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PSIR · PALGRAVE STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Performing
Nuclear Weapons
How Britain Made Trident
Make Sense
Paul Beaumont
Palgrave Studies in International Relations
Series Editors
Mai’a K. Davis Cross, Northeastern University,
Boston, MA, USA
Benjamin de Carvalho, Norwegian Institute of International
Affairs, Oslo, Norway
Shahar Hameiri, University of Queensland, St. Lucia,
QLD, Australia
Knud Erik Jørgensen, University of Aarhus, Aarhus, Denmark
Ole Jacob Sending, Norwegian Institute of International
Affairs, Oslo, Norway
Ayşe Zarakol, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
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Mai’a K. Davis Cross is the Edward W. Brooke Professor of Political
Science at Northeastern University, USA, and Senior Researcher at the
ARENA Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo, Norway.
Benjamin de Carvalho is a Senior Research Fellow at the Norwegian
Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Norway.
Shahar Hameiri is Associate Professor of International Politics and
Associate Director of the Graduate Centre in Governance and Inter-
national Affairs, School of Political Science and International Studies,
University of Queensland, Australia.
Knud Erik Jørgensen is Professor of International Relations at Aarhus
University, Denmark, and at Yaşar University, Izmir, Turkey.
Ole Jacob Sending is the Research Director at the Norwegian Institute
of International Affairs (NUPI), Norway.
Ayşe Zarakol is Reader in International Relations at the University of
Cambridge and a fellow at Emmanuel College, UK.
More information about this series at

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Paul Beaumont
Performing Nuclear
Weapons
How Britain Made Trident Make Sense
Paul Beaumont
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Oslo, Norway
Palgrave Studies in International Relations

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I dedicate this to book to lax word limits.
Foreword
The UK is currently in the process of replacing its Trident nuclear weapon

system at very great expense, beginning with the production of a new
Dreadnought-class of ballistic missile submarines. At the time of writing,
plans have been revealed for a new nuclear warhead based on a US design
to replace the current arsenal that equips the UK’s Trident submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). These missiles are leased from a
common pool of US Trident II (D5) SLBMs under the 1963 Polaris
Sales Agreement amended for Trident in 1982. The UK will also continue
to participate in the US Navy’s programme to sustain and modernise its
Trident stockpile through to the 2080s. All of this is intended to enable
the UK to deploy strategic nuclear weapons well into the second half of
the century.
The debate on this Trident replacement programme ran for a decade or
so from around 2006–2016. It proved deeply controversial for a number
of reasons: the cost of the programme and its military and wider social
opportunity costs; Scottish independence and the 2014 referendum; the
strategic necessity of investing another generation of nuclear weapons
given the shift in global security away from direct state-based armed
threats to the survival of the state and towards overlapping transnational
collective security challenges; and in terms of the resurgence of global
pressure for serious progress towards nuclear disarmament and the dele-
gitimisation of nuclear weapons. The opportunity costs of staying in the
nuclear weapons business gained more salience in the context of the
vii
viii FOREWORD
austerity programme introduced after the 2008 global financial crisis, the
unprecedented effect of the Covid-19 pandemic on the UK economy, and
the decision to exit the European Union.
The UK mission to provide “continuous at-sea deterrence” by having
at least one of its four nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines at sea
at all times is known as Operation Relentless. The drive to retain nuclear
weapons has been correspondingly relentless. But in order to understand
the contemporary politics of this debate, we need to know how we got
here, and this is the great service Dr. Beaumont has done through his
detailed research on the politics of procuring and replacing Trident. He
asks the vital “how possible” question about the UK’s retention of nuclear
weapons. Why did it make sense for those politicians at that time to
procure this “Rolls Royce”1 system of mass destruction in the 1980s?
Why did it make sense to retain nuclear weapons then and again in the
2000s? In doing so, he hones in on the vital questions of: what does
Trident mean, where do those meanings come from, who gets to say,
what political work do they do, and what are the possibilities for changing
them?
To that end, this book unpacks the system of meaning through which
the continued possession of nuclear weapons made sense for the UK
policy elite, first under Thatcher and then later in a transformed geopolit-
ical context under Blair. In the 1980s, the current Trident missile system,
Vanguard-class submarines, and Holbrook warhead were all procured to
replace the aging Polaris missiles, Resolution-class submarines, and Cheva-
line warhead. In the mid-late 2000s, the British nuclear roundabout was
given another spin. Dr. Beaumont show us how a British nuclear “regime
of truth” enables all of this. It constructs actors, nuclear weapons, and
threats in particular ways so as to render the procurement of Trident and
its successor as necessary, legitimate and “common sense”. In that way,
this book enables us to see discourses of nuclear weapons as fundamen-
tally constitutive of the weapons and the states that deploy them. We can
see how social constructions of the weapon and the state inform—or co-
constitute—each other: states possess nuclear weapons and in important
ways are possessed by them.
1 Colin McInnes, Trident: The Only Option? (London: Brasseys Defence Publishers,
1986), p. 42.
FOREWORD ix
Moreover, the analysis engages with arguments connecting the

continued retention of nuclear weapons to concepts of security, identity,
and status. These concepts are not mutually exclusive but knit together
into a system of values and positive meanings that can change but that
can also become deeply entrenched as “social facts” in a strategic culture.
A core assertion routinely presented as a social fact is the nuclear peace
hypothesis2 that conflates the correlation between the existence of nuclear
weapons and the absence of all-out major power war after 1945 with
direct causation.
Understanding the social construction of nuclear weapons is essen-
tial if we are to ever attain a world without nuclear weapons. Meanings
will have to change, sometimes in quite difficult ways. This will need
discursive contestation and political mobilisation to challenge the struc-
tures of power that reproduce the systems of meaning through which
nuclear weapons are made to make sense for the few. The 2017 Treaty
on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons that entered into force in January
2021 is the next step in this process. The treaty has directly challenged
the discourses that frame nuclear weapons as legitimate and necessary,
including in the UK. Instead, it has framed them as illegitimate weapons
of unacceptable violence.
By explaining and dissecting the social construction of British nuclear
weapons in detail, this book helps us to better understand the contin-
gency of the discourses, practices, and power structures involved and the
possibilities for change therein.
January 2021 Dr. Nick Ritchie

University of York, York, UK
2 Benoit Pelopidas, “A Bet Portrayed as a Certainty”, in G. Shultz and J. Goodby (eds.)

The War That Must Never Be Fought: Dilemmas of Nuclear Deterrence (Stanford, Hoover
Institution Press: 2015), p. 11.
Acknowledgements
Everything that follows would have remained a figment of my untapped

imagination had Norway followed Britain’s higher education policy.
Therefore, I would first like to put in writing my eternal thanks to this
cold, jagged, and generous country for granting utlendinger like me the
opportunity to study here without prohibitive fees and then pay me a
living-wage to do a Ph.D. A close second to Norway, I must next thank
Benjamin de Carvalho for his support in guiding me through this long
process, and for consistently offering constructive criticism: encouraging
me to think big, and guiding me away from the stupid. Without him, this
book would be unrecognisable and immeasurably worse. Beyond Ben, I
owe a debt of gratitude to the good people of the International Law and
Policy Institute (ILPI) for taking me on as an intern and thus giving me
the opportunity to do learn from experts in the field, while also allowing
me to spend a sustained period reading, debating, and writing about
nuclear weapons. In particular, my mentor at ILPI, Torbjørn Hugo Graff,
was instrumental to lighting the intellectual fire that would lead to this
book. I would also like to thank Iver Neumann for his feedback upon
an earlier version and for giving me the confidence to push on with the
book project. I am also grateful to my colleagues at Noragric, and later
NUPI, for providing such a hospitable work environment: a special hat-tip
here should go to Bill Warner, Halvard Leira, Katharina Glaab, and Kirsti
Stuvøy, who in different ways have been formative to my research. Outside
of my workplace, I am also privileged to have such smart and generous
xi
xii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
friends to bounce ideas off and argue with about nuclear weapons and
international relations: Pål Røren, Rolf Hansen, Joakim Brattvoll, and
Anders Bjørkheim have helped shape my thinking, and thus sharpen the
arguments found here. Back in the UK, decades of discussions with Andy
White and David Hughes about British politics have no doubt contributed
to this book as well. Meanwhile, I am indebted to John Todd and Anton
Lazarus who sadistically agreed to read, proof, and comment on earlier
versions, for such a small fee I am certain they later regretted it. I should
also thank my online “sit down and write” group—comprised of Felix
Anderl and Audrey Alejandro—who helped push me over the line and get
the revisions done in a far timelier fashion than would have been the case
otherwise. Finally, my partner Kathleen Rani Hagen warrants a special
mention for her all-round support, but also her patience for my many
annoying work-habits.
Contents
1 Introduction: Problematising the Maintenance

of Nuclear Weapons 1
2 Explaining Britain’s Bombs 21
3 Nuclear Regimes of Truth 55
4 Constructing the Nuclear Weapon Problem 85
5 Thatcher’s Nuclear Regime of Truth 113
6 Blair’s Nuclear Regime of Truth 159
7 Conclusion 215
Appendix: Methodological Reflections 229

Index 241
xiii
Abbreviations
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation

CASD Continuous At-Sea Deterrence
CND Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
EU The European Union
IAEA The International Atomic Energy Agency
ICAN The International Campaign for Abolishment of Nuclear Weapons
ILPI The International Law and Policy Institute (Norway)
IR International Relations (the discipline)
MoD The Ministry of Defence (UK)
MP Member of Parliament (UK)
NAM The Non-Aligned Movement
NATO North Atlantic Alliance Organisation
NNWS Non-Nuclear Weapons State
NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty
NWFW Nuclear Weapons Free World
NWS Nuclear Weapons State
RUSI The Royal United Service Institute
SDP Social Democratic Party (UK)
SSBN Ships Submersible Ballistic Nuclear (Ballistic missile equipped
submarines)
TASM Tactical Air-Surface Missiles
TPNW Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
UN United Nations
xv
CHAPTER 1
Introduction: Problematising the

Maintenance of Nuclear Weapons
“Atomic weapons are useful because of the stories people tell about them, the fears
those stories inspire, and the actions by which people respond to those fears”
—John Canaday1
This book investigates how it is possible that a state maintains nuclear

weapons.2 This is unusual. The conventional nuclear research agenda does
not consider the maintenance of nuclear weapons much of a puzzle. In
short, nuclear weapons are seen as so obviously useful for a state engaged
in “self-help”, that no right-minded government would ever willingly
give them up (Chapter 2). Nuclear weapon possession has thus prompted
a great deal of investigation into how best to manage these weapons,
but far less on how states maintain them. Indeed, Security Studies,
informed by Realism (e.g. Waltz, 1979), was traditionally concerned with
1 Reprinted by permission of the University of Wisconsin Press. © 2000 by the Board

of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System. All rights reserved.
2 Doty (1993, p. 298) provides in my view the most lucid account of what “how-
possible” questions entail: “In posing such a question, I examine how meanings are
produced and attached to various social subjects/objects, thus constituting particular
interpretive dispositions which create certain possibilities and preclude others. What is
explained is not why a particular outcome obtained, but rather how the subjects, objects,
and interpretive dispositions were socially constructed such that certain practices were
made possible”.
© The Author(s) 2021 1

P. Beaumont, Performing Nuclear Weapons,
Palgrave Studies in International Relations,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67576-9_1
2 P. BEAUMONT
studying nuclear weapons management strategies: deterrence and arms

control, and addressing the security challenges that changing nuclear
technology posed to the Cold War nuclear balance (Buzan & Hansen,
2009; Freedman, 2004; Williams & Krause, 1996). After the Cold War,
Security Studies—efforts at “widening” notwithstanding—switched its
nuclear focus from deterrence to anti-proliferation (Krause & Latham,
1998). Meanwhile, maintenance of nuclear weapons by great powers
remained largely ignored. Instead, one finds variations of the puzzle: Why
do non-nuclear weapons states exist? (Hymans, 2006) Those few that
did pose the opposite “why” question, tend to debate the factors that
cause states to acquire the bomb: whether they be security (the domi-
nant answer), prestige, or domestic interests (Sagan, 1996). One might
assume disarmament research would be promising; after all, if a state
ceases to maintain its nuclear weapons it has de facto disarmed. However,
as Levite (2009) lamented, disarmament remained much understudied
not least because of the absence of data to work with. Moreover, until
recently, what disarmament research had been undertaken typically sought
to explain the few states that have already given up or reversed their
nuclear weapons programmes. Again, this angle precludes puzzling over
how countries maintain their nuclear weapons.3
However, over the course of the last decade, Security Studies has
begun to wake up. A new “wave” of more critical nuclear scholarship has
emerged, running parallel and intermingling with the successful transna-
tional movement to establish a treaty banning nuclear weapons (Borrie,
2014; Bolton & Minor, 2016; Fihn, 2017). Diverse in their objects of
analyses, and theoretical approach, this “new wave” of nuclear research
shares a scepticism to the narrow materialist ontologies that characterise
conventional security scholarship (Lupovici, 2010; Rublee & Cohen,
2018). For instance, the interpretivist wing, of what Lupovici (2010)
termed the “4th wave” of deterrence scholarship, illuminates how social
contexts are crucial to understanding how threats become “threats”, why
certain countries consider nuclear weapons to be necessary while others
abscond, and what societal functions nuclear deterrence play beyond
those written on the tin (e.g. Lupovici, 2016; Ritchie, 2016). Meanwhile,
the “nuclear norms” research agenda has provided compelling explana-
tions for the non-use of nuclear weapons (the “nuclear taboo”) and a
3 For a review of the conventional nuclear research agenda see Sagan (2011).
1 INTRODUCTION: PROBLEMATISING THE MAINTENANCE … 3
sophisticated theoretical lens for making sense of the norm contestation

that has animated the Non-Proliferation regime in the last decade (Rublee
& Cohen, 2018; e.g. Tannenwald, 2007, 2018). This new wave of crit-
ical scholarship has also permeated British nuclear scholarship: William
Walker (2010, 2018) and Nick Ritchie (2010, 2016, 2019) in particular,
have pioneered an array of interpretivist concepts—e.g. actor network
theory, identity, norms, among others—to shed light upon, and some-
times contest British nuclear weapons policy (see Chapter 2). Ultimately,
by broadening the horizons of nuclear research, this burgeoning body
of interpretative scholarship has made nuclear weapons policies far more
amenable to systematic, empirical analysis and enabled security scholars to
escape their positivist straightjacket.
Indeed, strip away realist doxa regarding the desirability of nuclear
weapons and a research agenda-defining international puzzle emerges.
Only nine nuclear weapon-armed states exist, while 1864 get by without
nuclear weapons, and most seem quite content with their non-nuclear
status.5 Moreover, at least 50 countries have the technical capability to
build nuclear weapons yet only nine have chosen to do so (Hymans,
2006, p. 457). Rather than chomping at the bit to join the nuclear club,
most non-nuclear weapons states have instead imposed stricter limitations
on their ability to develop nuclear weapons. Indeed, going beyond the
measures that are required by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in
July 2017, 122 states voluntarily adopted the Treaty on the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Considering that non-nuclear security is the
norm, and maintaining nuclear weapons relatively odd, the realist puzzle
becomes a function of their theoretical commitments rather than empirics
(Hymans, 2006). Thus, instead of asking why non-nuclear weapons states
have not acquired the bomb, it would make more sense to consider the
few states that maintain such unpopular, yet expensive weapons to be the
puzzle.
4 There are 188 signators to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 183 of them have
signed as Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS). Currently four countries are not signato-
ries: Pakistan, India, Israel, and North Korea (which withdrew in 2003). India, Pakistan,
and North Korea have openly tested nuclear weapons, while Israel’s nuclear weapons
programme is an open secret.
5 Most seem content with not having nuclear weapons, but are not necessarily content
with the Nuclear weapons states (NWS) continued possession of nuclear weapons.
4 P. BEAUMONT
Indeed, taking this puzzle as its starting point, the following chapters
seek to make nuclear weapon states strange. Picking up and running with
Nick Ritchie’s (2013, 2016) notion of “nuclear regimes of truth”, this
book problematises the discursive maintenance of nuclear weapons in the
UK. While various answers to why states acquire nuclear weapons have
been posited, these explanations typically ignore the ongoing processes
of legitimation that keep these weapons in service: how the social and
material objects constituting these reasons are constructed, maintained,
remodelled, reified and sometimes discarded. This book does not dispute
any one of these explanations per se but contends that governments
have considerable power in producing the security, status, and domestic
political meaning that enable the maintenance of their nuclear weapons.
Indeed, because nuclear weapons are represented to “work” by not
being used, this book contends that their deterrence utility is transcen-
dental —what nuclear weapons have (or have not) deterred is impossible
to prove (Chapter 4). This transcendental quality of nuclear weapons
discourse grants nuclear states a peculiar flexibility in representing the
weapons’ benefits; however, it also has a flip-side. In the absence of
proven “effects”, the positive meanings attached to nuclear weapons
also require considerable imagination, adaptation, and thus discursive
labour to remain salient, avoid decay and thus enable maintenance. To
be clear then, by investigating the maintenance of nuclear weapons, I
do not mean documenting meticulously the materials required to keep
the nuclear weapons system going nor endeavouring to reach inside the
minds of policymakers and uncover why they made consecutive decisions
to renew British nuclear weapons. Rather, this book investigates the UK
governments’ role in constructing the social world within which it is
embedded: how the consecutive UK governments (re)produced a foreign
policy discourse that constituted their nuclear weapons as legitimate and
desirable.
To undertake this task, this book conducts a longitudinal discourse
analysis of the UK’s nuclear policy of two key periods: 1980–1987
and 2005–2009. By historicising and deconstrucing several of the UK
discourse’s nuclear “truths” “from “Thatcher to Blair”, the book docu-
ments how maintaining the UK’s nuclear weapons has often required
difficult and not always entirely successful discursive labour. Indeed, look
closely, and several of the axioms that underpin Britain’s nuclear ratio-
nale require considerable imagination and careful narration to become
plausible, let alone accepted. For instance, consecutive governments have
relied upon a peculiarly British version of the “nuclear peace” to legiti-

mate maintenance, asserting that its nuclear weapons have “proven” to
work in the past and thus can be expected to work in the future (Chap-
ters 5 and 6). As Thatcher (1984) put it the UK’s “nuclear deterrent has
not only kept the peace, but it will continue to preserve our indepen-
dence”. Yet, the only proof provided is absence: what Britain’s nuclear
weapons have deterred exists only in the collective imagination. In other
words, the attacks to which Thatcher alludes will forever remain transcen-
dental; existing in an alternative reality in which Britain did not maintain
nuclear weapons. However, instead of arguing—like so many have before
(Chapter 2)—that Britain’s nuclear peace is a myth, this book documents
how the nuclear peace is maintained and reproduced: What stories need
to be told, evidence presented, and alternatives marginalized, in order to
keep Britain’s “nuclear peace” in currency? Exploring this, as well as the
other moving parts of Britain’s nuclear regime provides the topic of this
book.
Theorising Nuclear Regimes of Truth

This book’s problematisation of maintenance is grounded in (my reading
of) Foucault’s notion of Regimes of Truth.6 Rather than conceiving
language as reflective of reality, this book holds that language is a produc-
tive meaning-producing force in its own right (Chapter 3). In short, this
approach assumes that no physical or social object has an a priori social
meaning that transcends social construction and therefore every “truth”
contained in language must be considered political. Here, what depiction
of the world dominates over other alternatives is not the result of it being
a superior reflection of reality, but a function of productive power: the
power to produce, circulate, distribute, and regulate statements about the
social world that form more or less coherent frameworks—discourses —for
making the world intelligible. These discourses have political conse-
quences; they constrain what we think of, and therefore what we can
6 This book builds upon (and complements) Nick Ritchie’s conceptualisation of the
UK’s nuclear policy as a regime of truth. However, as Chapter 2 will explain, my discursive
approach differs substantially because it conducts a longitudinal analysis that spans two
governments’ decision for renewal, problematises the process of meaning production across
time, and draws upon a different analytical framework (Hansen, 2006).
6 P. BEAUMONT
do (Neumann, 2008, p. 62). As regime suggests, truths require mainte-

nance: discursive labour to keep functioning. Indeed, rather than treating
the international as external reality whose truths we can reveal with careful
objective study, this book investigates the UK government’s complicity in
producing, maintaining, and modifying a regime of truth about the inter-
national and surrounding its nuclear weapons that makes make nuclear
maintenance possible.
While my reading of Foucault underpins this book’ problematique,
I also draw upon Lene Hansen’s Foreign Policy/Identity Nexus frame-
work to structure the analysis (Chapter 3). In brief, Hansen develops
a systematic framework for analysing how particular foreign policies are
(de)legitimated via reference to states’ collective identities. However, this
book does not merely use Hansen’s framework, but seeks to develop it.
Indeed, like a lot of post-positivist work, Hansen’s framework privileges
identity construction over policy representations. While Hansen’s Foreign
Policy/Identity nexus can accommodate more emphasis on policy repre-
sentations, Chapter 3 suggests she under-theorises it at the expense
of collective identity construction. Chapter 3 addresses this weakness
by incorporating nukespeak and theorising the role of metaphors in
foreign policy nexi.7 Second, I suggest that Hansen’s assumption that
foreign policymakers seek merely legitimate and enforceable foreign poli-
cies occludes how long-term policies may generate explicitly positive and
desirable meanings. Indeed, as Foucault (1980, p. 119) noted, productive
power—manifested by and through discourse—does not only repress—far
from it—but induces pleasure as well as social pressures. Chapter 3 will
thus theorise why adding desirable to the assumed objectives of foreign
policymakers can provide greater analytic depth to Hansen’s framework,
and allow it to better illuminate non-urgent, long-term foreign policies,
such as nuclear weapons maintenance. Finally, building on this incorpo-
ration of desirability, Chapter 3 theorises how Hansen’s conception of
degrees of Otherness can be utilised to illuminate instances of status seeking
in the international and help understand how nuclear weapons enable
Britain to perform privileged international status, at least to its domestic
audience. Chapter 3 will also elaborate on how treating international
status as a discursive phenomenon can contribute to the burgeoning
7 As my analysis will show, I certainly consider identity constructions to be key to

understanding the UK’s nuclear policy, just that their interplay with policy representations
should be analysed more closely and explicitly.
status literature in IR (e.g. Beaumont, 2017; Ward, 2017; Wohlforth, De

Carvalho, Leira, & Neumann, 2018).
The UK Case: Acquiring,

Maintaining and Renewing Trident
The UK constitutes an intriguing case for problematising the discur-
sive maintenance of nuclear weapons. Since 1952, Britain has spent
tens of billions of pounds building, maintaining, upgrading, and modi-
fying its nuclear weapons systems.8 Parallel to the material manifestations
of the bombs themselves, consecutive UK governments have produced
hundreds of thousands of words attaching meanings to the UK’s nuclear
weapons and their nuclear weapons policy. From the UK’s earliest nuclear
“gravity bombs”, to the UK’s current nuclear submarine launched inter-
continental ballistic missile system (Trident), consecutive UK govern-
ments have necessarily had to present their nuclear weapons to their
domestic public as legitimate and desirable, and thus ultimately as a good
and right allocation of resources.9
However, all this does not happen in a vacuum; the UK govern-
ment does not have a monopoly on imbuing its nuclear weapons with
meaning. Rather, the government is just one socially powerful actor
within national politics, and one state among many more in the inter-
national. To borrow Derrida’s (1984) term, nuclear weapons sustain a
“fabulously textual” realm in which governments, institutions, politicians,
anti-nuclear activists, academics, security professionals, newspapers, and
8 For example, the current nuclear weapon system, Trident, cost more than 15 billion
to acquire, and around 3–4% of the defence budget to run (Hartley, 2006, pp. 678–
679). The total life cycle costs of the current system (Trident) are expected to be 25
billion (at 2005/6 prices). While opponents dispute some of these figures, whether UK
nuclear weapons are considered a good use of resources tends to come down to whether
one believes in the security benefits accredited to British nuclear weapons: if one believes
nuclear weapons keep the UK safe they are cheap, if one believes they are “worse than
irrelevant” and dangerous they are a waste of money (see Chapters 4, 5 and 6). Hence,
this book focuses much more on the representations that account for Tridents utility and
legitimacy rather than the economic representations.
9 It is important to note the difference between the decision-making and the ultimate
presentation of policy. Particularly in the early years, nuclear decision-making was made in
secret without parliamentary approval. The decision made was only later announced and
presented to the public. Nonetheless, even though the decision was taken beforehand, the
future decisions depended on the acceptance of those earlier decisions.
8 P. BEAUMONT
other states provide competing representations of what the UK’s nuclear

weapons mean, what they do, and what they have done. Indeed, the
fact that nuclear weapons—through deterrence—are said to work by not
being used, encourages wildly divergent accounts of the UK’s nuclear
reality. Analysts have little concrete successes or failures to ground their
arguments, but must instead make do with a fuzzy peace correlation,
continuously patrolling but hidden nuclear submarines, and a great deal of
words. For example, David Cameron (2010), the former Prime Minister,
was fond of claiming that the UK’s nuclear weapons were the UK’s “ulti-
mate insurance policy”, which has kept the UK safe for 60 years. At the
same time, some defence analysts, such as Michael MccGwire (2006),
claim those same weapons are “irrelevant” and offer little more than a
“comfort blanket” that merely make the UK feel safe. For the UK to
maintain its nuclear weapons then, it requires a sufficient number, or at
least the necessary people, to share an understanding closer to Cameron’s
rather than MccGwire’s.
Maintaining the acquiescence of sufficient numbers of Britain’s citi-
zenry has not always been easy. More than any other nuclear-armed
state the UK’s nuclear weapons programme has been contested in main-
stream politics (Quinlan, 2006). Indeed, the UK government’s nuclear
regime of truth has undergone several periods of sustained contesta-
tion. In the 1950s the UK’s nuclear weapons laboratory at Aldermaston
was a constant site for mass protests; moreover, in 1964, 1983, and
1987 Labour stood for election on the promise of removing all nuclear
weapons from UK territory.10 While in 2007, the New Labour govern-
ment managed to set in motion the process of renewing its nuclear
weapons until the 2060s, it sparked a considerable fight in parliament.
The Labour leadership had to enforce a three line whip on their party to
ensure the bill passed11 and even then, they had to rely upon the oppo-
sition party to get the bill passed (Ritchie, 2012). Moreover, domestic
public opinion—which has generally hovered around 50% approval for
10 Although Labour won the election, they reneged on their promise to disarm the
UK’s nuclear weapons. Instead of getting rid of the UK’s nuclear weapons, they merely
decided to cut the number the UK would purchase from the US from five nuclear Polaris
submarines to four (Scott, 2006).
11 Enforcing a three-line whip on a party implies that anyone that votes against the
party line will receive severe reprisals, and risk getting thrown out of the party. Indeed,
four Labour ministers resigned their posts in the cabinet in order to vote against Trident.
Trident— has long seemed ambivalent to nuclear weapons, even if this

has not always been reflected in the policies of the mainstream parties.12
Thus, the British case illustrates how presenting maintaining nuclear
weapons to be a legitimate foreign policy can prove difficult, and thus why
investigating their discursive maintenance is a potentially fruitful object of
inquiry.
Nonetheless, in conducting a discourse analysis of the UK’s main-
tenance of nuclear weapons I am eschewing the traditional puzzles of
most British nuclear weapons research (Chapter 2). Until fairly recently
it remained almost untouched by the post-positivist turn in IR. Most
analyses of British nuclear weapons policy have focused on the following
questions: Why does the UK have nuclear weapons?13 Should the UK
have nuclear weapons?14 How have decisions to acquire particular nuclear
weapons been made?15 What are the problems and dilemmas associated
with the UK’s nuclear policy?16 Most of this research (implicitly) takes
language as reflective of reality and assumes a mind-independent world
amenable to objective analysis; certainly, these works do not problema-
tise the discursive maintenance of the UK’s nuclear weapons. To be sure,
some scholars have begun to mobilise, if not the methodology, at least
some of the terminology of this approach (Ritchie 2010, 2012, 2013;
2016; Walker, 2010, 2018). However, as Chapter 2 explains, they serve
to open doors to the problematising the discursive maintenance of Trident
rather than walking all the way through them.
12 However, it should be noted that this level fluctuates wildly depending on the how
the question is phrased. Regardless, this indicates that the approval of nuclear weapons
maintenance cannot be taken for granted in the manner realists typically assume. See
Byrom (2007) for analysis of British public opinion towards nuclear weapons.
13 See, Scott (2006), Ritchie (2010), and Stoddart and Baylis (2012).
14 See Ritchie (2009), Beach (2009), Beach and Gurr (1999), Lewis (2006), MccGwire
(2005, 2006), and Sliwinski (2009).
15 See Freedman (1980), Ritchie (2009), Ritchie and Ingram (2010), Stoddart (2008),
and Willett (2010).
16 Some notable examples of what is a popular theme: Freedman (1980), Quinlan
(2006), Ritchie (2008, 2012), Rogers (2006), Witney (1994), Freedman (1986, 1999),
Walker (2010), and Clarke (2004).
10 P. BEAUMONT
British Nuclear Puzzles

The book’s empirical analysis zooms in upon the UK’s two most recent
big nuclear-acquisition decisions: the purchase and defence of the Trident
nuclear weapons system by Margaret Thatcher in 1980, and Tony Blair’s
decision to begin the process of acquiring a “like for like” replacement
of Trident in 2007. Specifically, it will analyse two key nuclear periods
of foreign policy discourse: Thatcher government’s representation of its
nuclear policy from 1979 to 1987, and the Labour government’s repre-
sentation of its nuclear policy between 2005 and 2010.17 Choosing these
two periods has the advantage that it neatly straddles the Cold War
and captures how the UK’s nuclear discourse adapted to new and very
different circumstances. Moreover, it offers the methodological bonus
that the main part of the nuclear policy that the UK needed to present
as legitimate and desirable—the acquisition and then the renewal of its
Trident armed nuclear submarines—was similar for both periods.18 This
combination of theory and empirics leads to the research question that
animates this books analysis:
- How have consecutive UK governments managed to represent their

purchase, renewal, and maintenance of nuclear weapons as legitimate,
enforceable, and desirable between the decision to purchase the first
Trident nuclear weapons system in 1980 and the decision to initiate
renewal in 2007?
In answering this question, the book seeks to contribute to the

momentum behind the new international disarmament agenda (e.g.
Egeland, 2018; Ritchie, 2013, 2019; Sauer & Reveraert, 2018). Put
simply, if the anti-nuclear movement can better understand how states
maintain support for their nuclear weapons programmes, they can better
understand how to undermine them (Ritchie, 2013). Ceasing to maintain
17 I focus on the discourse around these periods because UK’s nuclear maintenance to
a large extent depends on these cyclical renewal decisions. Except for the continual but
usually peripheral whirring of the anti-nuclearist movement, the discursive activity around
UK’s nuclear weapons lulls in the down-time between major decisios on renewal (see
Beaumont, 2013).
18 Comparing the rationale for two very different policy decisions would undermine
comparative analysis of how those policies were represented. See Moses and Knutsen
(2019) on the pitfalls of comparison in social science.
nuclear weapons, after all, is the same as disarmament. Indeed, secu-

rity scholars are increasingly recognising the need to take investigation
into maintenance seriously, for example, Ritchie (2010) argues: “[T] here
are wider obstacles to relinquishing nuclear weapons that must be exam-
ined in order to understand why states retain nuclear weapons and will
find it difficult to abandon them, even if the strategic security threats
that motivated their original acquisition have diminished or faded alto-
gether” (see also Ritchie, 2013, 2016). Meanwhile Walker (2010) sensibly
suggests that giving up weapons implies “idiosyncratic implications” for
each nuclear-armed state and therefore analysts should focus on under-
standing each state’s specific relationship to their nuclear weapons in order
to better understand how they can be persuaded to give them up. This
book follows Walker and Ritchie’s suggested research agenda. Indeed,
this question opens up several puzzles related to British nuclear weapons
policy.
The conventional way of problematising nuclear possession involves
looking for various objective proliferation triggers that can explain why
these states acquired nuclear weapons: the dominant answer usually
given is “security”. Once nuclear weapons have been acquired though,
few scholars have investigated how the security threats (justifying the
weapons’ existence) are produced and maintained. While accepting that
acquiring working nuclear weapons is generally considered the hard bit
of putting together a nuclear weapons programme, states (to varying
degrees) still need to justify the continuous costs of their nuclear weapons
to their populace.19 Informed by Securitisation theory,20 this book inves-
tigates how those threats become threats; threats that justify nuclear
weapons in the UK, while prompting little more than a shrug among
non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS). However, this book also investi-
gates how the UK constitutes other positive meanings for its nuclear
weapons, beyond security alone. Indeed, most states certainly do not
represent nuclear weapons desirable in the way Britain presents them
to be, nor do they seem especially envious of the status and security
some assert nuclear weapons afford. Indeed, as Hugh Beech wryly notes,
Germany and Japan do not seem “unduly concerned” nuclear blackmail,
19 Krebs and Jackson (2007) for example suggest that even policies that appear to be
supported by consensus require a justifying “frame”.
20 See Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde (1998) for the seminal early text and (2005)
Balzacq for a contemporary research agenda.
12 P. BEAUMONT
so why should the UK? (2009, p. 37) Thus, lest Britain turn into Japan
and Germany, maintaining the need for the bomb requires (re)producing
threats and (thus) functions for its nuclear weapons, functions that must
also adapt to fit changing international circumstances. This book anal-
yses how this is achieved: how the UK has maintained a discourse that
represents its nuclear weapons as necessary when many other countries
apparently do fine without them.
Second, this book speaks to a specific nuclear legitimacy problem
prompted by the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, the UK
frequently justified the UK’s purchase of nuclear weapons as necessary
to defend against the threat from the Soviet Union. When the Soviet
Union disintegrated it left the UK’s nuclear weapons without its former
raison d’être. Given UK seemed to want to keep its nuclear weapons,
this presented a political problem. Indeed, Nicholas Witney (1994), of
the Ministry of Defence, wrote at length about how the UK govern-
ment needed to “refurbish the rationale” for its nuclear weapons in the
post-Cold War era and concluded that none of the options available
to the UK appeared unproblematic. Thirteen years later, with a new
nuclear-acquisition decision fast approaching, finding a convincing ratio-
nale remained elusive. As MccGwire (2006, p. 640) put it succinctly
in 2006: “Today the Soviet threat is no more and we are at least 750
miles from the nearest areas of political turbulence. Anchored off Western
Europe, with allies and friends on all sides, Britain is unusually secure. Do
we still need nuclear weapons?” MccGwire’s answer was a resounding
no, but the government’s was a resounding yes. This book seeks to
understand how the UK found a sufficiently convincing and legitimate
nuclear rationale in the post-Cold War era that successfully marginalised
alternative oppositional representations, such as MccGwire’s.21
Third, the UK, like many of the nuclear weapons states now vigor-
ously pursues anti-nuclear proliferation policy, while simultaneously main-
taining, upgrading, and renewing its own nuclear weapons programme.
This policy has led to accusations by Non-nuclear states—particularly
those in the Non-Aligned Movement—that nuclear weapons states such
as the UK practice a hypocritical system of “nuclear apartheid”. While
21 It is worth noting that MccGwire was certainly not alone, nor his opposition short-
lived. A member of the Navy, respected security scholar and Sovietologist he wrote at
length throughout the 1980s on what he considered to be the folly of deterrence, see
MccGwire (1984, 1985, 1986, 1994, 2001, 2005).
acknowledging that Realism can explain why the UK does this, and how
it physically can, it does not explain how a government can present this
policy as legitimate to its domestic or international audience. This book
will therefore investigate how the UK discourse reconciles the UK’s main-
tenance and renewal of its nuclear weapons with its strong anti-nuclear
proliferation policy, and its claims to be dedicated to a nuclear weapon
free world.
Fourth, nuclear weapons analysts frequently debate whether the states
pursue nuclear weapons for reasons of prestige or security (see Sagan,
1996). The UK is no different in this regard,22 but frequently the
discussion involves speculating about the motivations of decision-makers,
and/or by ontologies that demand a material measurable manifestation of
status distinct from security (Chapter 3). By taking a discursive approach
this book will seek to address this issue from a different angle by showing
and analysing how the UK has used its nuclear weapons policy to perform
a privileged identity in relation to various Others through its foreign
policy discourse.23 Thus, by focusing instead on what privileged iden-
tity constructions the UK does articulate with its nuclear weapons policy,
rather than try judge between prestige and security, this book offers a
plausible means of sidestepping the methodological shortcomings that
plague the debate around this issue (Chapter 3).
Objectives & Outline

Broadly speaking then, this book has two separate but related objectives:
First, this book will show how a discursive problematization of nuclear
weapons maintenance constitutes a fruitful agenda for nuclear weapons
research. A discursive ontology permits analysis of the wealth of empirics
that positivism precludes: the millions of words that have accompanied
22 See Croft and Williams (1991) for a British example.

23 This I suggest might be termed status-seeking —when an actor represents itself as
distinguished and superior in some way to its peers. But status itself is social and depen-
dent on recognition. Therefore, this can only constitute part of the story of acquiring
status: the next step would be to investigate to see to what extent other actors in the
international recognise, reinforce, and reproduce the UK’s privileged identity. However,
for the purposes of legitimating maintenance, domestic recognition of these status-seeking
moves would be at least as important. See Beaumont (2020), on the significance of
domestic audiences for state status-seeking.
14 P. BEAUMONT
governments’ nuclear weapons policies. As Chapter 4 argues, the fabu-

lously textual nature of the empirics that constitutes the nuclear weapons
debate indicates the “battle over truth” is likely to remain fierce until
either disarmament occurs or nuclear war ends life on earth. Indeed,
nuclear weapons discourse could scarcely provide a more suitable object
of analysis discourse analysis of this sort. Thus, this book lays the ground-
work for post-positivist scholars to investigate and unsettle other societies’
nuclear regimes of truth. Second, the success of these ambitions—whether
my book sinks or swims—rests on the empirical findings. My concep-
tion of discourse precludes making causal claims: here, policy and identity
are treated as mutually constitutive—linked through discourse—so delin-
eating independent causal variables is impossible. However, this is a
strength as much as a weakness: it permits the analysis of discursive
empirics that positivist scholars’ ontology and epistemology forces them
to ignore, and thus allows the investigation of puzzles, they have left
hitherto untouched. Indeed, the following chapters’ analysis allows this
book to make several theoretically informed, and empirically grounded
inferences about how the UK has maintained its nuclear weapons from
Thatcher to Blair, Trident I to Trident II. While neither definitive nor
bullet proof, my claims should at least offer useful additional and Critical
insight into the UK’s nuclear weapons policy.
This book proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 locates this book in the space
left mostly untouched so far by British nuclear weapons research; it argues
that the security, prestige, domestic politics, and identity explanations
found in the literature do not adequately address the puzzles identified
above. Next, Chapter 3 discusses how and why we can usefully treat states
nuclear discourses as “regimes of truth” and discusses and develops the
specific theoretical framework that undergirds my analysis. Chapter 4 then
sketches out and analyses the implications of the international discursive
economy surrounding nuclear weapons that enables and constrains the
UK’s nuclear foreign policy. Chapter 5 analyses Thatcher’s nuclear regime
of truth, and how her foreign policy discourse represented the purchase
of Trident as legitimate and desirable. Chapter 6 then investigates how
New Labour imaginatively remodelled the nuclear regime truth for the
twenty-first century: how it sought to overcome the instabilities in its
nuclear policy discourse prompted by the end of the Cold War. Finally,
the conclusion discusses the continuity and change of the UK’s nuclear
regime of truth across both periods and discusses what practical use these
insights offer to the international nuclear disarmament agenda.
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CHAPTER 2
Explaining Britain’s Bombs
Introduction
The bulk of the literature on British nuclear weapons comes from the
conventional security field. These scholars take a philosophical ontology
that implicitly takes for granted the researcher’s ability to “hook up”
(Jackson, 2010, p. 30) to a mind-independent world and analyse reality
for what it really is. These scholars typically understand language as reflec-
tive, unproblematic, and certainly do not seek to problematise it. In
contrast, this book conceptualises language as a meaning-producing prac-
tice in its own right; that is, I assume that the patterns of representation
found in texts—speeches, books, and images, body language—systemi-
cally produce the meaning of what they refer. These patterns of repre-
sentation can be treated and studied as discourses: “more or less coherent
frameworks for what can be said and done” (Dunne, 2008, p. 79), which
are always, in some sense, under-construction and thus contestable (see
Chapter 3 for an extended discussion). It follows then, that we can investi-
gate political outcomes—like the UK’s nuclear weapons maintenance—by
studying how the UK’s pro-nuclear discourses—frameworks for interpre-
tation—are (re)produced and how they marginalise alternatives that could
enable disarmament.
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 21

Switzerland AG 2021
P. Beaumont, Performing Nuclear Weapons,
Palgrave Studies in International Relations,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67576-9_2
22 P. BEAUMONT
Although, discourse analysis of this sort has long become part of

the “accepted canon of approaches when analysing international poli-
tics” (Diez, 2001, p. 5), it is also true that discourse analysts have not
always taken due care to speak to sceptics among the mainstream.1 Thus,
by juxtaposing my problematisation with prior research, this chapter
seeks to offer a bridge to mainstream security scholars. Indeed, while
scholars frequently call for plurality and mutual recognition in research
(Jackson, 2010; Klotz & Prakash, 2008; Moses & Knutsen, 2019) both
conventional scholars and “post-positivists” are often guilty of not making
enough effort to engage in an earnest constructive dialogue. Attempting
to avoid this trap, this chapter aims to show—in plain language—how
and why discourse analysis can offer insight into nuclear weapons. It also
serves as an introduction to the debates around British nuclear weapons
for those readers that are unfamiliar with the literature.
The chapter thus proceeds as follows. The opening section evaluates
the various explanations offered by the literature for why the UK has
nuclear weapons. It is structured around Sagan’s (1996) analysis, which
lists three general explanations—all found in varying degrees in the liter-
ature about UK nuclear weapon policy—for why states acquire nuclear
weapons: (a) security; (b) status; and, (c) domestic political interests.
I will then discuss a fourth more contemporary explanation: (d) iden-
tity explanations. Treating the debate in this way will show both the
breadth of the conventional British nuclear research, and in so doing
illuminate the largely untrammelled space this book explores. By illumi-
nating the limitations of these explanations,2 this chapter seeks to show
how a discourse analyse approach can augment their analysis by asking
1 In a quote I once found empowering, but now find problematic, David Campbell
(1998, p. 215) describes the attitude of post-structuralists towards conventional IR schol-
arship: “Where once we were all caught in the headlights of the large North American
car of international relations theory, now the continental sportster of critical theories has
long since left behind the border guards and toll collectors of the mainstream - who can
be served in the rear view mirror waving their arms wildly still demanding paper and the
price of admission as occupants go on their way in search of another political problem to
explore”.
2 However, it must be recognised that the four sections this structure leads to, divided
according to security, prestige, identity and domestic political explanations, represent
analytical constructs rather than empirically exhaustive account of the debate. Few of the
texts suggest that their explanation is final or perfectly distinct from the others. Indeed,
some do not pose and answer the question explicitly, but provide an answer via their
more historical accounts or security analysis.
2 EXPLAINING BRITAIN’S BOMBS 23
questions that conventional analysts are not equipped, nor inclined to

answer, in this case: how nuclear weapons states maintain their nuclear
weapons. The second half of the chapter then reviews the post-positivist
nuclear weapons literature that provides the theoretical foundations and
some helpful pointers for this book’s analysis. However, I lack the space
to review the literature pertaining to the British nuclear policy debate:
those security policy-orientated papers that argue the rights and wrongs,
problems and prospects of British nuclear policy.3
Competing Explanations: Security,

Status, Domestic Politics, & Identity
To realists, British nuclear weapons policy is not much of a puzzle.
Under anarchy, realists contend that rational states must pursue self -
help strategies, whereby the only way to guarantee survival is to develop
the capabilities to defend the state against all-comers (e.g. Mearsheimer,
2001; Waltz, 1979). Nuclear weapons are considered the best means of
ensuring security currently available, and therefore no “rational” state
would willingly give them up (see Chapter 4). Moreover, if one considers
the UK’s public policy pronouncements as window dressing and its inter-
national institutions as cobwebs, as realists tend to, then the UK’s nuclear
policy perfectly fits their model of expected behaviour given their mate-
rial circumstances. Equally, although realists acknowledge that domestic
3 There was a surge in such analysis around the period when New Labour sought
to legitimate renewal of the UK’s nuclear weapons. Notable examples from this genre
include: Booth (1999a, 1999b), which argues that the UK’s nuclear weapons policy is
incompatible with human rights; Ritchie (2008) who argues that the UK renewing its
nuclear weapons can only undermine the NPT; Rogers (2006) which argues that the
renewing the UK’s nuclear weapons ties the UK unhelpfully close to the US’s global
interventionist agenda; Ritchie (2011) which draws on critical security studies to suggest
that the UK’s nuclear weapons policy is symptomatic of the UK’s outdated statist security
priorities; Ritchie (2009a, 2009b) and Beach (2009) which argue that the UK’s twenty-
first-century rationale for Trident laid out in the White Paper does not make sense in the
post-cold war era; MccGwire (1986a, 1986b, 2001, 2002), who argues that the UK’s
nuclear weapons do not make the UK safer, but perpetuate animosity in international
relations; MccGwire (2005) which argues that unilateral disarmament offers an obvious
opportunity for the UK to improve its standing in the world; the various anti-nuclear
movement texts arguing that UK nuclear weapons are an immoral waste of money. Finally,
there was of course also several the conventional security analyses, puzzling about what
sort of nuclear force the UK should aquire (e.g. Clarke, 2004; Ritchie & Ingram, 2010;
Willett, 2010).
24 P. BEAUMONT
interests and low politicking of bureaucracies affect nuclear issues, they

expect marginal influence but only to the extent of explaining the details
of the weapons policy (Sagan, 1996, p. 65). Again, one can easily read
British domestic nuclear squabbling in such a manner.4
Rather than questioning nuclear maintenance or disarmament, realists
pursue variations on the nuclear puzzle “Why do Non-nuclear weapons
states exist”? (Hymans, 2006a, 2006b). Consequently, their research
agenda in nuclear matters tends to focus on explaining the “puzzle” of
why the number of states with the capability to go nuclear has grown
to exceed 40 states, yet only nine have chosen to weaponise (Hymans,
2006a, 2006b). Britain barely registers on the realist theoretical radar; its
position in the global nuclear puzzle is a boring corner piece, unworthy
of attention. However, as Hyman (2006a), and Tannenwald (1999) note,
the realist model does not match empirics: several states have given up
nuclear weapons, while the majority of states capable of acquiring nuclear
weapons have refrained, most with little coercion.5 Thus we can begin
to see why the UK’s maintenance of nuclear weapons may constitute a
puzzle after all.
Security Explanations
Although, the security explanation of the UK’s nuclear possession is near-
hegemonic among security academics, occasionally British conventional
scholars investigate the motivations of policymakers. Croft and Williams
(1991) provide a good example of conventional analysis of British nuclear
history.6 Indeed, they are one of the few to actually seek to answer the
4 See Freedman (1980) for a detailed account of the low political dilemmas the UK
faced in maintaining its nuclear weapons.
5 As Tannenwald (1999, p. 434) points out “Most non-nuclear states do not live daily
in a nuclear security dilemma. Finally, if deterrence is all that matters, then why have so
many states not developed nuclear weapons when they could have done so”? In particular,
Sweden, Australia, and New Zealand are good examples of states that made the choice to
reject nuclear security. Meanwhile, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan all gave up nuclear
weapons inherited from the Soviet Union (despite notable realists [Mearsheimer, 1992]
suggesting they do otherwise), South Africa gave up their “bombs in the basement”, and
both Brazil and Argentina stepped down the nuclear ladder even once they had mastered
the nuclear fuel cycle (the most challenging part of the process involved in making a
nuclear weapon) (Beaumont & Rubinsky, 2012).
6 That is not to say British nuclear weapons policy has not been the source of much
attention, but most conventional histories seek to describe chronologically the various
question directly “Why have successive British governments maintained

and, in fact, modernized the national nuclear forces”? and thus provide a
perfect starting point for this literature review which is structured around
different answers to that very question.
In order to pose the question, Croft and Williams (1991) need an
alternative explanation to counter. Thus, they consider the security expla-
nation against the popular (or populist) assertion that Britain acquired
and maintained its nuclear forces for reasons primarily of status. Croft
and Williams end up concurring with a classic security reading of British
nuclear history. Their research illuminates four long-standing strategic
assumptions of the UK policymakers that very closely mirror assumptions
made by realism, even if the authors do not state it. While the authors end
up privileging security as the main motivation for the UK’s maintenance
of nuclear weapons, to the author’s credit, they are cagey about drawing
strong conclusions. Instead, they suggest that their analysis intends only
to demonstrate “the interplay between status and security” and “that it
would be a mistake to underestimate the importance of security consid-
erations in British nuclear weapon policy and history” (Croft & Williams,
1991, p. 160). Indeed, there is no shortage of scholars who directly or
indirectly argue that security concerns explain the UK’s nuclear weapon
possession, not to mention obviously, successive British Governments.
Baylis and Stoddart (2012, 2014; Stoddart & Baylis, 2012) writing
more than 20 years later reach similar conclusions about the primacy
of security, albeit under the label “conventional constructivism”. These
works rank among the most empirically comprehensive of British nuclear
weapons research, however, their theoretical contribution underwhelms.
With their “new” approach they solemnly assert that “[…] the Realist
view of the world is a socially constructed “belief” rather than an objec-
tive reality” (Baylis & Stoddart, 2012, p. 331). However, the authors do
not indicate much construction, and instead end up repeating a familiar
history of the UK defence policymakers’ apparently fixed assumptions,
and how they informed the nuclear policy. Indeed, the articles’ key point
appears more of a semantic move: they suggest that rather than the “mate-
rial factors” emphasised by realists, the UK’s nuclear policy was driven
factors that led to policymakers making the decisions they did. See for example, Stoddart
(2008) documenting with newly declassified material the internal disagreements over how
much was needed to fulfil the “Moscow Criterion” (to deter Russia), or the decision-
making process that led to the Chevaline upgrade (Baylis & Stoddart, 2003).
26 P. BEAUMONT
by “ideational factors based on a ‘realist’ perspective held by Britain’s

political-military leadership” (Stoddart & Baylis, 2012, p. 493).7 Yet, real-
ists do not deny that policymakers have beliefs, they just suggest that in
the name of parsimony one can explain international relations without
them. Moreover, the author’s do not explain how these ideational realist
“beliefs” and “the deterrence mind-set” of the UK’s policy elite can
be separated from the material history of the UK.8 Hence, the authors
struggle to explain why this mindset remained so stable and became
“entrenched” without making reference to the various “material factors”
of the UK’s recent history. For example, the authors suggest how the
UK’s experience with Nazi bombing and the UK’s densely populated
island status, conditioned the establishment’s belief about the need for
strong military. However, it is difficult to see how these “material factors”
can be separate from the “ideational factors” apparently driving the UK’s
nuclear policy. Indeed, this problem is familiar in IR in which scholars
get trapped in an unhelpful Cartesian material/ideational dichotomy, and
ignore how “material facts do not speak for themselves, ideas do not float
freely either” (Pouliot, 2010, p. 296). Nevertheless, whether or not one
grants primacy to ideas or material factors, several other scholars when
investigating the motivations of British nuclear policymakers end up with
similar conclusions regarding the primacy of security in the UK nuclear
policymaker’s motivations (other notable examples: Croft, 1994; Gray,
2001; Hamwee et al. 1990; Stocker, 2007).
However, in the literature the security explanation is more often merely
asserted rather than investigated. Frequently, authors attempt only to
argue that it is right or prudent (and remains so) to maintain nuclear
7 Thus, the authors go further than Croft and Williams by giving “realism” its name,
however that they do fail to explore the link any further.
8 Many scholars have suggested a direct the link between realism and practice in
the nuclear field. Firstly, the hiring practices of the MoD in the UK seem likely to
have influenced the collective nuclear position of the MoD. Booth and Wheeler (1992)
complain that the academic hegemony of realism during the Cold War affected the
career prospects of security professionals. Elsewhere, Booth recalled “the nuclear debate
in the 1980s, the vitriol levelled against those of us [academics] who did not share
Whitehall’s pro-nuclear norms” (Booth, 1997, p. 372). If they disliked academics who
questioned nuclear weapons, it seems unlikely they would employ people sceptical about
nuclear weapons. One anonymous employee of the MoD offers support for this view
describing it as “a huge organization, but one which is precisely designed not to chal-
lenge the underlying assumptions, to take them as your starting point, the water in which
you swim” (Hamwee, Miall, & Elworthy, 1990, pp. 359–360).
weapons.9 For example, Desmond Bowen (2010, p. 9), formerly of the

MoD when writing in defence of the UK’s decision to begin the renewal
of Trident in 2007, sums up the UK’s motivations in the simplest terms
“The United Kingdom has nuclear weapons because successive govern-
ments decided that they enhanced the nation’s security”. According to
Bowen the “uncertainty surrounding the future and proliferation… were
the strongest determinants” of the British decision to renew. Freedman
(1980, p. 139) also supports the security account. While he is sceptical
about the official reasons given for the British nuclear force, he argues that
this does mean that all strategic security arguments are “specious”, only
their articulation “diplomatically awkward”. Lawrence suggests that the
“most compelling strategic rationale for a British nuclear force […] resides
less in the immediate requirements of British defence than in the uncer-
tainties of the future”. Official policy dare not flesh out precisely what
the UK is uncertain about, but Freedman cites unofficial pronouncements
from MoD and ministers to name doubts about the US’s commitment to
Europe and the credibility of the nuclear guarantee to NATO (Freedman,
1980, pp. 136–139).
The Hollowness of Security Explanations

As convincing as security explanations initially appear, they suffer from
a rather timeless problem: attempting to get into the mind of decision-
makers.10 Sagan (1996, p. 63) puts this clearly, “the evidence for realist
history depends primarily on the statements of motivation by the key
decision-makers, who have a vested interest in explaining that the choices
they made served the national interest”. Indeed, Freedman (1980), Croft
and Williams (1991), rely to a large extent on official announcements,
9 See Slivinski (2009), Lewis (2006, 2009), Quinlan (2006, 2009), Stocker (2013), and
Willett (2005).
10 See Wittgenstein (1955, §150–155) for a famous articulation of this problem.
28 P. BEAUMONT
while Hamwee et al. (1990) rely on interviews.11 This is particularly prob-

lematic for Croft and Williams because they seek to infer the importance
of status concerns in decision-making. Something, which, as Sagan (1996)
suggests, is unlikely to feature highly in public pronouncements, aimed at
legitimising policy decisions.12
Moreover, and troublingly, the security explanations of nuclear
weapons can explain every case of nuclear possession; all one needs to
articulate is a threat (Sagan, 1996, p. 63). Sagan observes that this leaves
scholars looking for threats that “must” have existed to prompt the devel-
opment of nuclear weapons. But even a “threat” is not strictly necessary.
After all, if one understands the structure of the system as anarchic and
self-help as a subsequent necessity (in the sense neorealists and the UK
policymakers); having nuclear weapons is a rational response in long run.
And so realism can explain nuclear possession without specific threats too.
Indeed, Booth and Wheeler (1992) named this view as “Structural Nucle-
arism” and declared the UK nuclear policy a “perfect expression” of it. So
when, for instance, Sagan (1996) attempts to demonstrate that a decision
to develop nuclear weapons by a particular state was caused by other moti-
vations than “security”, the analysis can never convincingly dispel security
explanations from the equation.
However, a theory that explains by default a minority of cases without
accounting for the rest is not very useful. Thus even if one accepted that
those realist assumptions and security concerns “caused” the UK to main-
tain its nuclear weapons, this still does not tell us very much. It cannot
explain how the UK arrived at, and maintained those assumptions while
others living under the same anarchic conditions have not. More specifi-
cally, once the Soviet Union dissipated, these approaches cannot explain
why the UK considers uncertainty and North Korea so dangerous as to
11 Croft and Williams (1991) acknowledge to a certain extent the problems inherent in
their task; in their footnotes, they write that “Official publications are noticeable for their
scarcity and blandness when examining underlying attitudes concerning security policy”
and go on to bemoan that “retired politicians and civil servants rarely write memoirs that
are of significant help” (note 6, p147). However, the authors do not go far enough in
acknowledging the unsuitability of their methodology for their task. Attempting to weigh
up the relative importance of status contra security concerns with a methodology that
relies largely on looking for their articulation in official quotes is likely to go only one
way.
12 Even on a personal level, admitting one does anything because of concerns about
status is socially awkward, both for other people and oneself.
necessitate nuclear weapons, while many non-nuclear armed states look

out at the same uncertainty and pursue non-nuclear security. The most
that we can say is that the UK policymakers seem to believe, and certainly
claim that the UK maintains nuclear weapons for security reasons (see
Baylis & Stoddart, 2014).
This book departs quite dramatically from these conventional security
accounts of the UK nuclear policy. Instead of seeking to get into the
minds of the decision-makers, it investigates the public performances of
foreign policy. In contrast to these scholars, this book holds that the UK
government has considerable—though not hegemonic—discursive power
in (re)producing the discursive frame through which the British public
understand nuclear weapons, UK-Self, and international Others. Thus, in
contrast to asking why the UK has nuclear weapons, this book asks how
the UK government represents its nuclear weapon policy as legitimate
and desirable, which, as the following chapters will show, has not been
easy. Indeed, a “realist” rationale does not offer a diplomatically amenable
rationale, and moreover, the realist account of the international might at
any one moment legitimise the UK’s possession of nuclear weapons but
it still requires continuous discursive labour to maintain and marginalize
alternative renderings of “uncertainty”, “anarchy”, and the utility of
nuclear weapons in such a world. Nevertheless, some chinks of light
amidst this conventional research point the way towards problematising
the discursive maintenance of the UK’s nuclear weapons.
Towards a Discourse Analysis of British Nuclear Policy

Freedman (1980) offers just such a window when he writes of the
difficulties the UK has faced finding nuclear rationale that was not
diplomatically awkward. What Freedman considers the true rationale—
self-help and doubt about the US nuclear guarantee—could not be
articulated without undermining NATO and angering its allies. Mean-
while, expressing certainty in the US’s nuclear umbrella would have
made redundant the need for the UK’s own nuclear weapons. Thus,
according to Freedman, the UK hit upon the “second the centre of
decision-making” rationale that (just about) managed to designate a plau-
sible role for the UK’s nuclear weapons in NATO, without explicitly
30 P. BEAUMONT
expressing doubts about the US “nuclear umbrella”. Although Freed-

man’s is an explicitly objectivist account,13 his analysis here clearly alludes
to the discursive agency the UK government has had in constructing the
meaning for its nuclear weapons (and the world) and how this has enabled
the UK’s nuclear maintenance. Further, Freedman’s suggestion that the
UK’s public rationale “is not wholly convincing” (1980, p. 135), indi-
cates that finding a legitimate and desirable rationale—representation of
the world and the UK’s nuclear weapons—was not easy.
Echoing Freedman 15 years later, Witney (1994, 1995) describes how
the end of the Cold War prompted the need to “refurbish the rationale”,
but none of the options available seemed appealing. Witney’s refurbish-
ment metaphor more than hints at how the UK government has agency
in constructing—or perhaps, given the metaphor—painting a picture with
its foreign policy that enables its nuclear weapons maintenance. Further,
the difficulties Witney (1995, p. 5) identified, hints at the considerable
discursive labour and imagination that have been needed to keep the
UK’s nuclear deterrent from “death by atrophy” (as Witney puts it).
All this suggests that conducting a thorough discourse analysis of the
UK’s nuclear foreign policy performances should prove insightful for
understanding how the UK maintained its nuclear weapons.
Further grist for this book’s mill is found when Hamwee and
colleagues (1990) begin to problematise the representations of the UK
nuclear policymakers, even if their primary goal is only analysing the
assumptions of those particular individuals. The authors draw attention
to two discursive habits that serve as a useful prequel to Chapters 4
and 5. First, they note that the policymakers “slipped into a kind of
childish banter”, whenever they talked about nuclear war, in contrast to
the clear language they used elsewhere (Hamwee et al., 1990, pp. 360–
361). Further, the authors also remark upon the “insurance” metaphor
commonly used by the “decision-makers” which they note misleadingly
“assumes that the possession of nuclear weapons creates no risk for the
possessor of nuclear weapons, just as the payment of insurance creates
no risk for the policy holder” (1990, p. 261). While the authors do not
go further than a couple of paragraphs, their observations fit with much
wider international literature encompassing research as diverse as Carol
Cohn’s (1987) feminist ethnography of “defence intellectuals”, and the
13 Freedman (1980, p. xv) ends his introduction that the goal of his book is to provide
“a book of description and analysis rather than advocacy”.
Harvard Nuclear Study Group (1983, p. 12). The latter, for instance,
suggests that “Denial of the horrors of war can be witnessed among
civilian strategists, military men, and policymakers in the penchant for
euphemisms the use of innocuous language to mask the ugly reality of
war” (p.12). Drawing on nukespeak (see Chapter 3), and picking up on
the thread begun by Hamwee and colleagues, this book analyses how
the UK foreign policy representations of its nuclear weapons facilitate the
maintenance of their meaning as desirable and legitimate.
Status Explanations
The following section turns to one of the other most common expla-
nations given for the UK’s nuclear weapons: status. Indeed, there is no
shortage of sound-bites spanning the duration of the nuclear age that
support the view that the UK has nuclear weapons primarily to maintain
its international status. For example, Margaret Gowing (1986) argued
“The A-bomb was symbolic of American power and Britain believed
that to possess such a weapon would put the it on a similar level
[to the US], halting its decline into a second-class nation” (Cited in
Beach & Gurr, 1999, p. 22). Meanwhile, in 1980, the future Foreign
Minister, Robin Cook, argued in parliament “It is time that we adjusted
ourselves to the fact that we are a declining medium rage power and
looked first and foremost how we use our desperately scarce industrial
resources to commercial advantage rather than on grandiose projects
which we have inherited from the past” (HC Deb 28 April 1980 vol 977
cc718). In 2012, The former Defence Minister Michael Portillo (2012),
commenting on Britain’s renewal of Trident, described Trident as “all
nonsense: it is completely past it’s sell by date, it is neither independent,
neither is it any sort of deterrent, because now we are facing the sorts
of enemies, the Taliban, Al Qaeda, that cannot be deterred. It is done in
entirely for reasons of national prestige, it is a waste of money and at the
margins it is proliferatory”.
However, there has been very limited rigorous academic work investi-
gating the status or prestige the UK generates from its nuclear weapons.
This is unsurprising. In contrast to theories on nuclear security, until
recently there was no well-established theory—akin to neorealism—that
could be used to explore the utility in terms of prestige and status a
32 P. BEAUMONT
state acquires from its nuclear weapons.14 This is at least partly because
“prestige” and “status” are social objects: non-material, nebulous, highly
subjective, contested, and ill-defined (O’Neill, 2006). Thus, attempting
to demonstrate causality between whatever an author determines status to
be, and material outcomes is extremely difficult (Wohlforth, 2009). This
has meant that security scholars have long lacked the theoretical tools
to adequately investigate how status concerns inform nuclear policies.
Croft and Williams (1991) are an excellent example of the shortcomings,
though they do it more justice than most.
Indeed, British academic literature is littered with cursory sections,
paragraphs, and sentences which write-off the value or importance of
status arguably because the author cannot conceive, except in the simplest
terms, what status is, how it is generated, or what effects it has. The
references to Britain’s lack of a “seat at the top table” in order to write-
off the value of Britain’s nuclear weapons for status, aptly illustrate the
limitations of conventional security analysis for apprehending status. For
instance, Freedman (1980, p. 131) mocks “the seat at the top table”
notion of status, because the UK does not participate in strategic arms
control talks.15 Similarly, MccGwire (2006, p. 639) claims status used to
be important because the UK had a seat at the Soviet–US arms control
negotiations in the 1950s, but since they lost it in the 1960s, “Nuclear
weapons became the lace curtains of Britain’s political poverty”. These
are typically literal materialist measurements of status that need to have
clearly observable material utility, a utility evaluated by the analyst. Mean-
while, similar problems arise in the discussions over whether the UK’s
seat on the UN Security Council is dependent on the UK’s possession
of nuclear weapons. Quinlan (2006) argues that the UK’s seat on the
Security Council is not dependent on its nuclear weapons, leading him
14 This has been addressed in the last decade. Major works include: de Carvalho and
Neumann (2015), Wohlforth, De Carvalho, Leira, and Neumann (2018), Wohlforth
(2009), Paul, Larson, and Wohlforth (2014), Larson and Shevchenko (2003, 2019),
Volgy, Corbetta, Grant, and Baird (2011), Duque (2018), Onea (2014), Wolf (2019),
Gotz (2020), Barnhart (2016, 2020), Røren (2019, 2020), Røren and Beaumont (2019),
Freedman (2016, 2020), Clunan (2009); Gilady (2018), and Murray (2018). Moreover,
a nascent strand of this research agenda has recognised the potential of taking a discursive
approach to status and/or begun to theorise the domestic audience as a crucial audi-
ence for “international” status seeking (Beaumont, 2017, 2020; Lin & Katada, 2020; Pu,
2019; Ward, 2013, 2017).
15 10 years later Croft and Williams (1991) cite Freedman’s argument uncritiqued.
to conclude that it is unimportant for Britain’s nuclear policymakers.

Conversely, MccGwire (2006), while agreeing with Quinlan’s analysis
that the nuclear weapons do not affect the UK’s membership of the P5,
suggests instead that this demonstrates how the UK policymakers wrongly
factor this consideration into the cost–benefit analysis of the utility of
British nuclear weapons.
There are two common examples that illustrate the limitations of
conventional methodology in attempting to account for the effects of
status. Indeed, this type of analysis has led to various scholars concluding
that status and political gains from nuclear weapons possession are
limited. However, depending on the scholar’s assumptions about the
value of deterrence this leads to different conclusions: Quinlan (“The
High Priest of Deterrence”) concludes that because status effects are
weak, security concerns must be important.16 While MccGwire (2006), a
long-term critic of Deterrence (MccGwire, 1984, 1986a, 1986b, 2001,
2002) suggests this indicates that policymakers wrongly attribute status
to nuclear weapons. A simple pattern emerges in the debate; if a scholar
believes in the security utility of deterrence for the UK they tend to favour
the security explanations and downplay status (For example, Bowen,
2010; Freedman, 1980; Quinlan, 2006) whereas if a scholar is suspicious
of the utility of deterrence for the UK, then the status is emphasised in
their explanation (Beach, 2009; MccGwire, 2006; Ritchie, 2010). Few
assert that the UK has its nuclear weapons for status, but maintain that
they are particularly useful as a deterrent, nor does anyone argue the
opposite: that nuclear weapons provide utility for the UK in terms of
status, but not as a deterrent.
Status vs. Security: The Wrong Question

Given how the motivations of decision-makers are not directly observable,
the objects investigated are neither material nor easily measurable, nor
necessarily independent, the debate was perhaps still born—at least with
the methodology applied—from the get-go. Nonetheless the debate has
16 Quinlan, the leading Ministry of Defence nuclear weapons specialist, was given this
nickname post-humously in an article in the Journal of Catholic Thought (Jones, 2013)
Given the journal, it seems this was meant as a compliment, however it may also be a
nod to the common anti-nuclearist attack on nuclear weapons advocates that subscribing
to nuclear deterrence has more in common with religious faith rather than science.
Another random document with
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populace of the city, some twenty-five thousand,[202] staring their
wonderment with open eyes and mouth, thronged either side of the
way along which marched the army in battle array, headed by the
cavalry. Never before had the Spaniards seen so beautiful an
American city. Cortés called it Seville, a name which Spaniards
frequently applied to any place that pleased them, as we have seen,
while the soldiers, charmed with its floral wealth and beauty, termed
it Villaviciosa, and declared it a terrestrial paradise. One of the
cavalry scouts, on first beholding the freshly stuccoed walls gleaming
in the sun, came galloping back with the intelligence that the houses
were silver-plated. It was indeed an important place, holding a large
daily market. A central plaza was inclosed by imposing temples and
palaces, resting on pyramidal foundations, lined with apartments and
surmounted by towers, and around clustered neat dwellings with
whitened adobe walls embowered in foliage. Statelier edifices of
masonry, some having several court-yards, rose here and there,
while in every direction spread an extensive suburb of mud huts with
the never failing palm-leaf roof. Yet even the humblest abodes were
smothered in flowers.[203] The people also, as we might expect by
their surroundings, were of a superior order, well formed, of
intelligent aspect, clothed in neat white and colored cotton robes and
mantles, the nobles being adorned with golden necklaces, bracelets,
and nose and lip rings, set with pearls and precious stones.
When the troops reached the plaza, Chicomacatl,[204] lord of the

province, stepped from the palace to receive his guests. He was
supported by two nobles, and though enormously stout,[205] his
features denoted high intelligence, and his manner refinement. He
was more of a gentleman than many of the Spaniards, whose
merriment over his corpulence Cortés was obliged to repress. After
saluting and wafting incense before the commander of the strange
company, Chicomacatl embraced Cortés and led him to his quarters
in the spacious halls adjoining the temple, after which he retired for a
time. There the men rested and refreshed themselves, guards being
carefully posted, for Cortés would not trust his fate to strangers, and
strict orders were given that no one should leave the building.[206]
It was not long before Chicomacatl returned in a litter with a
richly attired suite, bringing presents of fine robes, and jewels worth
about two thousand ducats. During the conversation that ensued,
Cortés as usual extolled the greatness and power of his king, and
spoke warmly of his mission to replace their bloody religion with a
knowledge of the true God. Were there wrongs to redress, that is to
say, when opportunity offered for the perpetration of a greater wrong
by himself, no knight of La Mancha or Amadis of Gaul could be more
valiant than he. In return the chief of Cempoala unbosomed himself,
for the manner of Cortés was winning, and his speech inspired
confidence whenever he chose to make it so. Then his fame, already
wide-spread over the land, and the dim uncertainty as to his nature,
whether more celestial or terrestrial, added weight to his words. So
Chicomacatl poured forth from an overflowing heart a torrent of
complaints against the tyranny of Montezuma. He drew for the
Spaniards a historic outline of the Aztecs—how a people the
youngest in the land had, at first by cunning and treachery, and
finally by forced allies and preponderance of arms, built their power
upon the ruin of older states. The Totonacs, whose records as an
independent nation in this region extended over seven centuries,
had succumbed only some twenty-five years before this.[207] And
now Montezuma’s collectors overran the provinces, gathering heavy
tributes, seizing the beautiful maidens, and conveying the men into
slavery or to the sacrificial stone. Neither life, liberty, nor property
could be enjoyed with any degree of safety.
Whereat Cortés of course was indignant. It was his special
business to do all the tyrannizing in that region himself; his sword
would give ample protection to his new allies, and bring abundant
honor to his king and himself. Let but the people prove loyal to him,
he concluded, and he surely would deliver them from the hated yoke;
yet he did not mention the more fatal bondage into which he would
place them. Chicomacatl eagerly assured Cortés of support from the
Totonacs, numbering fifty thousand warriors, with numerous towns
and fortresses.[208] Furthermore, there were many other states ready
to join an insurrection which should prove strong enough to brave
the terrible Montezuma.
Their visit over,[209] the Spaniards continued their march

northward to join the fleet. Four hundred tlamamas, or carriers,
attended, in courtesy to honored guests, to relieve the soldiers of
their burdens. The following day they reached Quiahuiztlan, a
fortified town about a league from the sea. This town was
picturesquely placed on a rocky promontory bordering one of the
many wild ravines thereabout, and of difficult access, commanding
the plain and harbor at its base.[210] The army advanced cautiously,
in battle array,[211] but the place was deserted. On reaching the
plaza, however, some fifteen chiefs came forward with swinging
censers, and apologized, saying that the people had fled, not
knowing what the strange arrival portended, but reassured by the
Cempoalans, they were already returning to serve them. The
soldiers then took possession of a large building, where food was
brought them. Presently the chief appeared; and close at his heels in
hot haste came the lord of Cempoala, who announced that the Aztec
collectors had entered his city.[212] While conferring with Cortés and
the chiefs assembled, Chicomacatl was informed that the collectors,
five[213] in number, had followed him to Quiahuiztlan, and were even
then at the door. All the chiefs present turned pale, and hastened out
to humble themselves before the officers, who responded with
disdainful condescension. The officers were clad in embroidered
robes, with a profusion of jewelry, and wore the hair gathered upon
the crown. In the right hand they carried their insignia of office, a
hooked carved stick, and in the left a bunch of roses, the ever
welcome offering of the obsequious Totonac nobles who swelled
their train. A suite of servitors followed, some with fans and dusters,
for the comfort of their masters. Passing the Spanish quarter without
deigning to salute the strangers, the emissaries of the mighty
Montezuma entered another large building, and after refreshing
themselves summoned the tributary chiefs, reprimanded them for
having received the Spaniards without permission from Montezuma,
and demanded twenty young persons for an atoning sacrifice. Well
might the demoniacal order cause to tremble every youth throughout
the land; for whose turn should be next none could tell. Even the
faces of the chiefs were blanched as they told Cortés, informing him
also that it was already determined in Aztec circles to make slaves of
the Spaniards, and after being used awhile for purposes of
procreation, they were to be sacrificed.[214] Cortés laughed, and
ordered the Totonacs to seize the insolent officials. What! lay violent
hands on Montezuma’s messengers? The very thought to them was
appalling. Nevertheless they did it, for there was something in the
tone of Cortés that made them obey, though they could not
distinguish the meaning of his words. They laid hold on those tax-
men of Montezuma, put collars on their necks, and tied their hands
and feet to poles.[215] Their timidity thus broken, they became
audacious, and demanded the sacrifice of the prisoners.[216] “By no
means,” Cortés said, and he himself assumed their custody.
Howsoever the cards fall to him, a skilful gamester plays each
severally, nothing cavilling, at its worth. So Cortés now played these
messengers, the method assuming form in his mind immediately he
saw them. With him this whole Mexican business was one great
game, a life game, though it should last but a day; and as the
agencies and influences of it fell into his fingers, with the subtlety of
the serpent he dealt them out, placing one here and another there,
playing with equal readiness enemy against enemy, and multiplying
friends by friends.
These so lately pride-puffed tribute-men, now low laid in the
depths of despondency—how shall they be played? Well, let them
be like him who fell amongst thieves, while the Spanish commander
acts the good Samaritan. In pursuance of which plan, when all had
retired for the night, he went stealthily to them, asked who they were,
and why they were in that sad plight, pretending ignorance. And
when they told him, this rare redresser was angry, hot with
indignation that the noble representatives of so noble a monarch
should be so treated. Whereupon he instantly released two of them,
comforting the others with the assurance that their deliverance
should quickly follow; for the emperor Montezuma he esteemed
above all emperors, and he desired to serve him, as commanded by
his king. Then he sent the twain down the coast in a boat, beyond
the Totonac boundary.
Next morning, when told that two of the Aztec captives had
broken their bonds and escaped, the Totonacs were more urgent
than ever for the immolation of the others. But Cortés again said no,
and arranged that they should be sent in chains on board one of his
vessels, determined afterward to release them, for they were worth
far more to his purpose alive than dead.
It is refreshing at this juncture to hear pious people censure
Cortés for his duplicity, and to hear other pious people defend him on
the ground of necessity, or otherwise. Such men might with equal
reason wrangle over the method by which it was right and honorable
for the tiger to spring and seize the hind. The one great wrong is lost
sight of in the discussion of numerous lesser wrongs. The murderer
of an empire should not be too severely criticised for crushing a gnat
while on the way about the business.[217]
At the suggestion of Cortés, messengers were sent to all the
towns of the province, with orders to stop the payment of tribute and
to seize the collectors, but to spare their lives. Information was
likewise to be given to the neighboring nations, that all might prepare
to resist the force which Montezuma would probably send against
them. The Totonacs became wild with joy, and declared that the little
band who dare so brave Montezuma must be more than men.[218] To
Quiahuitzlan flocked chiefs and nobles from all parts, eager to
behold these beings, and to ascertain their own future course of
action. There were those among them still timid, who urged an
embassy to the king of kings, to beseech pardon before his army
should be upon them, slaying, enslaving, and laying waste; but
Cortés had already influence, was already strong enough to allay
their fears, and bring them all into allegiance to the Spanish
sovereign, exacting their oath before the notary Godoy to support
him with all their forces. Thus, by virtue of this man’s mind, many
battles were fought and won without the striking of a blow. Already
every Spaniard there was a sovereign, and the meanest soldier
among them a ruler of men.
FOOTNOTES
[176] Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 27. Herrera, dec. ii. lib. v. cap. vi., and others
refer to a similar number as being on the sick-list. Yellow fever, or vómito negro,
now the scourge of this and adjoining regions, appears to have developed with the
growth of European settlements, and Clavigero states that it was not known there
before 1725. Storia Mess., i. 117.
[177] ‘Hasta el parage del rio grande de Pánuco,’ Herrera, loc. cit. ‘Llegaron al
parage del rio grande, que es cerca de Panuco, adonde otra vez llegamos quãdo
lo del Capitá Juan de Grijalua.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 27.
[178] ‘Doze dias que gastaron en este peligroso viage.’ Herrera, ubi sup. ‘Boluiose
al cabo de tres semanas ... le salian los de la costa, y se sacauã sangre, y se la
ofreciã en pajuelos por amistad a deidad.’ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 45.
[179] Ixtlilxochitl, Hist. Chich., 289. Quiauitl, rain or shower. Molina, Vocabulario.
Hence rainy place. Herrera calls it Chianhuitzlan, and this has been adopted by
Clavigero and most other writers. Prescott, Mex., i. 348, in a note holds up
Clavigero as a standard for the spelling of Mexican names, but he forgets that the
Italian form, as in the above case, would be misleading to English people.
[180] ‘Le llamarõ Vernal, por ser, como es, vn Cerro alto.’ Vetancvrt, Teatro Mex.,
pt. iii. 115. This may have been the origin of the name for the Spanish port, after
which Bernal Diaz says it was called. Hist. Verdad., 27. He applies the name to a
neighboring fort, spelling it in different ways, of which Solis, and consequently
Robertson, have selected the most unlikely. Gomara applies Aquiahuiztlan to the
harbor. Hist. Mex., 49.
[181] Bernal Diaz relates with great satisfaction how earnestly the speaker
pleaded for his vote, addressing him repeatedly as ‘your worship.’ One reason for
their earnestness, he implies, was the superiority in number of the Velazquez
party. ‘Los deudos, y amigos del Diego Velazquez, que eran muchos mas que
nosotros.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 28-9. He forms this estimate most likely on
the proportion of leaders who from jealousy of Cortés, and for other reasons, were
addicted to Velazquez; but their men were probably more in favor of the general
than of the captains, to judge from the result. The sailors for obvious reasons may
have added to the Velazquez number, if not to their strength.
[182] ‘Se hazia mucho de rogar: y como dize el refran: Tu me lo ruegas, è yo me

lo quiero.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 29.
[183] ‘Se puso vna picota en la plaça, y fuera de la Uilla vna horca.’ Bernal Diaz,
Hist. Verdad., 29; Vetancvrt, Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 116. This signifies that justice was
installed, its officers being next appointed.
[184] See note 23, chap. ii., this volume.
[185] ‘Nombrónos ... por alcaldes y regidores,’ say distinctly the appointed officers
themselves, in their letter to the emperor. Carta del Ayunt., in Cortés, Cartas, 20.
Bernal Diaz also indicates that Cortés made the appointments, although he at first
says, ‘hizimos Alcalde, y Regidores.’ Yet it is probable that the authorities were
confirmed formally as they were tacitly by the members of the expedition; for
Cortés, as he acknowledges, had no real authority to form a settlement.
[186] Testimonio de Montejo, in Col. Doc. Inéd., i. 489. ‘Â este Montejo porque no
estaua muy bien con Cortés, por metelle en los primeros, y principal, le mandò
nombrar por Alcalde.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 29.
[187] Herrera, dec. ii. lib. v. cap. vii; Torquemada, i. 587. Bernal Diaz skips the
regidores. He thinks Villareal was not reappointed alférez because of a difficulty
with Cortés about a Cuban female. Hist. Verdad., 29; Vetancvrt, Teatro Mex., pt. iii.
116. Promotion and other causes gave speedy rise to changes among the
officials; Ávila, for instance, becoming alcalde mayor of New Spain, and Pedro de
Alvarado alcalde of the town.
[188] ‘Los q̄ para esto estauã auisados, sin dar lugar a que nadie tomasse la
mano. A vozes respõdierõ Cortes, Cortes.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. v. cap. vii. Bernal
Diaz merely intimates that a ‘packed’ meeting was held, by stating that the men of
Velazquez were furious on finding Cortés and the municipality elected, declaring,
‘q̄ no era bien hecho sin ser sabidores dello todos los Capitanes, y soldados.’ Hist.
Verdad., 29. This indicates also that many of the opponents must have been sent
away from camp for the occasion, perhaps on board the vessels. Montejo had
besides a number with him.
[189] ‘El qual como si nada supiera del caso, preguntò que era lo que mandauã.’
Having signified his acceptance, ‘Quisierõ besarle las manos por ello, como cosa
al bien de todos.’ Herrera, ubi sup.
[190] Gomara says frankly, ‘Cortés acepto el cargo de capitan general y justicia
mayor, a pocos ruegos, porq̄ no desseaua otra cosa mas por entonces.’ Hist.
Mex., 48. ‘Y no tuvo vergüenza Gomara,’ is Las Casas’ comment on the
admission. Hist. Ind., iv. 496. Bernal Diaz states that Cortés had made it a
condition, when the army pleaded to remain in the country, that he should receive
these offices: ‘Y lo peor de todo que le otorgamos que le dariamos el quinto del
oro.’ Hist. Verdad., 29. The letter of the ayuntamiento to the emperor sets forth
that they had represented to Cortés the injustice of trading gold for the sole benefit
of Velazquez and himself, and the necessity of securing the country and its wealth
for the king by founding a colony, which would also benefit them all in the
distribution of grants. They had accordingly urged him to stop barter as hitherto
carried on, and to found a town. It is then related how he yielded his own interest
in favor of king and community, and appointed them alcaldes and regidores. His
authority having in consequence become null, they appointed him in the king’s
name justicia, alcalde mayor, and captain, as the ablest and most loyal man, and
in consideration of his expenses and services so far. Carta 10 Jul., 1519, in
Cortés, Cartas, 19-21. Both Puertocarrero and Montejo confirm, in their testimony
before the authorities in Spain, that Cortés yielded to the general desire in doing
what he did. Col. Doc. Inéd., i. 489, 493-4. According to Gomara, Cortés makes a
trip into the neighboring country, and, finding how rich it is, he proposes to settle,
and to send the vessels to Cuba for more men wherewith to undertake the
conquest. This was approved: Cortés accordingly appointed the municipality, and
resigning the authority conferred by the Jeronimite Fathers and by Velazquez, as
now useless, these officers in turn elected him as their captain-general and justicia
mayor. The council proposed that, since the only provisions remaining belonged to
Cortés, he should take from the vessels what he needed for himself and servants,
and distribute the rest among the men at a just price, their joint credit being
pledged for payment. The fleets and outfit were to be accepted by the company in
the same way, the vessels to be used to carry provisions from the islands.
Scorning the idea of trading his possessions, Cortés surrendered the fleet and
effects for free distribution among his companions. Although liberal at all times
with them, this act was prompted by a desire to gain good-will. Hist. Mex., 46-8;
Herrera, dec. ii. lib. v. cap. vii.; Torquemada, i. 395, 587. Las Casas terms the
whole transaction, as related by Gomara and the ayuntamiento, a plot to defraud
Velazquez of his property and honors. Comparing the conduct of Cortés with that
of Velazquez against Colon, he finds the latter trifling and pardonable, while the
former was a barefaced robbery, resulting to Velazquez in loss of fortune, honors,
and life. The captains were accomplices. Hist. Ind., iv. 453, 494-6. Peter Martyr
gives the facts in brief without venturing an opinion, dec. v. cap. i.; Zumárraga, in
Ramirez, Doc., MS., 271-2. Cortés still held out the offer to furnish a vessel for
those who preferred to return to Cuba. As for Velazquez’ goods, they remained
safely in charge of the authorized agent, who also recovered the advances made
to members. See note 5, cap. v.
[191] As for the ayuntamiento, the passive recognition accorded to it, confirmed as
it was by the popularly elected general, may be regarded as sufficient. Spanish
municipal bodies possessed an extensive power conferred upon them during
successive reigns, chiefly with a view to afford the sovereign a support against the
assuming arrogance of the nobles. Their deliberations were respected; they could
appoint members, regulate their expenses, and even raise troops under their own
standard. As an instance of the consideration enjoyed by these troops, it is related
that Isabella the Catholic, when reviewing the army besieging Moclin, gave a
special salute of respect to the banner of Seville. Alaman, Disert., i. 612;
Zamacois, Hist. Méj., ii. 401-2.
[192] According to Gomara, Cortés enters the country with 400 men and all the
horses, before the election had been mooted. He describes the towns visited. Hist.
Mex., 46-8. Bernal Diaz pronounces the number of men and the time of entry
false. He also states that Montejo was bought over for 2000 pesos and more. Hist.
Verdad., 30.
[193] According to Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 30, gold played an important role in
effecting this change of allegiance, termed by Velazquez, in his Memorials to
Spain, a witchery. Solis sees nothing but the dignified yet clever traits of his hero
in all this.
[194] The soldiers called them Lopelucios, because their first inquiry was
Lopelucio, ‘chief,’ whom they wished to see. They had not ventured to approach
while the Mexicans were at the camp. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 28.
[195] According to Gomara, followed by Herrera, the Totonacs were about twenty
in number, and came while Teuhtlile was absent on his second mission to Mexico,
without bringing a direct invitation to the Spaniards. Hist. Mex., 43-4.
[196] See Native Races, v. 475-7.
[197] Ixtlilxochitl, Hist. Chich., 288. This author is not very careful, however, and
his desire to court the Spaniards has no doubt led him to antedate the event.
Brasseur de Bourbourg accepts his story in full. Hist. Nat. Civ., iv. 87-8. A similar
revelation is claimed to have been made by two Aztec chiefs, Vamapantzin and
Atonaltzin, who came to the camp in the retinue of the first messengers from
Mexico. Descendants of the early Aztec kings, and discontented with the present
ruler, they promised Cortés to deliver certain native paintings foretelling the
coming of white men, to reveal the whereabouts of the imperial treasures, and to
plot an uprising among native states in aid of Spaniards. For these services they
received extensive grants after the conquest, including that of Ajapusco town. The
document recording this is a fragment which Zerecero parades in the opening part
of his Mem. Rev. Méx., 8-14, as a discovery by him in the Archivo General. It
pretends to be a title to Ajapusco lands, and contains on the first pages a letter
signed by Cortés at San Juan de Ulua, ‘20 March,’ 1519, as ‘Captain-general and
governor of these New Spains.’ Both the date and titles stamp the letter at least as
more than suspicious.
[198] The natives called it Citlaltepetl, starry mountain, with reference probably to
the sparks issuing from it. For height, etc., see Humboldt, Essai Pol., i. 273.
Brasseur de Bourbourg gives it the unlikely name of Ahuilizapan. Hist. Nat. Civ., iv.
99. The ending ‘pan’ implies a district or town, not a mountain. The description in
Carta del Ayunt., in Cortés, Cartas, 22-3, expresses doubt whether the whiteness
of the summit is due to snow or to clouds.
[199] Alvarado chased a deer, and succeeded in wounding it, but the next moment
the dense underbrush saved it from pursuit. The Carta del Ayunt., loc. cit., gives a
list of birds and quadrupeds; and a descriptive account, founded greatly on fancy,
however, is to be found in the curious Erasmi Francisci Guineischer und
Americanischer Blumen-Pusch, Nürnberg, 1669, wherein the compiler presents
under the title of a nosegay the ‘perfume of the wonders of strange animals, of
peculiar customs, and of the doings of the kings of Peru and Mexico.’ The first of
its two parts is devoted to the animal kingdom, with particular attention to the
marvellous, wherein credulity finds free play, as may be seen also in the flying
dragon of one of the crude engravings. In the second part, the aborigines, their
history, condition, and customs, are treated of, chiefly under Peru and Mexico,
chapter v. relating specially to the latter country. The narrative is quite superficial
and fragmentary; the ‘nosegay’ being not only common but faded, even the style
and type appearing antiquated for the date. Appended is Hemmersam, Guineische
und West-Indianische Reissbeschreibung, with addition by Dietherr, relating to
Africa and Brazil.
[200] ‘A tres leguas andadas llego al rio que parte termino con tierras de
Montecçuma.’ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 49; Torquemada, i. 395.
[201] Gomara, who ignores the previous night’s camp, states that the detour up
the river was made to avoid marshes. They saw only isolated huts, and fields, and
also about twenty natives, who were chased and caught. By them they were
guided to the hamlet. Hist. Mex., 49. They met one hundred men bringing them
food. Ixtlilxochitl, Hist. Chich., 289. Prescott allows the Spaniards to cross only a
tributary of la Antigua, and yet gain Cempoala. Mex., i. 339-40.
[202] Las Casas says 20,000 to 30,000. Hist. Ind., iv. 492. Torquemada varies in
different places from 25,000 to 150,000. The inhabitants were moved by Conde de
Monterey to a village in Jalapa district, and in Torquemada’s time less than half a
dozen remained. i. 397. ‘Dista de Vera-Cruz quatro leguas, y las ruínas dan á
entender la grandeza de la Ciudad; pero es distinto de otro Zempoal ... que dista
de este doze leguas.’ Lorenzana, in Cortés, Hist. N. España, 39. ‘Assentada en vn
llano entre dos rios.’ A league and a half from the sea. Herrera, dec. ii. lib. v. cap.
viii.
[203] ‘Cempoal, que yo intitulé Sevilla.’ Cortés, Cartas, 52. See Native Races, ii.
553-90; iv. 425-63, on Nahua architecture.
[204] Ixtlilxochitl, Hist. Chich., 294. Brasseur de Bourbourg, by a misconstruction

of his authorities, calls him Tlacochcalcatl. Codex Chimalpopoca, in Brasseur de
Bourbourg, Hist. Nat. Civ., iv. 93. See Sahagun, Hist. Conq., 16.
[205] ‘Una gordura monstruosa.... Fue necesario que Cortés detuviesse la risa de
los soldados.’ Solis, Hist. Mex., i. 175.
[206] ‘Se hizo el alojamento en el patio del Templo mayor.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. v.
cap. viii.
[207] For the reigns of their kings, see Torquemada, i. 278-80. Robertson, Hist.
Am., ii. 31, wrongly assumes the Totonacs to be a fierce people, different from
Cempoalans.
[208] ‘Toda aquella provincia de Cempoal y toda la sierra comarcana á la dicha
villa, que serán hasta cinquenta mil hombres de guerra y cincuenta villas y
fortalezas.’ Cortés, Cartas, 53. ‘Cien mil hõbres entre toda la liga.’ Gomara, Hist.
Mex., 57. ‘En aquellas tierras de la lengua de Totonaque, que eran mas de trienta
pueblos.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 31. The province appears to have extended
from Rio de la Antigua to Huaxtecapan, in the north of Vera Cruz, and from the
sea to Zacatlan, in Puebla. Patiño assumes Mixquhuacan to have been the
capital, but this must be a mistake.
[209] Gomara relates that the army remained at Cempoala fifteen days, during
which frequent visits were made by the lord, Cortés paying the first return visit on
the third day, attended by fifty soldiers. He describes briefly the palace, and how
Cortés, seated by the side of the lord, on icpalli stools, now won his confidence
and adhesion. Hist. Mex., 51-3; Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 561;
Herrera, dec. ii. lib. v. cap. x. Bernal Diaz declares Gomara wrong, and insists that
they proceeded on their way the following day. Hist. Verdad., 31; Clavigero, Storia
Mess., iii. 26-7.
[210] For illustrated description of barranca ruins, see Native Races, iv. 439 et
seq.
[211] Ávila, who had command, was so strict as to lance Hernando Alonso de
Villanueva for not keeping in line. Lamed in the arm, he received the nickname of
el Manquillo. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 31. The riders were obliged to retain their
seats, lest the Indians should suppose that the horses could be deterred by any
obstacles. Gomara, Hist. Mex., 53.
[212] Vetancvrt, Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 117. Others suppose that he came merely to
persuade the cacique to join Cortés. Clavigero, Storia Mess., iii. 27.
[213] Four men. Ixtlilxochitl, Hist. Chich., 289. ‘Twenty men,’ says Gomara, Hist.
Mex., 54, who does not refer to the arrival of Cempoala’s lord.
[214] ‘Monteçuma tenia pensamiẽnto, ... de nos auer todos á las manos, para que
hiziessemos generacion, y tambien para tener que sacrificar.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist.
Verdad., 28.
[215] ‘Carcerati nelle loro gabbie,’ is the way Clavigero puts it. Storia Mess., iii. 28.
One was even whipped for resisting.
[216] ‘Porque no se les fuesse alguno dellos á dar mandado á Mexico,’ is Bernal
Diaz’ reason for it. Hist. Verdad., 32.
[217] ‘Condotta artifiziosa, e doppia,’ etc., says Clavigero, Storia Mess., iii. 28,
while Solis lauds it as ‘Grande artífice de medir lo que disponia, con lo que
rezelaba: y prudente Capitan.’ Hist. Mex., i. 186.
[218] ‘Desde alli adelante nos llamaron Teules,’ says Bernal Diaz, with great
satisfaction. Hist Verdad., 32. ‘A los Españoles llamaron teteuh, que quiere decir
dioses, y los Españoles corrompiendo el vocablo decian teules, el cual nombre les
duró mas de tres años,’ till we stopped it, declaring that there was but one God.
Motolinia, Hist. Ind., i. 142-3. See note 16.
CHAPTER X.
MULTIPLICATION OF PLOTS.
June-July, 1519.
Cortés, Diplomate and General—The Municipality of Villa Rica Located—

Excitement throughout Anáhuac—Montezuma Demoralized—Arrival of
the Released Collectors at the Mexican Capital—The Order for
Troops Countermanded—Montezuma Sends an Embassy to Cortés—
Chicomacatl Asks Aid against a Mexican Garrison—A Piece of
Pleasantry—The Velazquez Men Refuse to Accompany the Expedition—
Opportunity Offered them to Return to Cuba, which they Decline
through Shame—The Totonacs Rebuked—The Cempoala Brides—
Destruction of the Idols—Arrival at Villa Rica of Salcedo—Efforts of
Velazquez with the Emperor—Cortés Sends Messengers to Spain—
Velazquez Orders them Pursued—The Letters of Cortés—Audiencia of
the Emperor at Tordesillas.
Palamedes invented the game of chess while watching before

the gates of Troy; a tame business, truly, beside the achievements of
the heaven-born Achilles, the hero of the war. Yet chess remains,
while Achilles and his heaven have melted with the mists. Who shall
say, then, which was the greater, Cortés the soldier, or Cortés the
diplomate? But these were barbarians, one says, with whom the
shrewd Spaniards had to deal; they had neither horses, nor iron, nor
gunpowder, to aid them in their wars. Furthermore, they regarded the
strangers fully as demi-gods, probably as some of their own
wandering deities returned. True; but he makes a great mistake who
rates the Mexicans so far beneath Europeans in natural ability and
cunning. Montezuma lacked some of the murderous enginery that
Cortés had, and his inner life was of different dye; that was about all.
If any would place Cortés, his genius, and his exploits, below those
of the world’s greatest generals, because he warred on enemies
weaker than their enemies, we have only to consider the means at
his command, how much less was his force than theirs. What could
the Scipios or the Cæsars have done with half a thousand men; or
Washington, or Wellington, with five hundred against five hundred
thousand? Napoleon’s tactics were always to have at hand more
forces than the enemy. In this the Corsican displayed his astuteness.
But a keener astuteness was required by Cortés to conquer
thousands with hundreds and with tens. Perhaps Moltke, who, with a
stronger force, could wage successful war on France, perhaps he,
and a handful of his veterans, could land on the deadly shores of the
Mexican Gulf, and with Montezuma there, and all the interior as dark
to them as Erebus, by strategy and force of arms possess
themselves of the country. I doubt it exceedingly. I doubt if one in ten
of the greatest generals who ever lived would have achieved what
the base bastard Pizarro did in Peru. The very qualities which made
them great would have deterred them from anything which, viewed in
the light of experience and reason, was so wildly chimerical. Then
give these birds of prey their petting, I say; they deserve it. And be
fame or infamy immortal ever theirs! Lastly, if any still suspect the
genius of Cortés unable to cope with others than Indians, let them
observe how he handles his brother Spaniards.
It was about time the municipality should find anchorage; too
much travelling by a town of such immaculate conception, of so
much more than ordinary signification, were not seemly. Velazquez
would deride it; the emperor Charles would wonder at it: therefore
half a league below Quiahuiztlan, in the dimpled plain which
stretches from its base to the harbor of Bernal at present protecting
the ships, where bright waters commingling with soft round hills and
rugged promontories were lifted into ethereal heights by the misted
sunshine, the whole scene falling on the senses like a vision, and not
like tame reality, there they chose a site for the Villa Rica,[219] and
drew a plan of the town, distributed lots, laid the foundations for forts
and batteries, granary, church, town-hall, and other buildings, which
were constructed chiefly of adobe, the whole being inclosed by a
strong stockade. To encourage alike men and officers to push the
work, Cortés himself set the example in preparing for the structures,
and in carrying earth and stones. The natives also lent their aid, and
in a few weeks the town stood ready, furnishing a good shipping
depot, a fortress for the control of the interior, a starting-point for
operations, an asylum for the sick and wounded, and a refuge for the
army in case of need.
Great was the excitement in Anáhuac and the regions round
about over the revolt of the Totonacs and the attitude assumed by
the Spaniards; and while hope swelled the breast of subjected
peoples, the Aztec nobles, seeing revolution in the signs of the
times, began to look to the safety of their families and estates.[220]
To Montezuma the seizure of his collectors was an outrage on the
sacredness of his majesty, and a slur on his power, which the council
declared must be punished in the most prompt and effective manner,
lest other provinces should follow the example. And yet the monarch
had no stomach for the business. Ofttimes since these accursed
strangers touched his shores would he willingly have resigned that
which he above all feared to lose, his sceptre and his life; then again,
as appetite returned and existence was loaded with affluent
pleasure, he sighed to taste the sweets of power a little longer. He
was becoming sadly pusillanimous, an object of contempt before his
gods, his nobles, and himself. It seemed to him as if the heavens
had fallen on him and held him inexorably to earth. There was no
escape. There were none to pity. He was alone. His very gods were
recreant, cowering before the approach of other gods. Repressing
his misgivings as best he might, he issued orders for an immediate
descent of the army on the offenders. Let the mettle of these beings
be proven, and let them live or die with their Totonac allies. To this
end let levies be made of men and money on a long-suffering
people, whose murmurs shall be drowned in the groans of fresh
victims on the sacrificial altar of the war god.[221]
See now how powerfully had wagged that little forked tongue of
Cortés! See how those gentle whisperings that night at Quiahuiztlan,
those soft dissemblings breathed into the ears of two poor captives
—see how they shot forth like winged swords to stop an army on the
point of marching to its slaughters! Here, as in scores of other
instances, Cortés’ shrewdness saved him from disaster.
For in the midst of the warlike preparations arrived the two
released collectors, and their presentation of the magnanimity of the
white chief, of his friendly conduct and warm assurances, materially
changed the aspect of affairs. There was no alliance; there was no
rebellion; the Totonacs dared not rebel without foreign support; with
them Montezuma would settle presently. And with no little alacrity did
he countermand the order for troops, and send an embassy to
Cortés. Thus through the vacillating policy which now possessed the
Mexican monarch was lost the opportunity to strike the enemy
perhaps a fatal blow; and thus by that far off impalpable breath was
fought and won another battle, this time vanquishing the king of
kings himself, with his hundred thousand men.
The embassy sent comprised two of Montezuma’s nephews,[222]

accompanied by four old and honorable caciques. They were to
express the monarch’s thanks to the Spaniards, and to remonstrate
against the revolt encouraged by their presence. He had become
assured that they were of the race predicted by his forefathers, and
consequently of his own lineage; out of regard for them, as guests of
the revolted people, he would withhold present chastisement. A gift
of robes and feather-work, and gold worth two thousand castellanos,
accompanied the message.[223]
We cannot blame Cortés if his heart danced to its own music as
he assured the envoys that he and all his people continued devoted
to their master; in proof of which he straightway produced the other
three collectors, safe, sound, and arrayed in their new attire.[224]
Nevertheless, he could but express displeasure at the abrupt
departure of the Mexicans from the former camp. This act had forced
him to seek hospitality at the hand of the Totonacs, and for their kind
reception of him they deserved to be forgiven. Further than this, they
had rendered the Spaniards great benefits, and should not be
expected to serve two masters, or to pay double tribute; for the rest,
Cortés himself would soon come to Mexico and arrange everything.
The envoys replied that their sovereign was too engrossed in serious
affairs to be able as yet to appoint an interview. “Adieu,” they
concluded, “and beware of the Totonacs, for they are a treacherous
race.” Not to create needless alarm, nor leave on the minds of the
envoys at their departure unpleasant impressions concerning his
projects, Cortés entertained them hospitably, astonished them with
cavalry and other exhibitions, and gratified them with presents. The
effect of this visit was to raise still higher the Spaniards in the
estimation not only of the Aztecs, but of the Totonacs, who with
amazement saw come from the dread Montezuma, instead of a
scourging army, this high embassy of peace. “It must be so,” they
said among themselves, “that the Mexican monarch stands in awe of
the strangers.”
Not long after, Chicomacatl came to Cortés asking aid against a
Mexican garrison, said to be committing ravages at Tizapantzinco,
[225]
some eight leagues from Cempoala. Cortés was in a merry
mood at the moment; he could see the important progress he was
making toward the consummation of his desires, though the men of
Velazquez could not—at least they would admit of nothing honorable
or beneficial to Cortés, and they continued to make much trouble.
Here was an opportunity to test the credulity of these heathen, how
far they might be brought to believe in the supernatural power of the
Spaniards. Among the musketeers was an old Biscayan from the
Italian wars, Heredia by name, the ugliest man in the army, uglier
than Thersites, who could not find his fellow among all the Greeks
that came to Troy. Lame in one foot, blind in one eye, bow-legged,
with a slashed face, bushy-bearded as a lion, this musketeer had
also the heart of a lion, and would march straight into the mouth of
Popocatepetl, without a question, at the order of his general. Calling
the man to him, Cortés said: “The Greeks worshipped beauty, as
thou knowest, good Heredia, but these Americans seem to deify
deformity, which in thee reaches its uttermost. Thou art hideous
enough at once to awe and enravish the Aztecs, whose Pantheon
cannot produce thine equal. Go to them, Heredia; bend fiercely on
them thine only eye, walk bravely before them, flash thy sword, and
thunder a little with thy gun, and thou shalt at once command a
hundred sacrifices.” Then to the Totonac chief: “This brother of mine
is all sufficient to aid thee in thy purpose. Go, and behold the
Culhuas will vanish at thy presence.” And they went; an obedience
significant of the estimation in which Cortés was then held, both by
his own men and by the natives.
They had not proceeded far when Cortés sent and recalled
them, saying that he desired to examine the country, and would
accompany them. Tlamamas would be required to carry the guns
and baggage, and they would set out the next day. At the last
moment seven of the Velazquez faction refused to go, on the ground
of ill health. Then others of their number spoke, condemning the
rashness of the present proceeding, and desiring to return to Cuba.
Cortés told them they could go, and after chiding them for neglect of
duty he ordered prepared a vessel, which should be placed at their
service. As they were about to embark, a deputation appeared to
protest against permitting any to depart, as a proceeding prejudicial
to the service of God, and of the king. “Men who at such a moment,
and under such circumstances, desert their flag deserve death.”
These were the words of Cortés put into the mouth of the speaker.
Of course the order concerning the vessel was recalled, and the men
of Velazquez were losers by the affair.[226]
The expedition, composed of four hundred soldiers, with
fourteen horses, and the necessary carriers, then set off for
Cempoala, where they were joined by four companies of two
thousand warriors. Two days’ march brought them close to
Tizapantzinco, and the following morning they entered the plain at
the foot of the fortress, which was strongly situated on a high rock
bordered by a stream. Here stood the people prepared to receive
them; but scarcely had the cavalry come in sight when they turned to
seek refuge within the fort. The horsemen cut off their retreat in that
direction, however, and leaving them, began the ascent. Eight chiefs
and priests thereupon came forth wailing, and informed the
Spaniards that the Mexican garrison had left at the first uprising of
the Totonacs, and that the Cempoalans were taking advantage of
this and of the Spanish alliance to enforce the settlement of a long-
standing boundary dispute. They begged that the army would not
advance. Cortés at once gave orders to restrain the Cempoalans,
who were already plundering. Their captains were severely
reprimanded for want of candor as to the real object of the
expedition, and were ordered to restore the effects and captives
taken. This strictness was by no means confined to them, for a
soldier named Mora, caught by the general in the act of stealing two
fowls, was ordered hanged. Alvarado, however, cut him down in time
to save his life, probably at the secret intimation of Cortés, who,

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Performing Nuclear Weapons: How

Britain Made Trident Make Sense Paul

More information about this series at

Palgrave Studies in International Relations

Cover image: © Tetra Images/Alamy Stock Photo

The UK is currently in the process of replacing its Trident nuclear weapon

Moreover, the analysis engages with arguments connecting the

January 2021 Dr. Nick Ritchie

2 Benoit Pelopidas, “A Bet Portrayed as a Certainty”, in G. Shultz and J. Goodby (eds.)

Everything that follows would have remained a figment of my untapped

1 Introduction: Problematising the Maintenance

Appendix: Methodological Reflections 229

BBC British Broadcasting Corporation

Introduction: Problematising the

This book investigates how it is possible that a state maintains nuclear

1 Reprinted by permission of the University of Wisconsin Press. © 2000 by the Board

© The Author(s) 2021 1

studying nuclear weapons management strategies: deterrence and arms

sophisticated theoretical lens for making sense of the norm contestation

relied upon a peculiarly British version of the “nuclear peace” to legiti-

Theorising Nuclear Regimes of Truth

do (Neumann, 2008, p. 62). As regime suggests, truths require mainte-

7 As my analysis will show, I certainly consider identity constructions to be key to

status literature in IR (e.g. Beaumont, 2017; Ward, 2017; Wohlforth, De

The UK Case: Acquiring,

other states provide competing representations of what the UK’s nuclear

Trident— has long seemed ambivalent to nuclear weapons, even if this

British Nuclear Puzzles

- How have consecutive UK governments managed to represent their

In answering this question, the book seeks to contribute to the

nuclear weapons, after all, is the same as disarmament. Indeed, secu-

Objectives & Outline

22 See Croft and Williams (1991) for a British example.

governments’ nuclear weapons policies. As Chapter 4 argues, the fabu-

MccGwire, M. (1985). Deterrence: The problem-not the solution. International

Sagan, S. D. (1996). Why do states build nuclear weapons? Three models in

Explaining Britain’s Bombs

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 21

Although, discourse analysis of this sort has long become part of

questions that conventional analysts are not equipped, nor inclined to

Competing Explanations: Security,

interests and low politicking of bureaucracies affect nuclear issues, they

question directly “Why have successive British governments maintained

by “ideational factors based on a ‘realist’ perspective held by Britain’s

weapons.9 For example, Desmond Bowen (2010, p. 9), formerly of the

The Hollowness of Security Explanations

while Hamwee et al. (1990) rely on interviews.11 This is particularly prob-

necessitate nuclear weapons, while many non-nuclear armed states look

Towards a Discourse Analysis of British Nuclear Policy

expressing doubts about the US “nuclear umbrella”. Although Freed-

to conclude that it is unimportant for Britain’s nuclear policymakers.

Status vs. Security: The Wrong Question

When the troops reached the plaza, Chicomacatl,[204] lord of the

Their visit over,[209] the Spaniards continued their march

[182] ‘Se hazia mucho de rogar: y como dize el refran: Tu me lo ruegas, è yo me

[184] See note 23, chap. ii., this volume.

[196] See Native Races, v. 475-7.

[204] Ixtlilxochitl, Hist. Chich., 294. Brasseur de Bourbourg, by a misconstruction

Cortés, Diplomate and General—The Municipality of Villa Rica Located—

Palamedes invented the game of chess while watching before

The embassy sent comprised two of Montezuma’s nephews,[222]

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