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A Companion to Motion Pictures
and Public Value
A Companion to Motion Pictures
and Public Value
Edited by
Mette Hjort and Ted Nannicelli
WlLEY Blackwell
This edition first published 2022
© 2022 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Hjort, Mette, author. | Nannicelli, Ted, author.
Title: A Companion to Motion Pictures and Public Value / edited by Mette
Hjort and Ted Nannicelli.
Description: Hoboken : John Wiley & Sons, 2021. | Includes bibliographical
references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2021027310 (print) | LCCN 2021027311 (ebook) |
ISBN 9781119677116 (hardback) | ISBN 9781119677130 (paperback) |
ISBN 9781119677079 (pdf) | ISBN 9781119677123 (epub) |
ISBN 9781119677154 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Motion pictures and public interest.
Classification: LCC PN1995.9.P7855 C66 2021 (print) | LCC PN1995.9.P7855 (ebook) |
DDC 791.43/655—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021027310
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021027311
Cover image: © EschCollection/Getty Images

Cover design by Wiley
Set in 10.5/ 13pt Minion by Integra Software Services Pvt. Ltd, Pondicherry, India
To Tom O'Regan, in loving memory
Contents
Acknowledgments xi
Biographical Notes xii
General Introduction 1
Part I Artistic and Aesthetic Value 23
Introduction 25
Ted Nannicelli and Mette Hjort
1 A Plurality of Values: Art, Fine Art, and Motion Pictures 30
Paisley Livingston
Public Aesthetics and Artistic Value in Iranian Cinema 46
Khatereh Sheibani
Appreciating Nature through Film: A Defense of
Mediated Appreciation 69
Glenn Parsons
Reframing the Director: Distributed Creativity in
u-
Filmmaking Practice 86
Karen Pearlman and John Sutton
viii Contents
Part II Moral Value/Ethical Value 107
Introduction 109
Screen Stories as “Imaginative Ecology”: A Thought Experiment 113
Carl Plantinga
Interactive Documentary and Ethics: Toward an Ethics of
Representativeness 130
Willemien Sanders
The Ethics of Filmmaking: How the Genetic History of Works
-1
Affects Their Value 148

Mette Hjort
Film Production and Ethical Criticism 171
00
Ted Nannicelli
kO
Emotion and the Cultivation of Ethical Attention in

Narrative Cinema 190
Jane Stadler
Part III Spiritual Value 209
Introduction 211
10 Abundant, at Ease and Expansive?: The Influence of Maori and
Polynesian Spirituality on 21st Century New Zealand
Motion Pictures 213
Ann Hardy
11 Secularly, Transcendence, and Film 235
Roy M. Anker
12 The Poetics of Karma: Reincarnation and Romance 254
Richard Allen
Part IV Environmental/Ecological Value 279
Introduction 281
13 Ecocinema and Ecological Value 285
Robert Sinnerbrink
Contents ix
14 From Content to Context (and Back Again): New Industrial

Strategies for Environmental Sustainability in the Media 308
Pietari Kaapa and Hunter Vaughan
15 Jordnaer Creative: A Danish Case Study of Green Filmmaking
and Sustainable Production 327
Anne Ahn Lund, Josefine Madsen, and Meryl Shriver-Rice
Part V Cultural, Social and Political Value 351
Introduction 353
16 Color Charts: A Cultural Chronicle of Non-Chinese Ethnic
Images in Hong Kong Cinema 357
John Nguyet Erni
17 Film Policy, Social Value, and the Mediating
Role of Screen Agencies 382
Ruth McElroy and Caitriona Noonan
18 Cinema as Ceilidh and Hui: The Place of the Audience
within Emergent Perspectives upon a Folk Cinema 401
Jamie Chambers
19 The Past and Future of Public Value: The End of an Illustrious
Career or Its Reinvention? 427
Tom O’Regan and Anna Potter
Part VI Cognitive, Educational, and

Developmental Value 445
Introduction 447
20 Representing the Redacted: Depicting the “Torture
Archetype” in Film 450
Jared Del Rosso
21 Negotiating Power through Art: Participatory Video
and Public Value 469
Paul Cooke
22 Virtual Reality and the Rhetoric of Empathy 488
Dooley Murphy
X Contents
Part VII The Value of Health 509
Introduction 511
23 Narrative Sense-Making in the Service of Health—
A Neurocinematic Approach 515
Pia Tikka
24 The Smoking Machine: Public Health Films and Public Value in
Britain and Denmark, 1950-1964 536
C. Claire Thomson
25 The Benefits of Genre: Feel-Good Films as a Path to Health and
Well-Being 558
Mette Hjort
26 Movies in the Closed Wards: Instruments of Mental Health in
Military Psychiatry 576
Kaia Scott
Index 597
Acknowledgments
Celia Tin-yan Ko provided excellent research assistance during the final stages of pre
paring the manuscript for submission. A Companion to Motion Pictures and Public
Value was generously supported by a research initiation grant from the Hong Kong
Baptist University, for which especially Mette is grateful. Ted would like to thank the
School of Communication and Arts at The University of Queensland for funding to
support the project and Madeleine Shield for completing the index. Above all else,
we are indebted to all the contributors for having been so supportive all along. The
global COVID-19 pandemic created countless hurdles and yet our authors remained
committed to our shared project throughout. For this, we shall always be immensely
grateful. Tom O’Regan, a dear friend, colleague, and scholar of great wisdom and
generosity, died shortly after sending us his co-authored chapter. A Companion to
Motion Pictures and Public Value is affectionately dedicated to his memory.
Biographical Notes
Richard Allen is chair professor of film and media art and dean of the School of
Creative Media at City University, Hong Kong. He has published widely on film the
ory, aesthetics, and poetics. His book, Bombay Cinemas Islamicate Histories, edited
with Ira Bhaskar, will be published by Intellect and Orient Blackswan early next year.
He recently curated the exhibition Art Machines: Past and Present at City University
exhibition gallery (catalogue: City University Press).
Roy Anker is professor emeritus of English at Calvin University. His most recent
book is Beautiful Light: Religious Meaning in Film (2017).
Jamie Chambers is a lecturer in film and television at Edinburgh College of Art

(University of Edinburgh). Alongside his research into the global possibilities of
a folk cinema he is an award-winning film director, having made a series of films
about community folk cultures in Scotland including When the Song Dies (2013)
and Blackbird (2014). He is the founder and curator of the Folk Film Gathering
(folkfilmgathering.com), the world s first film festival of folk cinema.
Paul Cooke is centenary chair of world cinemas at the University of Leeds and has
published widely on the cultural politics of contemporary film. He is currently the
Principal Investigator on Changing the Story: Building Civil Society with and for
Young People in Post Conflict Settings, a project looking at the ways in which her
itage and arts organizations can help young people to shape civil society in post
conflict countries. He is also co-lead of “Community Engagement for AMR” at the
University of Leeds, a project that seeks to use participatory practices to unlock
community-level knowledge in order to overcome antimicrobial resistance, one of
the largest public health issues we face as a planet. He has also run numerous advo
cacy-focused participatory video projects, working with communities in the United
Kingdom, Germany, Kenya, Nepal, Cambodia, India, and Colombia.
Biographical Notes xiii
Jared Del Rosso is an associate professor in the department of sociology and crim
inology at the University of Denver. He researches and teaches on denial, with a
specific focus on the collective denial of torture. His work in this area has been
published in Social Forces, Sociological Forum, and Social Problems. He also pub
lished a book on the denial of torture, Talking About Torture: How Political Discourse
Shapes the Debate, with Columbia University Press. He is currently writing a new
book on the sociology of denial, which is under contract with New York Univer
sity Press.
John Nguyet Erni is Dean of the Faculty of Humanities and Chair Professor of
Cultural Studies at The Education University of Hong Kong. He is an elected fel
low of the Hong Kong Academy of the Humanities, and an elected corresponding
fellow of the Australian Academy of the Humanities. In 2017-2018, Erni served as
president of the Hong Kong Academy of the Humanities. A recipient of the Gus
tafson, Rockefeller, Lincoln, and Annenberg research fellowships, and many other
awards and grants, Erni s wide-ranging work traverses international and Asia-based
cultural studies, human rights legal criticism, Chinese consumption of transna
tional culture, gender and sexuality in media culture, youth consumption culture
in Hong Kong and Asia, cultural politics of race/ethnicity/migration, and critical
public health. He is the author or editor of 9 academic titles, most recently Law and
Cultural Studies: A Critical Rearticulation of Human Rights (2019), and Visuality,
Emotions, and Minority Culture: Feeling Ethnic (2017).
Ann Hardy is a senior lecturer in the screen and media studies Program at Waikato
University, Hamilton, whose research explores how intersections between media,
religion, and culture are creating new identities in contemporary New Zealand.
From 2016 to 2019 Hardy was an investigator on the Royal Society’s Marsden Fund
Project Te Maurea Whiritoi: the sky as a cultural resource - Maori astronomy, ritual
and ecological knowledge, outputs from which included curating a section of the Te
Whaanau Maarama (Family of Light) exhibition on the recent resurgence of the
indigenous celebrations of the rising of the Matariki constellation in winter. She also
has an interest in audiences for popular culture and was one of four authors of the
2017 volume Fans, Blockbusterization and the Transformation of Cinematic Desire:
Global Receptions of the Hobbit Film Trilogy (Palgrave Macmillan).
Mette Hjort is chair professor of humanities and dean of arts at Hong Kong Baptist
University, affiliate professor of Scandinavian studies at the University of Washing
ton, and visiting professor of cultural industries at the University of South Wales.
Hjort holds an honorary doctorate in transnational cinema studies from the Univer
sity of Aalborg and has served on the board of the Danish Film Institute (appointed
by the Danish Ministry of Culture). Her current research focuses on moving images
as they relate to public value in the context of health and well-being.
xiv Biographical Notes
Pietari Kaapa is a reader in media and communications at University of Warwick.

He is a specialist in environmental screen media, focusing especially on environ
mental media production, policies, practices, and content (especially film
and television). He has published widely in the field, including Environmental
Management of the Media (Routledge 2018) and Ecology and Contemporary Nor
dic Cinemas (Bloomsbury 2014). He also works on media industry studies, espe
cially in relation to Nordic film and television. Publications include The Politics
of Nordsploitation (with Tommy Gustafsson, Bloomsbury 2021) and Nordic Genre
Film (with Tommy Gustafsson, Edinburgh University Press 2015). He is an editor
of Journal of Scandinavian Cinema and a docent (affiliate professor) in film and tele
vision studies at the University of Helsinki. He is principal investigator (with Hunter
Vaughan) of the AHRC Network on Global Green Media Production (https://
globalgreenmedianetwork. com/).
Paisley Livingston (BA, philosophy, Stanford University, PhD The Humanities

Center, The Johns Hopkins University) is professor emeritus of philosophy at Ling-
nan University in Hong Kong. He taught previously at the University of Copen
hagen, Aarhus University, and McGill University. He has published various papers
and books in aesthetics, including Art and Intention (Oxford University Press 2005),
“History of the Ontology of Art” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), and Cinema,
Philosophy, Bergman (Oxford University Press 2009).
Anne Ahn Lund is co-founder of Jordnaer Creative and Nordic Eco Media Alliance
(NEMA). She is teaching creative sustainability in the Nordic countries, has trained
production assistants and runners in sustainable practices, and has presented recom
mendations directly to the Danish Minister of Culture. Lund is a filmmaker and has
taught film production practices at University of Copenhagen and The Royal Acad
emy of Fine Arts. She holds an MA in film studies with a focus on embodied aesthetics.
Josefine Madsen founded Jordnaer Creative in 2017 to fight for climate action and
social justice in the creative industries. She has put the climate footprint of the
cultural sector on the Danish public agenda with appearances and press coverage
in national radio as well as news media. Madsen is also a co-founding member of
Nordic Eco Media Alliance (NEMA). She holds a BA and an MA in film and me
dia studies from the University of Copenhagen, and specialized in sustainable film
and TV production as the first Danish student to do so. Furthermore, Madsen has
worked with documentaries and film financing.
Ruth McElroy is professor of creative industries and faculty head of research at the
University of South Wales. She is co-director with professor Lisa Lewis of the Cen
tre for the Study of Media and Culture in Small Nations. In public life, McElroy is
chair of Ffilm Cymru Wales and a member of Ofcom’s Advisory Committee Wales.
She helps inform media policy through her membership of the Institute of Welsh
Affairs Media Policy Group. McElroys main research interests are in film and TV
Biographical Notes xv
studies, media policy and cultural identity with a particular interest in minority
language media.
Dooley Murphy is an audiovisual media researcher poised to receive his PhD from
the University of Copenhagen, Department of Communication. His recently-
completed doctoral thesis addresses the form and function of interactive virtual
reality (VR) artworks from a cognitive-analytic perspective, with a particular focus
on manifestations of narrative. He has published on video game player and VR par
ticipant experience, the structure and process of audiovisual narration, and design
strategies in interactive storytelling. His next avenue of research will likely be ava
tars, characters, and virtual embodiment. In his spare time, he likes to make media
art about the wonderful mundanity of technology and culture.
Ted Nannicelli teaches at the University of Queensland. His most recent books are
Artistic Creation and Ethical Criticism (Oxford University Press, 2020) and Truth
in Visual Media: Aesthetics, Ethics Politics (co-edited with Marguerite La Caze,
Edinburgh University Press, 2021). He is the editor of Projections: The Journal for
Movies and Mind.
Dr. Caitriona Noonan is senior lecturer in media and communication in the School
of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies, Cardiff University. She is an active
researcher in the areas of film and television production, creative labor, and cultural
policy. She is co-author of the book Producing British Television Drama Local Pro
duction in a Global Era (2019) with Ruth McElroy. More information about her
research is available at smallnationsscreen.org.
Tom O’Regan was a key figure in the development of cultural and media studies in
Australia. His major works include Australian Television Culture (1993), Australian
National Cinema (1996), The Film Studio: Film Production in the Global Economy
(2005, with Ben Goldsmith), Local Hollywood: Global Film Production and the Gold
Coast (2010, with Ben Goldsmith and Susan Ward), and Rating the Audience: The
Business of Media (2011, with Mark Balnaves and Ben Goldsmith). He co-founded
Continuum: Journal for Media & Cultural Studies and edited it between 1987 and
1994. In addition to his prolific and influential research output, Professor O’Regan
held a series of key leadership roles throughout his career. He was director of the
Centre for Research in Culture and Communication from 1996 to 1998 at Murdoch
University and Director of the Australian Key Centre for Cultural and Media Policy
at Griffith University from 1999 to 2002. He was Australia’s UNESCO professor of
communication from 2001 to 2003 and elected a fellow of the Australian Academy
of the Humanities in 2002.
Glenn Parsons is an associate professor of philosophy at Ryerson University in

Toronto. His interests include aesthetics, metaphysics, and the philosophy of sci
ence. His book Aesthetics and Nature (Bloomsbury 2008) is currently being revised
for a new edition.
xvi Biographical Notes
Dr. Karen Pearlman is a senior lecturer in screen practice and production at Mac
quarie University and the author of Cutting Rhythms (Focal Press 2016). Her
research into creative practice, distributed cognition, and feminist film histories has
produced a number of published articles and chapters, and three award winning
short films about Soviet women filmmakers in the 1920s and the 1930s. The third of
this trilogy, I want to make a film about women (2019), the case study for the chapter
in this volume, was long-listed for an Oscar, short-listed for an Australian Acad
emy of Cinema and Television Arts Award, and has won three best directing awards
(from the Australian Directors’ Guild, Women in Film and Television Australia, and
Cinefest Oz), along with 10 other nationally competitive awards.
Carl Plantinga is Arthur H. De Kruyter chair of communication at Calvin Univer

sity. His two latest books are Alternative Realities (2020) and Screen Stories: Emo
tion and the Ethics of Engagement (2018). He is also co-editor of Passionate Views:
Film, Cognition, and Emotion (1999) and The Routledge Companion to Philosophy
and Film (2009). He is former president of the Society for Cognitive Studies of the
Moving Image (SCSMI).
Anna Potter is an associate professor of creative industries at the University of the

Sunshine Coast. She is a researcher focusing on children’s screen production cul
tures and distribution networks, media industries, and communication policy. She
is the author of Creativity, Culture, and Commerce: Producing Australian Childrens
Television with Public Value (Intellect 2015), Producing Childrens Television in the
On-Demand Age (Intellect 2020) and multiple journal articles and book chapters.
Potter is chief investigator (with Amanda Lotz and Kevin Sanson) on the Australian
Research Council Discovery project (2021-2023) “Making Australian Television in
the 21st Century.” This project investigates the intertwined implications of non-Aus
tralian ownership, technological adjustments, policy changes, and support adjust
ments enacted since the mid-2000s that have challenged the making of “Australian”
television.
Willemien Sanders is a lecturer at the department of media and culture studies and
an affiliated researcher at the Institute for Cultural Inquiry at Utrecht University.
She also conducts research at the Netherlands Institute for Sound and Vision. Her
research interests include, but are not limited to, documentary film and non-fiction,
film and television production, and digital humanities/data studies with a focus on
questions of ethics, production cultures, and gender. She is currently a co-chair of
the Media Production Analysis Working Group of International Association for
Media and Communication Research. She is also an avid traveler.
Kaia Scott holds a PhD in film and moving image studies from Concordia Univer
sity in Montreal, Quebec. Her dissertation, Picturing the Damaged Mind: Film and
Techniques of Visualization in the Modernization of World War II Military Psychia
try is a critical history of the role of media in the modernization of the United States
Biographical Notes xvii
military’s psychiatry program during World War II. She specializes in institutional
visual culture and is a contributing author to Cinemas Military Industrial Complex.
Khatereh Sheibani is a scholar, author, and curator of Iranian cinema and Persian lit
erature and culture. She has established multiple courses in Persian studies (language,
literature, and culture) at York University, where she is working as a lecturer. Sheibani
completed her doctorate degree in comparative literature and film studies at the Uni
versity of Alberta, Canada in 2007. Her book entitled The Poetics of Iranian Cinema:
Aesthetics, Modernity, and Film after the Revolution was published in November
2011 by I. B. Tauris, United Kingdom. She has co-edited a special issue of Iran Na-
mag on Abbas Kiarostami (University of Toronto Press 2018). Sheibani has written
articles on modern Persian literature, Iranian cinema and Middle Eastern cinemas
in literary and film anthologies and journals, such as Iranian Studies and Canadian
Journal of Film Studies. She is collaborating with Iran Namag for a special issue on
radio to be published in 2022. She has written two novels (in Persian) so far. The first
novel titled Hotel Iran will be published in 2021 by Nashr-e Ameh in Tehran. Her
second novel, Blue Bird Cafe is going to be published in Europe in 2021. Sheibani
was consulted and interviewed on issues regarding Iranian cinema by broadcasting
services and journals such as CBC, PRI, and the New York Times. She is currently
working on a book-length project on gender representation in Iranian cinema.
Dr. Meryl Shriver-Rice is a media anthropologist and environmental archaeologist,

and director of environmental media at the Abess Center for Ecosystem Science
and Policy at the University of Miami. She developed and teaches for the Master’s of
Environment, Media, and Culture program and is a founding editor (with Hunter
Vaughan) of the Journal of Environmental Media (Intellect Press).
Robert Sinnerbrink is associate professor of philosophy at Macquarie University,

Sydney, Australia. He is the author of New Philosophies of Film (Second Edition): An
Introduction to Cinema as a Way of Thinking (Bloomsbury 2021), Terrence Malick:
Filmmaker and Philosopher (Bloomsbury 2019), Cinematic Ethics: Exploring Ethi
cal Experience through Film (Routledge 2016), New Philosophies of Film: Thinking
Images (Continuum/Bloomsbury 2011), and Understanding Hegelianism (Acumen
2007, Routledge 2014). He has edited two books (Emotion, Ethics, and Cinematic
Experience (Berghahn Books 2021) and Critique Today (Brill 2006)), and is a mem
ber of the editorial boards of Film-Philosophy, Film and Philosophy, and Projections:
The Journal of Movies and Mind.
Professor Jane Stadler holds an honorary appointment in film and media studies at
The University of Queensland, Australia. She led a collaborative Australian Research
Council project on landscape and location in Australian cinema, literature, and the
ater (2011-2014) and co-authored Imagined Landscapes: Geovisualizing Australian
Spatial Narratives (2016). She is author of Pulling Focus: Intersubjective Experience,
Narrative Film, and Ethics (2008) and co-author of Screen Media (2009) and Media
xviii Biographical Notes
and Society (2016). Her philosophically informed screen media research focuses
on ethics, aesthetics, and the audiences affective responses, drawing on phenome
nological and cognitivist approaches.
Professor John Sutton works in the philosophy of mind, cognition, and action, in
cognitive psychology, and in the interdisciplinary cognitive humanities. His main
research topics are autobiographical and collaborative memory, embodied memory
and skilled movement, distributed cognition, and cognitive history. He is a member
of the ARC College of Experts, 2019-2021; Fellow of the Australian Academy of
Humanities; and was first President (2017-2019) of the the Australasian Society for
Philosophy and Psychology. Books and edited collections by Sutton include: Philos
ophy and Memory Traces: Descartes to connectionism (Cambridge University Press
2007) and Johnson, Sutton, & Tribble (Eds.), Embodied Cognition and Shakespeare's
Theatre: The Early Modern Body-Mind. (Routledge 2014).
Dr. C. Claire Thomson is professor of cinema history and director of the MA in film
studies at UCL (University College London). She is the author of Thomas Vinter-
berg’s Festen (Nordic Film Classics, University of Washington Press 2013) and Short
Films from a Small Nation: Danish Informational Cinema 1935-1965 (Edinburgh
University Press 2018), editor of Northern Constellations: New Readings in Nordic
Cinema (Norvik 2006), co-editor of A History of Danish Cinema (Edinburgh Uni
versity Press 2021), and Transnational Media Histories of the Nordic Model (Palgrave
2023). Her research interests include documentary and public information film,
short films, unrealized films, and the cinema of Carl Theodor Dreyer.
Dr. Pia Tikka is a professional filmmaker and EU Mobilitas Pluss research professor
at the Baltic Film, Media, and Arts School, Tallinn University. She holds the honor
ary title of adjunct professor of new narrative media at the University of Lapland,
and is a former director of Crucible Studio, department of media, Aalto University
(2014-2017). She acted as a main investigator of neurocinematics in the research
project aivoAALTO at the Aalto University (2010-2014) and founded her Neu-
roCine research group to study the neural basis of storytelling. She has published
widely on the topics of enactive media, narrative complex systems, and neurocin
ematics. Her filmography includes international film productions as well as two fea
ture films and interactive films she has directed. She is a fellow of the Society for
Cognitive Studies of the Moving Image and a member of the European Film Acad
emy. Currently, she leads her Enactive Virtuality Lab associated with the MEDIT
Centre of Excellence, Tallinn University.
Dr. Hunter Vaughan is a research fellow at the Minderoo Centre for Technology
and Democracy, University of Cambridge. Dr. Vaughan is the author of Where
Film Meets Philosophy (Columbia University Press 2013) and co-editor (with Tom
Conley) of the Anthem Handbook of Screen Theory (Anthem Books: London 2018,
2020). His most recent book, Hollywood's Dirtiest Secret: the Hidden Environmental
Biographical Notes xix
Costs of the Movies (Columbia University Press 2019) offers an environmental coun
ter-narrative to the history of mainstream film culture and explores the environ
mental ramifications of the recent transition to digital technologies and practices.
He was a 2017 Rachel Carson Center Fellow and is a founding editor of the Journal
of Environmental Media (Intellect Press). He is currently Principal Investigator,
with Pietari Kaapa, on the AHRC-funded Global Green Media Network, and is also
Principal Investigator with Anne Pasek, Nicole Starosielski, and Anjali Sugadev on
the Internet Society Foundations Sustainability and the Subsea Telecommunication
Cable Network project.
A Companion to Motion Pictures and
Public Value
General Introduction
This volumes topic, the varied intersections and conjunctions of motion pictures
and public value, is somewhat daunting in its potential scope. As the table of con
tents indicates, the book is structured in terms of (a non-exhaustive list of) different
sorts of value that, we claim, can be understood as yielding public value or values
that are partly constitutive of a common good. Given the breadth and heterogene
ity of the contributions collected here, organized in seven different sections, our
discussion in this main introduction will remain quite general. Each section of the
book is preceded by a section introduction, in which we outline the main themes of
the section and draw some connections between the individual chapters therein. For
now, then, we will aim to do just two things. First, we will sketch a bit of background
context for the project, outline its aims, and describe the approaches that character
ize the contributions to the volume. Then, we will explain how we are conceiving of
the concepts of “motion pictures,” “value,” and “public value” respectively.
Background Context, Aims, and Approach
Background Context
A Companion to Motion Pictures and Public Value aims to bring probing, thoughtful
attention to the issue of public value, as it relates to the cinema in all of its diversity.
“Public value,” as we shall see, has been defined in a number of different ways. To us,
the concept of public value offers a means of answering questions about which kinds
of motion pictures ultimately matter and how they contribute to a good life and soci
ety. “Motion pictures,” as used in the title of this volume, is historically capacious in
scope, encompassing different periods of screen image production, including con
temporary developments related to virtual reality and the proliferation of viewing
A Companion to Motion Pictures and Public Value, First Edition. Edited by Mette Hjort and Ted Nannicelli.
© 2022 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Published 2022 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
2 Mette Hjort and Ted Nannicelli
platforms. One of the benefits of a collaborative, multi-author project is the possibil

ity of anchoring the exploration of public value, not in a single national context, or
a few selected genres of moving image-making, but in a rich variety of institutional
landscapes, policy formations, and, indeed, types and styles of filmmaking. While
analytic in its aspirations, given the intended pursuit of conceptual clarification and
concept formation, A Companion to Motion Pictures and Public Value also reflects
a commitment to concepts of world cinema (Andrews 2004; Nagib, Perriam, and
Dudrah 2011; Stone et al. 2018). Indeed, the underlying premise of the volume is
that an analytic project executed through the casting of a wide and inclusive cultural
net is best able to yield an adequate understanding of the public value of the cinema.
Having emerged in the 1960s, film studies, and, more recently, screen studies,
cannot be said entirely to have ignored the ways in which motion pictures are var
iously imbued with value, contribute value to a given society, or serve particular
values. Three examples suggest how concepts of value, whether explicitly or implic
itly, underpin vital areas of inquiry in this field. Let us, then, briefly evoke the
research paradigms associated with useful cinema, radical/activist cinema, and
state-supported filmmaking in small nations.
Field-defining edited volumes such as Vinzenz Hediger and Patrick Vonderau’s
Films That Work: Industrial Film and the Productivity of Media (2009); Devin Org-
eron, Marsha Orgeron, and Dan Streible’s Learning with the Lights Off: Educational
Film (2012); and Charles Acland and Haidee Wasson’s Useful Cinema (2011) effec
tively rescued non-theatrical filmmaking, with its “functional” (Acland and Was
son, 2) approach to motion pictures, from the margins of the discipline. Coined to
identify the multiplicities of cinemas functionalities, the term “useful cinema” is
now one of screen studies’ key words. Describing useful cinema as “an enduring and
stable parallel industry to the more spectacular realm of what we commonly think
of as commercial film,” Acland and Wasson (2011, 2) essentially locate its specific
ity in its instrumental value. Associated, not with any particular mode of produc
tion, genre, or, even context of exhibition, useful cinema emerges, claim Acland and
Wasson, when “institutions and institutional agents” adopt a particular “disposition”
(2011,4) toward the motion pictures in question. This stance is one that sees motion
pictures as an effective means of achieving clearly defined goals, as “a tool that is
useful, a tool that makes, persuades, instructs, demonstrates and does something”
(2011, 6). Well-known instances of useful cinema include industrial films designed
to train workers (Groening 2011), health films produced for the purposes of educat
ing a population about matters of illness and health (Ostherr 2011), and films made
to further the goals of museum educators (Wasson 2011). In each of these cases,
motion pictures are a deliberately selected means to a desired end. Although Acland
and Wasson do not use the term “instrumental value,” their references to functional
ity and tools strongly suggest a view of useful cinema as a repository of instrumental
value harnessed to goals of public benefit.
If instrumental value is indeed a defining feature of useful cinema, those looking
to further develop the analytic paradigm may be led to ask questions such as the fol
lowing: is the sphere of commercial filmmaking, the contrast term for useful cinema,
A Companion to Motion Pictures and Public Value 3
devoid of instrumental value? What do we make of those many instances in which

well-established commercial directors and producers intentionally pursue profit
(and other goals) through motion pictures? Is it not a matter here too of mobiliz
ing motion pictures for instrumental purposes, of imbuing them with instrumental
value, at the very least as a means of achieving economic gains? A charitable reading
of the useful cinema paradigm might involve the extrapolation of an implicit stip
ulation to the effect that cinema becomes truly useful when it becomes a means
of achieving goals that are inherently valuable, or of public or civic value. In this
case, narrow economic gains would disqualify commercial cinema from inclusion
in the category of useful cinema. Health films, on the other hand, might be seen as
belonging squarely within the category of useful cinema, because they are a selected
means of achieving the public value of health. Yet, as Kirsten Ostherr (2011) argues
in her contribution to Useful Cinema, public health films may also serve the narrow
interests of “insurance, dental, and medical establishments” (Acland and Wasson
2011,9), even as they (appear to) promote health as a public value. This in turn sug
gests that public value can be pursued strategically or duplicitously or in ways that
combine private and public interests. These remarks about the value-based dimen
sions of the useful cinema paradigm suggest that there is room for clarification, and,
indeed, for a project in which the focus is fully on issues of public value, as these
issues arise across the entire spectrum of filmmaking and across a range of different
types of value.
A second example of film studies’/screen studies’ (more or less explicit) engage
ment with issues of public value is research devoted to radical film culture, including
radical filmmaking and the practices of exhibition and distribution that support it.
Countless are the authors and filmmakers who warrant more than a brief mention
in the context of a discussion of radical film culture. For present purposes, how
ever, it suffices to make reference to a recent relevant intervention in the area, Con
temporary Radical Film Culture: Networks, Organisations and Activists, edited by
Steve Presence, Mike Wayne, and Jack Newsinger (2020). The collaborative project
finds its inspiration in the Radical Film Network. Established in 2013, the Radical
Film Network is an organization that promotes radical filmmaking and radical film
culture on a global basis. The global remit of this institutional source of inspiration
is amply reflected in the volumes various chapters, which jointly span Africa, Asia,
China, Europe, the Middle East, as well as the Americas. In Hjort’s (2020) contri
bution, the issue of public value is explicitly evoked in connection with the features
of activist film culture on the African continent. Hjort cites Mbye B. Cham’s evo
cation of a Fulani saying about art to describe one of the central tenets of activist
filmmaking in Africa: “It is entertainment, it is educational and it is functional,” for
“African cinema is integral to the wider social and collective effort on the part of Af
ricans to bring about a better life for the majority of Africans” (Cham 1996, 4; cited
in Hjort 2020, 101-102). Making reference to filmmaker Gaston Kabore’s socially
transformative talent development initiatives in the context of the alternative film
school Imagine in Burkina Faso, to the rights- and social change-oriented priorities
of the Zanzibar International Film Festival, to Kenyan Judy Kibinge’s social justice
filmmaking, and to Cameroonian Jean-Marie Teno’s tireless commitment to film

making on behalf of truth, justice, and change, Hjort makes the point that African
filmmakers offer the world a conception of filmmaking that is a precious ressource
and genuine “source of public value” (Hjort 2020,101). Imbued with entertainment,
educational, and functional (or instrumental) value, as Mbye Cham would have it,
African filmmaking often features a desire to effect change for the benefit of an
entire community or public. Often neglected or marginalized in the more resource
intensive production milieux of the Global North, this understanding of the role
played by moving images within the dynamics of community formation, nation
building, and the construction of good societies is part of the normative impetus for
A Companion to Motion Pictures and Public Value.
As in the case of useful cinema, the radical film culture paradigm invites ques
tions about the public value of the cinema’s moving images, but does not explicitly
establish a framework for the necessary considerations. Cited in the context of a
discussion of activist filmmaking, Mbye Cham’s references to entertainment, edu
cation, and function suggest some of the many values that may be pursued through
filmmaking and the wider institutional practices that sustain it. But what of other
values that might be mediated by motion pictures? And how do various values relate
to each other? How exactly are we to draw a line, even a fuzzy one, between values
that somehow count as private as compared with public?
Our last example of a field of film studies/screen studies research that relies
on intuitions about public value is that of small nation film studies (Hjort 2005;
Hjort and Petrie 2007; Thomson 2018), especially as it relates to state-support
ed film industries. The history of state support, for example in the small nordic
nation of Denmark from around 1960 onwards, is largely one of developing strat
egies and policies aimed at creating the conditions for a thriving film industry that
can serve the public good. A key underlying premise is that in the absence of state
support, filmmakers, and producers, facing punishing levels of global competition
(Bondebjerg n.d.), would come to see filmmaking in and about the small nation
as unsustainble. State funding, in effect, is about mitigating the systemic risks that
are a feature of the terrain of small nation filmmaking (Hjort 2015). Justifications
for state funding make reference to film as art, but often what is especially salient
is the cultural, social, or political value that is to be derived from cinematic works
reflecting the language, culture, history, and diversity of everday life in the small
nation in question. Cinematic output of a certain volume and genre-based scope is
seen as a necessary element in the preservation and further development of the var
ious elements that make up a national culture. Also important are the ways in which
filmmaking within and about the national space nurtures the self-understandings
of viewers qua citizens and, furthermore, facilitates national conversations about
matters of collective significance.
Reflecting on the defining tenets of nordic media studies, Kirsten Drotner (2020,
np) foregrounds two notions: “One is a welfarist definition of culture as a common
good and not, or not merely, as a commodity on a competitive market. [... ] The other
notion [... ] is the definition of media as forms of culture in [... ] a legal, economic,
organisational and social sense.” The welfarist definition (see also Syvertsen and
Enli 2014) is seen as yielding a conception of cultural institutions as serving all cit
izens, including through a “diversity of cultural output and outlets.” The definition
of film and other media as forms of culture has the effect of making them a source
of “public value and not, or not merely” a source of “private gain” for investors. The
welfarist and cultural definitions of film and other media, claims Drotner, are core
elements in a public service paradigm that continues to be of great relevance. More
specifically, this paradigm is shaped by ideals that are essentially normative (in the
sense of contributing to what ought to be the case), thereby offering “a much-needed
critical and ethical corrective” (Drotner 2020) to tendencies that eschew (explicitly)
normative thinking about the whys and wherefores of cultural production.
Aims
A Companion to Motion Pictures and Public Value finds a starting point in a dis
cernible film-related deficit in many government-driven discussions, reports, and
conferences devoted to the value of culture, especially in the United Kingdom
and the small nordic nations. Let us look at an example. In 2011 the University of
Turku, Finland, organized a conference entitled “Culture, Health, and Well-being”
in the context of the city’s successful bid for the status of European Cultural Capital
that year. The point of this well organized, carefully designed, and forward-look
ing interdisciplinary conference was to bring together scholars, civil servants, and
creative practitioners to explore the ways in which culture contributes to health and
well-being. Music featured prominently in the discussions, as did theatre, dance,
and the visual arts. Motion pictures, on the other hand, were less well represented,
just as research related to the positive contributions of motion pictures to health and
well-being was generally seen, quite rightly so, as substantially less developed than
undertakings in a field such as music for health and well-being.
Health as a public value relates not only to the health-promoting results of practi
tioners’ efforts, to the music that emerges from the musicians’ playing or to the film
that results from the coordinated work of a film crew, but also to the practitioners
themselves. Here too, a glaring deficit is immediately discernible when comparisons
between music studies and screen studies are undertaken. The public value of safe
guarding and nurturing musicians’ health is well recognized—among other things
through the development of health education for musicians (Matei et al. 2018) and
the elaboration of substantial wellness-oriented guides to practice (Klickstein 2009).
Filmmakers’ health, on the other hand, is a field that has yet to emerge in even the
most preliminary of ways, a fact that was clearly evidenced by the program of the
Turku conference which featured musicians’ (and dancers’) health prominently and
left the reality of filmmakers’ health untouched.
When it comes to the public value of practitioners’ health, screen studies offers,
not a field, but isolated accounts of relevant topics. Sylvia J. Martin’s (2012, 2017)
comparative ethnographic research on the risks associated with stunt work in
Hollywood and Hong Kong offers a rare and insightful take on the health and
well-being of a particular category of film practitioners. Within the context of a

discussion of Stanley Kwan’s Center Stage (1991), Hjort (2006) offers a perspective
on the suicide of Chinese star Ruan Ying-lu in 1935 in terms of psychological risks
linked to specific performance practices and the absence of formal training. And in
recent times, the #Me Too movement has served to bring physical and psychological
risks associated with the film industries into the foreground, with regulatory con
sequences in certain jurisdictions (Hjort 2018). However, what remain lacking are
general as well as fine grained accounts of the health- and well-being related chal
lenges and risks associated with filmmaking. With the film industry having to adjust
to the challenges of COVID-19, the private and public value of filmmakers’ health
and well-being are now set to become unavoidable topics.
In sum, a decade on from the pioneering conference in Turku, it is fair to say
that research on how the motion pictures on our screens actually do contribute, or
can and should contribute, to the public and private value of health remains unsys
tematic and surprisingly limited in scale, scope, and depth. One of the aims of A
Companion to Motion Pictures and Public Value, then, is to suggest the contours of
new and emerging motion-picture-based fields that have enormous potential and
warrant a substantial investment of time, effort, and resources. Two such fields are
filmmakers’ health and moving images for health and well-being. In the final section
of A Companion to Motion Pictures and Public Value, the contours of the second of
these two fields are evoked. The field of health, it should be noted, offers an espe
cially dire example, but other areas are in similar need of attention. To achieve the
necessary focus it is helpful to engage a team of researchers, in our case as many as 31,
to begin to chart the diversity of film-related values and to flesh in the ways in which
they are realized through motion pictures.
It is important to point out that the Turku conference by no means is an exception
in terms of the sorts of lacunae identified above. The same absences are discern
ible in policy-oriented reports by the Arts Council of England that aim to capture
the contributions of culture to society—“Understanding the Value and Impacts of
Cultural Experiences: A Literature Review” (Carnwath and Brown 2014) and “The
Value of Arts and Culture to People and Society: An Evidence Review” (Mowlah
et al. 2014). Motion pictures are recognized in these reports as significant forms of
cultural expression, yet the mentions of film are cursory and mostly merely indic
ative or suggestive. As a result, the phenomenon of motion pictures as bearers of
diverse types of public value remains to be adequately explored.
These reports have, however, prompted some initiatives in film-related contexts.
More specifically, referring to these reports, the Danish Film Institute decided in
2016 to establish a “Valuation Task Force,” the mission of which would be to pro
vide an evidence-based account of the ways in which moving pictures bring value
to society. The coupling of the term “value” with “evidence-based” marked the
beginning, as the DFI Board saw it, of a new way of thinking about the contributions
of motion pictures. Rather than assume the positive impact of motion pictures based
on purely philosophical, political, or ideological grounds, the aim was to under
take research of a more empirical nature, especially with regard to the notoriously
difficult-to-measure longer-term effects of engaging with motion pictures over the

course of a lifetime. While the DFI produces and supports excellent research, its
principal mandate is to fund filmmaking and to support the preservation of film
culture. Inasmuch as the same is true for the DFI’s counterparts in other parts of the
world (which similarly have much at stake in the central question of film’s value),
it is unsurprising that the need for substantial research focusing on the value of
motion pictures remains to be met. It is our view that this need is best met through
an internationally oriented, team-based effort drawing on the expertise of carefully
selected scholars with the funding, methodological training, time, and established
track records needed to undertake the envisaged research.
Motivating the design of A Companion to Motion Pictures and Public Value is an un
shakeable belief in motion pictures as (potential) bearers of a variety of types of value.
Some of these values are well recognized, entertainment value being a case in point.
Yet, to allow only a small number of values to monopolize our attention is, ultimate
ly, to restrict the potential of moving images to contribute to well lived lives and the
development of societies that qualify as good in a number of critically important ways.
If we lose sight of the diversity of values that motion pictures potentially realize, the
sphere of practitioners’ agency shrinks, with filmmakers and their funders ever more
likely to gravitate toward the realization of dominant values. A wide-ranging explora
tion of motion pictures and public value, we believe, helps to widen the scope of what
we expect from the fare on our screens. What is more, this exploration challenges us to
ask difficult questions, for example about the relative value of different kinds of values.
Approach
As the remit of the volume would suggest, the contributors hail from all over the
world, geographically speaking, and all corners of the humanities (and, in some
cases, beyond), institutionally speaking. The disciplines represented by the contrib
utors include, of course screen studies (including film studies, television studies,
media studies), as well as communications, cultural studies, environmental studies,
literature, philosophy, and sociology. Among their number are three practitioners—
that is, people for whom part of their job and professional identity is the creation of
motion pictures.
On the one hand, the inclusion of practitioners (and scholar/practitioners)
speaks to some of the practical aims of the project: We hope not just to describe the
relationship between motion pictures and public value, but actively to contribute
toward an ecology of motion pictures production that is driven by considerations of
the common good. On the other hand, the pursuit of normative ideals or, indeed,
values that are essentially normative demands some consideration of the nature of
those ideals and values at a fairly general or abstract level. Typically, this sort of work
falls within the purview of philosophy—in particular, “value theory,” which includes
aesthetics and ethics.
Somewhere in between the practical concerns of implementing or realizing
certain values in the production of motion pictures and the philosophers’ general
questions about how to understand the nature and warrant of those values, there
are a number of middle-level research questions to be asked about the historical
relationship between motion pictures and public value, their contemporary rela
tionship, and what their future relationship ought to look like. The sorts of ques
tions we might pose at this middle-level of generality are diverse and answering
them thus requires a diverse collection of methods. Some questions might require
historical research, including, but not limited to archival research. Other questions
might need to be addressed via close analysis of a specific group of motion pic
tures, and, depending on the research question, such a group might be defined by
language, nation and/or origin (or reception), medium (or artform), mode of pro
duction (i.e., commercial, public, private, independent), and so forth. And still other
questions involving the reception of motion pictures might need to appeal to the
methods of the psychological sciences or of cultural studies, depending on what
aspect of reception is under investigation.
What then, if anything, do the various methods and approaches taken by the
contributors in this volume have in common? Arguably, it is their analytical
orientation, as we suggested above. By “analytical,” we mean relating to analysis
in the sense of a detailed and careful examination of a particular phenomenon.
We might also add that in the chapters collected here, such analysis tends to be
question- or problem-driven and the point or purpose of the analysis is clar-
ificatory or explicative. In other words, although the project is explicitly un
derpinned by a commitment to particular ideas and values, this commitment
exists at a quite general level and underdetermines the kinds of methodolog
ical or disciplinary-specific commitments that one might find in another ed
ited collection. For example, our project might, methodologically speaking, be
contrasted with an edited collection that was oriented around, say, actor-net
work theory; in such a volume, the contributors might be committed to a fairly
specific doctrine and then proceed to offer a hermeneutic exploration of a text
or group of texts on that basis. In contrast, the contributors to A Companion to
Motion Pictures and Public Value tend to limit their doctrinal commitments and,
instead, avail themselves of those methods or approaches that are most suited
to exploring a particular research question or problem analytically in the sense
described above.
Explicating Key Concepts
Our goal in this part of the introduction is to offer some preliminary characterisa
tions of the key concepts of our project—motion pictures, public value, and value.
Our discussions will necessarily be brief here, but we hope at least to canvas some of
the general theoretical issues tied to these concepts and to clarify both the sense in
which we are using them and the extent to which our use of them involves particular
theoretical commitments.
Motion Pictures
In this volume, we understand and use the term “motion pictures” capaciously.
Included in the category of motion pictures are fictional films, documentary
films, interactive documentaries, instances of virtual reality (VR) “filmmaking,”
television advertising, and fiction and documentary television series. Likewise,
we use the term “television” in a broad sense to include not just the content that
we watch on physical televisions, but also the streamed “television” content of
providers like Netflix, Hulu, Amazon Prime, Disney +, and so forth, as well as
independently produced and distributed web-series and web-videos. “Screen me
dia” might be another term that roughly picks out the sorts of phenomena under
discussion here.
Yet, we have elected to use the term “motion pictures” rather than “screen me
dia” or similar terms in part because the concept of “motion pictures” has been
most thoroughly theorized and defended as a coherent category. Here we have in
mind the philosopher Noel Carroll’s definition of motion pictures (or “moving
images”, as he variously calls them) in his 2008 volume, The Philosophy of Motion
Pictures. Carroll’s definition is somewhat technical, and we will leave it to inter
ested readers to explore its details (2008, 53-79), as well as alternative accounts
(e.g. Ponech 2009, 52-63). The key point in this context is that Carroll’s inquiry
moves beyond the historically prominent question “what is cinema?” (posed most
notably by French film critic and theorist Andre Bazin) in a way that allows us to
recognize the commonalities between “cinema” and similar media such as televi
sion, VR, and the like.
In more ambitious moments, Carroll even urges us to “forget the medium” and
focus on the broader category of moving images (or motion pictures) (2003, 1-9).
Underlying Carroll’s entreaty is a worry that talk of medium-specific features of
cinema, television, and the like is bound up with dubious metaphysics—namely,
the doctrine of medium essentialism, according to which media are individuated
by their unique, timeless essences. Carroll has lodged a number of devastating
objections to medium essentialism (e.g., 2003, 1-9, 2008, 35-52) and we would
certainly want to distance ourselves from that doctrine. However, we are not
convinced of Carroll’s suggestion that medium-specificity claims—claims about
particular tendencies or affordances of, say, television versus film, or interactive
documentary versus traditional documentary—are necessarily underpinned by
medium essentialism and, thus, illicit or false (see Nannicelli 2017, 51-87; Smith
2006). On the contrary, we will work on the assumption that there is a meta
physically neutral or innocuous way of understanding such medium-specificity
claims, which seems necessary to make sense of the plausible arguments made
by a number of our contributors that the affordances or capacities of new media
(e.g., interactive documentaries, VR) often raise new ethical challenges or create
new possibilities for realizing value in the domains of politics, the environment,
health, and so forth.
Value
The extremely abstract nature of “value” and the varied uses and senses of the term
“value” make explicating it a particularly tall order. Of the numerous difficult ques
tions and issues orbiting the concept of value, we’ll address just a few—namely, what is
value? And what is its nature? The first of these questions is about the definition of the
term “value”; the second is about the metaphysics of value. In light of our present pur
poses, we will try to paint in broad strokes. Moreover, we will try to avoid the related
topic of the epistemology of value, which involves questions about the warrant and
justification of value judgments, even though there are many matters on which the
metaphysics of value and the epistemology of value intersect (see, e.g., Kirchin 2012).
First, what does it mean to say that something has value? A common and appar
ently sensible starting point is to reply that it either means that some person(s) value
it (or could value it) or that it is valuable. Yet what might seem like a straightforward
choice between two plausible starting points turns out to be the source of an ancient
and intractable problem—“the Euthyphro problem” from Plato’s dialogue of that
name. In our terms, the question is whether we value something because it is valuable
or whether something is valuable because we value it. The Euthyphro dilemma bears
not just upon understanding the concept of value but also upon the sort of thing (in
metaphysical terms) we take it to be. Nevertheless, we shall see presently that there is
a pragmatic approach to this problem that can help us at least avoid or defer it.
At least one apparently uncontroversial claim is that whatever else value might
be, it is goodness or “the good.” This seems to point us in the direction of explain
ing why we seek value out, why we are motivated to pursue it. And this observation,
in turn, underpins several of the better-known accounts of value. According to a
simple version of hedonism, goodness is nothing more than pleasure (and badness
is nothing more than pain or suffering). Put this way, hedonism will be familiar to
many of us from the role it plays in the classical versions of utilitarianism devel
oped by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, according to which the morally right
action is whatever brings about the most good (defined in terms of pleasure).
However, the definitional question is now merely moved back a step, since
defenders of hedonism then have to say what pleasure is—a task that is more com
plicated than it might seem. Mill, for example, acknowledged that there are different
kinds of pleasure that plausibly have greater or lesser value, although this is a conten
tious claim. (Is the pleasure one gets from watching televised soccer the same in kind
as the pleasure one gets from watching an experimental film? Are they comparable?
We return to this sort of question below.) Hedonism perhaps seems more plausible
in its negative formulation that takes badness to be pain and emphasizes its avoid
ance. However, the positive formulation, especially, has been subjected to much of
the sort of criticism one would expect to see leveled at a theory that equates value
with pleasure (e.g., it regards as good or valuable the drug addict’s high, the sadist’s
torture of his victim, Schadenfreude, a “pleasurable” life plugged into “the Matrix,”
and so forth). In the present context, it is worth noting that hedonism is premised
upon a kind of psychological individualism. In principle, hedonism allows for the
possibility of overall goodness as an aggregate of the pleasures experienced by mul

tiple individuals; but there is, apparently, no possibility of a collective or common
good that does not ultimately reduce to individual states of pleasure.
One might raise a similar worry with regard to another of the central accounts
of value—namely, desire accounts. Very roughly speaking, desire accounts of value
characterize the valued or valuable as that which is desired or desirable. As Thomas
Hurka explains, desire accounts are popular in part because “they seem to simplify
the metaphysics of value, making it not a mysterious addition to the universe but the
product of human desires. They are democratic and make value comparatively easy
to identify and measure” (2006,363). In these regards, desire theories share the same
attractive features of hedonism. Moreover, the more sophisticated desire theories at
least appear to be able to avoid some of the objections we noted above by invoking
the idea of a second-order desire. For example, according to David Lewis (1989), an
addict “may hate himself for desiring something he values not at all. It is a desire he
wants very much to be rid of.... We conclude that he does not value what he desires,
but rather he values what he desires to desire” (1989, 115). Lewis then proposes to
explicate the concept of value in terms of the act of valuing as second-order desir
ing: “Valuing is just desiring to desire. I say that to be valued by us means to be that
which we desire to desire. Then to be a value—to be good, near enough—means to
be that which we are disposed, under ideal conditions, to desire to desire” (1989,
116). Lewis’s so-called “dispositional theory of value” illustrates just how tight a con
nection there is between definitions of value and theories of (the nature of) value.
Let us briefly consider some objections to desire-based accounts of value with
Lewis’s dispositional theory in mind as an example. One potential problem is that,
like hedonism, such accounts seem premised on a sort of egoism—that is, on the
idea that value is ultimately reduceable to what is valued at an individual level. But
we might question if this is really the case, especially in societies that are not as
individualistic as WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic)
ones (Flanagan 2017). We can imagine, for example, a collectively-oriented society
in which a single individual’s satisfaction of his desires (first- or second-order or
otherwise) does not register as good in any respect if this undermines or detracts
from the common good of the community (say, in the form of shame, dishonour,
and so forth). Another problem, noted by Gary Watson in response to a similar
second-order account of desire advanced by Harry Frankfurt in a different context,
is that there is no reason to think one’s second-order desires should be especially
privileged. Rather, it would seem that one can also “be a wanton, so to speak, with
respect to one’s second order desires and volitions” (Watson 1975,217). That is, one
could desire what one does not value at the second order, as well as the first, and,
indeed, the problem is recursive in nature so adding more “levels” will not solve it.
Another way of putting this objection is to say that although desire-based theories of
value boast the ability to acknowledge the diversity of ways in which people identify,
desire, and realize what is good for them, this comes at the cost of not being able to
acknowledge the wide variety of ways people can be mistaken or misguided about
what is good.
Thus far, we have canvased some prominent analyses of value that seek to expli
cate the concept in terms of the act of valuing, and we have seen that there are force
ful objections to all of them. There are many more accounts of value (perfectionist
accounts, fitting-attitude accounts) that we cannot explore here. But one possibility
we need to consider is that value (or goodness) simply is not the sort of concept that
is amenable to further analysis in terms of other concepts. G.E. Moore, for example,
held that “good” is a basic concept that is neither definable nor amenable to reduc
tive analysis (2004 [1903]). That view might seem to be a dead end for understand
ing what value is, but, on the contrary, there are many concepts that we understand
even if we cannot define them. Our understanding of such concepts is evident in the
way that we use them in ordinary contexts.
This observation points us toward the pragmatic solution to the Euthyphro prob
lem. Roughly speaking, the question raised by Socrates in this dialogue is whether
the gods love an action because it is pious or whether an action is pious because
the gods love it. In our terms, recall, the question is whether we value something
because it is valuable or whether things are valuable because we value them. Now,
what initially motivates Socrates’s question is the desire to know what piousness is,
and his question assumes that such knowledge is essentially a matter of being able
to define and describe the nature of piousness. So, it may seem we face a similar
dilemma in attempting to say what value is. However, one might simply reject the
assumption that knowledge of what value is and the ability to describe value nec
essarily requires one to provide a definition or an account of its nature. This is the
point Peter Geach makes in his analysis of Euthyphro, in which he observes, “We
know heaps of things without being able to define the terms in which we express
our knowledge. Formal definitions are only one way of elucidating terms; a set of
examples may in a given case be more useful than a formal definition (1966, 371).
The upshot of this argument is that the best way of elucidating a slippery concept
like value may simply be to point to and try to describe the way we use the term in
language and conceive of the concept of value in our everyday practices.
In fact, this is what many, if not all, of the contributors do tacitly throughout
the book. The book’s seven-section structure, too, suggests something about value
that may seem obvious, but that is far from trivial: the evidence from our practices
suggests that value is plural—that there are distinct domains of value that may not
be reducible to a single kind of value (or good). We seek out aesthetic experiences,
spiritual experiences, social encounters, interaction with the natural environment,
and so forth in ways that indicate those experiences afford a plurality of goods.
So, too, we create, seek out, and watch motion pictures that offer those same expe
riences either directly or imaginatively and, thus, also afford the various sorts of
goods outlined by the sections of this book.
It is these sorts of practices, in the domains of the aesthetic, the ethical, the
spiritual, the social, the prudential, and so forth, that sustain value, and it is to these
practices that we need to look to glean a better understanding of the concept. As
philosopher Joseph Raz puts it, “As art forms, social relations and political struc
tures are created by social practices—or, at any rate, as their existence depends on
such practices—so must their distinctive virtues and forms of excellence depend on
social practices that create and sustain them” (2008, 33). These standards or criteria
for excellence are therefore relative to the norms of particular social practices. And,
of course, such standards and criteria are fluid for they are also contingent on our
social practices, which themselves are fluid.
Nevertheless, it should be noted here that this take on value as essentially socially
sustained raises one more difficult question that we should briefly address. As we
pointed out in objecting to desire accounts of value, one challenge for explicating
value is to accurately account for the fact that, in the sorts of practices described
above, we speak and act as if people can be mistaken or misguided about value. In
this sense, value is an essentially normative concept. It is worth saying a bit about
what this means and does not mean in the present context.
We may not necessarily agree on what an ideal vacation would be, but we have a
shared understanding of the criteria for something to count as a vacation as well as the
sorts of qualities that make a vacation good (relaxation, fun, a change of scenery, etc.)
and those that make a vacation bad (stress, illness, logistical problems, lousy weather).
In our social practice of vacationing, value is relativized to the kinds of things vaca
tions are, but is nevertheless objective because the criteria for kind-membership and
being good of a kind are intersubjectively shared. It is in this sense that value is an
essentially normative concept in virtue of the way it is socially sustained. The example
of vacations is our own, but it falls under a broader category of what Raz calls “genre-
or of kind-constituting values;” for Raz, “a genre or a kind of value combines two fea
tures: it defines which objects belong to it, and in doing so it determines that the value
of the object is to be assessed (inter alia) by its relations to the defining standards of the
genre” (2008, 39). The defining standards of a genre or kind, while socially dependent
and contingent, have an objective existence; they are intersubjectively available to
members of a given society, sustained and taught in the relevant social practice.
This sort of argument naturally leads Raz to discuss various art forms and art
genres at some length—but it is interesting to note that similar arguments have been
run independently by a number of philosophers of art (including by one of the con
tributors to the present volume, Glenn Parsons; see Parsons and Carlson 2008). For
example, Noel Carroll (2001) and Nicholas Wolterstorff (2015) have, respectively,
argued for accounts of art as a network of interrelated cultural practices and social
practices. Carroll describes a cultural practice as “a complex body of interrelated
human activities governed by reasons internal to those forms of activity and to their
coordination” (2001, 66). Moreover, and, of signal importance in the present con
text, he claims, “Practices are aimed at achieving goods that are appropriate to the
forms of activity that comprise them, and these reasons and goods, in part, situate
the place of the practice in the life of the culture” (2001, 66). Partly in virtue of this
fact, “art is a public practice” in the sense that the norms of the practice and its goods
are shared by members of the culture in which it is situated (Carroll 2001, 66). Like
wise, Wolterstorff emphasizes the public and social nature of our creative and appre
ciative art practices; a key point for him and for us is that there is a wide variety of
different ways of engaging art (2015, 86).1
The points made by Carroll and Wolterstoff can be put together in a way that
bears upon our discussion of the objectivity of value and the plurality of values af
forded by social practices. Another way of putting Wolterstorff s point about the
diverse ways of engaging art is to say that art fulfills a variety of functions and offers
us a variety of different goods. It is not implausible to think that particular arti
fact kinds, including art and motion pictures more specifically, might have multiple
functions or purposes and afford multiple sorts of value (see, e.g., Stecker 1997).
Wolterstorff (2015) persuasively argues that art can have the functions of memorial
izing, of venerating, of protesting, of pursuing justice. It can also have the purposes
of persuading, educating, and strengthening community relationships. The list goes
on, and the point applies, mutatis mutandis, to motion pictures.
There is an important connection here between function and value: it is plausi
ble to think of kinds that have primary or “proper” functions as good of their kind
insofar as they fulfill that function (see Stecker 1997; Parsons and Carlson 2008).
Furthermore, it is also plausible that whether a particular kind has a primary or
“proper” function is an objective matter. This is perhaps obviously true of biological
kinds—a good liver is one that rids the body of toxins and a bad liver is one that
does not fulfill that function—but it is also true of many artifact kinds. Both Raz
and Carroll discuss movies at length to make this point. One of Carroll’s examples is
slapstick comedy: “given the point or purpose of [slapstick] comedy—its function, if
you will—pratfalls contribute to the goodness of a slapstick comedy and the lack of
them, all things being equal, would be detrimental” (2009, 164). There is a missing
premise here, but it is fairly uncontroversial (and Carroll supplies it later on)—i.e.,
that the aim or purpose of slapstick comedy is “the provocation of laughter through
physical business, often of an apparently accidental sort” (2009, 168). Whether all
artifact kinds, let alone art, have such determinate purposes or proper functions is
a matter of debate. Yet whether a particular kind has such functions is an objective
matter (albeit a socially-established, contingent one), as is whether a candidate kind
has the right sorts of features and fulfills the relevant function to be good of its kind.
Clearly enough, some genres or kinds of motion pictures do, and this secures the
objectivity of their value.
That said, the argument does not establish that something is valuable simpliciter
or that a particular kind or genre is itself valuable. Christine Korsgaard raises the
possibility of “the bad genre” as an objection to Raz’s argument. According to Kors
gaard, “one obvious problem is that there are standards of excellence for very bad
things: a good assassin is cool, methodical, careful, and ruthless, but we are not going
to say ‘the assassin is good because he is a good assassin’” (2008, 69). Korsgaard is
right, of course, that being a good assassin isn’t a good thing and does not make one
a good person; but that is not what the argument asserts. And there doesn’t seem to
be anything erroneous or counterintuitive about saying that a Nazi propaganda film
is good as propaganda (i.e., effective, persuasive, etc.) yet not valuable as a film or
in general. In relation to this point, it is worth noting that the sort of value we are
discussing here is not intrinsic—either in the sense of having its source solely in the
intrinsic properties of a motion picture or other artwork or in the sense of it being
good for its own sake or an end in itself; rather, this sort of value is instrumental in a
way Paisley Livingston explores in Chapter 1. Following Aristotle, Livingston argues
that such instrumental value is only finally valuable if it serves ends that are valuable
in their own right. We think this is compatible with the argument sketched above,
the force of which is that there is an important sense in which the instrumental value
of artifacts is objective despite the fact that the final value of such artifacts depends
on the ends served.
What sorts of intrinsic value might secure the final value of such artifacts? The
sections of A Companion to Motion Pictures and Public Value constitute a plausible
(if not universally accepted) list. The book is divided into sections that individu
ally focus on values that are plausibly intrinsic (or final) in the sense of being good
for their own sake—aesthetic, ethical, spiritual, cognitive, prudential, environmen
tal, and so forth—and that motion pictures can afford. These values are public in a
number of senses, including that of being essentially socially embedded in practices
that are shared amongst a public.
In conclusion, it is necessary to speak to an important reservation one might
have about the view that motion pictures possess (or at least have the potential to
possess) a plurality of values. How do we then weigh up these different species of
value and aggregate them? If a particular motion picture, say, The Birth of a Nation
(1915) possesses substantive artistic value yet abounds in ethical disvalue (not just
the absence of value but negative value in the sense of being ethically flawed), how
should we aggregate those values and offer an overall evaluation of the film? We
suspect that the intractability of the problem of teaching The Birth of a Nation and
films like it is that motion pictures can indeed possess a plurality of values that are
neither reducible to a single value, nor comparable in a way that would allow us to
aggregate them in a way that facilitates an overall evaluation. As Paisley Livingston
puts it in Chapter 1, “In many cases, it may be very hard, or even impossible, to find
a single overarching value or norm in relation to which a work’s plurality of valences
could be compared and summed up” (32-33). Indeed, as Richard Allens discussion
in Chapter 12 suggests, it may be central to a film’s aims or purposes to hold two
competing values (e.g. religious value and entertainment value) in tension, and it is
even plausible that the aesthetic value that inheres in some motion pictures derives
from this sort of complex interaction of irreducible values.
Where does that leave us and our prospects for thinking about value in an over
arching or global sense? In practical terms, one promising idea is to simply restrict
the scope of our judgments or evaluations. Instead of global judgments, we might
make do with pro tanto judgments—as Mette Hjort does (following Gaut 2007) in
Chapter 7. On this view, a motion picture’s innovative use of editing might yield a
pro tanto artistic merit—a merit insofar as it contributes to its art-historical value;
yet the same bit of editing might yield a pro tanto ethical flaw—a flaw insofar as it,
say, aligns viewers with the Ku Klux Klan, encouraging us to root for them. It might
seem unsatisfactory to leave things at that, resisting the urge to say something more
definitive about the film’s overall value. But we should take comfort in the fact that a
number of philosophers have advanced compelling accounts of why we should not
expect such neatness when it comes to our general norms and values (e.g., Nagel
1979; Stocker 1990). This idea might raise the specter of ethical or value relativism,
but since we cannot address that question here, we will simply conclude by noting
that the very idea of a common good—roughly what we today refer to as a public
good—and the empirical fact that it is a common pursuit across historical epochs,
societies, and cultures give us reason to suspect and hope that people often converge
as well as diverge on the norms and values taken to be central to the good life.2
Public Value
The term “public value” acquired salience with the publication of Harvard profes
sor Mark H. Moore’s now classic Creating Public Value (1995), which addressed
itself to public managers in the field of public administration. Creating Public
Value sought to offer guidance to those charged with spending public funds, for
example in the sphere of education, housing, or public health. Based on insights
regarding the successful management of commercial enterprises, Creating Public
Value explored the extent to which principles from the commercial sector could
be transferred to the public sector. In 2013 Moore pursued his arguments further,
publishing Recognizing Public Value, an extended reflection on issues of evidence
and accountability, on how public managers are able to demonstrate that their pol
icies and actions actually have the effect of realizing public value. Revisiting the
aims of the earlier book in the introduction to the companion volume from 2013,
Moore highlights his contention that in devising “value-creating” strategies for
public organizations, public managers must make reference to the external envi
ronment of their operations.” “Public managers,” he claims, had to learn “to look
upward toward the political authorizing environment that both provided resources
and judged the value of what they were producing and outward toward the task
environment where their efforts to produce public value would find success or
failure” (Moore 2013, 7).
An example of the influence of Moores concept of public value can be found in
the BBC’s adoption of relevant principles in its 2004 “Building Public Value: Re
newing the BBC for a digital world,” a document developed in connection with the
organization’s bid for a renewal of its 10-year charter. Richard Collins finds evidence
of the “mediation” of Moore’s ideas “to the UK” in the BBC’s adoption of public
value as “a regulatory as well as a management doctrine” (Collins 2007, 164). Col
lins further contends that the concept of public value offered the BBC a means of
responding to “critiques of the BBC’s divergence from public service principles in
its broadcasting practice” (164). Matteo Maggiore describes the BBC’s mobilization
of “the notion of public value to guide” public service broadcasting and “to assess its
performance” as a clear and decisive “break with the traditional arguments devel
oped by public service broadcasters in Europe.” A distinctive feature of the BBC’s
“Building Public Value” document was its proposal, “for the first time” to make its
“plans for new services directly accountable to the public, including the wider media
industry” (Maggiore 2011,229). To this end, the BBC proposed to introduce a “pub
lic values test,” assessments of market impact, and a “performance measurement
framework” that would be designed to measure the “reach, quality, impact and value
for money” of the broadcasters programmes (BBC 2004, 15).
Seeking to establish a boundary between the roles and obligations of commercial
companies and public service organizations, the BBC’s “Building Public Value”
asserts that whereas the former exist to “return value to their shareholders or
owners” the latter exist to “create public value" (7). Broadcasting is referred to as
a “civic art” that is “never a purely private transaction” (BBC 2004, 6). Described
as infinitely shareable by an ever expanding public and as thereby qualifying for
the status of a “public good” (7), public broadcasting is seen as offering a “shared
experience [that] may itself represent a significant public value” (6). According to
“Building Public Value,” the aim is to serve “audiences not just as consumers, but
as members of a wider society, with programs and services which, while seeking to
inform, educate and entertain audiences, also serve wider public purposes” (7-8).
“Public value,” we are told, “is a measure of the BBC’s contribution to the quality
of life in the UK” (8). The document goes on to identify five types of public value
that the BBC is committed to creating: democratic value (which underpins civic
life), cultural and creative value (through opportunities for creativity, the celebra
tion of cultural heritage, and capacious national conversations), educational value
(that contributes to a knowledge- and skills-based society), social and community
value (that fosters social cohesion and tolerance by capturing commonalities and
differences), and global value (“by being the world’s most trusted provider of inter
national news and information, and by showcasing the best of British culture to a
global audience”) (BBC 2004, 8).
While Moore’s interventions have inspired an especially influential discourse of
public value, there are dissenting voices challenging aspects of the relevant theory
and practice. A key figure in this regard is Barry Bozeman, who claims that the stan
dard interpretation of “public value” represents a privatization of earlier notions of
public interest and the common good. The problem, as he sees it, is that “market
based philosophies of human behaviour and public policy” (Bozeman 2007, 3) are
made a basis for public agencies to adopt practices from the business sector and
for private corporations to assume (previously or ideally) “public responsibilities”
(Bozeman 2007, 6).
In his alternative approach to public value, articulated, for example, in Public
Values and Public Interest (2007), Bozeman revives the notion of public interest, an
ideal that he sees as being pursued through the more “tangible concept” (2007, 132)
of public value and, more specifically, through the “specific, identifiable content”
(2007, 12) of the public values that animate a given nation and its citizens. A key
feature of Bozeman’s account of public values, which draws on the communitarian
thinking of philosophers such as Michael Sandel, Jurgen Habermas, and Charles
Taylor, and the pragmatism of John Dewey, is its emphasis on normative publicness
(Bozeman 2007, 10):
A society’s “public values” are those providing normative consensus about (a) the
rights, benefits, and prerogatives to which citizens should (and should not) be entitled;
(b) the obligations of citizens to society, the state, and one another; and (c) the princi
ples on which governments and policies should be based (2007, 13).
Collaborating with Torben Beck Jorgensen, Bozeman offers an inventory of public

values based on an examination of about 230 studies (mostly articles) spanning the
period of 1990-2003 and with a focus on public administration in the USA, the UK,
and Scandinavia (Beck Jorgensen and Bozeman 2007, 357). The empirical data, then,
is drawn from societies that “represent very different positions on the spectrum of
the welfare state” (357). The researchers’ survey of the literature yields as many as
72 values that can be divided into a number of so-called constellations. In the first
constellation, for example, we find values that are linked to the guiding idea that the
public sector can and should contribute to society, to “the common good and to the
public interest” (361). Based on their empirical survey, Beck Jorgensen and Boze
man conclude that “values are not considered equally important, that some values
are so closely related that they seem to form clusters, and that values can be related
to one another in a variety of different ways” (369-370). Especially significant is their
finding that while government has a special role to play as the “guarantor of public
values,” the latter are not in fact “the exclusive province of government” (373).
A Companion to Motion Pictures and Public Value affirms this latter point about
the wider involvement of private actors in the creation of public value, the creation
of public value being the responsibility of individuals and groups within both the
private and public sectors. With reference, for example, to the actions of film pro
ducers, a conception of the causality of public value as encompassing the private
sector arguably entails a heightened awareness of the seriousness of producing
images for our various screens. As potential contributors to a common good and
a good society (Hussain 2018), the decisions and actions of film producers merit
assessment in terms of the extent to which they contribute to, or, as the case may be,
obstruct the realization of values that are constitutive of our communities’ well-be
ing. Viewers too participate in the realization of public value, for embedded in their
responses to films are forms of affirmation or rejection related not only to the values
on display but also, at least ideally, to the attitudes and practices underpinning the
making of the works. These responses pertain to the creation of public value inas
much as they have ramifications, for example, for the future scope of agency enjoyed
by a given work’s producers. It is not a matter here of denying the reality of private
lives, be it with reference to film producers or film spectators. Rather, the point
is to foreground the public dimension of film production (including funding) and
film spectatorship, the term “public” being an appropriate qualifier for state entities
but also, as Jurgen Habermas (1989; Calhoun 1992) taught us, for the activities of
individuals who rise above narrow self-interest and personal concern to contem
plate, debate, and engage with matters of mutual interest. A Companion to Motion
Pictures and Public Value offers an exploration of seven categories of value, each
of them with a clear public dimension. We know that much work remains to be
done: a number of key questions have yet to be asked, while others have been only
partially answered. Yet, if Motion Pictures and Public Value inspires further research
(of significant scope and scale) on how best to theorize, investigate, but also defend
the ideally public dimension of screen content in various contexts, the volume will,
we believe, have accomplished an urgent task.
Notes
1 Neither Carroll nor WolterstorfF rule out the possibility that someone could make art in
private; the point, rather, is that what it means to make art is socially established (and
public in that sense).
2 We are grateful to Paisley Livingston for a number of helpful corrections and insight
ful points from which this introduction has benefited. Any remaining mistakes are
ours alone.
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Part I
Artistic and Aesthetic Value
Introduction
Artistic and Aesthetic Value
Perhaps it will strike readers as odd that widespread acceptance of motion pictures
as an art form is a relatively recent development—one that emerged out of a
century-long debate about whether motion pictures could be art and, if so, under
what conditions (see, e.g., Canudo [1911] 1980; Lindsay [1915] 2000; Arnheim
[1933] 1957; Perkins 1972; Sesonske 1974; Scruton [1983] 2006; Carroll 1988.)
With the benefit of the knowledge that movies and television were the dominant
popular art forms of the 20th century, it may seem obvious that we value motion
pictures as artworks and, furthermore, that this is often because of the aesthetic
pleasure they afford.
However, such an apparently casual observation immediately raises a number
of complex questions: On what conception of “art” and under what conditions are
motion pictures artworks? What does it mean to say that we value a motion picture
as an artwork, or to say that it has artistic value? How does artistic value relate to
aesthetic value? And in what ways do the artistic value and aesthetic value of motion
pictures depend upon things like the content of what they represent, their means
of representation, their generative history or immediate production context, and
the wider socio-historical contexts of their production and reception? The chapters
in this section explore all of these questions in detail; our aim here is to do some
stage setting.
To begin, it is worth briefly revisiting the question of whether motion pictures can
be art because the positions in this debate constitute the backdrop for some of the
discussion in the chapters by all four of the authors in this section. From the start,
proponents of the view that cinema could be art anticipated objections. Consider,
for example, this statement from one of the earliest cases for film as art—Vachel
A Companion to Motion Pictures and Public Value, First Edition. Edited by Mette Hjort and Ted Nannicelli.
© 2022 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Published 2022 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
26 Ted Nannicelli and Mette Hjort
Lindsays The Art of the Moving Picture: “Let us take for our platform this sentence:
THE MOTION PICTURE ART IS A GREAT HIGH ART, NOT A PROCESS OF
COMMERCIAL MANUFACTURE” ([1915] 2000, 30). Even in his defense of cine
matic art, Lindsay accepts a dichotomy that skeptics of motion picture art (and mass
art more generally) would seize upon time and time again. Implicit in this dichot
omy is the premise that commercial production and art are mutually exclusive. A
pithy and forceful statement of this comes from Dwight Macdonald, who claims
that, since the mid 19th century, “Western culture has really been two cultures: the
traditional kind—let us call it ‘High Culture’—that is chronicled in the textbooks,
and a ‘Mass Culture’ manufactured wholesale for the market” (1953, 1). Moreover,
Macdonald claims, “Mass Culture has developed new media of its own, into which
the serious artist rarely ventures: radio, the movies, comic books, detective stories,
science fiction, television” (1953, 1).
For what reasons might one think that commercial manufacture and genuine
artmaking are mutually exclusive? One reason, offered by Macdonald himself, is
that commercial manufacture precludes individual expression or expression of “the
folk,” which is putatively a necessary condition for creating bone fide art. According
to Macdonald, “the essential quality of Mass, as against High or Folk, Culture [is
that] it is manufactured for mass consumption by technicians employed by the rul
ing class and is not an expression of either the individual artist or the common
people themselves” (1953, 3).1
While we might assure ourselves that this is a woefully outdated perspective,
aspects of it are clearly still with us, and the authors in this section make a number
of points that bring its flaws into view. Perhaps most obviously, one might want to
challenge the simplistic opposition between mass and high or folk culture. Khatereh
Sheibani’s chapter on the aesthetics of Iranian cinema poses just such a challenge
(albeit implicitly) by making a persuasive case that part of contemporary Iranian
cinema’s value derives from its manifestation of aspects of Persian folk culture. One
might also question the supposed necessity of an artwork offering an expression of
an individual artist. In their chapter on distributed creativity in filmmaking prac
tice, Karen Pearlman and John Sutton note how entrenched and pervasive this view
remains today. From their interdisciplinary perspective, however, a conception of
filmmaking as a collaborative enterprise with aims, intentions, and creativity dis
tributed across a production team, is both more empirically accurate and concep
tually sound. Moreover, Pearlman and Sutton argue for the centrality of the creative
contributions by the sorts of “technicians” Macdonald seems to have in mind—in
particular, editors. Paisley Livingston argues for a deflationary conception of art
derived from Aristotle’s concept of techne, according to which art is a group of “pur
poseful human practices, each of which requires some level of acquired skill” (p. 31,
this volume). Of course, if we think about art along these lines, there’s no reason to
think that artmaking and commercial manufacture are incompatible; again, many
mere “technicians” such as editors, camera operators, gaffers, sound recordists, etc.
draw upon quite refined and specialized skill sets to work collaboratively toward a
shared goal.
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Wenn auch nach J e n t i n k s Klarstellung der Unterschiede von C.
marginatus und brachyotis (1891) eine Revision der Bestimmungen von
marginatus in den Museen angezeigt ist, so scheint es doch, nach den
Catalogen des Britischen und des Leidener Museums (1878, 83 und
1888, 153), nicht zweifelhaft, dass sich überall, wo brachyotis
vorkommt, auch marginatus findet, und so sind vielleicht die Acten über
das Verhältniss der beiden Arten zu einander noch nicht zu schliessen.
[Inhalt]
11. Uronycteris 3 cephalotes (Pall.)
fem.,
a, b.
in Spiritus, Kema, Minahassa, Nord Celébes, 93 (69,
65 mm).
fem.,c.
in Spiritus, Makassar, Süd Celébes, IX 95 (67 mm).
J e n t i n k (NLM. 1883 V, 173) hat von einem adulten Männchen von

Amurang, Minahassa, bemerkt, dass es grösser sei als gewöhnlich,
nämlich (Vorderarm) 67 gegen 61 mm (2.4 inch.), was D o b s o n (Cat.
1878, 90) als constantes Maass adulter Exemplare aus dem
Ostindischen Archipel angiebt. Dann hat H i c k s o n (Nat. N. Cel. 1893,
84), dem wohl J e n t i n k s Bemerkung unbekannt geblieben ist, gesagt,
dass die Celébes-Exemplare längere Vorderarme hätten als die von
irgend einer anderen Localität, er giebt (p. 359) an: 63–76 für Manado
und 56–65 für Ternate, Ambon, Timorlaut, Cap York und die Admiralitäts
Inseln (?). Die Dresdner Exemplare von der Minahassa (66, 67),
Gorontalo (68) und Makassar (67) sind ebenfalls grösser, sie (4)
variiren, zusammen mit den 3 S a r a s i n schen, von 65–69; eins von
Siao misst sogar 75 (3 von der Nordosthalbinsel von Celébes, den
Inseln Manado tua und Talaut gestatten dieses Maass nicht zu
nehmen), eines von Ternate nur 56.
H i c k s o n knüpft an die grösseren Dimensionen der Exemplare von
Celébes die Vermuthung, „that the struggle for existence among bats is
so keen in Celebes, that only the extremely long-winged forms … have
been able to compete in the conditions of life“. Für Cephalotes peroni
(s. unten p. 9) aber zieht er für die angeblich geringeren Dimensionen
der Celébes-Exemplare dieselbe Schlussfolgerung.
Uronycteris cephalotes soll nach verschiedenen Quellen von Celébes

bis Morotai, Halmahéra, Gebeh, Ambon, Timorlaut, NW Neu Guinea
und Cap York zu Hause sein, während auf Misol, SO Neu Guinea,
Fergusson, Duke of York, Neu Irland und den Salomo Inseln U. major
(Dobs.) vorkäme, welche Art nach D o b s o n (Cat. 1878, 89) grösser
und heller ist als cephalotes, aber kürzere Ohren und längere
Nasenröhren hat, bei abweichendem Schädel und Zahnbau (PZS.
1877, 117 Abb.). Nun giebt D o b s o n den Vorderarm von major auf 78
mm (3.1 inch.) an, was dem Celébes-Maasse bis 76 bei cephalotes
(H i c k s o n ) und dem [9]von Siao mit 75 ganz nahe kommt. Wenn er
von major sagt: „upper canine with a prominent cusp“, von cephalotes
„with a blunt ill-defined external projection“ (s. auch Fig. 2 a und 3 a, l.
c.), so muss ich dazu bemerken, dass dies nicht durchgreifend ist, denn
ein Männchen von Amurang, Nord Celébes, im Dresdner Museum (Nr.
683) zeigt den major-Charakter, bei einer Vorderarmlänge von 66 mm.
Was die Färbung angeht, so sagt D o b s o n von der Unterseite von
cephalotes (Cat. 89): „dull yellowish white“ und von der von major (p.
90): „dull yellowish buff throughout“. Exemplare von cephalotes von
Tonkean (NO Celébes), Siao und Talaut im Dresdner Museum aber sind
keinenfalls dull yellowish white, soweit man derartige
Farbenbezeichnungen beurtheilen kann. Es giebt hellere und dunklere
Exemplare aus der Minahassa, die eben erwähnten von Tonkean etc.
aber sind eher „raw umber“ oder „tawny-olive“ (Ridgway Pl. III, 14 und
17), also auch nicht „dull yellowish buff“; auf der anderen Seite stimmt
ein mir vorliegendes Exemplar von major von Fergusson Is. in der
Farbe der Unterseite genau mit einem von cephalotes von Gorontalo in
Celébes, wenigstens wie letztere Art bis jetzt angesehen wurde. U.
cephalotes variirt, wie viele Arten in der Färbung je nach dem Alter,
worauf schon P e t e r s (Mb. Ak. Berlin 1867, 868) aufmerksam
gemacht hat.
Wenn ich nun auch nicht dahin neige, den Werth von major als
Subspecies anzuzweifeln, so ist doch, auch angesichts der bis jetzt
bekannten geographischen Verbreitung der beiden Formen, die
Sachlage unklar. Da die grosse U. major auf Misol vorkommen soll (Cat.
MPB. XII, 186) und auf Celébes nebst Siao eine Form, die etwas
grösser ist als die typische kleine cephalotes der dazwischen liegenden
Fundorte (Ternate, Halmahéra, Ambon), so müssten auch diese zwei
Formen von cephalotes einander und major subspecifisch coordinirt
werden. Allein das Material der Museen ist noch zu ungenügend, um
hier festen Fuss fassen zu können; dazu wären nicht nur viel mehr
Exemplare von den bereits bekannten Fundorten nöthig, sondern auch
solche von den zwischen Celébes und SO Neu Guinea liegenden
Gegenden, von denen noch Nichts bekannt ist. Erst dann wird man
urtheilen können, welcher Werth der U. major zukommt, und ob auch
das Celébes-Areal eine Subspecies beherbergt.
[Inhalt]
12. Cephalotes peroni Geoffr.
fem.,
a, b.
Bälge, Tomohon, Minahassa, Nord Celébes, 10. X 94
(117, 113 mm).
fem.,c.
in Spiritus, Tomohon (100 mm).
mas,d.in Spiritus, Kottabangon, Bolang Mongondo, Nord
Celébes, 2. XII 93 (116 mm).
fem.,e.in Spiritus, Buol, Nord Celébes, VIII 94 (95 mm).
Die Art findet sich von Celébes bis zu den Salomo Inseln. Auf Celébes
selbst ist sie vom Norden und Süden bekannt. Vom Norden von
Amurang 4 in der Minahassa und von Gorontalo (Mus. Leid.),
desgleichen und von Manado (Mus. Dresd.), wozu noch die obigen
S a r a s i n schen Fundorte kommen; vom Süden von Makassar (Mus.
Dresd.); auch J e n t i n k s Exemplar p (Cat. XII, 156) ist aus Süd
Celébes, da Te i j s m a n n 1877 in Süd Celébes (und Saleyer)
sammelte (s. NTNI. 1879, 54). Das Dresdner Museum hat die Art ferner
von Sangi und Talaut, von wo sie noch nicht registrirt war.
H i c k s o n (Nat. N. Cel. 1893, 85 und 359) sagt, dass die Exemplare

von Manado im Durchschnitte kürzere Vorderarme hätten als die aus
andern Theilen des Archipels, und zwar 104 mm von Manado gegen
103–151 von anderswo, allein er giebt weder an, wie viele Exemplare
von Manado er gemessen hat, noch ob sie adult waren; letzteres
bezweifle ich, da ein S a r a s i n sches (c) 117 und ein Dresdner von
Amurang 115 misst; seine Behauptung ist so ungenügend fundirt, dass
ihr keine Beweiskraft zukommt, und damit fällt auch die daran geknüpfte
Schlussfolgerung (vgl. oben bei Uronycteris cephalotes p. 8). Weit
entfernt eine an die Localität gebundene Differenz in den Maassen des
Vorderarms a priori in Abrede stellen zu wollen, so gehört doch, meine
ich, zu ihrer Constatirung eine ganz andere Grundlage.
D o b s o n beschrieb 1878 (PZS. 875) eine zweite Art der Gattung

Cephalotes, C. minor, von Amberbaki, Nordwest Neu Guinea und sagt,
sie sei halb so gross wie C. peroni, sonst gleich, nur mit weniger spitzen
Ohren und viel kleineren Füssen, auch setze die Flügelmembran an der
äusseren Zeh und tiefer an, und die Zähne seien „slightly different“. Das
Dresdner Museum besitzt ein s e h r grosses Exemplar [10](Balg) von
der Insel Mansinam bei Doré, Nordwest Neu Guinea, das den
angeführten Charakter der Flügelmembran exquisit aufweist, während
die anderen angegebenen Unterscheidungsmerkmale hier nicht
zutreffen; die ganze Länge (Kopf und Körper) ist c 225 mm, der
Vorderarm 148. Ferner ein kleines Exemplar von der Astrolabebai,
Südost Neu Guinea (in Spiritus), das ebenfalls den abweichenden
Flügelmembranansatz zeigt; ganze Länge c 100 mm, Vorderarm 70.
Dagegen ist ein Exemplar von der Insel Mysore in der Geelvinkbai in
dieser Beziehung typisch wie C. peroni und ebenso verhalten sich die
Exemplare von Ternate und Ambon. Dass die bis jetzt bekannten 3 Neu
Guinea Exemplare nur zufällig jenen unterscheidenden Charakter
aufweisen sollten, ist auszuschliessen; welche Bedeutung ihm aber, bei
den nicht stichhaltigen anderen von D o b s o n aufgeführten
Unterschieden, beizumessen ist, wird erst die Zukunft lehren.
[Inhalt]
13. Carponycteris australis (Ptrs.)
mas,a.in Spiritus, Kema, Minahassa, Nord Celébes, 21. VIII

93 (39 mm).
fem.,
b–e.dgl. (39 mm).
P e t e r s benannte (Mb. Ak. Berl. 1868, 13 Anm.) eine kleinere

Carponycteris-Art von Rockhampton, Ost Australien, gegenüber der
grösseren minima (Geoffr.), als var. australis und führte sie später (l. c.
p. 871) als Art auf mit dem Bemerken, dass es noch fraglich sei, ob
man es mit einer Art oder einer Localrasse zu thun habe (er sagt da,
irrthümlicherweise, von West Australien). D o b s o n (Cat. 1878, 96)
citirt zwar P e t e r s unter Macroglossus minimus, ignorirt aber australis
und giebt die Verbreitung von minima als von Darjeeling bis zu den
Philippinen, Nord und West Australien und Neu Irland; T h o m a s
dagegen (PZS. 1888, 476) nennt australis von den Salomo Inseln und
sagt, die Art unterscheide sich von minima auch durch das tief
gefurchte Rhinarium (die sonstigen Unterschiede im Gesichte, die
T h o m a s anführt, — Gesicht und Oberlippe kürzer — kann ich an
dem Dresdner Materiale nicht auffinden), und sie gehe bis zu den
Philippinen (1898 TZS. XIV, 385 führt er sie auch von Negros auf, und
M a t s c h i e Sb. ntw. Fr. Berl. 1898, 39 von Tablan), Mysol und Duke of
York; die Vorderarmlänge von minima (10 Ex.) sei 38–43 mm, die von 5
javanischen Exemplaren 45–48 (später hat T h o m a s noch eine Art:
crassa von den Fergusson Inseln beschrieben, die aber nicht kleiner ist
als minima, NZ. 1895, II, 163). B l a n f o r d , der T h o m a s auf einen
wesentlich unterscheidenden Charakter von australis aufmerksam
gemacht hat (PZS. 1888, 476 Anm.), sagt in seiner Fauna von Britisch
Indien (Mam. 1888, 265) noch, dass es nur éine Art Carponycteris
gäbe.
Über die Zugehörigkeit der Nord Celébes-Exemplare der Herren

S a r a s i n zu australis waltet für mich kein Zweifel ob. J e n t i n k führte
zwar (NLM. 1883 V, 174, 1888 XI, 29 und Cat. MPB. 1888 XII, 159)
minima von Nord Celébes auf, allein dies war, ehe T h o m a s die
Unterschiede von australis klar gelegt hatte. Das Maass der
Vorderarme mit 39 mm und das gefurchte Rhinarium weisen den
Celébes-Exemplaren ihre Stelle an. Das Dresdner Museum besitzt
australis ferner von Sangi (39 mm), Nordwest Neu Guinea (42), Aru
(38.5) und Murray Insel (38) — es sind hier in Parenthese immer nur die
Maximalmaasse angegeben —, die Vorderarme variiren also von 38–42
(T h o m a s 38–43), während die Exemplare von Java und Sumátra
(minima) von 44.5–46.5 (T h o m a s 45–48) variiren.
Bei dem noch so mangelhaften Materiale der Sammlungen lässt sich

heute nicht festlegen, wo die geographische Grenze zwischen C.
minima und der Subspecies australis zu ziehen sei, speciell Bórneo
steht noch aus, aber es scheint, dass die Festlandsform minima sich bis
Java erstreckt, und dass australis von den Philippinen und Celébes bis
zu den Salomo Inseln und Ost Australien verbreitet ist. [11]
1 Bei den Fledermäusen sind (in Parenthese) die Vorderarmmaasse angegeben, auf
die stets, als charakteristisch, Werth gelegt wurde; neuerdings machte J e n t i n k
(Webers Zool. Erg. I, 125 1891) noch besonders darauf aufmerksam, dass es besser
sei, dies Maass zur Beurtheilung des Alters des Individuums anzuführen, als die
Bezeichnungen adult, semiadult, juv. etc. Man darf dabei aber nicht übersehen, dass
ein exactes Messen des Vorderarms nur am Skelette möglich ist, wo man den Radius,
die Ulna und den Sesamknochen der Tricepssehne gesondert vor sich hat. Bei Bälgen
ist es schwer und oft gar nicht möglich, das proximale Ende der verkümmerten Ulna
zu tasten und es von dem Sesamknochen zu trennen. Auch bei Spiritusexemplaren ist
es nicht leicht. Das empfehlenswertheste Maass wäre das des Radius, der bei den
Fledermäusen so vorzüglich entwickelt ist, aber auch dies wäre an Bälgen und
Spiritusexemplaren oft schwer oder unmöglich exact zu nehmen, da man füglich
weder sein proximales noch sein distales Ende bei jedem Exemplare freilegen kann.
Es ist daher unter der „Länge des Vorderarms“ stets nur ein ungefähres Maass zu
verstehen, was aber auch für den vorliegenden Zweck genügt. ↑
2 Xantharpyia J. E. G r a y List spec. Mam. Br. M. 1843, 37: Cynonycteris P e t e r s
Reise Mossamb. I Säugeth. 1852, 25. Schon B l a n f o r d (Fauna Br. Ind. Mam.
1888, 261) und T h o m a s (PZS. 1894, 449 etc.) haben sich für Xantharpyia
entschieden. ↑
3 T h o m a s brauchte 1895 (NZ. II, 163) Uronycteris, statt des bis dahin üblichen
Gattungsnamens Harpyia und sagte anmerkungsweise: „Lydekker; replacing
Harpyia …, preoccupied“, allein, so viel ich sehe, that L y d e k k e r dies nicht. Er hat
(F l o w e r & L.: Intr. Mam. 1891, 654) Carponycteris für Macroglossus eingeführt, aber
gebraucht (p. 653) Harpyia, und T h o m a s selbst kehrte 1896 (NZ. III, 526) zu
Harpyia zurück. Uronycteris rührt von G r a y her (PZS. 1862, 262). Harpyia Ill. (Chir.)
stammt aus dem Jahr 1811, Harpyia Ochsh. (Lep.) aus dem J. 1810, dieser Name
muss daher für die Fledermausgattung Uronycteris Platz machen. ↑
4 Im Cat. MPB. XII, 156 (1888) ist zwar Ex. o als von Menado aufgeführt, allein es ist
nach J e n t i n k NLM. V, 170 und 174 (1883) von Amurang. ↑
[Inhalt]
Microchiroptera
Rhinolophidae
[Inhalt]
14. Rhinolophus minor Horsf.
mares,
a–c. in Spiritus, Kema, Minahassa, Nord Celébes, X
93 (41.5 — 41.5 — 40 mm).
fem.,d.in Spiritus, Kema, X 93 (42 mm).
Diese Art ist von Celébes noch nicht registrirt worden, Dr. R i e d e l
aber hatte sie schon im Jahr 1875 von Gorontalo nach Dresden
gesandt, und neuerdings kam sie auch von Talaut hierher (ein
Exemplar aus der Höhle von S. Mateo bei Manila ist vielleicht ein
wenig abweichend in der Form des Nasenbesatzes; minor ist sonst
von den Philippinen noch nicht aufgeführt). Dagegen ist die sehr
nahe stehende, grössere Rh. affinis Horsf. von J e n t i n k bereits
von Tondano, Nord Celébes, genannt worden (NLM. XI, 30 1888 und
Cat. MPB. XII, 162 1888), allerdings nur ein junges Weibchen. Nach
D o b s o n (Cat. 1878, 112 und 115) gehen beide Arten von
Vorderindien bis Bórneo. Bei diesem Parallelismus könnten beide
auch auf Celébes vorkommen, allein da J e n t i n k nur ein j u n g e s
Weibchen vorlag, so ist weiteres Material abzuwarten. P e t e r s gab
1872 (MB. Ak. Berl. 306) nur an, dass minor „ganz ähnlich affinis sei,
aber kleiner“ (den Fundort Timor bei minor glaubte er mit ?
bezeichnen zu müssen, J e n t i n k Cat. MPB. XII, 162 1888 aber
führte ihn wieder von daher auf). Es ist auch schwer, abgesehen von
der Grösse, durchgreifende Unterschiede aufzufinden, da minor
nach D o b s o n (Cat. 1878, 115) in Bezug auf die Sella, die
Interfemoralmembran und 2 pm inf. variirt. Die Grössenunterschiede
sind nach D o b s o n relativ ansehnlich, allein seine Maasse treffen
nach den Dresdner Exemplaren nicht überall zu. Das Verhältniss
dieser zwei Formen zu einander erfordert vielleicht eine gründliche
Untersuchung an reichem Materiale, wie es aber die Museen noch
nicht von überall her besitzen.
Die Färbung von minor ist nach D o b s o n (l. c. 114) hellbraun oben,
graubraun unten. Das erwähnte Exemplar von Gorontalo ist aber
„tawny“ (Ridgw. V 1) oben und „russet“ (III 16) unten, beide Nüancen
sogar noch lebhafter, allein da affinis in der Farbe variabel ist
(„greyish brown, reddish brown, golden orange brown“ D o b s o n l.
c. 112), so wird aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach auch minor in der
Farbe variiren.
Sonst ist von Celébes noch Rh. megaphyllus Gr. aufgeführt worden,
und zwar von Manado (D o b s o n l. c. 112) und Amurang,
Minahassa, letzteres in 3 Exemplaren (J e n t i n k NLM. V, 174 1883;
Cat. MPB. XII, 161 1888 1 Ex.), von wo auch das Dresdner Museum
2 Exemplare hat, die von P e t e r s als Rh. euryotis Temm. bestimmt
worden sind; ich halte sie aber, so weit Sicherheit bei ausgestopften
Exemplaren möglich ist, eher für megaphyllus. Diese Art ist affinis
(und daher auch minor) nahe verwandt, D o b s o n (Cat. 1878, 111)
sieht sie als australische Repräsentantin von affinis an, und führt
eine var. α von Batjan und eine var. β von Nord Celébes und Goram
auf. Eine genauere Kenntniss der Form von Celébes und den
Molukken liegt noch nicht vor. Rh. euryotis steht den genannten
Arten ebenfalls sehr nahe und ist bis jetzt von Ambon, Ceram, Aru
und Kei bekannt. Eine Revision der ganzen Gruppe ist erwünscht,
allein die Materialien der Museen genügen auch dazu schwerlich.
[Inhalt]
15. Hipposiderus diadema (Geoffr.)
fem.,
a, b.
in Spiritus, Buol, Nord Celébes, VIII 94 (82, 80 mm).
fem.,c.
in Spiritus, Kalaena Thal, Luhu, Central Celébes, c.
200 m hoch, 4. II 95 (86 mm).
J e n t i n k wies zuerst diese von Vorderindien bis zu den Philippinen

und den Salomo Inseln, also sehr weit verbreitete Art von [Süd]
Celébes und Sula nach (Cat. MPB. XII, 166 1888) und dann von
Central Celébes (Webers Zool. Erg. I, 127 1890). Ich erhielt sie 1871
in Gorontalo (Mus. Berlin), und das Dresdner Museum besitzt sie
seit 1877 von Amurang in der Minahassa, sie kommt also, wie zu
erwarten, über ganz Celébes vor. Auch von der Insel Kalao im
Süden ist sie im Dresdner Museum, sowie von Talaut im Norden. [12]
D o b s o n (Cat. 1878, 137) giebt das Vorderarm-Maass auf 86 mm

(3.4 inch.) an, was mit obigen Maassen der S a r a s i n schen
Exemplare mehr oder weniger stimmt, J e n t i n k hatte von Luhu
eins von 92 mm (Webers Zool. Erg. I, 127 1890); die Dresdner von
Celébes messen selbst bis 93, die von Java bis 87, von Nordwest
Bórneo bis 86, von Südost Mindanao bis 83, von Süd Neu Guinea
bis 77 mm etc. Nur an der Hand eines grossen Materiales wird man
überhaupt der Frage näher treten können, ob diese Art von
Vorderindien bis zu den Salomo Inseln gar nicht variirt, was an und
für sich wenig wahrscheinlich ist.
Es kommt noch eine zweite, kleinere, Art von Hipposiderus auf

Celébes vor, H. bicolor (Temm.). Dresden besitzt sie seit 1877 von
Amurang im Norden, und J e n t i n k hat sie 1883 (NLM. V, 174)
ebendaher aufgeführt, und zwar als D o b s o n s var. α (fulvus Gr.);
das Dresdner Exemplar aber hat nicht die schöne goldgelbe
Färbung von fulvus, sondern ist oben ungefähr „Prout’s brown“
(Ridgw. III, 11), unten weisslich „wood brown“ (III, 19), also typisch,
die Art variirt demnach in der Farbe wie Rhinolophus affinis und
andere. H i c k s o n (Nat. N. Cel. 1893, 85) sagt von den Exemplaren
der kleinen Insel Talisse im Norden von Celébes, dass sie röther
seien, als irgendwelche im Britischen und Leidener Museum, sie
werden es aber, glaube ich, auf Talisse nicht zu allen Zeiten und
nicht alle sein. 1890 führte J e n t i n k die Art auch von Süd Celébes
auf (Webers Zool. Erg. I, 127 1890) und meinte, dass die
Vorderarmlänge von 41 mm viel grösser sei, als D o b s o n sie
angegeben, allein dieser hat (Cat. 150) 39.37 mm (1.55 inch.), also
eine unbedeutende Differenz; das Dresdner Exemplar von Amurang
misst 39, zwei von Nord Luzon ergeben 38–39 mm.
[Inhalt]
Nycteridae
[Inhalt]
16. Megaderma spasma (L.)
fem.,a.in Spiritus, Tomohon, Minahassa, Nord Celébes,

13. IV 95 (53 mm).
Diese äthiopisch-orientalische Gattung erstreckt sich noch über

Celébes hinaus, bis Ternate. Von Celébes ist M. spasma schon
länger bekannt, allein genauere Fundorte wurden früher nicht
angegeben. Ich brachte sie von Gorontalo (Mus. Berl.), J e n t i n k
(NLM. V, 174 1883) hat sie von Amurang genannt, und (Cat. MPB.
XII, 170 1888) von Kema, das Dresdner Museum besitzt 3
Exemplare ebenfalls von Amurang in der Minahassa. Von Süd
Celébes scheint sie noch nicht gekommen zu sein. Ihre g a n z e
Verbreitung im Ostindischen Archipel von Hinterindien an ist noch
nicht bekannt.
Das S a r a s i n sche Weibchen von Nord Celébes hat einen

kleineren Vorderarm als D o b s o n im Allgemeinen angiebt (Cat.
1878, 158), 58 mm (2.3 inch.) gegen 53, und die drei anderen
Exemplare aus der Minahassa im Dresdner Museum messen auch
kaum mehr, die von Sumátra aber 57–59 mm.
[Inhalt]
Vespertilionidae
[Inhalt]
17. Vesperus pachypus (Temm.)
mas,a.in Spiritus, Kema, Minahassa, Nord Celébes, 93 (26

mm).
fem.,
b–m.dsgl. (25–27 mm).
Diese von Vorderindien bis zu den Philippinen und Java verbreitete

Art wurde zuerst von J e n t i n k (NLM. V, 175 1883, XI, 30 1888 u.
Cat. MPB. XII, 176 1888) von Amurang, Nord Celébes, aufgeführt,
mir liegt sie auch von der Insel Saleyer, im Süden, vor, während sie
von Bórneo noch nicht nachgewiesen ist.
P e t e r s (Mb. Ak. Berl. 1872, 705) hat von mir aus Luzon
mitgebrachte kleinere als meyeri abgetrennt, was D o b s o n (Cat.
1878, 208) jedoch nicht anerkannte. Ein mir von Mindanao
vorliegendes Exemplar ist ebenfalls in allen Dimensionen kleiner
(Vorderarm 24 mm), was aber besonders, gerade wie bei denen von
Luzon, „in Bezug auf den Kopf und Fuss auffallend“ ist (vgl.
P e t e r s ’ Maasse mit D o b s o n s ll. cc.). D o b s o n giebt für
pachypus die Vorderarmlänge auf 28 mm (1.1 inch.) an, drei
Saleyer-Exemplare messen 26–26.5. Ich möchte daher die
Identificirung D o b s o n s nicht ohne Weiteres als berechtigt
ansehen. [13]
[Inhalt]
18. Vesperugo petersi n. sp.
Tafel IV Fig. 2 (2⁄1 n. Gr.)
V. brunneus (Ridgway III, 5), alis nigris; auriculis parvis,

triangularibus, apice rotundatis, trago margine interno fere recto,
externo convexo, apice subacuto; alis malleolis affixis; cauda
apice extremo prominente; incisivo primo superiore bifido,
secundo paene ejusdem longitudinis, praemolari secundo 1
superiore bene evoluto et extrinsecus visibili; incisivorum
inferiorum tractu eodem quo mandibulae margines; pene
ossiculo armato.
Long. tot c. 90, antibr. 36.5 mm.
Habitatio: Celébes.
mas,a.
in Spiritus, Minahassa, Nord Celébes.
O b e r s e i t e vandykebraun, die Haare einfarbig, U n t e r s e i t e

etwas mehr rostfarben, die Haare an der Basis grau bis schwärzlich,
Fell sammetartig. F l u g h ä u t e schwarz, an der dorsalen und
ventralen Oberfläche nackt bis auf ein Dreieck zwischen den
Körperseiten und der proximalen Hälfte des Femur, und bis auf ein
ebensolches an der Schwanzbasis; am Knöchel angewachsen; die
Schenkelflughaut schliesst den Schwanz bis zum äussersten Glied
ein; S p o r n mit einem schmalen Hautläppchen am mittleren Drittel.
O h r e n innen sehr sparsam hellbräunlich behaart, Innen- und
Aussenrand convex, crus helicis lappig, Antitragus gut abgesetzt, 2
mm hinter dem Mundwinkel endend, Spitze abgerundet, T r a g u s
ziemlich gleich breit in seinem ganzen Verlauf, am inneren Rande
wenig concav, fast gerade, am äusseren convex, Zacken
angedeutet, Spitze schwach abgerundet. S c h n a u z e n d r ü s e n
gut entwickelt, schwach behaart, Nasenlöcher nach aussen offen,
innen vorgewölbt, dazwischen nicht vertieft.
i 1 sup. zweispitzig, i 2 einspitzig und kaum kürzer als die hintere

Zacke von i 1, auch im Querschnitt an der Basis i 1 nicht sehr viel
nachstehend; p 2 sup. innenständig, spitz, ⅔ so gross wie p 1 und
von aussen sichtbar, p 1 ein wenig von c abgerückt und halb so lang;
i 1–3 inf. dreilappig und in der Richtung des Kiefers stehend, nicht
übereinander greifend, i 3 durch ein kleines Diastema von i 2
getrennt und ein wenig quer gerückt (die linken unteren Incisiven
etwas verletzt); p 2 inf. mit der Spitze etwas nach aussen ausladend,
durch ein kleines Diastema von c getrennt und ⅔ so gross wie p 1,
dieser ⅔ so lang wie c.
Ein spitzer, 2.5 mm langer Stützknochen in der Ruthenspitze.
Maasse:
Kopf 17 mm
Körper 32
,,
Ohr 11 × 6.8
,,
Vorderer Ohrrand 7
,,
Tragus 5×2
,,
Humerus 24
,,
Vorderarm 36.5
,,
Dig. 1 mit Kralle 9
,,
2 (33 + 4?) 37
,, ,,
64.5
3 (35 + 12.5 + 10 + 7)
,, ,,
4 (34 + 12 + 8) 54
,, ,,
5 (32 + 7.5 + 5) 44.5
,, ,,
Femur 12
,,
Unterschenkel 15.5
,,
Fuss mit Krallen 8.5
,,
Sporn 18
,,
Schwanz 41
,,
Penis 9 2
,,
Ich widme diese Art dem Andenken meines hochverehrten Lehrers

und Freundes W i l h e l m P e t e r s , der sich bekanntlich um die
Förderung der Kenntnisse der Fledermäuse grosse Verdienste
erworben hat. So sagt D o b s o n (Cat. 1878 p. XXXV): „P e t e r s , to
whom we owe the first attempt to arrange scientifically many of the
genera of Chiroptera“, und: „At Berlin, through the great liberality of
Prof. P e t e r s , I had the privilege of inspecting the beautifully
executed series of unpublished plates representing the species of
Chiroptera in the collection of the Royal Zoological Museum.“ Leider
hat P e t e r s die von ihm vorbereitete Monographie dieser Ordnung
1883 unvollendet hinterlassen, allein ihre Veröffentlichung, auf den

A Companion To Motion Pictures and Public Value Mette Hjort Full Chapter

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A Companion to Motion Pictures and

Public Value Mette Hjort

Mette Hjort and Ted Nannicelli

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Cover image: © EschCollection/Getty Images

Part I Artistic and Aesthetic Value 23

Part II Moral Value/Ethical Value 107

Affects Their Value 148

Emotion and the Cultivation of Ethical Attention in

Part III Spiritual Value 209

Part IV Environmental/Ecological Value 279

14 From Content to Context (and Back Again): New Industrial

Part V Cultural, Social and Political Value 351

Part VI Cognitive, Educational, and

Part VII The Value of Health 509

Jamie Chambers is a lecturer in film and television at Edinburgh College of Art

Pietari Kaapa is a reader in media and communications at University of Warwick.

Paisley Livingston (BA, philosophy, Stanford University, PhD The Humanities

Glenn Parsons is an associate professor of philosophy at Ryerson University in

Carl Plantinga is Arthur H. De Kruyter chair of communication at Calvin Univer­

Anna Potter is an associate professor of creative industries at the University of the

Dr. Meryl Shriver-Rice is a media anthropologist and environmental archaeologist,

Robert Sinnerbrink is associate professor of philosophy at Macquarie University,

Mette Hjort and Ted Nannicelli

Background Context, Aims, and Approach

platforms. One of the benefits of a collaborative, multi-author project is the possibil­

devoid of instrumental value? What do we make of those many instances in which

filmmaking, and to Cameroonian Jean-Marie Teno’s tireless commitment to film­

well-being of a particular category of film practitioners. Within the context of a

difficult-to-measure longer-term effects of engaging with motion pictures over the

Explicating Key Concepts

possibility of overall goodness as an aggregate of the pleasures experienced by mul­

Collaborating with Torben Beck Jorgensen, Bozeman offers an inventory of public

Ted Nannicelli and Mette Hjort

11. Uronycteris 3 cephalotes (Pall.)

J e n t i n k (NLM. 1883 V, 173) hat von einem adulten Männchen von

Uronycteris cephalotes soll nach verschiedenen Quellen von Celébes

12. Cephalotes peroni Geoffr.

H i c k s o n (Nat. N. Cel. 1893, 85 und 359) sagt, dass die Exemplare

D o b s o n beschrieb 1878 (PZS. 875) eine zweite Art der Gattung

13. Carponycteris australis (Ptrs.)

mas,a.in Spiritus, Kema, Minahassa, Nord Celébes, 21. VIII

P e t e r s benannte (Mb. Ak. Berl. 1868, 13 Anm.) eine kleinere

Über die Zugehörigkeit der Nord Celébes-Exemplare der Herren

Bei dem noch so mangelhaften Materiale der Sammlungen lässt sich

14. Rhinolophus minor Horsf.

J e n t i n k wies zuerst diese von Vorderindien bis zu den Philippinen

D o b s o n (Cat. 1878, 137) giebt das Vorderarm-Maass auf 86 mm

Es kommt noch eine zweite, kleinere, Art von Hipposiderus auf

16. Megaderma spasma (L.)

fem.,a.in Spiritus, Tomohon, Minahassa, Nord Celébes,

Diese äthiopisch-orientalische Gattung erstreckt sich noch über

Das S a r a s i n sche Weibchen von Nord Celébes hat einen

17. Vesperus pachypus (Temm.)

mas,a.in Spiritus, Kema, Minahassa, Nord Celébes, 93 (26

Diese von Vorderindien bis zu den Philippinen und Java verbreitete

18. Vesperugo petersi n. sp.

Tafel IV Fig. 2 (​2⁄1 n. Gr.)

V. brunneus (Ridgway III, 5), alis nigris; auriculis parvis,

O b e r s e i t e vandykebraun, die Haare einfarbig, U n t e r s e i t e

i 1 sup. zweispitzig, i 2 einspitzig und kaum kürzer als die hintere

Ein spitzer, 2.5 mm langer Stützknochen in der Ruthenspitze.

Ich widme diese Art dem Andenken meines hochverehrten Lehrers

Carl Plantinga is Arthur H. De Kruyter chair of communication at Calvin Univer

platforms. One of the benefits of a collaborative, multi-author project is the possibil

filmmaking, and to Cameroonian Jean-Marie Teno’s tireless commitment to film

possibility of overall goodness as an aggregate of the pleasures experienced by mul

Tafel IV Fig. 2 (2⁄1 n. Gr.)