi. 68.
Manoah (in Jephson’s The Italian Lover), viii. 338.
Mansfield, ii. 18, 19.
—— Lord, iii. 419; v. 77; vi. 414; xii. 31.
Mansion House, The, vii. 68.
Mantes (town), ix. 105.
Mantua (town), vii. 96; ix. 355; x. 73.
Manwaring, Dr, iii. 395, 400.
Mary Morison, Lines to (by Burns), v. 140.
Manzotti (an Italian), xi. 341.
Maquerella (in Marston’s Malcontent), v. 229.
Mar, Earl of, iii. 415.
Marall (in Massinger’s A New Way to Pay Old Debts), v. 269 n.; viii.
274, 304; x. 172.
Maratti, Carlo, vi. 124, 128; ix. 19, 21, 409, 482; xi. 211.
Marcella (Sackville’s Ferrex and Porrex), v. 195, 243.
—— (in Don Quixote), viii. 110; x. 30.
March, Lord, ii. 28, 31, 35, 48.
—— to Finchley (Hogarth’s), i. 31; viii. 138; ix. 81.
Marchant, Nathaniel, vi. 438.
Marchese Pallavicini and Walter Landor (Landor’s), x. 244.
Marconi, Madame, viii. 297.
Marcus Sextus, The Return of (Guérin’s), xi. 240.
Mardyn, Mrs, viii. 249, 252, 270, 278, 285, 316, 336, 361, 463, 465,
475, 524, 525, 531, 537.
Marengo (a town), iii. 112; ix. 290.
Maret, H. B., iii. 154.
Margaret of Anjou, i. 293.
—— (in Lamb’s John Woodvil), v. 346.
—— Street, ii. 163, 203.
Margaret’s Ghost (an old ballad), ii. 42.
Margate Hoy, A, viii. 435.
Marguerite (in Godwin’s St Leon), viii. 131; x. 389.
Maria (in Holcroft’s Alwyn), ii. 95.
—— (in Holcroft’s He’s much to Blame), ii. 162.
—— The tale of (Sterne’s), viii. 121; ix. 178, 179; x. 39.
—— (in Sheridan’s School for Scandal), viii. 251.
—— Heartley (in Leigh’s Where to Find a Friend), viii. 258, 259.
Maria-Louisa, Queen, ix. 199, 200, 203.
Mariage de Figaro (Beaumarchais), ii. 112, 114, 115.
—— Forcé (Molière), v. 228.
Marialva (Le Sage’s Gil Blas), x. 214.
Marian, ii. 224.
Marianne (Claude Prosper Jolyot de Marivaux), x. 16.
Marianne’s Dream (Shelley’s), x. 264.
Marie Antoinette, i. 71 n., 427; xii. 290.
Marina (in Shakespeare’s Pericles of Tyre), i. 357; ix. 27.
Mariner’s Glee, The (Pinkerton’s), ii. 185.
Marino (Italian poet), v. 315.
—— Faliero (Byron’s), xi. p. viii.
Maritorneses (Cervantes’ Don Quixote), ix. 176.
Marivaux, Pierre Carlet de Chamblain de, iv. 217; vii. 311; viii. 112,
369; x. 31.
Mark Antony (in Shakespeare’s Julius Cæsar). See Antony.
Marlborough, Duke of, i. 8, 44; iii. 415; viii. 96; ix. 74.
—— Duchess of, viii. 160; ix. 71.
Marlow (Goldsmith’s), viii. 507.
Marlowe (Christopher), v. 192;
also referred to in i. 356; iv. 309; v. 99, 176, 181, 189, 202, 229,
298; vi. 218 n., 243 n.; vii. 134, 224, 313, 320; x. 205, 274; xii.
34.
Marmion (Scott’s), iv. 242; v. 155.
Marmontel, Jean François, vii. 311; ix. 118.
Marmozet (in Smollett’s Peregrine Pickle), viii. 513.
Marmozette (Thompson’s Dumb Savoyard), xi. 364.
Marplot (in Mrs Centlivre’s Busy-Body), viii. 156, 270, 503.
Marriage of Cana (Paul Veronese’s), vi. 319; ix. 53, 113, 491; xi. 197.
—— of St Catherine (Caracci’s copy of Correggio’s), ix. 35.
—— of Figaro (Chalon’s), xi. 245.
—— à la Mode (Hogarth’s), i. 25 et seq.; vi. 453; viii. 133, 134, 136,
141, 143; ix. 15, 75, 389, 391, 392; xi. 212, 252 n.; xii. 24.
—— of Two Children, The (Northcote’s), vi. 296.
—— of the Virgin (Caminade’s), ix. 125.
Mars, v. 30; vii. 202; viii. 375; x. 6, 7.
—— Mademoiselle, vii. 324;
also referred to in ix. 147, 148, 151; xi. 354, 355, 366, 379; xii. 24,
146.
—— Subdued by Peace (Miss Jackson’s), xi. 245.
—— and Venus (Titian’s), ix. 74.
Marsac, Mr, ii. 89, 261.
Marsan, Madame, ix. 152.
Marsennus (Marin Mersenne), xi. 53.
Marshall, Mr, ii. 172, 181.
Marston, John, v. 176, 181, 193, 224, 234, 280; vi. 164.
—— Chapman, Deckar, and Webster, On, v. 223.
Martello Tower, iv. 257.
Martigny (town), ix. 283, 288, 290.
Martin (in Voltaire’s Candide), v. 114.
—— Jack (fighter), xii. 4.
—— John (a bookseller), vi. 490.
Martin, John (painter), vi. 397; ix. 109, 336, 337; xi. 381, 553.
—— Richard, xi. 344.
Martin’s Muir (in Lancashire), ii. 2, 167.
Martinet, Mr (an emigrant), ii. 217, 219.
Martinus Scriblerus, v. 104; xi. 288.
Martorell, Jean, x. 56.
Martyrs, Book of (Foxe’s), vii. 129, 320; xi. 443; xii. 384.
Martyrdom of Saint Damian and Saint Cosmas, The (Salvator’s), x.
305.
—— of St Lawrence (Titian’s), ix. 273.
—— of St Placide (Correggio’s), ix. 204.
—— of St Sebastian (Guido’s), ix. 26.
Marullus (in Shakespeare’s Julius Cæsar), i. 195.
Marveil, Arnaud de, x. 55.
Marvell, Andrew, iii. 277; iv. 61; v. 83, 258, 311, 313, 372; vii. 232; xi.
123, 282, 514; xii. 47.
Marville, Vignuel de, vi. 170 n.
Mary, Lines to (Cowper’s), v. 95; vi. 210.
—— the Cookmaid (Swift’s), v. 110.
—— the Maid of the Inn (Southey’s), viii. 362.
—— Magdalen Anointing the Feet of our Saviour (Hilton’s), xi. 190.
—— Queen of Scots, viii. 460; ix. 23, 66; xi. 320, 324.
—— Stuart (Schiller’s), viii. 391.
Marys with the Dead Body of Christ, The Three (L. Caracci’s), ix. 112.
Mary-le-bone Street, ii. 163, 242.
Masaccio (painter), iv. 217; vi. 45, 126, 346; ix. 409, 427; xi. 211.
Masetto (in Byron’s Don Juan), viii. 365, 366, 371; xi. 307.
Mask of Arthur and Emmeline, The (Dryden’s), v. 356.
Mask of Cupid, The (Spenser’s), v. 35, 38, 40; x. 74.
—— of Semele (Congreve’s), viii. 76.
Maskwell (Congreve’s Double Dealer), viii. 72.
Mason, William, i. 171; x. 164.
Massacre of Glencoe, Apology for the (Defoe’s), x. 378.
—— of the Innocents (Le Brun’s), ix. 25.
—— of the Mamelukes (Vernet’s), ix. 137.
—— in Piedmont (Milton), vi. 176, 178.
Massachusetts, x. 315.
Massaniello (Tommaso Aniello), x. 301.
Massena, André, ix. 146.
Massinger, Philip, v. 248;
also referred to in iv. 309, 310; v. 193, 265, 269 n., 345; viii. 272,
287, 290.
Massys, Quentin, ix. 40.
Master Baillie (in Still’s Gammer Gurton’s Needle), v. 286.
—— Barnardine (in Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure), i. 241, 346,
347, 425; iv. 248; vi. 249; viii. 283.
—— Bobby (Sterne’s Tristram Shandy), xii. 152.
—— Edward Knowell (in Ben Jonson’s Every Man in His Humour),
viii. 312.
—— Froth (in Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure), i. 391; viii. 283.
—— Kerneguy (in Scott’s Woodstock), vi. 410.
—— Matthew (in Ben Jonson’s Every Man in His Humour), viii. 45,
311.
—— Nicolas the Barber (in Cervantes’ Don Quixote), viii. 108.
—— Oliver the Barber (Scott’s), iv. 248.
—— Silence (Shakespeare’s 2nd Henry IV.), iv. 365.
Master Stephen (in Ben Jonson’s Every Man in His Humour), vi. 194
n.; viii. 45, 311.
—— Well-bred (Ben Jonson’s Every Man in His Humour), viii. 312.
Mater Dolorosa (Carlo Dolce’s), ix. 20, 41.
Matheo (in Dekker’s Honest Whore), v. 238, 239, 241, 247.
Matilda (General Burgoyne’s Richard Cœur de Lion), viii. 195.
Matsys, Quintin. See Massys, Quentin.
Matter and Manner (Hazlitt), i. 421; xi. p. x n.
Matthew (Wordsworth’s), xii. 57.
—— Bramble (Smollett’s Humphry Clinker), viii. 117, 165, 510; x. 35.
Matthews, Charles, vi. 273, 278, 350, 417, 418 n.; vii. 300, 508; viii.
177, 243, 281, 317, 412, 428, 430–5, 459, 484, 523; xi. p. viii, 367,
483, 554; xii. 6, 140 n., 353.
—— (John), viii. 497.
—— Miss, vi. 293; viii. 231, 235, 236, 275, 531; xi. 395.
—— (in Fielding’s Amelia), viii. 114; x. 33.
Matthias (Massinger’s The Picture), v. 266.
Matrimony (a Comedy), viii. 392.
Maturin, Rev. Robert Charles, viii. 308, 368, 416, 421, 478; xi. 418.
Maud the Milkmaid (in Walton’s The Complete Angler), i. 56; v. 98.
Maurice of Nassau, Prince, xi. 289.
Maurice’s Parrot, Prince, iii. 101.
Maurocordato, Prince, x. 232, 251.
Mawworm (in Bickerstaff’s Hypocrite), i. 59; ii. 84; viii. 163, 246,
392; xi. 396; xii. 366.
Maximilian of Bavaria, xi. 289.
Maxims on Love, xii. 354.
Maxwell, Mr, ii. 173.
May-Day (Chapman’s), v. 234.
May-Day Night (Shelley’s, from Goethe), x. 261, 271.
May Fair, xii. 132.
Mayence, ix. 298, 299.
Mayor of Garratt, The (Foote’s), viii. 166, 167, 168, 316; xi. 368.
Maywood (actor), viii. 374; xi. 397, 405, 406.
—— as Iago, viii. 513.
—— —— Shylock, viii. 374.
—— —— Zanga, xi. 397; also referred to in viii. 513.
Mazarin, Cardinal, vi. 238.
Mazeres, Baron, xii. 302, 303.
Mazzuola, Francesco. See Parmegiano.
Meadows, Mr (actor), xi. 373.
—— (in Bickerstaff’s Love in a Village), viii. 329.
—— (in Madame D’Arblay’s The Wanderer), viii. 123; x. 42.
—— (in Godwin’s Cloudesley), x. 392.
Means and Ends, On, xii. 184.
Measure for Measure (Shakespeare’s), i. 345; viii. 281;
also referred to, i. 241, 391; v. 226; vi. 249.
Mecca, x. 120.
Mechel (print-seller), ii. 185.
Medea, The (Euripides), x. 97.
Medecin malgré lui (Molière’s), viii. 28, 159, 558; x. 107.
Medici Family, ix. 212, 221, 225.
—— Cosmo de, vi. 353.
—— Hippolito de (Titian’s portrait of), ix. 345, 385; xi. 222.
—— Lorenzo de, The Chapel of, x. 354.
Meditations (Harvey’s), vii. 163.
Mediterranean, The, viii. 126; ix. 182.
Medoro (Ariosto’s Orlando Furioso), v. 3.
Medusa’s Head (Leonardo da Vinci’s), ix. 225; x. 261; xii. 195.
Medwin, Captain, vii. 313, 343.
Meeting of Abram and Melchisedec (Rubens’), ix. 52.
Meeting of Christ and St John (Raphael’s), ix. 30.
—— of Jacob and Laban (Murillo’s), ix. 54.
—— of Jacob and Rachel (Murillo’s), ix. 23.
—— between Louis XIV. and the Spanish Ambassador (Gérard’s), ix.
123.
Meggett, Mr (actor), viii. 239, 240, 241, 532.
Meg Merrilees (in Scott’s Heart of Midlothian), iv. 248; vii. 341, 343;
viii. 129, 146 n., 292; ix. 206; xi. 531.
Meggy Macgilpin (in O’Keeffe’s Highland Reel), xi. 364.
Méhul, Étienne Nicolas, viii. 325.
Meillerie (Rousseau’s Nouvelle Héloïse), i. 133; ii. 326; ix. 281; xii.
25.
Melancholy, Address to (in Beaumont and Fletcher’s Nice Valour), v.
295.
Melanchthon, Philip, iv. 228; x. 143.
Melaric (in L. Bonaparte’s Charlemagne), xi. 236.
Melchior, Friedrich. See Grimm, Baron.
Meleager and Atalanta (Wilson’s), xi. 200.
—— ix. 433; x. 208.
Melford (Cherry’s The Soldier’s Daughter), xi. 297.
Melissa (Holcroft’s), ii. 264, 265.
Mellida (in Marston’s Antonio and Mellida), v. 225.
Mellon, Miss, vii. 127.
Melmoth (Maturin’s), viii. 478.
—— Wm., i. 93.
Melrose Abbey, ix. 235.
Memnon (mythological), v. 60; ix. 108; x. 221, 337.
Memoirs of Anastasius the Greek (Thomas Hope’s), v. 363.
—— (Baron de Bausset), xii. 135.
Memoirs of De Tott (translated by Holcroft), ii. 107.
—— (Count Grammont’s), iii. 307; xi. 276.
—— (of Margravine of Bareuth), vi. 445.
—— (Cardinal Retz), vi. 238, 349; x. 301.
—— (Sir J. Reynolds), i. 442.
—— of Granville Sharp (by Prince Hoare), vii. 48 n., 49.
Memoires de Voltaire écrits par lui-même, ii. 267.
—— of a Cavalier, The (Defoe’s), x. 382.
—— on Chivalry, The (by M. de St Palaye), x. 20.
—— of an Heiress, or Cecilia. See Cecilia.
—— of Fanny Hill (Cleland’s), iv. 102 n.
—— of Lady Vane, The (in Smollett’s Peregrine Pickle), vii. 221.
Memorabilia of Mr Coleridge, xii. 346.
Memory (in Spenser), v. 38.
Menæchmi (Plautus), i. 351.
Menander, viii. 552; x. 100, 232.
Mendacio (in Brewer’s Lingua), v. 293.
Menenius, Agrippa (in Shakespeare’s Coriolanus), viii. 403.
Mengs, Anton Rafael, vi. 345, 431; ix. 203, 349, 409, 472 n., 482; xi.
230, 255.
Menjaud, Mlle., ix. 150.
Merchant of Bruges, The (Kinnaird’s), viii. 264.
—— of Venice (Shakespeare’s), i. 320;
also referred to in i. 391, 392; ii. 71; v. 210; viii. 249.
Merciers, The, ii. 107, 114, 168, 181, 195, 218, 219, 228, 230, 234, 272;
vii. 241.
Mercury, i. 33, 71; v. 83; vii. 203; x. 93, 350, 387.
—— The Elgin, ix. 340, 341.
Mercury teaching Cupid to Read (Correggio’s), xii. 356.
—— and Herse (Turner’s), xi. 191.
—— inventing the Lyre (Barry’s), ix. 419.
Mercutio (in Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet), i. 257; viii. 32, 200.
Meredith, Sir W., iii. 422; vi. 88.
Mergées (Merger, Mr), ii. 280.
Mérimée, Madame (Madame M.), vi. 319, 503.
Merlin the Enchanter (early romance), x. 20, 21, 56.
Mermaid Inn, v. 297; xii. 207.
Merrimee, J. F. L., vii. 333.
Merry, Miss, viii. 323, 329.
—— England, xii. 15.
—— Robert, iv. 309 and n.
—— Devil of Edmonton, The, v. 289, 293.
—— Sherwood, xii. 15.
—— Wives of Windsor, The (Shakespeare’s), i. 349;
also referred to in viii. 31, 32, 43.
Mertoun, the elder (in Scott’s The Pirate), xi. 535.
Merveilleuses in Bedlam (Hogarth’s), vi. 167.
Meshech, iii. 265.
Message, The (in Liber Amoris), ii. 290.
Messalina, ix. 221.
Messiah (Handel’s), xi. 455.
Messora, M. (a painter), xi. 245.
Metamorphoses (Ovid), iii. 287.
Metastasio, x. 45; xii. 128.
Methodism, vii. 351; x. 158.
—— On the Causes of, i. 57.
Methuselah, xii. 263.
Metzu, Gabriel, ii. 225; ix. 35.
Meux, Mr, iii. 308.
Mexicans, xi. 319.
Mexico, iii. 290 n.; iv. 189.
Mezentius, ix. 132.
Mezzofanti, Prof. Joseph Caspar, ix. 205.
Michael, Poem of (Wordsworth’s), xii. 316.
Michael Angelo, i. 78, 85, 148, 161, 164; ii. 276; iv. 276; v. 18, 45, 247,
297; vi. 10, 74, 85, 127, 128, 132, 137–9, 145, 212, 297, 346, 347,
353, 363, 368, 392, 413; vii. 59, 61, 94, 96, 103, 107, 118, 157, 158,
199, 203; viii. 55, 284, 364, 470; ix. 11, 28, 42, 134, 165, 211, 219,
220, 232, 235, 236, 239, 240–1, 273, 274, 327, 360–4, 366, 369,
380–2, 394, 403, 409, 427, 491; x. 63, 77, 180, 181, 206–8, 279–
82, 336, 354; xi. 202, 212, 214, 215, 217, 227–9 n., 234 n., 424,
449, 482, 590; xii. 36.
—— Cassio (in Shakespeare’s Othello), vi. 195; viii. 189, 214, 339,
340, 473, 560; xi. 294.
Mickle, William Julius, v. 122.
Micklestane Moor, iv. 246; vii. 343.
Microcosmus (Nabbes’s), v. 289, 290, 292, 334.
Midas, v. 197, 199, 201; ix. 105.
Middle Passage, The, vii. 47; ix. 185.
—— Temple, The, x. 363.
Middlesex, iii. 423.
Middleton, Conyers, ii. 169, 173, 176, 190, 194; x. 249.
—— Thomas, v. 176, 181, 193, 214, 223, 224.
Midhurst, iii. 421.
Midsummer Night’s Dream (Shakespeare’s), i. 61, 244; viii. 274;
also referred to in i. 137, 178, 242, 244, 359; v. 190; viii. 305; x.
116; xi. 451; xii. 74 n.
Mieris (a family of painters), ix. 60, 92.
Mignet, François Auguste Marie, ix. 186.
Milan, vii. 169; viii. 291, 429; ix. 187 n., 198, 260, 264, 275, 277, 278,
419; x. 192.
Mile-end, ix. 480.
Milford (in Holcroft’s The Road to Ruin), ii. 124.
—— Haven, i. 182; xi. 292.
Milking (by John Burnett), xi. 247.
Mill, James, vii. 160, 183, 186, 495; xii. 131, 255.
Mill, John Stuart, xii. 255.
Millamant (Congreve’s Way of the World), i. 12; vi. 165; vii. 121; viii.
14, 37, 73, 74, 151, 152, 465, 555; xi. 346.
Millamour (in Murphy’s All in the Wrong), viii. 164.
Millar, Andrew, vii. 220.
Miller, Miss, viii. 128.
—— The (Chaucer), v. 24.
—— and his Men, The (Pocock’s), xi. 394.
Miller’s Wife (in Pocock’s Miller and His Men), viii. 292.
Millennium (in Cowper’s Task), v. 94.
Millisent (in Merry Devil of Edmonton), v. 293.
Millot, Claude François Xavier, x. 46.
Mills, Dr (Milles, Dr Jeremiah), v. 122.
Mills, Mr, Mrs and Miss (actors), ii. 70 n., 77, 78, 195.
Milman, Henry Hart, iv. 421; v. 379; viii. 416, 478.
Milner, Miss (in Mrs Inchbald’s Simple Story), vii. 304; ix. 237; xii.
65.
Miltiades, x. 232.
Milton, John, v. 44;
also referred to in i. 3, 22, 49, 79, 94, 138, 153, 156, 161, 164, 319,
381, 397–401, 425; ii. 79, 91, 166, 275, 358, 397 n., 436; iii. 1,
168, 258, 270, 299, 326, 336; iv. 45, 61, 190, 217, 229, 244, 275,
276, 355, 365; v. 11, 68, 70, 123, 125, 145–6, 148, 180, 183, 230,
247, 256, 316–8, 369, 371; vi. 42, 68, 73, 77, 85, 96, 100, 106,
110, 163, 169, 210, 218, 223–4, 316, 347, 350, 356, 362, 380,
392–3, 399, 401, 413, 423, 427, 433; vii. 8, 17, 36, 117, 119–20,
153, 158, 160, 169, 197, 203, 249, 268, 320, 322, 371; viii. 23, 43,
55, 58, 68, 101–2, 230, 232–3, 273, 298, 385, 478 n., 535, 561;
ix. 15, 159, 167, 186, 196, 211, 218, 232, 238, 243 n., 283, 320,
321, 427, 431, 483, 491; x. 13, 62–4, 71–2, 77, 116, 118, 155, 156,
200, 204, 232, 244, 324, 325, 327, 377, 399, 406, 416; xi. 215,
233, 235, 294, 431, 450–2, 457, 464, 486–7, 506, 514, 518, 546,
573; xii. 27, 39, 67, 116, 142, 192, 207–8, 273, 277, 341, 346, 372,
433.
Milton’s Eve, Character of, i. 105.
—— Lycidas, On, i. 31.
—— Sonnets, On, vi. 174;
also referred to in v. 371.
—— Versification, On, i. 36.
Milwood (in Lillo’s George Barnwell), viii. 269.
Mina, General, x. 250.
Mincing, Mrs (in Congreve’s Way of the World), viii. 465.
Mind and Motive, vi. 496; xi. p. x.
Mind, On the (Helvetius), xi. 173 n.
Minehead, xii. 272.
Mine Host (Ben Jonson’s New Inn), v. 263.
—— —— of the George (Merry Devil of Edmonton), v. 293.
—— —— of The Tabard (Chaucer), xii. 30.
Minerva (statue), ix. 341, 430, 466; x. 343, 350.
—— Sunias, Temple of the, ix. 325, 381.
—— Press, The, vii. 222; xi. 459.
Minna (in Scott’s The Pirate), xi. 532
Minor, The (Foote’s), ii. 170.
—— Theatres, viii. 403, 478.
Minstrel, The (Beattie’s), v. 100.
Minstrel’s Song in Ælla, The (Chatterton’s), v. 126.
Minucci (an Italian), x. 303.
Minuet de la Cour, The (a dance), xii. 122.
Minute Philosopher (Berkeley’s), vi. 198; xii. 397 n.
Mirabaud, J. Bapt. de, i. 408; vii. 430; xi. 579; xii. 116.
Mirabel (Farquhar’s The Inconstant), i. 154; viii. 73, 74, 75; xi. 367.
Miracles, Essay on (Hume’s), xii. 266.
Miracle of Bolseno (Raphael’s), vi. 340; ix. 240, 364.
Miracle of the Conversion (Raphael’s), ix. 380; xi. 227.
—— of St Mark (Tintoretto’s), ix. 274.
Miraculous Draught of Fishes (Raphael’s), vi. 220; viii. 147; ix. 47.
Miranda (in Mrs Centlivre’s The Busy-Body), viii. 270, 503.
—— (in Shakespeare’s The Tempest), i. 105, 238; x. 116; xi. 296, 417.
Mirandola (Barry Cornwall’s), vi. 96.
Mirror, The (a periodical), viii. 105.
Mirrour for Magistrates, The Induction to the (Thomas Sackville’s),
v. 196.
Misanthrope (Molière’s), viii. 28, 31, 554, 558; ix. 147–9; x. 107, 108;
xi. 354, 383; xii. 24.
Miscellaneous Poems, F. Beaumont, P. Fletcher, Drayton, Daniel,
etc., Sir P. Sidney’s Arcadia, and other works, v. 295
Miser, The (Molière’s), xi. 379, 380.
Miserere, The, ix. 235.
Misers (Massys’), ii. 417; ix. 40.
Misnah, The, iii. 274.
Miss Mactab (in The Poor Gentleman), xi. 376.
—— Prue (Congreve’s Love for Love), vii. 127, 226; viii. 14, 72, 77, 82,
152, 278, 555.
Mistress, Lines to his (Donne’s), xii. 28.
—— (Titian’s), vii. 282; ix. 33, 112, 121, 224, 270.
Mitre, The (an inn), vi. 193; viii. 103.
—— Court, vii. 37; xii. 35 n.
Mock Doctor, The (Fielding’s), viii. 159.
Modena (town), ix. 207.
Modern Comedy, On, i. 10; viii. 551
—— Midnight Conversation (Hogarth’s), viii. 142, 143.
—— Tory Delineated, xi. p. vii.
Mogul, The, ii. 224.
Mohun, Michael, viii. 160.
Moiano (a town), ix. 211.
Molesworth, Robert, Lord, iv. 93.
Molière, i. 81, 314; ii. 166, 229; v. 227, 228; vi. 49, 85, 86, 111, 196 n.,
417; vii. 311, 323; viii. 28, 29, 31, 42, 76–8, 122, 133, 159, 160, 162,
167, 193, 195, 244, 319, 554, 558; ix. 129, 146–50, 152, 166, 214,
242, 391; x. 40, 107, 108, 298; xi. 276, 288, 354, 358, 366, 371,
379, 383, 395, 452, 460; xii. 22, 37, 346.
Molineaux, Tom (pugilist), iv. 223.
Moll Flagon (in Burgoyne’s Lord of the Manor), xi. 316, 388.
—— Flanders (Defoe’s), x. 380; xii. 367.
Molly, Old, xi. 311.
—— Jollop (G. Colman the elder’s The Jealous Wife), viii. 168, 318,
392.
—— Seagrim (in Fielding’s Tom Jones), vii. 221; viii. 113.
Molteno’s print-shop, ix. 8.
Mombelli, Esther, ix. 174.
Momus, The Elgin, ix. 340.
Monaghan, Mr (in Amory’s John Buncle), i. 54; iii. 142.
Monarchy, On the Spirit of, xii. 241.
Monastery (Scott’s), vii. 201; viii. 439
Monasticon (Dugdale’s), v. 120; vii. 317.
Moneses (Congreve’s Bajazet), xi. 275.
Money, On the want of, xii. 136.
Monimia (in Otway’s Orphan), i. 157; v. 355; viii. 263, 310.
—— (in Smollett’s Count Fathom), xii. 64.
Moniteur, The (a newspaper), ix. 165.
Monk Lewis, xii. 271.
—— The (Lewis), viii. 127.
Monkeys, The (Gay’s Fable), v. 107.
Monmouth’s Rebellion, x. 357.
Monmouth Street, vi. 459; vii. 69; xii. 210.
Monrose (in Holcroft’s Knave or Not?), ii. 161, 162.
Monsieur Jourdain (in Molière), i. 81; viii. 160; xi. 355.
—— D’Olive (Chapman’s), v. 231.
—— Pourceaugnac (Molière’s), i. 81; viii. 28, 160; x. 107.
—— Thomas (Beaumont and Fletcher’s), v. 261.
Montagu, Mrs Basil, vii. 41, 132.
—— Edward Wortley, iv. 90 n.
—— Lady Mary Wortley, vii. 207; ix. 477; xii. 32, 134, 153 n.
Montaigne, Michael, Lord of, i. 7; ii. 410; iv. 195, 373; v. 334; vi. 86;
vii. 26, 28, 219 n., 230, 311, 313, 323; viii. 92, 93, 94, 95, 100; ix.
166; x. 72; xi. 383; xii. 37.
Mont-Mirail, The Battle of (Vernet’s), ix. 128.
Mont St Jean, The Battle of, ix. 128.
Montargis (a town), ix. 175, 176, 177.
Monte-Fiascone, ix. 231.
Monte Pincio, The, x. 303.
Monte-Pulciano, xi. 487.
Monte Rosa, ix. 279, 281, 296.
Montesquieu, Charles de St Bavon de, iv. 9 n.; vii. 40, 311; x. 184; xii.
247.
Montfort (actor), i. 440.
Montgomery, James, v. 378; vi. 156; vii. 14.
Monthly Magazine, The, ii. 175, 177, 192; iv. 9 n.; vii. 230; x. 221,
222; xii. 136, 150, 161, 173, 184, 198, 209, 230, 235.
—— Mirror, The, ii. 228.
—— Review, The, ii. 95, 163, 225; iv. 284, 311 n.; vi. 65, 216.
Montmartre, vii. 332; ix. 161; xii. 189.
Montmorenci, vii. 307; ix. 161.
Montpelier Tea Gardens, vi. 257.
Montroses, The, xii. 255.
Montrose (the town), ii. 308.
Monument, The, iii. 128; vi. 421; vii. 68; viii. 435; ix. 59.
—— of the Two Children (Chantrey’s), vi. 326.
Moody or Pinchwife (in Garrick’s adaptation of Wycherley’s Country
Wife), vi. 68; viii. 77; xi. 277.
Moonshine (in Shakespeare’s Midsummer Night’s Dream), i. 248;
viii. 276.
Moor (Schiller’s), xii. 67.
—— The (in Shakespeare’s Titus Andronicus), x. 117.
Moor of Venice, or Othello (Shakespeare’s). See Othello.
Moore, Edward, v. 6, 359; vi. 368.
—— Sir John, ii. 375.
—— Peter, viii. 413.
—— Dr, ii. 171, 198; vi. 360.
—— Thomas, iii. 122, 311, 312; iv. 9, 13, 213, 258, 312, 353; v. 151, 152,
153, 155, 369, 378; vi. 67, 334 n., 454, 495, 509; vii. 123, 153, 314,
319, 365–72, 378–82; viii. 10, 166, 284, 422; ix. 34 n., 73, 106, 160
n., 190, 218, 246, 257, 281, 283; x. 233, 314; xi. 372, 386; xii. 138,
155 n., 307, 323.
—— Sir Graham, vi. 385.
Moorish Alhambra, The, ix. 349.
Mopsa and Dorcas (Sir Philip Sidney’s), ix. 58.
Moral Epistles (Pope’s), v. 373.
Morals (Seneca’s), viii. 557.
Moral and Political Philosophy, Paley’s, iii. 224, 276; iv. 166 n.; vii.
49; xi. 336.
Morales, Luis de, ix. 26.
Morceaux, from Wat Tyler (Southey’s), iii. 194 et seq.
Mordaunt, Mertoun (in Scott’s The Pirate), xi. 532.
Mordent (Holcroft’s The Deserted Daughter), ii. 159.
More, Hannah, i. 66; v. 108, 147; vi. 363; viii. 194, 256, 257, 284.
Moreau, Jean Victor, iii. 53, 56.
Moredens, The (in Leigh’s Where to Find a Friend), viii. 258–260.
Morgan (in Holcroft’s Old Clothesman), ii. 173, 174, 176, 177.
—— (in Smollett’s Roderick Random), iii. 218; vii. 378.
—— Lady, iv. 308; vii. 220; ix. 226, 267; x. 233, 276 et seq., 305 n.
Morganti Maggiore (Pulci’s), x. 69.
Mori, Miss, viii. 341.
Morland, George, ii. 202; vii. 56.
Morn (Michael Angelo’s), ix. 363.
Morning (C. V. Fielding’s), xi. 248.
—— (Hogarth’s), viii. 144; ix. 80.
—— Chronicle, The, i. p. xxx., 415–6, 418, 425, 426, 434–5, 441–2; ii.
94, 204, 205, 207, 221, 222; iii. 47 et seq., 51, 101 n., 107, 205, 232,
339 n., 453–4; vi. 190, 292, 293; vii. 205; viii. 174, 241, 459, 502,
512 et seq., 522–3, 531, 551; ix. 84, 85, 186, 315, 462, 489; x. 213–
6; xi. p. ix., 162, 167, 172, 180, 187, 191, 195, 420, 447, 566, 567,
602; xii. 319.
—— Herald, The, ii. 106, 109, 224; iii. 97; vi. 190.

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China, Russia, And Twenty-First

Century Global Geopolitics 1st Edition,

China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century

China, Russia, and

Paul J. Bolt and Sharyl N. Cross

Sharyl Cross dedicates this book in memory of US Senate Majority Leader

Preface and Acknowledgments

Preface and Acknowledgments

This book provides a comprehensive analysis of the Chinese–Russian

Preface and Acknowledgments

Preface and Acknowledgments

Relations (IMEMO) of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Russian International

Preface and Acknowledgments

Julian Lindley-French, Isabelle Facon, Igor Okunev, Sergei Oznobishchev, Vadim

1. Historical Foundations, Strategic Visions, and World Order 1

2. Energy and the Economic Foundations of the Sino–Russian

3. The Sino–Russian Military–Security Relationship: Emerging

4. Russia, China, and Contemporary International Conﬂicts:

5. Emerging Non-traditional Security Challenges: Color

Conclusion: The Sino–Russian Strategic Partnership:

AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

ETIM East Turkestan Islamic Movement

SAM Surface-to-air missile

About the Authors

About the Authors

Historical Foundations, Strategic Visions,

China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics

Historical Foundations, Strategic Visions, World Order

China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics

challengers. In 1991, US President George H. W. Bush proclaimed a “new

Historical Foundations, Strategic Visions, World Order

Views of world order are inevitably tied to one’s theoretical perspective.

The Legacy of History in Chinese–Russian Relations

China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics

Historical Foundations, Strategic Visions, World Order

during the 1860s Russia encouraged Muslim separatists in Xinjiang in order to

China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics

Historical Foundations, Strategic Visions, World Order

China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics

perspective, Mao believed that Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization campaign,

Historical Foundations, Strategic Visions, World Order

of the Soviet Union, Chinese scholars looked at Soviet reforms to determine

China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics

China, Russia, and the Liberal International World Order

China struggled to adapt to the Westphalian world order in the nineteenth

Historical Foundations, Strategic Visions, World Order

China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics

It is China’s unshakable national commitment and strategic choice to take the

According to this viewpoint, China’s rise contributes to a peaceful inter-

Historical Foundations, Strategic Visions, World Order

is deﬁned as “1) neither a confrontation nor a conﬂict; 2) mutual respect; and

China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics

Historical Foundations, Strategic Visions, World Order

SCO is not a formal military alliance with a binding defense commitment

China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics

improvements in Tajikistan and Pakistan, electric power in Bangladesh, and

Historical Foundations, Strategic Visions, World Order

China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics

declaring that China’s sovereignty includes cyberspace. Moreover, the Chin-

Historical Foundations, Strategic Visions, World Order

China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics

of war.81 Similarly, military strategist Edward Luttwak asserts that China’s

Historical Foundations, Strategic Visions, World Order