Module III Contemporary Issues

54 Hours in Southeast Asia Casulla, R.R.K. Necosia, R.I.M. & Belderol, J.V.
S
IS 106: ASEAN Studies GeneralEducation Dept.CollegeofArts&Sciences
Module III
Contemporary Issues & Challenges
W ELCOME STATEMENT
This is Module 3, your final point! Brace yourself; it’s going to be a little
rough! In the previous module you had an in- depth view of the
ASEAN. Now its time to see how did ASEAN respond to
transnational issues affecting the region.
ASEAN AVE.
Module I Module II Module III
O UTCOMES
In this module, you are expected to assess the contemporary issues and
challenges in the ASEAN Regional Bloc.
51
54 Hours in Southeast Asia Casulla, R.R.K. Necosia, R.I.M. & Belderol, J.V.S
PRE-ACTIVITY
Short YouTube Video Analysis

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PjfR3VeckuI
Instruction: Students will watch the short clip and answer the following questions below.
1. What are the bases of China’s claim over West Philippine Sea?
2. What are the claims of the Philippines over West Philippine Sea?
3. How did the ASEAN respond to the dispute in the West Philippine Sea?
60
Lesson 1: Foreign Relations
Lesson Outcomes:
At the end of the lesson, student will be able to…
1. Identify the issues or key events faced by ASEAN in relation to their foreign policy.
2. Determine the response of ASEAN to the issues.
A. West Philippine Sea Dispute
Origins of the South China Sea Dispute The dispute on the territorial features in the West Philippine
Sea is rooted in the region's deep colonial past. South China Sea is a maritime trade route, before the
colonies are present in the region. In the early 16th century, the colonial control over the region began.
They arrived in the South China Sea with a view to setting up regional trading stations and suppliers of
natural resources.
In 1877-the British colony of Labuan, an island north of Borneo, granted a license to plant the British
flag on the Spratly Island for a group of businessmen to use it for commercial purposes. The group’s search
for guano stopped after a killing incident, hence no flag was planted. In April 1930, during the second
expedition to the Paracels and Spratlys by the ship La Malicieuse, France declared its formal possession of
the Paracels and Spratlys by hoisting a French flag on the highest point of an island called Ile de la Tempete.
On 26 July 1933-France officially proclaimed its jurisdiction over the Paracels and Spratlys and took
over the archipelagos in physical possession. Japan was the first to protest against French declaration of
sovereignty in 1933. The Japanese control over the archipelago was limited to economic ambitions, it
made no claim for sovereignty until it protested against French claims and forcefully occupied the Paracels
and Spratlys in 1939.
In the Treaty of San Francisco, Japan declared that it "waives all right, title and claim to the Spratly
Islands and the Paracel Islands." However, it did not specifically specify the status of the Paracels and
Spratlys' sovereignty after the Japanese renunciation. At the other hand, the Cairo Declaration (1943)
declared that all the territories that Japan had seized from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and
the Pescadores, should be returned to the Republic of China "This Declaration removed Paracels and
Spratlys from the" robbed territories to be returned to China. Nevertheless, the status of the Paracels and
Spratlys was still not established. In addition, the Potsdam.
Declaration declared that, "the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be applied and the jurisdiction of
Japan shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushsu, Shikoku and the minor islands we
decide." China and Taiwan, under the Cairo Declaration, assimilated the Paracels and Spratlys with those
issued to them. Vietnam based its statements on the invasion and declaration of France. In addition, they
reaffirmed their claims, as the Cairo Declaration removed from China the Paracels and Spratlys as Japanese
stolen land. Considering the lack of clarification in the status of the two island groups after the end of the
Second World War, the Philippines treated them as terra nullius, or belonging to none, thereby allowing
other countries the right to make claims.
61
The Paracels
The Paracels includes the Amphitrite and Crescent groups and several other islands and features
adjacent to them. It covers 305 square kilometers in area. The closest distances from the Paracels to Hainan
Island in China and Ly Son Island in Vietnam are roughly 140 nautical miles, respectively, and 123 nautical
miles.
Spratlys
The Spratlys also encompass a much larger 160 square kilometer area. The shortest distances from
the coastal states to the middle of the Spratlys are roughly 200 nautical miles from the Point of Brooke in the
Philippines, 330 nautical miles from the southern coast of Vietnam, 247 nautical miles from the coast of
Malaysia, 405 nautical miles from the southern islands of the Paracels archipelago, 540 nautical miles from
the Hainan Island of China, 860 nautical miles from the southern coast of Malaysia.
The future development in the South China Sea of rich natural resources is serving as a significant
contributing factor to the nature of the conflict. There are 125 billion barrels of oil in undiscovered deposits,
and 500 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Is one of the richest fishing grounds in the world, with many varieties
of fish such as round scads, sardines, big-eye scads, mackerel, and tuna (Chinese National Offshore Oil
Company ,November 2012). Malaysia has developed a diving facility successfully in the Swallow Reef and
China is also preparing to develop its tourism industry in the Paracels. Vietnam sent a party of tourists to the
Spratlys, too.
South China Sea's economic importance has made it a major source of dispute between claimant states.
The unresolved conflict over the jurisdiction of the territorial features and their waters has made the claimant
states resort as much as possible to assertive means of extracting resources and managing maritime spaces.
Incidents involving disputes with fishing vessels recently have been on the rise, exacerbating regional
tensions.
Geo-Strategic Importance of the South China Sea
It is the geostrategic value that is generally the principal reason for the parties to strengthen their
argument over the Spratlys and the Paracels. The South China Sea is the key to the world's ocean, the trade
hub, and a security barrier for many littoral states. The South China Sea is inside the overlapping area of
control between China and the United States. The South China Sea's geo-strategic importance has turned the
conflicts in the South China Sea from a regional to an international conflict. It has gradually become a strategic
chessboard for the presence and involvement of big power.
Public opinion or nationalism may act as a major barrier to some sort of compromise towards the
dispute over the South China Sea. Public opinion about the conflicts has also skyrocketed in both Vietnam and
the Philippines.
Anti-China rallies broke out in Vietnam and the Philippines following some of China's assertive
activities in the South China Sea in 2011, especially when a group of Chinese law enforcement boats harassed
the seismic surveillance vessels in Binh Minh.
62
In China there has been a significant revival of the mindset of the Middle Kingdom, known as "Tianxia,"
based on a book published in 2005 by Zhao Tingyang titled "The Tianxia System: A Theory for the World
Institution."Within the ideology of "tianxia," the Chinese claimed that there was no conflict in the South China
Sea between China and the littoral states because Southeast Asian states were historically vassals of China.
The South China Sea has long been under China's sphere of control where it has "historical privileges" and
"sovereignty." As "tianxia" – meaning the world as a whole belongs to the Chinese emperor who set his own
laws on the way the world was run.
Development of International Law
Three sets of international law governing the South China Sea dispute.
1. The Territorial Acquisition Law;
Under this, a territory title may be acquired in five modes: occupation, prescription, designation,
conquest, and accession
2. The Law of the Sea;
Codified under customary international law and three United Nations-led conferences on maritime law.
3. The Law on Dispute Settlement;
No international judicial body has compulsory jurisdiction to settle a dispute without the consent of the
States concerned as regards the question of sovereignty.
China's Coastal States 9-dragged Lines Gobble Up EEZs. China's claim to 9-point lines covers 85.7
percent of the entire South China Sea. The legal basis for the dashes was not clarified in China. There were no
set coordinates at the dashes. Under Art. 2(3) of the UN Charter.
“All Members shall resolve their international disputes by diplomatic means in such a way as not to
endanger international peace and stability, and justice”.
Moreover, CHAPTER VI of the PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES Article 33 states that the
“..parties to any conflict susceptible of jeopardizing the preservation of international peace and security
shall, first of all, pursue a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation , conciliation, arbitration, judicial
settlement, recourse to regional agencies or agreements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.”
All States that surround the South China Sea and assert jurisdiction over the South China Sea islands
are parties to UNCLOS. UNCLOS believes who has jurisdiction over land territories, including offshore islands,
is well established. This sets out what maritime areas States may demand from their land territories and
islands, and the rights and duties of coastal states and other states in the various maritime zones.
If a State is a party to UNCLOS, it consents in writing to the prohibitions on conflict settlement in

UNCLOS Part XV. The general principle in Part XV is that when a dispute occurs between two parties
concerning the interpretation or application of a provision in UNCLOS and the dispute cannot be resolved by
consultation and negotiation, either party to the dispute may bring the dispute unilaterally before an
international court or arbitral tribunal (Art.286,UNCLOS) and the court or tribunal 's judgment is legally
binding.
Neither China nor the Philippines has made a declaration indicating a preference for a particular court
or tribunal. Therefore, the Philippines initiated arbitral proceedings against China pursuant to Annex VII. In
63
1996, China made a formal statement pursuant to Article 298 stating that it does not recognize the scheme of
compulsory procedures requiring binding judgments on any of the types of conflicts referred to in Article 298
in Section 2 of Part XV of UNCLOS. The Philippines opened Annex VII to Arbitration on 22 January 2012. On
19 February 2013, the Chinese Foreign Minister's spokesperson addressed a query from the press, stating that
China declined to consider the note and its accompanying notice and returned it to Manila
Philippines v. China South China Sea arbitration
1.The Philippines sought a declaration that the countries’ respective rights and obligations regarding the
waters, seabed, and maritime features of the South China Sea are governed by UNCLOS. As such, China’s claims
based on any ―historic rights‖ to waters, seabed, and subsoil within the nine-dash line are contrary to UNCLOS
and invalid.
Holding: UNCLOS ―comprehensively‖ governs the parties’ respective rights to maritime areas in the South
China Sea. Therefore, to the extent China’s ninedash line is a claim of ―historic rights‖ to the waters of the
South China Sea, it is invalid.
Reasoning: Whatever historic rights China may have had were extinguished when UNCLOS was adopted, to
the extent those rights were incompatible with UNCLOS.
2.The Philippines sought a determination as to whether certain land features in the Spratly Islands claimed by
both China and the Philippines are properly characterized as islands, rocks, low tide elevations (LTEs), or
submerged banks.
Holding: None of the features in the Spratly Islands generates an EEZ, nor can the Spratly Islands generate an
EEZ collectively as a unit. As such, the Tribunal declared certain areas are within the Philippines’ EEZ and not
overlapped by any possible Chinese entitlement.
Reasoning: The baseline of analysis is what the features can sustain in their ―natural condition‖ .Based on
historical evidence; none of the features in the Spratly Islands can sustain either a stable community of people
or economic activity that is not dependent on outside resources or purely extractive in nature. The current
presence of personnel on the features is dependent on outside support and does not reflect the capacity of the
features in their natural condition.
3.The Philippines sought a declaration that China violated UNCLOS by interfering with the Philippines’ rights
and freedoms within its EEZs.
Holding: China violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights in its EEZ. It did so by interfering with Philippine
fishing and hydrocarbon exploration; constructing artificial islands; and failing to prevent Chinese fishermen
from fishing in the Philippines’ EEZ. China also interfered with Philippine fishermen’s traditional fishing rights
near Scarborough Shoal . China’s construction of artificial islands at seven features in the Spratly Islands, as
well as illegal fishing and harvesting by Chinese nationals, violate UNCLOS obligations to protect the marine
environment. Finally, Chinese law enforcement vessels unlawfully created a serious risk of collision by
physically obstructing Philippine vessels at Scarborough Shoal in 2012.
64
4.The Philippines sought a declaration that China’s recent actions, specifically its land reclamation and
construction of artificial islands in the Spratly Islands after the arbitration was commenced, violated the
obligations UNCLOS places on states to refrain from conduct that ―aggravates and extends‖ a dispute while
dispute resolution proceedings are pending.
Holding: China has aggravated and extended the disputes through its dredging, artificial island-building, and
construction activities.
Reasoning: While these proceedings were pending, China has built a large island on Mischief Reed, an LTE
within the Philippines’ EEZ; caused irreparable harm to the marine ecosystem; and permanently destroyed
evidence of the natural condition of the features at issue. There are no provisions in UNCLOS on how to
determine which State has the better claim to sovereignty over a disputed territory. UNCLOS only sets out
what maritime zones can be claimed from land territory (including islands), as well as the rights and
jurisdiction of States in such maritime zones.
The Role of ASEAN

In 1992, the first ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, adopted at the 25th ASEAN Ministerial
Meeting, took no sides and instead emphasized the non-use of force and urged all parties, whether these were
ASEAN member states or China, to exercise restraint in order to create a positive climate for eventual
resolution. In 2004, ASEAN and China agreed on an action plan, and guidelines for implementation in 2011.
“ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea” released on 20 July 2012 reaffirming ASEAN’s
commitment to:
1. The full implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (2002);
2. The Guidelines for the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
(2011);
3. The early conclusion of a Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea;
4. The full respect of the universally recognized principles of the International Law, including the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS);
5. The continued exercise of the self-restraint and non-use of force by all parties; and
6. The peaceful resolution of disputes, in accordance with universally recognized principles of International
Law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
The Road to ASEAN for Timor Leste & Papua New Guinea
The Accession of Timor Leste

In 1999, following the United Nations-sponsored act of self-determination, Indonesia relinquished
control of East Timor (Timor Leste). It became the first new sovereign state of the 21st century on May 20,
2002. In 2002, it was recognized as an observer of ASEAN. In 2005, East Timor expressed its desire to be a
member of ASEAN by 2010. By December 2007, President Jose Ramos-Horta restated that joining was a top
priority and he hoped to join by 2012. By 2009, Thailand supported East Timor’s membership of ASEAN by
2012.
65
East Timor officially applied for membership in ASEAN on March 4, 2011. In 2012, Indonesia pushed
for them to be granted ASEAN membership but other member states such as Singapore and Laos, have
objected on the grounds that East Timor is not yet developed enough to join (East Timor has by far the smallest
GDP in ASEAN, less than 15% of that of Laos). In June 2013, the Philippines pledged support for East Timor’s
ASEAN membership. However, by November 2013, U Aung Htoo, ASEAN Affairs Department Deputy Director,
said that Timor Leste would not be ready to join in 2014 since they do not have an embassy in all 10 current
ASEAN member states, a necessity for membership.
In 2015, East Timor stated that it is now ready to join the association any time since it has fulfilled two
major requirements for ASEAN membership: the country was located in the region and it had opened
embassies in ASEAN member countries. The Philippines re-echoed its support for East Timor’s accession to
ASEAN on the same year.
In 2016, Indonesia announced that TimorLeste’s ASEAN Membership bid might be realized in 2017
since the feasibility studies on Timor Leste’s stability, security, economy and culture will be finished by the
end of 2016. In the middle of 2016, Cambodia announced that they support Timor-Leste’s membership in
ASEAN.
In late 2017, it was declared that Timor Leste’s accession would not take place. This is mostly because
of its lack of human resources, as pointed out by Singapore. Despite this, it was announced that East Timor
Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri will continue East Timor’s participation in ASEAN as observer during the summit.
The Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and Cambodia reiterated Timor-Leste’s membership application during
the summits, however the other 6 ASEAN member states led by Singapore did not support the move.
In 2018, the Philippines was in talks with Brunei, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam regarding the approval
of Timor-Leste’s accession to ASEAN. Talks were also set with Malaysia and Singapore, but both nations
rejected the proposal again. Singapore, the ASEAN chair for 2018, noted that Timor-Leste’s membership will
be tackled during the year, but its
The Accession of Papua New Guinea (PNG)
PNG is no father away from the ASEAN HQ of Jakarta. It forms half of the huge island of New Guinea,
with Indonesia’s Papua province comprising the other half. ASEAN recognized that PNG is part of the region
when it gave PNG observer status in 1976. Since then, it has waited for 35 years for permission to become a
full member.
Violent crime, political instability, poor infrastructure, discriminatory laws and unskilled labor are
obstacles to this happening, as well as the fact that the country is closer, culturally and geographically, to the
Pacific Islands to its east and that it is historically and financially tied more closely to Australia in the south.
As early as 1987, one obstacle is PNG’s membership in the Pacific Islands Forum (formerly South
Pacific Forum), an intergovernmental organization that aims to enhance cooperation between countries and
territories of the Pacific Ocean. In 2009, the country asked for the support of the Philippines in its ASEAN bid,
however, no official response was heard, as it was election time that year. At present, Indonesia is the only
66
ASEAN member supporting PNG’s membership. A grassroots level of support exists in the Philippines,
although there is caution due to PNG’s discriminatory policies on human rights, notably on LGBT rights and
the issue of West Papua. Singapore, Malaysia, and Brunei have shown dissatisfaction over PNG’s economic
status which has hindered its acceptance in ASEAN. Thailand, Vietnam and Cambodia have shown displeasure
towards antiLGBT laws in PNG, as well as PNG’s lack of action over the issue of West Papua.
67
Assessment
As what you have learned in the previous lessons regarding with the territorial disputes faced by the
ASEAN region (Ex. West Philippine Sea Dispute), create a position paper (one page). It should include a brief
introduction followed by a comprehensive breakdown of the country's position on the topic that are being
discussed.
Note: A good position paper will not only provide facts but also make proposal for resolutions.
Rubric
Excellent (30) Proficient Average (20) Poor (15)
(25)
Content: All content Content Demonstrate Few facts
Relates to the directly related directly basic related to the
topic, to the topic. related to the understanding topic. Most
detailed and Opinions were topic. Almost of the topic. information
accurate always all opinions Many opinions was opinion.
supported by were always were not
the fact. supported by supported by
the fact. the facts.
Knowledge: Showed a Showed Showed basic Show little or

Demonstrate thorough working knowledge of no knowledge
knowledge of knowledge of knowledge of the topic. Able of the topic.
the subject the topic. Able the topic. to address Unable to
to use assessor Able to assessor answer
questions to satisfactorily questions by assessor
further answer just repeating questions or
demonstrate assessor parts of the comment
understanding questions presentation. further on
of the topic. and provide any part of
Appeared to be addition the
an expert on information presentation.
the subject
being
presented.
Total Points:
68
References:
Billo, Jing Huang and Andrew (2015). Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea. Palgrave Macmillan.
Carpio, A. (2017). The South China Sea Dispute: Philippine Sovereign Rights and Jurisdiction in the West
Philippine Sea.Retrieved from
https://archive.su.edu.ph/assets/media/2017New%20Folder/Philippine%20Sovereign
%20Rights%20and%20Jurisdiction%20in%20the%20West%20Philippine%20Sea%20The
%20South%20China%20Sea%20Dispute%20by%20Senior%20Associate%20Justice%20A
ntonio%20T.%20Carpio.pdf
Charter Of The United Nations. (n.d.). Retrieved July 27, 2020, from https://www.icj-cij.org/en/charter-
of-the-united-nations
Lo, C. (1989). China's policy towards territorial disputes: The case of the South China Sea islands. London:
Routledge.
Shicun, Wu.(2013).Solving Disputes for Regional Cooperation and Development in the South China Sea.
Cambridge: Chandos Publishing.
"United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea." n.d.
Williams, Robert D. (2016). Tribunal Issues Landmark Ruling in South China Sea Arbitration. Lawfare.
69
Lesson 2: Socio-Cultural Challenges

Lesson Outcomes:
1. Identify the challenges encountered by ASEAN in terms of socio-cultural
context.
2. Determine the response of ASEAN to socio-cultural issues.
I. ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN MYANMAR: CASE OF ROHINGYA

Brief Historical Background
As Burma gained independence in 1948, the

former British colony held all the resources to
maintain Britain's political structure. The
parliamentary structure subsided until the
coup d'état of General Ne Win on March 2nd
1962. Since then on isolationism and
nationalism have become the driving ideals of
the new military government
in Burma. The state progressively closed off to the world as the military Junta became more
and more powerful. Burmese people lost voting rights, freedom of speech and several other
important civil liberties. Amid this political oppression, numerous rebel groups were born,
fighting for their basic human rights, but mostly for the survival of their ethnic group.
In 1947, in preparation for independence, the Panglong Agreement, considered the
founding treaty of the present Union of Burma or Myanmar, was signed between the post-
colonial rulers and the minorities in order to guarantee their people's recognition, autonomy
and right to be included in the democratic process. Given the importance of Myanmar's ethnic
groups, the inclusive agreement was quickly forgotten after Aung San, one of its instigators,
was assassinated and the military took over the government.
Also opposing the Panglong process was the decision to make Buddhism the state religion of
Burma in 1961 due to the existence in Myanmar of a small minority of Indian Muslims who
felt threatened by this assimilation attempt. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the
government violently repressed mass protests seeking to restore democracy and secure
minority rights. During that same period, a number of ceasefires were signed between Burma
and the armed rebels, although there was no disarmament or progress on ethnic issues. The
military regime's refusal to back down, even after the National
70
League of Democracy (NLD) victory during the 1990 elections, triggered significant
national discontent.
The Case of Rohingya
Many of Burma’s indigenous Muslims live in

Rakhine State, on the Western coast next to the
border with Bangladesh. Rohingya are however
considered to be stateless, because the Myanmar
Government officially considers the ethnic minority
to be illegal Bangladeshi immigrants. The
persecution has forced nearly one million Rohingya
to flee into Bangladesh since 1977, with many more
seeking refuge in other countries. Other Muslim
countries have opened their doors to the refugees,
with some choosing to flee to India, Pakistan,
Malaysia and Indonesia.
Rohingya people claim they are descendants ofshorturl.at/stzKQ

Muslims who came to Myanmar
centuries ago, maybe Persian and Arab merchants. In Bangladesh, they speak a language
similar to the Chittagong Bengali dialect. Many in Myanmar are reviling the Rohingya as
illegal immigrants and they suffer systemic discrimination. The Government of Myanmar
views them as stateless persons and forbids them citizenship. Stringent restrictions have been
placed on Rohingya people’s freedom of movement, access to medical assistance, education
and other basic services. According to Human Rights Watch, the Burmese government
refused citizenship to any Rohingya people who could not claim that their ancestors were
settled in the country before 1823, the start of British invasion of what is now Rakhine State
(also known as Arakan). Almost 400,000 Rohingya people in the country of Myanmar have
been forced to flee from their homes to another country nearby, Bangladesh, because of
fighting in the state where they live.
In 1982, Myanmar didn’t recognized Rohingya as part of their ethnic group and
stripping them of citizenship. Hence, Rohingya babies born since 1994 were refused with
birth certificates. There were also longstanding restrictions upon freedom of movement and
denial of access to healthcare, employment opportunities and higher education. National
Registration Cards (NRC) was issued after independence, to the Muslim minority of Rakhine.
The following observation was subsequently made by the NRC:
"Holding this certificate shall not be treated as a definitive evidence of citizenship."
71
No more NRCs were given to the Rohingya starting in the 1970s, and the old NRCs were
confiscated. The 1982 law on nationality, which was strongly criticized by the United Nations,
decreed that all Burma residents would have to reapply for citizenship. Under this rule, new
color-coded NRCs were released, and the Rohingya were no longer qualified for full
citizenship promised by the pink NRCs, setting the groundwork for making the Muslim
minority, first second-class citizens, and later stateless.
Ethnic tensions have simmered in the Rakhine state for decades, with occasional
outbreaks of violence. Nine police officers were killed by armed men in October 2016, accused
by officials of being Muslims. 87,000 Rohingya Muslims fled to Bangladesh amid the
subsequent turmoil and government troops increased their presence in the state of Rakhine.
A senior UN official alleged that the Myanmar government sought to rid the country of its
Muslim minority – an accusation repeatedly made by human rights groups. The government
denies the charge.
Myanmar further raised the number of troops in Rakhine in August, after having been
found hacked to death by seven Buddhists. The troop build-up triggered warnings of a fresh
wave of aggression. The current violence is seen not only because of the size but also because
of the presence of the new insurgent Rohingya group, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army,
as a major escalation. It says the attacks on government forces were an act of self- defence.
In the last national and local elections, the Rohingyas were denied the right to citizenship and
even the right to self-identify, and were deprived of their voting rights. They are also subject
to many restrictions in day to day life: banned from travelling without authorization and
prohibited from working outside their villages.
They cannot even get married without permission from the authorities, and, because
of movement restrictions, they lack sufficient access to livelihood opportunities, medical care
and education. The number of children per couple is theoretically restricted to two but,
because it cannot be enforced, there are thousands of children without any administrative
existence.
Rohingya children in Myanmar face low birth weight, obesity, diarrhea and
reproductive obstacles on reaching adulthood, according to a 2016 study published in the
medical journal "The Lancet‖. Rohingya have a mortality rate of up to 224 deaths per 1000 live
births, more than four times the average for the rest of Myanmar (52 per 1000 live births),
and three times the average of living in the Rakhine state's non-Rohingya areas (77 per 1000
live births). The paper also found that 40% of Rohingya children in Myanmar camps suffer from
diarrhea five times the diarrhea rate of internally displaced persons.
On 25 August, when rebels targeted government forces, violence broke into northern
Rakhine province. In response, Buddhist militia-backed security forces launched a "clearance
operation" that killed a minimum of 1,000 people
72
and made more than 300,000 escapes their homes. The UN's top human rights official said on
September 11 that the military response to insurgent attacks was "clearlydisproportionate,"
andcautioned thatMyanmar's persecution of its Rohingya minority appears to be a "textbook
illustration" of collective action. Refugees have been thinking of massacres in towns, where
soldiers are being attacked and their homes burned.
According to the Govt, the Rohingya burned their own houses, killing Buddhists and
Hindus, an argument echoed by some locals. The military targets militants, including the
Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (Arsa), the organization that claimed responsibility for the
August attacks, it says. Satellite analysis by Human Rights Watch has shown evidence of
fireside damage in urban areas populated by Rohingyas, in addition as in isolated villages.
What does the government say?
The government has said it is

targeting militants who are responsible for
attacks on the security forces which are
terrorists the bulk of those killed. This also
claims that Rohingya is burning their own
villages – an argument that was challenged
by journalists who reported seeing new fires
burning in villages that Rohingya people had
abandoned. The government has also
accused foreign aid workers of helping to
besiege a village in Rakhine state by
"terrorists". The assertion has been
condemned by aid workers, who fear for their
health,
as being dangerously reckless. The word Rohingya is particularly dangerous for the Burmese
Government. The crux of the issue lies therein: The Burmese fear that an independent
Rohingya state along the Bangladesh border will come at the cost of Rakhine territory. The
Burmese military, which has cracked down on civilians from Rohingya, sees this as a possible
region of aggression by groups such as ARSA. "This apprehension inside the West is
extremely profoundly felt and not understood — and it comes from a true place rooted in the
past of Burma," Mitchell said. Indeed, Maung Thway Chun, the editor of a hardline Buddhist
nationalist newsweekly, told Rangoon-based journalist Joe Freeman: "[W]e don't want
Muslims to swallow our country ... they 're not going to end up targeting just Rakhine. they're
going to also invade Chin State or Irrawaddy region,” he said, touching on two states located
to the immediate south and northeast of Rakhine. ―Then this country will be a Muslim
country. It's such a shame for us that the land we inherited from our former
generations are going to be lost in our time.” That may sound absurd in an exceedingly
country with a 4 percent
73
Muslim population, but it’s an argument that several Burmese make, pointing to ARSA’s
growing presence in Rakhine and surrounding areas. Bangladesh has watched the group's
aggression on its soil with growing concern, and has suggested military operations against it
with Burma.
Base from the discussions above, answer the following questions.
1. What is the root cause of the problem in the case of the Rohingyas in Myanmar?
2. What is the stand of the government of Myanmar in the issue?
74
References:
Department of Population Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population. 2015.

MYANMAR The 2014 Myanmar Population and Housing Census Census Report
Volume 2-C. Accessed May 19,2018.
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/rohingyas-
burma/540513/
Keling, et al. 2010. A Historical Approach to Myanmar’s Democratic Process. Journal

of Asia Pacific Studies.
Khodaee Gh, Emami Moghadam Z, Khademi Gh, Saeidi M. (2015) Healthy Diet in Children:
Facts and Keys. Int J Pediatr.
Mahmood SS, Wroe E, Fuller A, Leaning J.(2016) The Rohingya people of

Myanmar: health, human rights, and identity. Lancet 2016; 1– 10. PMID
27916235. Doi: 10.1016/S0140- 6736(16)00646-2.
Ratcliffe, Rebecca. (2017) Who are the Rohingya and what is happening to
Myannmar. Accessed May 19,2018. https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2017/sep/06/who-are-the-rohingya-and-what-is-happening-in-
myanmar
Sakhong. 2012. The Dynamics of Sixty Years of Ethnic Armed Conflict in Burma.
Burma Centre for Ethnic Studies Analysis Paper No.
The World Factbook – Burma. Cia.gov. Archived from the original on 4

November 2010. Retrieved 4 May 2016
75
I. AGRICULTURE & FOOD SECURITY IN ASEAN
Introduction:
Food security is generally understood as access to adequate food to all households at all
times to enable them to lead a healthy and active life. On the other hand, food insecurity is
associated with poverty, ignorance and stagnant economic growth (Team,2019). It is important to
review the status of the region in terms of food security. Read the article below and answer the
questions that follow.
Food security a key issue for ASEAN
The ASEAN Post Team

12 March 2019
In 2015, the world’s leaders came together to pledge the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development. The 2030 Agenda is a universal call to action to end poverty, protect the planet,
and ensure all people enjoy peace and prosperity through global partnership. Built on the
achievements of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for 2000-2015, it is monitored

against a set of 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These SDGs target achievements
in poverty and hunger eradication, health and wellbeing, education, gender and economic
76
inequalities, conservation, climate change, innovation, sustainable consumption, and peace and
justice.
One of the key features of the SDGs is the interconnectedness of the goals. No one goal can be
fully achieved without progress in the others, and efforts towards achieving one goal almost
always will impact the progress of others. The failure to plan for one SDG may also decelerate or
render ineffective planning and implementation of national initiatives for other goals.Food security,
for example, underpins the achievements of all other SDGs. Primarily, it is targeted under SDG
2: End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture.
In turn, the fulfilment of a population’s food, energy, and nutritional needs, as well as
advancements in sustainable agriculture, provide for conducive conditions to improve health,
mental and labour capacity, sustainability of cities and urbanisation. This further strengthen efforts
towards industry building, levelling the playing field for poorer communities, women’s participation
in work and society, responsible consumption and production, and reducing conflicts. At the same
time, the attainment of SDG 2 depends largely and impacts absolutely on the achievements in
clean water and sanitation, affordable and clean energy, climate action, life on land, and life below
water.
77
An example of the interlinkages between food insecurity and the different SDGs can be seen in
Lao PDR. According to Lao PDR’s Voluntary National Review of the 2030 Agenda, around 33
percent of children under five in the country were reported to be stunted and nine percent wasted
in 2016/17. Stunting is a manifestation of chronic or long-term hunger, while wasting is a

manifestation of acute hunger such as those experienced during a famine or crises. In Lao PDR,
these manifestations show a strong influence of inequalities associated with poverty and ethnicity,
as well as rural-urban disparity.
Stunting in rural areas without road access is twice that in urban areas. Stunting in children from
some highland ethnic groups is nearly double that of children from lowland groups. Stunting
amongst children from the poorest households are three times higher than those from the richest
households. Stunting amongst children of uneducated women are four times higher than children
of mothers with at least a secondary education. All these manifestations prove strong and direct
interconnectedness between SDG 2 and other SDGs on poverty, education, income inequalities,
gender, sustainable communities, infrastructure, partnership, and more.
More needs to be done
Having previously achieved its MDG target of halving the proportion of undernourished or hungry
people – from 42.8 percent in 1990 to around 18.5 percent in 2015 – Lao PDR now is committed
to reducing the high prevalence of underweight and stunting amongst its children. This is
demonstrated through its National Zero Hunger Challenge launched in May 2015, as well as the
Agricultural Development Strategy, National Nutrition Strategy, and the National Socio- Economic
Development Plan.
Lao PDR authorities last week set a target to increase farmland in 2018-2019 from 177,000
hectares to 185,000 hectares. In another effort to ensure food security and commercial farm
production, the Japanese government will be providing another grant to the Lao government for
improvement of the Irrigation Agriculture Project at Tha Ngon farmland in Xaythany district,
Vientiane, in a project expected to start this month.
78
IS 106:ASEAN Studies GeneralEducationDept.CollegeofArts&Sciences
While handling the current drivers of hunger, ASEAN countries also need to keep an eye on
changes to the climate. ‘The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2018’ report
published by the United Nations (UN) Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) last year reported
an increase in the prevalence of severely food insecure people in the region, increasing from 7.3
percent or 46 million people to 10.1 percent or 65.8 million people between 2014 and 2017. The
trend, observed in three consecutive years, is largely driven by the adverse effects of climate
conditions on food availability and prices.
The derailment of efforts to achieve Zero Hunger can and will have adverse impacts on national
aspirations and development trajectories. At different levels of development, ASEAN countries
need to not only look at specific challenges facing their respective nations, but also come together
to learn from each other’s experiences. Just as how all SDGs are interconnected, ASEAN’s
success in attaining all SDG goals too is dependent on how effectively member states work
together towards common goals.
75
1. During the community quarantine/ lockdown due to CoVid-19, what are the programs
or activities present in your community to ensure that there are enough foods in
everybody’s table? List at least 3 and provide a brief description of the
programs/activities.
a. _
b.
c.
76
References:
Annex 2: Food Security in Southeast Asia - Achievements and the Unfinished Tasks. (n.d.).
Retrieved July 20, 2020, from http://www.fao.org/3/ab981e/ab981e0b.htm
Team, T. (2019, March 12). Food security a key issue for ASEAN. Retrieved July 20, 2020,
from https://theaseanpost.com/article/food-security-key-issue-asean
77
IS 106:ASEAN Studies General Education Dept. College of Arts & Sciences
LOSING STATEMENT
You have reached your final destination. I hope that the course widened your
perspective, from national to international. Keep it in mind that we are not a lone country.
Every move that we make, we think of our neighbors first, taking into consideration our
differences in order to have a harmonious relationship with them. That is the essence of
regionalism. That is the essence of ASEAN. Because we have One Vision, One Identity, One
Community.
78
Lesson 3: Covid-19 Pandemic
Lesson Outcomes:
1. Examine the effects of COVID-19 pandemic to the ASEAN member states.
2. Determine the response of ASEAN states to COVID-19 pandemic.
Introduction:
The CoVid-19 previously termed as
2019-nCOV or novel coronavirus acute
respiratory illness, was initially identified
within the city of Wuhan, Hubei Province,
China on December 2019 where there have
been emerging cluster of individuals with
cases of pneumonia. The outbreak became
more widespread, suggesting person-to-
person transmission. Soon, COVID-19
spread to distant city centres and other countries, as people moved primarily by travel. To
assist flatten the curve, various non-health measures were strictly implemented and ranged
from travel restrictions, strict social distancing, community quarantines to lockdowns. Other
counter health measures revolved around strengthening testing, contact tracing, diagnostics,
and treatment.
Indeed, the Covid-19 became a worldwide pandemic affecting not just the rich countries
but also countries with poor or limited capability to fight the health threat. Geographic region
has always been a hotspot for the emergence of latest infectious diseases. The region was hit
hard by previous epidemics like SARS, Avian Flu, and also the H1N1 Influenza virus and now
the CoVid-
19. Nevertheless, the pandemic has forged stronger regional cooperation and coordination
among ASEAN’s Member States and partners.
79
80
81
IS 106: ASEAN Studies General Education Dept. College of Arts & Sciences
1. In 5 sentences, summarize the responses of ASEAN to the threats brought by

CoVid-19 in the region.
2. As a ―batangASEAN‖, how did you contribute to combat the threats of Covid-19

pandemic?
70
References:
Fernando, F. M., De la Rosa, J. E., & Castro, M. Q. (2020, May). Covid-

19: A collective response in ASEAN. The-ASEAN Magazine Issue 1
May 2020, (1), 30-35.
Risk Assessment for International Dissemination of ... - ASEAN. (n.d.). Retrieved

July 20, 2020, from https://asean.org/storage/2020/02/COVID-19_Report-
of-ASEAN-BioDiaspora- Regional-Virtual-Center_8June2020.pdf
Timeline of WHO's response to COVID-19. (n.d.). Retrieved July 20, 2020, from
https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/29-06-2020-covidtimeline
71

Module III Contemporary Issues

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Module III Contemporary Issues

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

54 Hours in Southeast Asia Casulla, R.R.K. Necosia, R.I.M. & Belderol, J.V.

Module I Module II Module III

Short YouTube Video Analysis

Lesson 1: Foreign Relations

Geo-Strategic Importance of the South China Sea

Development of International Law

If a State is a party to UNCLOS, it consents in writing to the prohibitions on conflict settlement in

Philippines v. China South China Sea arbitration

The Role of ASEAN

The Accession of Timor Leste

The Accession of Papua New Guinea (PNG)

Knowledge: Showed a Showed Showed basic Show little or

Lesson 2: Socio-Cultural Challenges

I. ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN MYANMAR: CASE OF ROHINGYA

As Burma gained independence in 1948, the

Many of Burma’s indigenous Muslims live in

Rohingya people claim they are descendants ofshorturl.at/stzKQ

The government has said it is

Base from the discussions above, answer the following questions.

2. What is the stand of the government of Myanmar in the issue?

Department of Population Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population. 2015.

Keling, et al. 2010. A Historical Approach to Myanmar’s Democratic Process. Journal

Mahmood SS, Wroe E, Fuller A, Leaning J.(2016) The Rohingya people of

The World Factbook – Burma. Cia.gov. Archived from the original on 4

Food security a key issue for ASEAN

The ASEAN Post Team

achievements of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for 2000-2015, it is monitored

advancements in sustainable agriculture, provide for conducive conditions to improve health,

in 2016/17. Stunting is a manifestation of chronic or long-term hunger, while wasting is a

as well as rural-urban disparity.

More needs to be done

Vientiane, in a project expected to start this month.

conditions on food availability and prices.

aspirations and development trajectories. At different levels of development, ASEAN countries

together towards common goals.

Lesson 3: Covid-19 Pandemic

1. In 5 sentences, summarize the responses of ASEAN to the threats brought by

2. As a ―batangASEAN‖, how did you contribute to combat the threats of Covid-19

Fernando, F. M., De la Rosa, J. E., & Castro, M. Q. (2020, May). Covid-

Risk Assessment for International Dissemination of ... - ASEAN. (n.d.). Retrieved

You might also like